

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

TAKING THE LONG VIEW TOWARDS THE LONG WAR

Equipping General Purpose Force Leaders with Soft Power Tools for Irregular Warfare

By

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## *Preface*

My goal in writing this paper was to raise awareness within the Air Force, and hopefully the Joint community, of a specific group of Airmen and Soldiers whose mission effectiveness could be significantly enhanced through the application of a well thought out change to the personnel management and training systems. Development of a system that provides for focused and timely regional, cultural, negotiation and language training, can better prepare General Purpose Force Airmen for the challenges of daily interaction with host-nation personnel when performing duties on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Aviation Advisory Teams, and other extended, outside-the-wire, partner-nation capacity-building deployments. It is my hope that the Air Force will see that making a justifiable investment in a small number of key personnel will pay dividends in the Long War in which we are currently engaged. This investment will make our Airmen more effective in the capacity building missions that are the key to succeeding in Afghanistan and future Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations, which will shorten these engagements with a corresponding savings in lives and national treasure. Decisive steps to improve training and management would serve as a benchmark for the rest of the Department of Defense and perhaps for the Interagency at large.

I would like to sincerely thank my advisor, Dr. Stephen F. Burgess, for his time and assistance with this project. I would also like to thank the many colleagues, such as my fellow PRT commanders, who made time to be interviewed by me, and/or to research answers to my questions and send me the reference materials upon which this study is based. In particular I would like to recognize Mr. Jay Warwick from the AF Culture and Language Center, Maj Eric Larson, USAF Special Operations School, and Majors Anne-Marie Contreras and Matt Warner, from the Coalition Air Force Training Team. Their subject matter expertise and thoughtful insights resulted in significant contributions to this project, particularly in the area of intelligent and practical recommendations. I would like to thank Jo Anna Sellen for taking the time to give me an “interagency perspective” in an attempt to make this more readable for those outside the Department of Defense. Finally, thank you Dad for taking the time to go through this and once again give me the benefit of your experience and wisdom. Thank you all for your assistance, and I hope I was able to do justice to your ideas.

## *Biography*

Lieutenant Colonel Brad A. Bredenkamp is a student at the Air War College, Spaatz Center for Officer Education, Air University, located on Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Air War College is the Air Force's senior professional military education institution providing post-graduate senior leader development programs based on joint, multinational, interagency, warfighting, and international security operations, air and space force strategy development and national security planning. He is joined by 250 students representing all military services, the interagency, and 45 allied nations.

Lt Col Bredenkamp commanded the Mehtar Lam Provincial Reconstruction Team, in Laghman Province, Afghanistan, from April 2006 to April 2007. He then served as Chief of the Space and C4ISR Branch of the Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer Division for the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs in Washington, DC, prior to his selection for Air War College.

Before commanding a PRT, Lt Col Bredenkamp was an undergraduate pilot training instructor in the T-37B aircraft and an instructor and evaluator pilot in the E-3 AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System. He then served as Air Operations Officer and Chief of Regional Plans at Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF West), in US Pacific Command at Alameda California and Camp Smith, Hawaii. While at JIATF West he was responsible for the development, review, and execution of strategic and operational plans for counter-drug training, intelligence fusion, and detection and monitoring (D&M) operations to support the National Drug Control Strategy and build partner nation counterdrug enforcement capacity in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

Lt Col Bredenkamp graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1989 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering, and completed Undergraduate Pilot Training at Vance AFB, in Enid, Oklahoma in September of 1990. He has a Masters Degree in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle University and is a distinguished graduate of both the Air Force Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College. He is also a 2004 graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College's Joint Intermediate Warfighting School. Lt Col Bredenkamp is a command pilot with over 4,000 hours of flying time in the T-37, T-38, and E-3.

## *Abstract*

Senior American military and civilian leaders agree that military action alone will not produce victory in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the broader Global War on Terror (GWOT). Despite this acknowledgement and calls by Defense Secretary Robert Gates to increase funding for the State Department and other civilian agencies; interagency capacity to mentor in the areas of governance, justice, economic development, reconstruction, and security sector reform remains inadequate. Military support for these missions in non-permissive environments is essential.

In a recent interview in *Foreign Policy* magazine, General David Petraeus, reiterated his assessment that “Afghanistan will be the longest campaign of the long war.”<sup>1</sup> Last fall the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members of their staffs testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the war is a long one, that we need “...more Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” (PRTs) that “...better language and cultural skills are crucial,” and something “...we need to get better at.”<sup>2</sup>

This paper addresses shortfalls in non-kinetic skills among the General Purpose Force Airmen performing non-traditional missions to build partner nation capacity. It examines options, consistent with existing guidance, to improve training and management of key personnel performing these missions, and the benefits of proposed changes to both the Air Force and the mission. Recommendations include: early identification of key personnel; creation of an Air Force training wing to which key personnel PCS for the duration of training and deployment; development of a comprehensive program of language, cultural, regional, negotiation, and irregular warfare training; and using such tours as an on-ramp to regional specialist careers.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*USN & USAF PRT leaders are FUNDAMENTALLY NOT prepared to be “capacity building” or “developmental officers.”*

JCIFSA (Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance)  
Afghanistan Advisor PRT Training Workshop  
Summary Recommendations – August 2008

In February 2006, I was in training at Ft. Bragg in the first generation of Air Force and Navy officers deployed to command Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. During that time an Army Civil Affairs (CA) officer criticized the decision to send us, suggesting that we didn't know anything about civil affairs and the job should be left to the CA “experts.” This criticism has subsequently been repeated by other CA officers as well as civilians from the interagency community. The epigraph above was included in the Summary Recommendations briefing from the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCIFSA)-sponsored Afghanistan Advisor and PRT Training Workshop, held at Ft Leavenworth on 26-27 August 2008. The military is going to continue to be involved in these operations, which fall under the broader category of Irregular Warfare (IW), because the interagency community by itself cannot conduct them in high-threat, non-, or semi-permissive environments. General Purpose Force (GPF) Airmen and Sailors are going to remain involved in them because the Army, Marines, and Special Operations community cannot support them on the scale that is presently required. The number of capacity building missions involving non-SOF Airmen is growing, so the question

that needs to be asked is not “should they be doing it?” but “how can we prepare them to do it successfully?”

“The Interagency” is a term used to encompass all of the agencies and departments of the U.S. government, in the way “Joint” encompasses the branches of the military. It applies to one or more of these non- military organizations operating in conjunction with the Department of Defense, or two or more operating together.

The opening comment above was relayed to a senior Pentagon officer visiting Air War College in the fall of 2008, who seemed surprised. It was evident that such specific criticisms have not made it to high levels of the Department of Defense. When asked about the comment and plans to address it, the reply was that the officers selected to command PRTs were carefully selected, and that they had not reported any difficulties in running their PRTs. However, in the most recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Defense Secretary Robert Gates indicated an awareness that the DoD may not be doing all it can to effectively wage Irregular Warfare (IW) when he stated: “My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today’s wars and some of their likely successors.”<sup>3</sup> He then touts the creation of the air advisory program and the need for “small wars capabilities” even in major operations.<sup>4</sup>

What capabilities *do* we need to win these wars? On September 10<sup>th</sup>, 2008, Secretary Gates testified to the House Armed Service Committee that in Afghanistan “More maneuver forces are required, as well as aviation assets, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and mentors for the Afghan Army.”<sup>5</sup> General David Petraeus, new commander of US Central Command, made similar comments in a recent interview with *Foreign Policy* magazine. “...you’ve always got to be thinking not just about the conventional forms of combat...but also about the stability and

support component. Otherwise, successes in conventional combat may be undermined by unpreparedness for the operations often required in their wake.”<sup>6</sup>

In truth, while PRT commanders and their teams, have done tremendous work, the preparation of key PRT leaders has been lacking in several areas that, if corrected, could set future teams up to be much more effective and successful in stability operations than those who have already served or are currently deployed. These include areas such as: language training, regional cultural education, counterinsurgency theory, civil affairs doctrine, and negotiation skills.

Aviation Advisors serving on the Coalition Air Force Training Team (CAFTT) in Iraq, and the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF) in Afghanistan, are another group whose mission effectiveness could benefit significantly from an improvement in pre-deployment training. Indeed, an argument can be made that any Airman deploying to work face-to-face with members of a foreign nation on a daily basis, may perform more effectively if he or she is capable of communicating with the foreign national, and of understanding the cultural history that underpins their perspective and customs.

The missions discussed above have traditionally been performed by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and fall into categories such as Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, and Building Partner Capacity.<sup>7</sup> However, demands on the SOF community in the GWOT have necessitated the use of General Purpose Forces (GPF) for the PRT and Aviation Advisor missions due to the large scale of both endeavors. Additionally, the deployment strain on the Army and Marine Corps led the Secretary of Defense to solicit support for the PRT program from the Air Force and Navy beginning in 2005. As a condition of participation, the CSAF and CNO mandated that their own officers command the PRTs in which their Airmen and Sailors

were serving.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, GPF do not come to the table with the years of experience or the benefit of the training resources that are readily available to the SOF community.

When preparing officers for attaché duty abroad, the Department of Defense invests a great deal of time and money, sometimes as much as two years, in language and other professional training to ensure an officer is prepared for his or her two to three-year assignment. Such a program may be viewed as unreasonable for assignments that are likely to be only 9-15 months in duration. However, there should be an investment in enough language training to reach a functional capability, along with cultural, regional and professional studies relevant to the deployment. (Language proficiency levels will be discussed in chapter 3.) Such training would take place prior to the combat skills training block that is provided immediately before deployment.

In order to maintain a manageable focus within this relatively short paper, the author will examine existing policy and feedback related to PRT key personnel (which under the current structure, nominally include 5 AF and 3 Army personnel, out of the roughly 50-100 personnel that make up a typical PRT), Aviation Advisors (CAFTT and CAPTF) and Air Staff advisors/mentors within the U.S. Air Force. The intent is to identify shortfalls, if any, in the training and management of the service members involved, the impacts thereof, and recommend ways to improve the process to yield better long-term unit and mission effectiveness. This research will not address the combat skills training (CST) that teaches Airmen to shoot, move and communicate as part of a joint unit. That training is quite adequate, in the author's opinion; and already subject to a great deal of review and oversight by competent Air Force agencies. In the interest of brevity, PRT and Aviation Advisor deployments, between 270 and 365 days in

length, will be referred to collectively, using the AFDD 2-3 term, as BPC (Building Partner Capacity) tours, since that is their primary mission.<sup>9</sup>

Through the course of this research this paper will attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What training shortfalls have been identified? By whom? What is the impact?
2. What training is currently mandated at the DoD and USAF levels for GPF deploying on extended BPC tours? How can we adjust the current USAF strategy to address identified shortfalls?
3. What resources are out there that could be leveraged to improve the process? What is the proposed curriculum? Can it be standardized overall or at least by mission?
4. What challenges do current personnel management policies present to preparing for the long war?
5. Is there a better way to manage personnel identified for extended deployments in order to reduce the impact on the losing units as well as the individual?

The answers to these questions will shape a recommendation to improve the existing processes and programs, and demonstrate the viability of the proposal and its benefit to the Air Force. Because the joint and interagency communities are involved in these or similar missions, it is assumed that the findings and recommendations of this research could be applicable to them as well.

## Chapter 2

### Scoping the problem – Skill Deficits and Impact

*The Air Force will be increasingly called on to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and non-governmental partners, and deal directly with local populations. This will put a premium on foreign language and cultural expertise.*

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates  
Air War College, April 21, 2008

#### The Shortfall

In December 2006, a U.S. soldier in Afghanistan was killed in by an IED in the wake of a major military operation to improve security for the citizens in the province. A week prior to that incident in the same province, a U.S. airstrike targeted at an insurgent leader had allegedly killed four women and girls in a remote village. (It was later proven that the strike was successful.) Coalition leaders wanted the governor of the province to denounce the attack on the radio, but in the wake of the public outcry against the airstrike, the governor was reluctant to publically support the coalition. Tensions between the Coalition leadership and the governor escalated. The local PRT commander attempted to address the issue with the governor, but the newly arrived interpreter's proficiency was lacking so the commander and the governor were unable to communicate effectively. The PRT Political Officer from the State Department had independently studied Dari during almost two years in Afghanistan. His command of that language helped him to work the issue out one-on-one with the governor.<sup>10</sup>

In the fall of 2007, a newly arrived Aviation Advisor was assigned to fly with a Category C Iraqi helicopter pilot. (Category C students are supposed to fly only with Category A Iraqi instructor pilots, due to their lack of English language skills.) The Air Force instructor had no Arabic training, and there was no room for an interpreter on the aircraft. Initially, the Iraqi mismanaged the throttle during engine start, and the instructor shut the engine down, attempted to explain the correct procedure, and called for a restart. During the restart, when the instructor was distracted by a radio call, the student again mis-applied the throttle, resulting in an engine overspeed, damage to the engine, and an aborted mission.<sup>11</sup> The silver lining in this story is that the mishap occurred on the ground and no one was hurt. Procedural mistakes in scheduling notwithstanding, lack of a common language between instructor and student was a causal factor in this incident.

The examples above illustrate the dangers, to both life and mission, of not being able to communicate with foreign partners in a high-risk environment. These are not isolated incidents. Numerous PRT commanders, their staff members, Aviation Advisors, and USG civilians, have experienced similar incidents in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The tendency is to try to compensate for lack of language skills with interpreters, but the reality is that many units lack enough interpreters, and often those they do have are either not trustworthy, or just not proficient enough for the task.

Both military and civilian leaders at the highest levels of the U.S. government have stated that the United States is involved in a “Global Struggle” or “the Long War.”<sup>12</sup> “The Long War” is a term first used in 2003 by Heritage Foundation fellow James Carafano in an article entitled “The Long War Against Terrorism.”<sup>13</sup> Many Air Force PRT commanders, instructors at the Air University and AFSOC, and even General officers, have agreed that the non-combat skills

training provided for Irregular Warfare (IW) and/or Security/Stability/Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) is insufficient. In numerous conversations with and briefings from such individuals I have heard it referred to as “ad-hoc,” “just-in-time,” “disorganized,” and “inadequate.” These comments are not directed at just the six Air Force-led PRTs in Afghanistan. They apply to any mission that involves U.S. Government personnel deploying to an unstable region to work face to face with the indigenous population and build partner capacity for any length of time. Affected individuals include Provincial Reconstruction Team commanders and key team personnel, Interagency Foreign Service and Field Officers (from DoS, USAID, USDA, etc.), Civil Affairs Team leaders, CAFTT and CAPTF members, and Embedded, Police, and Military Training Team (ETT, PTT, MTT) leaders.

Why is this important? The individuals identified above are assigned to work face-to-face on a daily basis with foreign nationals for an extended period of time. Success in such an endeavor is highly dependent on establishing sincere relationships with foreign counterparts and two key components are the ability to communicate and to understand and respect cultural differences. This situation is addressed by Col T. X. Hammes, a retired Marine infantry and intelligence officer who spent much of his 29 years of service studying and participating in irregular warfare.<sup>14</sup> He states: “The lack of cultural awareness and language capabilities in coalition forces adversely impacts our ability to pacify Iraq. The lack of language skills means coalition personnel are isolated from the Iraqis even when they are surrounded by them.”<sup>15</sup> The just-released *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* directly addresses this issue:

...increased emphasis on security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities implies even more extensive contact and interaction with indigenous agencies and populations than does combat. Effective multinational cooperation...likewise relies heavily on cultural awareness on proficiency in foreign languages.<sup>16</sup>

Are service members receiving the training that they need not just to succeed, but to excel on extended deployments where they will interface regularly with host-nation officers and officials? Numerous reports from the field indicate the answer is no. If that is the case, what are the training shortfalls that are causing key, small-unit leaders to deploy without necessary skills for BPC? What is the impact of this shortfall on mission effectiveness?

### **Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Language training appears to be the most glaring deficiency in pre-deployment training for GPF and Interagency personnel deploying to conduct stability operations. Currently there is a heavy reliance on interpreters since none of the subjects of this study have been receiving more than a week of cultural orientation (culture, religious issues, history, and ethnic “human terrain”). Language training for PRTs began in 2006 with the inclusion of an interpreter assigned to each team for the latter part of the training. However, the lack of formal training materials, coupled with a busy combat skills training schedule, left little time to learn more than a few phrases. In 2007, 28 hours of Rosetta Stone training in a computer lab was added.<sup>17</sup> However, PRT commanders deployed from March 2007 – March 2008 reported as a group that their language training was inadequate and poorly scheduled since it had to be worked into the holes in the Combat Skills Training at Fort Bragg. The four of five USAF PRT commanders who responded to inquiries were unanimous that a working knowledge of the language would have been extremely helpful and recommended dedicated block training or immersion.<sup>18</sup> In the same messages, several also recommended a one-week introduction to counterinsurgency theory course of the type taught at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and the USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS).

Five of the six PRT commanders in the third generation of Air Force PRTs deployed from February to November 2008, responded to the author's request for assessment. All five described their language training as inadequate. They had instructors, in addition to the computer-based training, but lacked a syllabus and the instructors were not consistently assigned. As a result there was no consistency or building block approach to the training, which once again was haphazardly scheduled.<sup>19</sup> The scheduling problems are not due to lack of interest on the part of the trainers, but a result of myriad other, mandatory, training requirements that must be accomplished at Ft. Bragg before the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen may be certified to deploy. Many of these other events also face daylight and range availability constraints. Lacking a syllabus, or any clear goal on the level of language proficiency desired, it is to be expected that it receives low priority on the schedule. To be fair, the 189<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade at Ft. Bragg has done a remarkable job within the time and resource constraints they are under. Providing key PRT personnel with specialized training ahead of time will better-prepare them to partner with the 189th in the training of the full teams, and allow them to focus their time more effectively on combat skills training and other unit collective tasks.

The opinion of language training and its importance however, is not limited to a handful of officers. From September 2007 through March 2008, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted more than 94 surveys and interviews with recent and current members of PRTs from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those respondents, 69 percent rated their language training, which ranged from one hour to one week, as insufficient.<sup>20</sup>

On 11-12 March 2008, an interagency PRT Lessons Learned Workshop was held in Gettysburg, PA. Hosted by the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 Best Practices and Lessons Learned Working Group, led by representatives from OSD-Policy. It was

attended by about 80 representatives of military and interagency lessons learned organizations and about a dozen PRT alumni from across DoD and the interagency. Lessons identified by this group included the following:

1. Build sufficient time into civilian and military rotations for appropriate training (including language and subject-matter training as necessary) and post-deployment activities (such as lessons learned collection) to maximize the effectiveness of personnel in current mission and improve future operations.
2. Use COIN academies in both theaters for training during deployments.
3. Ensure PRT pre-deployment training includes:
  - Cultural training – understanding of local/provincial groups
  - Language training and also how to work with interpreters.
  - Counterinsurgency and stabilization & reconstruction theory<sup>21</sup>

Despite these recommendations, a State Department colleague who recently deployed to Iraq to lead an embedded PRT reported that the three weeks of training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), in the summer of 2008, included a mere *two hours* of Arabic.<sup>22</sup> The military side has shown *some* improvement. The most recent group of PRT senior leaders (Commanders, CA team leaders, First Sergeants, and Civil Engineers) to deploy to Afghanistan in October of 2008 attended Dari or Pashto immersion courses at the University of Indiana. However, the course that could have been a month or more was limited to just 12 days, and initial reports (before deployment) from some of the attendees were that it was “only introductory,” “I have no proficiency,” and “Once Combat Skills Training starts there is no time to get deeper into it.”<sup>23</sup> One PRT was actually given training in Dari when the predominant language in their assigned province is Pashto, even though this issue was pointed out two months ahead of time in a VTC.<sup>24</sup>

Lack of language skill is a problem because of a lack of enabling personnel. PRTs were originally supposed to be supported with four (4) category 2 or higher interpreters.<sup>25</sup> A category 2 interpreter is a native of the host country who has immigrated to the United States, lived there long enough to become a citizen, and been approved for a SECRET security clearance. A

category 3 has a security clearance higher than SECRET.<sup>26</sup> Category 1 interpreters are English-speaking local nationals who are hired from the host-nation population to work with the unit. They have no security clearance and there are restrictions on their freedom of movement, use of cell phones, and attendance at sensitive meetings. The problem arises when units have only 1 or 2 cat 2 interpreters, who may or may not have particularly strong skills themselves or limited vocabularies due to the length of time they have been in the U.S. This was another concern identified in the HASC O&I survey which reported that "...quality was inconsistent," "...only a few were well qualified and trustworthy," and "...missions were delayed or documents were not translated," as a result.<sup>27</sup>

Language is not the only area in which there are training deficiencies. Understanding Civil Affairs (CA) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and application are critical as these two missions underpin everything the PRTs do. However, these are subjects in which personnel can attain a working knowledge of the theory in a relatively short time, if taught in a formal course. These subjects will be addressed again in chapter four.

### **Aviation Advisors**

PRTs are not the only units suffering from a lack of language or other training. AF/A9L, the Air Force Lessons Learned (L2) office, has identified Aviation Advisors (AAs) as another group needing more training. In a September 2008 L2 report entitled *Airpower in Irregular Warfare*, AAs are identified as "...a critical piece of BPC because they contribute to winning the Long War."<sup>28</sup> It further states that "AA education and training should be institutionalized within the USAF," and identifies USAFSOS as an excellent source of education for preparing not only SOF, but GPF personnel to conduct IW and BPC.<sup>29</sup>

Some of the shortfalls in IW education and language training identified by L2 are echoed by officers who have served, or are currently serving on CAFTT in Iraq. The author interviewed four Air Force officers who either have served or are currently in the CAFTT program, as instructor pilots and in some cases as mentors to general officers on the Iraqi Air Staff. All four noted that lack of language training was a limiting factor. Comments included: "...the training we receive...doesn't' really address the true issue of advisors in Iraq – the ability to speak the language...;" "I would have liked far more language training;" "To really do this right we should be speaking their language;" and "The ability to speak and understand Arabic would be a huge force multiplier."<sup>30</sup> The anecdotes at the beginning of this chapter are just two examples of the negative consequences of inability to communicate.

The Air Advisor Course for CAFTT and CAPTF officers is currently four weeks in length and includes approximately six hours of classroom instruction in COIN and Aviation FID, eleven hours of culture-related topics, a four and one-half hour block of negotiation, and thirty hours of instruction in Dari or Arabic, as appropriate.<sup>31</sup> Thirty hours of instructor-led study is what is assessed as the requirement for an individual to achieve enough competence to continue with self-learning for a level 1 language such as French or Spanish. However, Arabic is level four language, assessed to require sixty hours to achieve the same proficiency.<sup>32</sup> Dari is a level 3 and so will require almost as much.

While better than the language training afforded the PRT members, this halfway approach to building language competency is still judged as ineffective by a number of officers serving on the CAFTT in Iraq. Criticisms included a very high student to instructor ratio, and a focus on very basic introductory phrases for social pleasantries, instead of addressing technical terms and aviation-related language useful for explaining lessons or ensuring safety of flight.<sup>33</sup> According

to one officer nearing the end of his tour, “The inability for Iraqis to comprehend Americans and vice versa is hands-down the number one LIMFAC in our interaction with one another.”<sup>34</sup> The ability to communicate technical concepts and tactics is seen as a key component of an effective advisor program.

## **Summary**

Mr. Joseph McDade, Jr. is the Director of Force Development under the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Manpower and Personnel and has been designated as the Senior Language Authority (SLA) for the Air Force. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 10 September 2008, he noted the following findings from a soon-to-be published RAND study entitled *Cross-Cultural Skills for Deployed Air Force Personnel: Defining Cross-Cultural Performance*.

1. Most Airmen surveyed believed that cultural and regional education and training were important.
2. A minority of Airmen believed that language skills would have significantly improved or helped them perform their job better in the deployed environment.<sup>35</sup>

These findings are from a survey of over 6,000 recently deployed Airmen on the impact of 14 categories of cultural behavior required in a deployed environment. The current Air Force program for Cultural, Regional, and Language competency was developed concurrently with the RAND study, based on OSD, JCS and CSAF guidance, and is consistent with the two findings above.<sup>36</sup> The study also validates the Air Force’s assessment that training needs to encompass regional, cultural and negotiation training in addition to language.<sup>37</sup>

It should be noted that the RAND study needs to be reviewed to clarify how many of the surveyed population were deployed to main operating bases where they worked primarily “inside the wire,” in offices, services, maintenance, supply, etc., versus “outside the wire” performing

the BPC missions that are the subject of this study. Unfortunately, although the study was completed in late 2007, the final report has not yet been published and so could not be reviewed for this paper. However, the tone of the comments in Mr. McDade's testimony raises the question of whether RAND even makes that distinction. The vast majority of all deployed Air Force personnel currently fall into the former category, and have very limited contact with the indigenous population in any formal capacity. Even on a PRT, the number of people who have a high level of direct interaction, warranting language proficiency is relatively small, perhaps as few as eight personnel, who will be identified in more detail in section four. That said, point number two above should not be misconstrued as an indication that language skill is not important, merely that the key personnel that are the focus of this paper and do need it are a minority of the deployed force.

In summary, the author received feedback from thirteen of seventeen graduated Air Force PRT commanders, and three of the six currently deployed. He also interviewed four field grade officers from the CAFTT in Iraq. Every single respondent stated that language training was inadequate in general, and most felt that taking it seriously would yield significant dividends in mission effectiveness. More formally, two Air Force Lessons Learned reports, one report from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), two interagency Lessons Learned workshops, and an independent survey by the HASC O&I subcommittee *all* identified language training as an area that needs improvement. Given that, it is time to examine options to remedy the situation.

## Chapter 3

### Training – Mandated vs. Desirable

*Executing IW campaigns will increasingly require GPF to perform missions that in the last few decades have been viewed primarily as SOF activities. Rebalancing GPF to conduct IW will expand joint force operational reach and enhance GPF versatility. GPF personnel will receive cultural and language training for the operational areas to which they deploy.*

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept  
11 September 2007

#### Where we are now

In response to the wealth of surveys and reports that have identified capability gaps and training shortfalls, direction has been given by senior leadership to fix the problem. In 2006 the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* stated that the DoD "...must dramatically increase the number of personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from the strategic to the tactical."<sup>38</sup> At this point, it is important to emphasize that the QDR uses the word *proficient* versus *familiar with*.

The reaction by the Chief of Staff at the time was to declare that the Air Force should implement language and culture training in Professional Military Education at all levels. In a 2006 *Letter to Airmen* he stated: "We can re-energize and re-focus our professional military education efforts into providing the necessary warfighting skills we see for the future - to include much more robust, regional and cultural understanding and foreign language skills."<sup>39</sup>

One of the first reactions to this guidance was an experiment with language “familiarization” programs in various forms across Air University schools at Maxwell AFB starting with the 2006-2007 Academic Year (AY-07). Three different programs were tried at the three tiers of officer PME. In November of 2007 the Air Force held a Language Summit at Maxwell AFB, to assess the initial results. It was attended by language experts from Air Force A1D (Force Development), the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Air University (AU), the USAF Special Operations School (USAFSOS), and the Air Force Academy (USafa). They provided much of the following assessment and reached some additional conclusions about “language for all.”<sup>40</sup>

The Squadron Officer’s College (SOC) instituted a voluntary program for lieutenants and captains, involving the issuance of language software licenses to those who wanted to learn a language on their own using the Rosetta Stone software.<sup>41</sup> (This is a voluntary, distance-learning program, since the SOC courses are only five (SOS) and six (ASBC) weeks long.) Over a 15-month period, 2667 total SOC students signed up for licenses. Of this total, only 67 students (2.5%) completed 50 or more hours. Completion rates for more difficult languages (such as Chinese) were particularly low, with the majority of students completing only 2 of 19 units.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, students were asked to take a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) once they completed the Rosetta Stone course. Of the first 920 students, only 10 returned a DLPT score and most of those were 0+, meaning they could recognize and recite a few memorized phrases.<sup>43</sup>

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) used a mandatory program in which students were required to complete an assigned amount of language software modules in one of four strategic languages (French, Spanish, Arabic, or Chinese) as a graduation requirement. Students were

given the Defense Language Aptitude Battery Test (DLAB) at the beginning of the academic year to determine which language each would study.<sup>44</sup> However, language was self-study outside of normal academic hours; few students availed themselves of the DLIFLC MTT available next door at the Air War College and most showed little motivation to pursue the computer-based learning.<sup>45</sup> The summary of the ACSC program was that scores on voluntary oral examinations were low and “the desired proficiency ratings were not met.”<sup>46</sup>

The Air War College (AWC) language program mandated the use of DLI software (not Rosetta Stone) in conjunction with video MP3 players, and face-to-face mediated instruction by DLI instructors.<sup>47</sup> The MP3-based software was poorly received, similarly to the software-based approach at ACSC, but the face-to-face time with the instructors was rated very highly.<sup>48</sup> However, in the 2009 academic year, the AWC language program is receiving numerous complaints. First, languages are not based on a DLAB score, or on prior language experience, but loosely tied to the area each student is slated to visit on a regional-cultural studies field trip as opposed to likely future regional-cultural assignment areas. Second, languages are limited to the previously identified four strategic languages and Russian. Some areas have a predominant language that is not being taught, such as German or Japanese, while students travelling to the Ukraine and central European nations are actively discouraged from attempting to speak the Russian they are mandated to learn in school. Finally, the language program is mandatory, but ungraded, and with an already-full load of other coursework, reading and research, many students make a conscious decision not to expend time or effort on the language program.<sup>49</sup>

The Air Force Academy requires language education, but only two semesters for individuals in technical majors and four for those majoring in non-technical disciplines. Additionally, AFROTC cadets accepting scholarships since 2006 must now complete four semesters of

language training if not enrolled in a technical major.<sup>50</sup> This is an admirable effort, but unless the Air Force implements a means of tracking this language training, there is no evidence that it will be factored into an active duty assignment in a region where the language is spoken, or used to track someone into the RAS career field. College or PME experience in Chinese will be of limited value to an officer serving on a PRT or as an Air Staff Mentor in Iraq or Afghanistan, just as a PhD in African Studies is useless during a remote to Korea.<sup>51</sup>

### **Where we need to go**

With a general consensus that the Air Force attempt at service-wide familiarization has been a failure, let us examine the rest of the guidance that has influenced or flowed from the 2006 QDR, and which should be guiding USAF policy. In January 2005, a year prior to the QDR, DoD published the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*. This document established four goals for language transformation that included:

1. Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.
2. Create the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.
3. Establish a cadre of language specialists possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (reading/listening/speaking ability).
4. Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).<sup>52</sup>

Pursuant to goal number three were the following remarks: “A higher level of language skill and greater language capacity is needed to build the internal relationships required for coalition/multi-national operations, peacekeeping, and civil/military affairs.” One of the required actions in support of this goal was to “Identify tasks and missions that will require 3/3/3 and determine the minimum number of personnel needed to provide the language services. Based on planning guidance the DoD Components will identify each billet that should be filled

by a language professional and the proficiency required for that billet.”<sup>53</sup> However, GPF-manned PRTs and Aviation Advisor units were not yet on the radar to be assessed.

Later in 2005, DoDD 5160-41E, *Defense Language Program*, directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to: “Organize, train and equip a level of language professionals and personnel with regional expertise...to meet operational requirements...” and to “Ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, all military units deploying to or transiting foreign territories have an appropriate capability to communicate in the languages of the territories of deployment or transit and provide appropriate cultural awareness training, basic language familiarization, and language aid...”<sup>54</sup>

CJCSI 3126.01, Language and Regional Expertise Planning, “...provides policy and procedural guidance that supports the SecDef Language Transformation Roadmap...” and “...provides comprehensive guidance and procedures to COCOMs for identifying foreign language and regional expertise requirements....”<sup>55</sup> One of its stated goals is to “Obtain warfighter requirements for foreign language and regional expertise capabilities to support language transformation.”<sup>56</sup> The “Background” section of the CJCS Instruction states:

Language skills and regional expertise are critical “warfighting skills” that are integral to joint operations. Lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) prove that this force-multiplying capability can save lives and ensure mission accomplishment throughout confrontation, conflict, and stabilization operations...Planners must plan for and prioritize their foreign language and regional expertise requirements to ensure that combat forces deploy with the essential ability to understand and effectively communicate with native populations, local and government officials, and Coalition partners when in theater.<sup>57</sup>

Pursuant to this statement, the Instruction identifies Language and Regional Expertise Capabilities. It defines the terms “Language Professional,” “Language Skilled,” and “Regional Expertise,” and then uses the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale for language

proficiency and provides a table with descriptions and criteria for regional expertise proficiency levels from 0 to 5.<sup>58</sup> (ILR skill level definitions for levels 0-3 in reading, listening and speaking are included in Appendix A.<sup>59</sup>) It also lists duties and missions that require language and regional expertise. (These tables are included in Appendix B.) The subsection entitled “Additional Language Skills” lists the following functions whose execution could be enhanced by language expertise:

- a. Information Operations and Psychological Operations (S). The act of transmitting information or make public an activity to persuade or change the outcome or views in a given environment can be accomplished by means of television, radio, web, print, or loudspeaker.
- b. Diplomatic (P). The act of conducting negotiations or establishing relations with foreign nationals by means of face-to-face interaction, or document exchanges.
- c. Liaison (L). The act of establishing and maintaining mutual understanding and cooperation with a military or civilian body.
- d. Advisory (Z). The act of providing information and/or consultation to influence an outcome.
- e. Training (E). The act, process, or method used to increase the skills, knowledge, or experience in a given task.
- f. Operations (O). The activity performed by distinct units such as security forces, unconventional warfare, internal defense and development, foreign internal defense, civil affairs operations...health services, humanitarian relief, inspection teams, legal services, logistics, and civil affairs that interact with the local populace of a given nation.<sup>60</sup>

Reading these definitions, it is evident that PRTs engage in all six of these functions to some degree, and Aviation Advisors conduct at least Liaison, Advisory, Training and Operations activities.

During an interview with the commandant of the USAF Special Operations School, it was suggested that an appropriate level of proficiency for those performing PRT, CAFTT, and

similar missions is a level 1 (elementary proficiency) in listening and in speaking. Proficiency in reading and writing was not judged to be as important, an opinion with which the author, having commanded a PRT, concurs.<sup>61</sup> A follow-on interview with a USAFSOS instructor provided a similar recommendation, for a one-month minimum immersion course to get individuals through enough basic vocabulary and grammar to be able to learn additional and more complex material through self-study. This equates to about a 0/0+/0+ in Reading/Listening/Speaking on the ILR scale.<sup>62</sup>

Even computer-based language training is time-intensive and costly. In 2006-2007 the USAF spent approximately \$1Million on the software and licenses for language training experiments at Air University. A proposed enterprise license to make Rosetta Stone available online for all Airmen would cost approximately \$2.3 Million per year. However, the AF Language Summit participants agreed that the self-study and short-term familiarization programs were ineffective, since virtually none of the students ever reached a 0+/0+ level of proficiency, let alone level 1.<sup>63</sup>

The Joint Staff has apparently recognized this, based on the following words from the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations:

...it is not reasonable to expect the entire force to be culturally and linguistically knowledgeable about every geographic locale to which joint forces might be committed. Future force development therefore must make provision for rapid assembly of liaison teams with the requisite expertise, and military educational institutions must be able on short notice to conduct targeted language and cultural familiarization courses for leaders and other key personnel expected to deploy to areas about which such knowledge is not widespread in the force.<sup>64</sup>

This paragraph highlights the biggest shortfall of any service-wide language familiarization program: it is not targeted. There is no way to know, particularly in the Air Force, which Airman will deploy to what part of the globe in a capacity that requires language skill, or in what

tongue. Therefore, when preparing to send Airmen into nontraditional roles where language is required, there must be a capability to target them with adequate training *at the right time*. The problem with this idea is twofold: What training do they need, and how do we identify them early enough to provide it?

A final note of caution about the current Air Force plan for producing regional and language experts from the accession point onward and developing them over a career, the plan outlined in the new *Air Force Culture, Region & Language Strategy*.<sup>65</sup> “Developing and sustaining Airmen with sufficient cross-cultural capability” from college or basic training onward is fine for intelligence officers, political affairs specialists, attachés and the like, but the long term solution is not universally applicable.<sup>66</sup> Aviation Advisors and PRTs perform nontraditional missions in potentially volatile environments, in the wake of crises in locations that we cannot predict ten or fifteen years in advance. It is impossible to identify an individual during accession and say, for example, “this person is going to learn Swahili so he or she can be an instructor pilot, or PRT commander, or civil engineer, etc. in Central East Africa in 202X.” First, we have no way of knowing where the crisis may occur and what will be required until we are in it, as we are now. Second we have no way of knowing which officers or NCOs will be suitable and selected for those missions when they arise. These missions require personnel to be selected based on *operational* experience and demonstrated leadership skills or potential, as much or more so than on academic background. They have to be filled by the best personnel available, regardless of their language and cultural orientation. Therefore, we owe it to them to plan far enough ahead and identify them early enough to provide them with the right Language, Cultural and Regional expertise to do their mission as effectively as possible. So let’s look at how a targeted, just-in-time preparation might occur.

## Chapter 4

### Outlining the Curriculum.

*...military educational institutions must be able on short notice to conduct targeted language and cultural familiarization courses for leaders and other key personnel expected to deploy to areas about which such knowledge is not widespread in the force.*

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations  
15 January 2009

The shortfalls have been identified and the attempts to address them to date have been examined. So what can be done? Is there indeed a better solution or will the Air Force continue to invest good money in half-hearted, ineffective fixes? In truth, upon examination, it becomes apparent that the Air Force, and the U.S. government as a whole, already has tremendous resources at its disposal with which to address this issue. The question is: how do we make these resources available to those who need them, and which ones do they need? This section will propose a list of individuals who should be Language Enabled and Regionally and Culturally trained. It will then propose a list of courses and the schools that offer them, and assess the projected timelines for putting servicemembers through the appropriate curriculum for their assigned mission.

#### **Who needs regional and language expertise?**

There are a number of functional positions, with descriptions, currently being filled by Airmen in OEF and OIF that would benefit from advanced training. For consistency, these recommendations will be based on the six “Additional Language Skills” from CJCSI 3126.01

that are listed on page 21 of this paper. These include: Information Operations (S), Diplomacy (P), Liaison (L), Advisory (Z), Training (E), and Operations (O). The letter designations come from a list of 22 Performance Objectives in the CJCSI, used to identify desired skills when a COCOM requests a person with regional and language expertise.<sup>67</sup> They will be used here to avoid confusion.

1. PRT Commander: (S,P,L,Z,E,O) Speaks publicly (S), negotiates with provincial and other government and traditional leaders (P), is a go-between for host-nation government and security forces and the higher coalition leadership (L), mentors key leaders in the “proper” performance of their duties (Z), and oversees the team’s conduct of training and operations (E&O).
2. PRT Intelligence Officer: (S,L,O) May serve as PRT Executive Officer and deputy to the Commander. Attends meetings with senior provincial government officials, may meet with intelligence and security officers of host nation security agencies, needs regional, cultural and language expertise to understand context of reports and how to analyze them.
3. PRT Operations Officer: (P,L,Z,O) May serve as PRT Executive Officer and deputy to the Commander. May attend meetings with senior provincial officials, may meet with officers from host nation security agencies. May coordinate with host-nation personnel in the development of plans for combined stability operations to bolster the legitimacy of host government and security forces. May administer small-rewards program to reward local citizens for turning in military weaponry. (Note: Active Duty Army)
4. PRT Civil Engineer: (P,Z,E,O) May conduct bidder’s conferences to present requests-for-proposal to local contractors for approved projects. May conduct project and contract negotiations with local contractors for PRT funded projects, conducts quality control inspections of projects, mentors contractors on safe construction practices and may conduct trade school instruction.
5. Civil Affairs Team Leader (PRT or other): (P,Z,E,O) Establishes relations with foreign nationals to assess needs, may advise on development, reconstruction and various other civil affairs activities. Senior CA officer may serve as PRT Executive Officer and deputy to the Commander. (Note: Normally Army Reserve Officer for PRT)
6. PRT Information Operations Officer: (S,P,L,Z,E,O) Develops public messages, mentors government officials and media personnel on public affairs. Attends public events where commander and host-nation officials are speaking, may interview local officials and population for media stories.

7. PRT First Sergeant (NCOIC): (P,L,O) Oversees day-to-day operation of Forward Operating Base, may conduct negotiations with local officials for hiring of host-nation personnel for on-base menial labor force support. May participate in negotiations with local officials for hiring and mentoring of host-nation security guard force. (Note: Active Duty Army)
8. PRT Police Training and Assessment Team NCOIC: (P,L,Z,E,O) Works directly with provincial police leadership at all levels, conducts or supervises police training programs, may accompany host-nation police on patrols and provide mentoring on procedures, ethics, and behavior.
9. Aviation Advisor: (L,Z,E,O) Conducts liaison with host-nation military, advises on organization and operations, works directly with foreign military forces to train in basic operational skills, irregular warfare, and foreign internal defense missions.
10. Air Staff Mentor: (P,L,Z,E,O) Works directly with host nation Air Staff personnel to mentor and advise on operations and organization. May also conduct the same functions as the Aviation Advisor.

It seems obvious that personnel performing any of the duties listed above would benefit and be much more effective in their jobs if they have a working knowledge of the language and culture of the population they are sent to engage. It must be noted here that this list is not all-inclusive. It is a list compiled by the author from two primary mission areas, based on personal experience and input from fellow officers. It also includes three positions for the PRT that are manned by active duty or reserve Army personnel, who will require creative and joint sourcing solutions. Serious consideration should be given to sourcing the CA team leader from the active duty military, regardless of service, so that individual has the time for comprehensive predeployment training.

There are likely other mission areas where this same proposal would apply, and possibly other duty positions within the PRT and AA arenas that the author has not identified. This should be seen a starting point from which to begin improving AF capabilities.

### **What level of proficiency is “sufficient?”**

As stated earlier, several language-enabled experts and language professionals have recommended a language proficiency level of 0+/1/1 (R/L/S) as a starting point for an extended deployment in the PRT and AA arenas. Examination of the CJCSI regional expertise tables implies a level 1, or Novice, rating is desirable as well. Based on correspondence with the JSOU Commandant, USAFSOS instructors, the Dean of Students at DLI, and the Director of Language Education at AFCLC, the majority opinion was that the 0+/1/1 (or better) should be achievable with a six-month course at, or provided by, DLI.<sup>68</sup>

### **A proposed plan of attack for education**

The “long pole in the tent” is obviously language training. To quote Major Eric Larson, Director of the Building Partner Aviation Capacity Course and former Director of the Asia-Pacific Orientation and Cross-Cultural Communications Courses at USAFSOS, “Language learning is best accomplished in concentrated and sustained doses.”<sup>69</sup> Whether this occurs at DLI or another location is not as important as having the students in a situation where the language training is their priority and not a peripheral additional duty while they are working some other job. The “how” will be discussed in chapter 6, right now we will look at the “what” in terms of the training that should be provided.

Language training could be provided at DLI, or FSI, or be taught to a sizable group by a DLI mobile training team (MTT). It could even be taught in an immersion setting by colleges like Indiana University that have such a program. However, this last is a very costly option, and would run in the thousands of dollars per month, per student.<sup>70</sup> The key here is to have the provider design a syllabus for a six-month program. The question then becomes: what other pieces of the puzzle do we need in order to properly equip the deployer for the mission?

The Joint Special Operations University and the USAF Special Operations School, co-located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, teach a number of courses that could fill current gaps in the cultural and regional training provided to PRT leaders and Aviation Advisors. Complete descriptions are available in appendix C, but desirable courses include:

Contemporary Insurgent Warfare Course (CIWC) (USAFSOS): This course provides a foundation for SOF and other DoD personnel who deploy or support internal crises, giving them an appreciation of the complexity of the intrastate conflict environment and a framework for analyzing such conflicts. A sister course, Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense, has a similar syllabus but also addresses the role of airpower in FID, Security Assistance, and COIN.<sup>71</sup>

Joint Civil-Military Operations Campaign Planning Workshop (JSOU) The JCMOCPW educates students on how to apply joint civil-military operations (CMO) doctrine to successfully conduct operational-level CMO campaign planning to support a joint force commander's mission...incorporating the interaction between military staff members and representatives of other US government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.<sup>72</sup>

Middle East Orientation Course (MEOC) (USAFSOS) Provides a comprehensive orientation to regional information ... in the region encompassing the Middle East. Provides US personnel involved in military training of or interaction with Middle Easterners with background information and effective strategies for cross-cultural communication to enhance instruction and related interaction. Course covers history, religion, culture, and politics. Also provides US personnel who have a professional interest in the Middle East with regional background information to enhance their analytical skills.<sup>73</sup>

Each of the school listed above requires one week (5 days). One insurgency course, the JCMOCPW, and an appropriate regional orientation course would require a total of three weeks. A full complement of the PRT key personnel identified above, for six PRTs, would be 48 students; if the three Army personnel are included. (Not an option for CA as long as PRT Civil Affairs Teams are being staffed from the Reserve Component.) This would seem to justify having the course taught as a “roadshow” by a TDY USAFSOS instructor, or better yet, by a training unit established under AETC since USAFSOS is not staffed or resourced to provide sustained, large-scale training to the GPF. Properly managed and scheduled, AA training could produce similar class sizes. Depending on the location of language training, the other courses could be interspersed with it to run concurrently.

Another piece that has been recommended by both PRT and AA personnel is negotiation training. The Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) at AFCLC currently provides a four-hour presentation to Aviation Advisors undergoing training at Ft Dix, New Jersey, but this is far less than adequate.<sup>74</sup> The “industry standard” for practical negotiation training is about 3 days, and a proposed course of that length, taught by the NCE, would include academics, “fishbowl videos” of good and poor negotiation examples, computer-based exercises with an avatar, and practical face-to-face exercises with role-playing instructors. The academics would include briefings and materials at the beginning of the program, as well as the opportunity to review distance-learning materials online prior to the commencement of the three-day program.<sup>75</sup>

In response to the author’s inquiries, Major Larson and Major Tom Meer, two USAFSOS IW instructors, brainstormed and sketched out a promising plan for a six-month training program. The basic outline of this program is included in Appendix D in its original form.<sup>76</sup> Their concept includes an introduction to COIN (CIWC), Cross-Cultural Communication, Civil-

Military Operations (JCMOCPW), and unit-specific command and control training over a period of two weeks, followed by six weeks of introductory language training. At the end of this period is a week-long cultural/language practical exercise and evaluation and a week of initial combat skills training, then another three-week block of language.

Following a mid-course break after week thirteen, there would be two more three-week blocks of language/culture/regional studies split by another week of operational scenarios and evaluation. All three of the three-week language blocks would consist of 4 hours of language per day, coupled with mission-specific skills training. In the case of AAs, that would include flying and related skills, while PRT members would spend the time in what the Majors term “PMESII Studies,” to develop their regional and cultural expertise through academics and contact with their predecessors in-theater. Academic programs would include an appropriate regional orientation course like those identified earlier in this chapter. Weeks 23 and 24 would include negotiation training, AOR-specific current situation briefings, and an introductory workshop with Joint and Interagency partners. Upon completion of the program, members would have a week of leave to spend with family, and return to conduct a training After-Action Review (AAR) and prep for deployment, leaving approximately 27 weeks after the commencement of training.<sup>77</sup>

This is a model that shows a great deal of promise for Aviation Advisors and other small-unit or individuals in training. For PRT key personnel this course would precede the 8-week combat skills training during which the rest of the 50-100 person team is brought together and prepared for the deployment. A three-week break after week 24 would permit a week of leave and a two week Pre-deployment site survey visit to the deployed theater by the commander prior to commencing CST. All told, this would be about a 9-month program.

This section has identified some key components that need to be included in pre-deployment training for key personnel in units with BPC missions. However, the reality of the current situation is that BPC personnel are already TDY 13-17 months for training and deployment, and this program would add at least six more to that, depending on how well the schedule was integrated. This idea is going to meet with significant institutional push-back as a result. The remainder of this paper will address some of the negative reactions expected to this proposal, ways to overcome or accommodate them, and how this program should be implemented to benefit the Airmen, the BPC and IW missions, and the Air Force.

## Chapter 5

### Implementation Challenges

*Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.*

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates  
"A Balanced Strategy" – *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009

Implementing a meaningful expansion of pre-deployment training is likely to face objection and pushback from multiple parts of the Air Force unless there is a shift in the force management paradigm. Some of the initial arguments are readily apparent. Home-station units are already forced to work harder to make up for an unfilled billet for thirteen months or more to accommodate the training and deployment of a servicemember selected for a 270 to 365 day TDY. Because they are "deployed" and not serving an unaccompanied remote tour, the losing unit does not receive a new person to backfill the position. This is easier to accept in larger aviation units, which are officer-heavy and more likely to have enough manpower on hand, but for maintenance, security forces and similar organizations, it can be a significant challenge to accept a long-term gap in a leadership position. The same holds true for Joint and Air Staff offices, which are often one-deep in a particular AFSC and more likely to suffer from a dearth of expertise while their member is deployed.

Another argument for home station units is the issue of performance ratings. Deploying personnel normally receive a performance report from their TACON organization at the end of an extended deployment, but lengthy periods of pre-deployment training may fall to the home unit to include in performance reports, unless the training is long enough to generate a separate training report. Because unit commanders generally rate members based on their contribution to their unit's mission, this can potentially hurt the rating of the individual deploying, with preference being given to those who are at home "doing the mission." This is likely to carry over to ranking personnel for promotion recommendations as well, especially in cases where the home station commander has changed while the member is deployed, and may not even know the individual personally. The combination of the above factors has also resulted in unit commanders refusing to support an individual who wished to volunteer, or attempting to talk him or her out of the decision on the grounds that "there is important work to do here at home."<sup>78</sup>

A third, and very significant, obstacle to training is the additional cost of sending individuals on more TDY for extra training. At DLI, in Monterey, California, on-base lodging costs a minimum of \$62.00 per night, and the rate for Meals & Incidental Expenses is either \$39.00 or \$64.00 per day, depending on whether some meals can be provided by facilities on-base. The best case is a total of \$101.00 per day, or \$3,030.00 per month.<sup>79</sup> Added to this will be Family Separation Allowance, which is another \$250.00 per month for any service member who has dependents and is TDY from home station for more than 30 consecutive days. This works out to \$19,680.00 per student for a six-month TDY for language school. Adding in costs for transportation to and from the home unit, it would cost well over \$600,000.00 to send 30 students (5 per AF-led PRT), or about \$960,000 if the CA team lead, Operations Officer, and NCOIC from the Army component are included for each team. One additional note: lack of a

dining facility on-base to provide meals increase the per diem rate by \$25.00 per student, per day (another \$216,000) while lack of on-base lodging nearly doubles the total, clearly an unaffordable expense. Including the three key personnel from the Army component for each PRT would cost an additional amount equal to sixty percent of the cost for the 5 AF personnel for any of these cases.

In contrast, Air University contracted a DLIFLC Mobile Training Team of instructors at an all-inclusive average cost of \$10,500 per instructor, per month. To teach 48 students, (5 AF plus 3 Army per PRT) would require 4-5 instructors, depending on whether one or two languages are being taught (1 instructor for each group of 15-20 students, plus 1 backup for each language).<sup>80</sup> A worst-case requirement of five instructors for a six-month contract period works out to about \$315,000.00, making it far more cost-effective to bring the school to the students, if the students are all at one location. Other courses are shorter and generally less expensive, particularly if the instructors are military, but the end result is the same, it is cheaper to bring the training to the students than to send a large group to school. This idea will be explained in the next chapter.

Extending the length of training under the current system has other obvious impacts on the service members and their families. Combat Skills Training currently takes between two weeks and three months for most individuals, depending on the type of extended deployment for which they are tasked. For PRTs, it is two and one-half months for most, four and one-half for the commanders and principal staff members.<sup>81</sup> This training adds to the time away from home and family, and runs seven days a week without interruption. Asking members to leave their families for several additional weeks or months of training is likely to generate significant discontent within the force and adversely affect the rate of volunteerism. This problem also has remedies that will be addressed in the next section.

A final issue that is likely to be contentious is the conflict between “career-broadened” or “well-rounded” officers and operational experience, and this is one that will be raised by other services, not just the Air Force. A senior leader speaking at Air War College noted that the services must maintain some sort of reasonable timeline so that individuals do not spend too much time away from their primary field or it may hurt their career progression. This has always been a common mantra. It was one of the reasons in the 1990s that Air Force pilots resisted instructor tours at Undergraduate Pilot Training and why the Navy utilized PME as a holding pattern for officers awaiting entry into a command pipeline, but generally shunned it otherwise. A better training program alone will not solve this problem; it must be addressed by senior leaders who weigh the needs of the nation and the mission against convenience for the service. It stands to reason that if a mission is important enough to fill with officers competitively selected by a command screening board, then it is important enough to do it right, and also important enough to warrant some accommodation by the existing personnel system.

In his most recent article, in *Foreign Affairs*, Defense Secretary Gates makes the following assessment of IW and the way ahead:

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign -- a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against the terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit.<sup>82</sup>

This is a war that requires highly capable and skilled officers and NCOs who understand the complexities involved in integrating all instruments of national power and have the acumen to effectively coordinate their activities in joint, interagency and coalition environments. It requires

that we invest adequate training and resources to provide them with the skills they need to excel in the IW arena, understanding that kinetic military operations are a supporting effort that enables diplomatic, economic and informational operations, and not the primary purpose of our presence in an unstable country. Finally, it requires that we find ways to manage the experts we develop in ways that not only benefit the Air Force and the Joint Force, but that leverage their expertise while providing them with career viability so that they move up into operational and strategic leadership roles. We must find the will and the way to produce these leaders.

## Chapter 6

### A Proposed Long-Term Solution

*I really like your concept on the two year tour. Anything would be better than the half-ass, ad hoc way we do it now.*

Colonel Albert “Buck” Elton, AFSOC IW Working Group Chair  
and National Defense Fellow for Special Ops/Low Intensity Conflict<sup>83</sup>

#### **Out with “Up or Out”**

A paradigm shift is in order for the U.S. military. The modern military has become enslaved to the “up or out” promotion system that rushes mid-grade officers through a series of schools, staff and command assignments so fast it makes one’s head spin. The “normal” series of assignments to progress through Major and Lieutenant Colonel includes two years of Developmental Education (Staff College and War College), a four-year Air Staff tour, three years to serve as an operations officer and squadron commander, and a three-year tour on a Joint Staff. An “on-time” officer will put on the rank of major at about the 11 year point, Lieutenant Colonel at 16, and Colonel by 22. This twelve-year career window can be shortened by as much as four years if the officer is promoted below the zone to both Lt Col and Col. Below the zone officers are automatic to attend IDE and SDE, so that means that their ten years of staff and command assignments get compressed into a mere six years. This barely gives them time to become proficient and make a significant contribution in each of those jobs, let alone do anything non-standard like commanding a PRT or serving as an AA. As Col. Hammes points

out in *The Sling and the Stone*, the military has a personnel management system using a model that is more than a century old, that "...focuses on creating generalists rather than experts," through this rapid series of short and varied assignments, and that as a result, military leaders are "...in effect, amateurs by profession."<sup>84</sup>

The services should consider slowing the frenetic pace at which Field Grade Officers "fill the squares," and add two years or so to the "normal" time in the grades of O-4 and O-5. This would enable them to spend more time being productive experts in their jobs, and less time getting broken in or worrying about their next assignment. It would also make it possible to prepare and utilize officers in non-standard IW roles in a manner much more likely to set them, and the teams they lead, up for success. Simply promoting officers to O-4 earlier does not fix this problem; it merely vaults them into higher rank with less experience and expertise (a primary reason that the Air Force discontinued below-the-zone promotions to O-4 in the late 1990s). This is a long-term institutional recommendation for fixing a lot of problems, but not critical to fixing the problem at hand.

### **Shifting from TDY to PCS**

Whether or not the Air Force, or the DoD, slows the pace of promotion, the key to fixing the problems identified in this paper is to handle 270-365 day deployments as a Permanent Change of Station (PCS). Relocate deployers to an assignment two to three years in length, at a common location. A permanent Irregular Warfare Training Group, for PRTs and the like, and an Aviation Advisor Group (AAG), should be created to manage these personnel. These groups would be subordinate to the Second Air Force at Keelser AFB, Mississippi, where the 602<sup>nd</sup> Provisional Training Group (TRG(P)) already provides oversight of some of the training addressed in this

paper. While these units could be established at separate bases, co-locating them would enable greater sharing of resources and result in greater cost efficiencies.

As an example of this concept, the AAG would have one squadron for CAFTT/Iraq and one for CAPTF/Afghanistan. The focus of each squadron and the number of squadrons would change depending on where the United States is engaged. Each would be broken down into flights, one flight per type of aircraft flown, or more if necessary. PRTs could be divided in the same manner, the flights being established based on location, with multiple PRTs grouped in a flight based on region of deployment and commonality of the required language. If identified 12 months prior to deployment, individuals could report 9-10 months out and commence a training program like the one proposed in chapter 4. Instructors could be brought in from USAFSOS, FSI, LDESP, the NCE or other locations to teach the shorter courses in COIN, IW, Civil Affairs, Information Operations, culture, and negotiation. For the long term, AETC should establish a permanent cadre of instructors, resident at the training base, for most of these subjects. Language would continue throughout, receiving greater focus between the other courses, and utilize the Mobile Training Team from DLIFLC. This construct would enable intensive, focused, and cost-effective training while keeping Airmen at a home station with their families until they depart for CST and deployment. This will benefit both service members and the Air Force.

One additional idea, proposed by one of the Aviation Advisors, that would perhaps yield even more “bang for the buck” is to shorten the deployment length to six or eight months, but have the member do multiple deployments.<sup>85</sup> For AAs, this would permit two, or even three, six-month deployments over a three-year tour or two during a two-year tour. Depending on available manning, AAs would have 11-12 months home between two rotations, or about 5 ½

months home each time between three rotations. It can be assumed that overlap time between AAs need not be extensive because they rotate individually rather than as a unit, and because they will already have continuity when returning to the same location.

For PRTs, this would permit two nine-month rotations of the core PRT personnel group, with about seven to eight months between tours. Some of this time would be free for leave, and being back at “home station” would enhance reconstitution time for families. There would also be opportunity for the members to receive additional advanced language training or participate in formal education to earn some credit towards a regional studies degree. The actual duty requirements during this period would include policy and curriculum development, lessons learned codification, and perhaps guest lecturing or instructional duty at developmental education schools. The final three months would require them to lead their second team through CST and prepare them for deployment, but the lessons learned by these key personnel the first time, and the pre-existing relationships they return to downrange will likely make the second team even more effective than the first. This concept actually results in tours slightly longer than three years for the key personnel, but keeps the overall training plus deployment time at twelve months total for the rest of the team. This is critical, given the current restrictions on Guard and Reserve component activation limits imposed by Congress in 2007.

### **Benefits to the Member and Retention**

A PCS allows deployers to relocate with their families to a location where they can focus on their pre-deployment and pre-CST training locally, and be home on nights and weekends. This will reduce the strain on families, and eliminate a negative retention factor. Establishing the training units at a base with good housing and good schools provides additional incentive for members to volunteer for BPC deployment.<sup>86</sup> Having a large concentration of families in the

same situation also allows them to form effective support groups prior to the deployment with others who are sharing their experience.

Second, members reporting nine months prior to deployment can focus their attention on preparing for their deployment for a longer period of time, without having to balance the demands of the “second job” that current deployers are TDY from. This gives them time to do more independent reading and research on their upcoming assignment, and to work on a daily basis with people already cognizant of the mission and its demands when not in one of the formal courses.

Third, consolidating deployers in one location centralizes the oversight of their administrative requirements while they are deployed. All officers and NCOs would have a common, and knowledgeable, home-station organization and command structure to maintain visibility on performance reports, developmental education and command screening boards, promotion recommendations, and follow-on assignment coordination.

Fourth, it provides a stable environment upon redeployment where personnel can reconnect with their families, ensure closure on awards and decorations for their subordinates, take post-deployment leave, participate in the development of lessons learned and after-action reports, without simultaneously trying to return to the demands of their “second job.”

Back-end tour length should be made flexible; allowing returnees to align their departure with follow-on school, staff, or command opportunities. A reasonable window might be three to nine months, during which service members would remain actively employed with training and policy development after taking care of the post-deployment issues previously mentioned. They would also be present to mentor the incoming group of trainees and serve as a bridge between them and the team downrange.

## **Benefits to the Air Force**

There are also positive benefits for the Air Force from such a change. First, losing units will receive a replacement instead of having an empty billet for a year or more. This will reduce the stress on the losing organization and encourage commanders to support and perhaps even recommend that individuals volunteer for such deployments.

Next, because some of the field grade officers involved may deploy from Joint assignments, the Air Force Personnel Command will have the opportunity to send backfills to Joint Staff billets when officers deploy from a Joint Staff assignment. This will yield opportunities for additional officers to serve in the joint and interagency environment and receive credit towards Joint Specialty Officer accreditation.

Third, consolidating the training for these units creates cost efficiencies that are desperately needed in the current economic crisis and budget climate. It saves on TDY expenses for the trainees, and for the staff of 2 AF, who will have fewer locations to visit.

Fourth, is perhaps the most significant benefit to the Air Force from developing Airmen in this manner. AFI 16-109, *International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program*, is intended to “...deliberately develop a cadre of Airmen with international insight, foreign language proficiency, and cultural understanding.” It further states that officers should be “identified at the mid-career point for deliberate development as Political-Military Affairs (PAS) or Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS).”<sup>87</sup> The following Selection and Development guidance is taken directly from the AFI:

**1.2.2. Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS).** RAS development typically begins in the 7-10 year commissioned service window, but some developmental opportunities exist as part of Senior Developmental Education (SDE). Officers designated for RAS development will earn a regionally-focused masters degree and complete foreign language training to gain a detailed knowledge of regional history, culture, language, and political-military affairs. They will then embark upon a well-managed dual career track, alternating between primary career field

and complementary RAS assignments. Where possible, assignments should be within the geographic area of RAS specialization.

**1.3. IAS Duties.** RAS officers typically serve as Major Command (MAJCOM) and Combatant Command (COCOM) staff officers, country desk officers, arms control specialists, Foreign Liaison Officers, political advisers, security assistance officers, and attachés where their unique combination of professional military skills, regional expertise, and foreign language proficiency are required.<sup>88</sup>

#### Selection and Development

Comparing the RAS Selection and Development guidance in paragraph 1.2.2 with the assortment of officer and NCO positions identified in this chapter, it would seem that individuals returning from an extended BPC deployment would be particularly well suited for accession into the RAS program. If provided with six months of language training and the targeted regional/cultural training proposed in this chapter, individuals possessing the right combination of language aptitude and motivation, or “skill and will,” could deploy with level 1 language and regional proficiency and would likely return at a 0+/1+/1+ (or higher) in language and a solid level 2 (Associate) in regional expertise, or higher depending on prior education and experience.

Those whose performance and aptitude warrant it could be recruited into the IAS program, RAS track, and sent to developmental education to complete a regionally focused masters degree. Additionally, their experience would lend itself to writing products based on their experience that would not only support their degree requirements but provide valuable educational material for others studying the region. Such a program promises practical, financial, and educational benefits to both the Air Force and the service members who complete these deployments. Also, their boots on the ground experience supports their suitability for many of the duties listed in paragraph 1.3, above; perhaps more so than any amount of academic-only education.

The current RAS accession process prescribed in AFI 16-109 will produce officers well-schooled in regional politics and language, but quite possibly lacking “out-of-office” field experience and lower level leadership opportunities that are critical to molding well-rounded senior officers. These types of officers are extremely useful for the intelligence community and as advisors to operational level commanders, but they may not be the optimum tool for leading troops in a non- or semi-permissive environment. Even if properly managed, the RAS program is going to take time to develop adequate numbers of the personnel it aspires to reach.

### **The Bottom Line**

We are at the point in Iraq and Afghanistan where we can accurately forecast when rotations will occur for PRTs and Aviation Advisors through the next several years. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, signed by the Commander, USSOCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, is based on “key assumptions” that include:

1. In 2014-2026, the United States will still be engaged in a global Long War, and will also face conflicts involving state and non-state actors that will predominantly use IW to confront the United States and its strategic partners.
2. The joint force will be required to conduct nonconventional military operations in support of, or in place of, IA (interagency) partners for an extended duration.<sup>89</sup>

There is consensus at the top that this is not a short term problem, and the rotation schedule for the foreseeable future is easy to discern. There is no legitimate reason why key personnel for these missions cannot be identified a year prior to their approximate deployment date. The only real obstacle here is bureaucratic foot-dragging in the Pentagon and the personnel system. It will only be overcome by firm, united, and unequivocal direction from the SECDEF, SECAF, CJCS and CSAF, but it *can* be overcome.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusions

*...we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessarily to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.*

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates  
“A Balanced Strategy” – *Foreign Affairs*, January 2009

The CAFTT in Iraq forecasts that it will require a force of at least 348 personnel through at least December 2012.<sup>90</sup> The forecast for the CAPTF is unknown, but given the relative conditions of the Iraqi Air Force and Afghan National Army Air Corps, it is a safe bet that it will require support well beyond 2012. The PRT mission is not likely to end soon, although it may morph into something else. Despite protestations that these are temporary missions, the manning requirements for ad hoc, In Lieu Of, and Joint Manning Solution Airmen have mushroomed in the last three years. The emphasis on smaller forces and shrinking defense budgets means that Airmen are likely to continue in these or similar missions for the foreseeable future. It therefore stands to reason that the Air Force should institutionalize a just-in-time capability to identify and train “culturally competent, language-enabled” Airmen to step in and lead these operations.

This research has addressed the questions that were posed in the introduction at the beginning of the project. First, shortfalls in Language, Cultural, Regional and Negotiations training have been identified by GPF practitioners of BPC missions. Their testimony is supported by virtually every survey, study, workshop, and report that has addressed the issue in

the last three years. Next, it was determined that training in these areas, currently mandated by Air Force as well as higher guidance, has so far been limited to across-the-board familiarization, which has been assessed by both civilian and military subject matter experts as inadequate, and indeed a waste of money to some degree.

Looking at existing force development guidance, available resources, and relatively new programs, like the USAF IAS program, a way ahead has become apparent that will improve short and long-term mission effectiveness and produce additional benefits for the Air Force and the Joint force at large. Although there are some institutionalized obstacles to making this happen, they are not insurmountable, and can indeed be overcome in a manner that will improve training efficiency, retention, and provide cost savings to the Air Force. A summary of these benefits is below.

Airmen who move into an organization whose mission is preparing them for deployment will be able to focus on developing the regional, cultural and language skills they will need. This will in turn enable them to better prepare those they will be leading. Consolidating these individuals through PCS to a training Wing or Group will provide better oversight and force management, provide greater stability for families, and reduce pre-deployment family separations by enabling most training to be brought to the Airmen instead of the other way around. The end result will be better-prepared Airmen and better-prepared teams, who arrive in theater ready to get to work, have a shorter break-in period, and are able to leverage existing relationships on a second tour rather than starting from scratch every time.

The Air Force will also gain maximum benefit by deploying individuals twice for one lead-in training bill; being able to leverage experience gained in lessons learned, policy development

and instructor duty; and harvesting those who demonstrate language proficiency, and motivation, to become “Language Enabled Airmen,” or even Regional Area Specialists.

There is consensus between the top and bottom of our military about the need for better language and cultural training for those deploying to perform security, engagement and relief and reconstruction missions. Returnees from these missions have identified the shortfall and the negative consequences. Key leaders have voiced resolve to improve this training, in speeches, media interviews and in the most recently released doctrine.

The bottom line is that whether we call it Counterinsurgency, 4GW, Irregular Warfare, or even Nation-building, we are involved in “the Long War.” Given the number of areas of instability across the world, we are likely to remain so involved. Global economic conditions and competition for resources will likely provide fuel for additional flare-ups. Whether unilateral or in coalition, we should expect responses to future Long Wars to be lengthy and require the same kinds of unconventional missions and skills that we are seeing a need for in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, General Purpose Forces will continue to play a significant role in these Building Partner Capacity operations. Establishing a capability to provide proper selection, training, tracking, career management, and mission continuity for Air Force personnel will be of benefit not only in future conflicts, but in completing the current ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sending Airmen abroad who can communicate with their host-nation counterparts sets them up to more successful and effective, sooner, and should thereby allow them to progress faster and reduce the length and cost of U.S. involvement. Acknowledging this and taking decisive, rather than piecemeal, half-hearted action to correct the situation, will help our service members reduce the length of Long Wars, with a corresponding reduction in the cost to our nation in American blood and treasure.

## *Glossary*

### **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
AFCLC	Air Force Culture and Language Center
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AWC	Air War College
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDE	Brigade
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CA	Civil Affairs
CAA	Combat Aviation Advisor
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAS	Close Air Support
CAT-A	Civil Affairs Team - Alpha
CAFTT	Coalition Air Force Training Team (Iraq)
CAPTF	Combined Air Power Transition Force (Afghanistan)
CFACC	Combined Force Air Component Commander
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIWC	Contemporary Insurgency Warfare Course
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COCOM	Combatant Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
CST	Combat Skills Training
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DLAB	Defense Language Aptitude Battery
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLIFLC	DLI Foreign Language Center
DLPT	Defense Language Proficiency Test
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	DoD Directive

DoDI	DoD Instruction
DoS	Department of State
ETT	Embedded Training Team (with Afghan National Army)
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
GPF	General Purpose Forces (non-Special Operations)
HASC O&I	U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee for Oversight & Investigations
IAS	International Affairs Specialist
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ILR	Interagency Language Roundtable
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCMOCPW	Joint Civil-Military Operations Campaign Planning Workshop
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
JSS	Joint Source Solution
MTT	Military Training Team (with Iraqi National Army)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCOIC	Noncommissioned Officer in Charge
NSA	National Security Agency
NSPD-44	National Security Presidential Directive 44 – Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAS	Political-Military Affairs Strategist
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PTT	Police Training Team
RAS	Regional Affairs Strategist
SA	Security Assistance

SECAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SLA	Senior Language Authority
SOC	Squadron Officer College
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSTR	Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAFE	United States Air Forces Europe
USAFSOS	United States Air Force Special Operations School
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VTC	Video Teleconference

## Appendix A

### Interagency Language Roundtable Proficiency Levels

The proficiency descriptions included below were deemed relevant to the scope of analysis and recommendations by the author. They are taken directly from the ILR website. For a full listing of proficiency areas and levels, visit the Interagency Language Roundtable online at: <http://www.govtilr.org/>.

The ILR is made up of the following agencies:

Department of Defense	Department of State
Central Intelligence Agency	National Security Agency
Department of the Interior	National Institutes of Health
National Science Foundation	Department of Agriculture
Drug Enforcement Administration	Federal Bureau of Investigation
ACTION/Peace Corps	US Agency for International Development
Office of Personnel Management	Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of Education	US Customs Service
US Information Agency	Library of Congress

#### **READING:**

R-0: Reading 0 (No Proficiency)

No practical ability to read the language. Consistently misunderstands or cannot comprehend at all.

R-0+: Reading 0+ (Memorized Proficiency)

Can recognize all the letters in the printed version of an alphabetic system and high-frequency elements of a syllabary or a character system. Able to read some or all of the following: numbers, isolated words and phrases, personal and place names, street signs, office and shop designations. The above often interpreted inaccurately. Unable to read connected prose.

#### R-1: Reading 1 (Elementary Proficiency)

Sufficient comprehension to read very simple connected written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript. Can read either representations of familiar formulaic verbal exchanges or simple language containing only the highest frequency structural patterns and vocabulary, including shared international vocabulary items and cognates (when appropriate). Able to read and understand known language elements that have been recombined in new ways to achieve different meanings at a similar level of simplicity. Texts may include descriptions of persons, places or things: and explanations of geography and government such as those simplified for tourists. Some misunderstandings possible on simple texts. Can get some main ideas and locate prominent items of professional significance in more complex texts. Can identify general subject matter in some authentic texts.

#### R-1+: Reading 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus)

Sufficient comprehension to understand simple discourse in printed form for informative social purposes. Can read material such as announcements of public events, simple prose containing biographical information or narration of events, and straightforward newspaper headlines. Can guess at unfamiliar vocabulary if highly contextualized, but with difficulty in unfamiliar contexts. Can get some main ideas and locate routine information of professional significance in more complex texts. Can follow essential points of written discussion at an elementary level on topics in his/her special professional field.

In commonly taught languages, the individual may not control the structure well. For example, basic grammatical relations are often misinterpreted, and temporal reference may rely primarily on lexical items as time indicators. Has some difficulty with the cohesive factors in discourse, such as matching pronouns with referents. May have to read materials several times for understanding.

#### R-2: Reading 2 (Limited Working Proficiency)

Sufficient comprehension to read simple, authentic written material in a form equivalent to usual printing or typescript on subjects within a familiar context. Able to read with some misunderstandings straightforward, familiar, factual material, but in general insufficiently experienced with the language to draw inferences directly from the linguistic aspects of the text. Can locate and understand the main ideas and details in material written for the general reader. However, persons who have professional knowledge of a subject may be able to summarize or perform sorting and locating tasks with written texts that are well beyond their general proficiency level. The individual can read uncomplicated, but authentic prose on familiar subjects that are normally presented in a predictable sequence which aids the reader in understanding. Texts may include descriptions and narrations in contexts such as news items describing frequently occurring events, simple biographical information, social notices, formulaic business letters, and simple technical material written for the general reader. Generally the prose that can be read by the individual is predominantly in straightforward/high-frequency sentence patterns. The individual does not have a

broad active vocabulary (that is, which he/she recognizes immediately on sight), but is able to use contextual and real-world cues to understand the text. Characteristically, however, the individual is quite slow in performing such a process. Is typically able to answer factual questions about authentic texts of the types described above.

**R-2+: Reading 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus)**

Sufficient comprehension to understand most factual material in non-technical prose as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to special professional interests. Is markedly more proficient at reading materials on a familiar topic. Is able to separate the main ideas and details from lesser ones and uses that distinction to advance understanding. The individual is able to use linguistic context and real-world knowledge to make sensible guesses about unfamiliar material. Has a broad active reading vocabulary. The individual is able to get the gist of main and subsidiary ideas in texts which could only be read thoroughly by persons with much higher proficiencies. Weaknesses include slowness, uncertainty, inability to discern nuance and/or intentionally disguised meaning.

**R-3: Reading 3 (General Professional Proficiency)**

Able to read within a normal range of speed and with almost complete comprehension a variety of authentic prose material on unfamiliar subjects. Reading ability is not dependent on subject matter knowledge, although it is not expected that the individual can comprehend thoroughly subject matter which is highly dependent on cultural knowledge or which is outside his/her general experience and not accompanied by explanation. Text-types include news stories similar to wire service reports or international news items in major periodicals, routine correspondence, general reports, and technical material in his/her professional field; all of these may include hypothesis, argumentation and supported opinions. Misreading rare. Almost always able to interpret material correctly, relate ideas and "read between the lines," (that is, understand the writers' implicit intents in text of the above types). Can get the gist of more sophisticated texts, but may be unable to detect or understand subtlety and nuance. Rarely has to pause over or reread general vocabulary. However, may experience some difficulty with unusually complex structure and low frequency idioms.

**LISTENING:**

**Listening 0 (No Proficiency)**

No practical understanding of the spoken language. Understanding is limited to occasional isolated words with essentially no ability to comprehend communication.

**Listening 0+ (Memorized Proficiency)**

Sufficient comprehension to understand a number of memorized utterances in areas of immediate needs. Slight increase in utterance length understood but requires frequent long pauses between understood phrases and repeated requests on the listener's part for repetition. Understands with reasonable accuracy only when this involves short memorized utterances or formulae. Utterances understood are relatively short in length. Misunderstandings arise due to ignoring or inaccurately hearing sounds or word endings (both inflectional and non-inflectional), distorting the original meaning. Can understand only with difficulty even such people as teachers who are used to speaking with non-native speakers. Can understand best those statements where context strongly supports the utterance's meaning. Gets some main ideas.

#### Listening 1 (Elementary Proficiency)

Sufficient comprehension to understand utterances about basic survival needs and minimum courtesy and travel requirements in areas of immediate need or on very familiar topics, can understand simple questions and answers, simple statements and very simple face-to-face conversations in a standard dialect. These must often be delivered more clearly than normal at a rate slower than normal with frequent repetitions or paraphrase (that is, by a native used to dealing with foreigners). Once learned, these sentences can be varied for similar level vocabulary and grammar and still be understood. In the majority of utterances, misunderstandings arise due to overlooked or misunderstood syntax and other grammatical clues. Comprehension vocabulary inadequate to understand anything but the most elementary needs. Strong interference from the candidate's native language occurs. Little precision in the information understood owing to the tentative state of passive grammar and lack of vocabulary. Comprehension areas include basic needs such as: meals, lodging, transportation, time and simple directions (including both route instructions and orders from customs officials, policemen, etc.). Understands main ideas.

#### Listening 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus)

Sufficient comprehension to understand short conversations about all survival needs and limited social demands. Developing flexibility evident in understanding a range of circumstances beyond immediate survival needs. Shows spontaneity in understanding by speed, although consistency of understanding is uneven. Limited vocabulary range necessitates repetition for understanding. Understands more common time forms and most question forms, some word order patterns, but miscommunication still occurs with more complex patterns. Cannot sustain understanding of coherent structures in longer utterances or in unfamiliar situations. Understanding of descriptions and the giving of precise information is limited. Aware of basic cohesive features (e.g., pronouns, verb inflections) but many are unreliably understood, especially if less immediate in reference. Understanding is largely limited to a series of short, discrete utterances. Still has to ask for utterances to be repeated. Some ability to understand facts.

#### Listening 2 (Limited Working Proficiency)

Sufficient comprehension to understand conversations on routine social demands and limited job requirements. Able to understand face-to-face speech in a standard dialect, delivered at a normal rate with some repetition and rewording, by a native speaker not used to dealing with foreigners, about everyday topics, common personal and family news, well-known current events and routine office matters through descriptions and narration about current, past and future events; can follow essential points of discussion or speech at an elementary level on topics in his/her special professional field. Only understands occasional words and phrases of statements made in unfavorable conditions, for example through loudspeakers outdoors. Understands factual content. Native language causes less interference in listening comprehension. Able to understand facts; i.e., the lines but not between or beyond the lines.

#### Listening 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus)

Sufficient comprehension to understand most routine social demands and most conversations on work requirements as well as some discussions on concrete topics related to particular interests and special fields of competence. Often shows remarkable ability and ease of understanding, but under tension or pressure may break down. Candidate may display weakness or deficiency due to inadequate vocabulary base or less than secure knowledge of grammar and syntax. Normally understands general vocabulary with some hesitant understanding of everyday vocabulary still evident. Can sometimes detect emotional overtones. Some ability to understand implications.

#### Listening 3 (General Professional Proficiency)

Able to understand the essentials of all speech in a standard dialect including technical discussions within a special field. Has effective understanding of face-to-face speech, delivered with normal clarity and speed in a standard dialect on general topics and areas of special interest; understands hypothesizing and supported opinions. Has broad enough vocabulary that rarely has to ask for paraphrasing or explanation. Can follow accurately the essentials of conversations between educated native speakers, reasonably clear telephone calls, radio broadcasts, news stories similar to wire service reports, oral reports, some oral technical reports and public addresses on non-technical subjects; can understand without difficulty all forms of standard speech concerning a special professional field. Does not understand native speakers if they speak very quickly or use some slang or dialect. Can often detect emotional overtones. Can understand implications.

### **SPEAKING:**

#### Speaking 0 (No Proficiency)

Unable to function in the spoken language. Oral production is limited to occasional isolated words. Has essentially no communicative ability.

### Speaking 0+ (Memorized Proficiency)

Able to satisfy immediate needs using rehearsed utterances. Shows little real autonomy of expression, flexibility or spontaneity. Can ask questions or make statements with reasonable accuracy only with memorized utterances or formulae. Attempts at creating speech are usually unsuccessful.

**Examples:** The individual's vocabulary is usually limited to areas of immediate survival needs. Most utterances are telegraphic; that is, functors (linking words, markers and the like) are omitted, confused or distorted. An individual can usually differentiate most significant sounds when produced in isolation but, when combined in words or groups of words, errors may be frequent. Even with repetition, communication is severely limited even with people used to dealing with foreigners. Stress, intonation, tone, etc. are usually quite faulty.

### Speaking 1 (Elementary Proficiency)

Able to satisfy minimum courtesy requirements and maintain very simple face-to-face conversations on familiar topics. A native speaker must often use slowed speech, repetition, paraphrase, or a combination of these to be understood by this individual. Similarly, the native speaker must strain and employ real-world knowledge to understand even simple statements/questions from this individual. This speaker has a functional, but limited proficiency. Misunderstandings are frequent, but the individual is able to ask for help and to verify comprehension of native speech in face-to-face interaction. The individual is unable to produce continuous discourse except with rehearsed material.

**Examples:** Structural accuracy is likely to be random or severely limited. Time concepts are vague. Vocabulary is inaccurate, and its range is very narrow. The individual often speaks with great difficulty. By repeating, such speakers can make themselves understood to native speakers who are in regular contact with foreigners but there is little precision in the information conveyed. Needs, experience or training may vary greatly from individual to individual; for example, speakers at this level may have encountered quite different vocabulary areas. However, the individual can typically satisfy predictable, simple, personal and accommodation needs; can generally meet courtesy, introduction, and identification requirements; exchange greetings; elicit and provide, for example, predictable and skeletal biographical information. He/she might give information about business hours, explain routine procedures in a limited way, and state in a simple manner what actions will be taken. He/she is able to formulate some questions even in languages with complicated question constructions. Almost every utterance may be characterized by structural errors and errors in basic grammatical relations. Vocabulary is extremely limited and characteristically does not include modifiers. Pronunciation, stress, and intonation are generally poor, often heavily influenced by another language. Use of structure and vocabulary is highly imprecise.

### Speaking 1+ (Elementary Proficiency, Plus)

Can initiate and maintain predictable face-to-face conversations and satisfy limited social demands. He/she may, however, have little understanding of the social conventions of conversation. The interlocutor is generally required to strain and employ real-world knowledge to understand even some simple speech. The speaker at this level may hesitate and may have to change subjects due to lack of language resources. Range and control of the language are limited. Speech largely consists of a series of short, discrete utterances.

**Examples:** The individual is able to satisfy most travel and accommodation needs and a limited range of social demands beyond exchange of skeletal biographic information. Speaking ability may extend beyond immediate survival needs. Accuracy in basic grammatical relations is evident, although not consistent. May exhibit the more common forms of verb tenses, for example, but may make frequent errors in formation and selection. While some structures are established, errors occur in more complex patterns. The individual typically cannot sustain coherent structures in longer utterances or unfamiliar situations. Ability to describe and give precise information is limited. Person, space and time references are often used incorrectly. Pronunciation is understandable to natives used to dealing with foreigners. Can combine most significant sounds with reasonable comprehensibility, but has difficulty in producing certain sounds in certain positions or in certain combinations. Speech will usually be labored. Frequently has to repeat utterances to be understood by the general public

#### Speaking 2 (Limited Working Proficiency)

Able to satisfy routine social demands and limited work requirements. Can handle routine work-related interactions that are limited in scope. In more complex and sophisticated work-related tasks, language usage generally disturbs the native speaker. Can handle with confidence, but not with facility, most normal, high-frequency social conversational situations including extensive, but casual conversations about current events, as well as work, family, and autobiographical information. The individual can get the gist of most everyday conversations but has some difficulty understanding native speakers in situations that require specialized or sophisticated knowledge. The individual's utterances are minimally cohesive. Linguistic structure is usually not very elaborate and not thoroughly controlled; errors are frequent. Vocabulary use is appropriate for high-frequency utterances. but unusual or imprecise elsewhere.

**Examples:** While these interactions will vary widely from individual to individual, the individual can typically ask and answer predictable questions in the workplace and give straightforward instructions to subordinates. Additionally, the individual can participate in personal and accommodation-type interactions with elaboration and facility; that is, can give and understand complicated, detailed, and extensive directions and make non-routine changes in travel and accommodation arrangements. Simple structures and basic grammatical relations are typically controlled; however, there are areas of weakness. In the commonly taught languages, these may be simple markings such as plurals, articles, linking

words, and negatives or more complex structures such as tense/aspect usage, case morphology, passive constructions, word order, and embedding.

#### Speaking 2+ (Limited Working Proficiency, Plus)

Able to satisfy most work requirements with language usage that is often, but not always, acceptable and effective. The individual shows considerable ability to communicate effectively on topics relating to particular interests and special fields of competence. Often shows a high degree of fluency and ease of speech, yet when under tension or pressure, the ability to use the language effectively may deteriorate. Comprehension of normal native speech is typically nearly complete. The individual may miss cultural and local references and may require a native speaker to adjust to his/her limitations in some ways. Native speakers often perceive the individual's speech to contain awkward or inaccurate phrasing of ideas, mistaken time, space and person references, or to be in some way inappropriate, if not strictly incorrect.

**Examples:** Typically the individual can participate in most social, formal, and informal interactions, but limitations either in range of contexts, types of tasks or level of accuracy hinder effectiveness. The individual may be ill at ease with the use of the language either in social interaction or in speaking at length in professional contexts. He/she is generally strong in either structural precision or vocabulary, but not in both. Weakness or unevenness in one of the foregoing, or in pronunciation, occasionally results in miscommunication. Normally controls, but cannot always easily produce general vocabulary. Discourse is often incohesive.

#### Speaking 3 (General Professional Proficiency)

Able to speak the language with sufficient structural accuracy and vocabulary to participate effectively in most formal and informal conversations in practical, social and professional topics. Nevertheless, the individual's limitations generally restrict the professional contexts of language use to matters of shared knowledge and/or international convention. Discourse is cohesive. The individual uses the language acceptably, but with some noticeable imperfections; yet, errors virtually never interfere with understanding and rarely disturb the native speaker. The individual can effectively combine structure and vocabulary to convey his/her meaning accurately. The individual speaks readily and fills pauses suitably. In face-to-face conversation with natives speaking the standard dialect at a normal rate of speech, comprehension is quite complete. Although cultural references, proverbs and the implications of nuances and idiom may not be fully understood, the individual can easily repair the conversation. Pronunciation may be obviously foreign. Individual sounds are accurate: but stress, intonation and pitch control may be faulty.

**Examples:** Can typically discuss particular interests and special fields of competence with reasonable ease. Can use the language as part of normal professional duties such as answering objections, clarifying points, justifying

decisions, understanding the essence of challenges, stating and defending policy, conducting meetings, delivering briefings, or other extended and elaborate informative monologues. Can reliably elicit information and informed opinion from native speakers. Structural inaccuracy is rarely the major cause of misunderstanding. Use of structural devices is flexible and elaborate. Without searching for words or phrases, the individual uses the language clearly and relatively naturally to elaborate concepts freely and make ideas easily understandable to native speakers. Errors occur in low-frequency and highly complex structures.

## Appendix B

### Excerpts from CJCSI 3126.01: Regional Expertise Level Descriptions and Criteria

These tables have been included from CJCSI 3126.01, dated 11 Feb 2008, pp E-14 to E-18.

MILITARY PLANNING GUIDE TO REGIONAL EXPERTISE LEVELS				
RE Level	Description*	Background Criteria		
		<i>Civilian Education</i>	<i>Military Education**</i>	<i>Experience</i>
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No regional expertise required</li> </ul>	None	None	
0+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can identify basic geographic facts of the region</li> <li>Can identify the major religion and social customs of the region</li> </ul> <p><u>Must</u> have knowledge of basic survival phrases of dominant language or lingua franca of the region</p>	<u>Secondary School</u>	Pre-assignment/ deployment***	
1  (Novice)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Can describe the security situation in <u>one or more</u> countries in the region</li> <li>Can describe elements of the culture, geography, government, history, economics, and religion of <u>one or more</u> countries in the region</li> <li>Can describe key aspects of the military<sup>1</sup> of one or more countries in the region</li> <li><u>May</u> have Level 0+ or Level 1 proficiency in a language spoken in a country or region, as defined by the ILR</li> </ul>	<u>Secondary School</u>	Pre-assignment/ deployment***	<u>6 months to 1 year</u> in the region working on issues related to the region
<p>The regional expertise descriptions are interim guidance. Final guidance will be distributed when the development of all skill levels is complete.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Includes doctrine, organization, training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions</p> <p>* Planners can expect personnel to possess the preponderance of the traits listed except where noted.</p> <p>** Applies to all DOD personnel deploying to the region</p> <p>*** COCOM-directed standards</p>				

MILITARY PLANNING GUIDE TO REGIONAL EXPERTISE LEVELS (Continued)				
RE Level	Description*	Background Criteria		
		<i>Civilian Education</i>	<i>Military Education**</i>	<i>Experience</i>
2 (Associate)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can describe US national security interests for <u>one or more</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe most elements of the culture, geography, government, history, economics, and religion of <u>one or more</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe in detail the military<sup>1</sup> of <u>one or more</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• <u>May</u> have Level 1+ or Level 2 proficiency in a language spoken in a country of the region, as defined by the ILR</li> </ul>	<u>Undergraduate degree</u> from an accredited university	Pre-assignment/ deployment***  <u>PME-Basic graduate</u> (e.g., Service basic NCO course or basic officer's course)	<u>1 to 3 years</u> in the region working on issues related to the region
<p>The regional expertise descriptions are interim guidance. Final guidance will be distributed when the development of all skill levels is complete.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Includes doctrine, organization, training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions</p> <p>* Planners can expect personnel to possess the preponderance of the traits listed except where noted.</p> <p>** Applies to all DOD personnel deploying to the region</p> <p>*** COCOM-directed standards</p>				

MILITARY PLANNING GUIDE TO REGIONAL EXPERTISE LEVELS (Continued)				
RE Level	Description*	Background Criteria		
		Civilian Education	Military Education**	Experience
3 (Professional)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can assess US national security interests for <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the national security interests for <u>more than one</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the effects of military operations and forward basing on the culture, geography, government, history, economics, and religion of <u>more than one</u> country in the region</li> <li>• Can assess in detail the military posture<sup>1</sup> of <u>more than one</u> country in the region</li> <li>• Can assess US military courses of action considering perspective of <u>more than one</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess likely courses of action of the military of <u>more than one</u> country in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and social dynamics in <u>more than one</u> country in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and ethnic dynamics between of the countries in the region and its neighbors</li> <li>• Can assess the military leadership of <u>more than one</u> country in the region</li> <li>• <u>May</u> have Level 2 or 3 proficiency as defined by the ILR, in a major language or lingua franca spoken in the region</li> </ul>	<u>Masters degree</u> from an accredited university in a relevant discipline with a regional focus <u>or</u> <u>Enlisted Career Language Professional</u> (E7 or above) with L3/R3/S3 language skills and has a regionally focused career training certification	Pre-assignment/ deployment***  <u>PME-Intermediate graduate</u> (e.g., Service advanced NCO course or command and staff college)	3 to 5 years in the region or working on issues related to the region
<p>The regional expertise descriptions are interim guidance. Final guidance will be distributed when the development of all skill levels is complete.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Includes doctrine, organization, training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions</p> <p>* Planners can expect personnel to possess the preponderance of the traits listed except where noted.</p> <p>** Applies to all DOD personnel deploying to the region</p> <p>*** COCOM-directed standards</p>				

MILITARY PLANNING GUIDE TO REGIONAL EXPERTISE LEVELS (Continued)				
RE Level	Description*	Background Criteria		
		Civilian Education	Military Education* *	Experience
4  (Senior Professional)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can assess US national security interests for <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the national security interests of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the effects of military operations and forward basing on culture, geography, government, history, economics, and religion of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the military<sup>1</sup> of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess US military courses of action considering perspective of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess likely courses of action of the military of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and social dynamics in <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and ethnic dynamics among countries in the region and other countries inside and outside the region</li> <li>• Can assess the military and political leadership of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• <u>May</u> have L3/R3/S3 or higher proficiency as defined by the ILR, in a major language or lingua franca spoken in the region</li> </ul>	<u>Masters degree</u> from an accredited university in a relevant discipline with a regional focus ( <u>could include an immersion education</u> experience of at least a year in a foreign university/staff college)	Pre-assignment/deployment** *  <u>PME-Intermediate level education graduate</u> (e.g., Service or joint sergeants major academy or war college)	Combination of at least <u>2 years in the region and 10 years</u> working on issues related to the region
<p>The regional expertise descriptions are interim guidance. Final guidance will be distributed when the development of all skill levels is complete.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Includes doctrine, organization, training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions</p> <p>* Planners can expect personnel to possess the preponderance of the traits listed except where noted.</p> <p>** Applies to all DOD personnel deploying to the region</p> <p>*** COCOM-directed standards</p>				

MILITARY PLANNING GUIDE TO REGIONAL EXPERTISE LEVELS (Continued)				
RE Level	Description*	Background Criteria		
		<i>Civilian Education</i>	<i>Military Education**</i>	<i>Experience</i>
5 (Expert)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can assess US national security interests for <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the national security interests of <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess the effects of military operations and forward basing on the culture, geography, government, history, economics, and religion of <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess in detail the military<sup>1</sup> of <u>most</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can assess US military courses of action considering perspective of <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess likely courses of action of the military of <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and social dynamics in <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• Can describe and assess the current political, economic, and ethnic dynamics between <u>all</u> countries in the region and other countries inside and outside the region</li> <li>• Can assess the military and political leadership of <u>all</u> countries in the region</li> <li>• <u>May</u> have L3/R3/S3 or higher proficiency as defined by the ILR, in a major language or lingua franca spoken in the region</li> </ul>	<u>Masters or Ph D</u> from either a foreign university or an accredited US university in a relevant discipline with a regional or global focus	Pre-assignment/ deployment <sup>***</sup>  <u>Graduate of a US senior-Service college</u>	Combination of at least <u>5 years in the region and 15 years</u> working on issues related to the region
<p>The regional expertise descriptions are interim guidance. Final guidance will be distributed when the development of all skill levels is complete.</p> <p><sup>1</sup> Includes doctrine, organization, training, equipment, logistics, history, and traditions</p> <p>* Planners can expect personnel to possess the preponderance of the traits listed except where noted.</p> <p>** Applies to all DOD personnel deploying to the region</p> <p>*** COCOM-directed standards</p>				

## Appendix C

### Joint Special Operations University and USAF Special Operations School Course Descriptions

The following course descriptions were deemed relevant to the research recommendations by the author. Additional detail on these courses, and complete course listings, can be found at: <https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/index.php>. (USAFSOS shares this website)

#### **JSOU:**

#### **Irregular Warfare Course** (10 Days, SECRET)

**Course Description:** As a module of the Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate (JSOWC) program, JSOWC-IW provides an introduction to the concepts and activities which comprise the DoD Joint Operations Concept (JOC) and the 14 activities for Irregular Warfare. The course provides a Strategy-To-Task Approach from Government Policy and USSOCOM Strategy, to implications and operations in the field. The course addresses the In-Direct Approach to Operations and Activities Comprising IW, encompassing military /civilian activities across the range of military operations, in peacetime, crisis and in conflict. The objectives of this course are to provide students a comprehension of IW policies, strategies, and activities for planners at the strategic and operational levels of the interagency, Combatant Command, TSOCs, and Service-Specific Components, to build an understanding of the inter-related nature of IW activities and to demonstrate how to leverage support during planning and operations with state and non-state actors in regional, multi-regional and global engagements.

**Key Lessons:** Introduction to IW; Analysis of Societies; Populace, Society and Culture affecting IW; Terrorist Analysis, Activities ;Counter-Terrorism (CT); Interagency Collaboration; Insurgency, Opposition Groups and COIN; Application and Supporting IW; Unconventional Warfare; Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense (SA/FID); Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations; Strategic Communications; Information Operations; Psychological

Operations; Transnational Criminal and Law Enforcement Activities; and Civil-Military Operations.

Joint Civil-Military Operations Campaign Planning Workshop (5 Days, UNCLAS)

**Course Description:** The JCMOCPW educates students on how to apply joint civil-military operations (CMO) doctrine to successfully conduct operational-level CMO campaign planning to support a joint force commander's mission, emphasizing the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and incorporating the interaction between military staff members and representatives of other US government agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The course uses faculty speakers, guest experts, and an end-of-course exercise. Students will work in an academic environment analyzing the civil dimension, developing and coordinating staff estimates and courses of action, and presenting a Course of Action (COA) decision brief with recommended CA force structure, and participating in an after-action review.

**Key Lessons:** Interagency Planning and Coordination; Joint Civil Affairs Concepts and Planning; Analysis of the Civil Environment; Joint Campaign Planning; Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) for CMO; and a Practical Exercise: CMO COA Development and Analysis.

## **USAFSOS:**

### **Contemporary Insurgent Warfare Course** (4.5 Days, UNCLAS)

**Target Audience:** This course is designed for USSOCOM and subordinate command personnel in the grades of noncommissioned officer through O-5. This course also accepts DoD and non-DoD US Government personnel whose job requires knowledge of insurgency and counterinsurgency as defined in Joint Publication 3-07, particularly personnel in intelligence, operations, and planning positions.

**Description:** This course provides a foundation for SOF and other DoD personnel who deploy or support internal crises, giving them an appreciation of the complexity of the intrastate conflict environment and a framework for analyzing such conflicts. It uses presentations and a panel discussion to provide a strategic and operational-level overview of insurgent warfare. The CIWC has four modules of instruction. The first module teaches insurgent ideologies, strategies, and infrastructures, and the second continues with theory, national policy and doctrine. The third module addresses the roles of the US Country Team and civil affairs operations with regards to intrastate conflict. The fourth module uses a case-study methodology to compare and contrast current and past internal

conflicts. It culminates in a panel discussion, exploring the future of insurgency and guerilla warfare.

### **Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense** (4.5 Days, SECRET)

**Target Audience:** This course is designed for USSOCOM and subordinate command personnel, especially USAF Special Operations Command (AFSOC), in the grades of noncommissioned officer through O-5 whose job requires knowledge of the role of "airpower" and how can be utilized in support of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Assistance (SA), and Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and operations. This course also accepts DoD and non-DoD U.S. Government personnel. IFID is specifically designed for AFSOC and USAF personnel but accepts students, on a nomination basis, from other Special Operations units who utilize and or promote airpower in FID and COIN operations.

**Description:** The Insurgency and Foreign Internal Defense (IFID) Course is a 4.5 day educational seminar that containing a strategic/operational level practical exercise. Entry into IFID is a NOMINATIVE process. This course is designed for USSOCOM and subordinate command personnel, primarily AFSOC, in the grades of E-4 through O-5. Priority acceptance into IFID will fall first to AFSOC, SOF, and SOF enablers. This course also accepts DoD and non-DoD U.S. Government personnel whose job requires knowledge of FID, SA, and COIN doctrine and operations. The IFID course includes five modules of instruction. The first module teaches the ideologies, strategies, and infrastructures or armed groups. The second continues with FID theory, national policy and doctrine. The third module uses case case-study methodology to compare and contrast current and past internal conflicts in order to highlight successful and unsuccessful examples of FID and COIN applications, and the role of "airpower" could have, should have, or did play. The fourth module addresses the roles of the U.S. Country Team and Interagency cooperation with regards to intrastate conflict. In the final module, the students participate in an in-class exercise dealing with FID operations and planning. The goal of the exercise is for the students to bring together lessons from the course in order to design and present a FID plan that will assist another country, and its air forces, in their efforts to provide security and stability to the population.

### **Cross-Cultural Communications Course** (2.0 Days, UNCLAS)

**Target Audience:** This course is applicable to SOF personnel working in Special Operations Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Foreign Military Sales, and International Student Training Offices. As space is available, others may benefit from this instruction. This secondary group includes government personnel who work or train with foreign nationals, in either a stateside or overseas location. Adult dependents of individuals on accompanied overseas status may attend the

course at their sponsor's expense, subject to space availability and USAFSOS approval. SOF quota requests are given priority.

**Description:** CCC provides a broad-based orientation to regional information designed to enhance the effectiveness of SOF personnel supporting US interests and the military mission in the regions, including the Middle East, Russia/Eurasia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America. Provides US personnel involved in stateside military training of international personnel with background information and effective strategies for cross-cultural communications to enhance instruction and related interaction. Course instruction is divided into two instructional areas: 1) a conceptual analysis of values and culture with strategies basic to effective cross-cultural communications and 2) a regional focus covering historical culture development and specific norms. Also provides US personnel with regional background information to enhance their analytical skills. Features resident faculty instructors, as well as civilian and military guest speakers who are subject-matter experts on various topics related to regional affairs.

#### **Middle East Orientation Course** (5 Days, UNCLAS)

**Target Audience:** This course is designed for SOF personnel currently serving or en route to the Middle East region. As space is available, others may benefit from this instruction. This secondary group includes joint personnel, DoD, or other government personnel with a professional interest in the area and/or personnel currently assigned or programmed for assignment in the Middle East region. Adult dependents of individuals on accompanied overseas status may attend the course at their sponsor's expense, subject to space availability and USAFSOS approval. SOF quota requests are given priority.

**Description:** Provides a comprehensive orientation to regional information designed to enhance the effectiveness of SOF personnel supporting US interests and the military mission in the region encompassing the Middle East. Provides US personnel involved in military training of or interaction with Middle Easterners with background information and effective strategies for cross-cultural communication to enhance instruction and related interaction. Course covers history, religion, culture, and politics. Discussions focus on such critical issues as working with the Middle Easterner, terrorism, political Islam, and the US military and SOF's future in the region. Also provides US personnel who have a professional interest in the Middle East with regional background information to enhance their analytical skills. Features resident faculty instructors, as well as civilian and military guest speakers who are subject-matter experts on various topics related to regional affairs.

### **South/Central Asia Orientation Course** (5 Days, UNCLAS)

**Target Audience:** This course is designed for SOF personnel currently serving or en route to theater. As space is available, others may benefit from this instruction. This secondary group includes joint personnel, DoD, or other government personnel with a professional interest in the area and/or personnel currently assigned or programmed for assignment in the South/Central Asia region. Adult dependents of individuals on accompanied overseas status may attend the course at their sponsor's expense, subject to space availability and USAFSOS approval. SOF quota requests are given priority.

**Description:** Provides a comprehensive orientation to regional information designed to enhance the effectiveness of SOF personnel supporting US interests and the military mission in the region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and post-Soviet Central Asia. Provides a comprehensive regional introduction for analysts and personnel who may be assigned to or work with military personnel from this region. Provides US personnel involved in stateside military training of South/Central Asians with background information and effective strategies for cross-cultural communication to enhance instruction and related interaction. Course covers history, religion, culture, and politics. Discussions focus on such critical issues as terrorism, oil and gas issues, organized crime, and the US military and SOF's future in the region. Also provides US personnel with regional background information to enhance their analytical skills. Features resident faculty instructors, as well as civilian and military guest speakers who are subject-matter experts on various topics related to regional affairs.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa Orientation Course** (5 Days, UNCLAS)

**Target Audience:** This course is designed for SOF personnel currently serving or en route to the Sub-Saharan Africa region. Other joint, DoD, or government personnel assigned or programmed for assignment or with a professional interest in the area may benefit from this instruction on a space available basis. Adult dependents of individuals on accompanied overseas status may attend the course at their sponsor's expense, subject to space availability and USAFSOS approval. SOF quota requests are given priority.

**Description:** Provides a comprehensive orientation to regional information designed to enhance the effectiveness of SOF personnel supporting US interests and the military mission in the region encompassing Sub-Saharan Africa. Provides a comprehensive regional introduction for analysts and personnel who may deploy or be assigned to Sub-Saharan Africa as well as those who work with Sub-Saharan African military personnel. Provides US personnel involved in stateside military training of Sub-Saharan Africans with background information and effective strategies for cross-cultural communication to enhance instruction and related interaction. Course covers history, religion, culture, and politics.

Discussions focus on such critical issues as working with the Sub-Saharan Africans, terrorism, conflict resolutions, and US policy and interests.

**NOTE:** USAFSOS offers additional regional orientation courses for: Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Latin America, Russia/Eurasia, and South/Central Asia. These are similar in content, length and format to the Sub-Saharan Africa course listed here.

## Appendix D

### A Proposed 27-Week Program of Instruction

The spreadsheet below was developed by Majors Eric Larson and Thomas Meer, USAF Special Operations School, Special Operations Education Development – Irregular Warfare. It is presented as a first, yet thoughtful, brainstorm of how to build a training program to meet the needs of GPF personnel deploying to do BPC missions.

Week	1-2			3-8	9	10
PRT	Common:	Breakout 1:	Breakout 2:	Language Initial (6hr/day)	Common:	Operational Scenario:
IQ	CCC	CMO	IQ Country Intro	Arabic Language	Weapons	Arabic
AF	COIN Intro	PRT C2	AF Country Intro	Pashto/Dari Language	Convoy Ops	Pashto/Dari
OTHER			Region X Intro	??? For HOA	Force Protect.	French
						Other (in English)
FOCUS:						
AA		Common:				
IQ		AvFID	IQ Country Intro	Arabic Language		
AF		AA C2	AF Country Intro	Pashto/Dari Language		
OTHER			Region X Intro	??? For HOA		
FOCUS:						
IW		Common:				
IQ		AvFID	IQ Country Intro	Arabic Language		
AF		SecAssist	AF Country Intro	Pashto/Dari Language		
PACOM			PACOM Intro	Tagalog/Bahasa Language		
SOUTHCOM			SOUTHCOM Intro	Spanish Language		
AFRICOM			AFRICOM Intro	French Language		
FOCUS:						

11-13	14	15-17	18	19-22
Language 2 (4 hr/day)	Mid-Course Break	Language 2 (4 hr/day)	Operational Scenario 2:	Language 2 (4 hr/day)
Arabic Language		Arabic Language	Arabic	Arabic Language
Pashto/Dari Language		Pashto/Dari Language	Pashto/Dari	Pashto/Dari Language
??? For HOA		??? For HOA	French	??? For HOA
Task-Specific Vocab		Task-Specific Vocab	Other (in English)	Task-Specific Vocab
PMESII Studies		PMESII Studies		Language Tutoring
Arabic Language		Arabic Language		Arabic Language
Pashto/Dari Language		Pashto/Dari Language		Pashto/Dari Language
??? For HOA		??? For HOA		??? For HOA
Task-Specific Vocab		Task-Specific Vocab		Task-Specific Vocab
Flying, AFSC Skills		Flying, AFSC Skills		Flying, AFSC Skills
Arabic Language		Arabic Language		Arabic Language
Pashto/Dari Language		Pashto/Dari Language		Pashto/Dari Language
Tagolog/Bahasa Language		Tagolog/Bahasa Language		Tagolog/Bahasa Language
Spanish Language		Spanish Language		Spanish Language
French Language		French Language		French Language
Flying, AFSC Skills		Flying, AFSC Skills		Flying, AFSC Skills

23-24	25	26	27	DEPLOY
Advanced Skills:	Family Week	Lessons Learned:	Deploy Prep	PRT Would deploy for 1 year
Negotiation				
AOR Specific PMESII				
Joint/IA Team				
				AA Would deploy for 1 year
				IW Would have 2-year vul period for short-notice deployments

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## Notes

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