

Force Structure Analysis: Observations, Findings and Near and Longer Term Actionable Goals

Synthesis Group Outbrief

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
Synthesis Group Observations (1 of 2)

- Exclusive use of exquisitely detailed campaign models as tools for force structure analysis has several drawbacks. Time, money and relevance to Sr. leadership. Analysis needs to be timely, not timeless. Still, detailed campaign models *are* desired and used by multiple communities.
- Two fundamental data issues:
 - Do we capture and understand what we have done lately in a useful way?
 - Can we extend that understanding to advise on the implications of a current force employment decision?
- Do our processes adequately detect when a shortfall (or repeated non-doctrinal use) must be addressed via force structure change?

- Have we adopted unreasonable assumptions with respect to near-term and longer-term force structure development?
 - Have evidence that current operations affect force availability as far out as 2020
 - Current staff organizations tend to disconnect those who do out year force structure work and those who work current ops problems
 - Dichotomy is that current operational decision makers focus on getting the current mission accomplished, not necessarily extrapolating to a future; the future force structure developers care about building to a specified set of capabilities and threats
 - There has been progress in bridging these camps (e.g. GFM)
- Not a lot of linkage between Service specific analytical tools, nor a lot of linkage between different communities and organizational levels.
- Tools and processes we have now do not holistically address the total force (military, civilians, contractors...).

Finding: Existing State

Support to Strategic Assessments



Friction

- Attrition
- RIP/TOA
- RC Contribution
- Employment

Costs

- FM Policies

Risk Assessment

Governance

"We've been in a sustained surge."

Near-Term Opportunities (1 of 2)

- Develop a method, process for linking current operations to future scenarios/ISC development
- DoD needs to work very hard on guidance that *connects* current operations impacts with future force design guidance
 - Ad hoc solutions versus specific design needs should be clearly spelled out
 - Challenge relates to the permanence/persistence of current demands

Near-Term Opportunities(2 of 2)

- Determination should be made whether the current scenario set is sufficient to support rebalancing the force, and whether it represents the current “inflection point.”
- Costing related to affordability of structure, tradeoffs, and force generation, need to be considered throughout course of action development.
- “We have data on ten years of COIN/stability ops”
 - RFF and Sourcing Data (deployment), but very limited data on actual employment (There is a lot of data and information coming in via various lessons learned studies on OIF and OEF, but not being archived and shared within the larger Joint community.)

Longer-Term Goals

- Develop alternative operational concepts/approaches for addressing future challenges.
 - Is this best done within the analytical community via “creating better inter disciplinary teams bringing in new types of domain experts and analysts with different skills and backgrounds?”
 - Or, how should the analytical community address indirect approaches, ‘whole of government’, support from and with coalition partners, and support between the Services?
- Address cyber and other asymmetric warfare areas within Support to Strategic Analysis (i.e., within the ISCs, force planning constructs)
 - How do we address a subject matter that inherently gets you into SAP channels within a process that is supposed to be “open, transparent, and collaborative”?
 - Can real decisions, ever be “open, transparent, and collaborative”?

Backup

Synthesis Group Discussion From Tutorials and Speakers

- Fiscal constraints, reality
 - Where do you factor in affordability in the process: in the scenarios themselves (i.e., in the CONOPs and forces allocated)?
 - Do we understand the constraints?
 - Are we accounting for both efficiencies and effectiveness?
 - Linking strategy to resources
- We are at inflection point between current and future requirements
 - How do we transition from 10 years of ground warfare?
 - How do we shift to prepare for next QDR?
- We have data on ten years of COIN/stability ops
 - Deployment versus employment data?

Synthesis Group Discussion From Tutorials and Speakers(2)

- “Air Gap” between current and future (ISCs) – and between the ISCs.
- Need scalable data that can be rolled up and down
- Balancing across the three ISC scenarios
 - ID tradeoffs that enable SL to see +/- of each
 - Risk
 - Supply the Sec with info needed to make informed decision
- Develop alt op concepts/approaches for addressing future challenges
 - May need to bring in new types of analysts with different skills and backgrounds.
- LT issues – buying S&T by the pound
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Synthesis Group Discussion From Tutorials and Speakers(3)

- Feedback – current ops; strategy informed by available resources
- How do our systems account for friction?
 - Personnel, casualties/non deployables, equipment loss, costs, readiness, etc.
- We are good at identifying shortfalls, but not as good identifying excess.
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WG1 Near Term Force Structure Analysis

- Two fundamental data issues:
 - Do we capture and understand what we have done lately in a useful way?
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- Do our processes adequately detect when a shortfall (or repeated non-doctrinal use) must be addressed via force structure change?
- Have we adopted unreasonable assumptions with respect to near-term and longer-term force structure development?
 - Have evidence that current ops affect force availability as far out as 2020
 - Current staff organizations tend to disconnect those who do out year force structure work and those who work current ops problems
 - Dichotomy is that current ops people care about getting the job done, not extrapolating to a future; future force structure people care about building to a specified set of capabilities and threats
 - There is progress in bridging these camps (e.g. GFM ICD)

WG2 Personnel

- What are the short term implications versus long term effects of economic conditions?
 - Workforce demographics
 - Market shaping of the future work force
 - Impact of benefits such as the Post 9/11 GI Bill
 - Reactive versus proactive analysis
- What are total requirements and capabilities needed?
 - Are we accounting for contracted services and the civilian workforce?

WG3 Acquisition and Materiel

- Is force structure the gear?
- Multiple use platform (red teaming)
- Trade space (versus 7 -9 year)
- Futures analysis
- Role of JUONs/rapid fielding – feedback?
 - Friction
 - Attrition
 - Reset/reconstitution

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WG4 Linking Current to Future Force Structure Analysis

- Robustness, adaptability, resiliency, complexity, vice optimality (suboptimal might be better)
- Time scales
- Context versus point solution
- Tension between capability versus capacity
- Component balance (active, reserve, etc.)
- Feedback to express what is not getting done
- Challenge between Ops (current) analysts versus Program analysts

WG5 Analytic Tools for Force Structure Analysis

- Deterrence
- Contractor support (logistics)
- Simulations versus conceptual models
- Lead times for building databases for simulations
- Accounting for the Black Swan (plausible, but unlikely)
- Need for red conops development
- Process – functions – linkage (to reality) - tasks
- Transform capabilities into platforms, organizations, etc.
- Cyber – SAP versus open, collaborative
- Three ISCs – service shaping within constraints – no one ISC covers the entire range of missions
- Nothing wrong with analysts doing sensitivity analysis and assisting with risk computation and risk mitigation associated with CONOPs
- Lack of tools that permit substitution across services
- Equivalence