

DESIGNING A STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL INTERESTS

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Designing a Stability Operations Framework to Achieve National Interests				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Deschenes				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. William G. Pierce, Director Advanced Strategic Arts Program				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
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15. SUBJECT TERMS Interagency, Whole of Government, National Security System					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 38	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Deschenes

TITLE: Designing a Stability Operations Framework to Achieve National Interests

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 01 March 2011 WORD COUNT: 7,701 PAGES: 38

KEY TERMS: Interagency, Whole of Government, National Security System

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) endeavor to sustain the minimal level of global economic access and security necessary to realize U.S. interests. SRO is a fundamental and enduring aspect of U.S. foreign policy and the ability to execute it will largely determine how successful America is in sustaining or furthering its preeminent prosperity and security needs. SRO requires the integrated application of all instruments of power and spans the continuum of conflict from engagement on emerging threats in stable states to conventional war in failed ones. Initiatives such as the Interagency Management System (IMS) and Civilian Response Corps (CRC) represent advancements in national SRO capability, but the U.S. must embrace and incorporate a more fundamental transformation in how power is applied abroad. Key principles from national frameworks implemented in Vietnam and Hurricane Katrina demonstrate how to empower an untested IMS in Washington and synchronize maturing hard and soft power capability in theater. These events demonstrate the essential elements of leadership, resource application and teamwork necessary to achieve what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has coined as smart power.

DESIGNING A STABILITY OPERATIONS FRAMEWORK TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL INTERESTS

This monograph will argue that the strategic environment and nature of United States interests necessitate a commitment to prioritized global stabilization efforts that will only be realized through a significant realignment of national power and strategic approach. American values and needs are dependent on a generally cooperative international state system that appears to be fracturing under the pressures of globalization. The passions of the people have emerged pre-eminent on the Clauswitzian Trinity, superseding, and to a degree subsuming, the chance and reason determinants of statehood traditionally leveraged by military force and governments. The people must be a strategic focus as they are increasingly influencing the operational environment independent of state government or security forces. Targeting this empowered element of the trinity requires attention to social and psychological models such as Maslow's Hierarchy of Need as much, or more, than to theories of war.

State legitimacy is increasingly reliant on the social fabric of interwoven populations demanding equal opportunity to pursue evolving needs. The ability and willingness of sovereign governments to provide a level of representation, security, justice, prosperity and services to sustain a minimum level of stability defines the legitimate state condition sought in SRO. The U.S. must acknowledge the limitations of military power in addressing the complex tapestry of socially based state conflict and continue to mature a focused soft power capacity to deliver targeted stability. The Department of Defense (DOD) must culturally embrace emerging SRO doctrine as well as other members of the interagency (IA) to develop a national approach for helping

states achieve the balance between security and development necessary to realize legitimacy. As indicated by the battle uniforms of our adversaries over the last ten years, the line between the “people” and the “enemy” is increasingly blurred. Elimination of armed opponents alone rarely addresses the root causes of state instability (example Taliban) and in some cases exacerbates it (example Iraq). Unless the vacuum created by tactical or operational victory can be leveraged by a representative, legitimate host nation government, the strategically significant population will continue to be a breeding ground for the mobilization of new threats or recruits for existing ones.

Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, states that

Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.¹

In an increasing number of conflict scenarios, security efforts must be balanced with development in order to realize the stability crucial to national interests. This realization has led to small, incremental modifications to our national security system and foreign policy since 2005. Unfortunately a much more significant national capability is required to leverage limited national resources and lead the international community in support of prioritized state-based SRO. The U.S. needs to make a clean break from cold war era approaches and design a national stabilization framework to synchronize, integrate and focus the national and international instruments of power. DOD must enhance its non lethal effects capability and be proficient as both a lead and supporting member of the IA. Concurrently, U.S. legislative and executive branches must provide specific authorities and resource capabilities within the IA to facilitate the leadership, unity of

effort and organizational structure required by SRO. Fortunately the U.S. has critical lessons from both Vietnam and Hurricane Katrina that support the development and institution of just such a framework.

The following paragraphs will offer justification and recommended improvements to the current SRO framework utilizing U.S. Joint Forces Command emerging design methodology. The first section will expand on the introductory remarks highlighting the enduring criticality of stabilization efforts to our national interests in an attempt to frame the problem. The monograph will then inform and clarify the problem statement by framing the operational environment. This second section will provide insight to root causes of instability and offer evidence that the U.S. Government's stabilization approaches are fundamentally flawed. Lastly, strategic and operational approach considerations will be presented in an effort to assist ongoing national and international level efforts to harness and deliver smart power in support of effective SRO. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that the U.S. should commit to an affordable, whole of government framework based on tailored unity of command and empowered with decisive authorities, adequate resources and IA mutual trust.

Framing The Basic Problem: U.S. Interests

As a world super power the U.S. must acknowledge that its policies and strategies are driven by organic interests, as much or more, than the global threats challenging those interests. The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) specifies prosperity, security, international order and the proliferation of values as America's enduring interests.² The first challenge to SRO is that values proliferation can complicate the operational problem statement and thereby the international partnership required to achieve targeted state legitimacy. Forcefully exporting certain values may

service objectives beyond root causes of conflict and if not delivered with the utmost cultural sensitivity can contribute to the pervasive international skepticism regarding U.S. hegemony. Members of the international community are rightfully skeptical when they read the U.S. National Security Strategy stating that “Even when we are focused on interests such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, or enhancing economic ties, we will always seek in parallel to expand individual rights and opportunities through our bilateral engagement.”³ This statement infuses a presumptuous strategic intent into all U.S. foreign affairs, invites mission creep and fosters mistrust with the international community. The fact that the U.S. struggles with the tension between values and other interests is testament to the hypocrisy perceived by the global community. Values should not be considered as separate interests; *true* values can only be gradually proliferated through the power of American example. Disingenuously imposing values that are “separate” from other enduring interests may be beneficial to long term global stability but is not always immediately essential to SRO. In fact, doing so must be recognized as a potentially unnecessary and self inflicted obstacle to building host nation legitimacy as well as U.S. international credibility.

SRO is critical to furthering all U.S. interests but is most important to prosperity because America’s economic needs are dependent on a stable and open international market. America has a mature, service based economy that relies heavily on international imports, investment opportunities and secures lines of communication to sustain and satisfy the enormous opportunity appetite of its growing population. Abraham Harold Maslow’s theory of human motivation will be used to demonstrate the pre-eminent and enduring nature of prosperity interests that will perpetuate U.S.

reliance on SRO well into the future. This model will also be used to understand the slippery slope of imposing American values as well the root causes of conflict essential to SRO.

Maslow's Hierarchy of need (Figure 1) is a simple and timeless model describing how human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies that generally drive people up the pyramid of "want" based on satisfaction of lower, more pre-potent needs.⁴ If lower



needs are largely unsatisfied the motivation for higher needs generally does not emerge in a significant way. Additionally, once a high or sustained degree of satisfaction is realized in lower needs, they often become de-valued in favor of want of the higher need. Finally, the theory informs that unless a significant deprivation of a lower need persists, it is unlikely that attention would shift from the drive to satisfy the current or higher need.⁵

With respect to American society, it is apparent that the opportunity to pursue peak experiences and self actualization needs is where the majority have evolved. As Maslow explains, this fact does not imply that love, safety and physiological needs do not exist; but it does explain why U.S. culture seems to so often take these for granted.

More importantly the theory would argue that America's insatiable appetite for global resources and economic opportunity will not be reversed without significant and sustained deprivation of love and safety needs. The drive toward these higher needs may explain why the events of 9-11, and others like it, seem to create only temporary distractions to the ultimate motivation for a more prosperous future. While safety and security interests are used to justify the global response to 9-11, the strategic impact and enduring concern of the attack continues to be economic. Finally, the favorable conditions allowing for ascension of the pyramid may help explain the difficulty America has in demonstrating the values it seeks to export in pursuit of international order. Global war on terror affordability discussions, public outcry at airport security screening stations and anemic voter turnout rates validate the relevance of Maslow's Hierarchy in reflecting America's demonstrated paramount motivations. It is not about what the U.S. says but what it does that counts in the eyes of an international community rightfully skeptical of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The enduring nature of prosperity and security needs combine with the externally dependent nature of the economy to drive America's reliance on a minimum level of global stability.⁶ Unfortunately, the same globalization forces that have challenged U.S. values and encouraged the U.S. economy to mature globally have also spawned very real challenges to global state sovereignty stability. This has driven the U.S. to embrace SRO as a vital capability. The argument is not that the spectrum of conflict has narrowed; only that stabilization capability increasingly represents the methodology by which the U.S. secures its NSS objectives. This is clearly reflected in the migration of U.S. Joint Doctrine toward operational design and planning in support

of “phase 0” operations. This Combatant Command centric strategy focuses on government legitimacy and regional stability driven largely by the recognition that conflict prevention is much more affordable than war. Understanding the effects of globalization on the strategic environment is critical to fully appreciate not only why the U.S. should improve its SRO capability, but how.

Framing The Operational Environment:

The Westphalia “Treaty” condition of 1648 established the initial sovereignty conditions necessary for states to responsibly pursue interests and international stability.⁷ Today, stability is challenged by a decline in the inherent strength of the sovereign state system as a result of globalization. Globalization has resulted in an interconnectedness and interdependence that has diversified and integrated the world’s economies and populations, enabled the rise of new transnational threats, proliferated information and awareness and exposed the fractured societies left behind by colonialism. As validated by the State Department’s recently released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review “the interconnected nature of today’s world makes instability and conflict, even in distant corners of the world, a much greater threat to the United States.”⁸ “With the emergence of rapid globalization, the risks to the international system have grown to the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability.”⁹ In order to appreciate the significance of empowered localized threats relative to state sovereignty it is useful to consider Carl Von Clausewitz’s Trinity.

Clausewitz proposed that to develop a framework of war one must maintain an appreciation of passion, chance and reason; influences represented predominately by concerns of the people, character of the army and political aim of the government.¹⁰

Extrapolating this timeless concept to study the contemporary operational environment, including both internal and international state conflict, one can recognize the importance of balancing “these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”¹¹ In this highly accessible world people are empowered with a greater potential to challenge the sovereignty, control and freedom of action of governments and state security forces.¹² In order to maintain balance in the trinity and sustain overall state legitimacy greater attention of the people is now required. It is important to recognize that this stress on the state system is an added complexity with more traditional threats to stability still a consideration.

While globalization challenges state governments by empowering the people it has also provided opportunities for emerging powers and exacerbated the growing concern over natural threats. Countries such as China, Brazil and India have leveraged a more networked and accessible world to develop their economic and military power and challenge the post cold war condition of a single, U.S., world power. Additionally, globalization has increased and exacerbated the potential of natural threats such as disease and climate change to become transnational in nature. Threats to stability, therefore, may be presented in three primary categories; non state actors (NSA), state actors (SA) and natural actors (state neutral). Understanding the anatomy and relevance of these threats is fundamental to designing a SRO framework.

The most critical emerging aspect of the modern threat environment is non state actors (NSA's).

These actors—ranging from NGOs, faith-based movements, civil society organizations and multi-national corporations to criminal networks, terrorist groups, and rebel movements—have an ever greater ability to impact international affairs. Their absolute number and variety, both constructive

and destructive, has increased exponentially. Many of these groups have become truly transnational, operating across national boundaries to promote policies, implement programs, and impact change.¹³ In much of the developing world, the warlord is returning triumphant while the state withers in its arbitrary, post-colonial borders. Transnational dynamics at the sub-national level are interacting to create regional incubators for violent non state actors.¹⁴

It is critical to recognize that not all NSA's are violent and that they can have both positive and negative effects on state sovereignty and stability of the operational environment. Specific effect and relevance to U.S. interests must be evaluated based on the nature of the particular NSA and perhaps more importantly on the capacity and willingness of governments to address the root causes and drivers of conflict.

NSA's emerge from a fundamental two step process, a root cause (source of conflict) and the inability or willingness of a government to effectively deal with that cause. Sources of conflict fall into four broad categories: socio-economic deprivation, corruption / organized crime, demographic pressures and resource scarcity.¹⁵ Individual governments unwilling or unable to effectively deal with these root cause challenges give rise to anti-government identities which if left unchecked can mobilize into influential and operational NSA. In developing stabilization strategies it is critical to recognize that the mobilization process requires three fundamental components: leadership, organization and resources.¹⁶ These agents of mobilization are targetable within SRO and represent the catalyst which transforms root cause conditions into drivers of conflict.¹⁷ The subtle but important differentiation between root causes and drivers of conflict may be best framed as potential energy and active energy respectively.¹⁸

Violent NSA's (VNSA's) mobilize from within the general population and their break from society requires significant influence and energy. For citizens to rationalize

unlawful defiance of their country or international community they usually isolate themselves from their surroundings, insulate themselves with others of similar deprivation perception and formulate a justification of means.¹⁹ This process often requires more than the motivation associated with the original need or source of disenfranchisement. The relevance of this to international stability is that unattended root causes often spiral into ideological fictions that become justification for conflict and are obviously much harder, if not impossible, to deal with.²⁰

Strategies that target drivers of conflict should be considered “defensive” in that they largely attack the symptoms and not the disease. Targeting VNSA leaders, command and control structures and resources can be essential in establishing the security or other conditions necessary for development but rarely yields significant progress toward state legitimacy. In contrast, efforts designed to empower a government’s ability to resolve root causes of conflict represent “offensive” strategies that hold the key to state legitimacy and long term stability. Based largely on a fundamental imbalance in deliverable instruments of power, the U.S. has been forced to focus on drivers of conflict at the expense of root causes. Expanding civilian capacity to compliment the military in achieving balance between security and development capabilities must be accomplished to achieve greater success against VNSA as well as other challenges to stability. Empowered and synchronized whole of government approaches are equally critical in dealing with the more traditional threats posed by state actors.

States are often categorized as strong, failing or failed. From the U.S. perspective, failed or failing governments present as much of a challenge to

international stability as do strong states. The United Kingdom (UK) is a prime example of a stable state facing significant challenges to domestic security and international order. In addition to the 7/7 bombings in London which killed 52 and injured 700, the UK has been a breeding ground for extremists seeking to export instability such as Richard Reid and Zacharias Moussaoui.²¹ In July of 2005 the United States Congressional Research Service reported that the failure of European governments to fully integrate second and third generation Muslims was turning some to Islam as a “badge of cultural identity” who are then mobilized by extremist Muslim clerics.²² This situation demonstrates the significant legitimacy challenges faced by even the most stable states today and includes the insidious, exacerbating effects of ideological influences. Not only must the UK address social integration and radical Islam, it must also mitigate the negative societal reactions of cultural stereotyping and unwarranted fear spawned by extremist ideology. A second major consideration in understanding the threat posed by strong states involves rising peer competitors.

China, India, Russia, Iran and other nation states are increasingly demonstrating global influence and beginning to challenge America as the sole world superpower. The essential realization with respect to SRO is that fragile and failed states are often just as susceptible to the influence of emerging powers as they are the U.S.²³ As decisions are made on where and how to promote stability, consideration must be given to what rising powers may do to fill the power vacuum not addressed by the U.S. Simply because state legitimacy of a particular country does not appear to currently influence U.S. prosperity or security interests, perhaps its submission to a rising peer

competitor would. The interests and expanding capabilities of numerous rising states must be included in the evaluation of power vacuums within the strategic environment.

The UK example demonstrates how stable states with both the capacity and will to promote global stability can be challenged by internal stability issues. It should therefore not be surprising that fragile and failed states often present extraordinary and intricate challenges to international stability. “Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single-most important problem for international order.”²⁴ The State Department acknowledges that national security depends on a more effective approach to fragile states including a better understanding of their challenges and more effective U.S. civilian capacity.²⁵

State strength is relative and can be measured by the state’s ability and willingness to provide the fundamental political goods associated with statehood; physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management and social welfare.²⁶

These fundamental state functions outline where U.S. or coalition “offensive” stabilization efforts focus on capacity building in order to address root causes of conflict. Prior to any significant SRO investment, however, the willingness of host nation governments to pursue common legitimacy objectives as defined by both their people and international community must be assessed. Historical examples of governments and state leaders motivated by objectives that are at odds with domestic and international stability are not rare.

Assessing the nature of state strength in relation to transnational threats is critical to the prioritization of stabilization efforts. Stabilization efforts should not focus on the poorest, the least governed, or the most resource laden states. They must be prioritized based on a comprehensive analysis of opportunity for success and risk.

Precious limited national and international resources are available to achieve the minimum level of stability required to achieve American interests. These resources must be applied to effect change in root cause conditions through targeted capacity building in key stable, fragile and failed states that, as a minimum, have the will to effect such change. Engaging in SRO without reasonable assurance of a minimally cooperative, willing and capable state partner is likely to be a futile endeavor. The final category of threat challenging international stability is natural phenomenon such as climate change, resource scarcity and environmental disasters.

While resource scarcity has already been identified as a root cause of conflict, natural disasters may be viewed as potential pre-cursors to all root causes. In framing the operational environment it is critical to project the incredible influence that disease and climate related events could have on states and regions in both the long and short term. An effective humanitarian response to often unpredictable natural disasters requires extensive preparedness and can be critical to mitigating new challenges to global and internal stability. Response efforts may be unilateral, multilateral or UN led and are guided by relatively mature, effective and proven national and international processes. After responding with the morally responsible physiological needs of victims, additional resource investments must be evaluated with respect to the overall global stabilization strategy. In cases of extensive need deprivation Maslow's theory informs us that the affected population is likely to be driven to satisfy more fundamental needs for the foreseeable future. This recognition informs prudent application of limited resources available for global stabilization operations.

If national and international preparedness is key to an immediate response stability requirement, then prevention may best describe the characteristic of operations focused on natural threats such as the depletion of natural resources, climate change or spread of infectious disease that proliferate more sequentially. Prevention initiatives may include alternate energy source development, phased population resettlement from evolving flood plains and the distribution of vaccines, fertilizer or mosquito netting. In all cases, natural conditions and phenomenon must be recognized as very real threats to global stability requiring a level of preparedness and prevention capability that necessitates an international commitment and approach. As will be demonstrated, the principles of preparedness and prevention underpinning existing frameworks for response to natural threats need to be infused within a rebalanced national security system in order to enhance the U.S. SRO capability.

Framing The Refined Problem

Analysis of the global environment reveals increasing threats to the global stability America needs to realize its national interests. Three primary threats and related principles have been revealed to help frame the problem: VNSA's including root causes and drivers of conflict; SA's including their ability and will to promote legitimate governance; and natural actors including the preparation and preparedness essentials to managing them. These threats challenge U.S. interests and must be prioritized and engaged with a mix of hard and soft power that leverages international capability as the only feasible means of realizing success. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has termed this approach smart power.²⁷ Having validated the essential role of stability operations and suggested that current approaches may fall short of desired ends, the reframed problem becomes what are the limitations of the current framework and how can they

be fixed? At first glance, recent efforts to develop more effective approaches appear to be both impressive and encouraging.

President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in 2005 to “improve coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stability assistance for foreign states and regions at risk.”²⁸ This foundational document directed the Secretary of State to utilize the newly formed Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to “coordinate and lead” whole of government and international stabilization efforts.²⁹ Nine days earlier the Department of Defense published Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, which established stability operations as a core mission of the U.S. military. It stressed the necessity of integrating, enabling and leveraging soft power capability emanating from the Department of State (DOS).³⁰ These documents and growing stability challenges around the world fueled organizational, doctrinal and business practice development including interagency resource sharing initiatives outlined in section 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, establishment of an the Interagency Management System (IMS) in March 2007 and the 2008 USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy.³¹

“The Interagency Management System for R&S (SRO) is designed to assist Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and military commanders manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination among all IA stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels.”³² The IMS provides the framework by which S/CRS provides “expeditionary, innovative, and interagency civilian capability to plan, manage, and conduct U.S. stabilization operations.”³³ Specifically, the 2008

Stabilization and Reconstruction Management Act authorized and funded the establishment of a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) which resources the exportability of a soft power capability historically limited to ad hoc organizations supported extensively by DOD; such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT's). This combination of standing and on call human capital is designed to resource tailored IMS, planning, oversight and operational capability for the NSC level Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG), the Combatant Command Integration Planning Cell (IPC) (which would re-enforce existing Joint Interagency Coordination Teams), Chief of Mission (COM) level Advance Civilian Team (ACT) and even tactical level Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTS). The 2008 Act also required DOS to submit a SRO strategy with its annual report to congress. This resulted in the U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.

These seemingly cutting edge initiatives and apparent improved capacities have been matched by comprehensive advancements in stability and interagency related DOD doctrine at both the Joint and Service Component level. Official documents throughout the interagency referencing “unity of effort” and “unity of action” provide apparently integrated approaches to relevant emerging planning and frameworks such as the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction just published by the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and adopted by S/CRS as the “first strategic “doctrine” ever produced for civilians engaged in peace building.”³⁴ Additionally, DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) tools such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) are aiding planners and executors

from the strategic to tactical level diagnose the conflict, address root causes and uncover mitigating factors.³⁵ In 2009 Congress approved \$50 million in flexible funding capability to DOS via the Complex Crisis Fund and the \$100 million appropriation for 2011 is further testament to the importance of SRO to our national interests. Closer analysis however reveals the significant limitations to the current system and questions the degree to which U.S. Government leaders understand and are committed to the demonstrated criticality of prioritized state legitimacy.

Shortfalls of the current framework may be summarized under the four interrelated categories of strategic focus, imbalanced and stove-piped resourcing mechanisms, lack of unity of action and organizational challenges. As indicated by a recent and an often referenced quote by Defense Secretary Gates on this subject, “The United States’ interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources and unwieldy processes.”³⁶ Challenges to developing national level smart power approaches begin with the “White House centralization of interagency missions” which creates “an untenable span of control over policy implementation” and “almost guarantees an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation.”³⁷ Beginning with the category of strategic focus, it is apparent that the current SRO approach lacks full appreciation of the doctrinally validated interrelationship between security and development (Figure 2).

Security is an absolutely critical component of SRO and is intended to promote the doctrinally defined SRO end state of a safe and secure environment.³⁸ Security




Figure 2. Balancing the Trinity

efforts are often led by military forces but represent only one of seven principles that DOD must be prepared to influence. Development includes efforts to achieve the four remaining desired end states of stability operations including Stable Governance, Sustainable Economy, Rule of Law, and Social Well Being (Figure 3 displays the doctrinal end states and cross cutting principles of SRO).³⁹ These operations require capacity *development* of the host nation through soft power deliverables that go well beyond traditional diplomacy and foreign assistance. Although “President Obama and Secretary Clinton have launched a new era in American foreign policy by committing to elevate development alongside diplomacy and defense as an equal pillar of American foreign policy” it is apparent that the engines for this initiative are still short on design and fuel.⁴⁰ The design shortfall may be best highlighted by expounding on the concept of defensive and offensive approaches introduced earlier.




Figure 3. SRO Doctrinal Framework

A “defensive” centric approach (the one the U.S. is currently pursuing) applies the preponderance of resources in limiting the mobilization and violence of prioritized threats as well as protecting citizens and infrastructure from their effects. This approach commits the majority of versatile defense forces along the security line of effort, focuses on short term political ends and limits the availability of “offensive” resources. An “offensive” approach applies the preponderance of resources to the root sources of conflict and seeks to partner with non state, state, and international organizations to resolve the fundamental challenges of sovereignty and legitimacy. “Offensive”

approach's are largely soft power focused and require many of the finite theater resources leveraged by the security line of effort (to include fundamental military capabilities). This creates a healthy tension between security and development efforts that if effectively managed and balanced based on evolving conditions can begin to foster long term stability. "Defensive" security operations set the conditions for "offensive" development to move forward in an effort to realize and promote increasing levels of state stability.

The U.S. possesses the most versatile and capable instrument of military power in the world but its current structure, culture and core competencies are tailored to address drivers of conflict and not root causes. This prejudice emanates from decades of strategic guidance that kept DOD focused on the ability to defeat the traditional militaries of rival powers. The fading promise of this bias was concealed by Desert Storm where overwhelming and largely unconstrained force was applied to compel a government to capitulate in record time and reverse its threat to Middle East security and economic stability. This historical success was perpetuated by near unanimous global denouncement of Saddam Hussein's actions and the political decision to address the drivers of conflict (Iraqi Army) and not the root causes (Iraqi perception of economic deprivation in the oil market, crime/corruption and social deprivation of the Kurdish and Shia population).⁴¹ As the U.S. continued presence in Iraq since the cessation of Desert Storm hostilities attests, global stability increasingly requires the ability to address root causes. "Addressing the root causes of conflict demands a wide range of skills, expertise, and capabilities. While State and USAID have many of these, no single agency of the U.S. government has them all."⁴² In order to do this more effectively DOD

must culturally embrace and refine its SRO strategic approach and skill set in conjunction with complimentary increases in diplomatic, economic and informational capabilities. This action will require a fundamental rebalancing and sharing of available resources.

Of the \$1.121 trillion budgeted for the Iraq and Afghanistan War by Congress since 2001, about \$1.1 trillion, or 94%, went to the Department of Defense (DOD). Another \$59 billion, or 5%, went to DOS/USAID, and \$1% for veteran's medical programs.⁴³ Although significant expenditures of DOD money may be attributed to reconstruction and development (such as Iraqi reconstruction funds executed by the United States Corps of Engineers), it is clear that the focus of U.S. resources has been toward the stated objective of dismantling, disrupting and defeating al-Qaida versus alleviating the sources of conflict that allow them to thrive in the region. Expanding the analysis, it may be roughly estimated that over the last ten years the total foreign assistance budget for DOS and USAID is roughly equivalent to the DOD budget for Afghanistan alone.⁴⁴ Further breaking down the FY 2009 foreign operations budget for DOS/USAID reveals a nearly 20% investment in "defensive" approaches including foreign military training, financing and counter-terrorism efforts.

While national policy and strategy documents may profess an "offensive" commitment to international engagement and prevention of failed states, U.S. Government actions clearly reflect a "defensive" posture both at home and abroad. This disconnect results from a national security system where resources are allocated to departments and agencies based on "narrowly defined core mandates rather than broader national missions and capabilities required by interagency missions."⁴⁵ This

condition creates the paradigm of resources driving strategy and operations which is not only backwards but encourages agencies to compete for resources with an isolationist mentality and drives them to develop yesterday's capability requirements at the expense of current ones. This is a major contributing factor to the foundational imbalance between security and development and without question contributes to ongoing frustrations throughout the Government regarding lack of unity of effort.

Though resource competition helps to reinforce the boundaries between agencies, the fundamental impediment to unity of effort is the lack of unity of command. The traditional forcing function for unity of purpose has been a presidentially appointed lead agency or "czar". The challenge has been that "neither a lead organization nor a lead individual has the de jure or de facto authority to command independent departments and agencies."⁴⁶ Such is the case with the aforementioned "empowerment" of the Secretary of State and DOS via NSPD-44. Although Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates have achieved a close working relationship that approaches unity of effort, relying solely on collegial professionalism is not promising based on the historically divisive nature of the IA. The fact that the IMS is not mentioned in the QDDR, that combatant command and State Department geographical boundaries do not match, the 2000 person Civil Response Corps has taken six years to be resourced, and CRSG's, ACT's and FACT's largely remain ideas on paper is indicative of the lack of formalized and empowered leadership necessary for unity of effort. Standing JIACG's within the Combatant Commands and ad hoc PRT's in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrate that cooperation and coordination are essential to whole of government approaches. However, until the U.S. has a framework to provide

more definitive command and control (C2) it is unlikely that national or international unity of effort in SRO will be realized. The final interrelated category frustrating attainment of the smart power vision involves organizational and cultural impediments within the IA.

Cultural frictions and capacity challenges within individual organizations are largely dependent on the strategic focus, leadership and resourcing mechanism factors discussed above. Irrespective of these transformational necessities, organizations largely continue to lack the incentive structures (reporting chains, cross departmental authorities, evaluations and promotion), training programs, and personnel laws required to realize integrated SRO smart power. Initiatives such as the 1986 Goldwater Nichols Act (GNA) represent how organizational parochialism can be overcome by altering the incentive structure without significantly adding organizational structure.⁴⁷ Although avoiding temptations to add bureaucracy is almost always advisable in the resource constrained environment, it is evident that the necessary functions of oversight and enforcement of IA planning and execution exceeds current executive branch capability. This limitation is at least in part represented by the fact that the CSRG is not a permanently standing strategic level capability. Lastly, in order to realize the expeditionary capacity to rapidly export unified hard and soft power, employees must be appropriately trained, motivated, resourced and compensated. As evidenced by the nearly six years required to build the CRC, current legislative restrictions constrain recruitment and development of the human capital required for successful SRO. Armed with an understanding of the strategic environment and key shortfalls in the U.S.

Government's ability to execute SRO, improvements to operational approaches may now be considered.

Considering Operational Approaches

The QDDR states that:

State and USAID will coordinate with interagency partners, through the National Security Staff led process, to develop an International Operational Response Framework that establishes the systems and procedures necessary to ensure transparent and accountable leadership structures and agency lines of responsibility which, when combined, will leverage and deliver the full range of U.S. international disaster, crisis, and conflict response resources.⁴⁸

As this framework matures the examples of CORDS in Vietnam and the U.S. National Response Framework (NRF) serve well to inform the shortfalls identified in the U.S. current national security system.

The CORDS program was enacted in Vietnam in 1967 in response to fledgling pacification efforts to secure popular support for the South Vietnam Government and in turn combat the insurgent activities of the Viet Cong (VC) and National Liberation Front (NLF). President Johnson became a primary driver of this program after enduring years of failed efforts to synchronize hard and soft power instruments in what amounted to SRO. The ultimate decision to achieve unity of purpose through unity of command placed ambassadors and general officers within an updated chain of command in the Headquarters of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV). Although General Westmorland retained overall command of the organization, Ambassador Robert Komer effectively served as a 3- star Deputy Commander with equal, if not greater, access to senior civilian leadership to include President Johnson. Komer had both soldiers and civilians assigned within the CORDS program and pursued personnel management based on capabilities and not organizational affiliation. Integrating civilian and military

capabilities within a unified chain of command introduced a sense of shared responsibility to both security and development lines of effort for the first time in the campaign. Ironically, “subordinating civilian capabilities to the military chain of command actually realized the principle of the primacy of civil power.”⁴⁹ This primacy included access to resources that civilian agencies did not previously have and most importantly it helped to ensure “that political objectives took precedence over those of the military.”⁵⁰

CORDS evolved into six major programs which not surprisingly align almost identically to the five doctrinal SRO end states recognized in current doctrine. Key initiatives in land reform, agricultural development, healthcare reform, and local government investment addressed root causes of conflict and were “effective at winning peasant support for the South Vietnamese government and put a major dent in VC recruiting efforts.”⁵¹ Pacification efforts were facilitated by a Hamlet Evaluation system leveraged by the CORDS Research and Analysis Division to identify and measure the impact of operations on root causes. This concept has been recently revived within current SRO in the form of the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework first employed by the UK’s 52nd Brigade in Helmand Province Afghanistan in late 2007. CORDS also targeted the insurgents themselves to compliment the security line of effort General Westmorland pursued against North Vietnamese conventional forces. This balanced approach between security and development resulted in 93% of the South Vietnamese believing they lived in “relatively secure villages” and between 80 and 90 percent voting in local elections by 1970.⁵²

A critical initiative encouraged by the CORDS experience is the current consideration to pool budgets through alignment with functional lines of effort. This would encourage agencies to develop mutually supporting capabilities and incentivize unity of effort. The potential dangers of pooled funding includes the “proliferation of small projects unconnected to a wider strategy,” competition between departments for limited resources and the potential encouragement of adding new structures with duplicative capability.⁵³ Based primarily on the unpredictable and often time sensitive nature of SRO, the benefits of pooling resources to leverage a wider array of idle capability far outweigh potential inefficiencies. In addition to resource pooling, CORDS demonstrated the benefits of organizational incentive measures.

Reporting chains and performance evaluations were aligned with the integrated chain of command from MAC-V Headquarters to the district level. This resulted in civilians reporting to and rating military personnel and vice versa. Manning strategies based on capability and demonstrated performance rather than departmental affiliation provided additional motivation to serve the broader purpose of U.S. and South Vietnamese objectives. These and other similar measures encouraged organizational culture to homogenize and, over time, the “parochial departmental and agency interests” that “paralyze interagency cooperation” were largely overcome.⁵⁴ Lessons from CORDS do not conclude that subordinating civilian leadership within military theater commands is the always the answer. Dependent on the security situation and other factors, this paradigm could easily be reversed, especially if resources and capability were brought more into alignment. Just as CORDS serves as a useful

reference for principles to consider in designing an SRO framework, so does America's National Response Framework.

The NRF provides the foundation, upon which the U.S. Government plans, organizes, equips, trains, exercises and responds to domestic incidents from natural disasters to terrorism. This framework is civilian led and provides an excellent example of how the different instruments of power may be synchronized without creating unnecessary additional structure. The NRF is also founded in the concept of tiered response which empowers the "lowest jurisdictional level capable of handling the work."⁵⁵ This principle may be extrapolated to the need for building both an IA country team and host nation capacity during sustained phase zero operations. Leveraging feedback from integrated efforts at the tactical level is essential to informing the current IMS, top-down driven, SRO framework. SRO must be prioritized but should be considered as enduring at varying levels and should be founded on the principles of preparedness and prevention which too often are reserved only for natural threats. The NRF effectively informs three of the critical SRO Framework shortfalls previously introduced; organization, resources and unity of effort.

"In developing this new framework, State and USAID will draw on applicable elements from the widely-recognized" and NRF based "National Incident Management System (NIMS)."⁵⁶ NIMS provides the organizational structure and empowered leadership necessary for effective command and control across multiple agencies.⁵⁷ An essential component of NIMS is the fifteen Emergency Support Functions which formally identify lead and supporting agencies along critical functional lines. This structure is driven by specific IA authorities and capability and "provides the greatest

possible access to Federal department and agency resources.”⁵⁸ Additional NIMS enabled capability pertinent to SRO involves pre-scripted mission assignments, advanced readiness contracting and pre-positioned resources. Pre-scripted mission assignments force information sharing and collaboration as IA resources and capabilities are organized, tailored and trained in support of mandatory exercises and other directed preparation tasks. As alluded to in the first ever QDDR, the interagency cooperation forcing functions between national and state level IA in support of domestic response should be extrapolated to the international environment for the full spectrum of SRO threats.

The NRF also provides an example of how to bridge the coordination gap between strictly hierarchical, military based, chains of command and the more collaborative and representative decision making process ultimately required for sustained state legitimacy. The Incident Command System (ICS) was structured in the 1970’s to facilitate command of control in combating wildfires and is the basis for NIMS. ICS establishes the unified command necessary for “direct, on scene control of tactical operations.”⁵⁹ The NRF reverses the traditional military hierarchy of unified command by designating all C2 echelons above the incident command post as supporting entities that work together in a hybrid command structure which effectively bridges unity of command and unity of effort. For example, the Joint Field Office is the primary federal incident management field structure and is led by the Unified Coordination Group comprised of a small number of designated state and federal officials, including military personnel. Although consensus based decision making is required within this body, it is definitively structured, equipped, trained and exercised to support the incident

commander. These NRF systems provide insight to the required development of tailorable C2 structures based on evolving state stability. In designing the necessary transition of C2 requirements from military to civilian and from directive in nature to collaborative, the NRF should be leveraged to the maximum extent possible.

Conclusion

By designing a SRO framework that proactively addresses true unity of purpose, functionally applies available resources, and addresses organizational shortfalls across the IA, smart power can realistically be achieved. Work on this framework over the next several years must include the international community including organizations such as the UN, NATO, G-20, European Union, African Union and others. This effort not only involves structure, C2 and the application of resources but the strategic guidance based on a fundamental appreciation of root causes of instability and an appropriate balance between security and development efforts. The unity of effort challenges faced by the U.S. IA pale in comparison to those with the international community but the same principles generally apply.

Significant efforts since NSPD-44 have generally failed to significantly enhance SRO because they remain nested in a national security system designed for the independent or sequential application of power. The current strategic environment combined with U.S. enduring national interests necessitates a renewed commitment to state sovereignty that will only be realized by appreciating how the needs of empowered populations are acting on the trinity. Both Maslow and Clausewitz remain timeless in identification of foundational root causes of conflict and the forces to be balanced in order to realize the state legitimacy required for international stability. In gathering the courage to transform the world's most powerful security system the U.S. must extricate

itself from the precarious moral high ground of values proliferation, break its transfixion with Desert Storm type operations and leverage critical lessons from less memorable histories such as Vietnam and Hurricane Katrina.

In studying Vietnam the U.S. can leverage lessons from a CORDS program that proved successful in accomplishing objectives and effects along the five SRO lines of effort. CORDS demonstrated the adaptive nature of U.S. organizational culture and should provide confidence that the benefit of unified command far outweighs the cost and challenges associated with IA integration. CORDS leveraged a civilian capacity that the CRC is only today beginning to reestablish, but it was ultimately successful as a result of integrating structure, not adding to it. By examining one of the greatest natural disasters in U.S. history the IA may similarly derive principles and lessons that inform the national security framework currently under design. Hurricane Katrina exposed an untested NRF that was neither fully developed nor well executed. Resulting improvements to the NRF exemplify how unity of effort can still result in unified action when driven by appropriate resource and decision making authorities. Through consideration of both of these dark memories it is possible to both inform and inspire an ability to influence a very different modern strategic environment in the manner necessary to realize enduring U.S. national interests.

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