

POLICIES GOVERNING MILITARY FOOD SERVICE CONTRACTS EFFECT SOLDIER READINESS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**POLICIES GOVERNING MILITARY FOOD SERVICE CONTRACTS EFFECT
SOLDIER READINESS**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Policies providing food service contracts within Iraq and Afghanistan and other combat areas allow for the utilization of food service personnel in non field feeding duties. These contracts employ a variety of personnel to perform key tasks from ordering, preparation to serving. Aiding these contracts are food products provided by industry which potentially use less or inexperienced personnel for preparation. Often Soldiers providing these functions serve in alternative roles as truck drivers, guards or guardians in the form of contracting officer technical representatives of these outsourced facilities. Commanders endorse these temporary increases of capability, because of the personnel surge capacity despite the potential long-term impacts to Soldiers. Additionally, industry partners currently create more self-efficient food products will simplifying the preparation process. This reduces both the need for certified personnel for preparation and questions the significance for food service personnel. Overall, this potentially impact Service members, particularly Soldiers, long term due to significant degradation of skill. Army readiness is the ultimate effect from these practices. Without periodic employment, Soldiers are in danger of becoming extinct.

This paper considers how the use of contractors and current industry practices degrade Service members' ability to maintain their professional skills, which ultimately impacts Army readiness.

POLICIES GOVERNING MILITARY FOOD SERVICE CONTRACTS EFFECT SOLDIER READINESS

There are two things man must do in order to survive. He must eat and sleep and no one supports eating better than the 92G Food Service Professional.

—Director Joint Culinary Center of Excellence¹

When the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army drafted the 2010 Army Posture Statement and stated, “*The Army must Retrain Soldiers, Leaders, and Units to build critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in the current security environment,*”² clearly they both understood the impacts from a long arduous 10 year war. Specifically, they realized the need of Soldiers re-learning skills necessary for succeeding in future battles and wars. Current policy within Afghanistan and Iraq go against the above ideals because of servicing contracts, which outsource food service capability and poses a threat to Service members with this expertise. The skills of a Food Service Specialist or 92G, is a perishable one requiring frequent utilization. Without practice, these skills depend on timely and costly retraining. Extensive efforts go into preparing each Soldier for tomorrow’s conflicts. Unfortunately, this training is possibly challenged somewhat due to the emergence of these food service contractors on the battlefield fulfilling their functions within Iraq, Afghanistan, and many bases Army wide. This is of Army wide importance because when 92Gs deploy to an area of operations (AOR) today, they have a tendency to occupy fixed facilities versus utilizing the professional training acquired at Fort Lee’s Joint Culinary Center of Excellence. Additionally, when not performing their trained skills, they become the utilization force needed by their unit. This is a problem because in future operations, U.S. forces may

deploy to undeveloped or austere environments therefore needing to establish field feeding sites which is imperative to Soldier survival and moral.

Overall, this impacts Army readiness because Soldiers either return to originating bases or deploy to other locations with diminished skills. Additionally, retraining these Soldiers to standard is timely, expensive, and limits the Army's ability to perform a critical sustainment function of feeding troops.

This paper examines issues with contracted services specifically for food and their impacts to Food Service Soldier readiness. Specifically, it focuses on current war AORs while highlighting historical perspectives on the needs for contracts and builds the argument of the Army's dependency. It examines current training methods used by the United States Quartermaster School's Joint Culinary Center of Excellence dispelling any possible competency shortfalls or lack of capability. It also analyzes present day culture of industry response to current food service requirements in theater and current methods of control. Finally, this paper makes the case of the impacts if current practices persist and provides recommendations or alternatives for future food service support.

Contractors on the Battlefield Background

Civilian contractors on the battlefield have been documented as far back as the 16th Century. Martin van Creveld noted in his book, *Supplying War*, that early commanders realized the need to furnish their armies with supplies beyond what they could plunder. They did this through the use of sutlers, which were paid to bring supplies to the army.³ All facets of general logistics support have been contracted at one time or another during this century including food, laundry, sanitation, shower service, security, recreation, translator service, terminal and base camp operations, water and power production, and medical service support.⁴

Since 2001, U.S. forces have been deployed in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Normally, when theaters become mature, contracts for food, life support, and other services are acquired. Per Field Manual (FM) 4.0, after a Joint Task Force Port Opening element completes its tasks, which include rapidly deploying and initially operating aerial and sea ports of debarkation and establishing a distribution node to facilitate port throughput, there is a handover to the sustaining force normally 60 days after their arrival at an operating base. The mission handoff to these sustainment forces become outsourced to contractors.⁵

Early in 2003, many of these contracts became possible through the logistic civil augmentation program or LOGCAP. However, they did not occur without scrutiny because the House of Representatives, specifically Ranking Minority Member Henry A Waxman, began investigating the LOGCAP no-bid contracts worth over \$425 million awarded to Halliburton's subsidiary Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR).⁶

United States Army Material Command oversees all logistic civil augmentation programs around the world. LOGCAPs are Army components of Department of Defense (DOD) contracting efforts to negotiate pre-existing contracts with U.S. vendors to provide a wide range of support in categories such as facilities, supplies, services, maintenance, and transportation. When there is inadequate logistics support available from U.S. military or host nation sources, LOGCAP contracts are activated.⁷ According to Army Regulation 700-137, LOGCAP objectives are to preplan for the use of civilian contractors to perform selected services in wartime to augment Army forces. Utilization of civilian contractors in a theater of operation will release military units for other missions or fill shortfalls.⁸

Initially, these contracted LOGCAP services proved extremely valuable but evidence shows over time they superseded their intent. Some units made conscious decisions to either leave behind their 92Gs in garrison or deploy them in other capacities. When deploying them, they served as contracting officers technical representatives within fixed facilities to oversee contractor provided field feeding operations. The Army recognizes that with today's operational tempo, there is a need for civilian contractors to perform select services in wartime to augment its Army forces, but that does not mean that 92Gs are no longer relevant in today's Army feeding mission.⁹

Other Services also engage in utilizing contracts; conversely, they are geared more towards garrison operations. Per the United States Air Force Contracting Strategic Plan's mission statement, they develop and execute responsive strategies and compliant sourcing solutions to enable global Air Force missions.¹⁰ One of its guiding principles is to "never award a contract at the expense of integrity."¹¹ Their guidance specifically states their civilian contracted workforce provides exemplary support and continuity while remaining prepared to carry the weight at home station.¹²

To further expand on the idea of garrison support and the inflated contracting operations of industry becoming a lucrative business and potentially constant, SYSCO of Central Florida, Ocoee, Florida, was awarded a maximum \$16,073,940 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-quantity, prime vendor contract for full-line food service distribution. There are no other locations of performance. The using Services are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. At the direction or requests from the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia (formerly Defense Supply Center

Philadelphia) has responsibility for contracting all such food actions when meeting the needs or requirement for U.S. Service members domestically and internationally.¹³

Contracts such as this typically provide false pretenses of current force capability for self sustainment. Within the influential environment, Service or congressional leadership may have a tendency to formulate pictures or dependencies on outsourced services verses utilizing or adding to current Military capability regardless of garrison, Iraq, and Afghanistan operations.

The Value of Training 92Gs

Training of the Army's Food Service Specialists or 92Gs occurs under the auspices of the Quartermaster School's Joint Culinary Center of Excellence (JCCoE) at Fort Lee, Virginia. This organization is the primary executer for the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) policies for volunteers coming into the food service profession. Since 1995, they've become the primary training location organization for Food Service by expanding training beyond the U.S. Army. Today, included are the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines. The U.S. Army provides the location and in some cases the actual training by way of an inter-service training review organization, which is an agreement to utilize the same food service training principles. This allows for each individual receiving the training to apply the learned job skills particular for his or her Service.

There is a significant process when molding brand new recruits or enlisted initial entry individuals into a food service Soldier. U.S. Army TRADOC Regulations 350-6 provides the guidance, policies, procedures, and responsibilities for managing and conducting initial entry training (IET). IET consists of basic combat training, one station unit training, advanced individual training (AIT), and any other formal enlisted Army

training accomplished within the IET environment received prior to the awarding of an initial military occupational specialty (MOS) (for example, English language training).¹⁴ Programs of instruction (POI) are developed and executed per their outlines or guidance designated by the leadership.

IET training categorizes into five phases which are Red (I), White (II), Blue (III), an immersion of learning Army core values, traditions, Army warrior ethos, discipline, introduction to physical fitness, and basic combat skills and tactical training.¹⁵ Phases Black (IV) and Gold (V) represent the AIT portion of where volunteers receive MOSs and certified entry into the Army general population.¹⁶

The overall twenty to twenty one week process relies on critical gates being met by volunteers. The last phases serve as the argument basis for Soldiers having the capability to execute their training in any environment. These phases are further categorized into specified focused areas of training depicted in Figure 1.

U.S. ARMY
QUARTERMASTER
SCHOOL

JCCoE Training Matrix

JCCoE TRAINING																					
	D1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
		WEEK-1					WEEK-2					WEEK-3					WEEK-4				
Army		InProc	IntroSSN			Tech of Cooking					SmQty Btg					SmGarrison					
Marines		InProc	IntroSSN			Tech of Cooking					SmQty Btg					GarrisonCPS					
Navy		InProc	INFO			Tech of Cooking					SmQty Btg					SmGarrison					
Air Force		InProc	Intro			Food Fundamentals														Services	

JCCoE TRAINING	JOINT CULINARY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE TRAINING MATRIX																															
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42										
	WEEK-5					WEEK-6					WEEK-7					WEEK-8																
Army	IntroFOTB					Round Robin					Field Feeding					Warrior S&N					Out Proc	Grad										
Marines	GarrisonCPS		Field Feeding														Quarterm		Out Proc	Grad												
Navy	Galley		Out Proc	Grad																												
Air Force	Services					Out Proc					Grad																					

Legend:

SS&N = Sanitation, Safety & Nutrition

FOTB = Field Operations Training Branch

Warrior Logisticians

Figure 1:¹⁷

For eight weeks, AIT service members undergo intense but focused expert led training in becoming a food service specialist. Figure 1 captures the current outline of the training program highlighting all of the services areas of instruction and sets boundaries for individualized requirements; then again for purposes of this study, the Army is the focal point. Soldiers receive initial instruction from JCCoE regarding safeguarding food products, safety for a food service environment, and a nutritional course. Next, they learn the basic techniques for navigating a kitchen from the type of equipment used to determining proper amounts for food products, enhancements, flavorings etc. They transition into small quantity baking which reinforces the need to learn to cook without having pre-made products provided by industry today. This area of instruction becomes critical to reshaping morale on the battlefield because sometimes these ready made products are not always available. This capability immediately impacts an environment.

Following this training, Soldiers receive the opportunity to apply previously learned areas of instruction in a garrison or commercial environment. Finally, Soldiers experience tactical training regarding food service equipment usage and employment; preservation of food products in a field environment and food operational sustainment, which culminates in a field training exercise (FTX). This final training answers the question of why Food Service Soldiers exist because they obtain those skills necessary for the survival of U.S. forces operating within the focused AOR.

The expert led training program at Fort Lee is designed to provide Soldiers and Service members the necessary skills to execute and perform under any condition in garrison or combat. The Army's training development process or systems approach to training (SAT) is a systematic approach to making these

training/education decisions. The SAT process is used by TRADOC Total Army School System Training Battalions and all subordinate organizations responsible for managing or performing training development related functions, including evaluation and quality assurance of the training, personnel, products, and institutions that present the training/education.¹⁸ Eight weeks of reinforced written and hands on subject matter expert instruction provided by JCCoE validates their capacity to execute in Iraq and Afghanistan in which many endeavor shortly after graduation. Not maximizing this capability reflects wasted time and money by the Army. Since fiscal year (FY) 08, the Army trained nearly 4,000 food service personnel on an annual basis by the previously mentioned process. Although the amount of personnel decreased to an approximately 3,500 personnel from FY 11 projections, nearly 3,130 of those trained in FY 10 comprised of Army personnel.¹⁹

Given the frequency of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan AORs, a valid argument of having enough required resources is justified considering President Barack Obama's declaration of ending the war and implementing a withdrawal from Iraq. Food Service Soldiers are trained and ready to assumed directed tasks, yet industry's support culture poses a threat to their survival. Easy, quick, and fast are constant themes throughout the current Army military food of today due to technological advances. Without careful administrative control, the results of these practices likely impact 92Gs in an Army wide personnel perspective.

Industry Practices and Control

During Napoleonic times, his quote, "*An army marches on its stomach,*"²⁰ proved applicable due to the scarcity of vendors and types of available food sources. Today

there are hundreds of thousands of vendors providing products ranging across the span of all the food groups and liquids. The food industry remains a very broad and lucrative business. According to the Plunkett Research Ltd, U.S. consumers spend in excess of about 1 trillion dollars on food.²¹ Markets continue growing, though select companies choose to provide products to the Department of Defense. Many choose this course of action based on the consistency of military demands and timely reimbursement for provided products. For the Army, the food program for subsistence was in excess of \$3.8 billion for fiscal year 2009.²² For Afghanistan, subsistence accounted for over \$2 billion and provided for over 216 delivery locations and over 500,000 meals daily for fiscal year 2010.²³ Like any other business, their primary focus is meeting the needs of the customer. To put into scope the magnitude of this business, 2008 the food contract awarded to Anham Company for Afghanistan cost \$2.2 billion for maintaining a variety of food products.²⁴ The LOGCAP figure for providing host nation support to fully operate U.S Army standing dining facilities in Iraq in 2004 equated to \$1.4 billion dollars.²⁵

Since technology continues evolving and military demands often change based on surging requirements, it forces industry to constantly reinvent itself to remain competitive and operational. During the process of remaining relevant and competitive, companies may target areas for expansion or for increased production without clearly understanding the complete cycle for military food service, which essentially is the training of personnel to prepare a product for Service member's consumption. Instead, they become more focused with the technology side for producing products that are quickly prepared by Service members with minimum committed personnel for preparation and eases distribution. The culture of the food service industry places

emphasis on improving efficiencies in terms of speed of production and expediency for distribution. Keeping the customers happy is a priority but their culture, like any other capitalistic entity, they exist to make money. One company's slogan is "What Matters to You Matters to Us."²⁶ They make the argument of how food distributors or in the military case prime vendors, do not necessarily put the customer first and do not understand the second and third order of effects from providing a service. There are two important sides of industry. One is the producer of the food products and the other is contracted personnel on the ground in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan providing the food service operation. Both seize opportunities to capitalize on shortfalls experienced by the military; still what has happened is this support has become the norm versus meeting a valid need.

Within Iraq and Afghanistan, contracts being issued continue to grow. One author suggested the required competitive process for these contracts rests with only certain companies such as KBR (formally Brown, Root and Kelly), DynCorp, Washington Group International, and IAP Worldwide Services (Cerberus Capital Management) to name a few. In fact, U.S. government contracts overall regarding work in Iraq and Afghanistan have grown more than fifty percent annually, from \$11 billion in 2004 to almost \$17 billion in 2005 and more than \$25 billion in 2006. David Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States until 2008, provided comments to The Center for Public Integrity regarding the escalation of government contracts across the board over the past five years beginning in 2004. Walker noted particular problems with military contracting. He noted 15 systemic, longstanding acquisition and contracting problems

that exist within the Defense Department, which is the single biggest contractor within the U.S. government.²⁷

When implementing controls or providing industry general direction, the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support organization based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania serves as the conduit between the Services and industry.²⁸ Specifically, their Subsistence Directorate Operational Rations Division provides streamline management of all Operational Ration Programs and a master strategy for the integration of the Nation's industrial base for military rations.²⁹ An operational ration is a ration that is used in a field or austere environment such as the meal ready to eat or unitized group ration. Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support Subsistence Division simply contracts all rations at each Service's request.

In order to prevent industry from developing random products from any sources, the DOD institutes various controls. Military food items are procured in accordance with the provisions of the Berry Amendment and the Buy American Act (BAA), which is an act restricting foreign access to U.S. government.³⁰ The Berry Amendment (Title 10, United States Code, Section 2533a) requires DOD to give preference to the procurement of domestically produced, manufactured, or home grown products, notably food, clothing, and fabrics.³¹ The Berry Amendment is referenced in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), part 225.7002 of the DFARS lists unless a specific exception in law applies, the products, components, or materials listed below must be grown, reprocessed, reused or produced in the United States if they are purchased with funds made available (not necessarily appropriated) to DOD. Except for manufactured or processed food, and chemical warfare protection clothing as explained

in DFARS 225.7002-2 “Exceptions,” this applies to prime contractors and subcontractors at any tier.³² Other controls include food safety and quality assurance policies for the Services, DOD agencies, and components, in partnership with the U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command, a division of the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, the U.S. Army Veterinary Command, the Food and Drug Administration, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).³³

The Army’s control comes in the form of dietary and nutritional standards as outlined in Army Regulation 40–25.³⁴ This regulation establishes nutritional standards, termed “military dietary reference intakes,” for military feeding and establishes nutritional standards for operational rations. It covers responsibilities of the Services’ Surgeons General and the Services’ food service programs. It identifies the effects of environmental factors on energy and nutrient requirements and outlines nutrition education policy. The nutrition standards apply to the Services’ hospital food service programs, the Services’ food service programs, and the DOD Combat Feeding Program. Compliance with this regulation is required for all food service operations, whether provided by government sources or through contractor support.³⁵ The industry representative or prime vendor complies before the Army agrees with procurement of the products.

Additionally, the Army has coordination responsibility for the Joint Services Operational Rations Forum (JSORF). This forum brings together DLA Troop Support, DOD Combat Feeding Directorate, U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research Development and Engineering Center, and all Services representatives for decision. The final approval comes from the Office of the Surgeon General and U.S. Army’s Joint Culinary

Center of Excellence Army Center for Excellence Subsistence (ACES).³⁶ The JSORF is the cornerstone in improving and recommending future requirements supporting field feeding and all types of contingency operations. It provides industry and academia with the way ahead for food and related products supporting future tactical feeding operations.³⁷

America is a capitalistic society with decisive needs for its Service members on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Complete embellishment of the military could exist if certain governmental regulations did not apply. More importantly, existing services within the combat area operation particularly for food services may appear filling needs of the Services; on the other hand, there are overall impacts to the government, specifically the U.S. Army.

Impacts and Recommendations

Current policies regarding feeding operations in theater poses great Army wide threat to the food service professional. If policies persist, a capability is potentially lost. Carl von Clausewitz once quoted "*there is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war.*"³⁸ Lack of strategic considerations serves as the many obstacles lying ahead not only for the 92G Soldier, but for all food service personnel operating in theater. Sun Tzu quoted, "*The line between disorder and order lies in logistics.*"³⁹ Having the correct personnel to provide certain functions contributes to order from a logistical perspective.

Food service personnel are trained by the staff at Fort Lee and capable of supporting humanistic requirements described by the Director, Joint Culinary Center of Excellence. Executing this task is not without challenges. There are two main areas of concern impacting the future of the food service professional, particularly for the U.S.

Army. The primary and probably the most significant challenge is the pending force reductions due in part by a slow U.S. economy and extended war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Next is industry's attempt to validate personnel shortages through the continued development and production of operational rations requiring less specialty or job skilled servicemen for food preparation. Additionally, field commanders continue requesting contracted support at deployed areas, which adds to an already present problem.

Continuing to use contracts appears as the root of a potential problem. One author asks the question "should we use contractors?"⁴⁰ This author makes the argument that the U.S. only uses contracted services because of the political ease of deploying contractors instead of Soldiers. Naturally, this can lead to abuse and corruption regardless the category of service. In June 2010, during Danielle Brian's testimony before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, he asked if contractors were performing inherently governmental functions? He stated, "any operations that are critical to the success of the U.S. government's mission in a combat zone must be controlled by government personnel."⁴¹ Clearly, using these efforts meet short-term gains but subsequently come at a cost.

The periodic need for shoring up Service shortfalls is not a point of contention; the fact of having a growing dependency of contractors is a concern. Critical points include when Service members, especially Soldiers, deploy to un-established or austere areas on the battlefield, the contractor may not or refuse to deploy to that area. Additionally, there are key issues of safety because the outsourced labor force possibly comes in the form of a Third Country National. Unfortunately, other countries do not

practice food safety like the U.S., which opens up a possibility of food being tainted or causing other associated risks to Service personnel. An expedient way to infiltrate a force is through stealth or negligent feeding operations. According to Sun Tzu, *“in conflict, direct confrontation will lead to engagement and surprise will lead to victory.”* *“Those who are skilled in producing surprises will win.”* *“Such tacticians are as versatile as the changes in heaven and earth.”*⁴²

In December 2010, the disclosure of the Government’s dependency and growing concern for potential contractor support corruption became validated when DOD was forced into a multimillion-dollar contract extension. The Agility company in Kuwait was under investigation for over billing food contracts worth \$8.5 billion dollars over a four year period. They received a \$26 million dollar contract extension for six months to continue feeding troops, civilians, and contractors in Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait.⁴³ Recurring themes of corruption from bidding to awarding contracts become possibilities without government oversight.

During President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address, he publically made mentioned that “The Secretary of Defense has also agreed to cut tens of billions of dollars in spending that he and his generals believe our military can do without.”⁴⁴ Built within those cuts are personnel. More than likely, areas targeted will undoubtedly be those considered underused or outsourced. Author Mark Cancian suggested for planning purposes, contractors are an integral and permanent part of U.S. force structure. He made the dispute that most of the U.S. personnel involved in these functions are blue-collar technicians (truck drivers, electricians, maintenance specialists), who keep materiel flowing and bases running. They are unarmed and often

highly skilled in their areas of expertise, frequently more so than their counterparts in the military who are often much younger and, in effect, apprentices in their trades.⁴⁵

Presently, the U.S. Army plans to cut 49,000 Soldiers equating to billions of dollars in the years to come. Currently, the projected end strength is around 520,000 in 2016. This is after both redeployments from Afghanistan and Iraq and after the Pentagon makes its final reductions.⁴⁶ The question on the table is the targeted reduction group. In 2007, the United States Army Combined Arms Support Command and Sustainment Center of Excellence chartered a team of food service experts at the direction of the Headquarters Department of the Army G4, to walk through the hypothesis of “if we where to lose Food Service Personnel, where could we possibly make the cuts.” This action directly resulted from the leaders in the Combat Arms community asking the question of how to add more Infantry, Armor, and Artillery Soldiers to the overall force. Today, the Army’s attrition total is now 1,000 or 10% of 92Gs from the entire food service capacity. Gone are Food Service Soldiers from Military Intelligence brigades due to current conflict and presumably the usage of food service personnel in theater.⁴⁷ Currently, there are 1,666 92Gs in theater who potentially are operating outside their MOS.⁴⁸

Being a nation at war over a ten year period has caused significant strain on the U.S. Military. The leadership realized the need for being a professional Soldier and developing a program outlining essential elements to return to the basics. TRADOC created a Profession of Arms pamphlet establishing guidelines for Soldiers to commit to what it means to be a professional. This manual depicts a multitude of messages and themes, yet a central theme is failure is not an option for United States and its people.

Therefore, failure of the military profession would have catastrophic consequences. American military professionals work, study, and train throughout their careers to ensure the military profession will not fail in its call to duty.⁴⁹ This passage reemphasizes the argument for each Soldier to know his job in order to fight and win, but in spite of this and a significant impact is Food Service Soldiers may conceivably not realize this guidance due to current theater policy. Another key impact include Soldiers showing their commitment to the Army's guiding values and standards by willingly performing their duty at all times and subordinating their personal welfare to that of others without expecting reward or recognition.⁵⁰ Again, this is another key impact potentially being surpassed due to current policy.

Compromise can be achieved by proposing resolutions in mitigating the problem. Unlike the culture for industry of making money, evidence depicts the U.S. Army above a capitalistic high ground which includes training its people and protecting the nation.

Recommendations

Each option represents an alternative to current policy. Additionally, each option considers feasibility, acceptability, suitability and associated risk for a strategic policy end state. The three recommendations include elimination of contracts providing food service in theater, change or take measures for the type of industry products provided to theater, and a combination of both options.

Eliminate contracts providing food service in theater. Eliminating contracts providing food service in theater mitigates the need for industry contracts to establish dining facility operations in permanent or semi-permanent buildings. Overall, this option has the likelihood of saving the U.S. Military billions of dollars on an annual basis. The desired *ends* from this option is returning the Food Service personnel to their original

formations to meet the needs of the Service members in theater. Furthermore, this option permits Service Members to exercise their job skills for preparing for tomorrow's wars without failure as expressed in the Army Profession of Arms document. A phased approach accomplishes the ways for this option. Establishing a transfer of responsibility serves as the method for assuming ownership for the mission. This allows for seamless transition for all end users in theater. It also allows for organizations to properly prepare their personnel before deployments. The *means* to achieving success reverts back to redirecting the funding used in contracts to more people, equipment and meal variety. Giving the opportunity for Food Service personnel to perform their mission re-instills excellence in the food service community and re-energizes confidence in end users. For the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test, eliminating contracts providing food service in theater is challenged due to current food service personnel shortages Army wide. Currently all Services train basic food service at Fort Lee, therefore imposing bilateral cross Service agreements easily meet theater needs. Without Service support these programs would essentially fail. Minimum associated *risks* exist when executing this option. There are possibilities of domestic contract disputes and law suits by industry partners not wanting to loose their contracts. Risks include other Services unwillingness to participate will leave the preponderance of the mission on the Army's shoulders. Some impact to government servicing companies may occur; however, the overall principle of returning Service Members to their jobs is a small price to pay.

Change or take measures for the type of industry products provided to theater.

Change or take measures for the type of industry products provided to theater need addressing. Currently, industry's culture for providing products in theater is fast, easy,

and uses minimum personnel for preparation. This option forces industry to re-look current practices putting the focus on the Service member executing mission oriented tasks. The desired *ends* from this option not only returns the Food Service personnel to executing mission tasks, it adds more controls on products being purchased. As for *ways*, similar to eliminating contracts providing food service in theater, a phased approach theoretically works best. Transferring the responsibility maintains the economic relationship without the large costs. This process also forces food service personnel to revert to the basics taught at Fort Lee. The *means* uses funding from redirected resources to increase the personnel numbers. For the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test, change or take measures for the type of industry products provided to theater like eliminating contracts providing food service in theater does not have the current personnel strength due to recent reductions. If all Services participate, the needs of the theater are met. If not, this program will fail. The *risks* include potential contractual disputes and theater leaders scrambling to fulfill requirements. Increased requests to other Services play an important factor in reaching success with change or take measures for the type of industry products provided to theater.

Eliminating contracts providing food service in theater and change or take measures for the type of industry products provided. Eliminating contracts providing food service in theater and change or take measures for the type of industry products provided completely eliminates industries influence while positively exposing Food Service personnel to execute the tasks independently. Industry must make paradigm shifts to remain relevant using this recommendation. The desired ends returns Food

Service personnel to executing mission tasks making them more relevant for future operations or deployments. As for ways, phasing processes allow for uninterrupted service primarily at the fixed operating bases. The means reallocate previous resources used in acquiring large and costly contracts and replacing them with increased personnel. For the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test, eliminating contracts providing food service in theater and change or take measures for the type of industry products provided doesn't have the current personnel strength, but assistance from other Services will meet current requirements. If not this program will fail. The risks include costly retraining of personnel to assume an overwhelming support mission. Based on the expert training provided at Fort Lee, this action is more of familiarization instead of completely starting over. Overall this option is win win and propels food service personnel into mission execution.

Conclusion

Current theater policies in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to effect the stability of food service personnel. These contracts provide short-term solutions, but the cost of doing business effects the food service Soldier potentially to a point of extinction. Industry continues to become wealthy even during a down economy. Their impacts to Soldier readiness remain a great concern, because no one knows when or where the next major conflict will take place. The probability of contractors' willingness to establish operations is uncertain, though Soldiers or Service members constitutionally answer the call every time to protect the nation. A solution is to apply one of the recommended options to cut overall budgeting costs and re-ignite favor and confidence in the food service Soldiers. Implementing one of these options provides the balance required to achieve success. This paper focused on the AOR, but the concepts extend to garrison

operations for all Services. Today, a reduction of Soldiers, but tomorrow a reduction in capability to support any Service. More attrition of Food Service Personnel is in the future if actions are not taken to resolve these issues.

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