

THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVE: THEORY AND HISTORY ON UNITY OF
EFFORT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVE: THEORY AND HISTORY ON UNITY OF EFFORT IN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS, by LTC Jan K. Gleiman, 222 pages.

The most respected theorists of counterinsurgency agree about prescriptive principles for the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. Insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns are each unique (*sui generis*), yet the theorists help provide common principles (*ceteris paribus*). The theorists state that counterinsurgents achieve unity of effort through centralized organization at the top and at lower geographic echelons. They also advocate for the interventionist power assisting the host country to similarly create a parallel organization. Organization theory provides the logical basis for this prescription. Counter-organization of the population is less prescriptive and is dependent on the uniqueness (*sui generis* nature) of the particular campaign. Three historic case studies; Malaya, Dhofar, and Vietnam are compared to contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns; Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate the wisdom of the theorists' prescription. Centralized organizations at the top and unified management at lower geographic echelons for both host country and interventionist power maintains unity of effort and prevents sub-organizational interests from distorting the counterinsurgency strategy. This prescriptive organization also enables the counterinsurgent to find the right solution for counter-organizing the population. The case studies further highlight the persistent organizational barriers that prevent the United States and its partners from organizing to fight and assist in counterinsurgency.

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ACRONYMS

AMF	Afghan Militia Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
BATT	British Army Training Team (SAS, Dhofar,Oman)
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CAT	Civil Action Teams (Dhofar, Oman)
CFC-A	Coalition Forces Command - Afghanistan
CFSOCC	Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary development Support (Vietnam)
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GVN	Government of Vietnam (South)
DDC	Dhofar Development Committee
DLF	Dhofar Liberation Front
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities

DWEC	District War Executive Committee
EPIG	Embassy Interagency Planning Group
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
HIG	Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin
IA	Iraqi Army
IP	Iraqi Police
IATF	Interagency Task Force
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
JAM	Jaysh al Mahdi
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LEP	Law Enforcement Professional
MAAG	Military Advisory Assistance Group (Vietnam)
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps - Iraq
MRLA	Malayan Races Liberation Army
MNF-I	Multi-National Force - Iraq
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDC	National Defence Council (Oman)
NLF	National Liberation Front (aka. Viet Cong, Vietnam)
OCO	Office of Civil Operations

OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PFLOAG	People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
PROVN	Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SAF	Sultan’s Armed Forces (Oman)
SAS	Special Air Service (British Special Operations)
SOI	Sons of Iraq
SWEC	State War Executive Committee
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Organizational Imperative

For the past decade, there has been a renewed and ongoing debate on counterinsurgency. It has filled the media outlets and the blogosphere with rhetoric and contention on many levels. Some of the debate concerns the best ways to fight the current counterinsurgency campaigns, while other parts of this complex discussion concern the very organizational essence and purpose of our armed forces. This research project unites these complex and disparate themes by exploring how the organization of the counterinsurgent force affects the counterinsurgency campaign.

In the last nine years since the 11th of September 2001 the United States (US) and several other partner nations have found themselves embroiled in campaigns whose aim is to defeat an insurgent force that threatens their perceived interest and in some cases the very existence of the established order within a country. In Iraq, the US and Iraqi government continue to be challenged by stability issues from the weakened, yet still active insurgencies that plagued the country after the US led invasion. In Afghanistan, the US, NATO, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) continue to fight against the multiple Pashtun-based insurgencies that include the Taliban and other related groups, each of them are at least influenced by al-Qaeda.¹ In several other countries from Southeast Asia, to Africa, to Latin America, governments continue to pursue campaigns against insurgents that challenge the existing order. Although these insurgencies pose an existential threat to the sitting governments, the governments often organized poorly to counter this threat. In several of these campaigns, especially in Iraq

and Afghanistan, the country leading the counterinsurgent effort finds itself using military units and organizational structures that were designed, organized, and trained for a conventional war. One only needs to look at the unused M-1A2 tanks that mostly sit idle and the battalions of artillery and air defense units that have found themselves re-tasked to infantry, advisory, or police duties in these two conflicts to quickly recognize that these campaigns are on a different end of the spectrum of warfare.² They also have civilian and interagency structures often conceived before the counterinsurgency campaign or developed incrementally over time to fix organizational problems or fill capability gaps rather than designed for the counterinsurgency mission at hand.³ Much of the organizational design in the major counterinsurgency conflicts of the last ten years has been ad hoc as commands and non-military departments attempt to create organizational models that will enable the campaign without shifting or disrupting bureaucratic turf, professional interests, or organizational culture.

Are the US and its partners using the best organizational models to fight counterinsurgency? Have we designed our plans and strategies with an understanding of how to best achieve unity of effort between civil and military authorities? Have we designed our organizations to establish and maintain local security or to enforce the authority of distant central governments? History may provide us with insight to answer these questions.

Research Questions

This research project answers the following general question. With respect to organizational models, are there historic lessons from counterinsurgency theorists and counterinsurgency campaigns that facilitated unity of effort where necessary? If so, could

counterinsurgent forces apply or adapt these lessons for current or future counterinsurgency campaigns? In order to answer these key research questions, this project answers a few general, but targeted supporting questions.

1. Many theorists agree that insurgency and counterinsurgency are primarily political struggles with key military and security components. Therefore, what civil-military organizational structures have counterinsurgent forces used to achieve unity of command, unity of effort, or harmony of effort between military and civilian or government entities?

2. What do theory and history provide with respect to the relationship between a host country government and an interventionist power in a counterinsurgency campaign?

3. Are there organizational principles from classic and modern organization theory that can help to identify favorable elements of counterinsurgent organization?

4. What role do concepts of structure, authority, leadership, and organizational culture play in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns?

5. How did unique characteristics of past counterinsurgency campaigns affect the organizational design of those counterinsurgent effort?

Summary of Results

Counterinsurgency warfare is no simple undertaking. Both theory and practice demand that the leaders and decision makers involved in the counterinsurgency campaign understand the nature of the problem and the unique nature of their particular situation. Attempting to merely cut and paste solutions from one campaign to another is an intellectual pitfall for counterinsurgency strategy just as it is for strategy in other forms of warfare. No specific way of organizing will provide any guarantee that the

counterinsurgency forces will prevail. Yet, the organization of any campaign is important because counterinsurgency warfare is complex and requires the combined efforts of various organizations of government at various levels. The theorists agree that getting the organization right is one of the first things the counterinsurgency campaign must do; failure to achieve unity of effort is the quickest way to defeat.⁴ This is especially true if the insurgents are well organized.⁵ As one of the leading proponents writes:

Counter-revolutionary warfare requires the use of military, political, psychological, economic, and organizational action from the village to national levels. These actions must be carefully coordinated in unified doctrine and plans to achieve specific objectives. Each unified plan must be backed by detailed plans of civic action, political operations, economic operations, security, military operations etc., which coordinate all available resources to achieve the required objectives. A unified plan obviously requires at each level a centralized intelligence, planning and control group and some individual who is responsible for ensuring coordination and for the success or failure of operations. Unified planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility are the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort, which will offer success against a unified revolutionary movement.⁶

The counterinsurgency theorists generally recommend that the counterinsurgent campaign be unified at the top with one single entity or leader. The case studies confirm the wisdom of the prescriptive theory as they demonstrate that counterinsurgency campaigns suffered when there was little unity of command at the top.

The theorists further advocate that at each geographic echelon of region, province, district and village, (or whatever the terms are in the area) that the organization be mirrored with a single entity or leader to manage and coordinate all activities. Again, each of the case studies seemed to demonstrate that without this unified management at each level, the counterinsurgency campaign suffered.

For interventionist powers, the theorists prescribe a system that mirrors this unity of command and effort on every level to coordinate all advisory assistance and support.

Again, here the case studies reinforced the importance of a mirrored structure of the interventionist not only because it provided unity of effort, but also because it greatly assisted the host country in building its own system. In almost every case, the structure set up by the interventionist to advise, helped the host country build its own security and governance structures.

The theorists also recognized the need to “counter-organize” the population. Yet, the case studies provided more insight than the theorists were able to give. The case studies suggest that the counterinsurgent can more readily achieve “counter-organization” of the population from the bottom-up. Counterinsurgency campaigns that relied solely on top-down governance and security provided exclusively or primarily by national or foreign assets had trouble effectively counter-organizing the population. Campaigns that made well-resourced efforts to co-opt existing social structures and their leaders (e.g. tribes, Diaspora communities) proved very effective.

Organization theory provides ample explanation for the theorists’ prescriptions of centralized control with decentralized authority. Organization theory holds that the best system of structuring for an undertaking is dependent upon the critical tasks.⁷ In a counterinsurgency campaign, several institutions must come together as one for an undertaking that effectively changes elements of their critical tasks. The military is often the largest institution involved and experiences the greatest shift in critical task between what it must accomplish in counterinsurgency warfare versus what it must accomplish to be successful at its intended mission, conventional warfare.⁸ For example, militaries that are trained, manned, equipped and designed for critical tasks that involve maneuver and destruction in major combat operations, find themselves addressing tasks in

counterinsurgency that involve protecting, advising, training, policing, and building trust. Other organizations involved experience similar shifts where their critical tasks link to military and political objectives. This shift in critical tasks runs counter to organizational culture and norms and disturbs the essence of institutions involved. This study breaks organization theory into four broad key categories or factors that policy makers must adjust to adapt an organization to a new critical task. They are structure, authority, leadership/personal dynamics, and organizational culture. Thus the counterinsurgency theorists, whether with purposeful understanding of organization theory or not, are recommending that the counterinsurgent campaign impose a new structure and realigned authority to break institutional barriers (from culture) and temporarily redefine organizational essence so that they meet the critical tasks of the counterinsurgency campaign. In two of the case studies, Malaya and Dhofar, the counterinsurgent did this successfully by realigning structure *and* authority toward counterinsurgency. These adjustments facilitated unity of effort but were not the only factor. In Vietnam, the counterinsurgent (both host country and interventionist power) began to use this approach late in the war with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS). It demonstrated some observable effectiveness toward unity of effort and positive results. In the two campaigns of the contemporary operating environment, the US and its partners have avoided the theorists' prescription of realigning authority *and* structure except when certain situations became untenable. Instead, the US has proceeded with ad hoc mechanisms for coordination and yielded to the parochial interests of organizations that fought to retain stove-piped authorities of the pre-counterinsurgency critical tasks of agencies and departments. They maintained command positions and

headquarters structures designed for major combat operations. In trying to reorganize for population centric counterinsurgency as an interventionist power, the career-centric interests of its own institutions of the US has persisted in thwarting the most serious efforts. The resulting structure of the interventionist advisory effort could be having negative effects on the building of sound host country institutions that will be a critical element of the current campaigns in years to come.

On a more positive note, this study found that initiatives by the US (especially the military) and commanders at various echelons are paying off toward unity of effort. In lieu of changes in structure *and* authority, the US has sought to change the organizational culture of the military and other agencies through doctrine and training. The armies of the US and United Kingdom (UK) have become learning organizations, even if stubborn bureaucratic interests are still prevailing in agencies, departments, and force-providing headquarters. Commanders at various levels are further influencing unity of effort initiatives by manipulating leadership and personal dynamics. For example, the introduction of US Army doctrine on counterinsurgency and full spectrum operations has yielded leaders who are not afraid to assume control of normally civilian dominated lines of effort at lower echelons. Commanders and their subordinates are embracing civilian integration and direct partnerships with civilian entities from both the US and host country. These relationships and arrangements may be “personality dependent” and acting with harmony of effort and purpose even if the authority and structure of a command relationship does not exist. While this study found numerous examples of changes in organizational culture and leadership/personal dynamics leading to unity of effort, there is still an undeniable undercurrent of opinion among practitioners and

leading policy professionals that realignment of structure and authority to systems closer to the theorists' prescription would be decisive in improving the overall efforts of the contemporary campaigns, especially in Afghanistan.

Study Methodology and Research Design

The methodology for this project is based primarily on comparative historical case studies. While the number of counterinsurgency campaigns in history could be limitless, the length of this thesis is not. Therefore, this study will examine three modern counterinsurgency campaigns that bear some similarity to the current campaigns. These are, the British and Malay campaign in Malaya 1948 to 1960, the British and Omani campaign in Dhofar, Oman 1965 to 1975, and the US and South Vietnamese campaign in Vietnam 1958 to 1975. In examining the organization of counterinsurgency efforts, this study looked at what can best be defined as leading theorists of both counterinsurgency and organization theory. Thus, this paper begins with a literature review that discusses definitions, counterinsurgency theory, doctrine and the interpretation of counterinsurgency theory, and organization theory as it applies to these campaigns. This literature review in chapter 1 helps to separate this study from some of the strategy debates about counterinsurgency by reexamining definitions and context of this type of warfare. There is limited discussion of the wisdom of pursuing counterinsurgency as an interventionist power or any normative judgments about the approaches that should be used. One cannot totally avoid this part of the counterinsurgency discussion. The wisdom of the pursuit of counterinsurgency on the part of an interventionist power as a strategy is central to the current debates. That debate is outside the scope of this study, but the fact that this study demonstrates the less than ideal ability of the US to organize for

counterinsurgency could be used as a point of argument against the use of counterinsurgency on the scale of some contemporary campaigns or point toward a reason for reorganization of some national security structures and relationships.

The study then looks at concepts of the value of theory, the use of history and attempts to tie together what the most respected theorists are saying about the subject of organizing a counterinsurgency effort. It examines common ground among the theorists on both principles of organizing the counterinsurgent effort, but also on the levels of prescriptive solutions for the actual organizational construct of the counterinsurgency campaign. Some of the key classic insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists include Mao-tse-tung, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, and John McCuen. Other more contemporary writers on the topic of counterinsurgency including, Daniel Marston, Kalev Sepp, John Nagl, Mark Moyar, David Kilcullen and John MacKinlay, are also used in this chapter to define some key concepts and illuminate some key points. Several of the authors were interviewed for this study. This study also reviews key parts of current doctrine to confirm some agreement on prescriptive aspects of counterinsurgency theory with respect to organization.

The second part of the literature review examines what organization theorists say about institutions in general and bureaucracy in government and national security in particular. These include material from instructional texts from the field of organization theory that define classical and modernist theory perspectives.⁹ It also includes the perspectives of more contemporary writers on the subject of organization with specific focus on security and governance including, John Q. Wilson and Morton Halperin. This part of study examines some key modern literature that addresses some aspects of

organization and counterinsurgency. These authors include Robert Komer, John Nagl, and Mark Moyar.¹⁰

The end of the chapter combines the wisdom of the counterinsurgency theorists with the understanding of organization theory and contemporary observations to provide a framework of four key categories that influence effectiveness.

Chapters 3 through 5 each examine a separate historical case study based upon the framework developed in the first chapter. Each examines the relevant background, summarizes the historical context of the counterinsurgency campaign, and then examines how the counterinsurgency was organized. This includes how the organization developed to its point of greatest effectiveness in pacifying or neutralizing the insurgency and reestablishing control of the counterinsurgency force.

In approaching this topic and examining each of these case studies, it was important to not bias the information based on whether or not the entire campaign was eventually viewed strategically as successful. There are many factors affecting the eventual perceived success or failure of a counterinsurgency campaign; this is most apparent in Vietnam. Instead, this study looked closely at the overall organization compared to the prescription of counterinsurgency theory and keeping in mind the categories of organization theory. Based on evidence, this study tries to determine if these factors facilitated successful outcomes or if there is evidence that they were counterproductive or inhibited progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in some way. As key themes are identified that relate to the organization employed by the counterinsurgent, those themes are articulated and examined to determine if, how, and why they manifest themselves in the other case studies.

According to a RAND study on modern insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, there have been over 86 such conflicts since 1934. Kalev Sepp, another respected contemporary counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner lists 48 such conflicts in the 20th century.¹¹ Both of these studies, however, leave out several conflicts that could accurately be described as counterinsurgency campaigns.¹² How then to determine which historic case studies to use? The case studies were chosen based upon accessibility of information on their organizational structure and an availability of data in the form of oral history, reports, and recorded metrics that can indicate results directly or indirectly related to the organization of the counterinsurgent force. Thus, Malaya, Vietnam, and Dhofar provide the three historic case studies, and Afghanistan and Iraq provide a more contemporary balance for the final case study chapter (Chapter 6, “Contemporary Operating Environment”). For each of these studies, the team of researchers from the CGSC Scholars Program obtained an exceptional amount of primary source material, especially in the form of first person oral history accounts. These included interviews with veterans, practitioners (both civil and military), and policy professionals in both the US and the UK. This study however, is probably most limited in its lack of primary source material from the perspectives of host nation counterinsurgent and insurgent forces. This gap is filled in part through secondary source material gained from other reliable and respected researchers.

Chapters 3 and 4 examine British influenced counterinsurgency campaigns. Chapter 3 focuses on Malaya. Key sources include primary source material including interviews with remaining veterans of the campaign. The study also makes ample use of the significant amount of secondary source work that exists. This includes a close look at

how the British and Malay authorities organized their civil and military hierarchy and how they worked together to include both British and Malayan elements. The study examined organizational effectiveness under the British administration and how it evolved under successive commanders including the plans of General Harold Briggs and also under General Gerald Templar. The chapter looks closely at the functioning of State and District Warfare Committees (SWCs and DWCs) as well as the integration of intelligence activities and special operations.

For chapter 4, the study focuses on the period of 1967 until 1975 when the British government ordered the SAS and other British forces to assist the Sultan of Oman in the pacification of a communist insurgency in the southern Dhofar region of the country. The British and the Sultan of Oman were successful and appear to have applied many of key counterinsurgency themes cited by a vast majority of respected theorists in the field. The difference in size, scope, and environment (physical and cultural) from other case studies helps to demonstrate how some additional organizational themes supported the successes of the campaign. The study uses some secondary material, but most of the sources are primary including the books of key individuals associated with the effort, as well as oral history interviews conducted in Britain with veterans of the campaign as part of the CGSC Scholars 2010 research project.

Chapter 5 examines the Vietnam case study and focuses on the US efforts from 1961 until 1972. This is a problematic case study for this project because Vietnam lasted so long and the organizational structure changed significantly in ways that both enhanced effectiveness and decreased effectiveness over time. While all of the case studies used demonstrate evolving organizational structures and dynamics, Vietnam is exceptionally

complex for the intended length of this thesis. The study approaches Vietnam with full understanding of multiple aspects of the conventional, war of movement, and the counterinsurgency fight. The chapter focuses on the organization of the pacification effort and how the civil and military organization and their linkages affected the counterinsurgency effort. For secondary source material, the study relies mostly on some of the most famous works including authors such as Andrew Krepinevich, James Willbanks, Robert Komer, and Dale Andrade. For primary source material, the study references some first-hand accounts, some of the independent reports on the pacification efforts and again the CGSC Scholars Program provided the opportunity for candid interviews with veterans of the war.

The first three case studies serve as a comparison for the next chapter (chapter 6), which examine two of the larger counterinsurgency campaigns currently being fought by the United States, the United Kingdom, their allies, and most importantly the host country governments that they imposed or facilitated to power. These contemporary counterinsurgencies are the ultimate reason for this study. In contrasting these contemporary campaigns with counterinsurgency theorists, organization theory, and previous historic case studies, this study should provide valuable insights for the organization of the these efforts and future efforts.

While counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq appear to have shown some clear signs of success, it would be premature to declare victory or label the campaign as a success. At the time of this writing the future of the current campaign in Afghanistan is anything but certain. Therefore, this study examines how the US and its host nation partners have approached the organizational issues. Much has been written and researched on these two

case studies, and this thesis makes full use of available secondary sources listed in the bibliography, but refrains from drawn out chronological analysis. The most significant advantage of this study is in the analysis of primary source material from oral history interviews conducted by the CGSC Scholars Class from 15 August through 1 October 2010. The CGSC Scholars group interviewed brigade commanders, key staff, and subordinates from US and UK armies and units recently returned from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the scholars interviewed policy professionals from both countries. These interviews helped gain clarity on how decisions on the organizational construct of these campaigns were made.

Chapter 7 concludes the study by comparing the key organizational themes derived in chapter one to the five case studies. This synthesis and summary provides the reader with key insights as to what organizational issues might be inhibiting or enhancing counterinsurgent progress in the current counterinsurgency campaigns. This chapter highlights what unique circumstances may have necessitated different organizational models or principles. It draws some conclusions about current organizational models and makes recommendations for changes that could improve the ability of the United States and the United Kingdom to conduct or support current and future counterinsurgency campaigns abroad.

¹Seth G. Jones, *In The Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009),152.

²See FM 3-0, *Operations* for full spectrum operations definitions. M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles have found moments in the contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns where they proved vital. These cases were the exception rather than the rule.

³Refer to any number of articles on the need for a Civilian Surge in Iraq or Afghanistan.

⁴This quote is a coincidental combination of three sources. Frank Kitson emphasizes the importance of getting the organization right first in his book and John McCuen states that failure to achieve unity of effort (the reason for organization) is the shortest road to defeat. General Petraeus, ISAF CDR in Afghanistan recently stated during an interview on NPR that NATO and the US were “just now getting the organization right (in Afghanistan).” Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* (London: Archon Books, 1971); John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005).

⁵All of the theorists used for this study were focused on well-organized communist insurgencies of the 20th Century. These insurgencies largely followed the Maoist model which saw insurgency as a way to take political power in a country from within through massive organization of an insurgency which was supported by the population.

⁶John McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 72.

⁷John Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It?* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 24.

⁸This statement applies primarily to western militaries like that of the United States that through their civil military traditions see the primary role and raison d’être of the military as combating foreign military threats to the state. Some militaries have a civil military tradition that defines the role of the military as protector of the state from both internal and external foes.

⁹Mary Jo Hatch. *Organization Theory: Modern Symbolic and Postmodern Perspectives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-19.

¹⁰Chapter 2 will also briefly examine the trends in modern organizational theory and phenomenon as they apply to modern insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. Recent authors and respected thinkers on counterinsurgency including, John MacKinlay and David Kilcullen, have begun to address some key elements of modern insurgency and how these new environmental concerns will change the way the counterinsurgent must approach the struggle. They have drawn an intellectual separation between the Maoist model of insurgency and new trends. This is really an area for further study and any in-depth analysis would be outside the scope and constraints of this particular study. The fact that insurgencies may be motivated by other motivations, may not necessarily seek to replace an existing government and may not have centralized organizations or even seek to organize the population could have serious effects on how a counterinsurgent force would deal with such threats.

¹¹Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 8-12.

¹²Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, “How Insurgencies End” (RAND Corporation Monograph Series, Santa Monica, CA, 2010). This study actually leaves out the Dhofar campaign. This is a strange omission for a study that intended to be comprehensive, though information on this campaign has been very limited until recently.

CHAPTER 2

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND ORGANIZATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND DEFINITIONS

The Trouble with the Current Counterinsurgency Debate

At the time of this writing, “Counterinsurgency” has become a contemporary cliché. The word itself sparks tangential debates inside the US military, academia, and inside the beltway of Washington, D.C. Some of the debates are intermingled with “population centric” counterinsurgency as a policy or a strategy where pundits often insincerely debate the wisdom of loaded terms such as “nation building.” Some of the debate concerns the best ways to fight the current counterinsurgency campaigns, while other parts of this complex discussion concern the very organizational essence and purpose of our armed forces.¹ Unfortunately, many policy advocates in particular choose to use selective history. As one contemporary writer explains:

Counterinsurgency aims at reshaping a nation and its society over the long haul,” says military historian Frank Chadwick, and emphasizes “infrastructure improvements, ground-level security, and building a bond between the local population and the security forces. . . . In theory, COIN sounds reasonable; in practice, it almost always fails. Where it has succeeded—the Philippines, Malaya, Bolivia, Sri Lanka, and the Boer War—the conditions were very special: island nations cut off from outside support (the Philippines and Sri Lanka), insurgencies that failed to develop a following (Bolivia) or were based in a minority ethnic community (Malaya, the Boer War).²

The statements by both the quoted historian and the writer-turned-strategist are illustrative of the problems and misunderstandings in the debate. While there are grains of truth, the statements are biased, selective to the point of tautology, and in some areas, demonstrably false. The author is essentially saying that all counterinsurgencies fail, except when they don’t, but we won’t count those. The history of counterinsurgency

demonstrates that it is often a difficult undertaking, but that some successful counterinsurgency campaigns (and there are certainly more than listed above) work within the cultural and societal limitations of a nation or population and use political calculation, action, and military force to address the insurgent threat. Counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded in other place and times throughout history including Oman, El Salvador, Peru, Chile, Columbia, Indonesia and the Philippines (twice in the last century) to name a few.³ Even some counterinsurgency campaigns that eventually “failed” have had elements of notable success in tactical and operational levels.⁴ Counterinsurgency campaigns that have shown success did not all seek to reshape a nation and its society, rather most succeed when they are grounded in preserving and working through the existing culture or the campaigns go to the other extreme and use totalitarian suppression and control of the population.⁵ Some successful counterinsurgencies have even used a combination of both⁶

For the purpose of this study, examining organizational aspects of the counterinsurgency effort will make no strategic or normative judgments on whether or not the governments involved should engage in the effort or to what degree. Instead, this study accepts that governments that face insurgencies internally or those who choose to join the counterinsurgency fight in partnership with an established and targeted government will have to embark on efforts to counter the insurgency.⁷ In doing so, there are applicable lessons from history, informed by counterinsurgency theory and organization theory that will enable the effort.⁸

Two Latin Phrases: Sui Generis and Ceteris Paribus

Because this study uses history and comparative historical case studies as a central part of its methodology it is helpful to keep two principles in mind that inform our understanding about the nature of insurgencies and the design of counterinsurgency campaigns. The principles are in themselves contradictory, but key theorists and scholars have found the balance between the two in such a way that history and case studies can be very useful to our ability to critically analyze our effectiveness in current and future counterinsurgency campaigns. The concepts represented by these principles may be true for the analysis of all warfare, history and social sciences. Two commonly used Latin phrases help to emphasize these principles. One is *Sui Generis*, the other is *Ceteris Paribus*.

Sui Generis

The phrase *Sui Generis* means “of its own particular kind.”⁹ This phrase represents the principle that while insurgencies and counterinsurgencies may have commonalities, historians and the most respected theorists have proven time and again that the techniques and strategies employed in one insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign may simply not be applicable in another because the conditions, environment, historical context, etc may be quite different.¹⁰ Conn Hallinan fell prey to this temptation by lumping some insurgencies and counterinsurgencies together and then selectively applying the *Sui Generis* nature of these conflicts in order to dissuade the reader from supporting a contemporary counterinsurgency effort. In truth, the histories of both “successful” and “unsuccessful” counterinsurgency campaigns all have unique conditions. Indeed, all counterinsurgency campaigns have what could be called “very

special conditions” and it is specifically these special conditions that invalidate such blanket historical maxims about counterinsurgency. The temptation to cherry pick the history of counterinsurgency campaigns is great and must be avoided by the serious scholar, student, and would be practitioner.¹¹ The same could be said of all wars or historic event typologies, but it seems particularly true of counterinsurgency where the political aspects of the fight seem closer to the day-to-day struggle.¹² At the same time, one must recognize that this study must also limit the analysis to certain case studies as a matter of practicality. Yet, the conclusions in this study should hold true and enlightening for counterinsurgency campaigns that face similar conditions and environments.

Some practitioners and contemporary writers who have joined in the counterinsurgency fray overlook what Mao Tse Tung wrote about insurgent leaders. Mao believed that the insurgent leader must totally understand and rigorously analyze their situation before action is taken. The revolutionary leader must fuse knowledge and apply the correct formula to his struggle.¹³ An insurgency is not simply an insurgency. It is part of its own thing and unique to its country, population, political situation, ideology, environment etc. To emphasize this point, Mao cites Carl von Clausewitz and Vladimir Lenin who both emphasize independent conditions of environment of a particular time and struggle might merit independent theory of war.¹⁴ In other words, Mao knew in 1937, even if several of his international fan club, did not, that insurgency differs depending upon where you are and when. In other words, it must be understood *sui generis*.¹⁵ This study uses the term *sui generis* to refer to unique conditions of a particular counterinsurgency situation that may require an adaptation to existing prescriptive theory.

“Cookie-cutter” templates, therefore, cannot apply to either insurgencies or counterinsurgency doctrine.

Ceteris Paribus

Ceteris Paribus. If, when studying insurgency and counterinsurgency, we must expect that each one is unique, then the obvious question that arises concerns the value of attempts to apply theory or principles. How can we be certain that any of the tenets of theorists, principles or patterns of historians, are even applicable to the current of future insurgencies? If all insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are unique, then this calls into question the value of having counterinsurgency doctrine or relying on the prescriptive solutions of some of the theorists to be covered. This may also be true for the organizational models of counterinsurgent campaigns. The answer can be illustrated by comparing the understanding of counterinsurgency to a key element of understanding the social science of economics.

Economists are often maligned because of their inability to predict accurately the peaks and valleys of economic health. While their principles are scientifically and mathematically sound, most economic principles are only observable with “all things being equal,” i.e. *ceteris paribus*.¹⁶ The same must hold true for the common observations of the most prominent counterinsurgency theorists and historians. While each will admit that all insurgencies are different and must be well understood, there exist commonalities in the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency that allow us to apply theory and informed best practices. If most of the respected theorists agree on a principle, if historians continue to point out the importance of a tenet or principle, and if contemporary studies demonstrate a similarity in the current data, then we can draw fair

conclusions about the effectiveness of policy, strategy, tactics etc. In the case of this study, one can draw conclusions about the optimal organization of the counterinsurgency effort itself as long as we can identify the common principles and the elements of organization that apply to all environments generally and what must change to adapt to a particular environment, time, or place.¹⁷

The Problem with Theorists

The theorists used in this study are all considered authorities on the subject of counterinsurgency, yet there are two conditions of their writings that need to be understood before proceeding. The theorists are much better described as “Prescriptive” rather than “Descriptive” theorists, and they are all products of their environment.

The most renowned “descriptive” theorist of warfare is Carl von Clausewitz through his most known work, *On War*. Clausewitz famously describes the nature of warfare with less attention to the perspective of telling a modern commander how to fight a war. Other theorists, such as Baron Antoine de Jomini, are more known for their “prescriptive” theory written with the intent to provide knowledge that will benefit one in understanding how to be successful in war. Clausewitz saw warfare as more of an art than a science.¹⁸ While elements of the descriptive theory could be used by a commander to enhance understanding and thereby enable him to create a winning strategy, the prescriptive theory could also enable a scholar to deduce descriptive theory from proven prescriptive elements.¹⁹ Nevertheless, much of the theory about modern warfare and counterinsurgency is prescriptive and that means that this study will apply the prescription to case studies.

All the theorists covered in this study suffer the same problem as historians regardless of who they are or where and when they come from. While each of the theorists were students of history and practitioners of insurgency or counterinsurgency, they developed their theories based consciously and sub-consciously on their own experiences. One must, therefore, accept that some of what they consider to be universal principles, may in fact, be prescriptive solutions based upon their experience and in relevant degree to the *sui generis* nature of the counterinsurgency campaigns in which they were involved. Simply put, what they may insist or imply is *ceteris paribus* could just be an element or solution based on something *sui generis*. The case studies will demonstrate this especially with respect to organization of the counterinsurgency campaign.

Defining Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: Theorists and Doctrine

Before diving into what counterinsurgency theorists say about organizing a counterinsurgency effort, it is helpful to identify them and provide their definitions of both insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Modern authors on the subject of counterinsurgency will generally cite the following individuals when referring to time-honored insurgency or counterinsurgency theory: Mao-tse-Tung, David Galula, Roger Trinquier, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, and John McCuen.²⁰ Modern counterinsurgency doctrine from the United States and Britain also reaches out to most of these particular writers to define and understand insurgency and counterinsurgency as part of revolutionary warfare.²¹

An insurgency can be defined in the simplest terms as part of revolutionary warfare, which itself is commonly defined as the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.²² This definition of revolutionary warfare, however, is broader than counterinsurgency and includes such phenomenon as a coup d'état or civil wars that are related to insurgency. Coup d'état rises from within an existing regime and civil war generally implies an internal conflict that approaches a more conventional nature in terms of symmetrical forces of armies. The clear lines of such definitions do not always accurately describe reality as these phenomena may coexist within the same historical situation, which some of the subsequent case studies will show. Revolutionary warfare and insurgency are generally internal struggles within a state, though they may be supported and influenced from abroad.²³

One of the most read and quoted counterinsurgency theorists,²⁴ David Galula attempts to distinguish insurgency from other forms of revolutionary warfare by more narrowly defining insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of an existing order.”²⁵ This definition is most useful as it provides a broad understanding, however, some insurgencies are not necessarily protracted and some pursue strategies to bring about a quicker realization of their objectives. Insurgencies often leverage conventional warfare from outside sponsors and internal power politics within an existing government to achieve their objectives.²⁶ Thus, even in defining insurgency, one cannot be too limiting in understanding

Frank Kitson defines insurgency similarly, but insists on understanding the close relation and important distinction between subversion and insurgency. Kitson defines

subversion as, “all illegal measures, short of the use of armed force, taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things which they do not want to do.” Kitson goes on to explain that it can involve political or economic measures such as strikes, demonstrations, and propaganda and can also include use of small scale violence for the purpose of coercing the population into giving support. According to Kitson, insurgency is the use of armed force by a section of a population against a government for the same purposes described in his definition of subversion.²⁷ Thus, Kitson makes the use of violence a key part of insurgency itself, but he also correctly highlights that complete overthrow may not be the ultimate goal. This distinction can be significant in designing counterinsurgent strategy. Robert Thompson and Roger Trinquier generally concur with this definition and distinction.²⁸ When discussing insurgency for this study, we are talking about organized efforts that seek to change the existing order by means that are illegal and include the use of force. This study, therefore, uses Kitson’s definition primarily because he draws from the others especially Thompson, Trinquier, McCuen, and Galula.

Counterinsurgency, therefore, is more easily defined and is the efforts employed by the government to deter, defeat, destroy, or neutralize the insurgency. In this particular area, there is little discrepancy in the definitions amongst the theorists. Kitson’s definition of insurgency is important because in clarifying that the use of violence makes the distinction in calling a movement an insurgency, we understand that there is much more to the insurgent effort than just its violent operations. It necessarily follows that the counterinsurgency campaign effort is about much more than security and military efforts. It is also about governance and is also a political struggle. The counterinsurgency

theorists agree on this point as well, though some may disagree on the importance of particular political elements.

Modern military doctrine from the United States and the United Kingdom do not differ significantly in their definitions of counterinsurgency. The US Army and US Marine Corps doctrine defines insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”²⁹ The US further defines counterinsurgency as “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”³⁰ The British define insurgency as, “an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.” And counterinsurgency as, “those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes.”³¹ For both of these definitions, it is important to note that these contemporary doctrinal manuals approach counterinsurgency from the perspective of the forces of the US and UK entering a sovereign country other than their own to assist a host nation government with countering an insurgency in that country. They should therefore be defined as interventionist states or countries involved in the counterinsurgency campaigns of another state.³² This study looks at the organization of the campaign that includes the efforts and organization of the interventionist country and the efforts and structure of that host nation government. How these organizations are structured to work together is another important concept examined in this thesis.

Counterinsurgency Theory on Organization

Historians and counterinsurgency practitioners have already done much in the way of both summarizing the wisdom of the theorists and studying the conceptual elements of counterinsurgency campaigns that work for the counterinsurgent. In an attempt to understand counterinsurgency, these historians derive general themes from numerous historical case studies and theorists in order to provide practitioners with a method of quick study. This method of using history is important to the understanding of contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian provide 14 themes of successful counterinsurgency campaigns in their collection of case studies in their book *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. They provide this from the historic experience of operations in addition to the highlights of some of the more famous and classic counterinsurgency theorists such as David Galula, Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson and others.³³

Table 1. Themes of Successful Counterinsurgency Campaigns

1. Comprehension of existing history and doctrine – military and civilian agencies within the host nation as well as any allies.
2. Adaptation to local situations and learning from mistakes
3. Bottom-up and top-down reform within military and civilian agencies (host nation and allies).
4. Appropriate training for both military and civilian agencies (host nation and allies)
5. Ongoing education in counterinsurgency: host nation, allied military and civilians
6. Risk-taking organizations
7. Harmony of effort- across various government agencies of the host nation as well as allies
8. Amnesty for enemies
9. Reconciliation and political compromise amongst combatants
10. Understanding of cultural and local perspectives
11. Small unit approach – in over 90 percent of counterinsurgency campaigns, most activity occurs at or below company level
12. Corporate memory within theater HQs
13. Population security – a mix of enemy and population focused activity
14. Raise, mentor, and fight alongside host nation forces (army/paramilitary police/local auxiliaries)

Source: Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey, 2010), 10.

Another author, Kalev Sepp, provides a practical listing of “do’s and don’ts” in his article, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency.” These lessons are also based upon the author’s (Sepp’s) own in-depth historical knowledge of counterinsurgency campaigns.

Table 2. Successful and Unsuccessful Practices in Counterinsurgency	
SUCCESSFUL	UNSUCCESSFUL
Emphasis on intelligence	Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency
Focus on population, their needs, and security	Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population
Secure areas established, expanded	Battalion-size operations as the norm
Insurgents isolated from population (population control).	Military units concentrated on large bases for protection
Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader)	Special Forces focused on raiding
Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns	Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment
Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents	Building, training indigenous army in image of US Army
Police in lead; military supporting	Peacetime government processes
Police force expanded, diversified	Open borders, airspace, coastlines
Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency	
Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces	
Insurgent sanctuaries denied	

Source: Kalev Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 10.

In surveying these themes or best practices, one can see that some of them directly relate to organization of the counterinsurgency effort. Several of Marston and Malkasian’s themes concern themselves with organizational considerations including, adaptation, bottom-up and top-down reform, training, ongoing education in

counterinsurgency, risk taking organizations, harmony of effort, and corporate memory. These are also all relevant for all types of war. Sepp simply emphasizes a single authority embodied in a charismatic leader and then his other points emphasize the appropriate roles and missions of sub organizations. Strangely, the US Army and Marine Corps use a table of successful and unsuccessful practices that is almost identical to Sepp's, but with one glaring change. Sepp places "Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader)" as the fifth successful practice, yet; the US Military's FM 3-24 removes that practice altogether. Instead it places a less definitive substitute toward the end of the list that reads, "Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing."³⁴ The omission of this particular practice from Sepp's list that the US Army copied to the manual is very telling and indicative of how the US has approached unity of effort in counterinsurgency.³⁵ Unlike, Marston, Malkasian, and Sepp; however, the theorists, whom they cite, are much more prescriptive about organizing a counterinsurgency campaign.

Organizing the Counterinsurgency Effort: What the Theorists Say

It is difficult to summarize the perspectives developed from the more classical insurgency and counterinsurgency theorists. All have a great deal to contribute to the theoretical foundations of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Mao gives us the most applicable understanding of insurgency and revolutionary war with some descriptive elements and provides the most basic prescriptive model for how the insurgent must fight, organize, and train from the bottom up.³⁶ In effect, he combines Clausewitz and Jomini, but with a focus on revolutionary warfare as an exclusive means for seizure of

political power from within. For much of the twentieth century it was Mao who influenced many insurgent organizations. Mao built the model for his protracted struggle in China over time and emphasized the importance of creating a political base of support.³⁷

Galula and Thompson focus on the counterinsurgent and explain that he must protect and gain the support of the population in a struggle where the political aspects have primacy over military. Additionally, both authors address principles of organization to ensure coordination of effort and the need for the government to have a comprehensive but simple and explainable plan.³⁸

Kitson dedicates a significant amount of his writing to the subject of organization and references the works of Robert Thompson, John McCuen, and Roger Trinquier. It would be impossible in the limited space of this study to go through a comprehensive review of what each of the theorists say about insurgency. Kitson's works are the most comprehensive and incorporate much of the ideas provided by the other theorists and he frequently cites each of them.³⁹

It is from these authors that one can derive three key tenets of historical study. The first, mentioned previously, is the recognition of the *sui generis* nature of the counterinsurgency struggle to be studied or addressed. While there may be general theory, each situation is different. Second, is the importance of separating the insurgent from the population. All of warfare is essentially a political struggle, but if an insurgency is a threat to the existing political order and deriving its base of support from the population, then it is the population that must be secured.⁴⁰ There is little disagreement among theorists on this point and Kitson, Trinquier, and McCuen agree that it is the "*Sine*

qua non” of victory in “modern warfare.”⁴¹ This is not to say that the approach to counterinsurgency defined as “population centric” is the only viable approach. Other approaches that may entail the decisive destruction of the insurgents may also be successful in defeating an insurgency. This assumes that the counterinsurgency has the means to locate and destroy the insurgents without negatively influencing the population or doing damage to the counterinsurgency’s own political narrative. Regardless of the approach chosen, insurgencies or counterinsurgencies must achieve the acquiescence of the population. Strategists will disagree on ways or methods, but the merits of strategic decisions will depend on the unique characteristics of the particular insurgency (*sui generis*) and the ability to understand fundamental commonalities of revolutionary warfare (*ceteris paribus*).⁴² Third, is the primacy of the political over the military and the importance of the narrative. The term narrative refers to a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experiences and provides a framework for understanding events.⁴³ The narrative combines the political grievances that the insurgent uses to gain the support or insure the complacency of the population. The counterinsurgent always requires some kind of applied counter-narrative that reaches the population and achieves the desired effect.

In describing his plans for insurgency in China, Mao is emphatic about the importance of organization. It was Mao’s belief that a political cadre was the core of the insurgency and that all other efforts must be organized around this core. This core cadre were true believers who shared a common vision of the cause and would be able to provide unity of effort in a region through unity of command in a hierarchical framework, but one that shared unity of purpose and coordinated both civilian and military functions

seamlessly. Indeed, they were seamless because in building his organization, Mao expected that the soldier and the politician, military and politics would not be separated.⁴⁴

Western theorists who have specifically dealt with revolutionary warfare from the perspective of the counterinsurgent are not as comfortable with the unity of political and military thought and action as Mao and the leaders of other communist influenced insurgency movements of the 20th Century. Western civil-military relations are framed by a belief, which is reinforced in law and culture that the military serves the civilian political establishment as a directed tool specifically for the purpose of warfare and when violence is necessary within the span of strategic objectives.⁴⁵ It is to some degree due to this ingrained inclination, that counterinsurgency in theory and practice is so difficult for the counterinsurgent forces of western democracies.

David Galula, perhaps the most well-known and cited counterinsurgency theorist seems to concur with this perspective. In his most famous work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Galula addresses why this dichotomy is difficult, why unity of effort must be achieved by political and military elements, and why the military must be prepared to assume duties that western militaries may not be comfortable assuming. Galula emphasizes that tasks cannot be neatly divided between civilian and soldier and that no operation can be strictly political or military. According to Galula, political and military tasks each have psychological effects on a population that can alter the over-all situation for better or worse. Galula uses the example of a judge prematurely releasing unrepentant insurgents without coordinated understanding of the effects, which will soon be felt by the policeman, the civil servant, the soldier, and certainly by the population.⁴⁶ The legal and cultural imperatives of an independent judiciary make such

coordination difficult. Without using any specific language of organization theory, Galula is stating that the critical tasks of the military as an organization (as well as those of other elements of the governments power) change significantly when confronted with counterinsurgency.

In perhaps indirect testament to the importance of creating the right organization in counterinsurgency, Galula makes it clear that in many societies, both the civil service and the military are often developed and grown during a time of relative peace where the existential threat posed by the insurgency did not exist. Therefore, both civil and military organizations are ill prepared for the demands and requirements of counterinsurgency. The military, however, often has the tremendous advantage of numbers of capable people. Though they may not be specifically trained for certain tasks, soldiers must be ready to take on the political challenges, convey a political narrative and assume the duties of everything from social worker to civil engineer to mediator. Galula, however, emphasizes the importance of raising a trained civil service to the necessary capacity as soon as possible in order to replace the soldier in those key roles.⁴⁷

Galula goes on to elaborate on his prescriptive theory for the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns and proposes two models. One is the committee model, which is derived from Malaya, where district control was invested in a committee under chairmanship of a district officer with single senior commanders from police, civilian governor, intelligence chief, and military leader served. The committee provides the coordinating structure that achieves unity of effort. A key point that is sometimes lost on contemporary counterinsurgency practitioners is that the committee as Galula describes it, is composed of the leaders of each government organization involved. It is not

composed of “liaison officers” or special representatives. In other words, it is a committee of leaders, not a coordination or policy working group. Galula further describes that a committee is flexible, and affords more freedom to its members and can be kept small, but it is slow. Galula also explains that an integrated staff model might be a second option instead of a committee system. Unfortunately, Galula provides no existing model for this and does not elaborate, but one would assume that the integrated staff is essentially a committee that falls under the command of a single leader. Galula alludes to the notion that the committee model may be better because it is more realistic.⁴⁸ In other words, Galula may be acknowledging the resistance of organizations and political interests to give up their authority in certain areas.

Robert Thompson is similarly prescriptive about the organization of the counterinsurgency campaign. He is strong in emphasizing the importance of a single authority at the top, but then is more concerned about unified management at lower echelons. He advocates that department heads at the provincial level must answer to their respective department heads at the national level and should not be responsible to the Province Chief or Governor. He states that the Province Chief is responsible for coordinating the departments and ensuring a smooth working relationship but emphasizes that he should not “control them” or have “direct authority” over them. This could be due to his experiences in Vietnam just before writing his book, when he witnessed incompetent provincial leaders appointed through cronyism. Nevertheless, he is still advocating a committee like system at the geographic lower echelons of province, district etc. This is best described as unified management at lower geographic echelons, which is the term Kitson and others seem to favor.⁴⁹

Frank Kitson is a very useful theorist in that his book entitled *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* ties together what several of his contemporaries say about organization and unity of effort. One of his most important insights is that the counterinsurgent must get the organization right first. He emphasizes that if the “coordinating machinery” is not in place, especially at the top, then members of subordinate groups will not receive the sound advice and guidance that they need to act on the narrative of the counterinsurgent and not work at cross purposes at the national level. He therefore advocates that a supreme council comprised of the heads of all the organizations involved in the counterinsurgency effort.⁵⁰

Perhaps the first bit of advice which the armed forces should give to the government is to set up the machinery at the top into which further advice can be fed because unless a supreme council for dealing with the trouble is formed on the lines mentioned earlier, it is unlikely that sound advice will get the right quarters or be acted upon resolutely. If the command machinery can’t be set up at the lower levels so much the better, but for political reasons it may not be possible in the early stages. In any case it is a mistake for machinery to be set up at lower levels unless there is a supreme council above it, because if this happens, the members of the subordinate groups will get instructions from their various superiors at the national level which may be contradictory and will at best be uncoordinated.⁵¹

Kitson prescribes two systems quite similar in nature to those explained by David Galula. Kitson likewise cites examples from the writings of Robert Thompson to support his reasoning for the organization of the high command of the counterinsurgent campaign. He defines these as the “Committee System” and the “Single Commander System.” He explains that both have worked in the past, but that these systems need to be mirrored at echelons below in order to ensure that this unity of effort is not just a policy at the top, but an imperative translated to action at the tactical level.⁵² As Kitson himself clarified, it does not work if it is only coordinated at the highest levels.⁵³ According to

Kitson, the single commander system is just a hybrid of the committee system where the chairman becomes the commander and any other members become his advisers and staff officers. This should usually be a military commander, but that is not always necessary. Kitson pulls no punches in explaining how this can only work if the civil and military departments are pulled together at the highest levels.⁵⁴

Counter-Organizing the Population

John McCuen states that the organization of an effective administration should be the vital first step in the governing power's strategy to counter an insurgency. At the population level, it is not so much the form of the administration that matters, as it is that it must be established on a "person-to-person" basis that is responsive to the people. McCuen goes on to point out that counterinsurgency campaigns that fail to make this kind of bottom-up connection and rely on governing only through loose connections to weak local chiefs makes the administration seem "inhuman and often anonymous."⁵⁵ While McCuen does not use the term "bottom-up," it seems clear that he is advocating the co-opting, enfranchising, and empowering of local people. Merely relying on local leaders without empowering them with security and administrative functions that are connected to the host country government is to create an administrative gap or margin that is ripe for the insurgency to intimidate and overwhelm with its own shadow administration.

While Kitson uses Trinquier and McCuen in influencing his theories, there is some nuanced differences in what they say about organization. In Trinquier's seminal work *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, he focuses less on the organization of the policy and command structures of the campaign and more on the

actual organization (counter-organization) of the entire society and population over which the insurgency and counterinsurgency are fighting. Especially in this regard he is the most prescriptive of the theorists used in this study.

Trinquier advocates a kind of “hyper-organization” of society that manifests itself in structured organizations that encompass the entire society. He states that control of the masses through a tight organization and often through several parallel organizations is the “master weapon of modern warfare.”⁵⁶ It is fair to say that Trinquier views counterinsurgency as a conflict between two entities attempting to organize society according to their own way. Specifically though, Trinquier calls for the designating of leaders at various levels or echelons of society from region, province, district and on down to towns neighborhoods, bocks, families etc. The leaders at each level then must be empowered.⁵⁷ What Trinquier does not make clear is where exactly the leaders come from, though the implication is that the leaders are vetted individuals who live in the areas that they are controlling. He does, however, indicate that if a leader cannot be found then it should be appointed from the security forces until one can be identified. In terms of enforcing this organizational model on an area, Trinquier explains at length the amount of security and population and resource control measures that must be put in place, including measures such as census, identification cards, travel restrictions, check points and mandatory searches and rationing or food denial as necessary.⁵⁸ Once the counterinsurgent has implemented his hyper-organization of an area and is satisfied that he has eliminated the insurgent threat from the area and obtained the compliance of the population, only then can he begin to build projects or services that will improve the area and reward the population. From this concept comes the often cited “Clear, Hold, Build”

method, with Trinquier's hyper-organization being an integral part of the holding and building phases.

Trinquier was heavily influenced by the French pseudo-doctrine of *Guerre Revolutionnaire*, which is perhaps best translated as "Counter-revolutionary Warfare." Inspired by the counterinsurgency campaign of the French in Indo-china (Vietnam) and refined in Algeria, this doctrine represents a modern anti-thesis from the civil-military relations taboos of western democracies. *Guerre Revolutionnaire* required the military to take an active role in politics and society to prevent insurgencies and subversion from communism. It demanded a counter-organization of the population into hierarchical and ordered basis with a foundation of clear political beliefs after the destruction of the insurgents organization and to some degree as even a preventive measure prior to an insurgency taking hold. Part of this concept also included the cooperation of all elements of government under a single chain of command.⁵⁹ The doctrine itself was largely discredited after the eventual failure of the Algerian campaign, the well-publicized use of torture by the military, and the role of the advocates of *Guerre Revolutionnaire* in the Coup D'etat in France in 1961. Though there is clear agreement among counterinsurgency theorists when it comes to achieving unity of effort between civilian and military organizations of government, the specter of *Guerre Revolutionnaire* undoubtedly has helped to prevent the kind of prescriptive organizations that impose rigid unity of command.

Though all of the theorists provide a good deal of prescriptive advice for waging and organizing a counterinsurgency campaign, Galula, Kitson, and Trinquier (and Thompson) give us two very important points for deeper examination in the case studies.

The first is the ultimate necessity of a unified command and decision-making authority at the top of the counterinsurgent campaign. This is not a suggestion; this is essential. As one authority on counterinsurgency noted:

Perhaps the most important function of an organization is to provide a decision-making mechanism for its constituents. From decision derives action. The military teams, governments and businesses have all grasped the value of unified authority. Athletes follow coaches, or risk sitting on the bench, employees obey the directives of their bosses, lest they miss a promotion or lose their job; representatives contravene voters at electoral peril. Although not as strict as the military, and not subject to the UCMJ, all of these organization accept the fundamental tenet of management-authority to direct action (whether creating a new business division, crafting a game plan, or passing legislation) coupled with responsibility for its effects.⁶⁰

The separate entities and organizations that actually represent the sovereign power of the government must be cohesive and unify their efforts if they are to compete for the population. Some of the contemporary writers on best practices and lessons have defined this as a key principle of “Unity of Effort” or “Harmony of Effort.”⁶¹ All of these theorists and recent authorities on the subject would concur that this cohesion that unites the greater narrative in the battle for the population is best achieved through unity of command under one competent commander.

The second point for further study is the importance of maintaining this systematic unity of effort at each geographically based echelon. The theorists mostly agree that a single commander at each geographic echelon is ideal, but at least a functioning mechanism that coordinates activity of military, police, intelligence, and civilian administration is necessary for a campaign to be executed successfully. Each has been prescriptive in the mechanism because they have seen the prescribed models work.

The final point is the counter-organization of the population and the methods for bottom-up organization. Does the counterinsurgent force merely establish a higher

district authority and communicate with local leaders and the people, or does it somehow co-opt and empower local leaders and existing societal networks that have some perceived legitimacy? Without either the forced and resource intensive hyper-organization of Trinquier, the counterinsurgent should at least find a way to identify, co-opt and empower local population and key leaders.

The Interventionist Power

If only the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns could be so simply reduced to the problem of unity of effort between the organizations of a single government, the problem would be much simpler than common reality of most counterinsurgency campaigns. Unfortunately, many of the most significant counterinsurgency efforts of the last 200 years have been complicated by the involvement of interventionist powers from outside of territory of the conflict. These have included the complex nature of colonial forces, allied nations or hegemonic powers, which perceived an interest in the outcome of the struggle. As Frank Kitson emphasizes, the coordinating of civil and military powers is complicated enough when the campaign is the affair of a single nation, but is even more difficult when an interventionist power is involved.⁶²

Kitson then provides a simple but important principle:

But once again the guiding principle for tying in the activities of two countries can be deduced from the ultimate aim of the host nation, which is to retain and regain the allegiance of its population. If this is borne [sic] in mind it becomes evident that the way in which the allies' help is delivered is as important as the help itself. The main thing being that the host nation should be seen as being at the center of the picture, with the ally coming to its assistance. This impression can only be achieved if the ally is prepared to subordinate himself at every level to the host nation. If there is the slightest indication of the ally taking the lead the insurgents will have the opportunity to say that the government has betrayed the people.⁶³

This begs the question though, what if the host nation government is incompetent or does not have the systems or the organizations in place to effectively prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign? Or, more relevant to contemporary conflicts, what if the host nation government is nascent and formed at the behest of an occupying power or hegemonic state? Kitson then proceeds to answer these questions, this time without being too prescriptive. He does so by providing three key principles for the interventionist power and providing some implied advice for prioritization of effort with the first principle. He states first that no coordinating arrangement between the interventionist power and the host nation government will work unless the host nation government has an ordered system for prosecuting the campaign.⁶⁴ Without alluding too much to the case studies found in the contemporary operating environment chapter, one can see how tremendous this can be if the host nation has no organizational structure or must build it virtually from scratch. It is here that the modern debates on counterinsurgency pick-up and rage. The theorists provide us little in terms of the strategic decisions for the interventionist power.⁶⁵

The second principle for the interventionist power is that much like the host nation government's need for unity of effort at the top, the interventionist power must coordinate its entire effort through one person that represents on the host country's supreme council. This single individual ensures that the ally plays a part in the formulation of policy for the campaign. This ties into the third principle, which states that the interventionist power needs to then be represented at each level of the host country's staffs according to whatever system the host country has in place.⁶⁶ One can see why Kitson puts emphasis on the first principle, as this cannot be done effectively if there is

no system in place to begin with. Kitson emphasizes the imperative that the interventionist power representative always remains in a subordinate and advisory role.

There is some contemporary irony in that Kitson, writing in the late stages of Vietnam, expresses admiration for the system by which the US advises and assists in counterinsurgency. Referring to the US embassy and its coordinating mechanisms for conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and creating an Inter-Agency Defense and Development Plan (IDAD), Kitson explains that the system is ideal for assisting countries that already possess the tiered coordinating machinery and unified management/command structures to prosecute the campaign. The system was not in effect for Vietnam as the counterinsurgency campaign and the US role in it went far beyond simply advising and assisting the Vietnamese. The contemporary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan also exceed the scope of this model that Kitson praises.⁶⁷

This study examines how interventionist powers organized themselves to support the counterinsurgency campaign. Each of the case studies has an interventionist power, in these cases either the United States or the United Kingdom. Therefore, the chapter on each case study will review the interventionist power on all three of Kitson's principles. Was the interventionist power certain that the host country had an ordered system for their governance and the prosecution of their counterinsurgency campaign? Of course, with this first question, if the answer is no, then what exactly could the interventionist power do about that situation? The answers in the case studies could provide clarification or supplementary advice to the body of prescriptive counterinsurgency theory.

The second point for analysis is to determine if the interventionist power coordinated their efforts with the host country through one person that represented at the

highest levels of policy making. If not, then was there a sufficient coordinating mechanism at the top? Finally, this study examines how the interventionist power was represented at each echelon and if that contributed to unity of effort or unity of command. One cannot fairly assess these things however if the answer to the first question was “no.” In other words if the host country did not have what Kitson called the “ordered system for prosecuting the war,” then the question becomes what (*ceteris paribus*) principles can the interventionist follow in building that system. This is very much the case for Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is also partially true for Malaya and Dhofar. In all of these cases, the lack of administrative and coordinating structures from bottom to the top meant that the interventionist power had to assume some role, beyond that which Kitson implies. Perhaps by omission, Kitson is saying that they should not attempt such an endeavor. One can easily assume that one option for the interventionist power is to assume the duties of that coordination mechanism and then assist the host country in building the institutions, but how can an interventionist power build such institutions in the midst of a war? Again the case studies provide some answers as to what guidelines can be used.

What Contemporary Doctrine Says

Modern doctrine has incorporated and been influenced by the writings of the very theorists that this study has described. It is interesting to look at how the modern doctrine of the US and UK interprets the theorists’ prescription for organization. The US and the UK are the two interventionist powers examined in the cases. The armies of both the US and the UK recently published doctrinal manuals about counterinsurgency as an interventionist power. The US, as of very recently, even has a government wide

Counterinsurgency Guide that fulfills a doctrine like role for the entire federal government. The same theorists reviewed above heavily influenced the writers of these doctrinal manuals, but they had to temper their writings to remain confined within the realities of the organizations they represent. Each of the doctrines, for example states that unity of command is the preferred doctrinal method for achieving unity of effort across the whole of government. Each manual, including the USG COIN Guide, readily admits that a single commander is ideal, but then acknowledges that this is not always possible.⁶⁸ Each of the manuals emphasizes the importance of unity of effort at all levels and provides some guidance as to how unity of effort can be achieved. While the military manuals mention the committee structures from the major theorists and the USG COIN Guide addresses the need for “business rules,” all of the manuals emphasize that formal structures and authorities are difficult to achieve and informal relationships, memorandums of understanding, and personalities will be important in achieving unity of effort.⁶⁹

The theorists and doctrine are prescriptive in two key areas. They define the command and coordination structures that should exist between civilian and military entities and they are particularly emphatic about the importance of authority. Prescriptions for authority and structure are deliberately left out of doctrine. The US doctrine acknowledges that formal structures and authorities are difficult to achieve in an interagency and coalition environment and must be essentially built through informal relationships or memorandums of agreement unless they are very deliberately specified in the executive documents that initiate or govern the counterinsurgency action.⁷⁰ In terms

of coordinating or achieving unity of effort with host country, the US Army doctrine addresses only as coordinating mechanisms.

2-37. Commanders create coordinating mechanisms, such as committees or liaison elements, to facilitate cooperation and build trust with HN authorities. HN military or nonmilitary representatives should have leading roles in such mechanisms. These organizations facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings while removing impediments. Sovereignty issues can be formally resolved with the host nation by developing appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status of forces agreements. In many cases, security assistance organizations, NGOs, and IGOs have detailed local knowledge and reservoirs of good will that can help establish a positive, constructive relationship with the host nation.

2-38. Coordination and support should exist down to local levels (such as villages and neighborhoods). Soldiers and Marines should be aware of the political and societal structures in their AOs.

The nature of the conflict and its focus on the populace make civilian and military unity a critical enabling aspect of a COIN operation.⁷¹

While the doctrines clearly reflect the wisdom of the theorists, there is an acknowledgement of the difficulty in achieving those ideal prescriptive solutions and surrender to the next best thing which is coordinating mechanisms. According to some involved in the actual writing of doctrine, there was some call for greater emphasis on unity of effort, but executive level officials including senior general officers rejected single authority and unified structures.⁷²

The following review of contemporary organization theory will provide some insight as to why these doctrinal manuals acknowledge the organizational recommendations of the theorists, but do not emphasize the importance of organizational structure and authority.

Organization Theory

Why examine organization theory? In every counterinsurgency campaign, the sovereign government and the interventionist power are represented by several

subordinate and distinct organizations that must come together to achieve the desired end state of the campaign. These may include the military, the intelligence services, the police, the courts or system that enforces rule of law, organizations that support other government services, and organizations that focus on government projects or development. As some contemporary authorities on counterinsurgency will point out, there are several other organizations that may be involved in the campaign directly or indirectly that do not necessarily belong to the sovereign power or to the interventionist power. These could include non-governmental organizations, corporations, or other international organizations.⁷³ The theorists make clear that these organizations must achieve unity of effort or at least harmony of effort. In attempting to do so, they experience several challenges. These may include challenges in leadership and interpersonal dynamics between organizations, overlap in perceived roles and missions, a need to define, retain, or claim levels of authority, and even clashes of organizational cultures. The most respected theorists of counterinsurgency discussed in the previous chapter all of whom experienced, led, and reflected deeply on the nature of counterinsurgency were convinced enough in the importance of organization to devote sections of their work to the subject. Organization theory provides us with the explanation and reasons why the theorists insist on unity of effort and why they found it necessary to be so prescriptive about things like command and coordination structures and about where authority is held.

For the purpose of this study it is helpful to understand the metaphors used by organization theorists. Classic organization theorists often view an organization as a machine with a manager or leader as the engineer who designs, builds, and operates it.

This metaphor is less valuable or accurate when considering what must happen when several separate organizations that are not normally bound together must come together and essentially form a new hybrid organization for the purpose of prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign. Instead the modern organization metaphor that views an organization as a complex organism is more appropriate. The leader of such an organization is part of that organism which is interdependent and adaptive.⁷⁴ With this concept in mind, one realizes that when these separate organisms come together for a counterinsurgency campaign, it is not as simple as communicating the intent of the overall leader or government. Each organism has already been adapted to its pre-counterinsurgency campaign purpose, views, and systems. It has evolved its tools and systems to function in a different environment. When separate organisms must come together and form a unified entity and somehow find common purpose, they become something quite different.

This study examines four applicable elements or conceptual categories of intangible concepts that can be manipulated to design an organization for a purpose. Without diving too far into the details and nuances of the field of organization theory, those categories are: (1) organizational culture and essence, (2) structure, (3) leadership and personal dynamics, and (4) authority.

There are other, more complicated and possibly more precise ways of examining organizational design. The US military, for example, has an interesting and applicable way of describing the design of organizations using the acronym DOTMLPF, which stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities. The military considers these seven things when designing and building its

organizations and forces to fill specific roles over time. There is no such construct or system used to design a host country government or interventionist power for counterinsurgency. Because the counterinsurgency organization must be constructed from other pre-existing organizations as a hybrid for that purpose, this study examines counterinsurgency organization using the four categories. Though, doctrine, training and education may have great effect on organizational culture and essence and changing those things can have a profound effect on the ability of a country to execute counterinsurgency. These four categories however are specifically important in understanding how countries bring their organizations together to achieve unity of effort in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Organizational Culture and Essence

Most people have heard the term “organizational culture” before. Its definition is intuitive to anyone who has had the life experience to work within more than one organization whether it is a government organization or a private firm. John Q. Wilson in his book, *Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, provided the most useful definition of organizational culture calling it, “the persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships in an organization. Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual. Like [sic] human culture generally, it is passed on from one generation to the next. It changes slowly, if at all.”⁷⁵ The culture of an organization can determine how well it is able to integrate into the command structure necessitated by a counterinsurgency campaign. How does that organization see itself and others? The case studies will provide examples as to how the

concept of organizational culture fits into how well an organization integrates as well as how it approaches the problems that are presented in a counterinsurgency environment.

Closely related to Wilson's concept of organizational culture is a term used by Morton H. Halperin in his book, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*.

Organizational essence is defined as, "the view held by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and capabilities of that organization should be."

Halperin goes on to explain and clarify that part of this is the convictions about what kinds of people with what expertise, experience, and knowledge should be a member of the organization.⁷⁶ If organizational culture is how an organization acts and relates to others and organizational essence is really how the organization sees itself, it is easy to then see how these two difficult to define concepts play an important role in determining how the organization's leaders accept, reject, or even propose organizational structures for a counterinsurgency campaign. When several government organizations of either the counterinsurgent or the interventionist power are brought together to wage a counterinsurgent campaign, essence and culture will greatly influence the decisions that are made. They will also influence how the organization approaches the entire counterinsurgency problem. This dynamic has been studied before. Most significantly after the Vietnam War, the subject was explored by Robert Komer in his book *Bureaucracy at War* and later by Dr. John Nagl in his book, *Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam and Malaya*. Nagl, with references to Komer, concluded that organizational culture (and essence) played a key role in whether or not an organization was able to support a change necessary for the prosecution of a counterinsurgency campaign. Nagl states that changes that conflicted with the organizational essence were

not adopted. Leaders of an organization brought up in a particular culture resisted changes that were outside of their organizational essence.⁷⁷ From organizational culture and essence come other factors such as organizational interests. These interests may include the pursuit of goals that are outside the scope of the organization's mission or purpose. They can be the motivations to protect the reputation of the organization, perpetuate the organization, fund it, or even to gain credit for success.⁷⁸ It is exactly these perceived interests that may conflict with the goals and objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign. While each organization involved wants success, the tasks required, may not fit into the perception and beliefs held by executives with respect to the culture, essence and interests of that organization. While Nagl focused on the overall culture and essence of the US military and how its conventional warfare essence inhibited adaptation to counterinsurgency warfare, this study looks at how these same concepts affect the ability of a government or interventionist power to form the necessary organizational model with the right structure and authority to effectively prosecute a counterinsurgency campaign.

Structure

The structure of an organization is defined as the way in which it is organized according to hierarchy and function. It is most easily represented in the notorious line and block charts that are attempts to graphically represent the very design of the organization. It is supposed to convey who manages whom and who reports to whom. The lines between the blocks represent defined relationships between entities. The lines are supposed to indicate levels of authority and influence. Reality, of course, is never as simple as these representations, but defined relationships of command, authority and

hierarchy are important to an organizations ability to plan, make decisions, and effectively execute complex tasks and operations. Structure can also be used to describe how hierarchical or “flat” and organization is. While some hierarchy is necessary, organizations described as flat do not have large bureaucracies separating the action elements from the decision makers. It is because of this ability to pass information and decisions quickly, that flat organizations are often preferable for some activities. Modern counterinsurgencies like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan desired the ability to quickly pass information and make decisions because of the speed with which media could affect the narrative. While the phrase, “flattening the organization” is a popular one, a hierarchical organization can have the same information and decision making abilities as a flat organization if authority is effectively delegated and distributed and if information technology and knowledge management are applied.⁷⁹ The counterinsurgency theorists prescribe a campaign that is structured in such a way that it has centralized control with decentralized authority to central commanders (or committees) at geographic echelons.

Leadership and Personal Dynamics

Much has been written on the subject of leadership and its effects on an organization. Recently, a well-known authority on counterinsurgency, Mark Moyar, published a book entitled *A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*. The central thesis of the book is that quality leadership was often the decisive factor in success or failure of counterinsurgency campaigns. Moyar goes on to further recommend that interventionist powers focus their efforts on raising the right kind of leaders within their own ranks and putting forth the effort to train and empower indigenous leaders when conducting counterinsurgency as an interventionist power. In

describing the type of person necessary for leading counterinsurgency campaigns, Moyer states that an ability to organize people and groups toward a unified effort is essential.⁸⁰

There is no need to argue the point that leadership is an important part of counterinsurgency, war, politics, or any other complex activity that involves organizations. Wilson acknowledges the importance of leadership and the personal dynamics in organizations, but quickly refutes the notion that it is “all that matters.” He reminds us that structure and culture are important for two reasons. First, people are products of their organizations.⁸¹ Other theorists would agree because the culture of an organization affects the way that it perceives its environment. Thus leaders who are brought up in an organization develop this “social construction of reality.”⁸² Naturally this will influence how they perceive the role of their organization within a counterinsurgency campaign. Wilson’s second reason brings us to the last of the four points of discussion about organization theory. Wilson states that regardless of one’s leadership ability, what people are able to accomplish depends a great deal upon their authority to act.

Authority

In his analysis of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mark Moyer found that good leaders had the ability to organize and empower their subordinates. He also found that even while authority is best held by one competent leader at the top levels of the campaign, decentralization of authority was also important.

Decentralized command has been the hallmark of effective counterinsurgency since ancient times, except in those cases where insurgents and counterinsurgents clashed with large conventional forces. National leaders and intermediate leaders- those between the national leaders and the local leaders- typically communicate the mission and a list of restrictions to local commanders

and then let the local commanders decide how to accomplish the mission.

Neither today nor at anytime in the past has decentralization involved eliminating the hierarchy entirely and replacing it with self sustaining 'networks' that cooperate without leadership. Counterinsurgency command remains hierarchical at the local level, with leaders, typically company or battalion commanders or civil officials with equivalent authority providing crucial directions to subordinates. Efforts to produce networks without strong leadership have consistently failed because the various entities became inert, unruly or because they went off in their own direction.⁸³

This study takes some issue with the terms used by Moyer to describe his thoughts. When Moyer says decentralized command and then expounds upon the need for hierarchy, he is really talking about centralized command and decentralized or generously delegated authority to centralized commanders. Other recent authorities on the subject, including Kalev Sepp, Marston and Malkasian, and theorists including Frank Kitson all agree that decentralization of command authority according to regions covered by echelons is important.⁸⁴ Modern doctrine also supports the need for decentralization or delegation of authority, as local conditions, environment, and nature of the insurgency in one area may not be the same as in others.⁸⁵ Thus it follows that commanders at each level, require a significant degree of authority over the area in which they are in charge. This includes other organizations and agencies that represent the sovereign government and may require them to emphasize degrees of authority over other organizations involved in the effort to the degree that is feasible and advantageous. For the interventionist power, the same principle should apply. The representative from the interventionist power at the regional level should maintain control over the other agencies that operate under him in support of the host country.

Organization theory supports this concept of structured organizations that decentralize command but retain authority to a single commander at echelon. Wilson

compares different organizations that demonstrated high levels of success in government. His study examined armies, prisons, and schools. He then contrasted between successful and unsuccessful models of each type of organization, looking at how they were structured and how authority was delegated. He notes that successful organizations from one category (armies, schools, or prisons) were not structured the same as successful organizations from another category. A successful school did not model its structure and authority the same as a successful prison. He concludes that the design of the organization's structure and authority should be based on the critical tasks that the organization must perform. Naturally it is the leader that must define that critical task and it is vastly important that complex organizations have a common understanding of the critical task, which should not be confused with other goals. Successful organizations were able to define their critical task, achieve a common understanding of those tasks and then acquire sufficient authority and freedom of action (to reorganize if necessary) to execute those tasks.⁸⁶

Consider then the complex problems in counterinsurgency. The counterinsurgent must do several things at different times and phases. He must vie with the insurgent for the support of the population. That includes many things from swift justice for criminals, to population and resource control, to destroying the insurgent network to development etc. What then is most important, what is the critical task? There is no *ceteris paribus* answer to this question. The only thing that is *ceteris paribus* is the desired end-state, which is the support of the population and the neutralization of the insurgency. The rest is *sui generis* for every counterinsurgency campaign and even within counterinsurgency campaigns. As Mark Moyar states:

Counterinsurgency requires different methods from one place to another because of differences in local populations, the insurgent forces, the counterinsurgent forces, and the terrain. It requires different methods from one moment in time to another because the insurgents change their behavior frequently and often in response to the actions of the counterinsurgents. Studying methods that have worked elsewhere is valuable in providing the commander with ideas but the effective commanders must determine which ideas are transferable and which are not.⁸⁷

Thus, a single commander to make policy at the top is ideal for both the counterinsurgent host country and the interventionist power. The structure of the organization must integrate all functions of the sovereign under some system that ensures unity of effort. That structure cannot just be unified at the top, it must be unified at geographic echelon and each echelon must have a commander or committee that controls all of those elements at the sub-echelon level (region, province, district, etc) where the nature of the insurgent fight is different.

At least one of the counterinsurgency theorists addresses this dynamic between structure, authority, organizational culture, and leadership and personal dynamics. David Galula explains that no matter what organizational structures or authorities are imposed, leadership and personal dynamics will still be held to chance. There may be good coordination or bad and might just hinge on personality. Aside from establishing the most conducive structure and authority to the counterinsurgency campaign, Galula recommends that government organizations possess a common understanding or a common doctrine about counterinsurgency. Although he does not use the word organizational culture, Galula advocates that a common doctrine will modify organizational cultures that might be resistant to working together.

Whatever system is chosen, however, the best organization is only as good as its members. Even with the best conceivable organization, personality conflicts are more than likely to be the order of the day. Although the wrong member can

sometimes be fired and replaced, this will not solve the problem for all committees or integrated staff. . . . The question, then, is how to make these mixed organizations work at their maximum effectiveness in a counterinsurgency, regardless of the personality factors. Assuming that each of these organizations works more or less with its over-all personality, how is the disjointed, mosaic effect of their operations to be avoided? If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved. Is this not precisely what a coherent, well-understood, and accepted doctrine would tend to achieve? More than anything else, a doctrine appears to be the practical answer to the problem of how to channel efforts in a single direction.⁸⁸

Summary

This study attempts to avoid the melee of the contemporary counterinsurgency debate by looking closely what the theorists are saying about the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. It specifically looks at command structures, relationships, and coordinating mechanisms that achieve unity of effort. The intent is to identify the points from the theorists, doctrine, and other authorities and then apply them to historic and contemporary case studies to see what else can be learned about the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. In doing so, it was necessary to first define insurgency and counterinsurgency and then explain the nature of these conflicts. Specifically, it is necessary to understand that each counterinsurgency case has its own unique elements that might affect the organization (*sui generis*). At the same time, if the theorists agree on a principle or a prescriptive solution, we should fairly consider it to be a theory that will hold true in most cases (*ceteris paribus*). For each case study, this thesis poses the following questions.

1. Is there a single unified commander of the counterinsurgency campaign that effectively pulls together all of the organizations that specifically represent the sovereign

power of the counterinsurgent? If not a single individual, does the system in place achieve the same effect?

2. Do organizations at echelons (regions, provinces, districts etc) have a similarly ordered and mirrored arrangement that maintains unity of effort in message and in deeds down to the tactical or ground level where the actual conflict for the population is fought? Or are efforts stove-piped through independent actors. Again, if the single commander model is not used, is how is unity of effort achieved.

3. Each case study will be examined for how it adheres to Kitson's principles for interventionist powers.

a. Does the host country have an established and ordered system and structure in place to conduct the campaign? If it does not or did not, what measures did the interventionist power take to correct this essential point.

b. Did the interventionist power have a single commander or representative at the top that coordinated all assistance and played a role in policy making of the campaign? If not, was the system, method, or structure effective?

c. Was the interventionist power's effort represented at every level with the host country by a single leader and if not did that system provide for effective coordination and unity of effort.

After examining the theorists' prescription for organization from the top down and comparing it to the case studies, it is then useful to examine how that organization is tied into the bottom-up efforts for counter-organizing the population. Host countries and interventionist powers must decide how to counter-organize the population. They can choose to impose the forced hyper-organization of Trinquier in a top-down, resource

intensive way, they can attempt to co-opt and empower the existing social structures, or they can employ some middle way that applies both top-down and bottom-up counter-organization.

This thesis continues with the assumption that organization and command structures are certainly not the only important factor in effective counterinsurgency. Prescriptive organization is not the *sine qua non* of success. Organization structures that follow the prescribed advice of the theorists will not help if there is a bad plan or poor leadership, but organizations that are not structured to achieve unity of effort could ruin a good plan led by a good leader. Even if and when structures are put in place to achieve unity of effort, there are forces within the organizations that embody the power of the sovereign government and the interventionist power. It is because of these forces that the theorists call for organizational structures to help impose unity of effort.

This chapter also provided the literature review for elements of organization theory that support the writings of counterinsurgency theorists on the key principles and prescriptive examples of organizing a counterinsurgency campaign. It examined four categories of organizational design including organizational culture and essence, leadership and personal dynamics, structure, and finally authority. Organizational culture and essence provide the organizations that must come together for a counterinsurgency campaign with perceptions, interests and goals that may not align with the need for unity of command or the requirement for unity of effort. Each case study will examine if, where, and why this happened. Leadership and personal dynamics are always important in counterinsurgency just as in warfare or governance. Good leadership and positive personal dynamics can sometimes help to achieve unity of effort where the organizational

structure does not support it. This study will examine how and when leadership and personal dynamics were able to compensate for less than ideal organizational structure. Structure and authority are important to effective counterinsurgency campaigns. The nature of counterinsurgency makes it challenging to identify the critical tasks involved in waging a particular campaign at a particular place and time. The nature of the fight changes often as the insurgent must adapt. Commanders or other decision making entities require a structured organization that provides control of organizations involved in their fight, but allow for the decentralization of authority to unified echelons. Without authority, the commander or committee, these structures are easily nullified, unless leadership and personal dynamics can overcome. Relying on leadership and personal dynamics without complimentary structures and necessary authority does not optimize the potential of success in complex counterinsurgency operations. This study will also examine each case study with respect to how command and control structures were organized in terms of structure and authority. Finally, one can't overlook how attempts at common doctrine and common understanding help to achieve unity of effort in the absence of optimal structure and authority. Common doctrine can change organizational culture and realign essence to achieve unity or harmony of effort. Is it enough? Is it better to optimize all four of the categorical elements?

¹The term “population-centric” counterinsurgency (COIN) is used frequently to describe the “approach” to counterinsurgency advocated by many strategists and tacticians from the Army and Marine Corps. Loosely it is defined as focusing efforts on turning the population against the insurgency and toward the government. It is partially defined by its opposite approach “enemy centric counterinsurgency.” Neither of these terms are accurate or effect ways to describe counterinsurgency. As these case studies will show, the counterinsurgent must focus on many things and including both the population, the enemy as well as other support relationships to the insurgency. The

definitions of these approaches can be found in the USG COIN Guide. A good taste of this debate can be found at Joint Forces Quarterly or Small Wars Journal on the web at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/06/the-great-coin-debate-in-jfq-a/> also at <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com>.

²Conn Hallinan, "The Great Myth: Counterinsurgency." *Foreign Policy In-Focus* 2010, 22-July, http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_great_myth_counterinsurgency (accessed 25 July 2010).

³Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 8-12; Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008).

⁴A good example of this is the Rhodesian Counterinsurgency effort in the 60s and 70s. This Counterinsurgency campaign demonstrated a highly effective organizational model that managed to empower a very small white minority over a much larger black African majority that was poorly organized and split on tribal lines. The Counterinsurgency efforts failed though for several reasons not attributable directly to organization, unity of effort etc. A good summary of this campaign can be found in Marston and Malkasian book referenced above.

⁵Examples of this include many of the Communist or Soviet led counterinsurgencies in Europe and in the Soviet Republics.

⁶Malaya provides an example of where a mixture of rigid state control combined with respect for local customs and local institutions was used Seth Jones, *In The Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2009), Introduction.

⁷Both Marston and Sepp address this.

⁸Applying Organization theory to counterinsurgency is something not unique to this study as far as I can tell. John Nagl and Robert Komer both refer to elements of organization theory in their major works and apply in to COIN.

⁹Latin Phrases and Quotes, "Sui Generis," <http://latin-phrases.co.uk/dictionary/s/> (accessed 9 November 2010).

¹⁰Marston and Malkasian, 13-20.

¹¹Kurt M.Campbell and Richard Weitz, *Non-Military Strategies For Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2007); John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 6; Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University

Press, 2009), 9; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Saint Petersburg, FL: Glenwood Press, 1964).

¹²This assessment is the author's.

¹³John Shy and Thomas Collier, "Revolutionary War," In *Makers of Modern Strategy*, by Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 815-862.

¹⁴Mao-Tse Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare (yu Chi Chan)*, Translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 49.

¹⁵Andrew Curry, "Mathematics of Terror," *Discover* (July/August 2010).

¹⁶Latin Phrases and Quotes, "Ceteris Paribus," <http://latin-phrases.co.uk/dictionary/s/> (accessed 9 November 2010).

¹⁷John Lewis Gaddis addresses this issue in a similar way in his book, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Though he does not use the terms *sui generis* or *ceteris paribus*, Gaddis discusses "continuities" and contingencies and emphasizes the historians role in understanding a situation in its historical context.

¹⁸Peter Paret, *Clausewitz* (Pinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 187-217.

¹⁹This comes from classes at the CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where the differences between prescriptive and descriptive theory are frequently discussed.

²⁰John A. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Mark O'Neill, *Confronting the Hydra* (Sydney Australia: Lowy Institute, 2009); Marston and Malkasian, 18.

²¹Land War Centre, "Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency," *British Army Field Manuals 1 10* (Warminster, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, January 2010). This source cites several of the theorists throughout and on page 3-14 discusses Frank Kitson. Also see, Department of the Army, FM-3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2006). This source is often criticized for relying too much on David Galula who is cited several times throughout. See page 2-1 (Section on Unity of Effort) for example. Also see British Army, *Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guideleines : Combined Arms Operations Part 10* (London, United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, 2001).

²²Shy and Collier, 815-820.

²³Sepp, 8-12. Mao Tse Tung in *On Guerilla Warfare* discusses insurgency as just another part of clausewitzian concept of total war.

²⁴Geoff Demarest, “Let’s take the French Experience in Algeria Out of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” *Military Review* (July-August 2010): 19-24. In this article, Geoff Demarest gives a very detailed and accurate account of Galula’s rise to prominence in the US Military community of officers, academics and doctrine writers.

²⁵Galula, 4-6.

²⁶The *focoists* tradition of the communist insurgencies are an example of non – protracted struggle. The Shy and Collier article on Revolutionary warfare provides the best in-depth explanation of this.

²⁷Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), 3.

²⁸Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), 28; Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964), 6.

²⁹Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 85.

³¹Land Warfare Centre, 1-1.

³²The two major contemporary counterinsurgency efforts of Iraq and Afghanistan (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) have the significant sui generis element of being waged by interventionist powers that had to move from the position of conquering force, to occupation force to an assistance/interventionist force. This fact has had significant impact on the writing of doctrine as well as on its inculcation to the military and civilian elements involved. It also sets the two conflicts apart from the three case studies, though the reoccupation of Malaya by Britain post World War II and the assumption of the role of interventionist power by the US in Vietnam provided a similar historic condition.

³³Marston and Malkasian, 13-18.

³⁴Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-29.

³⁵Sepp’s article was published almost one year before the release of FM 3-24 so it is likely that this list was copied from Sepp or that Sepp participated in the writing of the manual.

³⁶Mao Zedong, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Praeger, 1961), 20-40.

³⁷Ibid., 34

³⁸Galula, 87-95; Thompson, 50-63.

³⁹Kitson, 49-63.

⁴⁰Even on this fundamental principle, it is possible for an insurgency to derive its support from a source that does not represent part of the population. It is difficult to identify insurgencies where the insurgent group was not dependent to some critical degree on some element of a population. Frequently foreign support to an insurgency can provide critical supplemental support to an insurgency. The case studies of Vietnam and Dhofar bear this out. The minimal outside support provided to the communist insurgency in Malaya was significant to its outcome.

⁴¹Trinquier, Chap 2; Kitson, 29; Sine Qua Non means “without which not” or “an indispensable condition.”

⁴²The USG COIN Guide provides a useful explanation of various approaches to counterinsurgency. David Galula explains the different approaches that may be used by dividing his work into “Cold War” and “Hot War” the difference being in what phase and strength the insurgency has achieved.

⁴³John Mackinlay, *The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden* (New York.: Columbia University Press, 2009), 135.

⁴⁴Mao Zedong, 18.

⁴⁵Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and The State: theory and Politics of Civil Military Realitions* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 3.

⁴⁶Galula, 90-93.

⁴⁷Ibid., 90-93.

⁴⁸Ibid., 90.

⁴⁹Thompson, 74-75.

⁵⁰Kitson, 68-69.

⁵¹Ibid., 68.

⁵²Ibid., 56-57.

⁵³Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010. *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency, 2010), AA1009.

⁵⁴Kitson, 56.

⁵⁵John McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 85-88.

⁵⁶Trinquier, 30.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

⁵⁸Trinquier, Kindle location 450-468.

⁵⁹Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from IndoChina to Algeria* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 20-51.

⁶⁰Henry Nuzum, “Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of ‘Unity of Effort’ in American Counterinsurgency” (The Letort Papers, Carlisle, PA, US Army War College, 2010), 100.

⁶¹For references and definitions of these terms see Marston and Malkasian’s introduction. Also see Kalev Sepp’s article and the doctrine manuals from both the US and UK armies.

⁶²Kitson, 57.

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 59.

⁶⁵Particularly relevant questions would include concerns about what to do if the host country government’s will to fight is not conducive to victory or how much direct responsibility to accept in the case of incompetence of the host country. These are the kinds of strategic questions (and tactical implications) avoided by the theorists probably because if strategy is made up of ends, ways, and means, then counterinsurgency theorists provide only conceptual ways and recommendations for the means used. The ends desired are purely *sui generis* and are for the leaders to decide. Counterinsurgency theory may try to provide some concept of what is realistic, but even this is a *sui generis* determination and not easily placed into a convenient theory. It must be informed by history, environment, and resource limitations.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 60.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 58. A better contemporary model for the system that Kitson is referring to would be the actions of the USG over the past 10 years in the Republic of the Philippines where the embassy has led US efforts to coordinate advisory assistance to the counterinsurgency campaign in the south. Even this case does not reflect exactly the

system Kitson is praising, but it is much closer to his model than Iraq or Afghanistan campaigns.

⁶⁸Land Warfare Center., Chapter 1. Also see, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 2-2. Also see US Government, DOD, DOS, USAID. “US Government Counterinsurgency Guide” (Washington, DC: USG Printing Office, 2010), 15.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 16

⁷⁰Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 2-3.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 2-37 to 2-38. The US military has a Joint Doctrine Publication that the Department of Defense and Joint Staff approved after the publication of FM 3-24 that is similar in its wording on unity of effort.

⁷²CGSC Scholars Program 2010, *CGSC Scholars Program 2010 COIN Research Study* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency, 2010), Personal Correspondence to doctrine writer.

⁷³Richard Lacquement, “Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” *Parameters* (March 2010): 20-33.

⁷⁴Hatch, 53.

⁷⁵Wilson, 91.

⁷⁶Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1974), 28.

⁷⁷Nagl, 216.

⁷⁸Wilson, 72-89.

⁷⁹General Stanley McChrystal’s ISAF Commander’s Guidance emphasized the need to flatten the organization especially with respect to addressing collateral damage and perceptions.

⁸⁰Moyar, 11.

⁸¹Wilson, 24.

⁸²Hatch, 42.

⁸³Moyar, 6.

⁸⁴Marston and Malkasian, 18; Sepp, 2; Kitson, 27.

⁸⁵Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 4-5.

⁸⁶Wilson, 27.

⁸⁷Moyar, 9.

⁸⁸Galula, 92.

CHAPTER 3

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN MALAYA

The counterinsurgency campaign of the British in Malaya is a frequently cited and explored campaign that is rightly considered a successful counterinsurgency. The British waged the campaign after the Second World War against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), its military wing the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), and its support or auxiliary organization the Min Yuen, for about 12 years between 1948 and 1960.¹ Sepp, Malkasian, and Marston derive several of their themes and lessons from the ultimate success in Malaya. Theorists, including Galula, Thompson, and Kitson, all reference the lessons of the campaign and use the successes to support the credibility of their theories. A serious, in depth study of the Malayan campaign however, reveals that the campaign had to change both drastically and incrementally over time in strategy and in tactics. The British experience in Malaya proves assessment, understanding, critical thinking, and targeted political compromise were all very necessary in arriving at the right formula to apply key themes and lessons. A significant part of those key changes to the campaign included decisions about the very topics and questions of organization that are addressed in this study and were covered in chapter 2.

The best sources for inquiry into the Malayan emergency (as the campaign is often referred) especially when trying to understand the campaign and its organization are numerous. Richard Stubbs provides a succinct description of the campaign in Marston and Malkasian's book, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. John McCuen's theoretical work, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare* uses elements of the campaign, especially contrasting efforts between the early years and the later years to

demonstrate key points. More recently, John Nagl and Mark Moyar have included very detailed research in using the Malayan campaign as a case study in each of their works on contrasting of armies as learning organizations and leadership respectively. Each of these provides insight into the organizational challenges and makes the reader realize that although Malaya was quite different from contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns, the lessons of organization are still informative and valuable.

Overview

The initial strategy of the British forces to the rising attacks and actions of the insurgent force was to deny that it was in fact an insurgency and to conduct heavy handed military sweeping operations to root out the MNLA from remote jungles and villages from which they were staging attacks on the mining and rubber industries. This strategy, under General C. H. Boucher and the High Commissioner Henry Gurney, failed to quell the insurgency. The British replaced the military command of the operation with General Harold Briggs in 1950. He would change the strategy and begin effective implementation of the “Briggs Plan,” which called for some significant organizational changes in addition to many operational changes. Briggs would be the military commander, or “Director of Operations,” but would not have responsibility for civilian functions of government. These, the British left to the High Commissioner Gurney. After only two years under Briggs and Gurney, and following the renewed urgency created by Gurney’s assassination and a significant spike in violent enemy attacks, the British government appointed General Gerald Templar to the position of both military commander and High Commissioner. In addition to the decree of the British to eventually grant independence

to Malaya, Templer made further changes to the strategy, tactics, and organization to arrive at a formula that truly began to succeed.²

Sui Generis

The Malayan campaign, while frequently cited as an example of successful counterinsurgency, is also frequently cited for the uniqueness of its political situation.³ While different authors will claim different elements of its uniqueness to detract from arguments about successful counterinsurgency principles or tactics, there are primarily two elements that are most common and a third that should also be considered.⁴ Together, these factors comprise the summation of the *sui generis* nature of the Malayan campaign. Yet, it is important to point out that each of these reasons could be compared to other historic counterinsurgencies with very similar conditions. The Malayan campaign was not alone in history in having these conditions, but compared to some of its contemporary campaigns around the world, there were undoubtedly decisive advantages to the counterinsurgent forces. The first of these unique conditions was the ethnic make-up of the insurgency itself. While the communists of the MNLA sought a communist government of Malaya free of the colonial British rule, their ranks were made up almost exclusively of ethnic Chinese Diaspora. The ethnic Chinese made up about 38 percent of the total population of Malaya and were a disenfranchised minority.⁵ Frequently referred to as “squatters,” the Chinese could not own land and lived largely in communities outside of mining and rubber industries.⁶ Having a disenfranchised, ethnic minority as the popular foundation for the insurgency made it easier to both employ hyper-organizational tactics of Trinquier, including resettlement into “new villages,” and enabled the counterinsurgent forces to target the popular support for the insurgency and address

grievances. But, here the British had to convince the Sultans and native Malaysians to accept and enfranchise the Chinese as voting citizens in elections and grant them much-desired land reform by allowing land ownership.⁷

The second key element of the counterinsurgency in Malaya is that the British were both the sovereign power and the interventionist power. As a colonial power, which no longer had any interest in perpetuating their rule of the territory, the British could both set policy and direct the actions of the political and military arms of government, and could defeat the enemy narrative by announcing their intent to grant independence once the government was ready and the insurgency defeated.⁸

Finally, one must consider a key organizational element that may have made things a bit easier for the British as compared with some other counterinsurgency campaigns. As a colonial power, the British had a civil administration structure that was well established down to local and district levels. This colonial administration made up the skeletal structure for the native Malayan administration that was to takeover upon independence. In fact there was physically no difference as district areas would be assumed by Malayan administrators. Theorist and practitioner Frank Kitson acknowledged this point in an interview, recognizing that having an administrative structure and system of government in place was a tremendous advantage to the British in many of their insurgencies.⁹ John McCuen also concludes that the existing structure was beneficial to the British. Yet, McCuen further emphasizes that this was not a panacea and the administration had significant gaps that were deliberately exploited by the insurgency.¹⁰ Furthermore, the civil administration at the time of the Malayan emergency was not at all robust. It lacked the necessary people with the necessary skills to do the

job. It had, in fact suffered from serious losses as a result of the Japanese occupation who were systematically exterminated by the *kempeitai* or Japanese secret police.¹¹ This included administrators and police. It also lacked members and representation of the diverse population that included Chinese, Malays and Indians.¹²

Organizing for Unity of Effort at the Top

Counterinsurgency theorists are very prescriptive on the need for unity of command or at least the requirement for unity of effort facilitated at the top. The theorists are clear that this is best enabled by a structure that brings together civil and military departments of the counterinsurgent government to include police and law enforcement, military, intelligence, and other administrative activities. This is also supported by modern authorities on counterinsurgency and by modern doctrine. According to Kitson, the coordinating structure to achieve this unity must be established at the top first and then should be mirrored down at echelon structures. In Malaya, it actually happened with committee structures established at state and district levels before a truly unifying mechanism was firmly established at the top.¹³

Upon taking command of the military campaign, General Briggs quickly recognized the importance of coordination of military and civilian efforts in the campaign. In implementing his comprehensive plan, Briggs included provisions to recruit more administrators at the district levels from the local populations. Briggs and Gurney had inherited a colonial state system in Malaya that had a Federal Legislative Council made up of appointed members from the country's population. Some of these individuals became the heads of departments and made up the Federal Executive Council. The nine Malay states were each ruled by a Sultan. The Sultan served as a head of state, but the

actual administration was led by a British adviser and a “Menteri Besar” or Prime Minister. Each state had a legislative and executive council made up of departments. The states were further broken down into districts led by district officers. Districts might further be divided into sub-districts led by leading local figures known as “penghulus.”¹⁴ This hierarchy became the framework for all command and control in dealing with population centers and securing the population. Briggs would use this hierarchical structure to combine and coordinate the efforts of departments and agencies of government with his military forces. The system would begin to conform to what the theorists would later advocate. This was the system of committees that were made up of military and civilian representatives from various departments.¹⁵ The committees were called the State and District War Executive Committees (SWECs and DWECs), which essentially brought together police, military, intelligence services and administrators on a regular basis for collaboration on the implementation of government policy. They became at each level, the basis for methodical and coordinated action.¹⁶ This system was somewhat effective at providing some unity of effort. Yet even Briggs was frustrated by its shortcomings in several areas including the lack of unity of command, especially in the form of a single executive authority over military, police, and civil administration.¹⁷ Without this, the agency and department representatives serving on SWECs and DWECs were merely supporting the policy interpretations of their organizational superiors. They were in effect, approaching the conflict with all of the baggage of their organizational interests built from the culture and essence of organizations that had not been designed to fight a counterinsurgency war. The police and the Army did not have a clear hierarchy and even though the police objected, the Army saw fit to burn buildings and homes that

they suspected belonged to “the enemy” without any due procedures of civil law, which the organizational culture and essence of the police forces demanded.¹⁸ The organizational structure lacked a clearly defined authority and directly contributed to atrocities that were counter-productive to the counterinsurgency campaign.¹⁹ The military was still conducting large scale sweeps of territory and the police were overwhelmed, while the civil administration remained short-handed and sought to function as elements reporting to their higher offices on organizational priorities rather than on the counterinsurgency priorities of the *Menteri Besar* or district leaders.

Oliver Lyttleton, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, agreed with Briggs’ frustration on this point. After, examining the situation in person, Lyttleton made this his top priority and convinced the government to appoint General Gerald Templer as the individual directly responsible to the cabinet in London for directing the civil administration and military forces.²⁰ When Templer arrived in Malaya, he wasted no time in reorganizing and setting things right. Among his priorities upon taking over, Templer sought to “get the organizations right” just as the counterinsurgency theorists would recommend.²¹ He did this by merging the Federal War Council and the Federal Executive Council into one body that became like Kitson’s Supreme Council.²² Having supreme authority, with a council of the leaders of all executive departments, Templer had the mechanism for unity of command at the top.

Organizing for Unity of Effort at Echelons: Authority and Structure

With Templer taking control of the entire counterinsurgency campaign effectively as head of government, and creating the coordinating mechanism for achieving unity of

command at the top, Templer sought to empower the coordinating mechanisms of subordinate states and districts that Briggs had set up. The only way to do that was to delegate his authority to the states and districts. Templer ensured that the district officers were in charge as the DWEC chairman and were the leaders of the counterinsurgency campaign in their area.²³ Templer even went so far as to inform committee members that they would be fired if they failed to reach an agreement. This effectively put the chairman (district officer) in charge and empowered him with authority.²⁴

The British used the State and District authority to coordinate important activities and share necessary information on important aspects of the campaign. They established a single unified intelligence organization commanded under a single chief. The State and District committees established fusion centers run by the police, but with military and civil government representatives. The intelligence architecture included Malays and Chinese who were capable and understood local conditions.²⁵

The effectiveness of these measures reinforces the principle that unity of command at the top and mirrored at echelon is important, but without delegated authority to enforce policy and make decisions, coordinating mechanisms may not achieve their intended purpose. Coordinating mechanisms that are democratic or exist without the authority to commit agencies and departments to action have a much harder time in achieving unity of effort.²⁶

Interventionist Power and Sovereign

Although it is clear that the British had an advantage as an interventionist power in that they were sovereign over Malaya, there are still lessons and observations of value in their approach to organization. Under General Templer, the British made it policy that

independence would be granted to Malaya and that the administration and civil service would enable and form the mechanisms of that independent Malayan government. With the announcement of his intention to work toward eventual independence, Templer put himself in the position of interventionist power and followed the formula that would become Kitson's three critical points. He first ensured that there was an ordered mechanism and plan for fighting the insurgency. He then was himself the leader of that effort and represented all British assistance toward that effort. Finally, he ensured that each SWEC and DWEC had a senior representative of the British government who advised the district officer who was often, and where possible, a Malayan civilian.²⁷

On the first and second point though it is important to note that the British were able to reinforce an existing organizational structure at the local levels. It was a structure that the British had built as the colonial power. It was not in a good state in 1948 to 1952, given the lack of manning and trained personnel. Also, the communities of Chinese "squatters" and their forced relocation into "New Villages" required the Trinquier model of building that hyper-organization with the full support of the host country government (to be) and the interventionist power. Yet, the British also sought to empower the very people that were targeted and organized by the insurgents, i.e. the Chinese. By establishing "Home Guard" units, bringing the Chinese into Special Branch (including turned insurgents), and appointing Chinese Penghulus in the new villages, the British and Malay authorities were able to effectively counter-organize the population from the bottom-up. These new communities had to be integrated into districts and states (provinces). This took some significant effort and resources. Yet, the overall administration and organization was accepted as the legitimate model of authority and as

more and more, Malayan and Chinese ran its operations, its legitimacy in the eyes of the people increased and sustained.²⁸ Templer drew leaders from both the Malay and Chinese communities together in the responsibility for directing the war effort.²⁹

In the case studies of the following chapters, the counterinsurgent does not necessarily have the benefit of British sovereignty or a pre-established structure (albeit diminished from years of occupation). The organization of government and its administrative systems must be developed with great assistance from the interventionist power, yet the interventionist is often reluctant to assume too much control. That power has the choice of setting up an organization and then filling it with vetted members of the local population, or with trained outsiders from somewhere in the country who represent a national government. The interventionist could also support the idea of empowering existing social mechanisms of control and influence.

Lessons of Organization Theory

It is simply a difficult task to define the constructs of organizational theory discussed in chapter 2 for each of the British organizations involved in the campaign. While each organization, particularly the elements from the Army, the police, and the intelligence services (especially Special Branch) each had their own organizational cultures, essence, and interests, the British in general may have benefitted from a culture of cooperation in their entire government. This is relative to the United States or other countries without the significant history of administration of an empire and colonial interests. Over the years, colonial assignments had provided both military and civilians with some level of common understanding of the need for good administration. They shared some commonalities in upbringing and schooling and had a conceptual

understanding as to the importance of unity of effort. This would have included Templer as a leader and his associates.³⁰

When it came down to it though, the influences of organizational culture that may have been positive to the execution of an effective counterinsurgency campaign were simply not strong enough to overcome the tendencies created within the organizations from their social construction of reality. The Army was still locked into the influences of their organizational essence that required them to root out and destroy the enemy, while the police were trying to fight guerrilla bands with laws and prosecution designed for criminality grounded on very different motivations. The police also suffered from an incredibly rapid build-up of paramilitary manpower in the form of auxiliary police and special constables. These poorly trained and equipped forces suffered the brunt of the insurgency in the early years and could not easily be brought into operationalizing and understanding Brigg's framework plan.³¹ Committees for coordination and a spirit of working together toward a common goal were simply not enough.³²

Leadership and personal dynamics also mattered a great deal. At the highest strategic levels, effective leadership was key. Briggs was by all accounts an effective leader. Yet, Lyttleton's analysis of the situation made it abundantly clear that good leadership was not enough to create the unity required in counterinsurgency. Briggs himself knew this but likely could not reach out and ask for such authority without undermining the personal dynamic and influence he had with Gurney and his deputies. That personal dynamic was his only means of achieving any kind of unity of effort at the top. This is quite similar to what leaders in Afghanistan would experience over half a century later.

Mark Moyer emphasizes the importance of Templer's effective leadership in the success of the campaign. This is undoubtedly true, but the campaign continued for several years after Templer's departure and it was clear that the organizational structure that he and Briggs set up and the lines of authority with which he was empowered remained long after he left and likely maintained the success and momentum that he had achieved.³³

Summary

This case study validates the prescriptive models expressed by the theorists. To be fair, modern theorist were undoubtedly and in some cases admittedly influenced by its success. Pundits who want to resist counterinsurgency efforts for strategic or normative reasons often like to detract from the success of the Malayan campaign by emphasizing the *sui generis* elements. Frequently it is argued that the British faced a disenfranchised minority and that they already had an organizational structure. There is truth to these arguments, but the civil administration was decimated from the years of brutal Japanese occupation and that left serious gaps in personnel and geography that were exploited by the insurgents. Additionally, the ethnic Chinese still comprised over one third of the total population. The insurgencies in Dhofar, Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq also formed around ethnic or sectarian lines but in terms of organizing the campaign, these insurgencies can still learn something from the Malaya experience. The recognition of independence and the fact that the British had to simultaneously lead the counterinsurgency effort and slowly turn the fight over to a capable indigenous administration at all levels, influenced Kitson's principles for interventionist powers. But

in terms of organization, the models used prevailed largely because they adhere to the wisdom of organization theory.

Organization theory tells us that the design of an organization is best achieved by first understanding critical tasks. It was critical to the Malayan campaign that the government should address the grievances of the targeted populations at the local level, provide for security of the population and provide good governance that would support an independent Malaya in the future. The lack of unity of effort at the state and district levels was making the insurgency worse and was counterproductive. Briggs, Templer and Lyttelton all recognized that a structure was necessary to facilitate unity of effort, consistently address grievances, and demonstrate good governance. Leadership was not enough. Leadership required authority and authority required an organizational structure that informs its use with a holistic understanding of what needs to be done. The case study of the Malayan campaign demonstrates that it was not until the leadership of General Templer and the authority granted to him for complete control of all resources through the committee structure that the system began to work. Briggs established the structure at echelon, but then Templer empowered it with authority. If a counterinsurgency campaign, does not have the right leadership, with the right authorities and the right structure, it will not be able to break the competing influences of the organizations that make up its effort and were designed and structured for different critical tasks. Only with leadership, authority, and structure at all levels was Templer able to counter the influences of his subordinate organizations, alter their social construction of reality, and achieve common understanding. Only then could they learn and adapt. It is important to note that Templer and his office as both civil and military head did not last

till the actual end of the campaign. As soon as Templer left Malaya, the country went back to a separate military and civilian head, with the civilian holding ultimate authority over both civil and military actions.³⁴ Other case studies, especially Vietnam demonstrate that coordination of efforts, unity of effort and harmony of effort are easy things to write into a manual or demand in meeting or cable, but when they clash with resistant organizational culture, they do not yield success anticipated.

Counter-organization of the population demanded a bottom-up approach that could tie into the population most targeted by the insurgency. Despite the well structured organization at district and state level, the local populations needed to be organized where they lived by co-opting and empowering the Chinese to assume local security roles “home-guard,” police roles (special branch) and leadership roles as *penghulus*. This counter-organization model uses elements prescribed by Trinquier and McCuen.

¹Sepp, 8-12. The MRLA went through various name changes over the course of the conflict. In 1947 it was the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army and prior to that during WWII it existed as the Malayan peoples Anti-Japanese Army. Though Malayan in name, the party and the guerilla force were mostly comprised of ethnic Chinese that made up the Diaspora in Malaya.

²Richard Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 101-118.

³Stephen T. Hosmer et al., *Counterinsurgency, A Symposium April 16-20, 1962* (Washington, DC: RAND, 1962), 85.

⁴Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population Centric COIN and the Army,” *Parameters* (2009): 5-17.

⁵John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 169. In terms of percentages, this is just slightly less than the percentages of Pashtuns living in Afghanistan who make up approximately 42 percent of the population according to Seth Jones. The Sunni population of Iraq is similar making up slightly less than 30 percent according to cia.gov.

- ⁶Stubbs., 107.
- ⁷Coates., 168-175.
- ⁸Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya* (Plymouth: Frederick Mueller, 1975), 346.
- ⁹Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Scholars Program 2010, *CGSC Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency, 2010), AA1009.
- ¹⁰McCuen, 86.
- ¹¹Victor Purcell, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1954), 45-46.
- ¹²Stubbs, 110.
- ¹³Kitson, 49-63.
- ¹⁴McCuen, 88.
- ¹⁵Stubbs, 106-107.
- ¹⁶Coates, 85; Brigadier M. C. A. Henniker, *Red Shadow Over Malaya* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1955), 8.
- ¹⁷Stubbs, 106.
- ¹⁸Short, 154.
- ¹⁹Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 68.
- ²⁰Stubbs, 109.
- ²¹John Cloake, *Templer: Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer* (London: Harrap, 1985), 227.
- ²²Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 90.
- ²³*Ibid.*, 100.
- ²⁴Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 127; Cloake, 213-214.
- ²⁵Kurt Campbell et al., *Non-Military Strategies For Countering Islamist Terrorism: Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 12.

²⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA1009

²⁷Henniker, 9.

²⁸CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA1006.

²⁹Stubbs, 109

³⁰Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 196.

³¹James Corum, *Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 7-8.

³²Coates, 94-95.

³³Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 109-132.

³⁴Stubbs, 115.

CHAPTER 4

THE BRITISH AND OMANI CAMPAIGN IN DHOFAR, OMAN

Background and Context

The counterinsurgency campaign in the Dhofar region of Oman provides a case study that illustrates a very different counterinsurgency fight, on very different terrain with different people and a different insurgent narrative. The theorists' points on organization apply, the themes and lessons of contemporary authorities apply, but, once again, the *sui generis* nature of insurgencies demands the examination of the factors that influenced key organizational decisions. The Omani and British governments achieved success by co-opting and empowering existing social structures rather than attempting to create new ones that would require hyper-organization and force to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.

The rebellion in Dhofar, Oman lasted from about 1965 to 1976. The original insurgent group known as the Dhofari Liberation Front (DLF) changed overtime and, after the fall of neighboring Yemen (Aden) in 1967, it became a communist based, Chinese backed, insurgent group known as the Peoples Liberation Front of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).¹ In spite of their colonial presence and legacy, the British failed to execute a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Yemen (Aden). Fearing the subsequent loss of Oman, the British government sought to protect the government of Oman, led by Sultan Said bin Taimur. The British government was bound by a century old promise of defense assistance, but also recognized the interest to protect the nascent oil wealth of Oman, and more importantly to prevent the loss of its strategic position on the Arabian Peninsula controlling the Straits of Hormuz and access to the Persian Gulf.²

This insurgency, though much smaller in scope than Malaya, was no less complex and demanded considerable effort over time from Britain and the government of Oman.

Sui Generis

The Dhofar campaign took place in an isolated region, with insurgent forces occupying some of the most remote and environmentally challenging locations on the planet. The Jebel, or high desert mountains and plateaus of the Arabian Peninsula, were the sanctuary of the PFLOAG cadre and guerillas, known as the “*Adoo*” to the Sultans Armed Forces (SAF), the British and the locals.³ The Jebel was also home the home of the Dhofari tribes. These tribes were independent and ungoverned in the modern sense. They lived according to an order based on tribal systems and traditions. Again, there have been other counterinsurgency campaigns in similar regions, but compared to its contemporary insurgencies of Vietnam, Northern Ireland, Central America and Africa, it appeared quite unique.⁴

Unlike Malaya, it was not British regular forces that fought this campaign. It was fought by elements of the SAF, foreign units from Iran, Jordan, Baluchistan, and local tribal militias. The forces of the host country were very closely advised and in fact led, by a small group of seconded and contracted officers from the British Army.⁵ Therefore, the British were not sovereign as in Malaya, however, they were almost exclusively responsible to the Sultan for military and security matters. The British enjoyed an incredible level of trust with the Sultan (both father and son). This existing habitual relationship was very important in the British ability as an interventionist power advising the Sultan’s government and assisting in the counterinsurgency campaign.⁶ Just as in

Malaya, this would affect the organization of the counterinsurgency effort and the organization of the advisory effort of Britain, acting as the interventionist power.

The Sultan of Oman himself undoubtedly created the roots and motivations of the insurgency. Sultan Said bin Taimur had been extremely conservative and anachronistic to the point of oppression of the people of Oman and Dhofar. Sultan Said severely limited western and modern influences into the country in order to preserve the country's culture. His policies included measures that prevented progress in education and infrastructure development that would have been welcomed by the populace. More significantly it provided the grievances that actually sparked the insurgency and defined the narrative that would be used by the DLF and later the PFLOAG.⁷ With his forced abdication, came a very valuable opportunity to counter the enemy narrative and address the grievances that sparked the rebellion.

Sultan Said bin Taimur and his extreme actions and repression provided a cause for rebellion in Dhofar. However; when neighboring Yemen fell to the communists and the DLF was forcibly assimilated into the orthodox communist PFLOAG, the enemy's new *causus belli* and Marxist narrative would not find easy acceptance among the Dhofari people. The tribes of Dhofar held a distinct ethnic identity that was quite separate from the Arabs of northern Oman. In many ways, the Omani's, who, along with ethnic Baluchis comprised the SAF, looked down upon the Dhofari people whose lives centered on their cattle, their tribe, and Islam.⁸ The rejection of tribalism and Islam by the PFLOAG cadre who imposed themselves and their ideology on the Dhofari people would work significantly to the advantage of the later counterinsurgent campaign. The PFLOAG

cadre sought to change the very essence of Dhofari culture by indoctrinating the religious tribesmen with atheistic communist ideology that ran counter to their very identity.

The son of Sultan Said bin Taimur overthrew his father in a coup d'état in 1970. Sultan Qaboos bin Said would fundamentally change the counterinsurgency strategy. Unlike the PFLOAG, the counterinsurgency campaign of the new Sultan Qaboos would preserve and bolster the most important principles of Dhofari culture while simultaneously addressing the grievances of the population (education, infrastructure, security, services, water, development etc).⁹

The mission of the British was to work through and with the SAF and the government of Oman to quell the insurgency in the Dhofar region. The British officers and men of the 22nd Special Air Squadron (SAS) were assigned the mission of providing assistance to the Sultan to defeat the insurgency and two officers designed the Watts Plan, which provided the strategy for the campaign.¹⁰ Both the men of the SAS and the intrepid seconded officers of the SAF understood the nature of the Dhofari insurgency. They learned about the isolated Jebel region and the different ethnic and cultural make up of the Dhofari tribes who were quite distinct from the northern Omani tribes. This geographical isolation and separate culture presented a challenge in understanding. The British and later the Omani government understood that the culture of the Dhofari people was linked to their traditional occupation of herding cattle, to their tribes, and to Islam. While these tribes were being infiltrated by the PFLOAG, the British forces could not simply replicate best practices from Malaya or rely on the advice of theorists. If the British SAS and SAF had attempted to institute closed “new villages” on the Malaya model with Trinquier’s hyper-organization, the failure would have been immediate.¹¹

The British also benefitted from the secret nature of their campaign. Their assistance, especially with respect to the involvement of the SAS, was kept out of the international media. This meant that there was little concern for how the narrative back home was managed except that the numbers of troops needed to be kept to a minimum and the casualties be light enough to be kept off the radar. Within Dhofar, the British and the government of Oman had complete control of information services within Dhofar. They only had to compete with the information services of the enemy and not with third party, independent media outlets.¹²

Thus, British forces and the Omani government had to find ways to apply counterinsurgency theory to this very distinct and different environment, culture, and situation.¹³

Organizing for Unity of Effort at the Top and at Echelons

When Qaboos bin Said assumed the Omani throne from his father in a coup d'état on 23 July 1970, the transfer of power brought much promise and relief to both the British forces, the people of Oman proper, and the Dhofar region.¹⁴ Prior to that day the counterinsurgency campaign run by his father had followed every bad counterinsurgency practice and continued to inflame the insurgents and aid them in gaining the complicit and implicit support of the Dhofari people.¹⁵

When Qaboos came to power, he provided the essential leadership that Mark Moyar would later define as decisive. Qaboos had the wisdom to recognize the political, economic, and cultural nature of the struggle and make changes to the strategy that would defeat the insurgent narrative. Qaboos authorized the British SAS and the British led SAF

to assist in a counterinsurgency that would employ security and civic action to address the grievances of the Dhofari population.¹⁶

In addition to his understanding and leadership, Qaboos also organized his government for the counterinsurgency campaign. Upon taking control, he formed an advisory council made up of his new prime minister and other members; some of who returned from exile enforced by Qaboos' father and would now take responsibility for running departments of his reforming government. Qaboos soon adopted a campaign plan designed by British generals that included the establishment of a National Defence Council and a regional Dhofar Development Committee (DDC) to coordinate the campaign's civic action and military efforts.¹⁷ Qaboos also founded four new government ministries of Health, Justice, Education, and Interior within less than one month of his assumption of power.¹⁸ Less than one year later, Qaboos would establish the Ministry of Information using the very small existing organization run by the SAS with the help of some very intelligent and savvy Dhofari helpers.¹⁹

In Dhofar itself, the Sultan appointed Sheikh Braik bin Hamoud as "Wali" (effectively the provincial Governor with the Sultan's authority) and charged him with chairing of the Dhofar Development Committee (DDC). The Dhofar Development Committee was made up of lead representatives from agencies including the SAF Commander of the Dhofar Brigade, the Chief of Police, Head of Development, Head of Intelligence, and the Head of Civil Aid.²⁰ In terms of design and structure at echelon, the Sultan's National Defence Council and the Dhofar Development Committee matched the Malayan Federal Executive Council and the State War Executive Committees in design. It also matches what the theorists recommend for organizing a counterinsurgency

campaign. The design of the organization looks identical to Frank Kitson's organizational chart for the single commander system from *Low Intensity Operations*.²¹

The British and their Omani counterparts wasted no time in "getting the organization right," doing as Kitson recommends and other theorists support. The early SAS commanders on the ground had to fill their time with administrative work in organizing the infrastructure for a counter-revolutionary campaign. Organizations and people began working separately toward the same ends, and those ends had to be understood in priority and coordinated in such a manner that the ways and means did not conflict. As SAS Squadron Commander Tony Jeapes stated:

Administrative work to organize the infrastructure for a counter revolutionary war took up much of my time. Consultations had to be held and papers written to put committees together, under the Wali's chairmanship, on development and on civil affairs, neither of which existed. Many people were working separately towards the same ends but nobody seemed really sure what those ends were. Papers had to be written suggesting the status of prisoners of war, scales for *firquat* pay compared with SAF, the policy of rewards for enemy arms and ammunition, the myriad of details to be resolved if the campaign was to be set on a successful footing.²²

This coordinating structure was further empowered by generously delegated authority. The Sultan delegated his ultimate authority to the Wali. The Commander of the Dhofar Brigade and the SAS Commander both advised the Wali and met with him and the committee regularly. While the Wali provided them great freedom of action, especially on the Jebel where they were working with the tribes, no significant change of plans, policy or methods could be undertaken without his blessing.²³ Dhofar was the only province of the country threatened by the insurgency, so the complexity of the situation and the policies were easier to integrate. The Sultan himself remained most of the time in

the provincial capital of Salalah and was able to ensure timely decisions and understand the nature of the fight and the impact of his own decisions.²⁴

Operation Taurus further illustrates the well-coordinated civil-military structure. As SAS had gained headway into co-opting the Dhofari Tribes on the Jebel, the Wali, through his committee, developed the plan for late November 1972. The Dhofari tribes herded and drove their cattle to market from the Jebel supported by jet fighters, artillery support, local militias and SAF elements, something they had not been able to do since the PFLOAG cadres had infiltrated from Yemen. The PFLOAG elements could not prevent the action. The effort, and its value to the tribes robbed the PFLOAG of their manpower and resources, as the cattle and young tribesmen were no longer within their influence. The operation was planned at the highest levels, executed as a civil military effort, and then exploited by the small but effective propaganda machine set up by the SAS and the Omani government. Without the coordinating machinery that made unity of effort a reality, rather than just a slogan, such an event could not have happened so early into the campaign.²⁵

The Interventionist Power and Counter-Organization

As an interventionist power, the British had tremendous advantage in having an already established habitual relationship. They clearly used this to influence the counterinsurgent campaign at the highest levels especially the national and provincial levels. The previous quote from Tony Jeapes, SAS Squadron Commander, makes it clear as to their level of influence. Such influence enabled the British to take the lead, establish an organization with competent local leadership, and then as necessary and appropriate,

begin to fade into the background as a support and advisory role as Kitson and the other theorists recommend.

The Dhofar case study also provides insights when it comes to establishing security and building governance structure and coordinating mechanisms. As stated previously, the culture of the Dhofaris, the resource limitations of both the British and the Government of Oman, and the secret nature of the campaign, were not conducive to massive resettlement and large-scale security operations. Even though the Sultan himself was rich and the prospects of oil wealth were beginning to manifest themselves, the prospect of massive expenditures was not feasible. Instead, the Sultan and the British employed the same organizational principles, but through other means. The evolution of the Ministry of Information provides an example of what went on throughout the campaign. In 1972 the entire information operations or psychological operations effort consisted of eight British personnel, led by one SAS Non-commissioned officer, and a few selected Dhofaris. The small footprint meant that the SAS and all British personnel had to rely on and compel their Dhofari or Omani counterparts into action. While perhaps difficult at times, it was the only way and there was no temptation to default to more experienced British elements. The wisdom of senior and more experienced British officials who had worked in the Middle East in both military and civilian capacity passed this knowledge on.²⁶

The British commanders recognized the need to build up the security forces of Oman in order to have enough manpower to effectively fight the insurgency. The Sultan set about building the Dhofar Brigade and increasing the overall strength of his armed forces. This required time to do right and to finance properly. In order to balance the need

for time and for immediate security forces to both secure the population and fight the enemy, the campaign relied upon external forces from Iran, Jordan, and of course from British subjects that made up the officer corps.²⁷ The SAS also recognized that local security forces comprised of the Dhofari population would be necessary. The SAS, through tribal leaders and former Commanders of the pre-PFLOAG DLF, raised indigenous local security forces consisting largely of former PFLOAG militants who had either been captured, surrendered, or were turned on mass as part of an amnesty, reconciliation, and reintegration program. These “*firquat*” units (pronounced fur ka) became even more effective as the SAS and Dhofari government grouped and organized them by tribe and region.²⁸

The changes made at the top and at the provincial level, only enabled the government to secure the coastal areas that were already more or less under the control of the government forces. In effect, they were securing and reinforcing their own areas first as theorists Thompson and Galula recommend. The SAS and British effort in general provided the organizational infrastructure for the Omani Government to coalesce around and then gradually assume to the best of their ability. It only took a few months from the arrival of the first SAS teams that the protection of coastal towns passed to local police (Gendarmerie) and development in coastal areas was assumed by local Dhofari government agencies. Their standards may not have been as high, but this allowed the SAS to focus on contested areas and enemy held areas inland and on the Jebel. Here they would have to start new civil action teams (CATs) and build the indigenous organizational capacity from the bottom up that would be connected to the Wali and the Sultan.²⁹

The *Adoo* had freedom of movement on the Jebel but not in the coastal towns. The difficulty therefore became establishing a mechanism for fighting and coordinating the fight in the tribal areas on the Jebel. With no official government organization having any real influence in these areas, the British, as the lead interventionist power and the Sultan as the counterinsurgent host country power, had a choice. They could either attempt to impose a government and security system from the top down, or link their provincial government structure to the tribes by empowering them from the bottom up. The top-down approach would be much like Trinquier's hyper-organization and would have involved bringing in security forces and government officials from outside the Jebel and outside the tribes. To the Dhofari tribes on the Jebel, these people would have been seen as foreigners. The Sultan and the British chose to take the bottom-up approach, largely because there was no other viable choice. The decision turned out to be the right one, as the SAS British Army Training Teams (BATT) and Civil Action Teams (CAT) moved onto the Jebel and began to engage with tribal leaders and raise and train *firquat* units to fight the *Adoo* and secure tribal areas. The recruiting of the *firquat* required a well-coordinated and sanctioned amnesty and reintegration program that allowed tribesmen who were part of *Adoo* elements to switch sides and fight for the Sultan. Such efforts were well supported by the Wali and the Sultan as part of a coordinated effort.³⁰ In counterinsurgency, it is easy to see why a strictly coordinated mechanism for realizing unity of effort is necessary when dealing with the possibility of empowering local militias and irregular forces or turning entire elements of the enemy. Without the coordinated buy-in of all government entities, such plans would be difficult to undertake and likely to fail. If police or judicial systems do not recognize an amnesty granted by military forces

or tribal leaders co-opted by the government, then the government's credibility could easily be shattered and such an essential program be rendered useless.

The *firquat* were more than just a local security. In Dhofar, these *firquat* units assumed the key role that police or intelligence agents might serve in other campaigns. The programs for intelligence, amnesty, local security, policing, and local governance and development all became joined together under the *firquat* and they were enabled and supported by the SAS who could base their levels of support on performance and behavior. Over just several months, the SAS reached out to various tribes with the blessings of the Wali and the Sultan and began to empower the tribal leaders who would encourage young men to join the tribal *firquat* and supply the leadership.³¹

This was cause of great concern. Several regional experts from the British government were not thrilled about the power that was being readily turned over to these tribesmen who had, until recently, fought against the government. Empowering these tribes, with their blood feuds and questionable loyalties, seemed unwise and imprudent. These experts recommended that the Jebel be immediately divided into areas to include several tribes each with a government center run by the Wali's representative where education facilities, commerce areas, medical facilities, a mosque, and government meeting place would be. The goal, according to these experts, was to quickly shatter the aspects of tribalism and have a place where disputes could be raised and business done. The British and the Sultan agreed to many of the general infrastructure plans, but moved slowly to avoid any direct threats to tribal influence and authority. Their approach made the Wali and by extension, the Sultan, the symbol of ultimate authority over tribal issues without attempting to usurp or destroy the bonds of tribes. The British and the Wali

proceeded with the plan but very carefully and only after areas were free of *Adoo* influence. The *firqat* remained in tribal units for some time, but were not given permanently assigned heavy weapons so as to limit their effectiveness should they turn on the government.³²

Lessons of Organization Theory

What role did organizational interests and culture play? Did the campaign have organizational conflicts like Malaya with the police, army and intelligence services all seeing the fight through the each organizations socially constructed reality? The answer for the Dhofar campaign is deceptively simple. The size of the campaign and small British footprint helped to eliminate these issues.

The SAS were a special operations force designed to be adaptive and solve problems. They led the effort on the Jebel and were the close advisors to the initial stabilization efforts on the coastal plain. All government support was transferred to the SAS in small elements that were attached to small units and depended on them for support. The SAS was the dominant organizational culture with the exception of the tribal cultures of Dhofar. The goal of the SAS was to influence the tribal culture to assist the Sultan. The leaders of the SAS in the area conferred directly with tribal leaders and the assigned *firqat* leadership (often one in the same).

SAF and foreign forces did play important roles, but they were only employed within the capabilities of their organizations and within mission sets that fit their organizational essence. The Iranian, Jordanian, and UAE forces, that joined the fight provided a command and control challenge but were used in ways that minimized command and control and unity of effort issues. They were used in Northern Oman to

free up SAF forces, to establish and guard border defenses to prevent *Adoo* cadre from crossing over from Yemen, or to guard routes to key project locations.³³ The Iranian task force participated in the retaking of the town of Rakhyut and establishing the Damavand Line deep into the border regions. They were supported by SAS and some *firqat* with some great challenges involved.³⁴ There was some tension and difficulty in achieving unity of effort though with these foreign task forces as their activities needed approval of their own national commands back home. Had their roles been larger, or required more integration, these national caveats might have been a problem and their contributions might have been less notable.³⁵

The SAF was dominated by independently assigned British officers who were only doing a tour of duty for a few years away from their regiment. They had no organizational culture that was territorial or aggressively turf driven. As Samuel Huntington points out in his authoritative work on civil-military relations, it is often the officers in a military determine the organizational culture.³⁶ Even so, the SAF was employed within its capabilities, as were the allied forces involved. In the end, the fight was so small, in such a remote location, and so secret that there was no room for turf battles or the interference of organizational interests. The SAS was the dominant organizational culture where it counted and they were responsible for the decisive elements of the campaign.³⁷ In the end it was theirs to win or lose and it fit their organizational essence as an organization that was agile and adaptive. As a special operations force, they took pride in finding what needed to be done and figuring out ways to make it happen.³⁸

Summary

The Dhofar campaign demonstrated and reinforced that unity of command is important. It validated the theorists' concept of committee structures made up of principle leaders of relevant organizations to coordinate efforts at the highest levels. It also demonstrates that authority passed to a single leader at each lower echelon is conducive to effective counterinsurgency.

The dilemma of Kitson's first principle of interventionist power is given some answer and clarity in the Dhofar campaign. Kitson's first principle states that there must be an organizational structure for prosecuting the counterinsurgency campaign. Kitson provides little direct insight as to what the interventionist power can do if such mechanisms do not already exist. If there is no host country mechanism or an insufficient mechanism, then the interventionist power has some options. He must facilitate its creation somehow and must have the necessary influence over the host country leadership to impose if necessary a system that works. In stressing the importance of clarity of purpose and command structure at the top, Kitson provides the first priority for the interventionist power if he is to advise the host country. He must first fix things at the top. The British did this, not by appointing a leader through force, but rather by facilitating and supporting the transition of power in a way that was acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of those who matter, ie the people of Oman. To them, the forced succession of the Sultan and assumption to power of his son was legitimate. With the assistance and influence of the British, the Sultan was able to establish the mechanisms for prosecuting the campaign.

When it came to building the institutions and the organizational structures at lower echelons, the interventionist power and host country worked with what was available. The building of national armies and mechanisms of a competent central government is a painful and long-term undertaking even with unlimited funds. With limited resources, it becomes even more challenging. The British and the Sultan of Oman were clearly correct in empowering existing institutions like the tribes through local security and development aid that empowered tribal leaders and their militias and reinforced specific behavior. Growing government, security forces, and administrative departments by empowering existing social networks that have high levels of legitimacy provides an effective way to counter insurgents and counter-organize to create a level of government control in a timely manner. It achieves buy-in and ownership from the population. A plan to control and integrate these forces and organizations into the higher echelons of government is necessary and should be enacted slowly and patiently.

¹John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman 1965-1975* (London: Michael Russel Publishing, 1982), 1-25.

²CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA1006; Akehurst, 24.

³This refers to the Jebel in Dhofar and not the earlier Jebel Akdar campaign in Oman.

⁴Connable et al.; Ian Beckett, "The British Counter-insurgency Campaign in Dhofar, 1965-1975" *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010). This is the author's assessment based upon an examination of these two sources. It was a strange choice by Connable to omit the Dhofar campaign from his study.

⁵Bard O'Neill, "Revolutionary War in Oman," *Insurgency in the Modern World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

⁷O'Neill, 217-218.

⁸Most of the SAF enlisted soldiers were actually from Baluchistan in modern Pakistan. Baluchistan had been a possession of Oman and as part of its independence agreement, Baluchi men continued to serve the Sultan. CGSC Scholar's Program 2010, AA1006.

⁹Tony Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman* (London: William Kimber and CO Ltd, 1980), 40-60.

¹⁰Beckett, 177-180; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Dhofar Veterans Panel, AA1016.

¹²*Ibid.*, Dhofar Veterans Panel (Netley).

¹³Beckett, 175-179.

¹⁴Akehurst, 15.

¹⁵Beckett, 179-180; Akehurst, 41; Jeapes, 14; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA1016, AA1006, Dhofar Veterans Panel. Several of the individuals cited from both primary source books and the personal interviews conducted by the CGSC Scholars said that Sultan Said bin Taimur was certainly insane.

¹⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

¹⁷Beckett, 181.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 178.

¹⁹CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel (Netley).

²⁰Beckett, 181; Akehurst, 54.

²¹Kitson, 56.

²²Jeapes, 58.

²³CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel, AA1016, AA1017; Jeapes, Chapter 2.

²⁴CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

²⁵Jeapes, 141; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel (Netley).

²⁶*Ibid.*, Hand-out testimonial.

²⁷Beckett, 163.

²⁸Jeapes, 140. The initial *firquat* unit known as the *firquat Saladin* was very effective initially, but after the death of its charismatic leader, the unit fell apart largely due to tribal frictions within the unit. Tony Jeapes offers a compelling account of the endeavor and the lessons inculcated by the SAS.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 139.

³⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans panel; Akehurst, 33.

³¹This practice had its place in British colonial history and there was no better example than that of COL Robert Sandeman in the late 19th century. It was unclear from research just how much knowledge the SAS and Commanders had with respect to Sandeman's use of tribal engagement and negotiations for pacification or if this played any part in their decision to pursue the strategy of engaging tribes and raising firquat. All indications are that the commanders and SAS personnel built the strategy out of necessity. Christian Tripodi's article in the bibliography provides a rich account of the methods used in convincing historical context. Tripodi makes an effective case that such approaches might be viable in Pashtun areas of the AFPAK region.

³²*Ibid.*, 80-82.

³³Beckett, 186.

³⁴Akehurst, 82; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

³⁵Beckett, 187.

³⁶Huntington, 10.

³⁷CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA1016, AA1017, Dhofar Veterans Panel.

³⁸*Ibid.*, AA1006.

CHAPTER 5

THE US AND VIETNAMESE CAMPAIGN IN VIETNAM

The counterinsurgency campaign of the Government of (South) Vietnam (GVN) against the National Liberation Front (NLF or Viet Cong) and the forces of communist Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) from 1958 to 1975 provides a wealth of historic material. There is no shortage of books and historic documents on the Vietnam War and US involvement in the campaign. While the Vietnam War was going on, close to 10,000 books were published about the war and some authors have said that more has been written about Vietnam than any other American War in history.¹ Yet, when examining key sources on the subject of counterinsurgency and the organization of the campaign, there are fewer that stand out. These include books and articles by James Willbanks, Harry Summers, Andrew Krepinevich, Dale Andrade, Robert Komer, Mark Moyar, John Nagl, and William Colby. While this is only a small group and some of these authors are quite critical of each other's approach, each of them is particularly important to this study because they all take the time to address and understand a little about how the organization of the campaign and the campaign's attempts to achieve unity of effort affected the outcome.² This study makes use of these authors (whether directly cited or not) but simply cannot incorporate every significant finding or point of view. This study also uses some primary sources that have confirmed much of what Komer, Krepinevich, Moyar, Nagl and Andrade have said with respect to the bureaucratic difficulties in achieving unity of effort at all levels. It is also important to understand that most of the counterinsurgency theorists that this study uses as a theoretical base were

writing their most widely read works during the Vietnam War and were certainly influenced by the debates and questions that arose from its prosecution.

The organization of the campaign with respect to both the host country and the interventionist power changed significantly as the war progressed. In Dhofar, the assumption of power by Sultan Qaboos brought immediate and permanent changes to the organization of the campaign. It was then followed by small refinements as the campaign progressed. In Vietnam, however, the organization would evolve and change drastically throughout the conflict. This made Kitson's imperative of "first get the organization right" particularly profound.

Sui Generis

The study of the Vietnam War and its counterinsurgency campaign demonstrates, perhaps better than any other case study, just how complex a counterinsurgency struggle can be. The authors cited above have tried to make sense of the complexity and convey an understanding of the greater strategic conflict and decisions and what that meant for effort at operational and tactical levels. Dale Andrade provides a useful explanation of the complex nature of the conflict that effectively credits and acknowledges the opposing perspectives of the authors mentioned above and gives some contextual understanding as to what forces inhibited the establishment of effective organization with both the host country and the interventionist power.³

Dale Andrade demonstrates the strategic complexity of the Vietnam War in his article "Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War." For years the Vietnam War has pitted historians and strategists against each other as they have argued about the simultaneous conventional and revolutionary nature of the war.

While the North was invading at different times with regular forces, it was also providing various levels of support to the NLF insurgency, which was a major threat. In many areas, at different times, the NLF was supported and sustained by the population.⁴

Andrade argues that some historians, such as Harry Summers, believed that the US failed to destroy North Vietnam and that the political restrictions on the conventional fight were the reason for the eventual failure because the NVA was the real enemy and the NLF/VC insurgency was a nuisance.⁵ Others, such as Andrew Krepinevich, John Nagl, and Lewis Sorley argue that classic counterinsurgency should have been used from the beginning. Andrade's point is that they were both partially right and therefore all wrong in their strategic assessments. General Westmorland devised a strategy to first repel the North Vietnamese and then later focus efforts on pacification of the insurgency. Andrade further argues that Westmoreland's successor, General Abrams, followed through with much of this strategy, however, political will in the US and dysfunction in South Vietnam eventually led to the conventional defeat of the South when the North resumed its conventional fight after the US pulled out.⁶

For this study and in terms of looking into the organizational structure and decisions, it is important to understand that many will claim that Vietnam is unique among the case studies because it was both a conventional fight and a counterinsurgency. The GVN was threatened by an internal insurgency supported by an interventionist power to the north. To be clear; the other studies also demonstrate that external powers supported the insurgencies in Malaya and Dhofar. The Chinese did extend some material support to the MCP, and in Dhofar, both China and its Yemenese surrogates provided the bulk of training and materiel to the PFLOAG. In each of these case studies, part of the

counterinsurgent campaign was to cut off that support. The GVN, however, faced a situation that was not only driven by interventionist support to the insurgency, but also by a real and credible threat of sustained direct invasion by conventional forces. Neither Malaya, nor Dhofar faced this strategic dilemma.

Why is this so important in terms of the organization of the counterinsurgency campaign? The answer goes back to what John Q. Wilson said about the first priority in designing the best organizational model for a particular organization. Wilson says that the government must first identify critical tasks. In the case of Vietnam, the question was always one of which task was more critical, the defense of South Vietnam from invasion, or the “pacification” of the insurgency. Andrade argues that Westmoreland correctly believed that repelling the invasion from the north and preventing future invasions were the critical tasks that needed to be done first and with the greatest effort and resources. The pacification of the insurgency was next. To put this in perspective, think about the subtasks of a counterinsurgency campaign. It is hard to focus on such things as “Reconciliation and political compromise amongst combatants” or “Conventional military forces reoriented toward counterinsurgency” or “Separating the insurgents from the population” when there are Corps and Divisions invading your country and threatening to divide and conquer your physical territory.⁷ As this case study will demonstrate, this controversy and the influence of organizational culture upon the decisions and interpretation of directives, led to organizational flaws and great delays in establishing the right organization for the counterinsurgency campaign.

Unity of Effort: Host Country and Interventionist

The counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam got off to bad start in terms of addressing unity of effort in either the host country government or the interventionist power. In July of 1954, when the Geneva peace agreement divided Vietnam into North and South, the power struggles and establishment of effective government in the South was anything but certain. The South would be plagued by an inability to truly consolidate government power at the top. The coordinating mechanisms for basic governance, never mind a counterinsurgency campaign, would always be plagued with internal struggles for power that had little to do with the insurgency. Though, by several assessments, the central government under President Ngo Dinh Diem (1955 to 1963) and the last government under President Nguyen Van Thieu (1965 to 1975) both made progress in consolidating power and authority and improving the organization of the government and the counterinsurgency campaign.⁸ The United States, as interventionist power, held tremendous influence in decisions of leadership and authority. In several cases throughout the history of the conflict major decisions would be made based upon the perceived support of the US government. This would include the decisions on Coup d'etat and assumption of the presidency itself.⁹ It is this extreme level of influence and the constant internal threats to the power of the government that make any discussion of unity of effort and organization of the host country campaign very difficult without the inclusion of discussion on the how the interventionist power influenced and affected decisions. It is sufficient and accurate to say that the US did not adhere to Frank Kitson's first rule for the interventionist power. In fact, Kitson wrote his prescriptive theory for the

interventionist power in 1971 based largely on input from Robert Thompson's observations on the Vietnam War.

The situation in Viet Nam (sic) during the early stages of the war there was less satisfactory for two reasons. In the first place neither the Americans nor the Vietnamese had bodies capable of coordinating all aspects of their own war efforts, so every different type of aid had to be negotiated between the head of the relevant US agency with his Vietnamese opposite number. More important still was the fact no supreme council existed for the overall prosecution of the war on which the Americans could be represented. After 1967 considerable improvements were put in hand.¹⁰

Kitson's point is that neither the interventionist power, nor the host country was able to get the organization right at the top and this would affect every other element of strategy, operations and tactics.

Kitson and Thompson were certainly not the only people who recognized this error while it was going on and scholars and historians since then have also recognized this deficiency. Early on in the conflict the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Chief LTG Sam Williams made a point to insist that he worked for the military commander of Pacific Command (or CINCPAC) and not for the Ambassador, Eldridge Durbow. Williams insisted on having full autonomy to talk to President Diem. This particular disagreement exacerbated personality conflicts and was probably causal to a disunity of effort that affected even the very central decision of how much effort should be put toward counterinsurgency as opposed to the very real conventional threat from the North.¹¹ This disunion between military and civilian advisory efforts of the interventionist power continued for several years, at least until 1967. Robert Komer, in his book *Bureaucracy at War*, does a convincing job of establishing the fact that the failure to establish this coordinating structure on both sides was readily understood by the most powerful decision makers in both Saigon and in Washington. Several individuals

and commissions reported this very flaw to President Kennedy and others in Washington.¹² Both the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, led by Robert Thompson, and the PROVN study pointed out the need for counterinsurgency efforts to be placed under a single command.¹³

It was not just on the US side where organization mechanisms were failing. Several reports over the seventeen-year history of the war expressed varying levels of criticism of inadequate GVN organization and administration. In 1960, for example, a JCS approved CINCPAC study recommended that the GVN to adopt a Malaya like SWC and DWC system of integrated committees. The GVN did attempt some integrated committees and organizational innovation to achieve unity of effort that was clearly wanting. These committees and interagency groups existed mostly on paper though and did not really become empowered with authority until 1969 when the Central Pacification and Development Council was established based on the American advisory model of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).¹⁴

US organizations involved in the effort suffered from organizational constructs and designs that were based on their peacetime mission. Funding sources, procedures, oversight, resources and personnel all provided for a structure that simply was not flexible enough for counterinsurgency. The critical tasks had changed or at least the conditions under which those tasks were to be conducted had changed. The organizations, however, had not changed and the lack of unified management hurt US advisory efforts, as plans were not synchronized with the GVN. These poorly coordinated organizations influenced the nascent GVN organizations and provided a poor example that manifested

itself in the GVN's inability to build its own institutions or handle the necessary administration of its own tasks.¹⁵

How could so many people and commissions offer the same advice with respect to establishing unity of command and unity of effort and so little be done. There are indications that some tried hard to fix the unity of effort on the US side. The calls were in fact heeded at the highest levels of the executive branch of the US government. Understanding the need for unified leadership and management of the US effort to assist the Vietnamese, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara convinced President Johnson to appoint Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor to the position of Ambassador and give him full and unprecedented authority over civil and military aspects of the advisory effort. In his letter of appointment he said, "I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole US military effort in South Vietnam and authorize the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate." Ambassador Taylor did not make use of this authorization for sweeping power and Templer-like pro-consul assignment. Robert Komer speculated that it may have been because of the recurrent and chaotic power situation in Saigon with the recurrent coups that lasted until 1965.¹⁶ The truth may have more to do with organization theory and the social construction of reality that Taylor, as a military man in a civilian's job felt. His concern was that his new position would conflict with unity of military command, as Westmoreland's superior was naturally CINPAC.¹⁷

CORDS Breakthrough

The demands for civil and military integration continued amidst the general frustration about the progress of the war and a feeling in Washington D.C. that policy

decisions about the importance and primacy of the pacification effort were not being effectively carried out on the ground in Vietnam. After Taylor failed to achieve the level of integration that Johnson had desired and as a compromise to full civil military integration, Johnson established the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in 1966. This organization combined all civilian pacification efforts under a chain of command that reported to the deputy chief of mission. Yet, military counterinsurgency efforts continued under a separate chain of command.¹⁸ The OCO still met with resistance from the various civilian agencies with the Department of State (DOS) and United States Agency for International development (USAID) objecting the strongest. The OCO did, at least, provide the military and the GVN with one headquarters to work with, and would later set the conditions for the more successful transformation to CORDS.¹⁹

In 1967, the Johnson administration finally implemented the CORDS program. This program formally combined the chains of command of every department involved in the counterinsurgency effort.²⁰ Robert Komer became the civilian deputy to Westmoreland and commanded the pacification efforts of military and civilian personnel in a unified command structure that went from Saigon to the provinces and districts. Finally, after many years of stressing the primacy of the pacification effort and the importance of counterinsurgency, a major sustained and effective effort took shape. The interesting result was that it strengthened the claims of both the military and civilian agencies on resources for pacification and improved the influence of civilian agencies.²¹

The implementation of CORDS helped with achieving unity of effort at the top of the US advisory effort. There was still a separate Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, however, the tasks of advising, assisting, and influencing the Vietnamese Government

with respect to the counterinsurgency effort was run by Komer and Westmoreland and then later by General Creighton Abrams and William Colby.²² Even though there were now three chiefs in the US war effort, something about their personal dynamic and ability to define roles worked effectively. Some of the possible reasons for this will be addressed in the next section of this case study dealing with the elements of organization theory.

The US advisory effort on counterinsurgency achieved great cohesion and effectiveness at lower levels as well. Much like Kitson's third principle for the interventionist power, CORDS ensured that all agencies and elements dealing with the counterinsurgency effort were working for one provincial director. This provincial director had the delegated authority of Komer and Westmoreland to act in the interest of the counterinsurgency in his own area. Komer was able to refocus the advisory effort to provincial and local security forces dubbed "Regional Forces" and "Popular Forces" respectively (or RFs and PFs, pronounced "Ruff Puffs" in the daily jargon). Komer did not simply put the agencies under one command in the provinces, he also put an emphasis of finding the right kind of people and mixing up the responsibilities with balance from the military, DOS, USAID, United States Information Agency (USIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and others. He even took some of the brightest young Foreign Service officers from DOS and placed them in-charge of CORDS in some of the provinces, giving them tremendous experience for future work as Chiefs or Deputy Chiefs of Mission.²³ In effect, Komer was able to create a brand new organization, with the blessings of Westmoreland and Bunker. He structured this new organization based upon clearly understood critical tasks and the authorities necessary to prevent the wayward influence of organizational cultures from misinterpreting what needed to be

done. In effect, Komer had the authority to create a new organizational culture and construct a new social perception of reality based upon the mission at hand.

More importantly, it appears to have worked. Historic evidence is clear that CORDS had demonstrated effectiveness, even though its actual numbers never exceeded 16,000 personnel assigned.²⁴ CORDS had an observable impact on the organization of the counterinsurgency effort of the host country and together they achieved significant gains in the campaign. Most significantly, by 1971 less than 4 percent of villages in South Vietnam could be considered unsecure or in the control of insurgents or NVA replacements.²⁵ It is not fair to give the credit, or even a majority of the credit, to CORDS. CORDS was likely not causal to the massive reduction in Viet Cong activity though the program certainly helped the GVN solidify its gains after Tet.

At the very top of the GVN, the example set by CORD's organizational structure influenced the reforms of President Thieu.

The campaign (CORDS) brought to the Vietnamese something beyond initiative. It brought organization. President Thieu quickly understood that a major strategy of pacification required the kind of unified management structure the Americans finally produced in the CORDS machinery. In response, he set up a Central Pacification and Development Council to direct the campaign and the work of all the Ministries and agencies of the Government involved in it. He placed the Council in the office of the Prime Minister with its own integrated staff led by an effective Major General, Cao Hao Hon, who could speak with the direct authority of the prime minister. All of the Ministries, including Defense plus the Joint General Staff, were represented on the Council, so that its directives were specific and binding on all the local organs involved in the pacification campaign. None could ignore them by asserting that it had not received instructions from its parent Ministry.²⁶

The influence did not stop there. Regional Councils and Provincial Councils followed that mirrored the committee structure of the Central Council. Regional and Province chiefs controlled the councils. The government charged the councils with

developing pacification plans based upon their areas. The Americans in CORDS matched their staffs to the regional and provincial staffs with a single American Senior Advisor representing the US effort and in command of all US forces under CORDS.²⁷

This mirrored pyramid structure allowed the US to exert influence without total control and dominance over the GVN efforts. Komer charged CORDS advisors with reporting on and about their Vietnamese counterparts. They could assess the leadership and corruption levels of key personnel and then provincial or regional chiefs or, if necessary, President Thieu could fire or reprimand those individual leaders based on the recommendations of US Senior Advisors or the Commander of CORDS (Komer and later Colby).²⁸

CORDS was not perfect either in its structure, its effectiveness, or in its attempt to replicate the SWCs and DWCs of Malaya. Even its founder Robert Komer called CORDS a “qualified success.” It was able to unify efforts in pacification by forcing agencies and departments to put resources where they needed to go (i.e. local security) and to create the coordinating environment necessary for programs such as the amnesty programs of Chu Hoi and Phung Hoang and the reporting systems that provided information needed to determine key resource allocation and operational decisions.²⁹ These were not always popular but they succeeded in getting advisors out on the ground and forcing the GVN to address in real terms, programs and actions, the political nature of the counterinsurgency fight.³⁰ There were issues with the organization and authority over intelligence tasks and some friction with the CIA and GVN intelligence operations. Yet, the CIA was able to effectively integrate into CORDS through fusion centers. This may not have been the ideal unity of effort structure, but it seemed to work.³¹ Komer also

believed that CORDS did not go far enough and should have been bigger as it was able to achieve far more with less money and manpower than the conventional war efforts or previous efforts aimed at the Viet Cong.³²

It is a fair assessment of historic evidence to say that CORDS effectively influenced pacification for the better. The effects created by the unity of effort it catalyzed helped defeat the insurgency. In 1968, when CORDS was just beginning, 59 percent of South Vietnamese lived in secure villages, but by 1971 it had risen to 96 percent with most of the gains in areas where the insurgency had been the strongest.³³ There are reports that indicate that the destruction of the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive contributed to this decline and there can be little doubt about that. Yet, even before Tet, the Viet Cong was in trouble as it began to gut its local cadre to fill the ranks of its guerilla and regular units that were bearing the brunt of the US and Vietnamese conventional attacks. CORDS provided the framework to capitalize on these weaknesses that the US Command was slow to identify.³⁴

The unity of effort achieved under CORDS and Thieu's organizational changes created, in effect, Kitson's model and the prescription echoed by other theorists. It was not exactly the same, but it provided for the key elements of centralized management and authority to make policy at the top, followed by delegated and decentralized authority to single commanders at echelons in relevant regions. Those commanders possessed the authority over most of the elements of counterinsurgency campaign in their areas. It was similar to the SWCs and DWCs of Malaya, and the councils set up in Oman and Dhofar.

Counter-Organization Influenced by CORDS

In addition to helping unity of effort at the top and at echelons, CORDS was able to influence efforts that directly affected the counter-organization of the population. At the local level, the government began to win when they sought security by empowering locals for their own security. When it came to the establishment of local governance, CORDS advisors were able to influence the make-up of government leaders through the reporting structure and identify the best local leaders and make recommendations based upon local conditions.³⁵ Elements of hyper-organization of the population as represented by Trinquier were conducted and experimented with at various levels throughout the war, but by the time CORDS came around, the decisions and the systems were in place and could be tailored based upon the conditions in each province or district. In other words, the command structure of CORDS and its Vietnamese spawn, the pacification and development councils, allowed provincial leaders to identify and implement the best organizational solutions to the *Sui Generis* nature of their counterinsurgency fight.

Lessons of Organization Theory and the Vietnam War

The Vietnam case study provides a wealth of information relevant to understanding aspects of organization in counterinsurgency campaigns. Mark Moyar provided insightful analysis on the importance of leadership and how leadership failures at various levels thwarted the counterinsurgency campaigns and led to eventual defeat of South Vietnam by conventional forces. Robert Komer and John Nagl looked closely at the culture of organizations in the war and how they influenced decisions that thwarted effective prosecution of counterinsurgency. Komer also gives us some insight into the

formula based on organization theory that has the power to break those obstinate barriers created by institutions that thwart unity of effort. Komer called it “institutional inertia” and explains the temptations for organizations to develop independent plans based upon their institutional repertoires. Leadership of key individuals proved effective and significant, but it was never enough to break the inertia and achieve unity of effort. It required structure and authority combined with leadership. Only then could a new government hybrid organization be created that was designed for the critical tasks of counterinsurgency.

In Vietnam, many people who studied the issues recognized the importance of leadership in both the host country efforts and those of the interventionist power. James Willbanks, one of the leading historians on Vietnam, recognized that leadership was the *Sine Qua Non* of all things that the South Vietnamese had to achieve both with pacification and with repelling the invasions from North Vietnam.³⁶ Both John Paul Vann and Robert Komer had come to the conclusion that while integrated command structures and other factors all helped the situation, it was leadership that truly made the biggest difference.³⁷ These kinds of testimonies about leadership are not surprising and really apply to any military situation. Counterinsurgency should be no different and therein lays the greatest criticism of Mark Moyer’s thesis. But when a particular form of warfare tends to favor certain strategies, methods, forces etc, is it enough to just count on leadership? Can leadership and personal dynamics really be assessed in advance? What happens when you put a good leader into an organization with limited authority and a structure that does not facilitate his decisions?

While this case study demonstrated the effectiveness of CORDS in getting the organization almost right, what could have happened if the dynamic between leaders of equivalent rank under separate structures failed to achieve a personal dynamic that was favorable to unity of effort? The US never had a Templer or a Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces. Vietnam never had a Templer or a Sultan Qaboos. Instead, they had Komer, Westmoreland and Ellsworth Bunker.³⁸ Had Ellsworth Bunker been a different kind of Ambassador, unity of effort might not have been achieved. Both William Colby and Robert Komer acknowledged that had it not been for Bunker's personal dynamic, experience, and leadership, CORDS and pacification in general might never have worked so well. The fact that Bunker was willing to delegate such a large part of his own authority to Komer and willing to support him in any organizational issues between the agencies was vital. His unquestionable experience and the respect that he commanded must have been of considerable value in influencing individuals vested in their organizations that had been opposed to the unified management of CORDS.³⁹

The Vietnam case study demonstrates that when organizational culture or institutional inertia are inhibiting progress toward a critical task, a new organizational model with the right leadership, structure, and authority is the most sure way to fix the problem. The fact that the military and the government had also made efforts to train their personnel how to do counterinsurgency and providing some doctrine on areas such as advising and training security forces means that some progress was made in changing organizational culture.⁴⁰ Yet, it was nothing like the effort that the US military would undergo over 30 years later when facing new insurgencies.

There are plenty of examples prior to CORDS, where the US tried to make these changes without manipulating structure and authorities of organizations. President Kennedy wanted to get the Army and DOS on the same page and focused on the pacification effort. He was prepared to appoint Major General Edward Landsdale to the position of Ambassador. The US military, specifically the JCS, reacted to the pending decision negatively as Landsdale did not fit their concept of what a Soldier should be doing and involved in.⁴¹ The Army either could not comprehend or simply disagreed about the importance of pacification tasks especially for its Special Forces so it pulled them out of pacification roles. This was done because it was outside of the Army's organizational essence.⁴² The government continued to stress the importance of pacification to the military and the departments, but the military believed that the main forces of the Viet Cong and the NVA were the priority threat and acted accordingly. It is not a question as to who was right and who was wrong. Dale Andrade may be correct in saying that Westmoreland had correctly assessed the importance of stopping the main forces and addressing the conventional war first. Yet the fact that the Vietnam War was a hybrid war does not change the readily observable fact that what little effort the Army directed toward pacification was insufficient and ineffective especially in its ability to coordinate the efforts of the entire US government. Even as CORDS proceeded and the importance of the advisory mission was well understood, the Army could not make such a mission fit into its organizational essence as it grappled with and was very concerned for the careers of the officers who took those positions in CORDS or as advisors.⁴³

The roots of the organizational dysfunction in Vietnam were in Washington D.C. and embedded into the procedures and systems of the various bureaucracies. The

institutional inertia and turf battles of Washington DC played out in Vietnam to the detriment of the intended policies of the President and National Security Council. If CORDS helped to overcome these intangible forces in Vietnam, it did little to affect the great bureaucracies of the US. While John Nagl focused on exposing how the Army as an organization failed to come to grips with counterinsurgency, there is ample evidence that the civilian departments including DOS and USAID were as bad or worse in grasping the need for unity of effort and what it would take to achieve it.⁴⁴ To the senior executives in Washington, the gap between stated policy and the action on the ground was maddening, but the sense of urgency to do something about it, or at least a complete understanding of how strong these bureaucratic forces were was never truly appreciated.⁴⁵ The military consistently tried to solve the problems of the war with the tools they had and readily expected the other agencies and the Vietnamese to take care of the pacification. DOS and USAID had the programs and funding for various initiatives that could not be undertaken without security that only the military could provide and the intelligence organizations of both the US and GVN often overlapped and interfered with each other. The redundancies and failure to coordinate were massive.⁴⁶

Summary

The counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam achieved varying levels of success and failure over time. Much like other counterinsurgency campaigns, both the host country and the interventionist power did not immediately grasp the need for unity of effort or did not comprehend the need to set up a coordinating machinery along the lines of what the counterinsurgency theorists recommend. It took a long time; far longer than it took the British in Malaya and Oman. It was certainly not just organizational issues that

made the campaign difficult. It is clear that three key elements hampered US and Vietnamese efforts to address the organizational issues. These elements are particularly relevant to this study. One was the nature of the conflict as “fortified compound warfare” or hybrid war. In other words, the fact that the South Vietnam and its US ally were facing large conventional formations of VC and NVA from the North provided a powerful disincentive to address organizational issues of the counterinsurgency campaign. The complexity of the situation that the US and the GVN faced, and Dale Andrade articulated, actually provides even greater reasons why unity of command at the very top of a campaign is so important. One can directly attribute the inability of the decision makers in both Washington and Saigon to firmly agree on the strategy and priorities of the campaign to the failure to establish, what Kitson called, the coordinating mechanisms at the top. Some scholars have criticized Mark Moyer for his focus on the importance of leadership in counterinsurgency because clearly leadership is important in all forms of warfare. Perhaps the same is true and should be obvious for achieving unity of command and designing the right organizational structure supported by the right authorities. In reality, the need for the right leadership and the right organization is never obvious until decision makers are staring failure in the face.

The second element that prevents organizational reform is that the most powerful organization involved in the whole conflict was actually designed to fight a conventional war against conventional formations. This meant that everything about the essence of the US military drove it to focus effort, decisions, and resources to that fight even though strategic leaders continued to stress the importance of pacification.

Finally, the third element deals with all organizations particularly of the interventionist power. The bureaucratic organizations and their cultural resistance to integrating and giving up control of their own programs, people, and assets prevented unity of effort. For both elements two and three it is clear the behavior patterns of organizations played a role in how they interpreted missions. Each organization tended to make policy conform to practice when they were confronted with critical tasks for which they were not designed. These bureaucracies tweaked policy to match existing structures rather than changing structures to best operationalize the policy.⁴⁷

The implementation of CORDS fixed much of the organizational problem in Vietnam. By integrating the forces of the interventionist power, it provided the example and the model for the host country that was desperately wanting in its organization. Kitson did not state in his writing that if the host country does not have the coordinating machinery established for the campaign then the interventionist power can help by either setting it up themselves or at least creating an advisory organization that sets the example in structure, authority, and leadership. Vietnam demonstrates that this can be done at significant cost, however, the cost in people and presumably in money was insignificant to the cost of the war effort before the CORDS organization had been adopted. The organization of CORDS brought an efficiency and focus to countering the insurgency, which the disjointed structure, before 1967, could not. Even without the serious effort that had to be put into fighting NVA and Viet Cong main force units, the pacification effort would have greatly benefitted from an organizational structure closer to what Kitson and the other theorists recommend. This example provides food for thought for

the critics and pundits who criticize the largess and the astronomical financial costs of the two contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CORDS also proved somewhat effective in achieving the unity of effort necessary to facilitate the counter-organization of the population. The focus on RFs and PFs and their vital local security function, which connected villagers to the government and drew them away from the insurgents, would not have been as effective without CORDS.

Amnesty and intelligence programs such as Chu Hoi, Phuang Hoang and the Phoenix program would likely have suffered and been less effective without CORDS.

Hoping that leaders and individuals will get along and achieve a personal dynamic is not enough. Attempting to perpetuate a common understanding is likely to be insufficient and take significant time. Relying on the better angels of our nature is foolish in that it forgets that people of different organizations will have a hard time gaining a common understanding if their social construction of reality is different.

The real question though is “Did the US learn anything from Vietnam and the success of CORDS with respect to organization of counterinsurgency campaigns?” Given the tragedy of Vietnam and the vastness of material written about the war, the answer is surprising and disappointing.

¹Nick Turse, “Publish or Perish: Getting a read on The American War,” *The Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-turse/publish-or-perish-getting_b_762678.html (accessed 1 December 2010).

²Dale Andrade's work provides the best overall summary of the differing views and lessons of Vietnam with respect to decisions made on strategy and effort. Krepinevich, Nagl, and Moyar provide useful accounts of the organizational issues faced by the US Army and the military in General. While conclusions about the most important points of strategy are important to our understanding of the sui generis nature of Vietnam, this study focuses specifically on organizing for counterinsurgency. In Vietnam, this was often referred to as pacification. Pacification was considered a separate and distinct effort

during the greatest period of military build up. Yet, the question should be posed: Is this prescriptive organization also beneficial to conventional conflicts. The prescriptive organization of the theorists which was followed in Dhofar, still allowed the British led SAF to conduct large scale conventional operations, where necessary, as a strategic effort, while integrating pacification efforts.

³Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (June 2008). Andrades article effectively outlines the intellectual debate about the fact that Vietnam was both Counterinsurgency and Conventional War. The term fortified compound warfare used by some historians to describe this type of situation.

⁴Andrew Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

⁵Andrade, 145-181.

⁶Ibid., 145-181.

⁷Marston, Malkasian, Sepp, raise this points about counterinsurgency in tables 2-1 and 2-2. The point about Vietnam is from the author.

⁸Mark Moyar, *Triumph Foresaken* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 30-45.

⁹Ibid., Several books and memoirs make it clear that the various power players, elites and militias sought the approval and guarantees of support from the US Ambassador or Generals before attempting a Coup. President Diem was finally deposed in a Coup that was approved by the United States. This was after years of requests from various elites. Mark Moyar provides detailed description of the political intrigue in *Triumph Foresaken*.

¹⁰Kitson, 58.

¹¹Nagl, 121; William Colby, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), 28. John Nagl cites this same reference to William Colby's book. Nagl however states that the MAAG chief at the time was John O'Daniel, while Colby says it was LTG “Hanging Sam” Williams. According to internet sources, Williams replaced O'Daniel in October of 1955. It is a safe assumption that both military leaders held the same position WRT the autonomy of the military to discuss security matters with President Diem. This separation insistence continued throughout the war at various levels and continues today as Military personnel in a country will answer to the combatant commander, though the Ambassador may control whether or not they operate in a country.

¹²Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 89. “Forrestal and Hilsman reported to president Kennedy in a P4 (personal for) annex to their early 1962 trip report that “the real trouble . . . is that the rather large us effort in south Vietnam is managed by a multitude of independent US agencies and people with little or no overall direction. (report cited). From Hilsman’s book *To Move a Nation*.

¹³Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 81-89; Andrew Birtle, “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” *Journal of Military History* (2008): 1214, 1238. PROVN is the incongruous acronym for *Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN)*. This study was commissioned by the Chief Of Staff of the Army Harold K. Johnson. Several Historians have accused Westmoreland of marginalizing or burying the report including John Nagl and Andrew Krepinevich. Andrew Birtle challenges this notion in his article about PROVN. Regardless of how it was generally received, its muted calls for unity of command were not well heeded initially.

¹⁴Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 93.

¹⁵Henry Nuzum, *Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The false hope of “Unity of Effort” in American Counterinsurgency* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 49.

¹⁶Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 90-91.

¹⁷Maxwell Taylor, *Swords Into Ploughshares* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), 316.

¹⁸Nuzum, 49.

¹⁹Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 89-92, 119.

Birtle, 1239.

²⁰Nuzum, 43.

²¹Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 118.

²²Colby, 208.

²³*Ibid.*, 208-209.

²⁴Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 125.

²⁵Nuzum, 59.

²⁶Colby, 260.

²⁷Colby, 261; Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 84; Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 166.

²⁸Robert Ulin, *Memoirs of The Cold War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Self Published, 2010), 8; Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 35; Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 161; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA512.

²⁹Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 120-122.

³⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA512, AA514.

³¹Thomas Ahern, "CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam," *CIA History Staff Center ForThe Study of Intelligence* (Langley, VA: CIA History Report Classified Secret, Declassified in 2001), 252.

³²Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 126.

³³*Ibid.*, 126-130; Nuzum, 59.

³⁴CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA512; Ahern, 207-249; National Intelligence Council, *Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975* (Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, 2005), 275-500.

³⁵CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA512, AA514; Ahern, 266-267.

³⁶James Willbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 283.

³⁷Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 102, 126.

³⁸Or Colby and Abrams as they replaced Komer and Westmoreland respectively.

³⁹Colby, 208.

⁴⁰Department of the Army, FM 31-74 Advisors Handbook for Counterinsurgency. (1965).

⁴¹Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 167.

⁴²Krepinevich, 274-275.

⁴³Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 171.

⁴⁴Birtle, 1239; Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 89-92, 119.

⁴⁵Komer states the same thing. (McNamara 1995) McNamara expresses his frustration with DOD and other agencies at times, but the mention of interagency

cooperation is barely addressed in his book. He does not mention CORDS or its impact on the war. These concerns are crowded out by concerns about bombing campaigns and troop levels. The reality of what was needed on the ground is constantly filtered through the organizational lens of the bureaucracies in Washington.

⁴⁶Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 89-92, 119.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 89-92, 159-173.

CHAPTER 6

THE US AND PARTNERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Overview

In the contemporary operating environment, the United States and its partners, including the United Kingdom, have both found themselves embroiled in counterinsurgency wars. As with the previous three case studies, the counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the host country government and the interventionist powers entered the conflict unprepared for the fight ahead. The theorists explain that one of the most important things that the counterinsurgent must do is to get organized or create stable organizations.¹ That means achieving effective organization at the top, at echelons and on the ground level with the counter-organization of the population.² In Iraq and Afghanistan, the host country and the interventionist powers have had a difficult time in doing so over the last decade. The prescriptive advice of the counterinsurgency theorists has not been fully heeded with respect to the organization of the effort. Despite the reflection of key elements of the theory in doctrinal manuals, vignettes, and historical case studies (including the ones in this paper) the interventionist powers have still not been able to achieve anything close to the optimal organization and continue to struggle with organizational issues.³

As with Vietnam and Malaya, but perhaps unlike Dhofar, much has been written about the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, in understanding what has occurred with respect to organization and unity of effort, a few key works stand out. Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston provide the most succinct and useful summary of events

and counterinsurgency trends in Iraq and Afghanistan in their book *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. Their essays on Iraq and Afghanistan respectively, highlight the efforts and the organizational issues that ensued. Mark Moyar's book, *A Question of Command* covers much of the same ground as the two essays, but looks carefully at the counterinsurgencies and the interventionist powers from the perspective of leadership and the ability of leaders to organize and influence. Two other works are especially notable for their description of issues in Afghanistan. The essay "Shades of CORDS in the Kush," by Henry Nuzum, takes an in-depth look at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept and its application in Afghanistan with a comparison to the concept of the CORDS program in Vietnam. The essay's sub-title, "The False Hope of 'Unity of Effort' in American Counterinsurgency," accurately implies Nuzum's thesis. Nuzum believes that the PRT concept is far less effective than it needs to be. Using evidence from first-hand accounts and comparing the PRTs to the CORDS program, Nuzum demonstrates that the same organizational interests, turf, culture and inertia that delayed the implementation of CORDS still exist and have prevented real unity of effort in Afghanistan.⁴ The second work is *In The Graveyard of Empires, America's War in Afghanistan* by Seth Jones. In this work, Jones effectively takes a close look at the organizations of both the insurgents and counterinsurgent forces and provides insight into what can only be described as a break down in unity of effort on the part of the counterinsurgent forces.

This study uses those works mentioned above, but has also made use of dozens of interviews from the CGSC Scholars Program. In the project there were over 80 interviews, plus additional correspondence with individuals. These interviews include

discussions of unity of effort with counterinsurgency practitioners and policy professionals who have very recent first-hand experience with the difficulties of waging a counterinsurgency fight. This study attempts to make use of their input as much as possible. Most of the practitioners and policy professionals have had experience with both conflicts from the beginning but were asked to reflect on their most recent experiences and the most current situation. They were further encouraged to provide some description to previous activities in those same campaigns for comparative purposes.

Iraq and Afghanistan are not the same fight. As with all counterinsurgencies, each has its own *sui generis* elements. Dealing with them in the same chapter as a kind of two-part case study has its challenges. Yet, they share some very important commonalities. The brief histories of the two current campaigns are inextricably linked by the involvement of the same primary interventionist powers during the same time in history. The national security bureaucracies of the US and the UK with all of their organizational issues have greatly influenced the awkward organization of both campaigns. In both cases the interventionist power orchestrated the overthrow of an existing government and then had to establish and build a new host country government and security apparatus almost from scratch and achieve perceived legitimacy at home and abroad. This is no small undertaking. In each case, the inability to or slowness in organizing and establishing that government helped to fuel the insurgencies. The efforts to build governance were based largely on a top-down approach. The coalitions concentrated resources and capacity on the central government first. This is actually well in keeping with the spirit of the prescriptive counterinsurgency theorists. The new governments were

unprepared to govern and as the interventionist powers were unprepared to build a framework for governance in part because their own interagency dysfunction prevented it. Part of that may have been due to the nature of the force sent by the interventionist. Military combat forces focused, at least at the beginning, on fighting a conventional war or counterterrorism suddenly had to deal with governing or advising on governance or other tasks that they were not designed or prepared for. With the exception of some Special Forces elements in Afghanistan, in 2002 and 2003, few military units understood counterinsurgency or its subtasks including raising and training indigenous security forces.⁵ A few years into each conflict, the Army and Marine Corps of the US developed a doctrine and began training for critical tasks of counterinsurgency and this change, along with some changes in leadership and organizational culture of the key organizations and agencies of the interventionist power has helped to improve the situation with respect to unity of effort. In the later years of Iraq and now Afghanistan, the military is forcing civil and military unity of effort by dominating functions at the local levels including taking steps to counter organize the population. This may have been facilitated by a change in organizational culture, which has been driven, at least in part, by changes in doctrine. Yet structure and authorities in the organization of both conflicts have remained firmly entrenched in the protection of organizational interests.⁶

Sui Generis: Iraq

The counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq began soon after the US led invasion in 2003. The problems with unity of effort and organization began almost immediately and despite several attempts at reorganization or changes to the plan and campaign, the problems persisted. The insurgency in Iraq was several insurgencies, each with their own

complexity. Generally speaking though, the largest category of the insurgency came from Sunni Arabs in Baghdad and both Western and Northern Iraq. The insurgents sought to force the US to withdraw and hoped to regain some of the political and economic control they had under Saddam Hussein and the Bathists.⁷ The new government of Iraq promised to enfranchise the Shia majority and the Shia were able to gain some of the most powerful positions. The dominance of Shia leaders on the temporary Iraqi Governing Council, the de-bathification mandate that gutted the existing government organizational structure of its experienced people, and the ill advised dissolution of the Iraqi Army all contributed to the inflaming of the Sunni insurgency. This insurgency was further supported and inflamed by the Al-Qaeda network and its representatives led by Abu-Musab al Zarqawi that would become known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Additionally, the US and its partners, especially the UK in southern Iraq, would face a separate radical Shia insurgency in the form of the Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM) led by the young cleric Moqtada-al Sadr and supported by Iranian Special Forces.⁸ The insurgencies were sectarian based insurgencies that were driven by complex influences of religion, nationalism, ethnicity, and an overwhelming sense of grievance in the loss of political and economic influence. Additionally, one cannot dismiss the role of the US as an occupier and what it did to create the condition for the insurgency. Failure to immediately organize the population and establish security in this modern society and culture failed to achieve the level of expectation that Iraqis had held. Though modern in its use of technology and urbanization, Iraq's culture still had strong tribal loyalties that would become even more important as government and security mechanisms diluted and crumbled as a result of debathification.⁹

Sui Generis: Afghanistan

From a broad perspective of comparative counterinsurgency, Afghanistan has some similarity to Iraq. It is easier to point out the distinct differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. The key differences, again in the most general terms, may be that Afghanistan is even more complex in its cultures, ethnicities, and tribal relationship. It is also far less developed in terms of its urbanization and modernization which should have been advantageous in some respects to an interventionist power with significant resources. The insurgencies in Afghanistan are all Pashtun based Sunni insurgencies from four primary groups that act as insurgent franchises vying for power and influence. The Quetta Shura Taliban network led by Mullah Omar, The Peshawar Taliban that operates in Kunar province, the Haqqani network led by Jalauddin Haqqani, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Quetta Shura and its leaders represent the Taliban that was displaced from power by the US led coalition and Northern Alliance forces that set up the current Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). The others were in opposition to the Taliban but never joined the Northern Alliance forces and are now allied to varying degrees with Taliban elements. The Pashtun belt, which covers much of eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan is home to these insurgent groups and the areas of Western Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) provide safe haven and support to all four of these groups. The Government of Pakistan has its own counterinsurgency campaign, which must deal with the same insurgent groups.¹⁰

In 2001 and 2002, after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US led coalition assisted the Northern Alliance in overthrowing the Taliban government. The primary

mission of the US was to destroy Al-Qaeda by killing or capturing its leadership. US forces spurred on to quick victory but did not take the time to build up greater support from the Pashtun population. The strike operations and searches for the Taliban, combined with the heavy use of non-Pashtun, Northern Alliance forces alienated a large part of the Pashtun population.¹¹ When the Taliban fell, and the US and coalition facilitated the establishment of the GIRoA with the Bonn Agreement, the US began to make its efforts in Afghanistan an economy of force operation in order to prepare for the invasion of Iraq and then later to stabilize it. During this critical stability period, the interventionist and the nascent host country government would struggle to organize and understand. Thus, while the insurgency began to quickly rise in Iraq, it would slowly simmer and rise in Afghanistan largely under the radar of mainstream media. The economy of force effort in Afghanistan would be a contributing factor to the rise of the insurgency.¹² Insurgencies in both countries rose, in part, from the failure of the new government and coalition to achieve what McCuen called counter-organization of the population.¹³

Similar to Vietnam, but very much unlike Dhofar and Malaya, the media would play a pivotal role in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The resignation of General McChrystal over the effects of media events and their impacts to perceptions of unity of effort further reinforces the point made in the Vietnam case study about the media. The additional *sui generis* factor of overwhelming media coverage and availability of information increases the importance and relevance of achieving unity of effort by using the strict prescription of the theorists.

Organizing for Unity of Effort at the Top:
Host Country and Interventionist

The previous case studies of Malaya and Dhofar provided effective examples of how effective counterinsurgency campaigns are organized at the highest levels. The theorists would all concur that in Malaya under Templer, the campaign was led by a single authority, with a council or committee of principle actors that achieved unity of effort in plans and policy because they had unity of command, at least during the most critical period of the conflict.¹⁴ The interventionist power, represented by Templer in this case, was able to assume both the role of host country sovereign and lead advisor to the “supreme council” and then slowly cede political power and authority in practice and finally in law to the legitimized host county. In Dhofar, the host country leader, Sultan Qaboos did much the same in terms of centralizing power and policy making and establishing a committee of relevant government agencies to form plans and policy that would maintain unity of effort throughout the campaign. The British, as the interventionist, maintained a single representative to Qaboos with respect to the counterinsurgency campaign. The Commanding General of the SAF was the direct link to the Sultan for all matters of policy concerning the Dhofar conflict including the civil-military aspects of that fight. The SAF Commander did have to report to the Ambassador for all major commitments and policy efforts, but the line was clear, and did not extend to some separate military chain of command governing the region.¹⁵ That is not to say that either of these two counterinsurgency campaigns were not without their frictions or disagreements, nor did the leaders come up with these organizations without several years or months of trial and error. Yet, once these simple systems were in place, the counterinsurgency campaign began to win. Vietnam was different. For the reasons

discussed in the previous section, it took far longer to come up with a similar system at the top. The ideal system, according to the theorists' prescription was never actually achieved. Weak leaders plagued the host country and the interventionist continued to have separate chains of command for civil and military efforts that adhered to organizational interests rather than national objectives.¹⁶ Iraq and Afghanistan would both suffer similar problems as Vietnam.

Iraq: Unity of Effort at the Top

In Iraq, challenges in unity of effort were met at the top with some attempts to structure the government along the lines of the supreme council and single leader model. The details of the transitions of power and changes to the organization at the top are manifold and difficult to summarize throughout the span of the conflict. There were, however, key periods in the organization and dynamic at the highest levels. The first period was from 2003 to 2004 when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Paul Bremer, was the effective head of government of the country. Bremer represented and reported to Washington and should have served as effective proconsul of the campaign. In fact, that seems to have been the intent. Bremer's mission was to govern Iraq and quickly facilitate its transition to democracy, which the administration believed would provide the stability and buy-in from the population to prevent an insurgency.¹⁷ His military counterpart was Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez who reported to the Commander of USCENTCOM, General John Abizaid. Bremer was supposed to be the Templer of Iraq, even though no one at the time would have made that connection because there was no recognized insurgency. A better historical analogy would be to call him MacArthur of Iraq as compared to MacArthur's role in post war Japan. Whether or

not the policy makers had this in mind is unclear, but it seems to have mattered. The US immediately established a governing council to determine policy at the top of government. Bremer did this without the recognition that the country was facing an insurgency.¹⁸ The conditions were ripe for insurgencies to build and the need to counter-organize the population simply was not recognized. The Iraqi Governing Council, however, was only an advisory board with little authority other than its influence on Bremer and the CPA. For one year after the invasion, Bremer ran Iraq from Baghdad. The lack of unity of effort between Bremer and Sanchez, and in some cases their open contempt for each other, was well known and clear enough that Washington had to make changes.¹⁹ Yet, the changes were primarily in personalities and leadership, rather than in structure and authority.

In mid 2004, General George Casey replaced Sanchez as the military Commander on the ground in charge of the new command of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). His civilian counterpart was John Negroponte and later, Zalmay Khalilzad. Casey was in charge of the military aspects of the fight and the military now recognized it as multiple insurgencies and civil war.²⁰ Unity of effort improved for the US as interventionist power because the military assumed such a high degree of responsibility for the fight, as security became the major issue and reestablishing control over the areas that had largely fallen into the hands of insurgents. Khalilzad brought with him the organization of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams from Afghanistan and more civilian agency assistance.²¹ The PRTs in Afghanistan had demonstrated greater effectiveness at development and at building governance and government institutions, than anything that

the CPA had done thus far in Iraq. The need for governance at province and district levels was becoming abundantly clear.

According to the prescriptive counterinsurgency theorists, it is the host country government that must be in charge of the campaign. The US and coalition put forth great effort to make this possible. Yet, power was not officially handed over to the Iraqis until the summer of 2004 and it was not until January of 2009 that the status of US forces came under a negotiated status of forces agreement. It was during this period when the insurgency reached its peak. To the surprise of many, Iraq, even amidst a nascent democracy, began to experience the consolidation of power and authority at the top combined with relatively competent leadership. Although Nuri al-Maliki did not appear to have promise as a leader at first, he consolidated power and, with the strong advice of his US counterpart team, used his singular authority to set the direction for the campaign, as various bottom-up initiatives began to turn the tide.²² He began as a compromise choice amidst much more powerful political players in the Shia blocks. He was able to maintain close ties with all Shia blocks including JAM.

In early 2007, the command of the effort changed to General David Petraeus who like Templer had Briggs in Malaya and like Abrams to Westmoreland in Vietnam, built upon the successes of his predecessor. The team of Petraeus and the new Ambassador Ryan Crocker became legendary for their unprecedented level of coordination. Petraeus and Crocker were well known for attending the same high level coordination meetings and “speaking with one voice.” This greatly assisted in the development of coherent policy decisions that enabled some the key tide turning decisions of the campaign. In particular was the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq movement that formalized

relationships and efforts started under General Casey to turn Sunni tribes against AQI in the west. The efforts spread to Baghdad and throughout Sunni dominated areas with the help of a surge of US forces that were now focused on security.²³

Petraeus and Crocker entered the campaign at a critical time. There was a good deal of speculation that the insurgency would prevail and there was a great deal of pressure from the media for the US to pull its forces out of Iraq. This political situation led to a change in strategy in January 2007 and the appearance of unprecedented trust and authority for the new team of Petraeus and Crocker. Though the actual authority granted was no different from their predecessors, in many ways it was comparable to the situation when Templer took over in Malaya. Petraeus had the authority to negotiate with insurgents, to embark on large-scale development, and to encourage his soldiers to live among the population and fight the campaign according to some counterinsurgency best practices. The very acknowledgement of the campaign as a counterinsurgency greatly assisted in perpetuating his guidance and eventual success. This strategy and the full use of their combined authority made a great deal of difference.²⁴ The fact that this change in the interventionist power occurred just as Maliki began to consolidate power added to the overall unity of effort.

While the Iraq campaign did not follow the theorists' prescription for organization at the top initially, in the end, as momentum of the campaign built, it came close. It would be a stretch to conclude that changes in organization at the top were causal to the campaigns successes in 2007 to 2010, but clearly the effects were positive when combined with the other initiatives of the campaign plan. The host country under Maliki achieved unity of command at the top under a competent leader. The team of Petraeus

and Crocker used the power of leadership and interpersonal dynamic to act as one and become that single representative to the host country supreme council that Kitson recommends.²⁵ Crocker and Petraeus used their relationships to force linkages in their staffs and influence linkages at echelons of their commands.²⁶

Afghanistan: Unity of Effort at the Top

Afghanistan's history of organization at the national and strategic level was not entirely different, but it has not yet reached the maturity of the solution achieved in Iraq. As the military Commander in Afghanistan in 2003, General David Barno recognized that the US and its NATO partners were in a counterinsurgency fight together with the nascent and weak GIRoA. Barno further recognized the desperate need to achieve unity of effort between his military forces and the efforts of the US Ambassador. At this early stage of the conflict, before the Taliban and other insurgent groups began to effectively take root and re-establish themselves, Barno noted that the ability to achieve what he called "unity of purpose" with non-military elements was the single greatest flaw in the US ability to attempt counterinsurgency as an interventionist power. The separate chains of command of the Ambassador and Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A)(Barno's Command) made it difficult to achieve the unity, which General Barno understood to be critical. Instead of waiting for a mandate from Washington to fix structure and authority, Barno decided to rely on actions through leadership and personal dynamics to bridge the gap in effort and coordination.²⁷ He undertook several measures to create a predecessor to the Petraeus/Crocker relationship that was perhaps based on the relationship of Westmoreland and Komer (or Abrams and Colby).²⁸ He moved his headquarters to Kabul to the embassy compound where he synchronized his schedule and

meetings with that of the Ambassador, Zalmay Khalizad. According to General Barno and others, this created a personal dynamic that achieved unity of effort at the top and sent a clear message to the staffs of both the embassy and the headquarters that military and civilian efforts would be synchronized. It also affected how the military would view their own mission. The staffs combined as Barno created the Embassy Interagency Planning Group (EPIG).²⁹ This commendable attempt at achieving unity of effort at the top didn't last and did not really come close to the prescription of the theorists. Neither the single commander model or the committee model were being used by the interventionist power to tie into the GIRoA counterpart. As with Vietnam and the appointment of Robert Komer in 1967, Barno's measures were once again an attempt by the US to achieve the British Templer model of the Federal War Council without rattling the cage of department and agencies back in Washington and without assuming control from the host country.³⁰ The difference however was that Barno's decisions did not originate in Washington as did the decision to appoint Komer and to stand up CORDS.³¹

As the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq picked up in 2004, the US began transitioning control of the entire campaign in Afghanistan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As ISAF/NATO assumed the lead role and General Barno departed, the attempts at unity of effort at the top became more difficult (2004 to 2006). NATO Commanders in Afghanistan had to deal with national caveats and disjointed chains of command.³² As ISAF took command insurgent attacks increased and the Taliban began to control areas throughout Regional Commands East and South. The situation in Afghanistan was far from achieving Kitson's ideal of having a single point of contact for the interventionist

power to help the leader of the host country make policy and decide the course of the counterinsurgency campaign and struggled to exercise control at echelon in the provinces. The host country was simply not in-charge of anything with respect to the decisions in the campaign. This difficulty in attempting to run a counterinsurgency campaign from a true coalition headquarters with the lead nation having its own unity of effort issues and minimal capacity, makes achieving anything close to the required level of unity of effort extremely difficult. Several of those involved in the campaign and outside observers agree.³³

In late 2008, retired Army Lieutenant General Douglas Lute and a team of staffers from the National Security Council (NSC) reported to then President Bush on the status of the war. In terms of unity of effort, what he found was shocking. He claimed to find 10 distinct but overlapping wars in progress. He enumerated the separate and poorly coordinated efforts of alliance partners and, agencies, and separate military commands of the special operations forces (SOF). As Bob Woodward explained the report, “Nobody was in charge. There was no unity of effort or command.”³⁴ This harsh indictment of the inability of the US Government to achieve the required level of unity of effort at the top in what was then becoming its top national security priority acted as a wake-up call for the outgoing and incoming US administration.³⁵ For Frank Kitson, other theorists and those with deep understanding of counterinsurgency it was exactly the mess that their prescriptive theories sought to avoid and he and others were shocked to find that almost eight years into the campaign in Afghanistan, efforts had only recently begun to fix the unity of effort at the top.³⁶

Even though General David McKiernan took command of ISAF and US forces in 2008, the structure of command at the top remained disjointed. General McChrystal was appointed to the position of ISAF Commander in 2009 with the intent in part to align the command structure. He created the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) under General David Rodriguez, which had the task of coordinating the efforts of all of the regional commands.³⁷

General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, made some visible attempts to improve unity of effort specifically their joint memorandum of strategy.³⁸ They called this the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. The document included primarily changes that would help to unify efforts at echelons, but also made the embassy more counterinsurgency oriented. It created the Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA), which assisted in advising the GIRoA and coordinating policy with ISAF and IJC. It also created civilian and military working groups at the embassy to coordinate policy matters.³⁹

Though McChrystal and Rodriguez took great efforts to unify the effort and commands under them, the effort still suffers at the top. One policy professional with vast experience in counterinsurgency that asked not to be identified stated that McChrystal and Eikenberry got off to very bad start as McChrystal came in and through his actions and words indicated dissatisfaction with efforts that Eikenberry had been leading or been a significant part of. Additionally, the seemingly disorganized US Embassy run by Ambassador Eikenberry visibly frustrated the military staff at ISAF. The relationship between McChrystal and Eikenberry was nothing at all like Petraeus/Crocker and had no hope of getting to that.⁴⁰ Eikenberry, in early 2009, also angered his Department of

Defense counterparts including Commander of USCENTCOM, General Petraeus, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen when he submitted a memorandum through DOS channels expressing doubts about the new ISAF strategy recommendations. Eikenberry's demarche to the new President Obama questioned the wisdom of expanding counterinsurgency efforts and military presence in Afghanistan.⁴¹ It remains to be seen whether or not General Petraeus, who replaced McChrystal as ISAF Commander in mid 2010, can achieve with Ambassador Eikenberry anything close to the synergy that he achieved with Ryan Crocker in Iraq.

The current administration and the National Security Staff say that Petraeus is a NATO General and this is a NATO mission, so they are not trying to achieve a Petraeus Crocker relationship, instead they see Petraeus as forming a civil/military partnership at the top with Ambassador Mark Sedwill, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative. Staffers from the national security staff admit that it has never been very clear or entirely functional since the US "NATOized" the effort but that is where they hope to go with the NATO Senior Civilian Representative.⁴² Ambassador Sedwill and General Patreus occupy the same headquarters, unlike their US counterparts.

One additional factor added some level of confusion with the unity of effort at the top of the Afghanistan campaign and that was the role of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy to Afghanistan/Pakistan.⁴³ The Obama Administration created Holbrooke's position within DOS, directly under the Secretary of State. The administration did this with the recognition that the insurgency problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan were inextricably linked and could not be solved without a comprehensive solution on both sides of the border. Yet, the fact that Holbrooke answered to the

Secretary of State, but dealt with the US Ambassador, the ISAF Commander and the NATO Senior Civilian while attempting to influence the GIROA and the Government of Pakistan does not easily or naturally facilitate a clear policy. The position (filled by Marc Grossman after Ambassador Holbrooke's death) and its cross functional team of various agency players continued to run into significant organizational challenges in its relationships with the NSC, the embassies, and ISAF.⁴⁴

Why has unity of command at the top been such a challenge for the US and its counterinsurgency allies? The answers are no secret and take the discussion back to organization theory and some of the observations of Robert Komer from his experience in navigating the bureaucracy of Washington D.C. as it attempted to organize for a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign as a heavily involved interventionist power. John Q. Wilson noted that, "Turf problems are large and largely insoluble, when the government has within it dozens of agencies that make foreign policy, scores that make or affect economic policy, and countless ones that regulate business activity and enforce criminal laws."⁴⁵ Keeping Wilson's observation in mind and considering the frustrations of the pre-1967 pacification efforts in Vietnam, one can see how the struggle to maintain authority and degrees of autonomy is still the most serious impediment to unity of effort at the top.⁴⁶ This notion is fully supported by senior ranking practitioners and policy professionals with a front row view of the interagency environment in Washington D.C. One senior General Officer involved in the campaign stated that in the higher executive ranks of key agencies, the organizational culture is more hardened and individuals want to defend their turf. While many concur that counterinsurgency requires a true whole of government approach, the reality is more complicated. As one senior policy professional

reflected with visible frustration, “The whole effort screams for Unity of Command more than anything else.”⁴⁷ But culture, the desire for autonomy and turf are just a part of the problem. There are restrictions that are based in law, congress, and how efforts are financed, resourced, and oversight issues that contribute to the problem as well.⁴⁸ This has not gone unnoticed in the national security community. One relatively new think tank/non-profit group called the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) is attacking the problem through advocacy and political channels. Among the five key problems that the project seeks to address are, “Lack of integrated national strategy and severe systematic and structural imbalances.”⁴⁹

Without the reforms recommended by the PNSR, the executives at the top of the counterinsurgency efforts must attempt other methods of achieving unity of effort. The interagency task forces (IATFs) at high levels and working groups are attempts at bridging these gaps. Much like those created from the ICMCP document signed by McChrystal and Eikenberry, these IATFs and working groups have little authority except to monitor, report, and recommend. The representatives have no authority to commit their agency.⁵⁰ This limits the utility of such arrangements especially when compared to the committees recommended by counterinsurgency theorists, where those on the committee were the leaders and decision makers for their organizations in that area. Certainly there were sub-committees or staff coordination committees that prepared the debate for a meeting of principles, but the theorists clearly call for the committees and councils as represented by Malayan Campaign where principals met regularly, consulted, debated and resolved issues.⁵¹ The degree of their authority was and is essential to the utility and effectiveness of that coordinating arrangement.

In the contemporary environment, especially in Afghanistan, unity of effort continues to suffer for several reasons. The leading role of an alliance, the fragmented headquarters and influences of legacy interagency environments that plagued Vietnam all play a role. This disunity has implications at lower geographic echelons and in the ability of the host nation and interventionist power to commit to methods and systems to counter-organize the population. The good news, from both Afghanistan and Iraq is that changes in organizational culture facilitated by doctrine and leadership are improving the organizational models and the unity of effort at echelons. The US and UK militaries are leading the way with their proportionally large forces and efforts compared to other agencies.

Organizing for Unity of Effort at Echelons:
Iraq and Afghanistan

In chapter 1, this study posed the following question based on the prescriptions of counterinsurgency theorists; Do commander's at echelons (regions, provinces, districts etc) have a similarly ordered and mirrored arrangement that maintains unity of effort in message and in deeds down to the tactical or ground level where the actual conflict for the population is fought? If the single commander model is not used, is the organization effective? This study further seeks to examine the role of the interventionist power and again poses the question: Does a single representative who leads the effort represent the interventionist power at each level?

In the Malaya case study, this organization at echelons worked well. The Malays and the British achieved unity of effort through unity of command facilitated by appropriate structure and delegated authority to commanders at echelons that controlled

the whole of government effort in their areas. The British and the Malays benefitted from the existing framework, but still, the British had to fill the gaps while the Malayan civil service and security forces were slowly built up to adequate levels of competence and strength. In Dhofar, The Sultan and the Wali maintained a similar system for the province and districts. In both Malaya and Dhofar, the British and the host country elements benefitted from some existing structures. As the SAS moved onto the Jebel, they established initial control through existing social structures and tied in these structures to the province. In Vietnam, the organization at echelons had been severely crippled by the ongoing conflict since the Japanese occupation. The GVN needed US help in building it. It was only after the US implemented CORDS, a system structured along the lines of the prescriptive theorist model, that the organization of the host country improved and the counterinsurgency campaign began to show serious results. In CORDS, the interventionist power was represented and controlled by a single authority at every level and that example helped the host country to take similar measures.

For Iraq and Afghanistan, the structure of the organization at echelon did not match this prescriptive model. Over time, however, there occurred an evolution of organizational culture in the military, and to a degree in the other agencies and departments, that helped facilitate other systems of unity of effort. The absence or dilution of host country government institutions at the beginning of the campaigns and the difficulties involved with growing them have placed the interventionist powers in the difficult position of often having to build, lead, and mentor all organizations within the host country campaign. The three prior case studies demonstrate that this is not all that uncommon, as some practitioners and policy professionals maintain. Having some

existing framework like in Malaya provides an organizational advantage, but again the decimation of the Malayan civil service weakens that argument.⁵²

Throughout the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan the US and its partners acting as the interventionist power divided the countries based upon military regions and security areas that were based on terrain and military formations. In Iraq these territorial areas fell under the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the division areas known as Multi National Division (MND) areas for North, South, West and Baghdad.⁵³ These divisional areas did pay attention to civil and political boundaries of the host country, but as the echelons got closer to the ground, the ordered systems of occupation and governance did not align neatly. The military forces though also included separate chains of command for special operations forces and a separate chain of command for those elements assigned to train the Iraqi security forces.⁵⁴ Afghanistan suffered similar issues. General Barno was able to divide the major Regional Commands (RCs) into relevant areas of the country, but he still had a separate SOF chain of command and a separate chain of command for those working with national level Afghan security forces Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). Additionally the civilian capacity for governance building existed under the PRTs who reported to the embassy. The PRTs and RCs had no direct relationships at first.⁵⁵

It would be difficult and beyond the scope of this paper to go through the chronological changes in the organization of these two counterinsurgency campaigns. This study instead examines several problem areas for unity of effort at echelons and also examines some specific areas where unity of effort was achieved despite the lack of adherence to prescriptive models. This chapter highlights a couple of areas where unity of

effort has suffered due, at least in part, to non-adherence to the theorists' prescription. Those areas are the PRTs, the integration of SOF, and working with host country government and elements. The study will then examine how these difficulties have been fixed or reduced by efforts that were outside of the specific prescription of the theorists.

There are several other areas that could also serve to illustrate where organization models being used are affecting unity of effort. Much could be said about intelligence and about amnesty/reconciliation efforts. These two areas were raised frequently by respondents in the CGSC Scholars Study 2010 as problem areas that were exacerbated by the lack of unity of command. Several respondents, for example, recognized that reconciliation or reintegration were important, even vital, to the counterinsurgency campaign, but felt that such programs required a level of commitment and unity of all agencies of both the host country and allies or coalition that simply could not be achieved. While outside the scope of this study, these two elements are important.⁵⁶

In both Iraq and Afghanistan there have been struggles in unity of effort with respect to governance and especially in how the US and its allies and partners have approached the problem by directing a top down strategy of central governance to the provinces, districts and lower levels. One of the manifestations of this struggle has been the difficulties and frictions in coordinating the activities of the PRTs with that of the military forces who are responsible for facilitating the establishment of security. As security is the primary responsibility of governance, unity of effort in this area was important.

The concept of the PRT was founded under the civilian military team of Barno and Khalilizad in Afghanistan in 2003. At that time the PRTs worked in support of the

Brigade Commander that was in charge of the Regional Command. Although not a hierarchical unity of command structure as recommended by the theorist, the attempt to integrate was clear.⁵⁷ Yet, with the departure of Barno and Khalilzad at the top, the civilian-military coordination that they had fashioned disintegrated as Khalilzad was sent to Iraq, and Major General Karl Eikenberry assumed command.⁵⁸ The PRT concept, however, spread to Iraq in 2005 as a model of success from the early stages of efforts in Afghanistan. These PRTs suffered many of the same issues that plagued the organizations in Afghanistan, but there have been modifications over time. Some PRTs became “embedded” PRTs (EPRTs), which were civilian led but worked directly with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) or Marine Regiments.⁵⁹ As of 2010, most PRTs work directly with a military headquarters, though the separate chains of command remain.⁶⁰

The PRTs themselves were a kind of triumvirate of command structure designed to protect the stove-piped turf of the leading agencies. Each had a military commander, a commander from USAID responsible for development and political head from DOS. This design meant that this single organization responsible for helping the GIRoA connect its governance authority through the provinces to districts and villages had three separate commanders who represented the governance advisory effort from the interventionist power to the host country at the province level. Add to this, the fact that the RC commanders and their staffs would also seek to hold key leader engagement (KLE) with those host country leaders and their staffs.⁶¹ Additionally, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) elements would also seek their own avenues of influence to these host country provincial and district governments. Information between these various leaders and stove-piped commands did not always travel seamlessly

causing some confusion and consternation among host country and the various agencies, organizations, and military commands involved in the US effort. This meant that frequently objectives that needed to be nested were not and as leaders reached impasses on important decisions and the key nuances of counterinsurgency, clarification, and guidance from higher headquarters went up varying chains of command. DOS representatives would report back directly to Kabul, while USAID and the Military reported to regional staffs, and CJSOTF elements reported to their separate regional headquarters to CJSOTF.⁶²

In Iraq, for example, the Commander of the 25th ID, Major General Robert Caslen found his Division headquarters in 2006-2007 without a PRT counterpart at his level. This became a source of frustration as each of the division's brigades had a PRT. The division did have a Political Advisor (POLAD), but this person had no authority over the PRTs.⁶³ Though General Caslen and his brigade commanders recognized the centrality of the mission of the PRTs, the effectiveness of their coordination remained largely personality dependent.⁶⁴ While other allied and coalition partners had their own issues, some countries such as New Zealand followed the organizational prescription of the theorists and had a single civilian-military chain of command in their PRTs and their areas. The artificial barrier that existed in the US national security system had filtered down from the top and affected all efforts at echelons of region, province, and district.⁶⁵

Examples of this disunity of effort that was inherent in the structure and delegated authorities manifested themselves in several areas related to the PRTs, though not directly. One of the most apparent by the end of 2006 was the role of DOS in building a police force. The training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) was the task of DOS

through the funding and management of their International Narcotics and Law Enforcement directorate (INL). The size and scope of building the Afghan National Police was far beyond anything that the INL had attempted previously. In order to execute such a massive program that would be central to the local security efforts (vital to successful counterinsurgency according to theorists) INL had to contract the support through Dyncorp. But Dyncorp and their DOS bosses proved extremely difficult for the military to work with.⁶⁶ The military was spread out across the country and had to coordinate their own security initiatives and actions with the Afghan National Army (ANA), ANP elements, Special Forces, various militias and even local militia and tribal *Arbacai* forces. Often, when one element in an area conducted an operation against Taliban insurgents, there would be no joint plan or sharing of intelligence and this lack of coordination would allow the Taliban to slip through the cracks. Sometimes there was coordination and intelligence sharing but this was largely dependent on individuals developing trust and relationships.⁶⁷

The roots of the coordination issues with Dyncorp and the police that the company trained came from the turf concerns and the organizational interests that Wilson and Komer discuss in their works. Seth Jones traces the source to executives at the top of INL who apparently were exceptionally protective of INL's organizational essence as the office responsible for the training of law enforcement.⁶⁸ DOD would become involved later as it became clear that the national police force was developing a well-earned reputation for corruption.

The controversy with the national police also deepened as many counterinsurgency experts and on the ground commanders began to recognize that the

training and organizational model of the ANP was not properly designed for the critical tasks of counterinsurgency. The ANP, under INL and DynCorp training was similar to and partly modeled after western law enforcement agencies. In their current form and pace of organizational growth, the ANP could only be part of the security solution and was not the kind of force needed in the parts of Afghanistan most vulnerable to the insurgency. Instead, local security forces were needed that would be similar in effect and purpose to the Chinese Home Guard in Malaya, the *Firquat* in Dhofar, or the popular forces (PFs) in Vietnam.⁶⁹ As recently as 2009 and 2010, there were still reports from soldiers who had worked with the PRTs of both the UK and the US who reported deliberate resistance to local security initiatives to raise district and village *Arbacai* forces that were partially based on tribal loyalty.⁷⁰ This had a serious negative effect on the ability of the host country and the interventionist powers to arrive at a counterinsurgency solution that included significant policy and operational efforts to raise local security forces from the same recruiting and population base as the Taliban. While elements of the CJSOTF continued to raise security elements from local indigenous tribes, these were not of the scale necessary to have a strategic impact on the counterinsurgency.⁷¹

The history of the PRT concept in these two major counterinsurgency campaigns has been one of tremendous success amidst extraordinary frustration and waste. In terms of projects and reconstruction, the PRTs have injected money and development into both campaigns that undoubtedly have had positive effects. The lack of unity of command however, has taken its toll when the adhoc arrangements at coordination fail. These arrangements are based on the personal dynamics of leaders, which becomes the sole factor in ensuring the unity of effort that is imperative to successful counterinsurgency. In

discussing interagency unity of effort with respondents during the CGSC Scholars Study, most professionals who had interagency responsibility at the province or district level cited personal relationships as the essential factor.⁷²

Several of these same respondents complained about the lack of civilian capacity from agencies whose expertise and funds were needed in various areas. These areas included USAID, Law Enforcement Professionals (LEPs) and Agricultural professionals.⁷³ Several other authors including Seth Jones and Dan Green have noted this lack of capacity in the civilian agencies. Even though there has been a “civilian surge” in Afghanistan since General McChrystal took over as ISAF commander in 2009, it simply hasn’t been enough, nor have the people hired been the right people for the job. As one author put it:

Additionally, over half of the DSTs do not have the full complement of diplomat, development adviser and agricultural expert to partner with local Afghan officials and work with military units. Disturbingly, many of the civilian “experts” who have been hired for the uplift are too fat, frail and/or flaky to undertake their responsibilities. Some are physically incapable of doing their job of visiting villages and meeting with local officials, and others are not taken seriously and do not know how to represent the agency they speak for and thus are quickly marginalized by the military.⁷⁴

While capacity may not seem related to unity of effort issues, one must realize that incompetent or semi-competent individuals get marginalized or ignored. If structure and authority are not designed for unity of command or unity of effort and instead an organization relies on personal dynamics, then semi-competent people are a recipe for ineffectiveness. Henry Nuzum concurred with this assessment; “The interagency assessment captured these concerns in its surveys, noting that performance is too dependent on interpersonal dynamics and an individual’s appreciation of the mission.”⁷⁵

In a unified command or management structure, however, such people are more likely to be supported by those who share their responsibility to a single commander. A single commander will naturally adjust talent within his organization to assist weaker individuals.

In this respect, waste has become another issue that is at least in part caused by the lack of capacity and unity of effort between USAID and military. Whereas USAID had the control of funds and contracts for various development projects in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the agency did not have the manpower to provide sufficient oversight for the vastness of projects that it funded.⁷⁶ The military certainly had the capacity to fill such a role and it is doubtful that the USAID would ask for such capacity assistance though at lower levels this has happened. Additionally, most of the problems that occurred with USAID projects were security related or were related to the host country government's inability to manage aspects of the control of the project areas.⁷⁷ In terms of counterinsurgency theory and the advice of the theorists, it is unclear why the US government would spend money on development before the security situation allowed and before the host country had the administrative machinery of local government built up. This is one of the classic mistakes of counterinsurgency and commanders frequently raised the complaint during the CGSC Scholars Study.⁷⁸ It is no stretch to imagine that the coordination structures and authorities recommended by the theorists would have helped if not solved the problem. A single command representative from the interventionist power could have recognized the security deficiency and halted the project until security and oversight could be in place. If the host country government was not sufficient in the area, or more manpower was necessary, the District or Provincial

Governor could raise the issue in committee and the single representative from the interventionist power and the combined staff could assess all available assets and based on priorities, find a way to address the situation.

Another significant area where counterinsurgency practitioners in both theaters complained about disunity of effort was in the separate command chains of between SOF and conventional forces and within SOF. SOF in both Iraq and Afghanistan operated in each theater with two distinct chains of command for each of the separate major task forces. The more secret forces comprise a task force of national level assets assigned the mission of capturing or killing the most high value individuals of Al-Qaeda and senior Taliban. The other SOF element is the CJSOTF, which in Afghanistan operates under the Coalition Forces Special Operations Component Command (CFSOCC). CJSOTF elements have various multi-faceted missions that may involve any number of core tasks that use both the direct and indirect approach to special operations.⁷⁹ The CJSOTF forces were comprised of mainly US Army Special Forces who have the mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as one of their core tasks. FID is the doctrinal term in Special Operations for support to a counterinsurgency effort of a host country. Elements of the CJSOTF are very often split between missions where they are operating with indigenous elements to conduct the same kind of direct action capture or kill missions, while others have been assigned the more Dhofar like mission of engaging with remote villages and tribes to counter the insurgents.⁸⁰

Although over the years of both campaigns the coordinating mechanisms and understanding have grown, unity of effort or even harmony of effort between SOF and conventional forces has been and continues to be a constant source of consternation. This

friction was readily admitted to and explained by leaders from both SOF and conventional forces. There was generally clear understanding of the nature of the difficulties on both sides. Conventional forces, which “owned” an operational area whether in Iraq or Afghanistan, frequently had to do damage control after SOF elements from either CJSOTF or the national task force conducted raids in their areas. This would then require explanations to local government partners and community leader that these conventional forces were often unprepared to give. Throughout the history of both campaigns there is examples where such actions were poorly coordinated and caused major issues for the local counterinsurgency fight that were not worth the value of the targets.⁸¹ On the other hand, there are also several examples of commanders who claimed that their coordinating mechanism, whether it was a fusion cell or liaison officer (LNO) was excellent and operations were well coordinated.⁸²

Another point of friction between the conventional forces and SOF occurred with the indirect approach used by numerous elements of the CJSOTF. This wasn’t just the use of indigenous forces, which SOF and conventional forces were both doing especially in the last few years of both conflicts. BCTs and SOF were partnered with ANA and ANP in Afghanistan and in Iraq with Iraqi Army (IA) units and Iraqi National Police (INP) elements. Rather, CJSOTF elements began early in the conflict working with local militias. In some cases, this was with Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) that were largely the armies of the Northern Alliance and other so called “Warlords”⁸³ In other cases, US Special Forces soldiers in remote areas of Eastern and Southern Afghanistan began working with and financing security elements that were tribally based militias. These militias served a local security function and were similar in concept to the *Firquat*

elements that the SAS had raised in Dhofar, or the Nung and Montanyard elements raised by Special Forces in Vietnam. Since late 2006, these local initiatives have been legitimized first under the CJSOTF elements and have had an evolution of names for the program(s) including the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), Village Stability Operations (VSO), and most recently Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative. The problem from the very beginning has been disagreements between some conventional commanders and CJSOTF elements concerning the legitimacy and status of these forces.⁸⁴ The friction has now evolved as in 2010 the ALP and Village Stabilization Programs (VSP) are now a major part of the strategy of General Petraeus as the current ISAF Commander and President Hamid Karzai and his interior minister have agreed to support the initiative.⁸⁵ The question being worked out is how much of these local security initiatives will be run by CJSOTF/CFSOCC and how much will be run or supported by conventional forces. Policy professionals and practitioners are recommending that even these SOF elements that are raising these local *Arbacai* forces work directly for the conventional force commander.⁸⁶

The relationship between SOF and conventional forces is one of the most emotionally charged divisions of turf and organizational culture. Several SOF leaders and conventional force leaders have recognized the issue and are taking serious measures to instill in their soldiers and officers the need for clear lines of communication and coordination with conventional forces that are serving as “battle-space owners.” Some SOF leaders emphasized the recognized need to place quality people in LNO positions and emphasized the ever-important dimension of personality and personal relationships in coordination. “Fusion Cells” that are well manned with quality, proactive individuals

have also proved very effective in sharing intelligence and in coordinating efforts so that SOF missions to capture insurgents are well understood and conventional forces are prepared to help mitigate negative fall-out. These efforts and systems are now being emphasized and strengthened especially in Afghanistan.⁸⁷ Yet, the familiar pattern of choosing to rely on adhoc structures without authority or on the dice throw of personalities does not provide adequate assurances of unity or even harmony of effort.

In order to make up for the disunity of effort that was inherent in the organization of both campaigns, the military forces of the US and its partners have resorted to several different measures. Some of these were highlighted in the previous paragraphs including the significant reliance on personal dynamics and just building relationships. This recognition has led many commanders to think carefully and deliberately about which officers are placed in certain positions that require interagency coordination or significant dealing with host country officials.⁸⁸

In both campaigns, leaders at various levels have quickly realized that structural components of their organizations were important. If they could not fix the stove piped authorities and misaligned structures above them, they would take actions to create structural mechanism of coordination. Some of these have already been mentioned, including fusion cells and LNO positions. Yet, one of the most effective mechanisms has been the combining of operations centers at various levels. Whereas the idea of a SOF element and a conventional force combining an operations center might have been seen as taboo at the beginning of these campaigns, it happens more and more as time goes on. Also, combining operations centers with host country and local forces at province and district levels had become commonplace in Iraq by 2008 and now in Afghanistan as well.

This held true for both UK and US forces even though UK forces suffered from a severe lack of coordination with their Iraqi partners in Basra prior to 2008, and only changed the dynamic after the “Charge of the Knights” operation.⁸⁹ The implementation of these coordination measures may not seem like much, but they reflect a fairly significant change in organizational culture of the US military and its partners. Most would agree that such arrangement of close partnering and unified command centers with host country personnel were taboo in the early years of this decade.⁹⁰

Thus it is apparent that in addition to relying on personal dynamics and adhoc coordinating mechanisms, unity of effort is being achieved at lower geographic echelons by changes in organizational culture. These changes have occurred over time as the US military, other agencies, as well as host country institutions are actually learning from their mistakes and implementing counterinsurgency strategies and doctrines that emphasize unity of effort.⁹¹ If doctrine emphasizes unity of effort then regardless of structure and authority, people and organizations will take the initiative to achieve at least the “harmony of effort” that Marston and Malkasian describe in their elements of successful counterinsurgency.⁹² For example, BCT commanders whose elements were particularly well acquainted with counterinsurgency theory and doctrine recognized that unity of effort and governance were decisive to their operations and to the overall success of their part on the counterinsurgency campaign. Recognizing the PRTs were decisive in this regard, they chose to collocate and embed PRT elements and leaders into their command structures. These leaders used the lack of PRT civilian capacity and overwhelmed the lines of effort with their own elements. They ensured that commanders at lower echelons created coordinating mechanisms such as combined operations centers

that incorporated host country command elements of Army, Police, local militias and corresponding civilian authorities. By sheer force of will and overwhelming capacity, these units created CORDS-like structures at echelons to ensure unity of effort. By several accounts, units in Afghanistan are doing the same thing, though more and more, it is with the guidance of the most senior people.⁹³

This is the kind of adaptation and learning that John Nagl described in his book *Learning to eat Soup with a Knife*, and later advocated with the team that wrote the US Army counterinsurgency manual. Such adaptation reflects in efforts by elements to reorganize and structure elements so that they can better address counterinsurgency. Positive examples include the addition of personnel to BCTs that must advise and assist host country elements as Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and the reorganizing of staffs along lines of effort in addition to Napoleonic G-staff organization. This approach was used by Major General Caslen and the 25th ID in Iraq and has been copied by other organizations where civilian expertise and host country expertise is integrated directly into staffs that form operational planning and working groups around lines of effort.⁹⁴

Counter-Organization Iraq and Afghanistan

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have both experienced similar evolutions in strategy. As in the previous case studies, the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns was about more than achieving unity of effort at the top and at the echelons and achieving it between the host country and the interventionist power. The prescriptive structures and authority arrangements of the theorists serve the purpose of facilitating the effective counter-organization of the population. In Malaya, General Briggs had achieved an organizational model that was effective in coordinating much of the effort, but on the

ground he was unable to complete the effective counter-organization of the population. Once he authorized and Templer later reinforced the initiatives to build a Home Guard force consisting of Chinese, including former insurgents, he began to achieve the local security that enabled the Chinese community to be effectively counter-organized and linked into the district and provincial governments from the bottom-up.⁹⁵ In Dhofar, the SAS, the SAF, and the provincial government of Dhofar were able to secure and counter-organize the coastal plain regions fairly quickly, but the remote and untamed Jebel region required a different strategy. In order to counter-organize the population there, the SAS had to link into the existing social structure of the tribes, turn the key tribal influencers (chiefs and elders) and use their influence to first establish security elements (*Firquat*) that served the role of police, militia and intelligence services and then link this local organization into the province from the bottom-up. In order to do this, they needed the complete authority and blessing of a single command authority to accept former *Adoo* who would switch sides and return their loyalty to government. In Vietnam, the CORDS program of the US helped to influence the GVN to raise numbers and training of RFs and PFs that could establish local security and help counter-organize local populations. Again, the US helped to link that organization to the districts and provinces from the bottom-up because of the clean and mirrored chain of command provided by CORDS. While none of these efforts were easy or perfect, they showed success partly by forming a campaign organization from the top-down that generally followed the theorist prescription for organization at the top and at lower echelons. They then simultaneously instituted efforts to counter-organize the population from the ground up. They took advantage of existing local institutions when possible in order to establish local security

as quickly and effectively as possible and to ensure local buy in and ownership of security situation.

Iraq has undertaken a similar conceptual path, albeit very much its own *sui generis* stream of events, and Afghanistan, after much delay and difficulty, may finally be on a path of counter-organization similar to these other areas. The only concern is that in the other case studies, the organization of the host country and interventionist powers at the top and at echelon provided the structure and authority to support unity of effort from the top down. In Afghanistan, one cannot be too sure.

As US and Iraqi forces struggled with the insurgencies in Iraq in 2006, momentum in a local security solution began to build in Anbar province. The Anbar Awakening, which led to the Sons of Iraq and other integrated local militia elements, was a key example of using existing influencers (tribal leaders) to assist in the counter-organization of the population with the first step being establishing that local security element.⁹⁶ This particular effort at using existing structures to expediently counter-organize the population and turn it toward local security is well documented, as are the efforts of then Major General Petraeus and the 101st Airborne in Mosul immediately after the invasion. Together they provide examples of where the US military assumed a great deal of authority that was not necessarily given to it and forced a counter-organization solution on the host country whose institutions were weakened or non-existent.⁹⁷

A few years later, after the undeniable success of those local security efforts in counter-organizing the population, other US commanders expanded upon the idea conceptually. Using popular sociological concepts of Malcolm Gladwell's book *The*

Tipping Point, COL David Miller's BCT in Iraq deliberately sought out key individuals in the community of his area. His unit systematically attempted to identify those key individuals and bring together these people into a unity conference that was at first facilitated by the US military and PRT as the interventionist power, but was quickly institutionalized by host country provincial and district leaders. These efforts were successful in part because Miller had been able to achieve unity of effort at his level by incorporating the PRT, building strong coordinating mechanisms with Iraqi counterpart organizations, and paying close attention to personalities of leaders entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring unity of effort.⁹⁸

Yet, Miller's Brigade was one among several in Iraq in 2009 and 2010 that experienced some of the ongoing issues with the Sons of Iraq (SOI). The SOI had been largely organized, trained and mentored by the US forces. Their pay had been initially arranged by the US and then shifted over to the Iraqi government. Many respondents indicated that the efforts to demobilize and reintegrate the Sons of Iraq were being executed, but were not going well. The government of Iraq had a program to find work for these forces, but the impression was frequently given that the efforts were not well coordinated and not a priority. Several respondents indicated concern for the future of the individuals who made up the Sons of Iraq.⁹⁹ The lessons of this counter-organization effort in terms of payment systems, raising too many too fast and then having viable and executable plans for demobilization and reintegration need to be better understood as this is becoming more important in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, after hard lessons and several years of missing this key lesson in counter-organization, the ISAF commander has made reintegration and local security

initiatives a centerpiece of the current strategy. There is still some resistance, but the tide is clearly turning in favor of counter-organizing from the bottom-up. As Seth Jones pointed out:

The United States and its allies had focused almost entirely in a top down strategy to stabilize the country by creating a strong central government. Not only was a strong Afghan state ahistorical (sic), but US policymakers spent little time trying to co-opt Pashtun tribes, subtribes, clans, and other local institutions in the south and east. There was little bottom up strategy to complement top-down efforts.¹⁰⁰

Recent efforts indicate that that the tide is further changing in Afghanistan. While CJSOTF continues its tribal engagement and local security initiatives, ISAF and the GIRoA have committed to 10,000 ALP forces as an initial effort at reaching out locally to counter-organize the population and deprive the Taliban of young male recruits. 10,000 though is not much when compared to the population of RC East and South, but it is a start. If it can be combined with effective district and provincial efforts and approached as part of coordinated national strategy it will have great effect. It will be difficult to replicate the Anbar Awakening and its legitimization into the SOI, but just as in other campaigns, the Afghan version of counter-organization will have its own sui generis flavor. One such effort that may show some promise is the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP). This program in Afghan tries to tap into existing Afghan social structures (including tribes) to integrate these structures into the government.¹⁰¹ Yet, negotiating with tribal or religious leaders and getting commitment from influencers to turn local individuals from the Taliban to support the government is tricky and difficult. It requires the building of trust and commitment on both sides. This kind of delicate trust can easily be shattered if the tribal elders or other influencers are not convinced of the host country and interventionist commitment to such an initiative. If mixed signals are

sent or if other poorly coordinated actions give the perception of a breach of trust, such local security and reintegration initiatives could fail. The danger for Afghanistan now is that the non-integrated chains of command and the organizational structure that does not follow the theorist prescription could produce exactly those kinds of signals.¹⁰²

Summary

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been plagued with organizational issues that stem from the same institutional problems that the US experienced in Vietnam and Robert Komer articulated. Perhaps in part because in both of these campaigns, the US and its partners took a great deal of time to recognize the nature of the problems they faced. It took a few years in both cases before the US and host country governments recognized the conflict as “counterinsurgency.” Yet, once recognized, the US, its partners, and the weak and nascent host country governments did not organize according to the theorists’ prescription. While the organization structures have evolved and improved, they still suffered problems in unity of effort. Iraq at the top eventually achieved unity of command of sorts. Afghanistan on the other hand is just getting there. As General Petraeus, other General Officers associated with ISAF, and policy professionals admitted, NATO, the US and GIRoA are still getting the organization right.¹⁰³ At echelons, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, the organization suffered with deficiencies in structure and authority relative to what the theorists recommend. Provincial and District committees and councils were rarely represented by a single voice from the interventionist power. The military initially tried to focus on security and then on working through only security forces, while governance was left to under resourced PRTs with ambiguous chains of command. SOF elements operated independently and

pursued their own goals, which were only partially understood by conventional commanders even at higher echelons. Even as late as 2008, outside observers were finding little to no unity of effort as the US and NATO could be described as fighting “ten different wars.”¹⁰⁴

One cannot ignore the issues of coalition warfare and national caveats. Practitioners in Afghanistan were frustrated by the limitations and national caveats of NATO countries. In Dhofar, the British SAF Commander, who took great care to employ Iranians and Jordanians within the scope of their capabilities and organizational essence, ran the organization of the advisory effort. Unfortunately this was not always the case in Afghanistan and it hurt the mission.¹⁰⁵

The command structure in Afghanistan is just a wreck. Coalition warfare is hard and then you add SOF and it gets harder. GEN McChrystal made some adjustments because of his background. I don't know how much better it's gotten since November of 2009. . . . At that time the ISAF CDR worked for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander and the CENTCOM CDR. Lots of officers sat around and bad mouthed NATO partners. It's simply that some NATO forces and their countries are doing something they weren't designed to do. We should have tailored to place other NATO units into jobs that they can do. We don't do that effectively. We need to get better at finding them the right mission.¹⁰⁶

But changes have been made and there are several steps that the US and its partners have taken which may not fulfill the theorist prescription, but do make incremental steps in the improvement of unity of effort. The US has aggressively pursued changes in doctrine and other efforts to build a common understanding across the military and other US Agencies. This has changed organizational culture to a degree that has made the military more accepting of advisory roles and assistance to governance and holistic stability. It has also, through emphasis on the importance of unity of effort, influenced lower level solutions and adhoc coordinating mechanisms. It has in turn

forced leaders to consider carefully the matching up of the right kinds of leadership and personalities to key tasks that affect unity of effort.

While positive to some degree, these incomplete mechanisms seem to have inhibited the ability of the GIRoA and NATO to achieve policy coherence for efforts and initiatives that are vital to the bottom-up counter-organization of the population. The frustratingly long delay in recognizing the value and necessity of locally provided local security and the co-opting and empowerment of local institutions can fairly be attributed to this lack of unity of effort on the part of the interventionist power. As one General Officer noted:

It was an insane structure in Afghanistan. I believe now that you needed to have battle-space owner own everything. Yes that was a hard thing ... When we were best we had clear relationships and coordinating mechanisms with the BCT. You can't solve the problem if you get organization right or perfect, but you can make it insolvable if you get the organization wrong.¹⁰⁷

¹See Chapter 1 and 2. Key theorists are David Galula, John McCuen, Frank Kitson, Roger Trinquier, and Robert Thompson.

²See Chapter 1.

³See Chapters 1 and 2.

⁴Nuzum compared to Komer.

⁵Donald Wright, *On Point II* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), Chapter 4.

⁶This paragraph is based on the authors own conclusions and is just an introduction to the findings.

⁷Carter Malkasian, "Counterinsurgency in Iraq," *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 287. Malkasian recommends Gordon and Trainor's book *Cobra II* for a history of the invasion and immediate aftermath, and Marr's book, *The Modern History of Iraq* as additional sources on the roots of the conflict.

⁸*Ibid.*, 288.

⁹The decisions on debathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces are discussed at length in Woodward's Bush at War series and are also covered in Paul Bremer's book about his year in Iraq with the CPA. The decisions which are largely considered to have helped create the insurgency can be attributed to the reliance on expat dissidents on the governing council who were not well connected to the reality on the ground and an unrealistic expectation as to what it would take to rebuild these institutions.

¹⁰Daniel Marston, "Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead: Afghanistan 2001-2010," *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 263-265. The extent to which Pakistan deals with its insurgencies and their linkages to Afghanistan and to terror groups is the topic of much debate especially concerning the intelligence service, the ISI. Woodward's, Obama's Wars and Marston's essay in *Counterinsurgency in modern warfare* are both good sources on this topic. Daniel Marston's article provides coherent and effective summary of the history of the Afghan conflict. He explains the nature of the struggle in more effective terms than can be done in this thesis. The describing the organization of the counterinsurgency campaign does not require Marston's level of detail, but the understanding is beneficial in a holistic way to understanding the challenges of the counterinsurgent forces.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 258.

¹²The degree of media attention to these two wars is self evident especially when compared to Malaya and Dhofar.

¹³This is part of the author's conclusion. Also see Barno's article which highlights the lack of government control and representation outside of the provincial capitals.

¹⁴Kitson, 34.

¹⁵Beckett, 180-181; Kenneth Perkins, *A Fortunate Soldier* (London, Brassey's, 1988), 186.

¹⁶Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*; Moyer, *Triumph Foresaken*.

¹⁷Malkasian, 288.

¹⁸Paul Bremer, *My Year in Iraq* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 39-42. See Bremer's Book on his year in Iraq and the Bush at War series by Woodward for perceptions and historical basis for Bremer's position.

¹⁹Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 215-221; Brian Burton and John Nagl, "Learning as we go: The US Army adapts to COIN in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006," <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/sanchez-delivers-democratic-pa/>. This is just one article that highlights the disagreements. Most books on Iraq, especially pre-surge

books confirm this notion. Additionally several of the policy professionals from the CGSC Scholars interviews highlighted this particular time period as displaying dysfunctional relationship and disunity of effort.

²⁰On point II provides the official US military history of this period and discusses the resistance to official acknowledgement of an insurgency.

²¹David Barno, "Fighting the Other War: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003-2005," *Military Review* (October 2007): 34-44.

²²Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 253-255.

²³Malkasian, 304-306; Burton et al., 310-315; Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 249-253.

²⁴Malkasian, 304.

²⁵Kitson, 63.

²⁶(Partlow 2010) This is just one of many articles referring to the relationship between Crocker and Petraeus.

²⁷Barno, 34-44.

²⁸A key difference in the relationship of Petraeus/Crocker and Westmoreland/Komer is that in Vietnam, Westmoreland is described as leaving much of the pacification effort to Komer's leadership while he continued to direct the main fight against large concentrations of enemy. After the departure of Westmoreland and Komer, Abdams and Colby both focused a bit more on pacification. There is some disagreement here on degree. See Dale Andrades article in the bibliography, Nagl's book, Colby's memoir and Lewis Sorley's book on Abrams. Komer also had a close relationship with President Johnson and had the ear of the Administration.

²⁹Barno, 35-37; Seth Jones, *The Graveyard of Empires* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2010), 139.

³⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA803, AA807.

³¹Barno, 35-37.

³²CGSC Scholars Program, AA806, AA808. Some of these caveats have included situations where troops were not allowed to patrol cities on foot. See <http://www.aco.nato.int/resouces/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf>

³³CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA808, AA807.

³⁴Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), loc 847 kindle.

³⁵“As Lute examined the situation there, he found about 10 distinct but overlapping wars in progress. First, there was the conventional war run by a Canadian General in charge of the region for NATO. Second, the CIA was conducting its own covert paramilitary war. The Green Berets and the Joint Special Operations Command each had their own wars, tracking down high value targets. The training and equipment command ran its own operations. The ANA the ANP and the afghan directorate for Security, the country's CIA sponsored intelligence agency, were also fighting separate wars....By placing different icons on a map of the regional command that included Kandahar, he could see how ten different war were sprinkled around. They looked like the scribbles of a child. Nobody was in charge. THERE WAS NO UNITY OF COMMAND OR UNITY OF EFFORT.” Woodward, *Obama Wars* Chapter 4.

³⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, A1009, Correspondence with IJC staff, AA806, AA808.

³⁷Marston, 258; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA907 indicated that many changes had been recommended and implemented by McKiernan much like Briggs had done prior to Templers arrival.

³⁸Eikenberry had served as the CFC-A Commander immediately after Barno.

³⁹Dan Green, “The Other Surge,” *Armed Forces Journal*, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/10/4771231> (10 November 2010); CGSC Scholars Program 2010, interviews with PRT personnel confirmed these issues. AA803 and AA804. Henry Nuzum also confirms.

⁴⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA806.

⁴¹Woodward, Kindle location 4467-4482. “The top American diplomat in Afghanistan had just isolated himself from the military and alienated his counterpart-McChrystal. One of the essentials in counterinsurgency was cooperation between the civilian and military leadership. That had just been blown to pieces.”

⁴²CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA808.

⁴³During the writing of this thesis, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke passed away. As of this date, he has not been replaced.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, AA804, AA806.

⁴⁵Wilson, 195.

⁴⁶Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*, 84-107.

⁴⁷CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA807.

⁴⁸Ibid., AA505; QDR Review and the Project of National Security Reform.

⁴⁹Project on National Security Reform, www.pnsr.org (accessed 5 November 2010). This website lists the five problems as: Problem # 1: Lack of an integrated national strategy—no strategic context for setting priorities or allocating resources. Problem # 2: Severe systematic and structural imbalance—dominated by agency stovepipes, resource inefficiencies and lowest common denominator approaches paced to slowest player. Problem # 3: Highly reactive, few strategic management functions and processes in place—Excessively narrow scope of national security—little or no foresight and proactivity. Problem # 4: Overburden and under resourced National Security Staff—unable to handle complexity and rate of change—dangerous levels of staff burnout. Problem # 5: Fragmented legislative oversight—with enduring investments in status quo—no whole-of-government perspective reinforces divisions in the Executive Branch . . . Align Strategy and Resources: Rebalance current resource allocations by linking resources to goals through national security mission-based analysis and budgeting, as well as performance management systems to ensure evidence-based results and accountability. . . . Interagency Teams and Task Forces: Delegate and unify management of national security issues and missions through empowered interagency and intergovernmental teams and crisis task forces.

⁵⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA801.

⁵¹This can be seen in each of the theorists cited in Chapter 2. A primary source that provides rich description of the workings of a DWEC is Hennikers book. It describes the meetings with a Malayan district chiefs and the interactions with British Advisers.

⁵²Several of the policy professionals and those who claimed to know something about counterinsurgency who participated in the Scholars interviews continued to stress that the British had a tremendous advantage in Malaya because it was a former British colony. This seems to be a persistent perception among historians and practitioners. Yet several records and sources here claim that the decimation of the British colonial administration by the kempeitai was almost total. Read Victor Purcell or John Cloake's accounts.

⁵³These divisional areas changed several times throughout the campaign and included some other divisional areas during times of peak strength.

⁵⁴Wright et al., 180-183. "Unity of effort in OIF was severely handicapped, however, by constantly changing command relationships in 2003 and 2004. DOD, CENTCOM, and CFLCC had taken formal control of the planning of all phases of OIF, but the overwhelming majority of their effort was focused on phase III of the plan, the invasion of Iraq. The plans that did exist for phase IV operations were based on the

believe that an amorphous mix of other US Government entities, international organizations, and new Iraqi leaders would quickly take over...”

⁵⁵Nuzum, 20. In November of 2009, CSTC-A Commander and staff became “dual hated” as the Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. The organization now does all police and Army training.

⁵⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, Each respondent was asked about amnesty and reconciliation. Most respondents simply had no idea as to how reconciliation could be incorporated into the strategy in Afghanistan. Others assumed that the PRT would work that out with the local government. Some of those who had returned more recently from Afghanistan did make some efforts to work out their own programs particularly the forces of the UK in Helmand province. In Iraq, the Anbar Awakening provided a good example of how reconciliation efforts were established. The unity of effort facilitated by General Casey’s Command, followed by General Petraeus and the Petraeus Crocker relationship helped to legitimize those efforts and gain cooperation across the Iraqi government.

⁵⁷Nuzum, 27.

⁵⁸Jones, 150.

⁵⁹Embassy of the United States: Baghdad Iraq, http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html (accessed 1 November 2010).

⁶⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA505.

⁶¹Key Leader Engagement or KLE is a term widely used in the military vernacular to describe meetings to influence key personalities of the host country. The term was used in both Iraq and Afghanistan and continues to be used today.

⁶²Nuzum, 17, 21; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA603, AA604, AA614; Jones, 167; Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 19.

⁶³Political Advisor POLAD was a DOS Foreign Service officer responsible for advising the Division Commander.

⁶⁴Robert Caslen et al, “The Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq,” *Military Review* (2010); CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA509, AA504.

⁶⁵Nuzum, 29.

⁶⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA504, AA903.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, AA504, AA903; Jones, 167, 173.

⁶⁸Ibid., 168.

⁶⁹CGSC Scholars Program 2010; Report to ISAF CDR and CAC CDR; Jones, 335-340; Marston, “Realizing the Extent of Our Errors,” 284.

⁷⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA604.

⁷¹Ibid., AA604, SOF CDRs.

⁷²Ibid., AA614, AA807, AA509, AA504, AA614, AA620, AA804, AA905, AA1008.

⁷³Ibid., AA614, AA506, AA611, AA620.

⁷⁴Green.

⁷⁵Nuzum, 35.

⁷⁶Donald Gambastes, “How Good Is Our System For Curbing Contract Fraud, Waste, And Abuse?” Testimony Before The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. United States Agency for International Development (24 May 2010).

⁷⁷Gambastes, “USAID contracting instruments have too often placed incentives on the number of tasks completed rather than the ultimate results they deliver.” First, at present, USAID does not have a sufficient number of qualified personnel on the ground to properly monitor its development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID’s ability to field experienced personnel in the coming months and provide them with the training, facilities, and support they need to do their jobs will have major implications for the success of future development initiatives. While ensuring that it has appropriate personnel in place, USAID must also overcome the problems associated with frequent turnover of staff by establishing and maintaining systems and processes for retaining and transmitting institutional knowledge. . . . Given the size of our organization, limited pool of Foreign Service personnel, and current 1-year tours to Iraq and Afghanistan, we have limited flexibility in assigning and deploying personnel to these posts. Travel restrictions and security concerns sometimes limit our ability to conduct routine audit and investigative work. . . . The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recently suggested that Congress establish a US Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO) to plan and execute the subset of civil-military operations that occur in conflict zones.”

⁷⁸Thompson, 161-164; Also see Galula; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA804, AA201.

⁷⁹Michele Malvesti, *Time for Action: Redefining SOF Missions and Activities* (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2009).

- ⁸⁰CGSC Scholars Program 2010. This was reflected in all SOF interviews.
- ⁸¹CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA907, AA601, AA605.
- ⁸²CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA506, AA504, AA907.
- ⁸³Jones, 130-131.
- ⁸⁴CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA604.
- ⁸⁵*Ibid.*, AA806; Moyar, *Afghanistan's New Interior Minister*.
- ⁸⁶CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA806; Email Correspondence with IJC Staff.
- ⁸⁷*Ibid.*, AA401, AA305, AA612.
- ⁸⁸*Ibid.*, AA201, AA103.
- ⁸⁹*Ibid.*, AA201, AA103, AA1011.
- ⁹⁰*Ibid.* In general, every respondent was eager to explain how much things had changed in terms of their own understanding of counterinsurgency. Some claimed to not care about doctrine, but all understood that counterinsurgency was fundamental and sought ways to expand their own knowledge and to educate their soldiers and NCOs. This was true of British Army respondents as well.
- ⁹¹See Chapter 1 for the specific quotations from doctrine about unity of effort.
- ⁹²Marston and Malkasian, 18.
- ⁹³CGSC Scholars Program, AA201, AA103, AA202, AA205, AA104; Octavia Manea, "Interview with Dr. John Nagl," *Small Wars Journal*, Al.
- ⁹⁴Caslen et al., 21; CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA506, AA509.
- ⁹⁵See chapter 3 for more on these points or look at bibliography for McCuen, Corum, and Coates.
- ⁹⁶Neil Smith and Colonel Sean MacFarland, "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point," *Military Review* (2008): 41-54.
- ⁹⁷Kristen Lundberg, "The Accidental Statesman," *Kennedy School of Government Case Study Program* (2008).
- ⁹⁸CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA202, AA201, AA205.
- ⁹⁹*Ibid.*, AA201, AA209.

¹⁰⁰Jones, 202.

¹⁰¹CGSC Scholars Program 2010; Correspondence with IJC Staff.

¹⁰²Ibid., AA305, AA306, AA307.

¹⁰³Ibid., AA907; Correspondence with IJC Staff; also see Petraeus interview on NPR.

¹⁰⁴Woodward, Kindle location 847

¹⁰⁵CGSC Scholars Program 2010, AA906.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., AA807.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This study closely examined what counterinsurgency theorists say about the organization of counterinsurgency campaigns. It determined that the theorists are generally in agreement about a few key things. Some of the most important points include:

1. The theorists prescribe a unified command mechanism at the top (national level) that generally means a single leader with a council or a committee of the heads of all the departments of government that will play key roles in the campaign. This is for the host country, but also for the interventionist power, a single leader at the top is key.

2. The theorists prescribe that each echelon requires unified management for all departments and agencies based upon geography for government-controlled areas. Similarly, the interventionist power must unify management at these levels and it is best done under a single leader.

3. An effective method of counter-organizing the population is essential. The theorists are less clear about what that means. Some, such as Trinquier, advocate a very prescriptive method and demand resource and manpower intensive methods that have proven effective in some campaigns. Others are less prescriptive in this area. This study demonstrates that while separating the insurgent from the population is a *ceteris paribus* principle, the method of counter-organizing is ultimately *sui generis*. Where it has been successful, the Counterinsurgent has co-opted existing social structures and networks to facilitate a bottom-up, local solution.

Organizing for Unity of Effort at the Top:
Host Country and Interventionist

The theorists agree that the organization at the top must convey a unified policy between all departments of government. The wisdom about the principles of organization for counterinsurgency articulated by theorists like Galula, Kitson, Thompson and McCuen are fairly demonstrated in these historical case studies. They demonstrate that unity of effort is best achieved by the unity of command provided through a single authority that controls the elements of national power that are applied in a counterinsurgency campaign. That can be collaborative in the sense of Kitson's supreme council, or embodied in a singular political and military leader like General Templer in Malaya or Sultan Qaboos in Dhofar. When that unified structure at the top is disjointed or the interventionist power that is playing a decisive role has a disjointed command structure at the top, problems become clearly visible. All three of the case studies of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrate this. They each also demonstrate that measures to clarify and unify the organizational structures at the top correlate to improved unity of effort at echelons. The consolidation of power by President Thieu in Vietnam and the rise of Maliki in Iraq helped to achieve something close to the theorist's model. It remains to be seen if Hamid Karzai and GIRoA will evolve into something similarly effective.

Counterinsurgency is war and for a national government facing an insurgency that is by definition an existential threat, it is total war. When faced with a conventional war threat that possess an existential threat, even western democracies have historically chosen to reorganize for the task that requires unity among organizations involved. Yet, reorganizing to face the internal existential threat of insurgency is more difficult. For the

interventionist power, whom may not be facing the existential threat themselves, the need to reorganize is not always apparent enough to spur the action.

The theorists, however; are even more emphatic about the necessity of unity of command at the top for interventionist powers. They make this clear when using words such “Pro-Consul” and even Thompson uses unequivocal language when explaining that structure and authority are needed to resist the organizational tendencies of departments toward disunity.

As a means of checking these tendencies and ensuring a coordinated effort, I am a firm believer in the appointment by the supporting power of a pro-consul with full local authority over all policy and all agencies. This pro-consul must of course be the Ambassador. This may raise problems of command channels between agencies locally (including military headquarters) and their head offices in the capital of the supporting power. The answer, briefly, is that all policy questions must be routed through the Ambassador, and that direct communications between agencies locally and their headquarters be confined to administrative and logistics measures necessary to give effect to approved policy. What the Pro-consul requires is the full support and backing from his government and, since most policy proposals will originate at his end, fast decisions on them. What he does not require are conflicting policy proposals from agency headquarters in his capital and constant queries and requests for progress reports suitable only for computer processing. The war can be won only by those on the spot. Let them be trusted to get on with it.¹

When that structure is not in place and the correct framework has not been built, leaders must create it *de facto* by close collaboration and concerted efforts to “speak with one voice.” Westmoreland and Komer, followed by Abrams and Colby, briefly achieved this in Vietnam. Crocker and Petraeus did it in Iraq. The same holds true when an ally intends to aid a weak national government with advice and support. That entire advisory effort is best managed under a single authority. Mark Moyer’s points about leadership are essential, if not obvious qualifiers as the point would be moot if the leadership was poor. Yet, even effective leadership requires the necessary authority. The agreement on this

point is overwhelming among classical counterinsurgency theorists. Elements of the modern study of organizational theory support this notion. The review of the organizational structures of historic case studies provides ample evidence that this principle holds. Modern theorists and contemporary doctrine confirm this principle and emphasize it. Yet, the United States and the United Kingdom, when faced with contemporary counterinsurgency campaign simply do not heed what should be a “no-brainer.” Why?

The answer lies in the study of organizational theory with John Q. Wilson, Morton Halperin, and others. Organizational cultures and executives engage in the protection of turf, bureaucratic inertia, and autonomy at the highest levels of government. These cultures and this turf are rooted in the national security bureaucratic structures and the laws of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are simply not optimized for the “whole of government” effort necessary for fighting or assisting in a counterinsurgency campaign. In essence, the executive leadership of the departments that wield the tools of national power has chosen the interests of their organizations over the interests of the country and the objectives of the counterinsurgency campaigns. Rather than “population centric” counterinsurgency, they are practicing “career centric” decision-making that is having negative effects on the current campaign in Afghanistan and will likely hinder any future counterinsurgency efforts. Instead, they try to find the right leadership and obtain a unity of effort through personal dynamics and attempts at common understanding.

Organizing for Unity of Effort at Echelons:
Host Country and Interventionist

The theorists further conclude that unified management of government departments at echelons of provinces, districts on down is also necessary. While Thompson emphasizes the need to maintain stove piped structural authority for host country departments, even he concurs that the district governors must manage the entire effort, thus giving some structure and authority to ensure unity of effort and challenge institutional interests.² This must be true for both the government of the contested country as well as for the nations providing the advisory efforts. This had clear and demonstrated effectiveness in Malaya with the SWECS and DWECS, which became the theorist's model. The often cited argument that the British had their colonial structure to lean on has only limited application here as the Malayan civil service was decimated by the Japanese and the British, as interventionist power, had to fill in the gaps where they could with very limited capacity.³ It was effective in Dhofar, but it is fair to say that the size and scope of that mission make the unity of effort and the organization easier. The organization in Vietnam was a mess by all accounts until the vast improvement when the CORDS program was finally implemented in 1967 and the GVN under President Thieu formed the Central Pacification and Development Council system. The host country system began coalescing district and local government coordination around the advisory structure. Again there was correlation and some indicators of causality that these organizational efforts improved the results of the campaigns. Thus, this study can further conclude that if the host country does not have the coordinating mechanisms of government, then the unified management structure of the interventionist power at the top

and at echelon is even more vital. Without it, the host country has little to no institutional framework to guide it while it develops the expertise, the capabilities and the capacity.

Counter-Organizing the Population

The theorists have been less clear and uniform in their prescription for counter-organizing the population. Each of the theorists lived in a world where insurgencies were largely based upon the Maoist model and therefore countering the Maoist influenced insurgent's attempts to organize the population were very important. This study demonstrates that locally provided security and bottom-up organization of the population is a *ceteris paribus* principle. The best manifestation of that counter-organization is wholly dependent on the artful design informed by the *sui generis* nature of the particular campaign. This may be a missing piece of counterinsurgency theory. Unity of effort prescriptions at the top and echelon are also *ceteris paribus* principles but probably will not change too much according to *sui generis* nature of a counterinsurgency campaign. Unity of effort achieved through the prescriptive solutions of counterinsurgency theorists can greatly assist a host country and interventionist power in coming up with the right ways to counter-organize a population. Even if the counterinsurgency campaign leadership adopts the harshest forms of counter-organization including resettlement and intense population and resource controls such as those articulated by Trinquier, the hyper-organization hyper-organization advocate, they still must obtain the buy-in of local support. This may only be the acquiescence of the population but it must at least be enough for them to not support the insurgency. Counterinsurgency efforts cannot focus on simply attempting to change how a population feels about the government. These efforts must change the behavior of the population and the insurgents. Counterinsurgency

must eventually neutralize the insurgents and cut off their support from whatever its source (local population, foreign government or entities, or criminal networks and enterprises). When that source is the population (which it often is), co-opt existing organizational structures of the society that exist at the local level can be critical. Even when the bulk of the support is coming from outside the population, co-opting the population can be a powerful tool. Most importantly, the counterinsurgent must find a tailored organizational solution that considers the environment. Attempting to create an entirely new organizational and governance structure from the top down exclusively will have difficulty conveying a political narrative that confers a lasting and stable sense of legitimacy. Such top-down efforts should be matched by bottom-up organization that begins with the engagement of local community leaders and influencers and then moves to organize and empower local security forces. The British in Malaya were able to take advantage of the hyper-organization strategy with the Chinese and their sequestered “New Villages.” They were able to do this because certain *sui generis* conditions existed that made it palatable and even desirable to the landless and disenfranchised minority of Chinese. Yet the “New Villages” were not successful until their organization was reinforced by bottom-up measures that reached out to Chinese community leaders and employed Chinese into “Home Guard” units.

Such a strategy would likely have been disastrous in Dhofar, Oman had the British attempted forced relocation and attempted to implement a local organizational structure that ignored that traditional tribal organization that effectively governed the Dhofari’s on the Jebel. That was, in effect, what the PFLOAG was attempting to do. Yet, the British conceptually achieved the same thing in Dhofar as in Malaya, but in Dhofar

the British co-opted the tribes through engagement, negotiation, and some threats. When the SAS co-opted and empowered the tribes on the Jebel through the *Firquat*, the PFLOAG's anti tribe and anti-Islam elements lost legitimacy in the eyes of Dhofari's.

In Vietnam, the CORDS program helped to convince the Vietnamese government to focus on local counter-organization in a way achieved the buy-in of locals. President Thieu established the Central Pacification and development Council system that mirrored CORDS. RFs and PFs became the manifestation of the first truly effective steps at counter organizing at the local level. The unified management at district and provincial levels influenced by the CORDS advisory effort made this initiative and other key initiatives much more effective and had it not been for the conventional invasion, the counterinsurgency campaign may have been successful. Previous attempts at local security and tribal militias employed for local security by Special Forces and Marines never compounded into strategic effects partly because they were not nested into a greater strategy supported by an organization with unified effort. CORDS itself was too small though. With personnel numbers in the thousands compared to the several hundred thousand US personnel in the country. Whereas the SWECs and DWECs in Malaya were the command structure for all forces and agencies, the CORDS hierarchy was comprised of only military advisors and agencies involved in development.

The theorists imply counter-organization of the population from the bottom-up but the experience of the case studies helps to inform us as to why this is particularly effective. In a little known monograph published by the RAND Corporation in 1965, Charles Wolf proposed that counterinsurgency efforts be directed toward changing the specific behaviors of the population rather than towards winning their support. Trinquier

and McCuen are in truth saying the same thing and providing different prescriptions for doing so.⁴ The important point though is that counter-organization must be done in a way that forces a change in the behavior of the insurgents and the specific individuals of the population from which they draw membership and support.⁵ By directly reaching out to societal institutions and co-opting them to support the government by coercion or employment, especially in the duties of local security, empowers them at the expense of the insurgency. The support of the government remains conditional upon rejection of the insurgent influence and active measures taken to counter it. This, also, is a *ceteris paribus* principle of counterinsurgency. Such steps that might involve, building local security forces, careful and deliberate allocation of government funds and services incentivized, as well as amnesty and reintegration programs all demand very well coordinated unity of effort so that the government earns trust and respect of the targeted population and is not fooled by insurgents taking advantage of poorly coordinated efforts. The design of these efforts will reflect the *sui generis* nature of the counterinsurgency campaign.

In Malaya, this meant standing up the “Home Guard” made up of the same Chinese males that the insurgency was attracting, and it meant food denial enforced by British and Malaya police and soldiers. In Dhofar, this meant convincing tribal leaders to turn the men in their tribe away from the *Adoo* in exchange for weapons, money, livestock and a restoration of their authority and influence over their tribes. Their partnership then brought projects, which the tribal leaders promised to their tribes and were seen as delivering based upon their decision to fight the *Adoo* alongside the Sultan and his British representatives. These other efforts came fully coordinated and only after the Dhofari tribes had demonstrated their loyalty, operationalized their *Firquat*, and

rejected the *Adoo*. In Vietnam, CORDS helped to make possible the connection of the government to this ground level organization of villages, where the recruitment of PFs and other programs stole the manpower from the Viet Cong to the extent that they had to bring in their guerilla manpower from the north. In Iraq, the decisions of tribal leaders facilitated a true bottom-up grassroots counter-organization that robbed the insurgency of its manpower resource. The decision by US commanders to co-opt, resource, and empower these tribally based forces was the turning point. The organizations at echelons between the host country and the interventionist power of the US actually made this co-optation difficult as there was some resistance and disagreement about how to legitimize, incorporate and control this grassroots counter-organization effort.⁶ In Afghanistan, co-opting, building and strengthening the local tribal *Arbacai* forces will be the central element of effective counter-organizing. The slowness, maddening caution, and in some cases outright resistance to initiatives like VSO, LDI, and now ALP could be reminiscent of Robert Komer's sad critique of CORDS as too little, too late.⁷

Lessons From Organization Theory

This study demonstrates that the failure to recognize this vital piece of counter-organization is at least partly, but probably mainly, caused by the failure of the US to heed the organizational prescriptions of counterinsurgency theorists. It was true in Vietnam and it is true in the contemporary environment. Organizational interests in many cases prevented even the remote consideration of organizational design that uses centralized hierarchical structure and delegated command authority to achieve unity of effort. Instead, the US has relied on the slow but persistent promulgation and inculcation of doctrine and the gamble of hoping that the right people can come together and achieve

unity of effort. As a result, our own agencies again played out their repertoires with some variations, just as Komer lamented about Vietnam. As Henry Nuzum explains:

The Army, and the nation more broadly, interpreted the experience in Indochina as the error of attempting COIN, when in fact the interagency effort had succeeded when properly organized and resourced. . . . The US is no closer to unified authority than it was in the earlier 1960s, approximately 5 years before CORDS was finally implemented. Field management has not received attention from Washington that it did during the Vietnam War. Not surprisingly, practitioners and doctrine writers seem to assume that policy makers will fail to integrate civilian and military authority...There is a tendency among participants to concede that a literally integrated chain of command would be ideal, but to defend whatever level of integration they have experienced as the highest level feasible.⁸

It happened in both Iraq and Afghanistan, though improvements in Iraq out-paced those of Afghanistan probably because the situation in Iraq appeared more desperate with more frequent insurgent attacks and mounting casualties during 2004 through 2007.⁹ However, in Afghanistan it has played out longer and is still playing out, albeit with some evolutionary and incremental improvements. DOS insisted on the power of the central government and built a police force that did not work with the Army (or anyone else). USAID and the PRTs built projects that inadvertently aided the insurgency, fed government corruption and wasted US dollars. Special Forces aggressively hunted the enemy often without coordinated explanation and sometimes with negative effects.¹⁰ Brigade Combat Teams whose headquarters could have provided the hub of centralized coordination struggled to finally get to a point of understanding their role and limitations in these conflicts. All organizations attempted to engage the GIRoA representation at all levels with varying degrees of interventionist power integration. All was done with some coordination and varying levels of unity of effort. These efforts ranged from amazingly efficient, even against the odds, to the deplorable. Usually it meant relying on “Hand-

shake CON” relationships that had no formal structure or authority.¹¹ Even the most effective and efficient lash-ups of random units, agencies, and commanders was never enough to have built an effective and coherent amnesty or reintegration program in Afghanistan or arrive at the central policy solutions that could facilitate the counter-organization of the population. Even in Iraq, it is doubtful that the US and Iraqi central government would have succeeded in co-opting Sunni tribes had it not been for the actions of Al-Qaeda that threatened tribal leaders.¹² In effect, the stupidity of the enemy’s actions made up for the lack of effective organizational structures on the part of the allies and Iraqis.

The US military and other government agencies and departments as well as partners such as the British have concentrated efforts on doctrine. Following Galula’s advice of a common doctrine to achieve a common understanding, counterinsurgency leaders and advocates of population centric solutions have written, publicized and promoted doctrine and guides that have created debatable levels of common understanding.¹³ The interviews from the CGSC Scholars Program make it clear that this doctrine and the common understanding it generated have had an undeniable impact on the organizational culture of the military and to a degree of other government agencies. This is having positive impacts on unity of effort, as commanders deliberately create mechanisms and relationships to facilitate it.

Mark Moyar rejects this notion and contends that the common understanding is beyond the point.

If, as the population centric school of thought maintains, counterinsurgency were primarily a question of finding the right methods or tactics, techniques, and procedures as they are known in military parlance, then

victory would be won easily once the proper methods were identified . History, however, does not record such outcomes. Sound counterinsurgency methods dictated from on high, in the form of orders or doctrine, have consistently failed when good leaders were lacking. The installation of good leaders, by contrast, has most often produced success even if those individuals were not told in detail how to do their job.¹⁴

Moyar's point and his thesis are partly right. Leadership and personal dynamics can be a *sine qua non* of counterinsurgency. But to rely on picking the right leadership alone assumes an ability that even with the most refined and careful systems is hit or miss. What he is saying is little different than what others in this study have said. That leadership and personal dynamics and relationships, properly manipulated, will solve the quest for unity of effort. This study concludes and contends that it is also about organizational design, structure and authority. Defined command relationships matter, even if doctrine writers and executives of government departments would prefer to wish them away.¹⁵

Further arguments against Moyar and his detractors claim that leadership is not exclusive to counterinsurgency in its importance. The same could be said of the need to create organizations that are adaptive and able to learn as John Nagl contends.¹⁶ Surely this is as important for all warfare as it is for counterinsurgency. The need for a common doctrine and understanding in counterinsurgency, as Galula contends, must also be similarly relevant to all forms of warfare. This study makes the case that organization is at least as important as those things; leadership, adaptive institutions, and common doctrine. Organization theory emphasizes the intuitive notion that in designing an organization, structure and authority will be based on the purpose of the organization (Wilson's critical tasks). When a host country or interventionist power embarks on counterinsurgency, then defeating the insurgency becomes its purpose. This may be true.

However; the same argument could be made against the organizational imperative in counterinsurgency that this study concludes is necessary. The argument would state that the right organization is necessary in conventional war and the counterinsurgency organizational imperative is merely advocating unity of command or as close as one can get to it. Certainly this is also desirable in conventional conflicts? The difference is that in conventional conflicts one is often less concerned about other agencies of government at echelons and counter-organizing the population. Counterinsurgency requires these other elements of national power as well and therefore it requires structures and authorities that combine military, intelligence, police, development, and civil administration functions. This provides all the more reason and emphasis as to why the US needs interagency reforms that will provide this flexible whole of government capacity.

The problems in the US prosecution of counterinsurgency lay not in the leadership talents of US generals or diplomats, nor does it lay in the adaptive ability of our separate agencies and institutions, rather it lays soundly on the inability of our chosen and legacy organizational structures to empower leaders and enforce adaptation through clear lines of authority established through the optimal organizational structures. The organizational cultures and essences of our agencies and departments involved in foreign policy have developed territorial inclinations, unhealthy levels of separation, and parochialism that have been reinforced by laws and systems. They can be traced back to Article 2 of the constitution, but also include the structures of committees in Congress and the internal power politics of our legislative branch.¹⁷ If national leaders and policy makers cannot break these through serious comprehensive reform, then our vast bureaucracies involved in foreign policy will continue to implement policy under the

intoxicating influences of the individual organizational interests which are born of the cultures and essences of the agencies and departments. To these agencies and departments, otherwise patriotic individuals owe their livelihoods and self-worth. Leaders will continue to preach policy and plans that call for “population centric” approaches to counterinsurgency but the reality will be “career-centric” decisions that erode chances of success with anything close to reasonable or efficient expenditures. This will continue to inhibit our ability to assist other fragile states that are trying to build effective government organizations to govern and protect their populations.

The need for an organizational design in counterinsurgency campaigns that the US wishes to embark on as an interventionist power is just one more point in a greater argument for national security reform. The Project on National Security Reform is one key group of advocates that has recognized how stove piped organizations and agencies hinder the implementation of strategy as well as its formation. The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Review Panel recently published its report calling for sweeping changes in the organization, structure, authority and professional education systems that make up the US national security mechanisms. As the panel made up of some of the most respected names in national security stated:

The panel notes with extreme concern that our current federal government structures-both executive and legislative, and in particular those related to security-were fashioned in the 1940s and they work at best imperfectly today. The US defense framework adopted after World War II was structured to address the Soviet Union in a bipolar world. The threats of today are much different. A new approach is needed . . . Just as Congress has a responsibility to improve our national security performance, so does the Executive branch. The panel finds that the Executive branch lacks an effective ‘whole of government’ capacity that integrates the planning and execution capabilities of the many federal departments and agencies that have national security responsibilities.¹⁸

As one high-ranking General Officer lamented when reflecting on Templer's pro-consular authority compared to the campaign in Afghanistan:

Why wouldn't you do that? Counterinsurgency is a complex problem that required unity of effort and a unified solution. This is how it was for all players, the less unified we were the harder it was. I know that key leaders at the highest levels did not push for more power and authority. Should they have? If a commander or ambassador asks for that now he wouldn't get it and in the very act of asking he would create scar tissue and once rejected there would be bad blood. We need a BRAC like solution, a blue ribbon panel, to design and recommend it. Then we need a President and/or Congress to approve it. It is just too hard to get done when those asking and proposing are part of the deal.¹⁹

¹Thompson, 159-160.

²Ibid., 74-76.

³Purcell, 46.

⁴See McCuen and Trinquier in chapter 2 for more on this.

⁵Charles Wolf, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and old Realities* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1965), 8.

⁶Smith et al., 43.

⁷See The conclusion of Robert Komer's book *Bureaucracy at War*. Also see Komer's RAND study "Impact of Pacification on Insurgency on South Vietnam"

⁸Nuzum, 104-105.

⁹This is the author's own conclusion.

¹⁰Gambastes; also see Greg Collier article about the use of aid.

¹¹CGSC Scholars Program 2010. This term was used by several respondents especially those working in SOF. "Hand-Shake CON" is the name for a command relationship when there is no formal relationship. It is a play on acronym terms used to describe command relationships. OPCON, TACON and others.

¹²Much has been written about Sunni awakening and military review article provides insight into the incentives that Al-Qaeda in Iraq provided through their actions. The An Bar awakening happened in spite of our efforts and thankfully the right people were there to seize it. Again this is an opinion not easily proven, but certainly realistic.

¹³British Army Manual 2001, 3-14; see also the US Army/USMC FM 3-24 and the USG COIN Guide.

¹⁴Moyar, *A Question of Command*, 5.

¹⁵The term “Executives” is used here in reference to John Q. Wilsons book, *Bureaucracy*. Refer to that chapter for his insights into the power and motivations of those in the executive level.

¹⁶Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. This a simplification of Nagl’s thesis. Nagl certain sees a common and evolving doctrine as also very important and part of the adaptation of a learning organization. He would also include leadership.

¹⁷Project for National Security Reform provides a great deal of information on this argument. In referring to Article 2 (The Executive Branch) this study also refers to Titles of law and National Security Directives.

¹⁸Quadrenial Defense Review Independent Review Panel, *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Advance Copy Received from Paul Hughes USIP, 2010).

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