

CLOSING THE CHASM: PREPARING AND BUILDING POST-CONFLICT CIVIL CAPACITY

BY

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Disclaimer

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This paper addresses how the “chasm” of civil capacity capabilities between the different Departments and Agencies of the US and coalitions of democratic nations can be harnessed and brought to bear in nation-states prior to and following conflict resolution with a more resolute and positive endstate.

Through intervention, peacekeeping, conflict, and war, the involvement of the US military in building and enabling a nation’s autonomous sovereign civil capacity is a constant requirement and will certainly increase in the future to aid in global security. A holistic approach must be taken from the onset of planning, organizing, and training to include all relevant factors, agencies, and processes to successfully enable and achieve sovereign civil capacity. Currently, a void exists in the synthesis and processes of military, interagency, and coalition training, planning, and execution for the dynamic task of providing competent and capable civil capacity building advice to supported nations.

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CLOSING THE CHASM: PREPARING AND BUILDING POST-CONFLICT CIVIL CAPACITY

Background and Analysis

Introduction

Plans fail for lack of counsel, but with many advisers they succeed.¹

Proverbs 15:22

A deep and wide “chasm” exists between two sources of our national power in the orchestra of planning and executing post-conflict operations and building civil capacity. Specifically, how we plan, prepare, train, coordinate, integrate, synchronize and ultimately execute post-conflict operations between the elements of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS)—they may be on the same sheet of music, but they’re way out of tune. A further complicating factor in coordinating and executing post-conflict operations is the multitude of capabilities national, and international non-governmental agencies (INGOs)² which can, and often do, provide multidimensional support in resolving the complex and ill-structured challenges of post-conflict operations. Without proper preparation, training, and a unified effort led by DoS, supported by DoD, we will continue to create ad-hoc structures and call upon ill-prepared leaders and units to execute these extremely difficult missions.

This paper will highlight lessons learned from past operations and bring forth changes that we must incorporate to professionally prepare individuals, teams, and organizations for future operations. Through training and professional development these individuals, teams, and organizations will be able to effectively and competently organize, operate, build, and manage civil capacity operations. We must identify the right instruments (individuals and organizations), to form the orchestra (the structure), effectively tune everything and train to play to the same music (implement policy) to increase capabilities internal to the US government and have an understanding of how to holistically integrate and co-opt unity of effort with partnering nations and INGOs to achieve objectives with globally accepted standards and norms. In support of future multinational efforts, we must focus our vision through the lens of how we can influence

the positive change in the governance, economics, and civil capacity of nation-states that are weak, are failing, on the brink of collapse, or are potential hotbeds of conflict and stability operations such as many central African nations, Burma, North Korea, South American countries, or other regions of civil unrest.³

Experiential Foundations and Expectations

Since World War II, the influence of globalization dramatically increased the international community's ability to dynamically harness and provide critical resources immediately following natural disaster or conflict. This is the direct result of the ease of travel, increased ability to communicate transnationally, and the political, social, cultural, and economic interconnectedness of society and nations. Globalization increasingly influences the standards and expectations of the affected and supporting nations as infrastructure modernization, economic sustainability, and human rights are often at the center of post-conflict operations. Optimally, these operations are multinational with a lead nation, multinational group or committee, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There is no doubt that a multinational effort increases resources and expands capabilities, but it comes with the cost of increased cooperation and collaboration among all participants—extensive diplomacy. It is imperative to understand the complexities and the challenges members of the DoD and DoS face as they conducted (or are conducting) post-conflict operations and build civil capacity abroad. Lessons learned abound in volumes of information about what our forces, including civilians, must do during deployment, but little exists as to how to best prepare individuals, organizations, and units for the daunting task prior to execution. In November 2005, DoDD 3000.05 provided clarity to the dearth of DoD's civil capacity policy and President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive-44, published in December 2005, provided the whole-of-government post-conflict policy with the DoS as the lead in policy implementation.

Policy and Directives

Three distinct policies address the actions required to develop, train, and provide the ability to provide civil capacity support abroad. The third policy outlines how the

DoD will execute the training of civilians and military members and further serves as the foundation to justify resources and obligate personnel to accomplish the policy directives. Unfortunately, due to structure, resourcing, and manpower constraints, the US continues to approach each challenge as a reaction rather than proactively planning, preparing, training, integrating, and organizing for civil capacity missions before deployment. The DoS's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) drafted National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) for President Bush to mandate the improvement of the US to provide capable civil capacity support to failed, failing, or disaster stricken nations. The policy states "the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated US Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."⁴ Although this directive exists and remains valid under the new administration, little has been formally implemented across the government to provide the resources and structure that will enable future success. To highlight the lack of support and dedicated efforts internal to the DoS, the office of the S/CRS only has 100 personnel dedicated to the task.⁵ As a result of the severe understaffing, the DoD continues to fill the capabilities gap during operations and attempt to train on the local level (tactical) tasks rather than the regional or national (strategic) levels.

As a result of this capabilities gap, the most recent version of DoDD Number 3000.05 stipulates that "Stability operations are a core US military mission that the DoD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations."⁶ We must be "compatible, through interoperable and complementary solutions, to those of other US Government agencies...to establish civil security and civil control, restore or provide essential services, repair critical infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance."⁷ Military forces must be able to successfully integrate, support, and collaborate "with other US and foreign government's efforts aimed at unity of effort in rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, economic stability, and development; and building indigenous capacity for such tasks."⁸ The Combat Training Centers, and the Joint Warfighting Center (which focuses at the Corps and above levels), integrates civil capacity situations into their scenarios and, at the

joint level, governmental agencies participate, to a very limited degree, during Joint and Interagency simulations exercises. However, speaking from first-hand experience, it is the minimal support and involvement by interagency organizations and noticeable void in participation that continues to remain a constant during this training. As a result, our military and interagency civil capacity capabilities will continue to erode across the DoD and DoS in addition to other supporting agencies and organizations across our government. The full commitment of all parties must begin from the planning phase to ensure unity of effort through execution—build the team from the beginning and commit the same team throughout the operation. This brings to light the nexus of the problem; all participants are not fully involved from the onset of planning through mission execution. We continue to develop ad hoc organizations and enter into the fray in a disjointed manner. The decreased dwell time for military units packages available theater specific training and certification in the last 180-90 days prior to deployment for units across the Army. Units structure their organizations according to their Deployment Mission Essential Tasks (DMET) and gaps are immediately apparent when the unified inter-agency participation is supposed to take place. The reason for the inadequate civilian integration and training is simple, inter-agencies do not have the depth in personnel built into their structure and they do not provide expeditionary capabilities—they continue to exist with a peacetime, steady-state, status-quo structure (more instruments are needed to play the score like it needs to sound). Arguably, we frequently meet success on the ground, but consider how much faster and effectively can we attain our unified objectives if we have all the right resources and personnel committed from the start.

Regardless of the degree of interagency participation in training prior to deployment, military forces must effectively “assist other US Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts.”⁹ We have the ability to execute these diverse tasks with organic personnel, especially when we bring the capabilities of the Reserve Component (RC) to bear and apply their civilian skill sets to the problem. However, when we rob individuals from existing units we are only applying “band aid” solutions rather than establishing and maintaining a capabilities based

manpower structure focused on future requirements. When required skill sets are not available we, again, will continue to resort to establishing ad hoc organizations which continues to pull personnel from other functions and creating resourcing gaps for subsequent missions in existing units. Optimally, we could organize specific units in the Active and Reserve Components that could wrap their education and training around the strategic task of building civil capacity from the national to local government levels—creating a true harmonic symphony. Partial capabilities exist within our Civil Affairs units, most of which are understrength and lack the level of education, training, and integration from the local to strategic levels of operation. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) accomplish this task today to a limited degree. However, they are not integrated from the onset of pre-deployment planning and are often ad hoc organizations with a combination of civilians and military Worldwide Individual Augmentation System (WIAS)¹⁰ tasked individuals with limited ability of conducting security tasks in conjunction with their stability tasks. Additionally, PRT leaders are challenged to fully harmonize the coordination among leadership within the military, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the embassies, and the influence of Washington-based country representatives of the Departments and Agencies in theater—especially when the responsibility and authority lines are unclear. From my personal interaction with PRTs and their leadership from the tactical to national levels in Iraq during OIF 2006-2008, three significant organizational and leader flaws which continue to exist in today's operations abroad: PRTs lack measures of effectiveness integrated with the diplomatic lines of operations, performance is often driven by military tactical commanders with their (or their higher headquarters') agendas, and the affected local leadership is drawn to the authoritative figure in uniform more than one dressed in civilian clothes. It wasn't until October 2007 when a civilian became the lead Joint Planning Committee (JPC) integrator of governance and infrastructure in Baghdad that civilian control and strategic purpose was established—the military leadership conducted this function for almost five years after we entered Baghdad and often supported tactical-local initiatives rather than a holistic strategic-national level approach.

DoDD 1322.18 serves as the foundation for training our military and DoD civilian forces. It stipulates, “Military training to generate and sustain capabilities shall encompass all phases of joint campaigns and the full range of integrated operations.”¹¹ Specifically, forces must be able to successfully synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate with “other US Government agencies’ activities, in coordination with partner nations, and non-Governmental entities across the full range of military operations, which achieves a comprehensive approach that advances US Government goals and objectives.”¹² To facilitate the development of these capabilities the Combatant Commanders are charged with establishing a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to “leverage interagency expertise.”¹³ The problem is the lack of operational, staffing, and preparedness standardization across the commands. When deployed unit leaders must balance the availability of their personnel talent pool between the lethal and non-lethal missions. Often, military leaders resort to their “comfort zone” and continue to reinforce our lethal missions rather than the non-lethal civil capacity missions and tasks which are on the critical path for an exit strategy of transitioning to enable civil authorities. In essence, we continue to fill MTOE billets for the lethal focused missions we are expected to execute versus creating temporary duty assignments on our manning documents to accomplish non-lethal objectives. Therefore, those non-lethal missions often play second or third chair to the sound of the tactical drums, which is our rhythmic comfort zone. The lack of Human Resource depth in the military and other Federal agencies’ directly impact their priorities of ongoing missions and their ability “to provide appropriate” *or continuous* “liaisons and planners to the Combatant Commands”¹⁴ and in-theater civilian leadership. The end result is continuous reaction to crisis rather than continual preparedness and training of teams to execute extremely dynamic and challenging missions abroad.

Establishing Solutions to Bind Capabilities

The establishment of a center of excellence was the result of combining the three policy directives previously discussed into national level training and education facility—in 2007 the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) was initially formed by the DoD and

fully operational a year later. The CCO is based out of the offices of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, VA, with the primary purpose to “connect education and training programs across the government to foster a ‘whole of government’ understanding, assessment and approach to complex operations.”¹⁵ At the heart of the CCO is the ability to harness significant educational and application of interagency tools and products, lessons learned, and providing a training base that is future focused. In essence, it is the nation’s only holistic educational and training resource center tasked to develop intellectual capabilities for future national support to stability and civil capacity operations. However, it is more of a repository of information and a conduit for best practices than it is a training center.

Clearly, current operations continue to provide evidence that our nation must better prepare individuals and elements deploying abroad to conduct and build civil capacity missions with fledgling governments and economies at the local to national levels. Live urban operations and homeland security training, for Brigade-sized units and below, occur at one of the four training centers in the US: the Muscatatuk Urban Training Center (MUCK) located at Camp Atterbury near Butlerville, IN; the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA; Twentynine Palms, CA, and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA. Of the four, the MUCK—established in 2005, is the newest complete urban training center focused on military and interagency training. The DoD is committed to improving the experience and reality of the facilities with a five-year investment of \$100M ending in FY 2012.¹⁶ The purpose of the MUCK facility is to providing individuals and units with a realistic experience focusing on contingency operations, domestic catastrophe response, and dealing with the local population—all of which are applicable while deployed. Additionally, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the Foreign Service Institute joined capabilities in the effort to develop professional competencies in the Civilian Response Corps by establishing a two week minimum training course for standby deployers and an eight-week training course for active deployers, which includes a three-week Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) Level One course intended to aid in the interagency planning process. A unique approach to synthesize the

interagency and military training approach would be to unify the effects, from a national level, by combining the actions of participants located at each training center under the guidance of senior military and civilian leaders executing training at the JWC.

Defining the Chasm

As NPSD-44 directs the Secretary of State to “coordinate, lead integrated US Government efforts...with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities,”¹⁷ we continue to accept the fact we are not fully meeting or resourcing the intent of this directive—the change in administration may be the cause for the willingness or rift in execution. Separately, in the DoD internal directive, it specifies its internal responsibility to prepare to “conduct stability operations with proficiency to combat operations”¹⁸ and be capable of conducting, supporting, and leading activities to achieve a desired democratic endstate. Two major requirements result from these directives yet remain a significant void in doctrine and process: training and planning our military and interagency partners for success in future operations. Given the availability of our training centers, educational courses, priorities, focus of individual preparedness, and manpower resources, the two national departments focusing on similar objectives seem to be disjointed in today’s operational environments; hence, the dichotomy of unified effort and resourcing as we plan for future operations. Unified efforts between departments and agencies will certainly streamline fiscal spending, reinforce the educational experience, and integrate training opportunities more effectively and efficiently than our current fragmented training approach.

The historical examples of civil capacity challenges from operations in Germany and Japan contrasted with those in Afghanistan and Iraq provide us with classic examples of how to prepare and execute post-conflict operations. By contrasting post-WWII with current operations, we can identify lessons that enable success with what doesn’t work well. The overarching intent is to establish a solid foundation, which will enable a unified effort abroad in the future. This is the focus of this paper—highlighting how we can *close the chasm* between two primary operating departments and supporting agencies of the US

through cooperation, education, training, and unified planning to achieve National Security objectives.

History of US Involvement in Building Civil Capacity.

We don't *always* choose conflict, but when it occurs and strife exists, the US often intervenes. Multiple examples exist from which we can derive and learn lessons to improve upon and develop strategies to improve civil capacity for the betterment of the affected populace. These improvements may take months to gain a foothold, while others may take years to establish a credible and transparent form of government—the ultimate strategic and international objective.

Over 60 different types of conflict, peacekeeping, disaster relief, stability/security missions have been conducted by the US since the beginning of WWII. The majority of these missions required few to no *boots-on-the-ground* or significant diplomatic presence as we partnered with existing governments to provide materiel or economic support in an effort to achieve our objectives. To maintain perspective on duration, scale of operations, resources, and nation-building efforts I will focus on four similarly scaled operations in which the US dedicated its efforts and served as the driving force for the building of civil capacity following the defeat of a foe or reconstructing a failed nation-state. Sequentially, the four similar scaled and resourced operations are post-conflict Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

In Germany, we completely disbanded their military, parceled out occupied terrain, reset their form of government, and continued to maintain a presence for over 65 years in support of our, and Europe's, security objectives against communist expansionism. In Japan, we eliminated their capacity to threaten neighboring nations, disbanded their military, changed their hierarchical form of government, and enabled them to flourish technologically. In Afghanistan, we seek to form a stable and transparent government capable of securing its people. In Iraq, we sought to dispose of a dictator and introduce democracy to a nation held together by threats and brutality. The constant between these examples is the significant presence of the military from the onset of conflict through the stabilization of a nation. Our efforts must build upon the lessons

learned and we must provide the impetus to change as the future guarantees we will face these types of challenges again.

Damascus, Syria...a Prologue

Although British, Thomas E. Lawrence, otherwise known as “Lawrence of Arabia,” provides a first-hand account of how to create harmony among players and effectively integrate and synchronize operations to dominate the terrain and the enemy, stabilize the environment, and transition to enable civil authority over 85 years before it was captured as doctrine (Phases III–V of campaign planning)¹⁹. Lawrence documented the extreme importance of building post-conflict civil capacity in Damascus, Syria, in late September through early October 1918 as he worked with Arab, Syrians, British, and Bedouin tribesmen to regain normalcy following conflict. Upon seizing Damascus, he, “had no instructions what to do with the captured city; and as we had taken possession, knowing our road, with dear purpose, prepared processes, and assets in hand.”²⁰ Ultimately, the objective was to establish “an Arab Government, with foundations large and native enough to employ the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of the rebellion, translated into terms of peace.”²¹ In order to accomplish this task, he orchestrated the establishment of security, power, infrastructure, sanitation, emergency response, relief workers, currency, and economics in order to restore order and provide a stable environment for the people. He departed less than a week from seizing the most critical transportation hub between the Germans and Turkish and, in reflection stated, “It was run up so furiously well that...the Syrians had their de facto Government, which endured for two years, without foreign advice, in an occupied country wasted by war, and against the will of important elements among the Allies.”²²

Lawrence took culture, available resources, and the existing expertise of the local government and economy into account in Damascus resulting in a relatively successful early example of how to conduct or build post-conflict civil capacity. The US has conducted numerous operations abroad, which called for expertise to aid in building civil capacity in a war-torn country or following an environmental disaster. We have yet to successfully bring all elements and resources to bear as quickly as Lawrence did in Damascus.

Building Post WWII Civil Capacity

Prior to the cessation of hostilities in Germany and Japan in WWII, national leaders from Allied countries met to determine how to regain a sense of normalcy and stabilization in the Axis countries. At these meetings, held in Casablanca, Yalta, and Potsdam, leaders agreed upon the conditions and objectives for post-conflict civil capacity, set the tone within their respective governments, aligned resources to enable success, and clearly articulated lines of authority, responsibility, and the chain of command. It is relevant to contrast current operations with that of post-WWII as it shows how our interagency collaboration and unity of effort have fallen by the wayside. The DoS continues to focus on peaceful democracy in stable environments and the DoD successfully transformed and modernized the military to fight and win the nations wars.

Building Civil Capacity in Germany (1945–1952)

On the 8th of May 1945 the German high command unconditionally surrendered to the US, Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom and military occupation soon began. From 17 July to 2 August 1945 leaders of the three occupying countries met at the Potsdam Conference in Berlin and agreed upon the military occupation zones, denazification, demilitarization, reconstruction, reparations and restitution of Germany.²³ To orchestrate the post-conflict civil capacity efforts, a Council of Foreign Ministers was established to ensure “appropriate uniformity of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in their respective zones of occupation and to reach agreed decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole.”²⁴ Germany stood as a divided country until its reunification in December 1989 and a sharp contrast in civil capacity efforts was keenly evident in governance, economics, and infrastructure between West and East Germany. Following the war, the US initially maintained a military presence of 1.622 million out of a total of 3.077 million men in Europe.²⁵ The Office of the Military Government, US (OMGUS)²⁶ became the governmental institution responsible for all efforts within the US Sector. The controlling and policy mechanisms established in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 (April 1945) and the Potsdam Conference communiqué (August 1945) were binding for US forces. Although the JCS directive preceded the communiqué, it was

the latter that served as the superseding and controlling document for any discrepancies thereby establishing a clear task and purpose for the forces in the US Sector.

Under the oversight of the OMGUS, remaining occupational forces focused on the priority tasks of building civil capacity at the local levels, demilitarization, and maintaining law and order. In January of 1946, OMGUS oversaw the actions of a 31,000 Soldier US Constabulary in Germany, consisting of three brigade equivalent sized units, roughly similar to today's Advise and Assist Brigades, who assumed the primary occupational tasks a year after Germany surrendered thereby allowing the drawdown or realignment of the remaining occupational forces across the country. In response to the inadequate post-conflict civil capacity capabilities within the occupational forces, a school to "train Soldiers on law enforcement and military government issues"²⁷ was established by the US Constabulary in July of 1946. The challenges the US civilian and military leaders faced in post-WWII Germany were beyond anything ever executed in our history. Strategies focused on securing and running an occupied country, establishing and transitioning to a democratic civil administration from a Nazi-led government, repatriation of over 15 million displaced persons,²⁸ establishing law, order, and justice, the significant reconstruction effort to meet the needs of German citizens, and the demobilization of 1.2 million US Soldiers from Germany in the year and a half following the surrender required synchronization between the occupational Allies, civilians, and military forces. Unfortunately, Soldiers were not trained on these tasks nor was it well orchestrated prior to tasking them to accomplish the mission. Nevertheless, leaders understood the overarching purpose and set out to meet the objectives outlined in the Potsdam Agreement and JCS Directive 1067 as quickly as possible in a country tired of war—the advantage was, Germany had the capacity and willingness to regain its industrial capabilities, reestablish its economy, rebuild its infrastructure, and create a better form of democratic government. The OMGUS, INGOs, Allied partners, and the Germans themselves began at the basic levels of the local government, economy, and infrastructure and executed unified tasks to achieve agreed upon goals and objectives. Ultimately, the combined efforts resulted in a national currency and the European Recovery Plan (the Marshal Plan), which further enabled reconstruction in 1948; a

nation-wide election and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949; Germany was acceded to NATO and, the establishment of the Bundeswehr on 21 November 1955.²⁹

In essence, it took over ten years to formally reconstitute a nation with a new form of government capable of meeting the people's needs, establish and maintain a consistently growing economy and gross domestic product, stabilize essential services through formal national and international ties to enable the constant improvement of infrastructure, and the internal ability to provide for the common defense of the people with a structured military. The early unified efforts, beginning in 1945, between the occupying forces, the country's citizens, and influencing border nations all resulted in the reunified country of present day Germany recognized as a global economic success with a "foreign policy" *focused on* "peace and safety in the world."³⁰

Building Civil Capacity in Japan (1945–1951)—Organizing for Success

The post-conflict operations in Japan were significantly different from in those in Germany. The 26 July 1945 Potsdam Agreement included the terms and conditions for the post-conflict occupation of Japan. The implementing policies were decidedly different in the structure and execution of rebuilding the country compared to the parceling multinational occupation of post-conflict Germany. General Douglas MacArthur accepted Japan's unconditional surrender on 2 September 1945 at 0908 hours on the deck of the Missouri in Tokyo Bay³¹ and immediately set out to rebuild Japan's infrastructure and its civil capacity.

The Potsdam Agreement established the principal objectives for post-conflict Japan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1080/15 established the specific policies and parameters for General MacArthur's occupation. Initially, MacArthur established a Military Government Section (MGS) in his General Headquarters (GHQ) US Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), to "handle non-military affairs in the areas under Allied control."³² The MGS served as the initial foundation for his GHQ Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP), which had the direct responsibility of executing the non-military related policies and directives in post-conflict Japan. The uniqueness is the fact that both GHQs were under the same commander and General Staff³³ thereby

creating unity of command and purpose as directed by the JCS and the President of the US.

The initial occupational force of approximately 430,000 Allied troops³⁴ focused on missions as directed by GHQ/AFPAC to establish military authority over Japan without occupying “any part of Japan unless it becomes essential to impose direct military government therein.”³⁵ Approximately 40,000 of the Allied Soldiers³⁶ were from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) including Soldiers from Australia, Britain, India, and New Zealand) conducted occupational tasks in southwestern Japan. A key point in the occupation was the US’ post-conflict administration of Japan operated unilaterally and General MacArthur’s authority was supreme. This simplified policy implementation, provided unity of effort, and clarified the lines of responsibility and authority for all parties.

General MacArthur postured the SCAP in Tokyo with the right people and skill sets to enable success, and explicitly stated to “use the existing form of government, not to support it.”³⁷ The JCS Directive 1308/15 created the provision for maintaining select governmental structure within Japan to further enable success. To prepare for and enable the occupying forces, many civilian and military members of the GHQ/SCAP were trained in the language, culture, and the civil administrative functions of conducting the myriad of civil capacity tasks for over a year prior to the organization of the SCAP.³⁸ Knowing the task of occupying, orchestrating and building civil capacity, and providing security for Japan could not be executed without the proper elements and talent in place, the recruitment and filling of critical positions ensued. “They included former civil servants, financiers, labour consultants, lawyers, and other professional. PhDs abounded.”³⁹ “At the height of the occupation, the GHQ swelled to 6,000 personnel, of whom 3,850 or 64 percent, were civilians.”⁴⁰ Military Government Teams, the precursor to today’s PRTs, were established to oversee the development of local level society, governance, economics, and the infrastructure improvements. Unfortunately, individuals in these lower tiered administrative elements were often less educated and experienced than the local leaders, but this is where it is clearly evident that the “buy in” of local leaders and the populace makes a significant difference in the success of our efforts.

The JCS 1080/15 directive stated General MacArthur “will not establish direct military government, but will exercise his powers so far as compatible with the accomplishment of his mission through the Emperor of Japan or the Japanese Government.”⁴¹ Nevertheless, the GHQ/SCAP began the huge undertaking of making the humanitarian provisions for over 9 million⁴² (12.2% of Japan’s 1945 population) displaced persons across Japan, demilitarizing over 4 million troops,⁴³ establishing security with occupational forces, begin reconstruction efforts of the severely damaged urban population centers, and provide oversight of economic democratization. The onset of the Korean War in 1950 resulted in a restructuring of US forces in Japan and, perhaps, expedited the overall process of enabling the civil capacity of Japan, provided the foundation for establishing the Japanese Defense Forces, and exponentially boosted its economic growth.

Post WWII Civil Capacity Applicable in Future Planning

...unilateral US leadership” (as in Germany and Afghanistan) “in managing the civil and political transitions would likely lead to faster results and more rapid institutional change. However, a multilateral effort” (as in Japan and Iraq), “particularly one conducted under UN auspices, may defuse popular resentment...against US “imperialism” and make it easier to ensure regional reconciliation and stability.”⁴⁴

The contrast to the post-conflict operations between Germany and Japan is remarkable. The most significant aspect is the planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization that occurred prior to occupying the two countries. Although the tasks of rebuilding the country, maintaining order and security, reestablishing the economy, and providing for the development of a democracy were all similar in purpose, they differed in their structure, preparation, method of execution, and level of authority.

In preparation for post-conflict operations, the leaders of the Allied nations met at three major conferences (Casablanca, Yalta, and Potsdam) to establish unity in direction and purpose—which Russia departed from shortly after the war, thereby initiating the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Allies agreed upon the standards to which they would occupy and begin building post-conflict civil capacity in Germany and Japan. The key difference between the two was post-conflict administration in Germany was

multinational and, as a result, significantly more difficult for unity of effort and command, resources were not uniformly applied, and governance/civil administration differed across the three (later four) zones of occupation. Due to the structure, function, and positioning of the military governments, the US did not have an active Ambassadorial presence in Japan until 1952 or Germany until 1955.

In Japan, the authority was supreme and unilateral under General MacArthur. It was this unilateralism, which sped the process of rebuilding the civil capacity, and enabled the occupation forces to achieve local to national level success as they partnered with in-place government entities. The combination of unilateralism, buy-in from the citizens, and retaining the government and the civil servants all resulted in an autonomous and very successful example of building, or realigning, civil capacity in a nation ready for and accepting of change. The planning, preparation, and training of civil capacity functions of military officers and civilians in advance of Japan's surrender paralleled the planning of occupational military efforts and presence—a holistic approach that resulted in success. The economic impacts to ensuring labor and product costs were not inflated ensured the local economy could sustain (and improve) the process, democracy was widely accepted form of civil governance at the local and national levels (it gave people a voice and ability to impact their country), and the unilateral partnership for the next seven years led to a successful transition to civil authorities in April 1952.

Current Post-Conflict Civil Capacity Operations

Afghanistan—Eliminating Sanctuaries and Establishing a Government.

Consider the strategic challenges in balancing the combined efforts of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—consisting of 43 Allies and partners;⁴⁵ the US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A); and NATO across the region to include the influences of Pakistan and Iran. Differences of national policies, human and economic resources, objectives, rules of engagement (ROE), and limitations on operational/tactical employment of military power all complicate a unified effort to achieve a desired endstate—one of the reasons behind our long-term commitment in the region⁴⁶. In this respect, the coordinating multinational

efforts are similar to those of post-WWII Germany. As the US led the initial strategic efforts in 2001 to destroy Al Qaeda, eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and support systems, demonstrate the US resolve and commitment, build international support, and stabilize the Afghanistan government, the current long-term unified strategy calls for increasing our civilian assistance footprint to ~1,300 deployed civilians and a surge to ~98,000 US troops⁴⁷ as a means to an end in the region. President Barack Obama's *New Way Forward*⁴⁸ address to the nation resulted in a change to the US strategic policy⁴⁹ in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region to include the following:

- Reconstruction and development of Afghanistan's agriculture sector.
- Improve governance at the provincial, district, and local levels.
- Improve the rule of law by increasing the capacity of the police and supporting Afghan-led anti-corruption efforts.
- Reintegrate former Taliban who renounce Al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system.
- Initiate regional diplomacy and economic integration.
- Challenge extremist claims and articulate Afghanistan's future through effective communications.
- Provide focused and sustained civilian assistance.

The New Way Forward strategy is not so much of a shift as it is the impetus to refocusing our structure and efforts originally outlined in national policy. No longer can our strategic efforts abroad be sequential, they must be collaborative and simultaneous with a holistic government approach. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates clearly articulated to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that we must divest ourselves from the way we used to do things to how we need to do things in the future by stating, "Over the last 15 years, the US government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed

in the wake of the Second World War.”⁵⁰ Without changing the entire process of how we approach building civil capacity capabilities within our own government, our relevance will continue to depend upon unresourced and overextended civilians and service members to accomplish the mission at the expense of effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness.

On 14 February 2003, in reference to Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “The objective is not to engage in what some call *nationbuilding*...it's to try to help the Afghans so that they can build their own nation...*and not* create a dependency.”⁵¹ This statement highlighted the perceived DoD’s position of wishing away the post-conflict requirements that military and civilian personnel would be burdened with and lack unity of effort for years to come. For over seven years, Afghanistan was second to our efforts in Iraq—even during the planning phases. Human and materiel resources, government support, and orchestration of international support have only become of greater importance in the last thirteen months. The transition from stabilizing the country to fully enabling the Afghan authorities is expected to last for ten or more years, but our recent efforts to focus on the non-lethal lines of operation will certainly enable transition earlier than if we only focused on constant domination.

Our efforts to successfully build civil capacity and capitalize on our efforts in Afghanistan continue to falter as “the failure to learn the lessons throughout this period (2004 through mid-2009) such that the challenges and gaps persist.”⁵² The bottom line is that there is no civil-military “permanent, predictable method of integrating decision making and resource-sharing.”⁵³ This stems from the lack of resourcing, process, and standardization across the US Government. Currently, military planners and commanders conduct the vast majority of these efforts. Civilian involvement remains minimal due to manpower availability at critical planning nodes at the strategic and operational levels. Often, civilians are available, but due to the sheer number of daily and weekly meetings and planning sessions conducted at various echelons, it becomes impossible to participate with any relevance.

Counterinsurgency isn’t, necessarily, kinetic. Speaking from personal experience, integrating and synchronizing non-lethal effects into our operations as the main effort and

closely tying it to the affected through communication mitigates the ability of insurgents to gain a positive foothold. If the populace desires positive change, they must first establish and maintain security. Leaders must identify and apply non-lethal, or non-kinetic, methods and concepts as the key to success, or critical path, as we work to closely to *hold and build* in areas where insurgents have or may gain a foothold. The military must lead the building of civil capacity efforts when insufficient civilian resources are available, PRTs are disjointed or unsynchronized in their respective stages of implementation across the region, and USAID continues to rely (almost exclusively) on local national project managers for hiring of workers, contracts, and payment of funds. They have organic security and are afforded the ability to work closely with local leaders at the tactical level. The lack of civilian efforts left the military on the ground to, fundamentally, implement and effect positive change at the tactical level and use it to affect or lead change at the operational level...the planning and execution of capacity building did not appear to be clearly nested at the strategic (national) level. More military on the ground does not, necessarily equate to better security. The epiphany occurs when you see change through less military involvement and more local/district/regional/national level civilian involvement and the desire to positively affect change; often prioritization of effort and resourcing are what can spark change.

The lack of unified national interagency efforts to institutionalize centers of excellence to build upon best practices, effectively train individuals and teams, and prepare for continual improvement of conditions and operations abroad. Simply put, after-action reports (AARs) are completed when units or teams redeploy, they are collected, and left up to individuals to glean what they can from the volumes of information available to a point of information overload. National level civilian and military leadership must clarify the tasks and purpose for all efforts and designate a clear chain of command/responsibility. If we don't successfully bring collective groups of experts together with those who are to assume the mission, we will continue to be inefficient in our efforts. The institutionalizing must be civil-military in nature and included in training exercises, classrooms, and virtual discussions with those in the field abroad if we are going to improve.

Iraq...This Won't Take Long.....

The near unilateral approach to conflict intervention and resolution in Iraq complicates the burden on those working to resolve the challenges to accomplish the mission. As was most recently evident in the build-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, building a “coalition of the willing”⁵⁴ may not come to fruition and, once committed, the US, and its lesser-committed allies, opt for a unilateral approach rather than a global approach to establishing security, stability, and resolving conflicts. The influences of international non-governmental agencies and organizations further complicate the paradigm, but we must focus on mitigating, or ultimately eliminating, the internal dichotomy of the State and DoD as they work to achieve common objectives in weak, failing, or failed nations. To accomplish this significant task we must harness our internal civil capacity capabilities and effectively bring them to bear prior to, during, and/or following conflict resolution in foreign nation-states with a more resolute and positive endstate.

We initiated OIF with extremely poor interagency and international planning. The planning completely failed to recognize the importance of how to resource and build post conflict civil capacity in a failed state.

Our military and the individuals within are extremely adaptive, competent, and capable of meeting any challenge. Our nation continues to provide the best resources to enable tactical mission accomplishment through precision engagement, kinetic lethality, survivability, detection, and intelligence capabilities. Each of these facets requires resources in manpower and time to adequately train and prepare for employment. These capabilities enable our forces to dominate the Operational Environment (OE) and defeat any threat on the battlefield. However, when we fail to comprehensively plan a campaign, inclusive of other agencies and the competencies, capabilities, and skill sets they possess, the results require a significant increase in manpower, materiel, and time to obtain national and strategic objectives. No one sets out to fail—everyone does the absolute best they can to accomplish the mission within their resource constraints.

Building the civil capacity of Iraq has taken seven years and we are nearing the date for withdrawing our troops. The second major national elections took place on 7

March 2010 with minimal violence directed toward the voting citizens—10.4 to 11.4 million voters turned out to cast their individual ballot to elect their choice of the 6,200 eligible candidates competing for 325 parliamentary seats.⁵⁵ The elements that continue to disrupt progress will remain a constant for years to come, but their nuisance will not require the force of the US military or diplomatic power to deter the threat, the Iraqi government is proving capable of handling those threats. Speaking from personal experience, the key to success is engaging the right leaders at every level and gaining their trust and support for our intentions. To gain a foothold for progress you must achieve the *buy-in* of the people and their leadership from the national to local levels include government, tribal, and religious leaders. Without their desire for effort or meeting their prioritized needs, our efforts will continue to play an unharmonized symphony which will gain little to no interest or support. PRTs in Iraq relied upon the Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) for security and, often, direction of effort to ensure synchronization—often with less priority than tactical kinetic missions and operations. As we near the culmination point of providing security forces in Iraq, the transition point must include the interagency elements, INGOs, and PRTs spread across the country. Specifically, the PRT transition must ensure no gaps or disruption of progress occur as they begin to depart. In essence, the PRTs must work themselves out of a job as part of their current execution plan and they must fully synchronize with the holistic State and DoD plans to successfully implement before 1 September 2010 as the bulk of US forces begin to retrograde out of theater.

The Critical Path

The construct of preparing for and executing post-conflict operations and, ultimately, transitioning to a sovereign, stable, and legitimate national government is the critical path in the overarching process. Through intervention, peacekeeping, conflict, and war, the involvement of the US military in building and enabling a nation's autonomous sovereign civil capacity is a constant requirement and will certainly increase in the future to aid in global security. We must take a holistic approach from the onset of planning, organizing, and training to include all relevant factors, agencies, and processes to successfully enable and achieve sovereign civil capacity. The operations in Afghanistan

and Iraq continue to reflect the chasm between the synthesis and processes of State, DoD, interagency, and coalition training, planning, and execution for the dynamic task of providing competent and capable civil capacity building advice to supported nations. The practical lesson learned in Iraq following the implementation of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in January 2003 and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in April 2003 is that we must unify interagency purpose, resourcing, and implementation early in the planning phase. ORHA and CPA were both DoD organizations; hence the poorly orchestrated planning and execution efforts for post-conflict Iraq. ORHA was brought into the process two months before the Coalition attacked into Iraq and never truly integrated into the plan nor were they provided the comprehensive National Command Authority guidance, responsibility, and authority required to establish governance, security, and stability in an occupied country. Unifying authority and providing a common purpose (for unilateral and multinational efforts) will certainly increase discussion and dialogue across the participants, but it will lead to a more efficient approach to establishing and executing post-conflict operations.

Critical Aspects for Future Success

Based on the lessons learned following WWII, we must think of and approach future operations as they relate to our national security strategy in terms of maximizing unity of effort and resources over a short duration to achieve security, stability, and economic prosperity in future post-conflict operations. Critical components must address the following questions during the planning phase:

- Will we gain multinational support or will this be a unilateral operation?
- Will multinational contributions be limited in scope and degree of resourcing and commitment?
- What level of involvement will our coalition partners expect and how much influence will they have over strategic/national level decisions?
- What are the long-term impacts of unilaterally executing this mission and how will it support and affect our national security strategy and economy?

- What is the most dangerous threat, which may limit our success, and what is the scale of forces required to maintain security and stability?
- What is the endstate and will the populace of the receiving nation accept the direction toward change?
- What is the advantage of demilitarization and removing the nation's security and policing forces compared to maintaining and rebuilding their capacity aligned to the future of their country and government?
- What potential interior, exterior, and transnational threats exist and how do we deny or mitigate their success without creating the means to aid their recruitment efforts?
- What language and cultural barriers exist that we must overcome in order to gain the acceptance and support of our efforts by the populace?
- What structure must we apply to best resolve the conflict and execute post conflict operations as we partner with the nation to build its civil capacity?
- What US Departments and Agencies will participate and how do we establish unity of effort under a single leader rather than a co-led operation? Which agency is designated as the lead (or main) effort and will it have the appropriate levels of authority and responsibility delegated to it to empower the leadership during execution?
- Has the President of the US clearly articulated the endstate for the US' diplomatic and military elements and are the resources available?
- Has the US established a clear division of effort, purpose, and expectations for multinational operations?

These questions, and hundreds more, must be addressed by the appropriate agencies and staffs for future planning and operations. To develop and execute a

comprehensive strategy, flexibility must be built into the plan to allow for acceleration (sequels) or change (branches) and responsiveness among the supporting elements (partnering/coalition countries, industry, materiel delivery, economic response, and building of political support).

Divergence from Past Lessons and Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

There are few cases in which the US Armed Forces would engage in sustained large-scale combat operations without the associated need to assist in the transition to just and stable governance. Accordingly, the US Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities to create a secure environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian relief.⁵⁶

What happened in Afghanistan and Iraq? Are both operations laden with disconnected objectives (i.e., State, Defense, and USAID efforts) and an uncertain or immeasurable endstate? Is there clear direction and unity of effort among US Agencies and Departments? Are we executing reconstruction and civil capacity missions piecemeal or are they unified and driven by the desires of the affected country and culture in mind?

Operations in Afghanistan continue to seek ways to gain a foothold for democracy and justice in a culture less familiar and unaccustomed to Western forms of government and authority. Since 330 BC, Afghanistan has experienced an identity crisis in leadership, governance, and development. As a result of the country being a critical migratory route through South Asia, generations have endured a harsh and brutal existence under the occupation and governance of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, internal dynasties and empires, European influences (until their independence from the United Kingdom in 1919).⁵⁷ Afghanistan began modernizing and establishing a stable existence from 1919 through 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded in a strategic attempt to “expand communism”.⁵⁸ Diplomatically, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan was practically abandoned in terms of economic, military, and diplomatic support which provided a base of distrust in future foreign intervention and support. After ten years of bitter fighting, many of the educated and intellectual leaders departed the country creating a vacuum, which the Taliban filled. By 1998, less than four years from

the start of their rise, the Taliban attained nearly 90% control⁵⁹ over the country and established a repressive existence for the general population. As a result of the diverse governance over 20+ centuries, creating a stable and secure democracy is completely foreign to the Afghan people. In essence, we are literally starting from scratch and attempting to bring an unindustrialized and impoverished country of 28.4 million people⁶⁰ living across 34 different provinces⁶¹ with very difficult and unforgiving terrain that are set in their culture into the 21st century. Ultimately, our goal is to stabilize and create lasting security for the people of Afghanistan and prevent the reemergence of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

Building a Future Afghanistan

Culture in Afghanistan will be the biggest obstacle to success. Corruption is rampant across the country, including the military, further compounding the difficulties in establishing legitimacy in government. Desire for individuals and smaller populated areas to accept change and modernize without being affected by corruption and taxes imposed by criminal elements along market and transportation routes will continue to be difficult. Corrupt individuals and criminal elements must be dealt with by a well-founded and accepted national justice system (rule of law) capable of absolute authority that will enable modernism and future economic development and sustainability.

In Afghanistan, we're starting from scratch, as there was no existing form of functional national government. Post-conflict operations in Iraq are similar in scope to how we conducted our initial post-conflict civil capacity efforts in Germany; unfortunately, the scope of the mission and scale of forces were not included in the original planning efforts. General Franks, and his CENTCOM planning staff "assumed the DoS would have the lead for rebuilding the political institutions and infrastructure."⁶² As General Franks saw it, "the first order of business was to defeat the Republican Guard and demolish Saddam Hussein's regime, planning to secure Iraq after the regime was ousted was an issue to be dealt with later."⁶³ His direct failure was the required collaboration to ensure success when the initial objective was met. In retrospect, the defeat of Iraq's forces and removing Hussein from power were merely decisive points in the overarching first phase strategy of stabilizing Iraq—transitioning to enable civil

authorities was completely omitted from the plan—yet it became the central focus for the next seven years. The CENTCOM planners omitted the critical components of enabling security, justice, economics, and governance in support of the population to create the foundation for stability.

These are the challenges we must first understand and prepare for prior to intervening in the future. We must identify the structure (size of military and diplomatic element) that we can muster to best train and employ to help other countries in the future. We cannot, and must not, look at future intervention as we have in Iraq and Afghanistan—stove piped in separate Departments and Agencies expecting the other will handle the post-conflict operations. Our Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG), established at the Combatant Command level, are an attempt to unify elements, but a reluctance to commit or contribute elements continues to exist. Additionally, these JIACGs are not uniformly prepared, trained, or organized across the commands, which further complicate compatibility and employability.

In both cases, we have the preponderance of forces and have committed the majority of resources in manpower and materiel toward building stable countries. Since the invasion in 2003, the main effort for our nation has been in Iraq, roughly equivalent in population to that of Afghanistan. As a result, we lost the diplomatic post-conflict civil capacity initiative once gained when we purged the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2002–2003; reminiscent of the lack of support and follow-on efforts in 1989 as the Soviets withdrew. Our continual lack of strategic long-range foresight, planning, and interdepartmental and interagency integration over the last nine years of operations in Afghanistan and seven years in Iraq may be the reason we continue to have difficulty in attaining our objectives.

The effective pull out of US forces from of the cities last year was a milestone in the independence of Iraq, the next major milestone is the Iraqi imposed 31 December 2011 deadline to be out of country.⁶⁴ As a result, our ability to provide the stimulus and oversight in reconstruction will be more limited and the Iraqi's will face certain challenges as they further develop their autonomy and sovereignty. However, they will still have the challenge to reconstitute an effective military capable of defending its

borders, maintain capabilities, and serve as a deterrent to terrorism and external threats in Southwest Asia. The fact is, according to Secretary Gates, pending an Iraqi government request, it is likely tens of thousands⁶⁵ of US forces will remain in Iraq following the 2011 deadline to provide ground and air training, intelligence, and other security roles across the country to provide, enhance, and ensure stability. This is similar to our presence in Germany following its declaration of partial sovereignty on 5 May 1955—almost ten years following Germany’s surrender (full sovereignty didn’t occur until 15 March 1991 following the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Iron Curtain).

If the assumption is that we will maintain forces in Iraq in the near future, what are we doing to properly prepare for that event and will we continue building civil capacity and providing materiel and economic resources to Iraq? Given Iraq’s recent successful elections, one can ascertain we stumbled upon success rather than holistically prepared for it with a clear vision and endstate articulated from the National Command Authority.

We must approach future operations without limiting requirements as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks did in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their plan was haphazard, shortsighted, and insufficient in scope as they only focused on the kinetic fight and wished away the post-conflict challenges that resulted in years of simultaneous kinetic and non-lethal civil capacity building efforts across the country. It is evident that the urgency to “take the fight to the enemy” overrode the post conflict considerations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over eight years of conducting counterinsurgency operations while, simultaneously, coordinating and building each nation’s civil capacity has been an exhaustive challenge and drain on the monetary and military resources of the US, and to a lesser degree, other contributing coalition countries.

Creating Civil Capacity Capable Teams

Consistent with the President’s vision, the United States will...strengthen our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power...⁶⁶

Considerations and departmental and interagency consultations must be made in the planning and allocation of resources...we may not need overwhelming combat power to achieve military objectives. It is the post-conflict resources that may drive the force

and resource ratios. Developing strategic teams capable of conducting comprehensive planning inclusive of all Departments and Agencies will create efficiencies and enable unity of effort and purpose. A system which harmonizes these elements into an effective symphony of instruments would include education, successive training of individuals and teams, and through deployment in the future. To ensure we continually build upon our capabilities to successfully execute civil capacity tasks in the future, we must create and resource the structure (the orchestra) and eliminate the status quo—we have organizations within our Departments and Agencies which haven't changed in years and they continue playing to yesterday's tune and existing without a vision of adapting to what the future will certainly challenge us with again.

Education

DoD will continue to place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies.⁶⁷

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stipulates the military will specifically build the requisite skill sets to further enable leaders to conduct post-conflict civil capacity operations. However, what is being done holistically across the government with other Departments and Agencies to enable interoperability, compatibility, and synchronicity without being duplicative in our efforts with the limited resources we have available? This must be a whole of government approach rather than maintained in stovepipes across the government. The DoD “must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support” our abilities to “build the security capacity of partner states.”⁶⁸

Capacity building is an “ill-structured problem.”⁶⁹ Currently, the military continues to bear the burden of building civil capacity from the local to national levels in the months and years immediately following conflict—this hasn't changed since WWI due to the lack of requisite stability and security civilian departments and agencies need to most effectively and efficiently operate. We must establish, educate, resource, and provide a flexible and responsive structure to provide civil capacity capabilities early in the transition from combat operations to a sovereign and stable environment. Building the

competence of enabling civil capacity within our military would significantly increase tactical, operational, and strategic effectiveness. Providing the “first responder” level of competence and enabling reach back to experts in civilian departments and agencies further increases the military capabilities and the confidence the affected population will have when we are driving change through non-lethal effects. This approach will establish bonds between those executing the civil capacity tasks abroad; the civilian departments, agencies, and organizations; and the local to national affected government and populace. These bonds will further solidify as the conflict phase transitions to enable civil authorities in the affected country and US civilians increase their advisory and assistance presence abroad effectively replacing the military in this capacity.

We can certainly agree that there is no existing common structure, process, or system to comprehensively prepare Soldiers, civilians, leaders, and units for success in the myriad of challenges they potentially face during full spectrum operations at the tactical to strategic levels. Many will have their own views on how to structure the training regimen to set the condition for future success; capacity building is more of an art than a science, and success is often elusive and based on trial and error. Mapping this structurally complex problem is difficult, as is understanding the application of concepts in different cultural societies, resources, and methodologies we apply during post-conflict operations abroad. As the QDR stipulates, we must provide better education and training to enable our Soldiers, civilians, and leaders to achieve success under austere conditions now and in the future.

All too often, our military and civilian elements execute missions their predecessors previously conducted and from which they learned invaluable lessons. In essence, they apply tools gained from what they perceive through training for their mission (based on site surveys, previous experiences/deployments, and their training center experiences) and focus on specific deployment mission-essential tasks. During deployment, they again revisit the experiences and relearn the lessons of their predecessors. Everyone strives to get it “about right” in their training and education and applies their training experiences during deployment. However, these “home-grown” solutions are a compilation of valuable experiences that often remain at home or move

with the individuals to their next assignments or job. Our Combat Training Centers do a credible job in orchestrating, resourcing, and replicating many of the challenges units and leaders will experience “down range,” and, from this experience, we expect units and leaders to arrive in theater with credible skill sets and a higher degree of knowledge to enable their success in stability operations. I submit we are not doing enough training and integrating with other Departments and Agencies during these training events due to their manpower and resourcing constraints.

What Are We Missing?

US Departments and Agencies lack a holistic training strategy, knowledge base, and training construct to execute stability operations, specifically capacity building in enabling and transitioning to civil authority. Two parallel challenges exist—focusing and structuring civil capacity training for deployment; and resourcing the training at the right levels to successfully meet mission requirements.

As part of training, we must educate ourselves to effectively recognize, assess, resource, and resolve essential service, infrastructure, facility, governance, and economic processes for national to local governance and enable transition to civil authority. In future operations across the globe, we will certainly be building and executing civil capacity missions during conflict and post-conflict operations. To maintain momentum, increase efficiencies, and set the conditions for future transitions to civil authority, we must unify this training in our professional education processes across the Departments and Agencies at the national level and address and resource tactical to strategic requirements if we are to increase efficiencies and set the conditions to achieve success.

A Comprehensive Approach to Training and Education

In order to properly prepare for full spectrum operations in austere environments, we must nest training methodology and resources within leader development programs based on the availability of personnel. Clearly, the Departments and Agencies will have challenges balancing standard daily (status-quo) tasks with those that may prepare for future operations. If the civilian Departments and Agencies are under resourced, perhaps justification exists for transforming or changing structure (adding more chairs to the

orchestra) to meet the demands of the future. Serious consideration must be given to establishing expeditionary capabilities within our Departments and Agencies. If expeditionary capabilities are not created then the leadership of the US must acknowledge the DoD, specifically Soldiers, will continue as the lead agents in building civil capacity. If this is the case, then the structure and education of the military must adjust its competencies and training priorities to meet the demands of the future—we cannot continue creating ad hoc organizations and executing deliberate civil capacity operations on the fly.

Application in the Military

Specifically, in the military, we can use the three cycles of force generation (reset, train/ready, and available) to better prepare individuals, staffs, and units for future operations. However, training must balance the lethal with non-lethal tasks and include education and embedding with other Departments and Agencies. During the reset phase, we must capture and incorporate lessons learned into our training products at our centers of excellence. As individuals arrive, they can share their previous experiences and learn from the experiences of their new unit. Individuals and units in the train/ready phase can benefit from the products and inputs of units and leaders in the reset phase and previous operational experiences relevant to their objectives. Units in the available phase sustain the knowledge and skills as leaders and staffs change or rotate. Individuals and units in the train/ready phase can benefit from the products and inputs of units and leaders in the reset phase and previous operational experiences relevant to their objectives. Units in the available phase sustain the knowledge and skills as leaders and staffs change or rotate.

The Army personnel and readiness core enterprises must leverage their capabilities and resources to effect and enable a holistic education, training, and employment strategy if Soldiers are to continue building post-conflict civil capacity. This concept focuses on specific training audiences and incorporates multiple resources to reach training end states. Simply put, training and education must begin in entry-level schools and course and extend into the Generating Force through a gated training strategy if we are to effectively sustain civil capacity capabilities within our force. We must focus our training, education, and professional development on individual, collective, leader-

specific, and specialized organizational and staff tasks we commonly perform to influence the populace to continually improve our organic capabilities.

A Whole of Government Approach to Education

Institutionalizing the civil capacity education process across the US Government Departments and Agencies will further develop professional competencies for all involved and increase the capabilities of the respective organizations. Numerous policy, government, political science, law, economics, and regional studies institutes already exist and serve as the foundation for a common educational baseline. Expanding and accrediting the Center for Complex Operations, located in Washington, DC, could serve as a school within the National Defense University and provide a centralized institution for professionals within US Departments and Agencies. The individuals selected from their respective organizations could have a regional career track specifically oriented on building civil capacity in their respective fields of expertise.

Recruiting, or identifying, individuals from these disciplines and from within the military from across the country with the specified intent to broaden the overarching government capabilities will create a talent pool which can be further expanded. Initial entry individuals gain insights and experience through initial theater specific education and training followed closely by temporary duty or deployments abroad under the close supervision of more qualified and experienced leaders. Upon their return, we must capture their observations and lessons and incorporated into near-term and future instruction and training to continually refine the process. Some select individuals remain at the institution as instructors or they become fellows with partnering universities across the US and are provided the opportunity to further their education and can serve as the means to recruit future candidates.

During the educational process, individuals from separate organizations working and learning together will foster unique ties that will transcend Departments and Agencies and create strong alliances, bonds, and ties that will further enable success in future operations.

A Whole of Government Approach to Training

During periods of little US commitment or presence, individuals can continually train and prepare for future conflict and how the capabilities they and their organizations may be able to provide. Military units constantly prepare to fight and win our nation's wars through tough, intensive, and realistic training. Unfortunately, this often does not include other US Departments and Agencies due to lack of human resources and/or time and operational employment and success often suffers as a result of this lack of integration and unity of effort. Prior to deployment, Army Divisions and Corps size units conduct certification-training events with the Battle Command Training Program or the Joint Warfighting Center respectively. Brigades and below culminate their training at one of the Combat Training Centers and, to my knowledge, have never had their counterpart Provincial Reconstruction Team participate in any rotation—they're all replicated to the benefit of the military unit rather than from a holistic training perspective. Often, individual civilians who will augment the military unit(s) do participate, although to a limited degree, in the exercises. This trend of selective participation in preparing for deployment must end if we are to effectively prepare ourselves for success.

The bonds that form between civilian and military individuals and organizations during education and training will certainly benefit the planning and execution of missions while deployed. We can significantly improve the efficiencies of our success in operations abroad if we focus efforts on improving our training, intellect, and the resources made available prior to and during deployment. A resourced and comprehensive civil capacity training strategy, flexible enough to remain relevant in today's operating environment, can increase efficiencies and provide the unity of effort leaders across our Government seek.

Closing the Chasm

In order to successfully execute in accordance with NSPD-44 and DODD 3000.05 and *close the chasm*, we must synchronize the military and civilian agencies to effectively plan and train to build and/or enable civil capacity from the onset of future strategic planning and operations in a unified effort. This is a mission set we can expect

to execute in the future and we must establish solutions now if we are to be relevant and effective later. We must first acknowledge and build upon the lessons learned from past operations from World War II, beyond the present, and into the future of conflict and asymmetric or hybrid operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Second, we have to prepare for the future by building and training national-level leadership and the requisite Post-Conflict Strategic Teams (PCSTs) consisting of Defense, State, other governmental agencies (OGAs), and partner with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to enable effective planning to ensure manpower and materiel resources are postured for successful transition to post-conflict operations, Phase IV (Stabilize)⁷⁰, where forces focus on establishing security and restoring essential services. Third, in order to properly plan for future operations, we must understand the context of the operation. Specifically, the social environment (e.g. the people, their culture, internal and external influencing factors), the existing capacity to govern, provide and sustain services and security, economic capacity and trade, and the dynamics of change sought by the intervening element(s) or government(s) to establish resourcing and operational agreements to Enable Civil Authority (or Phase V)⁷¹. Fourth, we must establish PCSTs and outline the design and contextual framework of the strategic operation and the leadership must be at the level of authority to effectively unify military and civilian agencies. We must assemble, train, and integrate this element with the same intensity we train and integrate combat, combat support, and combat service support forces for the Major Combat Operations (MCOs) as an equally important element in Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). Lastly, we must execute with the fullest support of all elements of national power to achieve success as we “work ourselves out of a job” and transition to enable civil authority in a stable and sovereign country.

In essence, we (through the combined and unified efforts of the State and DoDs and other agencies) have the direct responsibility to effect this holistic approach to closing this chasm that currently exists by fully integrating all elements of national power in a coordinated manner, continue to authoritatively set the global example or lead the efforts in stabilizing failed or failing states, create or foster international support to building civil capacity, and increase the effectiveness of our national security efforts

abroad. The acceptance and implementation of the policies that would enable these successes to occur are the responsibilities of our national leadership as they answer to the people here in the US. The obvious chasm that exists between the military and civilian professional elements is what must be closed through existing systems to enable future success. If existing education and training facilities, manpower, and fiscal budget will not change, we must accomplish this task with on hand resources and, perhaps, transform our structure and non-lethal capabilities.

Concluding Remarks

The US has expended over “\$944 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).”⁷² Can we continue to afford this in light of our current economic situation?

Educating, training, and inculcating successes from our past into future operations will directly, and positively, impact through efficiencies gained and not repeating mistakes of the past. Are we forward thinking enough to close this chasm or will we continually create ad hoc organizations, waste resources, generate organizational friction, and not work under unified command/leadership because we are too focused on economy of force?

Are we seeing a change in operational and strategic trends for future worldwide employment of American diplomacy? If so even remotely, we must consider numerous factors as we plan, execute, and terminate conflict. Future assessments, education, training, and the earliest stages of planning, must integrate the factors of:

- Environment (security and criminal threats, type(s) of combatants, sociopolitical, cultural, and religious boundaries/fault lines, infrastructure capacity, government capacity, external influencing elements or nations, cost benefits of infrastructure reconstruction vs. essential services, and governance).

- Security (internal and external influence, the threat's composition and capabilities, the threat's socio/political objectives and their associated timeline, methods the threat(s) will use to influence the populace, government, security forces, intervening forces, or stability forces; and how the population's and potential threat element's needs can be met without force through governmental action).
- Governance (civil capacity to meet the people's needs, structure, acceptance by the population, health, education, effectiveness, transparency, ability to form and implement the rule of law, and provide justice for the good of the people).
- Economics (ability of the country to meet the basic essential needs of the people, capacity for import/export, local and national level economic structure, industry capacity, currency, inflation).
- Essential Services (status of infrastructure and its shortcomings, power, water, sewer, waste management).

We must be revolutionary in the development of future organizations best suited to meet the demands and needs of future operations. Applying lessons learned, effectively integrating all facets of the US Government, and establishing an inclusive education and training platform will positively affect our efficiencies and capabilities in the future.

Departing Q&A

Question

Are we prepared to execute post-conflict civil capacity operations with fewer resources, in less time, and with more efficiency than our recent past? If it is deemed critical to our National Security interests, what will it take to stabilize the ethnic and economic strife and restructuring of the governance and infrastructure in the Congo, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Burma, or North Korea?

Answer

We can increase interdepartmental and interagency efficiencies and capabilities if we restructure our resources, train, and plan to meet the dynamic demands of the future and close the chasm that exists today

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ENDNOTES:

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⁵⁴ President Bush quoted on Wednesday, November 20, 2002 and posted: 6:13 PM EST (2313 GMT) on CNN.com, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/>, "However, should he choose not to disarm, the United States will lead a **coalition of the willing** to disarm him and at that point in time, all our nations ... will be able choose whether or not they want to participate." (accessed on September 30, 2009)

⁵⁵ *General: Iraq troop pullout on schedule after vote*, USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2010-03-08-election-results_N.htm, (accessed 8 March 2010).

⁵⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 1 February 2010, p. 20.

⁵⁷ US Department of State, Background Note: Afghanistan, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>, (accessed 14 January 2010).

⁵⁸ This point is arguable, as I have found little evidence of true Soviet intentions in my research, most of it is speculative.

⁵⁹ US Department of State, Background Note: Afghanistan, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>, (accessed 14 January 2010).

⁶⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>, (accessed 14 January 2010).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, (New York: Pantheon Books 2006), pp. 67–68.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 28.

⁶⁴ Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, Article 24, Withdrawal of the United States Forces from Iraq, p. 20, (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf, (accessed 14 January 2010).

⁶⁵ Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, Talks about residual forces in Iraq after 2011, interviewed by Charlie Rose, *Current Affairs*, 17 December 2008, <http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9871>, (accessed 15 Dec 2009) .

⁶⁶ QDR, p. iv.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. x.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 2.

⁶⁹ US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5-500, The US Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, ver. 1.0 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO]), 28 January 2008.

⁷⁰ JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Chapter IV, Planning, Operational Art and Design, and Assessment, page IV–29.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Amy Belasco, Specialist in US Defense Policy and Budget, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, 28 September 2009.

