Centralized Execution, Decentralized Chaos: How the Air Force Is Poised to Lose a Cyber War
Abstract
In the current state of cyber warfare, massive centralized networks are at best fragile and often indefensible. The Air Force's network operations (AFNETOPS) paradigm relies on centralized control of the service's cyberspace; although arguably adequate for maintenance and counterintelligence in "cyber peacetime," it could fail spectacularly if ever tested by a serious cyber attack. At present, the Air Force relies on a handful of units from the 67th Network Warfare Wing (67 NWW) to handle most aspects of network defense. Primarily brought on by reductions in manpower, this consolidation also came about because of the perceived benefits accrued from establishing unity of command across Air Force cyberspace as well as reducing time-consuming training on network attack and defense tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, in seeking unity of command, the Air Force has almost completely abandoned decentralized execution, leaving its cyberspace vulnerable to a variety of attacks that could isolate base networks from the central network units. Compounding this problem is the fact that most Airmen remain unaware of these vulnerabilities, blindly assuming that enemy cyber attacks will never affect their own mission area. The current AFNETOPS paradigm must give way to a more effective model of network defense. Specifically, the service should take two steps to mitigate the risks of network failure and cross-domain mission failure: (1) cyber operators at the base level must be capable of running their networks and responding to attacks independently of higher-level network units, and (2) Air Force wings need to conduct exercises in which they operate under network isolation, degradation, and outage scenarios.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA544693
Entities
People
- John Cobb
Organizations
- Air and Space Power Journal