An Evaluation of Counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War
Abstract
The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Leadership is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Leadership has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a militarily, economic, or political perspective. Counterinsurgency is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through which the U.S. may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. However, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. It is less likely the U.S. will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or incompetent through engaging in counterterrorism, support to insurgency, or antiterrorism, compared to counterinsurgency. An overall strategy combining counterterrorism and antiterrorism is the best means of employing military forces to counter violent extremism.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 20, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA545049
Entities
People
- Baucum Fulk
Organizations
- The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy