

Coalition Warfare: The leadership challenges

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

COALITION WARFARE: THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES by Colonel Mark J. Thornhill, British Army, 42 pages.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased willingness for countries to engage in coalition operations for peacekeeping, peace enforcement and resolving regional conflict. Coalition operations have increasingly become the primary focus of military activity and consequently nations have displayed an increased willingness to join coalitions of the willing on an ad hoc basis as a means of delivering their foreign and security policy. Since Vietnam, the American elite has been increasingly aware of the dangers of going it alone in military affairs and the legitimacy of its military operations overseas has become more dependent on persuading other states to join the U.S. as coalition partners. Indeed, for the U.S. coalition warfare is increasingly seen as the future of war. Coalition objectives will often be more focused on political than military objectives. The very existence of the coalition may become the imperative.

This monograph highlights that effective senior military leadership in coalition operations demands a range of leadership skills that differ from those required when operating within a unilateral military environment where the commander is working to a unified civilian and military leadership. This examination of coalition operations and the attributes required by a successful senior coalition commander will be extremely valuable for future commanders as they prepare to operate in a multinational or coalition environment.

In order to determine the leadership attributes of the successful coalition commander at the strategic and operational levels this monograph analyzes coalition operations. A definition of coalition operations is provided and a comparison is made between coalitions and alliances. The monograph determines the characteristics of coalition operations, looking specifically at the political and military nature of these operations. This monograph shows that coalition commanders face a series of challenges that are wide ranging in nature.

This monograph determines that leading a coalition operation successfully demands a range of skills that are more consultative than they are direct in their approach. The effective commander will listen attentively to his coalition partners and will have a keen appreciation of their military capabilities as well as an understanding of their domestic political interests and motivations for being in the coalition. The capable coalition commander will be able to make decisions based on judgments about a wide range of competing priorities, not only those concerning his own nation, but also from those of the contributing nations. He will determine clear objectives that are in line with the political intent of the various nations within the coalition, and will ensure these are well understood by all participants. When necessary he will accept a degree of compromise to achieve the objective, but will ensure he does not compromise on the objective to achieve the victory. The effective commander will maintain a sharp focus on the central aim of the coalition and will work tirelessly to ensure the cohesion of the coalition is preserved.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Coalitions.....	2
Coalitions Defined.....	3
Why Coalitions?	4
Coalitions as Tools of the Politicians	10
A Partnership of Equals or a Partnership of Unequals	12
Coalitions and Alliances – Marked Differences or Certain Similarities	13
The Challenges of Coalition Command	17
Command in War	19
Achieving Unity of Command in a Coalition.....	21
Maintaining Cohesion in a Coalition.....	23
Delivering Effective Command in a Coalition	27
The Effective Coalition Commander.....	29
The Desired Attributes of an Effective Coalition Commander	30
Human Factors in Coalition Command	32
Conclusion.....	36
BIBLIOGRAPHY	39

Introduction

“Coalition operations have made a tremendous impact upon world history over the past century and we ignore them at our peril, however difficult they are to understand.”¹

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased willingness for countries to engage in coalition operations for peacekeeping, peace enforcement and resolving regional conflict.² Coalition operations have increasingly become the primary focus of military activity and consequently nations have displayed an increased willingness to join coalitions of the willing on an ad hoc basis as a means of delivering their foreign and security policy. Since Vietnam, the American elite has been increasingly aware of the dangers of going it alone in military affairs and the legitimacy of its military operations overseas has become more dependent on persuading other states to join the U.S. as coalition partners. Indeed, for the U.S. coalition warfare is increasingly seen as the future of war.³

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are two high profile examples where nations have come together in large military coalitions to deliver policy objectives through the decisive use of military force. Coalitions are not easily characterized and while each will have similarities, they also have their “own particulars rooted in the nature of the power relationship among the allies, the ideological givens of the countries involved, and the beliefs of the individuals who form the coalition and make it function.”⁴

¹ Keith Neilson and Roy Prete (eds), *Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord*, (Ontario: Wilfred Laurier, 1983), xii.

² Report of a French-German-UK-U.S. Working Group, *Coalition Military Operations, The Way Ahead Through Cooperability*, (Arlington: U.S.-Center for Research & Education on Strategy and Technology, 2000), xv.

³ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 205.

⁴ Neilson and Prete, xii.

This monograph seeks to highlight that effective senior military leadership in coalition operations demands a range of leadership skills that differ from those required when operating within a unilateral military environment where the commander is working to a unified civilian and military leadership. An examination of coalition operations and the attributes required by a successful senior coalition commander will prove extremely valuable for future commanders as they prepare to operate in a multinational or coalition environment.

Coalition objectives will often be more focused on political than military objectives. The very existence of the coalition may become the imperative. To achieve coalition objectives the effective senior military commander may have to exercise leadership skills that would not be appropriate were he in a military force comprised solely from his own nation.

Coalitions

“All coalitions are unusual, but some coalitions are more unusual than others.”⁵

In order to determine the leadership attributes of the successful coalition commander at the strategic and operational levels it will first be necessary to conduct an analysis of coalition operations. This analysis of a number of historical cases shows that coalition operations are a “phenomenon easily observed but awkwardly characterized.”⁶ Coalitions are increasingly favored, over unilateral action, by nations facing the prospect of undertaking military action to deliver political objectives; a coalition serves to share the risks as well as spread the burdens among the participating nations. The existence of the coalition will deliver a form of legitimacy within the international community which will enable the coalition and its participants to undertake certain operations that a single nation could not or would not conduct unilaterally.⁷

⁵ Neilson and Prete, x.

⁶ Neilson and Prete, xii.

⁷ American, Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (Edition 5)*, (ABCA Nations, September 2010), viii.

This analysis of coalition operations will provide a definition, whilst also comparing and contrasting coalitions with alliances. The characteristics of a coalition operation will be determined, looking specifically at the political and military nature of these operations. This section will also determine why coalitions come together and what they look like.

Coalitions Defined

There is no one definition that can be usefully used to characterize all coalitions however, in U.S. and U.K. doctrine, a coalition is defined as “an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”⁸ This rather bland definition tends to mask many of the complexities of operating within a coalition. Others have defined it, with more detail, as “a grouping of like-minded states that agree on the need for joint action on a specific problem at a particular time with no commitment to a durable relationship.”⁹ This detailed definition provides a more useful description as it explicitly states the need for action in response to a specific situation, whilst critically noting the absence of a long term relationship.

Coalitions will range in size and scope and consist of a variety of different forces with differing command and control arrangements. Examples include the use of the predominantly NATO led coalition deployed against the Serbs in the Kosovo conflict or the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), which was an Australian led taskforce of twenty two nations created to address the humanitarian and security crisis in East Timor from 1999 to 2000. Another example would be the broad grouping of in excess of 170 nations that has come together under

⁸ United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 2)*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 2010), GL-8 and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 (Edition 7)*, (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, June 2006), C-9.

⁹ Andrew Pierre, *Coalitions: Building and Maintenance*, (Washington, D.C.: The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2002), 2.

U.S. leadership to fight the global war on terrorism.¹⁰ Other coalitions, such as that brought together by Britain and its European allies to oppose Napoleon, may be organized during conflict for the explicit task of defeating one aggressor. The British and European coalition of 1813-14 can be considered the first modern coalition, enabling the uniting of nations that had previously been enemies to overcome the seemingly indomitable Napoleon¹¹.

As coalitions come together to counter specific circumstances they are, by their nature, ad hoc. As soon as the threat that led to the coalition has been eradicated the need for that coalition also passes.¹² Coalitions are therefore, by their very character, transitory and, unlike alliances, have no permanent standing structures. Coalitions are dependent upon extemporized command and control arrangements for the duration of the operation. These unplanned and spontaneous command arrangements can lead to friction and ineffective leadership. Given these disadvantages it is important to consider why nations would choose to undertake operations within a coalition.

Why Coalitions?

Unilateral full spectrum operations in the joint arena are complex enough so why would nations wish to enter into coalitions that introduce the added dimensions and complexities of two or more national armed forces, all of which bring their own distinct approaches to the practice of warfare?¹³ Coalitions are complex beings that involve multiple interactions between political and military leaders of different nations across the full spectrum of operations from the grand strategic level to the tactical level of war. The Second World War and the coalition created between Britain, its dominions and America offers a clear example of the difficulties of working closely

¹⁰ Pierre, 14.

¹¹ Jonathan Riley, "The Partnership of Unequals: A Short Discussion on Coalition War," *Defence Studies* (Autumn 2002): 105.

¹² Robert Scales, "Trust, Not Technology Sustains Coalitions," *Parameters* (Winter 1998-99): 5.

¹³ Robert RisCassi, "Principles for Coalition Warfare," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1993): 59.

with other nations. Whilst the Grand Alliance created in response to the overwhelming Nazi threat is oft referred to as the greatest coalition ever created, with integrated political and military leadership, there is considerable evidence to show that the leaders from all sides experienced significant difficulties while working with partners in the coalition.¹⁴ On the surface, at least, coalitions appear to present intractable problems whilst compounding the challenges faced by the political and military leaders. Despite this, and by working through the leadership challenges presented, there are some substantial rewards achieved by nations that do agree to participate in a coalition.

There are essentially two significant advantages for creating a coalition in response to a military threat. These can be distilled into those that provide military advantage and those that provide political benefits. In previous centuries the need to gain military advantage by joining forces in coalitions was a fundamental consideration and it was certainly what motivated the Europeans to come together against Napoleon Bonaparte in 1813. Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary of the day wrote to Lord Cathcart, British Ambassador to Russia, stating “whatever scheme of policy can most immediately combine the greatest number of powers and greatest military force against France, so as to produce the utmost effect against her...is what we must desire to promote.”¹⁵ Coalitions were often viewed as an effective force multiplier to be employed against a dominant enemy thereby providing additional forces and potentially more space with which to strike the enemy. It also served to spread the risks should the operation fail.

In the present era the military benefits of acting within the framework of a coalition are significant for the smaller, less powerful nations. It allows for the sharing of the military and political risks, which in many cases will be weighty factors for consideration by smaller nations,

¹⁴ Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), Chapter 6.

¹⁵ Viscount Castlereagh, *Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, (London: William Shoberl, 1851), 304.

as well as an ability to share access to costly military capabilities. In its most recent Strategic Defence and Security Review the British government stated its clear intent to use coalitions as a fundamental part of the nation's approach to defense and security. This allows the United Kingdom to share the burden of securing stability and "ensures that collective resources can go further."¹⁶

A good example of how the current British government expects to use coalitions to share risk and access military capability is the coalition created in March 2011 between Britain, the U.S., France and some Arab countries to enforce the United Nations no fly zone over Libya. France and Britain, two smaller, less capable nations, led the political effort to achieve a United Nations resolution on a no fly zone. Concurrently these nations formed a military coalition with a far more powerful nation (the U.S.) to provide access to a host of essential capabilities to ensure military success was assured.

The ability to be flexible and create command structures that are suited to a specific coalition and its members can also be of significant value, as was the case in the First Gulf War where General Schwarzkopf used a hybrid lead nation and parallel command structure designed and implemented by General Yeosock, Commander of Third Army. Recognizing that he could not afford to overtly dominate Saudi Arabia, the host nation, General Yeosock established the Coalition Coordination and Communications Integration Center (C3IC) which acted as a conduit for orders to coalition members. This C3IC was under the authority of the Joint Military Committee which, from December 1990, was co-chaired by General Schwarzkopf with General Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This ad hoc and improvised structure achieved "unity of effort between the Saudi and American militaries while maintaining the independence of both."¹⁷ General

¹⁶ United Kingdom Government, *The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, (London: HM Government Stationary Office, 2010), 2.10.

¹⁷ Richard Swain, "*LuckyWar*", *Third Army in Desert Storm*, (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997), 55.

Yeosock had used his previous knowledge of the Saudi military at the same time as rapidly exploiting the emerging situation to create a bespoke command and control arrangement that suited all participants.

In many recent coalitions the strictly military need for assembling large and multifarious coalitions has not been apparent, and certainly not for the most powerful nation in the world. The coalition created to oust Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait in 1990-91 was, to a degree, a symbolic partnership and "fitting [other countries] in, with their very disparate capabilities, was not an easy task and was viewed by some U.S. officers as a necessary evil, contributing little to actual military effectiveness."¹⁸ However as already stated it was clear to the politicians that a coalition had to be the favored approach as it would provide a degree of legitimacy not otherwise possible, as well as access to a number of bases that would make the liberation of Kuwait militarily far less demanding.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the U.S political and military leadership struggled with the concept of creating a coalition to help in the effort to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. This is aptly illustrated by the discussions of the principals of the National Security Council at a meeting on September 30, 2001. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, was putting pressure on the defense chiefs to incorporate into the military plans those nations that had offered to be part of the coalition for operations in Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not want forces included for cosmetic purposes, but General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, showing a sound grasp of the need for an inclusive coalition, declared "we're going to try to be forward leaning. We understand it's a political issue."¹⁹ Unusually the politician was against the need to create a coalition as he recognized the military disadvantages of operating

¹⁸ Pierre, 23.

¹⁹ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 180.

with other nations, whilst the military leader had quickly identified the political advantages of bringing a number of nations alongside.

Many coalitions have existed over the centuries and each has existed for different reasons however there appear to be some sound reasons why coalitions may be preferred by the political leaders of each nation. The one constant in every coalition is that the participants have become involved in order to serve their own national interests. “In a system of power politics the chief duty of each government is regarded as being to preserve the interests of the people it rules and represents against the competing interests of other peoples.”²⁰

Some interests will be clear for all to see, for example the need to remove the overwhelming threat presented by an adversary such as Nazi Germany in 1939 which led to the creation of probably the greatest coalition of all time, the Grand Alliance between Britain, her dominions and the United States. Britain and America clearly shared the common interest of defeating the Axis, however they were each driven by their desire to advance their own national interests within the framework of the Grand Alliance. There was much discussion within the political and military leadership of the U.S. and Britain over the merits of launching the U.S. favored Operation Anvil, the invasion of southern France, versus the British option of expanding operations in the eastern Mediterranean. During one such discussion in Washington, U.S. Secretary of War Simpson declared that following the British proposal would be “another diversion in the interests of the British Empire and contrary to our American interests.”²¹ In joining a coalition, political leaders will have to recognize that each nation has joined for its own interests and in order to succeed there will have to be a careful balancing of the different national requirements by the politicians throughout the operation.

²⁰ Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, (London: Continuum, 2002), 95.

²¹ Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 172.

Others reasons for joining a coalition might be less clear, for example leaders of some nations may determine that their status confers some sort of responsibility on them to participate in a coalition and guarantee a seat at the table post conflict. The Japanese and German governments felt compelled to offer sizeable financial contributions in support of the coalition against Saddam Hussein in 1991, in part due to their inability to provide military forces thanks to the legacy of the Second World War²², but also in part due to the need, as large and economically powerful nations, to be seen to be playing their part in countering the threat presented by Saddam Hussein. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated the cost to the U.S. at \$61 billion, with \$54 billion being offset by contributions from other members in the Coalition. Two-thirds of the \$54 billion was provided by the Gulf States (\$36 billion) with the remaining one-third was mostly provided by Japan and Germany (\$16 billion).²³

By playing a part in a coalition, a nation might also be serving some longer term national interest to improve the prospects for that country in other areas, including trade agreements or defense alliances. Uzbekistan, for example, demanded membership of NATO and preferential loan agreements from the U.S. in exchange for providing access and basing rights for U.S. combat search and rescue forces in support of operations in Afghanistan in late 2001. Uzbekistan had poor relations with its neighbors Russia and the country wanted to exploit the situation to its own ends as well as wanting “bragging rights that they [Uzbekistan] were permanent friends of the United States.”²⁴ These political factors of why nations choose to use coalitions make it important to consider in further detail how coalitions are used by politicians.

²² As a result of the Second World War both Japan and Germany had constitutions imposed on them that prevented them from undertaking military action except in the most specific of cases. This was largely restricted to self-defense and the coalition action to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait did not constitute self defense.

²³ US Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, The Final Report to the US Congress* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1992), Appendix P.

²⁴ Woodward, 172-173.

Coalitions as Tools of the Politicians

Coalitions are agreements between nation states to take action to address a specific situation and although coalitions are often regarded as tools of military action it is critical to note that coalitions are first and foremost political instruments.²⁵ Clausewitz provides a useful reminder that “the political object [is] the original motive for the war” and without a common political goal for the coalition there will be little chance for a coordinated and effective military response to address the political needs of the participating nations.²⁶ Coalition warfare is “simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”²⁷ The real challenge in coalition warfare is that the political leaders from the different nations must ensure their political objectives are aligned in order to provide clarity to the military leaders. The BBC, whilst covering the French, British and American coalition created in March 2011 to enforce the no fly zone over Libya, considered the overall strategic purpose of the coalition and asked “how far are the coalition forces willing to go? They will have carefully drafted rules of engagement but the question is really political and not military.”²⁸ In unilateral operations the political leaders will usually find it far easier to achieve unanimity on the action required and the strategic end state. It is the political leaders, and not the military commanders, who create the coalitions and map out the political objectives for the multinational force.

The creation of the coalition for the First Gulf War illustrates this point. By chance the day after the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1990, President Bush and Prime Minister Thatcher were both attending a conference in Colorado. Together they quickly determined that the

²⁵ Pierre, 2.

²⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), (New Jersey: Princetown Press, 1989), 81.

²⁷ Clausewitz, 605.

²⁸ Jonathan Marcus, “Tripoli Blast As Coalition Action Goes On,” *BBC*, March 20, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12799620> (accessed March 20, 2011).

aggression of Saddam Hussein must not go unchallenged. Whilst still in Colorado, and only forty eight hours after the Iraqi invasion, “Bush and Thatcher agreed in principle on a strategy of assembling a broad coalition to reverse the occupation of Kuwait.”²⁹

As this example illustrates coalitions are created to meet the needs of the politicians and so it is that political necessity will continue to have a significant impact even after the coalition is established. Coalitions, which are created for a number of reasons, are likely to face constantly changing membership as the nature and goals of the coalition shift or as coalition members take account of the changing operational situation or altered domestic factors. An example of a shifting coalition is the U.S. led coalition in Iraq. Many changes occurred within the coalition, including the departure of the Spanish military contingent in the summer of 2004. With only two months’ notice the Spanish government ordered the withdrawal of its troops following its close fought general election, the outcome of which had been significantly influenced by the devastating Madrid terrorist attacks which left 201 killed and over one thousand wounded³⁰. The departure of this relatively small contingent of 1,300 Spanish troops had little operational impact given they made up just 0.8% of the overall force³¹. The political impact was, however, much more severe as detractors were able to highlight potential fractions within the coalition that could then be exploited by those who did not support the military action in Iraq or by those fighting in Iraq against the coalition.

Nations will enter into a coalition with an understanding of what they expect to achieve as a result of that undertaking, however the politicians in each nation will hold different views on what it is they expect to achieve. The political leaders will also have to determine the leadership

²⁹ Pierre, 20.

³⁰ Simon Jeffrey, “New Spanish PM promises Iraq withdrawal,” *The Guardian*, March 15, 2004.

³¹ In the summer of 2004 there were 157,450 coalition troops in Iraq, of which 135,000 were from the U.S..

structures, both military and political, that will exist for the coalition. Leadership of a coalition, unlike in an alliance, is unlikely to be shared on an equal basis.

A Partnership of Equals or a Partnership of Unequals

“The basis of a...coalition is an agreement between two or more sovereign states to subordinate their separate interests to a single purpose.”³² It has already been determined that coalitions are usually ad hoc affairs, generated specifically to engage in combat, with one or two powerful members.³³ Each sovereign state will make its own contribution to the coalition based upon a series of factors such as its own objectives, political willingness to participate and availability of capable forces. Some states will, not surprisingly carry greater influence within the coalition and this influence will be driven by a series of factors including the level of political commitment as well as the size and capability of the military contribution. In some coalitions it will be the strongest partner that determines the objectives, with “the weak accepting what they have to accept.”³⁴ The power in coalition warfare usually lies with the strongest participant and the effectiveness of the coalition will be determined by that member.³⁵ A review of recent coalitions, where the U.S. took the leading role, illustrates this point. Examples include the operation to prevent the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the coalition that undertook the relatively short fight to remove the Taliban government from power in Afghanistan post 9/11.

The U.S. led liberation of Kuwait in the First Gulf War is a classic example of one such coalition. With no notice the U.S. created a coalition of up to thirty six nations willing to take action to challenge Saddam Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait which was widely seen as a flagrant

³² Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna, A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1946), 51.

³³ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 214.

³⁴ Rex Warner, *Thucydides: A History of the Peloponnesian War*, (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1972), 402.

³⁵ Riley, 113.

disregard of international law. In creating this coalition it was clear that the U.S. would provide the required leadership to ensure success for this massive undertaking.

President Bush was clear on the necessity for strong leadership when he spoke to his National Security Council on October 31, 2001, about creating the coalition for Afghanistan, saying; “you hold a coalition together by strong leadership and that’s what we intend to provide.”³⁶ Napoleon’s First Empire coalition, which consisted largely of unwilling partners and delivered a number of victories for the French between 1805 and 1807, offers an alternative example of a coalition led by the dominant member, where all participants followed French leadership. Hitler’s coalition of Axis Powers in the Second World War provides another example of dominant leadership in a coalition. Having considered the leadership of coalitions it is now necessary to undertake a short review of the similarities and differences between alliances and coalitions.

Coalitions and Alliances – Marked Differences or Certain Similarities

When conducting an analysis of coalitions it is important to understand that there are marked differences between alliances and coalitions. Both U.S. and U.K. doctrine define alliances as “the relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.”³⁷ Professor Glenn Snyder, political scientist and alliance specialist, defines alliances more specifically as “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”³⁸ Both definitions are valid,

³⁶ Woodward, 281.

³⁷ *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 2)*, GL-5 and *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 (Edition 7)*, A-17.

³⁸ Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

however the academic assertion that military force is involved given pre-stated conditions is an important distinction between alliances and coalitions.

Whilst coalitions are ad-hoc and created rapidly, alliances are most likely to have been forged in peacetime and are long term in nature, usually with equality among members. NATO is an example of one such long term enduring alliance. Alliances are formed in anticipation of events or as a counter to a threat and provide collective security, whilst coalitions, such as that created for the First Gulf War, are specifically created to undertake military action usually with little time for preparation or training. Alliances, such as the Warsaw Pact Military Alliance, are likely to form part of an overarching national security policy for each member nation and will be designed to deliver a level of confidence that the nation is able to counter external threat. “An alliance agreement usually is a treaty and thus partakes of all the bindingness and solemnity that international law accords all treaties.”³⁹

As well as creating binding legal commitments the treaty will also establish a moral responsibility which will serve to enhance the sense of shared responsibility and reciprocity between the parties. This sense of shared responsibility has certainly been a key factor in the development of NATO since the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and may have been a contributory factor in the collective action taken against Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo.

As Professor Snyder asserts in his definition, alliances are likely to tie the members to collective action on the basis of certain events. The signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 declare, in Article 5, that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and...they agree that...each of them...will take...action..., including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the

³⁹ Snyder, 350.

North Atlantic area.”⁴⁰ These obligations will not exist in informal and hastily created coalitions which will have come together in response to a specific threat or action. There is considerable flexibility in having no pre-determined criteria for action and this makes coalitions extremely favorable in some operations.

Alliances, like NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)⁴¹, are liable to have permanent political and military command structures to support these mutual obligations. As part of these military command structures they will also have well developed strategies and plans supported by assigned forces provided by the alliance members. These forces will have trained together, maybe within the framework of a common doctrine, and in so doing will have developed high levels of mutual understanding. For example, CSTO holds yearly military command exercises to enable nations to improve cooperation and integration. In 2008 CSTO conducted training in Armenia, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, with 4,000 troops from all 7 constituent CSTO member countries. The main aim of the exercise was to improve the collective security element of the CSTO partnership.⁴²

As already stated alliances will usually involve decision making based on equal rights for all members regardless of their level of involvement in the alliance. This can, however, lead to desperately slow “decision-making, the acceptance of the lowest common denominator, and, in NATO, the ridiculous situation whereby in a war, action by the USA could be vetoed by a small

⁴⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, “Article 5,” NATO Website.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed February 9, 2011).

⁴¹ CSTO is a collective military alliance between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan formed in 1992. Uzbekistan joined in 2006. The member states have committed to not joining other military alliances or other groups of states, and have agreed that aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all.

⁴² Rubezh 2008: The First Large-Scale CSTO Military Exercise, Partnership for Peace website.
<http://www.pims.org/news/2008/08/06/rubezh-2008-the-first-large-scale-csto-military-exercise> (accessed March 20, 2011).

nation which was not sharing the risks and dangers nor bearing any of the costs.”⁴³ Political deliberations and differences of national opinion during the Kosovo war proved hugely frustrating for the U.S. leadership. With the greatest proportion of aircraft and precision ordnance as well as the highest sortie rates, the American military leadership was concerned that the U.S. high precision equipment would be rendered ineffectual by the political and moral hesitations of ‘nineteen allies running a war by committee’.⁴⁴ They felt, as their nation was providing the largest contribution to the air war, that they should have had a greater control over the conduct of operations.⁴⁵

This negative experience in the Kosovo operation greatly influenced the U.S. willingness to enter into coalitions in the future, and resulted in the reticent approach of President George W. Bush in creating a coalition to conduct the initial operations in Afghanistan post 9/11.⁴⁶ In an unprecedented show of unity NATO had invoked Article 5 shortly after the attacks, thereby paving the way for multilateral action, yet in the early days, much to the frustration of the Europeans, the U.S. showed little interest in exploiting the integrated military machinery of NATO. “They [the U.S.] wanted support from the rest of the world, but they did not want...to tie their hands.”⁴⁷ However, after much international political criticism of American unilateralism, and a growing recognition that America had more to gain on the world stage by creating an inclusive coalition, allied contributions were allowed to increase substantially. NATO gradually took a much larger role in Afghanistan.

⁴³ Riley, 110.

⁴⁴ Anthony Cordesman, *The Lessons and Non Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Revised 2000), 36-38.

⁴⁵ Ignatieff, 92.

⁴⁶ Woodward, 322.

⁴⁷ Woodward, 48.

It can be seen, therefore, that there are marked differences between coalitions, formed quickly and in an ad hoc manner for urgent action, and alliances which have a conditional rather than an immediate purpose, based on recognized obligations in the form of treaties. Alliances are formed to “deal with a specified event that may or may not happen at any time during their life, rather than a situation that is already occurring.”⁴⁸ Alliances can be said to provide collective security on an enduring basis, whilst coalitions are very much short term and less predictive in nature. It would not have been possible to forecast on August 1st, 1990 that only 13 days later negotiations would be underway to create a coalition of over thirty nations to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Equally, it would not have been possible to predict in February 2011 that only one month later at least three nations would have formed into a coalition to take military action against Libya to enforce a no fly zone.

The Challenges of Coalition Command

“The first task of a commander in combined operations must be to establish complete harmony with and between the various personalities of the senior commanders of the services of the various nations under command.”⁴⁹

Having provided some context on the nature of coalitions, in the previous section, as well as a consideration of the issues involved with embarking on coalitions operations, this monograph will now examine the specific challenges faced by individuals when operating in command of a coalition. This section will offer a definition of command in unilateral operations, from the U.S. and British perspectives, in order to act as a benchmark to assist the review of command of multinational coalition operations. This section will look at various command systems and discern the challenges that face the coalition commander, looking at how the good commander overcomes the organizational constraints and how he manages the often divergent political

⁴⁸ Snyder, 16.

⁴⁹ Jacob L. Devers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations,” *Military Review* (January-February 1997): 157.

objectives of each participant in order to achieve the desired end state. “Coalition commanders often head a symbolic presence as well as a physical force. However the greatest operational challenge is often internal – maintaining intracoalition unity.”⁵⁰ Consequently this section will also consider the specific challenges faced by the coalition commander when delivering unity of command in his organization whilst also maintaining cohesion.

General Wesley Clark quickly discovered the challenges of coalition command when he commanded Operation Allied Force in 1999, the NATO led coalition campaign to enforce the United Nations ceasefire in Kosovo and prevent the use of force against the civilians by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. When initial air strikes did not deliver the anticipated success, General Clark, as the coalition commander, had to employ a range of skills in order to create support for sustained operations against a tenacious enemy. When interviewed about the operation, General Clark said “I talked to everybody. I talked to diplomats, NATO political leaders, national political leaders, and national chiefs of defense. There was a constant round of telephone calls, pushing and shoving and bargaining and cajoling.”⁵¹ General Clark had recognized that in order to achieve military success he had to allow the need to be a transatlantic diplomat to usurp his role as the military commander of a complex and demanding air war over Kosovo. As the strategic leader of a coalition he was operating in a zone on the fringe of his force, often spending more time looking out and maintaining the cohesion of the coalition rather than leading his force in delivering its military objectives. His Kosovo campaign was characterized by the need to fight two wars. General Clark fought an offensive air war against

⁵⁰ Larry M. Forster, “Coalition Leadership Imperatives,” *Military Review* (November-December 2000): 55.

⁵¹ Wesley Clark interview with Frontline. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html> (accessed March 29, 2011).

Milosevic whilst simultaneously fighting a defensive war against those who supported the coalition.⁵²

Command in War

In determining the challenges of command in a coalition environment it is first necessary to provide a short review of the nature of command itself. Command is defined in NATO doctrine as the “authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.”⁵³ Command is a function that must be exercised continuously for it to be effective. Its need is directly related to the size and scope of the organization that is being commanded with the role of command increasing with the sophistication of the forces. The responsibilities of command can be broadly broken down into two areas. Firstly, proper exercise of command ensures that the force is created and organized into an effective fighting force. Secondly, good command will ensure that the force is able to carry out the mission assigned to it by its superior.⁵⁴

The British Army identifies five principles for command. These are unity of command, cooperation, balanced structure, common and responsive procedures and a dynamic organization. In British doctrine the use of these five key tenets of command makes up the art of decision making. The key ingredient of this art is the skill of leadership, that is, the ability to motivate those under command to achieve the desired objective. In order for leadership to be effective it is important that command is vested in one individual who has the requisite authority, who accepts

⁵² Derek S. Reveron, “Coalition Warfare: The Commander’s Role,” *Defense and Security Analysis* (Volume 18, Number 2, 2002): 107.

⁵³ NATO Standardization Agency, *Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-6*, (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2010), 2-C-9.

⁵⁴ Martin Van Crefeld, *Command in War*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 6.

responsibility and who is accountable.⁵⁵ This is referred to as employing the principle of unity of command.

The command of any operation, be it multinational or unilateral, is likely to present its own challenges that will require the close attention of the designated commander. The commander of a single nation joint task force operation is likely to encounter a range of challenges. These might include deconflicting limited logistic resources between the services through to the integration of air, maritime and ground forces to achieve the military task. In exercising his command of this unilateral undertaking, the joint task force commander is likely to operate within a clearly defined and well tested national command and control structure. The political intent may not be clear but it will certainly emanate from one group of political leaders in the national capital. The joint force will fight under one flag and the command will be unified. Whilst not simple, the command of unilateral operations is usually less contentious than the command of coalition operations.

The coalition commander, as well having to address the usual constraints of operating as the commander of a unilateral force, will have to address many other factors, such as national vital interests, pride, level of commitment and influence over other coalition members.⁵⁶ In addition, the contributing nations will seek to retain some form of sovereign control over their forces to prohibit their unconditional use. These factors all conspire to make the employment of the multinational force by the designated coalition commander a complex business that requires the near constant attention of the commander.⁵⁷ However lessons of previous wars illustrate that coalitions are more likely to be successful if the principles of command, as espoused in British

⁵⁵ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 8 – Command and Staff Procedures*, (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, November 2007), 1-2.

⁵⁶ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Army Doctrine Publication Operations*, (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, November 2010), 4-22.

⁵⁷ Wesley Clark interview with Frontline.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html> (accessed March 29, 2011).

doctrine, are adhered to. As already stated the first, and most important, principle of command is that of unity of command.

Achieving Unity of Command in a Coalition

The need to achieve unity of command in coalition operations has long been recognized as a prerequisite for success. Indeed the U.S. principles of war include unity of command as one of the key tenets of waging successful warfare. Unity of command is defined as ensuring “unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.”⁵⁸ In British doctrine unity of command is defined as having one commander “accountable to only one superior thus ensuring clarity and unity of effort. Unity of command is achieved through a clear chain of command, whereby command at every level is focused on one commander.”⁵⁹ The appointed commander must have the authority to direct all forces placed under his command to achieve the political intent of the operation with the maximum unity of effort.

The Allies arrayed against Nazi Germany in the Second World War quickly realized they needed to introduce a unified command structure to ensure unity of effort and achieve decisive effect. By the time the first major allied offensive was mounted the principle of achieving unity of command had been fully embraced. The British and U.S. political and military leaders determined the need for a Supreme Commander for each of the theatres of operation at the Casablanca conference in January 1943. They had reached this conclusion largely on the basis of the command arrangements created late in the First World War, when the Allies were facing the near collapse of the Western Front. At a conference in Beauvais in France General Foch was appointed

⁵⁸ *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 2)*, A-2.

⁵⁹ *Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 8 – Command and Staff Procedures*, 1-2.

to coordinate the actions of the Allied Armies on the Western Front, with all powers being given to him to achieve this.⁶⁰

Two years after the Casablanca conference and following much discussion between the two principle leaders, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, General Eisenhower was appointed the Supreme Commander of Allied forces in Europe.⁶¹ General Eisenhower had already been supreme commander for the invasion of North Africa and, whilst he and his British and U.S. subordinates experienced some difficulties, the lessons learned were to prove crucial in the way command was exercised for Operation Overlord and the subsequent defeat of Nazi Germany. In his seminal memoir, *Crusade in Europe*, General Eisenhower was to declare that “Allied effectiveness in World War II established for all time the feasibility of developing and employing joint control machinery that can meet the sternest tests of war. The key to the matter is a readiness...to designate a single commander who is supported to the limit.”⁶²

Conversely the U.S. command structure in Vietnam amply illustrates that a lack of unity of command will lead to significant issues in the conduct of military operations. General Westmoreland, who was the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, had no command over the South Vietnamese troops and only limited command over the contingents from Australia and New Zealand who were all operating within his area of responsibility. He also had no control of U.S. forces operating in neighboring countries despite the fact that these forces were contributing towards his objectives. His command of the major civil and intelligence organizations operating in Vietnam was also outside his prerogative. He was also limited in his jurisdiction over the air, naval and marine forces within his command. The impact of these multifaceted and diverse

⁶⁰ John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the First World War*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 376.

⁶¹ Forest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1996), 23-35.

⁶² Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), 451.

command arrangements resulted in an extraordinarily complex organization that prevented General Westmoreland from exercising decisive leadership and prevented him from achieving unity of effort.⁶³

The nature of some coalition operations will mean that it is not possible, or even desirable, to achieve unity of command. As discussed previously in this monograph, the U.S. led operation to liberate Kuwait in 1991 offers a good example of where a parallel command structure was deemed to be preferable to a unified command structure. Regardless of the specific nature of the resultant command structure the overriding intent must be to create successful unified action. This unified action will stem from unity of effort within the multinational force. This requires a coordinated approach that enables all elements of the force to focus on achieving the common objectives.⁶⁴ This was certainly achieved through the implementation of the unique parallel command structure employed in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. However, the NATO led coalition that embarked on the operation to remove Slobodan Milosevic's forces from Kosovo experienced significant challenges in achieving this coordinated approach. As has been illustrated already the very existence of the coalition was threatened and General Clark quickly discovered he needed to expend significant effort merely maintaining cohesion in the alliance.

Maintaining Cohesion in a Coalition

Maintaining cohesion across the international community is a strategic priority in any multinational operation. Building and maintaining cohesion during the operation will inevitably occupy a significant amount of the force commander's time and energy.⁶⁵ General Rupert Smith, the British General and veteran commander in a number of recent coalition operations, including

⁶³ Crefeld, 243-244.

⁶⁴ *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Incorporating Change 2)*, A-2.

⁶⁵ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Joint Doctrine Publication, 5-00 Campaign Planning*, (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, December 2008), 3-18.

the First Gulf War and Bosnia, declared that “maintaining the coalition requires hard diplomatic work and inevitably some compromise of the positions of its members, and the expenditure of materiel and diplomatic capital particularly by the principal members.”⁶⁶

Maintaining cohesion within the coalition will be easier to achieve and ultimately far stronger when the threat is significant and defeat appears to be a potential option. This was the case on the Western Front in 1918 when the German Army appeared to be about to force an allied collapse. It was the imminent threat presented by the possible German breakthrough that drove the Allies, now including the newly arrived U.S. forces, to introduce the controversial but ultimately successful unified command structure. This was despite orders earlier in the war from the respective national leaders to their generals in the field that they were to retain independent command of their own forces.⁶⁷ As General Smith stated in his formative work, *The Utility of Force*, “one must always bear in mind that the glue that holds a coalition together is a common enemy, not a desired political outcome.”⁶⁸

The coalition will bind around the shared cause of defeating a strong enemy and achieving the shared objectives. Adolf Hitler, struggling under the coordinated onslaught of the Allies in 1944, declared that “the time will come when the tension between the Allies becomes so strong that, in spite of everything, the rupture occurs. History teaches us that coalitions break up, but you must wait the moment however difficult the waiting may be.”⁶⁹ General Eisenhower, the man who led the coalition that defeated Germany in the west, agreed with Hitler when he stated in his post war memoir that:

⁶⁶ Smith, 214.

⁶⁷ Anthony J. Rice, “Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare,” *Parameters* (Spring 1997): 154.

⁶⁸ Smith, 304.

⁶⁹ Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), 444-445.

“History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in waging war. Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusable blunders so common that professional soldiers have long discounted the possibility of effective allied action. Even Napoleon’s reputation as a great military leader suffered when students in staff colleges came to realize that he always fought against coalitions – and therefore against divided counsels and diverse political, economic, and military interests.”⁷⁰

However General Eisenhower recognized that the Second World War was different and one of the great achievements of the allies was to coalesce around the overriding objective of defeating the enemy. History teaches us that Hitler failed to recognize this new paradigm. General Eisenhower went on to state that “now it was necessary to produce effective unity out of concessions voluntarily made. The true history of the war, and more especially the history...in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe, is the story of a unity produced on the basis of this voluntary cooperation.”⁷¹ The allies recognized the need to subjugate their own national interests to the common goal in order to achieve cohesion and thereby victory over the Axis powers.

As has been demonstrated in this section maintaining cohesion in a coalition in the face of a determined enemy is generally easier, however when the threat begins to recede coalition partners will inevitably become more focused on their own national interests. As the objectives are achieved by the coalition forces so the glue that binds the coalition together becomes weaker. Attention naturally turns to the post conflict phase and once again national interests become the predominant factors for each coalition member. Cohesion within the coalition naturally starts to breakdown. Henry Kissinger, the foremost foreign diplomat of his time, illustrated this point very clearly in his study of international politics and specifically the coalitions that were formed during the Napoleonic Wars. Henry Kissinger stated:

“As long as the enemy is more powerful than any single member of the coalition, the need for unity outweighs all considerations of individual gain. But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most determined member. Confronted with the complete collapse of one

⁷⁰ Eisenhower, 4.

⁷¹ Eisenhower, 4.

of the elements of equilibrium, all other powers will tend to raise their claims in order to keep pace.”⁷²

As illustrated elsewhere in this monograph, partners in a coalition may not share the same objectives and there may not be the same assessment of the threat facing each nation in the coalition. The end result of this will be that coalition cohesion will be far more difficult to achieve and will require far greater effort on behalf of the commander. The First Gulf War is an example of such a coalition.

Even after the commencement of military operations in the First Gulf War in 1991, “Washington was forced to give continuing high-level attention to the consistently strenuous task of coalition maintenance.”⁷³ Three examples highlight this point. First, the U.S. efforts to prevent an Israeli response to the Iraqi Scud attacks were both immediate and strenuous and were conducted at the highest levels.⁷⁴ Second, in a sign of respect for the Arab armies, it was decided that Arab forces would be the first to liberate Kuwait City despite the military logic that dictated U.S. forces were better equipped and better able to undertake this task. Finally, the decision by President Bush to halt the coalition in southern Iraq and Kuwait once it had achieved its limited objective rather than attempt regime change by advancing on Baghdad was a clear indication that the coalition would not have survived had the Americans insisted on regime change.

The operation to liberate Kuwait was undertaken by a broad coalition where each of the participants had their own objectives. The inherent fragility of the coalition meant that a great deal of effort was expended by coalition commanders in negotiating and compromising in order to maintain cohesion.⁷⁵ As coalitions are a tool of international diplomacy the political leaders

⁷² Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Matternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812 – 1822*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson History, 2000), 54-55.

⁷³ Pierre, 24.

⁷⁴ Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 111-112.

⁷⁵ Khaled Bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 32 and 265.

will focus significant efforts on the maintenance of the coalition, however the military commander is expected to wage an effective military campaign as well as preserve cohesion. In order to achieve these two objectives, the military commander will face a series of command and control challenges which must now be considered.

Delivering Effective Command in a Coalition

As coalitions are inherently ad hoc organizations with no predetermined structures, the commander will face some real challenges in exercising command over his multinational force. The delivery of an effective command and control system is often one of the most controversial issues in a coalition. No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure.⁷⁶ The complexities of the command and control structures that are required in a joint and multinational force allied with the inevitable tensions within the coalition provide added leadership challenges for the commander. The commander and his staff will have to synchronize the actions of the different coalition members to ensure the predetermined objectives are delivered in accordance with the requirements of the political leaders. The need to create unity of command and unity of effort within the command and control system is likely to highlight disparities in the objectives of the participants. The strategic military commander is necessarily operating in the political realm and has now become a participant in the political contest that his and the partner nations are now engaged in.

Each nation will contribute forces with markedly different capabilities, procedures, training and doctrine. The commander will need to ensure all elements of his force are adequately integrated and apportioned suitable tasks within their given capabilities in order that the entire

⁷⁶ United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 2007), xii.

force is best placed to achieve the coalition's overall objective. The commander must keep in mind that since coalitions are above all else political instruments considerations of military efficiency should not trump the political underpinnings of the coalition.⁷⁷

When participating in coalition operations nations will rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. "As such, forces participating in coalition operations will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command."⁷⁸ This presents an added challenge for the coalition commander who is likely to be commanding his own nation's forces as well as those of the contributing coalition partners. As General Clark experienced when he commanded the Kosovo operation, the coalition commander must tread a fine line while commanding a multinational force, made up of nations each with their own national interests, which must operate as a unified military fighting force to achieve the political objectives. The commander will quickly discover that the contributing nations are unwilling to relinquish their national objectives or indeed their allegiances to their national command structures and that a degree of pragmatism and compromise will be required in order to achieve the desired goals.⁷⁹ Early in the formation of the coalition it will be necessary to agree to the command structures employed during the operation. The commander will also need to ensure that the command system employed remains sufficiently flexible to be able to adapt as the nature of the operation changes and the structure of the coalition matures.⁸⁰

The coalition commander will have to ensure the creation of suitable command and control arrangements that are carefully crafted to ensure authority matches both commitment and responsibility. Headquarters, at the theatre level, will have to be both joint and combined and will

⁷⁷ Pierre, 8.

⁷⁸ *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, II-3.

⁷⁹ *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, II-5.

⁸⁰ Holly A.H. Handley and Alexander H. Levis, "Incorporating Heterogeneity in Command Center Interactions," *Information, Knowledge, Systems Management* (2001): 299.

have to be representative of the nations participating in the coalition undertaking. It was a fundamental principle of General Eisenhower's that to achieve the most effective unity of effort in coalition operations there was an absolute need for combined headquarters at the theatre level. Integration of forces and headquarters at the tactical level is possible but it is certainly much more problematic than at the theatre level. This is especially the case when considering the integration of ground forces. If not done quickly and efficiently there is a high likelihood that vulnerabilities will be available for the enemy to exploit. The decimation of the Turkish brigade in the early stages of United Nations operations in Korea offers a suitable example of poor integration of ground forces in a coalition leading to tactical defeat.⁸¹ Thrown into the fluid battlefield without suitably integrated command and control, the Turkish brigade was forced to operate in isolation, unable to call upon combat power from neighboring allied units.

The Effective Coalition Commander

General Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Allied expeditionary forces in 1944 and the officer charged with leading the invasion of 'Fortress Europe' and the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, is widely recognized as one of the greatest contemporary coalition commanders. He is credited with recognizing the need to create fully integrated combined staff as a necessary tool to help achieve unity of effort. It was the staff structure that he implemented for the planning of the invasion of North Africa that became the model for the creation of the staff structures for Operation Overlord. Whilst these combined headquarters were sometimes criticized for their cumbersome size and the difficulties they had in merging two different staff systems they were absolutely critical in delivering the vital unity of effort that often proves so critical to the success of coalition operations.⁸²

⁸¹ RisCassi, 67.

⁸² Pogue, 58-61.

Having laid out the key challenges that are likely to face the coalition commander it is now necessary to provide some conclusions about the desired attributes of an effective coalition commander. The personal qualities of General Eisenhower, and not his previous command experience, were what singled him out as the preeminent coalition commander of the Second World War. General Eisenhower's approach to coalition command is accurately illustrated in a letter he wrote to Admiral Mountbatten after the latter was nominated to take over the South East Asia command:

"The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theatre. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field."⁸³

The Desired Attributes of an Effective Coalition Commander

"Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential."⁸⁴

Having provided an analysis of the nature of coalitions, why nations choose to undertake operations in a coalition and the challenges faced by the coalition commander this monograph will now explore those attributes that contribute to the making of a successful coalition commander. This section will review the experiences of a number of coalition commanders, citing examples across a range of operations, in order to provide an insight into the attributes that successful coalition commanders have employed. This analysis will focus on aspects of leadership that fall within the umbrella of human factors and encompass a variety of attributes. The personality of the commander, and his ability to understand wider issues, will be key to

⁸³ Alfred D. Chandler, *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1970), 1420.

⁸⁴ Chandler, 1420.

success in coalition operations in a way that it is not for unilateral operations.⁸⁵ These insights will prove valuable to coalition commanders of the future as they prepare to undertake what could well prove to be the most challenging command of their career.

The analysis presented in the previous sections illustrates that the essence of the problem facing the coalition commander is that he needs to balance the achievement of the objectives of the contributing nations with the need to fight a military operation within the framework of an ad hoc command structure whilst maintaining coalition cohesion. To compound the challenge for the commander each of these areas is interrelated and overlapping and each will require his detailed personal attention. The good coalition commander will find that he must expend significant energy on these matters.

As Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower had to contend with a number of recalcitrant personalities who unwittingly distracted him from his main duties. Chief amongst these was Prime Minister Winston Churchill who was, even in the hours before the launching of Overlord, “adding to my personal burdens” by requesting that he be allowed to observe the invasion from supporting naval ships.⁸⁶ It is almost as if fighting the enemy becomes a secondary issue for the commander of a coalition.

The coalition commander that fails to understand the wider issues at stake for each of the nations and their contributing forces is likely to degrade his ability to achieve the objective set by the politicians. As General Eisenhower stated when he wrote to Admiral Mountbatten, in order to be effective the leader must solve the human equation on a daily basis. The effective commander will “strive for the utmost in mutual respect and confidence among the group of senior officers

⁸⁵ *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, I-3 to I-4.

⁸⁶ Eisenhower, 251.

making up the multinational command.”⁸⁷ In solving this human equation the commander will draw on a range of human factors in making his decisions.

Human Factors in Coalition Command

The effective coalition commander will be expected to have a sound grasp of a range of intangible human facets in order to ensure the coalition achieves its objectives. It will be vital that the commander comprehends these human factors quickly in order to achieve unity of effort. Both United States and British doctrine refer to the key tenets of success in multinational operations as respect, rapport, knowledge of partners and patience.⁸⁸ Without these tenets there is no guarantee of success, however ignoring them may well lead to mission failure through an inability to achieve unity of effort.

General Eisenhower was perhaps the exemplar of these attributes. He was widely recognized as possessing an “extraordinary ability to work with others, to get along with them, to encourage them, to mediate among them, to direct them, to encourage them and to correct them.”⁸⁹ The coalition commander will have to possess a clear understanding of the political motivations for each of the partner nations. These interests will determine the political factors that need to be considered at every level by the coalition commander. He will need to place the deployment of the multinational military force into context at the level it is intended to be used.

The commander will have to recognize that his force is not homogenous and in fact that each of the constituent nations will have deployed their forces to the coalition for their own different reasons. “Each of the allies is in it for their own reward and the nature of this reward

⁸⁷ Chandler, 1421.

⁸⁸ *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, I-3 to I-4 and *Army Doctrine Publication Operations*, 4-24.

⁸⁹ Alan Axelrod, *Eisenhower on Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 10.

must be understood by the commander.”⁹⁰ The military forces will maintain their allegiances to their own national capitals and are likely to retain two chains of command during the operation. Indeed, the U.S. President can never relinquish national command authority over U.S. forces, although it is possible to place U.S. forces under operational control of another nation’s commanders if required.⁹¹ The coalition commander must have a detailed grasp of each of these issues and many others if he is to exercise effective command over his multinational force. General Devers, the commander of the 6th Army Group from 1944 to mid-1945 was clear about this aspect of coalition command in his recollections of the major problems facing a commander in combined operations when he stated that a commander:

“must first know the several national problems and aspirations in detail before he can hope to deal with his commanders. It must be thoroughly appreciated by him that no commander, regardless of the position he may occupy in the world of allied powers, will submerge his national pride and aspirations for what appears to be the benefit of another. Some compromises will be arrived at through diplomacy. The theater commander, in order to secure the whole-hearted cooperation of the armed forces of another nation, must take this into account.”⁹²

General Eisenhower was able to understand the conflicting ideologies and differing national interests that were at play in a coalition whilst all the time maintaining focus on the ultimate goal of defeating Nazi Germany. The authority vested in him as the Supreme Commander was clear and was derived from the political leaders of the coalition. As the overall commander for Overlord it can be said that, in accordance with modern day British doctrine, General Eisenhower had the requisite authority, he accepted the responsibility and ultimately he would be held accountable.⁹³ General Wilson, as the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean commanding the invasion forces that landed in southern France in August 1944,

⁹⁰ Smith, 304.

⁹¹ *Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations*, I-4.

⁹² Jacob L. Devers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations,” *Military Review* (January-February 1997): 150.

⁹³ *Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 8 – Command and Staff Procedures*, 1-4.

fully appreciated his role in assuming responsibility for the coordination of a large number of multinational troops in a complex operation. General Wilson:

“refused to saddle his task force commander with a responsibility which he felt was his own, the establishment of complete harmony and agreement between so vast a number of dissimilar armed services and principal commanders, for so vital a task. This the theater commander accomplished in a most magnificent manner and to the satisfaction of the task force commander and all the principal subordinates, through the tactful and patient application of his own knowledge, professional skill and ingenuity... The importance of the personal assumption by the theater commander of his vital responsibilities in operations of this character cannot be overly emphasized.”⁹⁴

For the invasion in northern France the authority and weight of the big decisions rested finally on General Eisenhower, but as General Devers observes those decisions could be arrived at only through a process of compromise and consensus.⁹⁵ His ability to compromise for the benefit of the overall mission was ably illustrated in his dealings with the Vichy French forces after the Allies landed in North Africa. To prevent an unnecessary and costly conflict with the French he quickly decided that they needed to be won over and if necessary through the use of bribery. Going beyond his remit, he instructed one of his subordinates to “give them money if it will help.”⁹⁶ General Eisenhower knew when to compromise for the benefit of the Allied mission. General Clark, the commander of the NATO led coalition in Kosovo, learnt that compromise was necessary in his prosecution of the air war over Kosovo in order to prevent the weakening of his coalition. Following a series of widely publicized mistakes, including the bombing of the Chinese Embassy and the destruction of a passenger train on a bridge which incurred civilian casualties, targeting became more conservative. “We would have wanted to conduct a more rapid, overwhelming campaign with more strike power. Our desire to do so, however, had to be

⁹⁴ Devers, 157.

⁹⁵ Axelrod, 2.

⁹⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower quoted in Alan Axelrod, *Eisenhower on Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006), 78.

balanced with the need to maintain...cohesion and unity. The loss of unity would have ended the campaign.”⁹⁷

General Eisenhower understood that his role as a leader was to establish relationships with all his subordinates and the other leaders, both military and civilian, not based solely upon his position as the Supreme Commander but based on a shared understanding of the collective undertaking. He worked hard to build trust and confidence, both in himself as the Supreme Commander, the single unified commander with the authority, responsibility and accountability, but also between and amongst the contributing nations. General Eisenhower recognized that personal characteristics are more important than ever; the most important role of all is played by the personalities of the senior commanders and their staff officers.⁹⁸ Major General Carter, the British commander of the multinational Regional Command South in Afghanistan from November 2009 to November 2010, observed that “much of what is achieved in Afghanistan is down to personal relations.”⁹⁹

The commander’s ability to use his personal relations to assess his subordinates’ abilities will prove vital to the maintenance of unity of effort within the coalition. As General Devers observes “it is, in fact,...his first concern. This problem is the complete analysis and understanding of the characteristics, capabilities, personalities, ambitions, and personal and professional habits of his various senior commanders. A complete understanding of this problem is the very essence of successful leadership.”¹⁰⁰ When problems arise with subordinates that are of the same nationality as the commander the issue is easily solved through the execution of robust leadership. In a multinational environment the coalition commander must be able to

⁹⁷ Wesley Clark, James Ellis and Michael Short, *Combined Prepared Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, (United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, October 1999): 6.

⁹⁸ Axelrod, 38.

⁹⁹ Nick Carter, “Lessons Learned Post Tour Interview”, *United Kingdom Ministry of Defence* (November 2010): 3.

¹⁰⁰ Devers, 157.

undertake his assessment with tact and diplomacy so that he is able to instill a sense of harmony and cohesion amongst his subordinates. He will need to expend significant effort in understanding his subordinates as only in extreme cases will he be able to seek the removal of a coalition commander. It may be that the commander is “compelled to accept less desirable solutions to tactical and logistical problems in order to secure that complete harmony which is so essential among commanders in the successful pursuit of a campaign.”¹⁰¹

Conclusion

“All coalitions are made up by different cultures which need to be understood and respected. We must all work hard to understand each other.”¹⁰²

A coalition is defined as an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalition operations will remain a favored tool of the political leaders of many nations for the foreseeable future; coalitions are first and foremost political instruments. Coalitions can be employed in national diplomacy by nations who choose to share the risks and spread the responsibility of conducting military options. Nations will enter, and if necessary, leave coalitions based largely on their own national interests. Some nations will choose to undertake coalition operations in order to enhance legitimacy across the international community or to provide political benefits for the participating nation. Coalitions are especially attractive as they are, by their very nature, transitory and, unlike alliances, have no standing structures that require no long term investment. The military benefits of coalitions for the smaller nations are significant. A pooling of resources, such as that seen in the coalition for Libya in 2011, enables far greater weight of effort and more decisive military action than would be possible as single entities. The military benefits for the one remaining superpower are less clear. Often a coalition

¹⁰¹ Devers, 157.

¹⁰² Nick Parker, “In Bed With An Elephant: Personal Observations on Coalition Operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment,” *Kermit Roosevelt Lecture* (January 2011).

will provide more challenges for the U.S. in terms of integration and interoperability. For the U.S. the creation of a coalition is more about the politics and the need to have partners to provide some form of legitimacy and a shared sense of responsibility. Coalitions differ from alliances in that an alliance is based on a formal treaty which is usually based on broad, long term objectives that further the common interests of the members. Alliance members are bound to act under certain conditions, whilst coalitions allow significant flexibility and are therefore favorable in some circumstances. The ad hoc nature of coalitions means that decision making tends to be far more rapid and responsive than the decision making in alliances. Coalitions offer significant advantages and many nations will continue to join coalitions as a means of delivering their foreign and security policy.

Command of coalition operations presents a series of significant challenges that are distinct from the challenges of command in unilateral operations. Coalition commanders will expend significant personal energy and time on the command of the coalition rather than the execution of the military tasks to achieve the political objectives. The commander must ensure he achieves unity of effort across his multinational force. This is best achieved through a unified command structure however in coalition operations this may not always be possible, so a range of command and control options will be open to the commander that will allow him to achieve the vital component of unity of effort. An integrated staff is likely to be a key component of the command and control of an effective coalition operation. The need to maintain coalition cohesion will become a strategic priority for the commander and will inevitably occupy a significant amount of the commander's time. When the threat is significant the ability to achieve cohesion will be enhanced, however as the threat recedes so the need to remain a cohesive political entity and fully integrated fighting force will reduce. This will in turn impact on the ability of the commander to achieve his objectives. In order to achieve cohesion the commander will necessarily have to compromise as well as having to continually encourage the participant nations to subjugate their own national interests to the common goal. Coalition maintenance will require

constant attention not only from the military commander but also from the political leaders of the member nations.

Leading a coalition operation successfully demands a range of skills that are more consultative than they are direct in their approach. The effective commander will listen attentively to his coalition partners and will have a keen appreciation of their military capabilities as well as an understanding of their domestic political interests and motivations for being in the coalition. The capable coalition commander will be able to make decisions based on judgments about a wide range of competing priorities, not only those concerning his own nation, but also from those of the contributing nations.¹⁰³ He will determine clear objectives that are in line with the political intent of the various nations within the coalition, and will ensure these are well understood by all participants. When necessary he will accept a degree of compromise to achieve the objective, but will ensure he does not compromise on the objective to achieve the victory.¹⁰⁴ The effective commander will maintain a sharp focus on the central aim of the coalition and will work tirelessly to ensure the cohesion of the coalition is preserved.

¹⁰³ Pierre, 6.

¹⁰⁴ Axelrod, 78.

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