Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured?
Abstract
The concept of deterrence is as old as war, but determining if deterrence activities and messages are having the desired effect on the adversary decision maker is challenging since the adversary will not readily admit to being deterred. Developing deterrence measures of effectiveness is imperative to determine if deterrence activities and messages are meeting the deterrence strategy objectives and achieving the desired end states. However, determining why something did not occur is difficult to assess. This paper proposes that planners can use intelligence indicators to provide feedback for measuring deterrence effectiveness. Reviewing the evolution of U.S. deterrence strategy, as well as, current U.S. deterrence strategy provides planners with the desired end states and principles for executing deterrence operations. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the current general deterrence strategies because specific adversary decision makers are not targeted. A search for joint deterrence doctrine disclosed that such doctrine does not exist. In the absence of deterrence doctrine, this paper reviewed four historical cases. The cases highlighted the relationships between the United States and Japan prior to and during World War II, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Libya from 1981 to 2003 and Iraq prior to Gulf War I. These cases demonstrate that a multitude of indicators showed deterrence activity effects, yet the United States did not always adjust its deterrence strategy to successfully influence the adversary decision maker. A review of military deception doctrine and historical deception operations provides insight into what is required to influence and deter an adversary decision maker.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 10, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA545543
Entities
People
- Debra K. Rose
Organizations
- National Defense University