

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188**

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Service, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)**

01-06-2011

2. REPORT TYPE

Master's Thesis

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

31-07-2010 to 01-06-2011

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLERENOVATING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE:
INFLUENCING YOUR UNIT'S DESTINY**5a. CONTRACT NUMBER****5b. GRANT NUMBER****5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER****6. AUTHOR(S)**

COLONEL Paul Bontrager, United States Army

5d. PROJECT NUMBER**5e. TASK NUMBER****5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER****7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**Joint Forces Staff College
Joint Advanced Warfighting School
7800 Hampton Blvd.
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER****9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)****10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)****11. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER****12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**14. ABSTRACT**

The conduct of war continues to change, but how we imbue organizations with a culture of effectiveness has not. In the last decade of war, the military has made numerous improvements in many aspects of training, equipping, manning, and executing military operations. Similar improvements concerning organizational culture have failed to keep pace. Renovation of our organizational culture is overdue and must occur for our military to reach its full operational potential. The Defense Department's analysis of organizational culture consistently takes a back seat to individual leadership, with few actual practical solutions or improvements having been identified and implemented. Analyzing the ideas and best practices of academics, highly effective for-profit businesses, and high performing special operations units can provide insight into alternatives and new methods that may benefit general purpose forces. A renovation of organizational culture will prevent a lapse into the negative organizational cultures characteristic of previous interwar periods, and will guarantee the Department of Defense is fully prepared to meet future challenges.

15. SUBJECT TERMS**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:****a. REPORT**
Unclassified**b. ABSTRACT**
Unclassified**c. THIS PAGE**
Unclassified**17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT**
Unclassified
Unlimited**18. NUMBER
OF PAGES****19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON****19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)**

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

1. REPORT DATE. Full publication date, including day, month, if available. Must cite at least the year and be Year 2000 compliant, e.g., 30-06-1998; xx-08-1998; xx-xx-1998.

2. REPORT TYPE. State the type of report, such as final, technical, interim, memorandum, master's thesis, progress, quarterly, research, special, group study, etc.

3. DATES COVERED. Indicate the time during which the work was performed and the report was written, e.g., Jun 1997 - Jun 1998; 1-10 Jun 1996; May - Nov 1998; Nov 1998.

4. TITLE. Enter title and subtitle with volume number and part number, if applicable. On classified documents, enter the title classification in parentheses.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. Enter all contract numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. F33615-86-C-5169.

5b. GRANT NUMBER. Enter all grant numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257.

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. Enter all program element numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. AFOSR-82-1234.

5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Enter all project numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 1F665702D1257; ILIR.

5e. TASK NUMBER. Enter all task numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 05; RF0330201; T4112.

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. Enter all work unit numbers as they appear in the report, e.g. 001; AFAPL30480105.

6. AUTHOR(S). Enter name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. The form of entry is the last name, first name, middle initial, and additional qualifiers separated by commas, e.g. Smith, Richard, Jr.

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Self-explanatory.

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER. Enter all unique alphanumeric report numbers assigned by the performing organization, e.g. BRL-1234; AFWL-TR-85-4017-Vol-21-PT-2.

9. SPONSORING/MONITORS AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES). Enter the name and address of the organization(s) financially responsible for and monitoring the work.

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S). Enter, if available, e.g. BRL, ARDEC, NADC.

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S). Enter report number as assigned by the sponsoring/ monitoring agency, if available, e.g. BRL-TR-829; -215.

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Use agency-mandated availability statements to indicate the public availability or distribution limitations of the report. If additional limitations/restrictions or special markings are indicated, follow agency authorization procedures, e.g. RD/FRD, PROPIN, ITAR, etc. Include copyright information.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: prepared in cooperation with; translation of; report supersedes; old edition number, etc.

14. ABSTRACT. A brief (approximately 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information.

15. SUBJECT TERMS. Key words or phrases identifying major concepts in the report.

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION. Enter security classification in accordance with security classification regulations, e.g. U, C, S, etc. If this form contains classified information, stamp classification level on the top and bottom of this page.

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT. This block must be completed to assign a distribution limitation to the abstract. Enter UU (Unclassified Unlimited) or SAR (Same as Report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



RENOVATING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE:
INFLUENCING YOUR UNIT'S DESTINY

By

Paul Bontrager

Colonel, U.S. Army

RENOVATING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE:
INFLUENCING YOUR UNIT'S DESTINY

by

Paul Bontrager

Colonel, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: Paul Bontrager

25 May 2011

Thesis Adviser

Signature: Bryon Greenwald
Bryon Greenwald, PhD

Approved by:

Signature: Stephanie Zedlar
Stephanie Zedlar, Committee Member

Signature: Fredrick Kienle
Fredrick Kienle, Committee Member

Signature: Joanne M. Fish
**Joanne M. Fish, CAPT, USN, Director,
Joint Advanced Warfighting School**

This Page Intentionally Blank

ABSTRACT

The conduct of war continues to change, but how we imbue organizations with a culture of effectiveness has not. In the last decade of war, the military has made numerous improvements in many aspects of training, equipping, manning, and executing military operations. Similar improvements concerning organizational culture have failed to keep pace. Renovation of our organizational culture is overdue and must occur for our military to reach its full operational potential.

The Defense Department's analysis of organizational culture consistently takes a back seat to individual leadership, with few actual practical solutions or improvements having been identified and implemented. Analyzing the ideas and best practices of academics, highly effective for-profit businesses, and high performing special operations units can provide insight into alternatives and new methods that may benefit general purpose forces. A renovation of organizational culture will ensure the military retains the talented individuals who sustained our forces so well during the recent wars, will prevent a lapse into the negative organizational cultures characteristic of previous interwar periods, and will guarantee the Department of Defense is fully prepared to meet future challenges.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, thanks to my family who continues to support me beyond any reasonable measure. Kelly, your patience and advice, as I became consumed with this project, was truly above and beyond. You heard my complaints, doubt, and concerns more than anyone, and it is your opinion and acceptance I seek above all others. For Zack and Katie, thanks for being the wonderful Americans that you are and for supporting your mom and I through the deployments and tough times. JSB, you're my boy, good times ahead.

I am indebted to many individuals who helped me with this paper. Thanks to my Thesis and Academic Advisor Dr. Bryon Greenwald who is primarily responsible for any readability or coherent presentation of concepts, if any, within this paper. For our other JAWS Seminar II instructors, Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles Cunningham and Colonel Barry Peavie, thanks so much for the effort and mentoring; we are forever indebted.

Special thanks to Major General Bennett Sacolick, a long-time mentor who generously provided his thoughts, ideas, and beliefs. This paper would have been impossible to produce without his assistance and input. Thanks to my wonderful friends Scott Bridegam, Wayne Pollard, and LJ and Amy Horner for content suggestions as well as proof reading. Also, thanks to the professionals at the Ike Skelton Library, primarily Dr. Gail Nicula, Catrina Whited, and Dawn Joines for proof reading as well as research assistance.

Finally, thanks to all my JAWS Seminar II classmates, from whom I have learned so much over the past year. You have made this year well worth any mild academic hardship we endured. I look forward to building our friendships and working with each of you in the future—stay in touch.

May God continue to bless America.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
The Thesis Road Map	3
Key Disclaimers	6
Summary	7
CHAPTER 2: DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE	9
Culture Defined.....	9
First Principles of Military Organizational Culture	12
Purpose	14
Responsibility.....	15
Loyalty	16
Trust	18
Integrity	19
Conformity	20
Courage	21
Summary	22
CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT SITUATION.....	25
The Current Situation.....	25
Near Term Expectations	26
Previous Interwar Periods	28
Future Threats	31
Understanding Cultural Change.....	32
What Drives Change?.....	34
Is Change Necessary?.....	35
Summary	39
CHAPTER 4: ANALYZING OTHER CULTURES.....	41
Academics	42
Jim Collins.....	42
Daniel H. Pink	43
Businesses	43
Netflix Corporation	44
Toms Shoes	44
Special Operations Organizations.....	45
Summary	49
CHAPTER 5: BEYOND CULTURAL FIRST PRINCIPLES:.....	51
TWO PRIORITY ELEMENTS	
Recognizing True Motivation	52
Facilitating Creative Problem Solving	56
Train for the Known, Educate for the Unknown.....	57
Summary	60
CHAPTER 6: BEYOND CULTURAL FIRST PRINCIPLES:.....	63
SUB-ELEMENTS THAT MATTER	
First- Position Talented Individuals, the “Who”	66
Second- Provide Organizational Focus, the “What”	72
Execution- Responsibility and Authority at the Right Level, the “How”	77

Promote a Culture of Collaboration- Flatten the Organization	84
Reduce Bureaucracy- Everyday	90
Use Information Technology Effectively	94
Candor- Live It	103
Summary	106
CHAPTER 7: INCREASING UNDERSTANDING: A NEW MODEL	109
Legacy Leadership or Organizational Culture Models	109
A New Organizational Culture Model	111
Learning From the Model	116
Summary	117
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION.....	119
APPENDIX A: Senior Leader Correspondence	123
APPENDIX B: Examples of Effective Written Formats.....	127
APPENDIX C: Examples of Previous Culture Models.....	131
APPENDIX D: Building a New Model.....	136
BIBLIOGRAPHY	143
VITA.....	150

FIGURES

Figure 1-1: The Complexity of Organizational Culture	5
Figure 2-1: Linkages between First Principles	23
Figure 5-1: Linkages between First Principles and Priority Elements	60
Figure 6-1: Linkages between First Principles, Priority Elements and Sub-Element.....	106
Figure 7-1: Creating Change in Systems of Varying Interdependence	111
Figure 7-2: The Complexity of Organizational Culture	115
Figure A-1: General Eisenhower Handwritten Note	123
Figure A-2: Major General Garrison Handwritten Note.....	124
Figure B-1: Example of a Single Page Overlay Order	127
Figure B-2: Example of a Single Page Administrative Order	128
Figure B-3: Example of Single Page Tactical Operations Order.....	129
Figure C-1: Competing Values Culture Model.....	131
Figure C-2: Comparison of Adaptive and Unadaptive Corporate Cultures.....	132
Figure C-3: The Circuit of Culture	132
Figure C-4: Culture in an Organization	133
Figure C-5: USAF Force Development Process.....	133
Figure C-6: USMC Leadership Traits.....	134
Figure C-7: USMC Leadership Principles.....	134
Figure C-8: Eight Core Leader Competencies and Supporting Behaviors	135
Figure C-9: Army Training and Leader Development Model.....	135
Figure D-1: Afghanistan Stability and Counter-Insurgency Dynamics Model	137

TABLES

Table 1: Fundamental Ways with the Most Terminal Points	117
Table 2: Consolidated List of Linkages and Connectors	139
Table 3: Progression Through the Model	140
Table 4: Fundamental Ways with Total Number of Terminal Points.....	142

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This thesis addresses the current military culture—a culture which must adapt to meet future threats during an anticipated period of reduced resources. The conduct of war continues to change, but how we imbue organizations with a culture of effectiveness has not. In the last decade of war, the military has made numerous improvements in many aspects of training, equipping, and executing military operations. Similar improvements concerning organizational culture have failed to keep pace. Previous leader-centric models and instruction from Department of Defense (DoD) educational programs are helpful to individual development efforts, but do not adequately address the more encompassing organizational culture that leaders must confront. Leaders who embrace the concepts and recommendations in this thesis can develop a holistic approach to understand and modify their organization's culture, which will afford the Defense Department the best chance for success in an uncertain future.

Leaders tirelessly extol today's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines as the country's most valuable national asset. Yet the United States military let down the very individuals they so altruistically honor. At the outset of the war in Iraq, the military services failed to equip, train, and prepare their service members for the enemy they would ultimately face and be expected to defeat. Justify it as one may, it is not overly dramatic to assert that thousands of the nation's youth have perished or been maimed because of the failings of DoD senior leaders and the ineffective organizational cultures they tolerate. In 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated that the Defense Department essentially fielded a force that was, "a smaller version of the U.S. Cold War force" that through its own low level creativity and innovation eventually became an

“effective instrument for counterinsurgency...but at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome.”¹ While this comprehensive failure was understandable—even predictable—the tragic results should burden leaders with the obligation to prevent similar travesties in the future.

Over the past decade the Defense Department reacted to and corrected many of the issues that caused failings during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Improvements in equipment included procuring adequate body armor and rapidly developing and fielding Mine Resistance Ambush Protected vehicles. The services needed aggressive procedural and training adjustments to correct oversights concerning detainee operations and to prepare the force to locate, counter, and defeat improvised explosive devices. New counterinsurgency doctrine brought clarity and understanding to defeating irregular threats while protecting population centers. What the military has not addressed is the very culture that allowed these failures to occur in the first place—a culture that has promoted stale, antiquated thinking, and lacked forethought and problem solving ability.

Numerous senior leaders, including former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary Gates, and General James N. Mattis, the commander of the U.S. Central Command, have stated the need for the Defense Department to change its thinking in order to become more flexible, adaptable, and able to meet future uncertain

¹ Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, 2009, 28.

and hybrid threats.² Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed the need for the Defense Department to become an organization of change by always looking to improve and modernize equipment and thinking. Admiral Mullen stated, "...what worked well today will not necessarily work tomorrow. The day you stop adjusting is the day you lose."³ Tying modernized equipment together with doctrinal shifts and an evolving workforce requires a culture that embraces change through perpetual introspection and investigating innovative ways to improve how organizations function and perform. In light of DoD and service failures to create a more flexible culture within the military, this thesis examines the finer points of military culture and offers relevant ways for leaders and organizations to better prepare for the challenges ahead.

The Thesis Road Map

To provide a deeper understanding of culture and ultimately validate the arguments contained in this thesis, Chapter 2 defines and identifies the first principles on which an organization builds its culture. The first principles are those timeless attributes always

² Secretary Rumsfeld called for significant change in the comprehensive structure, doctrine, and business practices of the Defense Department. For an example see, Donald H. Rumsfeld, "21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces," *Speech*, Washington DC, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183>, January 31, 2002.

The Rumsfeld Doctrine, Transformation, and Revolution in Military Affairs are all theories that articulate the broad changes Secretary Rumsfeld recommended, referenced in numerous articles and speeches during that time. See David Von Drehle, "Rumsfeld's Transformation; There's Been a Small Change in Plan," *The Washington Post*, February 12, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/11/AR2006021100836.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).

Of late Secretary Gates and General James Mattis, the commander of U.S. Central Command, have consistently called for an improved way of conducting business. See Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," 28.; Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, "Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies," *Speech*, Washington DC, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechID=1527>, January 6, 2011; James N. Mattis, General, "Irregular War, Hybrid Threats and the Future Role of Ground Forces," *Speech*, Washington DC, June 1, 2009; James N. Mattis, General, "Developing and Retaining the Officers We Need for the 21st Century," *Speech*, Washington DC, February 18, 2010.

³ Michael G. Mullen, Admiral, "Landon Lecture Series," *Speech*, Manhattan, March 3, 2010.

present in organizations regardless of an organization's mission or bottom line, whether it is a private business, a corporation, or a military unit. Chapter 3 provides context for military organizations to understand the events that produced the current situation and what to expect in the future, to include possible threats America may need to counter. Chapter 3 also delves into the particulars of change regarding what it takes to create cultural change, the drivers of change, and possible impacts of changing the attributes of a unit's culture. Chapter 4 explores varied approaches to cultural change from academics, selected businesses, and special operations units. The academics have studied organizational culture, applied scientific principles when able, and developed recommendations intended to enable organizations to improve their performance. The selected businesses integrated innovative practices to create effective business environments. A subsequent examination of special operations unit characteristics, drawn from interactions and interviews with special operations forces key leaders, reveals interesting similarities among how special operations units function, what academics know, and how innovative businesses operate.⁴

Chapter 5 builds on the discussion of organizational culture by extracting two primary elements, essentials that make all the difference in creating an effective organization. The two elements—understanding true motivation and fostering an effective problem solving environment—are precursors to a final break out of the critical sub-elements of an effective culture. Chapter 6 identifies these seven specific sub-

⁴ U.S. Army Major General Bennet S. Sacolick, who has commanded at all levels within special operations organizations, is a long-time mentor of the author who, over the course of several months, provided generous input and insight into the characteristics and attributes of special operations organizations. Major General Sacolick is currently serving as the Commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

elements of culture that build on the first principles identified in Chapter 2 and the priority elements discussed in Chapter 5. The sub-elements of Chapter 6 provide insight into the particulars of effective culture, with prescriptive techniques for implementing and putting into practice options that can result in a transformed workplace environment.

Chapter 7 places the concepts discussed in this thesis in a model that visually depicts the complexity and structure of a highly effective culture. An analysis of previous leadership and cultural models exposes the inability of these models to depict the cultural environment accurately. A new construct derived from the findings of this thesis, depicted in Figure 1-1, suggests a more accurate representation of organizational culture.




Figure 1-1: The Complexity of Organizational Culture

This new model of the complexity of organizational culture, affords an appreciation of the intricacy and sophistication of the cultural environment facing military organizations,

thereby increasing comprehension, and ultimately creating an opportunity for organizations to transcend average and become extraordinary. Analysis in subsequent chapters explains the construction of this new model, as well as derives assumptions that may assist a leader who chooses to change his unit's culture.

Key Disclaimers

While this thesis applies to all organizations within the Defense Department, it generally focuses on improving the performance of conventional, general purpose units. Even though this thesis recommends that general purpose organizations adopt some of the best cultural practices of the business world and special operations organizations, it does not make all-encompassing generalizations. Cultural innovations initiated by the private sector and academia are sometimes discounted by military theorists as driven by a profit motive or as feel-good, overly sensitive esoteric nonsense that has no place within military culture. This thesis challenges military leaders to consider varied options, discount those that do not apply to their specific situation, but then attempt other techniques in any area where their organization is not operating at optimal effectiveness.

This thesis does not apply to and is not a condemnation of all conventional or general purpose organizations, many of which benefit from model workplace environments and cultures. While some private sector theories may not have military application, analysis irrefutably challenges some of what military leaders have believed and practiced. Additionally, although this thesis lauds some qualities of special operations organizations, not all special operations units are worthy of emulation. Some of the very cultural characteristics that enable special operations organizations to develop a positive culture can lead to negative results in conventional situations.

Individuals who have studied and examined leadership may not find many new or revolutionary concepts within this thesis. None the less, the movement from a leader-centric to an organizational culture-centric focus provides imaginative perspective for leaders to explore. If a leader should decide to adopt some of the more radical recommendations within this thesis, he or she should realize that some may view these concepts as extreme and proceeding may seem threatening to traditional norms and customs. A leader should only employ the more innovative elements of this thesis with the full knowledge and support of his or her higher headquarters.

Summary

Recent events have exposed the inadequacy of some aspects of DoD culture, which until now have been ineffective, yet tolerable. Anticipating a near term future of continued complex threats highlights the need for military organizations to increase capabilities despite a likely reduction of resources. Analyzing the best practices of academics, innovative businesses, and special operations units provides insight into alternative methods that could create more effective organizations throughout the Defense Department. By implementing the recommendations within this thesis, a supervisor desiring to modify his or her unit's behavior within a workplace environment will have a starting point for creating a more effective and adaptive organization—one that is capable of reaching its full operational potential.

This Page Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER 2: DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Defining and understanding the term “culture” is imperative when considering whether or not to modify a specific organization’s culture. Culture, manifest in the environment that encompasses the workplace, is a powerful component that shapes how an organization functions, the effectiveness of the organization, the relationships between workers, and the level of enjoyment of the work force. While culture is not physically visible, the effects of a culture are often observed and moreover felt in an organization’s morale, spirit, energy, and effectiveness.

Despite the somewhat latent nature of organizational culture, it is perhaps the most important attribute affecting an organization’s ability to function well. Attitudes, morale, and discipline are all indicators of the quality of an organization’s culture. General Mattis believes that in this age, how people view things and their resultant attitudes and morale are the new high ground that leaders must win as a fundamental strategy to establishing an effective culture.¹ Napoleon Bonaparte placed great value on high morale stating, “...morale is to the physical as three is to one.”² Given the inarguable importance of culture within an organization, a commander would do well to understand what constitutes a unit’s culture and what is in his power to adjust or change.

Culture Defined

Experts provide fairly similar and consistent definitions of organizational culture over the years. Primarily written as a general definition of cultures

¹ Mattis, "Developing and Retaining," 2010.

² Peter G. Tsouras, *The Book of Military Quotations* (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2005), 286.

throughout society, the following definitions also apply to organizations within the Defense Department.

A set of common understandings around which action is organized...finding expression in language whose nuances are peculiar to the group.³

A set of understandings or meanings shared by a group of people that are largely tacit among members and are clearly relevant and distinctive to the particular group which are also passed on to new members.⁴

A system of knowledge, of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating and acting . . . that serve to relate human communities to their environmental settings.⁵

...beliefs create an organizational culture, marked and accentuated by: (1) the way the organization has defined success in operational terms; (2) selective information available to the organization; (3) special systems or technologies operated by the organization in performing its task; (4) professional norms for recruitment and tenure of personnel in the organization; (5) the experience of making "street level" decisions, and (6) distribution of rewards by the organization.⁶

Every military unit has a unique culture, and every subordinate element within a unit has a culture that is affected by its higher headquarter, but is separate and distinct in its own right.

...distinct societies are composites of interacting subcultures rather than a single overarching culture. Organizations consist of subgroups that have specific characteristics and a sense of identification. Within organizations, people can easily classify themselves and others into various social categories or groups based on identification with their primary work group,

³ H.S. Becker and B. Geer, "Latent Culture," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, September 1, 1960, 303-313.

⁴ M.R. Louis, "Organizations as Culture-Bearing Milieux," *In Organizational Symbolism* (JAI), 1980, 84.

⁵ Y. Allaire and M.E. Firsirotu, "Theories of Organizational Culture," *Organization Studies*, 1984, 193-226.

⁶ Graham Allison and Philip Zelinkow, *Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 1999), 167.

occupational or professional skills, union membership, or age cohort.⁷

Leaders must understand the complexity of sub-cultures within their unit since basic communication techniques and methods must cross sub-cultural boundaries in an inclusive manner that appeals to the unit as a whole.

Within the Defense Department, organizations tend to draw closer together than ordinary businesses or civilian organizations. Long deployments force close, continuous contact within the unit and cause individuals to turn to unit members for emotional support when they otherwise would have relied on family members. Also, sharing physical misery and sometimes danger develops deep, emotional, almost familial ties. This all-encompassing nature of culture has a direct impact on and often defines or explains individual and collective behaviors. Regardless of what an organization's leaders say, watching what the organization actually does is the true indicator of its culture. Simply put, culture within military organizations is the overarching term that encompasses and explains a unit's collective human domain and its generally accepted rules for working together, how it views itself, how it performs, and how it relates to other units.

While culture is a reflection of the "whole" of an organization's environment, to understand culture requires a break out of the characteristics and attributes that compose an organization's culture. Complex and intricate links connect the

⁷ William G. Ouchi, "Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25, 1980, 129-141; Blake E. Ashforth and Fred Mael, "Social Identity Theory and the Organization," *Academy of Management Review* 14, no.1, 1989, 20-39 as quoted in National Defense University, "National Defense University," *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making*, December 20, 2010, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/cont.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).

characteristics and attributes of culture. To help understand complex issues, Major General Sacolick recommends the technique of visualizing success and looking at the problem as if it were a maze. Sometimes this is best done by starting at the end state and moving back towards the beginning.⁸ Therefore, visualizing the desired end state of an effective culture provides a point of departure when pinpointing and defining the attributes that characterize a desirable organizational culture.

A start point for this examination is the identification of the basic, foundational characteristics of positive military culture. While the finer and intricate facets of military organizational culture require deeper examination, the basic elements are more easily identifiable. These “first principles” of military organizations are unchanging and enduring. An organization simply must inculcate these first principles at its core, with no misgivings about the importance of and organizational commitment to these non-negotiable attributes.

First Principles of Military Organizational Culture

First principles on which to build effective organizational culture transcend all types of organizations, large and small, civilian, and military. All organizations have first principles, but some have the wrong first or underlying principles that can lead to unethical or corrupt behavior.⁹ Correct first principles are part of the required DNA for any organization operating at a high level. By considering the definitions of culture provided earlier, some would argue that first principles are not part of organizational culture. After all, the terms in the definitions such as

⁸ Sacolick, personal communication.

⁹ The financial scams of Enron and Bernie Madoff would not have been possible if those organizations operated on the first principles this thesis recommends. In the military domain, the Third Reich of Nazi Germany could not have conducted genocide during WWII had it been based on a more robust set of first principles.

“common understandings,” “nuances peculiar to the group,” or “standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating and acting,” do not approach the gravity of the first principles this thesis identifies.¹⁰ However, if an organization lacks the qualities described in the first principles, it has no chance of freely operating within the bounds of legal, moral, and ethical behavior, or withstanding adversity while effectively functioning within the structure of the larger DoD.

Identifying military cultural first principles requires pinpointing those timeless, foundational, internalized truths that comprise the basic elements of an organization. This necessitates discriminating judgment, given the vast number of options and alternatives from which to choose. Identifying cultural first principles is less of a scientific endeavor than a psychological examination. Examinations of private sector companies and military organizations reveal numerous options for potential first principles.

The first principles that appear to matter most in establishing a positive military organizational culture are purpose, responsibility, loyalty, trust, integrity, conformity, and courage. These first principles are inextricably connected, yet have distinguishing characteristics that make them individually important. Though traditional leadership instruction primarily mentions elements similar to these first principles as desired individual characteristics or traits, this thesis uses these

¹⁰ A study from the National Defense University argues to “Don't oversimplify culture or confuse it with climate, values, or corporate philosophy. Culture *underlies* and largely *determines* these other variables.” While a valid rationale, in order to change culture, this thesis argues that establishing the right first principles is the priority and that a positive culture can only emanate from a correct set of first principles. National Defense University, *Strategic Leadership*, 2010.

principles in the context of establishing the foundation of an organization's culture.¹¹

Purpose

A high sense of purpose or relevance is perhaps the most important principle present in high performing organizations. All organizations have a purpose, but if a workforce knows that its efforts and sacrifices contribute to something that matters, it can reach higher levels of performance. To commit and dedicate efforts to a higher cause can in and of itself bring positive energy to the workplace environment. Organizational purpose taps into intrinsic motivation, emphasizing that one is contributing to something of importance, that one's effort is not about oneself, but rather in support of a higher calling. Purpose subsequently leads to personal buy-in and commitment to ensure the organization is successful.

For many military organizations preparing for a combat deployment, deriving a sense of purpose comes easily. Individuals can see a direct and immediate link between their current training and the need for near term focus and effort. Maintaining a high sense of purpose usually comes easily for special operations organizations that frequently experience deployments and that require high proficiency with relatively little time to prepare. Organizations within the general purpose force may lose a sense of purpose if there is not a deployment or other major event scheduled in their immediate future.

¹¹ Leadership manuals from the US Marines, Army, and Air Force all list desired leadership characteristics and traits. See U.S. Department of the Navy, *Leading Marines, Field Manual 1-0*. (Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of Defense, 1995), 103; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, Field Manual 6-22* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), 2-2, 4-1 - 4-16; U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), 3-8.

In some military organizations that have a broad scope of responsibilities and specialties, sections with a closer proximity to physical danger tend to have a higher sense of purpose. If individuals do not feel their work is important or relevant, they will have a proportional loss of belief that their work matters. In these organizations it is incumbent on the organization's leadership to communicate a high sense of purpose across the entire unit. Leaders must ensure a sense of teamwork. Proximity to the enemy is not directly related to importance of one's job, regardless of how mundane, since the organization cannot attain full mission accomplishment without all sections of the unit doing their part. An organization that does not possess a high sense of purpose may face challenges establishing a positive organizational culture. Conversely, a unit with a high sense purpose inherently possesses great organizational energy that if focused, can result in higher performance.

Responsibility

Like all the first principles of military organizational culture, demonstrating responsibility begins with unit leadership and spreads to the remainder of the organization. An organization that embraces responsibility places a premium on high standards of performance, individual accountability, and discipline. Leadership within this type of organization also displays willingness, even eagerness, to accept responsibility for the organization's actions, especially in the execution of high risk missions. This willingness for accountability is often visible in the acceptance of blame when things do not go as planned. General Dwight D. Eisenhower demonstrated this deep understanding of responsibility by drafting a

letter accepting full responsibility if the D-Day invasion into Normandy failed.

“The troops, the air and the navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attributes to the attempt it is mine alone.”¹²

An acceptance of culpability by organizational leadership is the surest way to make certain that a unit does not develop a risk averse mentality. This type of organization does not undertake unnecessarily dangerous missions, but neither does it shy away from hazardous missions when the need arises. Instead, the leadership takes visible interest in mitigation efforts to reduce risk as much as possible without detracting from the ultimate purpose of the mission. Once the mission commences, there is no doubt that the leadership will absorb any blame resulting from the mission not proceeding as planned, which enables the individuals executing the operation to pursue the desired end state with vigor and intensity, thereby giving the mission the best chance for success.

Loyalty

Loyalty, or commitment, is the key to dedicated involvement and developing a sense of ownership of an organization’s mission success. If individuals do not have a sense of loyalty to their unit, they are not involved and subsequently not committed. Individuals loyal to an organization, who observe their leaders demonstrate reciprocating loyalty through acceptance of responsibility for their actions, will assume a high level of commitment to the organization.

Reciprocating loyalty between the leadership and a work force develops a strong

¹² See APPENDIX A for copy of actual document. Dwight D. Eisenhower, General, "National Archives," *Teaching With Documents*, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-message/images/failure-message.gif> (accessed January 15, 2011).

partnership where the collective workforce sees itself as part of the overall solution, or at least partially responsible for the unit's overall direction.

U.S Army Major General (Retired) William T. Garrison demonstrated uncommon loyalty in 1993 following the highly publicized mission to capture a rogue warlord in Somalia that resulted in numerous American casualties. Even though there were multiple influencing factors that he could have blamed, Major General Garrison sent a hand written letter through Congressman Murtha to President Clinton, that pointed the finger only at himself.

The authority, responsibility and accountability for the mission rests here in Mog [Mogadishu] with the TF Ranger Commander, not in Washington...President Clinton and Sec Aspin need to be taken off the blame line.¹³

Though a lesser man would have likely blamed his superiors for turning down earlier requests for armored vehicles, Major General Garrison willingly shouldered the load, protecting his superiors and his unit from blame, knowing it would likely mean the end of his career.¹⁴

Highly successful business practitioner Stephen Covey believes that leaders will find that demonstrating loyalty and commitment to their unit is an effective way to build confidence and trust. Conversely, to break commitments is a quick way to destroy trust. When you make a commitment you build hope, when you keep commitments you build trust.¹⁵

¹³ See APPENDIX A for a copy of the actual document. William T. Garrison, Major General, "The Philadelphia Enquirer," *Blackhawk Down*, <http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/dec14/garrison.asp> (accessed January 15, 2011); Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 337-338.

¹⁴ Karen Deyoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 355.

¹⁵ Stephen M.R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything* (New York: Free Press, 2006), 215.

Trust

The first principle that emanates from a strong sense of loyalty is trust. High levels of trust are built over time, and like loyalty, radiate laterally as well as vertically throughout an organization. Trust is often visible when communication links are lost and organizational elements must operate on their own when they are accustomed to working collectively. An organization with high levels of trust tends to give others the benefit of the doubt, making the assumption that the other element is operating in the best interest of the organization, even when the situation may indicate otherwise. Trust in subordinates is directly tied to subordinate initiative. Steven Covey writes of operating at the “speed of trust.” “When trust goes up, so does confidence, speed of action, efficiency, morale, vice versa, trust goes down, so does everything else.”¹⁶

Understanding what often causes subordinates to lose trust gives insight into cultural traps to avoid. Leadership mentor Major General Perry Smith believes that leaders must take great care ensuring they send the right message to their organizations.

“People who say “I never want to be surprised,” or “check with me before you start anything,” or “I’m off on a trip; I’ll call for an update” are sending out a very strong “I don’t trust you” message to their subordinates. People who know they are not trusted will never contribute at their full potential.”¹⁷

When subordinates see a difference in what leaders say and what they do, there is an immediate loss of trust and increase of suspicion. Individuals are quick to trust when they see behavior match stated values. Leaders must ensure

¹⁶ Covey, *The Speed of Trust*, 13-26.

¹⁷ Perry M. Smith, "Learning to Lead," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 2001, 36-40.

consistency in all aspects of managing and leading an organization. “Building trust is one of the most important principles a leader can perform...it is a conscious act, not something that just happens...[leaders] must actively build [trust] through words and actions.”¹⁸

Integrity

Organizations display integrity by having a set of values that they follow as the everyday norm. Organizational integrity ties closely with loyalty and trust, and is also visible laterally as well as vertically. Integrity knits together other first principles and lays the foundation for the cultural sub-elements covered later in this thesis. General Mattis believes integrity becomes more important when organizations face adversity. “We need officers who do not run ethical sidelines, rather who have strong personal, emotional shock absorbers to accommodate the shock that our fighting units will take.”¹⁹ Though General Mattis was speaking of integrity in terms of individual leadership, like other first principles, integrity is displayed organizationally as well.

Many organizations espouse values and ethos, but living up to a consistently high standard can prove difficult. An organization can reliably live its values, but a highly visible failure or a few small missteps in rapid succession can harm a unit’s reputation for living its values. Enforcing values through hierarchical discipline and mandates is important, but of limited worth. Units display true organizational integrity through adherence to unit ethos, individual accountability,

¹⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices* (Suffolk, Joint Warfighting Center, 2008), 16.

¹⁹ Mattis, "Developing and Retaining," 2010.

and peer enforced organization norms, which fill discipline gaps and ensure unit members make good decisions, regardless of the presence of formal leadership.

Conformity

Organizational conformity reflects the willingness of unit members to sacrifice a bit of their individualism to belong to an entity bigger than themselves—to subordinate self interest and ego to a general purpose. Conformity becomes easier if the organization has a high sense of purpose—a rewarding purpose with which the individuals take pride in associating, thereby creating a desire to adapt and belong. Conformity within an organization is important, but only in the right context.

Healthy conformity reflects an environment of inclusion and diversity, absent of social cliques and ethnic exclusion. Conformity also means a willingness to accept conflict, to listen to varied ideas, or receive feedback and countering opinions. Individualism is still important, since an individual must feel distinctly different from others to maintain a healthy sense of worth. Some of the most creative individuals are sometimes viewed as eccentric or unconventional, but still must willingly desire to take on the group norms, customs, and standards. The entertainment industry leader, Netflix Corporation, espouses values that say they will tolerate “brilliant jerks,” but only if the individuals embody other company values and ethos, and not at the expense of workplace harmony.²⁰ The best organizations have environments of conformity, with many individuals having

²⁰ Netflix Corporation, "Reference Guide on our Freedom & Responsibility Culture," (Slideshare, Present Yourself), January 1, 2011, <http://www.slideshare.net/search/slideshow?searchfrom=header&q=netflix> (accessed January 6, 2011).

acquired the unit's values and norms, and collectively working toward a common goal.

Courage

Of all the first principles, courage is the one least associated as a unit attribute. It is almost exclusively considered a desirable individual characteristic. But the necessity for organizational courage presents itself daily, from conducting the routine business of the day through executing difficult missions in austere conditions. Organizational courage does not refer to an obscure, mysterious definition that is hard to visualize unless brought on by the happenings of dramatic events or crisis. Well functioning organizations continuously display courage on multiple fronts, every single day.

Units reflect organizational courage as a genuine demeanor, often displayed through candor and a willingness to confront and work through difficult issues. An organization that possesses courage displays great introspection, conducting thorough and honest after action reviews and sincere performance counseling. It never takes the path of least resistance regardless of the immediate unpopularity of its actions. It is the organizational embodiment of the West Point cadet prayer that encourages every cadet to choose "the harder right instead of the easier wrong."²¹ It is best if unit leadership establishes these attributes, but even lacking strong leadership an organization can imbue these characteristics. The famous Band of Brothers of the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment in WWII is an example of an organization that embodied courageous conduct as a group norm through its

²¹ U.S. Military Academy, *Office of the USMA Chaplain, Cadet Prayer*, <http://www.usma.edu/chaplain/> (accessed January 15, 2011).

numerous exemplary combat actions despite adversity and great danger.²² In the business world, many recognize the Ford Corporation as exhibiting organizational courage by not accepting U.S. Government bailout funds, even though it would have made their ability to withstand difficult economic times easier.²³ A unit that aspires to set itself apart, to rise above the average, requires a culture of disciplined individuals, working passionately for a common goal, and this is displayed through organizational courage. Disciplined individuals, engaged in disciplined thought, take disciplined actions for the betterment of the organization.²⁴

Summary

Possessing a keen understanding of the definition of culture and selecting appropriate first principles are an important starting point when deciding whether or not to modify organizational culture. While there are arguably more or differing first principles from those identified above, a watering down and resultant loss of focus by creating an all inclusive list does not provide the clarity needed to increase cultural understanding. This understanding of organizational culture provides a starting point for those seeking to modify their organization's behavior and cultural ethos.

Considering the various linkages between the first principles provides the initial input into a new model. While the first principles are invariable connected to each other to some degree, the simple illustration in Figure 2-1 depicts where

²² Richard D. Winters and Cole C. Kingseed, *Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters* (New York: Penguin Group, 2006) .

²³ Bloomberg Business Report, "Ford Image Goes Way Up for not Taking Taxpayer Money," May 1, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/brandnewday/archives/2009/05/ford_image_goes_way_up_for_not_taking_taxpayer_money.html (accessed January 15, 2011).

²⁴ Jim Collins, *Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don't* (Harper Collins Publishers: New York, 2001), 127-129; Sacolick, personal communication.

they are interdependent to a large extent. This figure provides the beginning point for building a new model that depicts the complexity of organizational culture.




Figure 2-1: Linkages between First Principles

Thinking in terms of these first principles as organizational attributes instead of individual attributes requires adaptive thought. Imagine the framework required for an organization to exhibit courage, loyalty or other previously identified first principles. If the formal and informal leadership within an organization exhibits and practices these characteristics, they become part of the unit's ethos or norms, and the organization will exhibit the characteristics regardless of the physical presence of unit leadership. Individuals within the unit will make decisions based on supporting and furthering the unit ethos, even when, if left to their individual devices they may have chosen a less courageous or easier path.

Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of organizational culture, one should consider the current situation facing the Defense Department. This includes the challenge of dealing with an expected lengthy period of budgetary constraints and an analysis of projected threats. A discussion of change—what drives change and considerations regarding whether DoD organizations require

cultural change, further sets the scene and provides an appreciation of the complexity of modifying organizational culture.

CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT SITUATION

An understanding of the circumstances and conditions facing military organizations gives insight into whether DoD organizations should modify their cultures, and if so, in which way and at what magnitude. An examination of the current state of affairs and the near term expectations within the upcoming decade provides that understanding. An assessment of potential enemy threats and the Defense Department's ability to counter prospective threats gives leaders context for deciding whether their organizations need cultural change to meet upcoming challenges. Further analysis of change, with an understanding of what drives changes, provides background for leaders to appreciate the challenges they will face in orchestrating organizational change.

The Current Situation

From the end of Operation DESERT STORM through the 1990s, the Defense Department struggled to find its role and direction. The success realized in Operation DESERT STORM unfortunately reinforced the belief that highly linear and structured Cold War tactics and its associated major equipment programs adequately provided the capability to counter future threats. This belief misled DoD leadership into allowing an already entrenched culture to remain, instead of driving it to change, adapt, or otherwise explore alternatives to counter emerging threats and meet potential expanded missions. During the 1990s, the Defense Department was too busy. The high tempo of deployment required to meet obligations in numerous peace-keeping and humanitarian missions further detracted from identifying doctrine gaps, addressing cultural shifts, and preparing the force to meet the threat America would face in the new century. It took exasperating conditions in Iraq and lesser, but still significant, capability gaps in Afghanistan to sound

the wakeup call that the Defense Department was facing a type of war it had not expected and for which it had not prepared.

Over the past decade of war, the Defense Department implemented numerous changes in equipment, task organization, and doctrine, including “transformation” circa 2002 and, most recently, the new doctrine and methods needed to meet counterinsurgency threats.¹ Improvements in technology, developments in doctrine to counter changing enemy threats, and the general modernization of the comprehensive military apparatus were all needed to meet unanticipated requirements. Similarly, this period of war produced a generation of experienced and effective junior leaders who had proven their mettle on the battlefield. These leaders exude confidence and poise earned from executing tough jobs well, often in dangerous environments requiring their free use of initiative and best judgment. The changes of the last decade were primarily implemented in a reactive, crisis mode as stop-gap measures for obvious shortcomings. To reduce the likelihood of similar miscalculations in the future requires forward thinking and anticipation of requirements, which in turn will provide insight into near term expectations for the next decade.

Near Term Expectations

The impending drawdown in Iraq and presumed reduction in forces in Afghanistan will drive a period of transition as the Defense Department recedes from a norm of fighting wars on two fronts. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has ordered DoD officials to find \$100 billion in budget cuts over the next five years.² To pay for necessary

¹ Rumsfeld, 21st Century Transformation; U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).

² Rick Maze, "Webb: Don't Cut Military Pay or Bennies," *Army Times*, November 8, 2010, 8;

modernization initiatives, one can expect the Defense Department to reduce its overall force structure.³ Virginia Senator James Webb confirmed the force will likely shrink, stating that the most significant reductions would come in force structure, such as rolling back the size of the Army and Marine Corps after troops are withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴ Emerging governmental policy appears to trend toward tighter Defense Department fiscal constraints and additional defense budget reductions to fund economic revitalization programs and social programs such as health care. Regardless of the likelihood of a smaller force and reduced resources, many senior leaders and analysts predict enduring deployments to meet security requirements.

In its latest report on the Joint Operating Environment, the Joint Forces Command predicts that within the next decade the U.S. will almost undoubtedly find itself involved in combat.

“Such involvement could come in the form of a major regular conflict or in a series of wars against insurgencies...not only against terrorist organizations but also against those who sponsor them...the only matter that is certain is that joint forces will find themselves committed to conflict.”⁵

Preparing for the myriad of threats the U.S. is likely to encounter requires a highly flexible and agile Joint force.

Anticipating and meeting potential obligations requires a DoD culture of expecting the unexpected combined with increasingly agile and flexible applications of capabilities. Continued reliance on inflexible, prescriptive planning times associated with targeting

Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, "Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies," *Speech*, Washington DC, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechID=1527>, January 6, 2011.

³ Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," 28; Gates, Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, 2011.

⁴ Secretary Gates confirmed that among other cuts, the Army will lose approximately 27,000 troops and the Marines will lose up to 20,000 positions. See Maze, "Webb: Don't Cut," 8; Gates, Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, 2011.

⁵ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*, (Suffolk, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010), 62.

and planning cycles may not seize opportunities that the enemy presents. Conceptually, this is not just about moving faster in a time-sensitive targeting mode, but rather adapting to whatever weakness the enemy exposes. The daunting challenge is to prepare for wars that remain uncertain as to their form, location, the sophistication of the enemy, and contributions from potential allies. General Mattis recognizes the uncertainty of preparing for the unknown by stressing that the Defense Department must maintain full visibility of potential conflicts. Addressing those who would pigeon-hole future defense structures, General Mattis argues that “planners cannot adopt a single preclusive view of war...we must not repeat previous mistakes like embracing wishful thinking regarding enemy capacity while espousing untested concepts as capabilities.”⁶ While the next decade will likely require the Defense Department to maintain a forward security posture, including continued participation in combat operations, the anticipated budget reductions and decline in force structure and resources is eerily reminiscent of previous interwar periods. Appreciating the patterns, nuances, and lessons learned from previous interwar periods gives insight into the pitfalls and difficulties the Defense Department is likely to face in the near term.

Previous Interwar Periods

Throughout U.S. history, interwar periods have proven to be difficult times for the military. This consistent phenomenon has occurred following every U.S. war or significant military action as the pendulum swings from full support of the military prior to and during a conflict to injurious reductions of budgets and force structure afterwards. Budget and manning reductions reflect the general loss of political and public support for maintaining a robust military capability shortly after the conclusions of combat

⁶ Mattis, “Irregular War,” 2009.

operations. Excessive reductions are usually only corrected when emerging threats force renewed investment in the Defense Department.

While dealing with reductions in budgets and personnel, interwar periods are ideal times for transitions, as services look for relevance in anticipation of future requirements. Additionally, issues become noticed that otherwise may have been ignored during war time periods. This was precisely the case throughout the late 1990s when the Army culture perpetuated increasingly poor environments that finally came to a head in the form of a dramatic increase of junior officers leaving the service at their first opportunity.⁷ In 2000, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki ordered a Blue Ribbon Panel to study leadership and training and provide recommendations to slow the mass departure of junior officers from the Army.⁸

The panel produced revealing and somewhat startling conclusions, which were damning of the Army's leadership. Lieutenant colonels and colonels in command, products of the Cold War era that the junior officers did not relate with, were considered unable to connect with their junior leaders.⁹ Citing the panel's conclusions while exploring the leadership failings of the era, Professor Leonard Wong of the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute identified a generational divide. Army lieutenants and captains of the era had remarkably different experiences from their leaders, which perpetuated a belief that the senior leaders were out of touch, and that "the Army's senior

⁷ The percentage of voluntary losses of captains per year nearly doubled from 6.5% in 1995 to 11.6% in 2000. See Mark R. Lewis, "Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus," *Armed Forces and Society*, 2004, 63-93, Table 1.

⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to The Army*, (Washington DC: Army Training Leader Development Panel, June 30, 2003). <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415810&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2011).

⁹ Ibid.

leadership is not connected with the reality of the trenches.”¹⁰ A *Washington Post* article brought to light especially harsh revelations from the study, citing the perceptions that “top down loyalty doesn’t exist” and the belief that senior leaders would “throw subordinates under the bus in a heartbeat to protect and advance their careers.”¹¹

The statistics undeniably show that high quality junior officers were leaving the Army at higher rates than they were a few years earlier.¹² What the services did not realize was a crisis in leadership culture during the transition from the Cold War era was all too easily understood by junior officers rising through the ranks. General Shinseki and others were pinpointing and bearing down on the problems created by the increasingly intolerable military culture when external events forced a shift of focus.

The events of September 11, 2001 ended the debate on service culture as the force at large prepared for the impending wars that would consume the next decade. Today, given an understanding of previous interwar periods, and the high probability of budget and force reductions in the near future, leaders must anticipate the pendulum swing away from full support of the Defense Department, toward challenging times for the military. Continuing to look to the future, an understanding of the projected threats and anticipated conflicts provides further insight into the inadequacy of the Defense Department’s organizational culture to meet impending challenges.

¹⁰ Leonard Wong, *Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officers Corps* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 3.

¹¹ Thomas E. Ricks, "Younger Officers Quit Army at Fast Clip; Study Finds Little Trust in Senior Leadership," *The Washington Post*, April 17, 2000.

¹² Wong, *Generations Apart*, 2000, 14; The percentage of voluntary losses of captains per year nearly doubled from 6.5% in 1995 to 11.6% in 2000. Lewis, “Army Transformation,” 2004, 65, Table 1.

Future Threats

There is a remarkable consensus among analysts and experts about the future threats to U.S. interests. Unfortunately, the predictions forecast a diverse array of threats that will require the Defense Department to maintain a full spectrum of capabilities. Retired General Gary Luck, a senior advisor and contributor to Joint Forces Command, describes the enemy as a “hybrid threat,” an increasingly widely used term that describes and identifies America’s future adversaries.

Hybrid describes the increasing complexity of war, the multiplicity of the actors involved and the blurring between simple categories of conflict. Innovative and learning adversaries have employed unique approaches to unbalance an enemy throughout history. What makes today’s hybrid challenges particularly threatening is the combination of lethal technology and the protracted and population-centric nature of contemporary conflicts. Future adversaries will work through surrogates, including terrorist and criminal networks, manipulate access to energy resources and markets, and exploit perceived economic and diplomatic leverage in order to complicate our plans....placing a premium on our ability to innovate and adapt.¹³

While “hybrid” describes the threat, the conflicts will likely embody equally complex and difficult to anticipate characteristics. Projections of future conflicts predict that hybrid threats will come from a greater number of state and non-state actors employing a range and mix of military and non-military instruments to achieve their objectives.¹⁴ Terrorist networks will likely seek safe haven within the borders of fragile nations, building capacity and strength within the disarray and turmoil of states that are unable to create order and enforce rule of law.¹⁵ General Luck further expands his discussion of future threats by emphasizing that,

¹³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 66.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” 28.

...the future cannot be predicated upon a single or preclusive vision of conflict at one extreme or the other. We face an era of failed states, destabilized elements and high end asymmetric threats. We must be prepared to adapt rapidly to each specific threat, and not narrowly focus only on preferred modes of warfare.¹⁶

These projected threats and likely conflict scenarios demand that the U.S. field an agile, thinking force at all levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) capable of quickly adapting to changing situations and unanticipated requirements. America's history of failing to prepare to meet emerging threats, as well as the stated need for a highly adaptive force capable of anticipating requirements, gives one cause for a hard look at the organizational culture of military units, with critical introspection and evaluation to determine if units are up to the challenge of cultural change.

Understanding Cultural Change

Attempting to change organizational culture will test a supervisor's leadership ability and a unit's adaptability. According to Professor John Kotter from the Harvard Business School, "Culture is not something that you manipulate easily. Attempts to grab it and twist it into a new shape never work because you can't grab it."¹⁷ Discarding older theories that teach that to alter culture one must first change norms and values, Kotter believes that the key to altering culture lies in changing people's actions and behaviors, and this is a lengthy process. Only after people see the benefit from their new behaviors, over a long period of time, will culture eventually change.¹⁸ Since the course of changing an organization's culture takes several months, even years, the process can last beyond the tenure of a single unit leader, usually spanning several leaders. The inconsistency between sequential leadership priorities and styles contributes to the

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 66.

¹⁷ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1996), 155-156.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 156.

difficulty of modifying unit culture. A leader committed to changing his organization's culture should therefore focus on establishing organizational norms of ideal behaviors intended to last well beyond his departure.

To establish an environment of organizational consistency, with a focus on altering behaviors in order to ultimately improve culture, requires leaders comfortable with making unpopular decisions. The ability for leaders to not only embrace change, but also to manage the transition from one period to the other effectively sets exceptional leaders apart from their peers.¹⁹ Most, if not all, units will resist change. Since leadership must compensate for resistance to change when dealing with minor issues, resistance can significantly inhibit modifying something as ingrained as organizational culture. The level of resistance to modifying organizational culture will cause a corresponding time lag of effects from gaining traction and having an impact. The length of the time lag depends on the magnitude of the change, the reluctance and the level of entrenchment of individuals needing to modify their behavior, and the level of bureaucracy inherent within the unit.²⁰ Unit leadership must constantly monitor the associated risk of attempting to modify an organization's culture, gauging potential impacts with the likelihood of success. This ongoing assessment should determine the pace of integrating change within a particular unit, recognizing that to either proceed too fast or too slow could have adverse results. Given that an ineffective organization's culture likely has general, even if only tacit, "buy-in" from the majority of unit members, the willingness to modify culture will likely meet with great resistance. To sell members of the organization on the need to change aspects of the organization's culture, unit leadership

¹⁹ Sacolick, personal communication.

²⁰ Ibid.

should understand what drives change and therefore how to devise a game plan for implementing change.

What Drives Change?

Change within the military is both driven and inhibited by internal and external factors. While internal factors can drive change, they are more likely to hamper change. In his “military as an ocean liner” analogy, Professor Bryon Greenwald, from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, writes that like changing the direction of a large ocean-going vessel, the inherent bureaucracy and conservative, pluralistic nature of the military can make changing an organization’s direction a very slow and next to impossible task. If change within the military is to occur, external factors such as security requirements and national strategy as they are affected by geography, history, ideology and culture, will create the conditions for the military to acquiesce and accept the adjustment. Additionally, external pressure created by social trends and technological advancements consistently become forcing functions that drive change within the military. Commercially developed equipment enables the military to adapt and advance its capabilities by using modern technology to gain the upper hand over less advanced adversaries. Simultaneously, the progression of liberal democracy creates new social norms that the military must incorporate into its makeup, such as recent modifications to the “don’t ask don’t tell” policy.²¹

For change to gain traction and have lasting effect within the military, a strong leader must champion the cause. Stephen Rosen, professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University, believes that civilians lack the ability to innovate within

²¹ Bryon E. Greenwald, “The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation,” *The Land Warfare Papers* (September 2000), 6-12.

the military since they are outsiders, lacking legitimate authority or power. “In short, military innovation occurs when respected senior officers with traditional credentials formulate a strategy for innovation and create a promotion pathway for junior officers learning and practicing the new way of war.”²² Greenwald confirms the assertion that although mavericks or dissident individuals often voice the need for change, individuals operating outside of the military’s formal structure, without clout or adequate authority, cannot truly bring about lasting change.²³

Simply put, change occurs within the military when external factors highlight a capability gap, provide advanced technology, or clearly show a better way to operate. But the change will not take effect without senior leaders taking up the cause, creating the conditions for the new equipment or methodology to gain a foothold and flourish. When applying this construct to the question of cultural change within the military, one must consider if external factors or advancements provide new insight or methodology, and whether or not senior military leaders are willing to undertake the task of cultural innovation within the military. Since senior leaders would inarguably accept the challenge to modify anything within their purview that they found lacking, the questions becomes whether the current military culture is inadequate, and whether the Defense Department can realize gains by applying varied methods or new thinking.

Is Change Necessary?

Traditionalists might argue that few DoD organizations require any innovation or creative thought, and that the Defense Department would benefit if it merely focused on conducting basic tasks to a high standard. However, the military’s record of failing to

²² Stephen P. Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 251.

²³ Greenwald, “The Anatomy of Change,” 14.

anticipate needed adjustment and slow reaction to recognizing the need to evolve, the latest of which was the inept adaptation to the counter-insurgency fight in Iraq, suggests differently. These indicators suggest that the Defense Department would benefit if leaders at all levels critically examined their respective organizational cultures and took action to adjust their cultural characteristics. This view is itself a shift of focus from leader-centric development to organization culture development. Institutionally, the services rely heavily on “leadership” as a broad heading under which to lump every accomplishment or miss-step of an organization. This characterization ignores the possibility that a marginal leader could supervise an exceptional organization, which maintained effective practices in spite of its leader’s inadequacies. Despite the military’s focus on unit accomplishments, service manuals and junior officer professional military education curriculums remain focused on the development of individual leadership characteristics and competencies. Each service professes its theory through doctrinal manuals and published values and mission statements.²⁴ These service manuals consistently provide summaries and definitions of core values, ethos, and foundational leadership characteristics. The manuals undoubtedly inspire leaders to improve individual performance, providing descriptive methods for developing individual leadership abilities. However, these doctrinal manuals and service internal writings almost exclusively focus on individual leadership, rarely addressing organizational

²⁴ All services have their version of individual leadership instruction through doctrinal manuals and leadership centers of excellence. U.S. Department of the Navy, *Leading Marines*; U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development*; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*.

The U.S. Navy does not have a leadership manual, but has widely published values and ethos statements, as well as the U.S. Naval Academy Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership and the Center for Naval Leadership.

culture—what characteristics make a good culture, what elements to look for and adjust, and just as importantly, which attributes to avoid.

This leader-centric focus inaccurately implies that if one develops individual leadership traits, everything else will take care of itself. The leader-centric approach contributes to disproportionately large egos when units excel and harmful stress when things do not progress as intended. A leader must develop individual leadership traits and characteristics, but that is only half, or possibly less than half, of the solution. As a leader develops mastery of individual leadership traits, he or she must also focus on the rest of the equation, developing a positive organizational culture that creates the best conditions for mission accomplishment, adaptive problem solving, and high morale. Undeniably, the Defense Department needs leaders who passionately focus on self improvement and continuously develop individual skills. But in the end, a leader, whether an Army platoon leader taking command of his first platoon or a Navy captain taking command of a ship, must realize success is really about the unit at large, not about personal objectives or ambitions. Moreover, even self-effacing commanders who instinctively place the unit first need techniques designed to improving a unit's cultural foundation.

Commanders ultimately decide whether their organization's culture is adequate, or if it requires modification. While many organizations possess remarkable capabilities, it is difficult to fathom that a unit could operate continuously at maximum effectiveness or that it would not benefit from slight adjustments or refinement. This situation is especially true when considering the anticipated near term environment, one that includes the traditional interwar characteristics of reduced budgets and resources and the new

requirements for agile, flexible, sophisticated units to counter future hybrid threats. Some DoD senior leaders believe the military must actively adapt to the new era, as opposed to relying on reactive methods that have consistently failed to prepare the military in the past. Their challenge is to change the culture within the Defense Department

Recognizing the potential advantages gained by modifying the Defense Department's organizational culture is not a phenomenon new to this era. Making the case for the current need for change, Secretary Gates referenced his colleague Robert Komer, who led the pacification campaign in Vietnam, who wrote that the overarching national military apparatus needed improvement in numerous areas during the Vietnam period. Komer went on to highlight that the predispositions of institutions prevented them from adapting long after they identified problems and proposed solutions. This condition manifest itself through,

...a reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, the attempt to run with a peacetime management structure and peacetime practices, a belief that the current set of problems either was an aberration or would soon be over, and the tendency for problems that did not fit organizations' inherited structures and preferences to fall through the cracks.²⁵

General Mattis believes that preparing for irregular warfare must become the primary focus of our forces in order to produce operationally savvy troops able to shift from one form of warfare to another. To respond to the hybrid threat, general purpose forces must move capably and freely between conventional and unconventional or high tech and low tech environments. Since there is no template to plan against and no textbook answer to rely upon, this capacity requires new and better training and thinking at all levels. Mattis warns that if the Defense Department fails to create this more agile and flexible, better

²⁵ Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," 28.

thinking force, the military will maintain its conventional dominance, yet become irrelevant. The way to avoid irrelevance is through maintaining conventional superiority while gaining the ability to wage irregular war as a core competency.²⁶

In a more universal sense, Major General Sacolick believes that organizations excel when they exercise high levels of introspection, remaining in a constant state of change. This is only possible through an organizational culture that accepts change as a daily norm as opposed to something to avoid at all cost. Just about everything (tactics, equipment, and techniques) becomes antiquated and obsolete over time. If a unit is not searching for what it can improve, it simply is not working to its full potential. Leaders must identify and correct obsolescence. This quest only occurs through continuous self-scrutiny and, more than merely willingness to change—which implies a unit will change when it needs to—a desire to change and try new things as a matter of daily life. Leaders do not have to do this entirely by themselves if they have created a climate of change where their people have demonstrated a willingness to learn, accept responsibility, and perpetually reinvent the organization.²⁷

Summary

Leaders must understand the current situation and anticipate their unit's challenges when deciding if their organization is prepared to meet future requirements. Given that senior leaders predict interwar-type draw downs, the persistent requirement to counter emerging hybrid threats necessitates highly effective organizations able to adjust and rapidly shift efforts in ambiguous and fluid situations. Understanding what causes, and perhaps more importantly, what inhibits change, increases the possibility of success for

²⁶ Mattis, "Irregular War," 2009.

²⁷ Sacolick, personal communication.

leaders who desire to modify their unit's methods and techniques. When instituting change, leaders should focus on altering individual behavior. By altering individual behaviors in a manner that establishes the better behaviors as the unit norm, the organization's culture will eventually change for the better. Finally, somewhat paradoxically, while the services need an institutional shift from leader-centric to organizational-centric development, leaders must individually decide whether their organizations require cultural change.

Some senior leaders like General Mattis believe cultural change and holistic organizational adjustments are necessary for the Defense Department to remain relevant. Others, such as Major General Sacolick, value ruthless introspection, believing that the best units continuously reinvent themselves as a matter of course. Both are correct. Indeed, lasting organizational adjustments will only occur in an environment that rewards ruthless introspections and reinvention.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYZING OTHER CULTURES

The premise that external drivers instigate the majority of change within the military compels research into what the business world and academia have learned regarding organizational culture. Unlike technological advancements where companies hawk their goods to the Defense Department's industrial machine, business cultural advancements and scientific developments identified through academia may lay dormant if not sought out and investigated by military leaders and thinkers. Not surprisingly, given the importance and relationship of culture to an organization's effectiveness, the academic and business communities have, in fact, made advancements in modifying workplace environments designed to tap into their workers' motivation and creativity, while maximizing efficiency and effectiveness.

Identifying credible academics and companies who utilize innovative cultural concepts provides understanding and context for determining possible cultural adjustments available to military leaders. The theories of the academics and the practices of companies discussed in this chapter reflect heavily throughout the remainder of this thesis, resulting in the final recommendations and synthesis. Further, running discussions and interviews with various individuals and senior leaders within special operations organizations revealed that some special operations organizations have adopted many of the techniques recommended by academia and practiced in the business world. An analysis of what academia has learned and cultural practices already implemented by high performing businesses and special operations units provides insight into potential options that general purpose force organizations may wish to test or employ.

Academics

Numerous academic research projects result in dozens of books and new theories intended to substantiate breakthroughs and provide new methods for creating great organizational culture. Contradictory theories abound. For every new concept, someone will publish an argument to disprove the theory.¹ Yet, the collective field of study has undoubtedly afforded increased understanding, with some academics inarguably providing answers and concepts worthy of application. Also, an increased application of scientific principles provides factual data that one cannot ignore. Of the numerous academics who have studied organizational aspects complimentary to this thesis, the ideas and studies of Jim Collins and Daniel Pink provide the most substantial contributions. Collins and Pink set themselves apart by their disciplined application of scientific principles that increases understanding and ultimately gives insight into repeatable behaviors that other organizations can replicate.

Jim Collins

Jim Collins is a distinguished author and researcher, widely recognized for his reliance on scientific research and analytical approaches to finding pragmatic solutions and effective techniques. Mr. Collins' study of the performance of 1,435 companies over the course of 40 years enabled him to delineate clearly which companies were "good," but more importantly, which 11 companies made the transition to becoming "great."

¹ For example, Malcolm Gladwell's concepts in his book *Blink*, where immediately countered by Michael LeGault's ideas in his book, *Think*. See, Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005); Michael R. LeGault, *Think: Why Crucial Decisions Can't Be Made in the Blink of an Eye* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006)

Detailed analysis of the 11 “great” companies reveals consistent themes and repeatable characteristic that are transferable to military organizations.²

Daniel H. Pink

Daniel Pink is a contemporary theorist who has made a name for himself by formulating theories and providing synthesis of earlier scientific studies. A bestselling author and prolific speaker within the corporate world, Mr. Pink’s latest book, *Drive: the Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us*, debunks antiquated theories concerning motivation. Focusing on identifying organizational attributes that attract highly talented individuals and create environments of increased productivity, he gives concrete options supported by scientific studies. Mr. Pink’s recommendations enable an organization to create the conditions for high performance, while tapping into its best creative thought and problem solving abilities.³

Businesses

The number of companies employing innovative business practices is growing rapidly. Though many adaptive and innovative companies provide examples that bear out the specific concepts in this thesis, the scope of this study only allows detailed scrutiny of a few. Although the business practices of Google and Amgen receive mention, the two thriving companies this thesis will highlight are Netflix Corporation and Toms Shoes.⁴

² Collins, *Good to Great*.

³ Daniel H. Pink, *Drive: the Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009)

⁴ This thesis will later highlight Amgen’s focus on reducing bureaucracy, increasing discipline, and providing their scientists with research autonomy, and Google’s ability to tap into their worker’s creative talents through providing them with autonomy over their time and projects.

Netflix Corporation

Netflix is widely known for its movie rental business model, but what is not readily apparent is the remarkable culture that keeps Netflix a viable, growing company—one that continues to branch into new areas in an extremely competitive market.⁵ Having reinvented itself in anticipation of shifts in the entertainment industry, Netflix has little resemblance of its original 1997 business model. Using different techniques with salaried and wage workers, Netflix wage workers focus on the lower level day to day company operations while salaried worker receive high levels of autonomy over their time and duties. The Netflix “highly aligned, loosely coupled” philosophy for its salaried workers reflect its values and a focus on innovation and productivity. Netflix takes pride in the corporation functioning like a professional sports team that pays well for the best talent, but refuses to accept mediocrity—“adequate performance gets a generous severance package.” Netflix places the highest value on maintaining a large pool of highly talented individuals, which enables it to operate with minimal bureaucracy.⁶

Toms Shoes

Toms Shoes’ true genius, what makes Toms different and sets it apart from competitors, is its business model that taps into one of mankind’s most powerful driving motivator—purpose. Toms is a hip and trendy company with a product of moderate quality, originality, and price, that values philanthropy and making the world a better place. For every pair of Toms Shoes sold, the owner, Blake Mycoskie, gives a pair of shoes to a needy child in an underdeveloped country. Toms’ workers possess high

⁵ Netflix is the world’s leading internet subscription service for movies and television shows. Netflix has continuously increased its market share while other companies in the field struggle. See, Nick Wingfield, “Netflix Boss Plots Life After the DVD,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 23, 2009; Netflix Corporation, “Netflix Overview,” <http://ir.netflix.com/index.cfm> (accessed November 17, 2010).

⁶ Netflix Corporation, “Reference Guide.”

motivation and energy levels because they feel that they are part of something bigger, making someone's life better instead of just making a living. This "giving" philosophy permeates every aspect of the company, including its "one for one" motto, highlighting the charitable business philosophy. After working at Toms for a year, employees have the opportunity to travel on an international "shoe drop" to give their product away to those in need, individually confirming that their efforts are worthy and contributing to international betterment.⁷

The Toms "feel good, contributing to a higher cause" aspect crosses over from its employees to its customers. When ordering online, it is, at times, difficult to determine if one is donating to a charity or purchasing shoes. Place a pair of shoes in one's virtual shopping cart and the message flag says, "You are about to give one pair of shoes to a child in need. Want to give more?"⁸ This immediate reinforcement—that one's purchase is contributing to international betterment—draws on the innate desire to lead a charitable life. Whether it is clever marketing or altruistic giving, Toms Shoes benefits from the human desire to believe that one's life has a calling or higher purpose. The ability for a military leader to draw from this same motivation can prove an equally powerful force that can result in a previously unattainable positive workplace culture.

Special Operations Organizations

Some special operations organizations embody the same innovative business practices that academics recommend and that effective businesses have implemented,

⁷ Tamara Schweitzer, "The Way I Work: Blake Mycoskie of Toms Shoes," *Inc. Online Magazine*, June 2010, <http://www.inc.com/magazine/20100601/the-way-i-work-blake-mycoskie-of-toms-shoes.html> (accessed December 07, 2010).

⁸ TOMS Shoes, "TOMS," <http://www.toms.com/?keyword=toms%20shoes&network=g&matc htype =e&mobile=&content=&search=1&gclid=CIq2kcfMwaYCFQUSbAodtBm-Gw> (accessed January 16, 2011).

beginning with a focus on hiring the right individuals. Similar to Netflix efforts and Jim Collins' recommendations to only hire the best talent, special operations organizations place a premium on their hiring and personnel selection processes.⁹ Some special operations organizations spend up to a month with their job interview process, testing mental and physical toughness as well as critically assessing individual values and personality traits. Special operations unit efforts to hire the "right" individual begin with the recruitment process. Recruiters target and seek out individuals who exhibit desired characteristics. Besides finding physically fit individuals with high discipline and impeccable military records, recruiters look for individuals who are comfortable living, working, and executing difficult missions in ambiguous, non-contiguous, and ill-defined environments. Some special operations recruiters target individuals who are unhappy with their careers in conventional organizations, recognizing that smart, highly qualified individuals, who know they can have successful careers outside of the military, often leave military service when they feel underutilized and constrained.¹⁰ This type of individual is often self-motivated with a desire for a high level of autonomy.

Similar to employees of Netflix, Google, and Amgen, and consistent with the theories of Daniel Pink, individuals within special operations organizations are often afforded high levels of autonomy. This autonomy, often visible through bottom-up input, provides valued feedback for *what* the unit will focus on, and almost exclusively controls *how* the unit will accomplish the tasks. A consistent comment from individuals soon

⁹ (Netflix 2011) Using their professional sports team analogy, Netflix tries to fill every position with a super star. See, Netflix Corporation, "Reference Guide".

Chapter 6 of this thesis elaborates on a Collins' primary concept that the "first who" approach is a foundational aspect of the best companies. Collins, *Good to Great*.

¹⁰ Discussions with a special operations recruiter revealed that one commander directed him, upon arrival to a conventional unit to recruit candidates, to first seek out the retention officer, to get a list of the individuals who were leaving the military, and to target exceptionally bright individuals who still wanted to serve, but were disenchanted with attributes of their current situation. Sacolick, personal communication.

after their in a special operations unit is that for the first time in their career, their unit treats them like adults. This feeling is a manifestation of the individual's buy-in to functioning in an environment and culture where one's opinion is sought and valued, and one can see a direct correlation between individual input and the direction of the unit.¹¹ Environments that encourage candor and introspection, usually in the form of critical after action reviews of every mission and unit function, encourage and reinforce the desire for special operators to participate in determining the unit's direction.

Like employees at Toms Shoes, special operators do not need to seek a purpose to drive their motivation. Special operations organizations are generally close to the action with a high likelihood of numerous combat deployments. There is a low tolerance for wasting time, with much of the training directly tied to operations individuals can foresee themselves conducting in the near future.¹² The willingness of special operations units to adjust to meet whatever solution the problem calls for ensures that units maintain high levels of purpose or relevance. In his thesis explaining innovation within special operations organizations, Air Force special operator Jon Giese states that the special operations culture is flexible and externally focused, always looking for what is next.¹³ This operational mentality embraces flexibility and typically results in units continuously looking for new missions, using innovation and ingenuity to get in the action. Some special operators gauge their level of contribution and personal worth, and even self esteem, on the recency of their last combat deployment and their proximity to the action.

¹¹ Sacolick, personal communication.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Jon F. Giese, "Military Innovation: Sources of Change for United States Special Operations Forces" (Master's Theses, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 1999), 89.

There is simply little search for purpose for special operators, which directly influences one's motivation and desire to function at a high level.

Academics recommend and businesses desire relatively long individual assignments when the “right” individual is found. To paraphrase Jim Collins, get the right person into the right seat on the bus and *keep him or her there*.¹⁴ This is another similarity these groups share with special operations organizations, who believe longer assignments tend to breed increased loyalty and commitment to the organization. Individuals assigned for short tours tend to have a short term outlook focused on getting through the immediate assignment or duty position, without a long term effort to make the organization better. As opposed to this short term outlook common in general purpose forces, special operations organizations can draw on an environment that is less of a win-lose environment or an immediate goal orientation. Unit members with a more infinite outlook tend to remove boundaries. They are more likely to explore new techniques and try new things because of their commitment to the organization for the long haul.

Valuing personal accountability instead of a rule heavy, bureaucratic environment also provides common ground between special operations units and the private sector. Netflix and Amgen tout the need for less bureaucracy, directly correlating increased bureaucracy with reduced productivity. The special operations unit environment resembles the “highly aligned, loosely coupled” atmosphere that Netflix desires.¹⁵ Special operations organizations do not tend to emplace artificial or self-induced limiting factors when conducting planning or problem solving. As long as something is not prohibited, and falls within the realm of the “legal, ethical, and moral” clause, it is a

¹⁴ Jim Collins, “Discussion Guide,” May 1, 2006, <http://www.jimcollins.com/tools/discussion-guide.html> (accessed January 11, 2011), *The Bell Curve V. the Double Hump*.

¹⁵ Netflix Corporation, “Reference Guide”.

possible solution. “In special operations, assumptions and facts are your boundaries, battlefield graphics, and control measures...do not manufacture unnecessary limiters.”¹⁶

Special operations organizations try to avoid the urge to manage through creating rules and regulations, preferring to rely on individual discipline to do the right thing, often referred to by the colloquialism of “operating under big boy rules.”¹⁷

Summary

Academics have increased the body of knowledge concerning organizational culture by applying scientific analysis. Science has contributed to the study of leadership and organizational culture through determining what truly motivates individuals and by identifying best practices that set the conditions for an effective organization. Businesses have increased their productivity and efficiency through implementing innovative changes in their culture. When considering adjusting the cultural attributes of a military organization, thinking of a military unit as a small company like Toms Shoes or Netflix, instead of as a large bureaucratic institution can make the problem seem more manageable, as well as provide examples and techniques of how others solve similar problems.

¹⁶ Sacolick, personal communication.

¹⁷ Ibid. Newly assigned unit members of special operations organization repeatedly stated two themes; they felt like they were doing work that truly mattered and that they were treated like adults for the first time in their careers.

This Page Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER 5: BEYOND CULTURAL FIRST PRINCIPLES: TWO PRIORITY ELEMENTS

After ensuring the strength of a solid foundation of the cultural first principles mentioned in Chapter 2, leaders may want to focus on embracing two priority elements upon which to build the organization's ethos: the establishment of an environment where true motivation can flourish and an organizational approach of perpetual, inventive problem solving. These two elements do not meet the criteria of the first principles, yet directly influence every aspect of how an organization executes its daily activities and conducts its operations. Variances in the need for balance and change over time separate the priority elements covered in this chapter from the first principles covered earlier. First principles remain fixed and durable over time, while priority elements need to change, flex, and adjust, depending on the situation. Adjusting behaviors and practices must take into account the complexity and ambiguity created by varied personalities as well as the organizational environment as affected by internal and external factors.

If a unit gets one or even several of the first principles wrong, it may not become apparent until that unit faces adversity or difficult circumstances. If an organization gets one or both of these priority elements wrong, it can immediately reflect as the unit struggles to accomplish ordinary functions or has difficulty dealing with significant problems. Signature characteristics highlighting this condition may include an unenergetic workforce, stale thinking, low morale, rampant inefficiency, and discipline issues. Unit members will eagerly leave the unit at the end of the duty day and the most talented will impatiently await the end of their contractual obligation so they can depart military service and get on with other endeavors. If the unit leadership understands true motivation and the benefits gained by an organizational culture of perpetual, inventive

problem solving, they will maximize work force commitment, effort, and effectiveness, and build an organization capable of handling any adversity.

Recognizing True Motivation

In his book *Drive: the Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us*, Daniel Pink discredits previous beliefs that motivation is something that a leader does to individuals, claiming that true motivation is not a top down driven process.¹ This position contradicts the Army's capstone leadership manual, Field Manual 6-22, which states the often quoted buzz phrase that it is a leader's duty to provide subordinates with "purpose, direction, and motivation."² Granted, a leader must ensure that unit members understand their purpose and the direction the unit is moving, but producing motivation in a directive manner is rarely effective and can have immediate negative consequences. Understanding what motivates adults is critical since these bright, talented, and educated individuals possess distinct and relevant life experiences that when drawn upon can contribute to understanding the situation or solving the problem at hand.

According to Pink, scientific studies show that there are three distinct, progressive types of motivation that have driven people throughout time. The first type of motivation is the basic biological drive that ensures survival through meeting the need for food, reproduction, and shelter. As human beings progressed to no longer needing to worry about basic survival, the next level of motivation that people needed was reward and punishment based, or, if you do "this," then I give you "that" incentivized motivation. This second type of motivation is largely where most organizations operate, even though

¹ Pink, *Drive*, 77-81.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 1-2.

Pink's research indicates that it is not the best method for achieving maximum productivity from a work force.³

Pink cites numerous studies that prove that rewards-based motivation techniques have limited application in the modern workplace, sometimes creating adverse effects.⁴ Rewards-based motivation generally works with basic, mundane or repetitive tasks that require little thought or creative innovation. When tasks requires creative thought, Pink's analysis shows that the path to higher performance is not in one's biological drive or the reward and punishment drive, but in the third drive. The intrinsic third drive states that the humans have a natural, innate desire to control their own life, to determine how to apply their abilities to influence the situation, and ultimately to live a life of purpose. The previous motivation types suggest that if people had freedom and were not controlled, they would avoid responsibility and accountability. This higher level of motivation presumes that people seek accountability and desire control over their lives.⁵

Pink defines the third type of motivation by breaking it down into various elements, giving the utmost importance to affording workers high levels of autonomy. Pink recommends that leaders should afford their workers autonomy over their time, over their tasks, and over their technique of accomplishing those tasks to create an environment that fosters high levels of intrinsic motivation. Pink views the discussion on autonomy as

³ Pink, *Drive*, 58.

⁴ Ibid., 1-11, 23-32, 37-46, 71-73. Harry F. Harlow, Margaret Kuenne Harlow, and Donald R. Meyer, "Learning Motivated by the Manipulation Drive," *Journal of Experimental Psychology* (1950), Harry F. Harlow, "Motivation as a Factor in the Acquisition of New Responses," in *Current Theory and Research on Motivation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953). Edward L. Deci, Richard M. Ryan and Richard Koestner, "A Meta-Analytical Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," *Psychological Bulletin* 125, no. 6. Edward L. Deci, "Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1971). Edward L. Deci, "Intrinsic Motivation, Extrinsic Reinforcement, and Inequity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1972). Karim R. Lakhani and Robert G. Wolf, "Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects," in *Perspectives on Free and Open Software*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

⁵ Ibid., 77-81, 85-108.

simply understanding the course of nature. People are not born with the default setting of wanting others to manage their lives. The default setting is for individuals to desire freedom. Over time, these feelings and beliefs become more powerful, especially in America, as people gain increasing amounts of freedom and autonomy through adulthood. This situation is especially true for individuals of high intellect, those best and brightest individuals the Army was having difficulty retaining in the late 1990s. Jim Collins concurs with this belief that high quality individuals are self motivated, stating that the hardest thing is not to figure out how to motivate individuals, but to work for conditions that do not de-motivate them.⁶ Whether people realize it or not, they yearn to control their destiny and the pursuit of their version of happiness. Therefore, an organization that desires to tap into the powerful resource of intrinsic motivation must recognize the benefit of creating a highly autonomous work place, where people can control their time, their tasks, and how they accomplish those tasks.

Netflix and Google are companies that provide their employees with high levels of autonomy. Recognizing the difference between the daily running of a business and the creative problem solving and innovation needed from an organization's best thinkers, both companies afford great autonomy to those individuals from whom they expect imaginative and inventive ideas. Netflix salaried employees benefit from extraordinary autonomy over their time. They not only work from home or from whatever location makes the most sense, but they do not track days worked or vacation days, focusing on output of quality work instead of time logged in the office. While accomplishments are

⁶ Collins, *Good to Great*, 74.

more difficult to track than effort expended, the results gained from smart, disciplined minds hard at work is what matters to Netflix rather than hours logged in a cubicle.⁷

Google's policies afford their workers with uncommon autonomy regarding their tasks and the manner in which they accomplish those tasks by requiring their employees to spend up to one day a week (20% of their time) developing ideas not related to their general duties. By providing employees the freedom to work on their individual concepts, Google tapped into innovative ideas they otherwise would have missed. This technique resulted in the launch of 48 new projects, virtually all of Google's best ideas, including development of Google News, Google Talk, and Google Mail (Gmail.)⁸

Creating environments within DoD organizations with levels of autonomy to the extreme of Netflix and Google is not realistic. Yet, leaders should realize that over controlling highly talented individuals severely limits an organization's performance and can drive the best and brightest individuals away from the military.⁹ While the military needs structured administrative management practices in many situations, units must work equally hard at creating unstructured, creative, and inventive environments. If organizational leadership seeks balance between structured control when it makes sense and allowing independence when able, it will maximize elements of autonomy, which will tap into the intrinsic motivation that truly drives individuals to their highest performance and greatest accomplishments.

⁷ Netflix Corporation, "Reference Guide".

⁸ Pink, *Drive*, 96.

⁹ The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study, analyzed by Wong and Lewis, highlighted how individuals indentified as the best and brightest were leaving the Army due to restrictive procedures and over controlling leaders. See, Leonard Wong, *Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); Lewis, "Army Transformation," 2004; U.S. Department of the Army, *The ATLDP Officer Study*, 2003.

Facilitating Creative Problem Solving

How a military organization solves problems, both large and small, provides great insight into a unit's culture and overall effectiveness. Resourceful problem solving methods will enable DoD organizations to meet the ambiguous environments and hybrid threats of the future. Unfortunately, rigid thinking and an overly structured approach, frequently devoid of original solutions or varied options, characterizes problem solving in many military organizations. The often stated desire for planners to "think outside the box" rarely results in creative solutions. This overused phrase gives the impression that creative thought is an innate ability that one may or may not possess; a shoot from the hip approach that expects a planner to have a stock of epiphanies from which to draw. While the respective services employ various structured systems to assist their training and planning efforts, the utilization of established systems sometimes impedes rather than facilitates the fresh thinking required to meet future challenges.

The Army's Battle Focused Training, the Navy's Composite Warfare Commander Program, the Marine Corp's Systems Approach to Training, and the Air Force's Ready Aircrew Program are all examples of these highly structured training management systems.¹⁰ While these systems can assist the formulation of training plans and identification of required training resources, they do not accommodate the agility and flexibility required to prepare for an ill-defined enemy or unclear situation. The Army's Battle Focused Training is an example of how these cumbersome programs have

¹⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Battle Focused Training, Field Manual 7-1*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003); U.S. Department of the Navy, *Ready-for-Sea* (San Diego, Naval Reserve Intelligence Program, U.S. Department of Defense, 1999); U.S. Department of the Navy, *Systems Approach to Training* (Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2004); U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Instruction 11-202 Volume 1* (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010).

application, but encourage rigid practices that may not meet requirements in all situations.

Battle Focused Training, largely unchanged since it was instituted in the Army in the 1980s, culls an organization's mission down to a concise Mission Essential Task List that clearly defines what tasks a unit must execute successfully. The unit further refines the training requirement into specific Battle Tasks, with precisely defined tasks, conditions for accomplishing those tasks, and standards of acceptable performance.¹¹ This checklist approach to training has its place and accomplishes its intended purpose, but it is ill-suited for preparing an organization for the unknown. Leaders who discourage or forbid subordinate units from training on any task outside of its Mission Essential Task List exacerbate this condition. Herein lies the problem. Battle Focused Training is adequate for training for the "known," but it is insufficient in preparing an organization for training and planning for the "unknown." General Mattis and others repeatedly state that given the hybrid threat, the services must be capable of an aggregate approach—to move from conventional to unconventional and high tech to low tech. There simply is no template to plan against, no textbook answer.¹²

Train for the Known, Educate for the Unknown

The idea that military organizations should train for the known and educate for the unknown provides a concept for increasing a unit's ability to operate when faced with ambiguity.¹³ Many military organizations never get beyond the "train for the known"

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Battle Focused Training*, 3-8 – 3-12.

¹² Mattis, "Irregular War," 2009; U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008; U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*.

¹³ This concept is originally the idea of Dr. David Fautua, PhD, who is the U.S. Joint Force Command Academic Chair for the Joint Education Enterprise. Dr. Fautua believes that training for the "known" and educating for the "unknown" is a viable approach for leaders to prepare an organization for the complexities of uncertain environments.

technique of operating or problem solving, which can lead to difficulty when faced with a situation that does not fit neatly into a unit training program. To combat this overly simplistic approach, a unit must take an adaptive stance of continuous education and preparation for hybrid threats, irregular warfare, or complex problem solving in general. The “educate for the unknown” approach requires detailed study (education) of a potential domain or environment in order to gain a complete understanding of potential issues and challenges. This education-centric approach for gaining detailed understanding can help organizations prepare for nebulous situations and is at the very heart of creative thinking and problem solving.

While widely encouraged, discovering creative solutions, or “thinking outside the box,” are poorly defined or explained phrases. A leader desiring a culture that encourages creative problem solving can facilitate this all-encompassing environment if he or she understands the required elements that create and encourage this organizational characteristic. A “shoot from the hip” approach will not create an environment conducive to finding creative solutions. Individuals can develop and improve their ability to think creatively, but it requires laborious study and tremendous attention to detail. Colonel John Boyd, a leading theorist in this area stated that,

...creativity is a painful, laborious, repetitive, detail-haunted debate. If you want to understand something, take it to the extremes and examine its opposites. Consider every word and every idea from every possible angle. Discuss, argue, and restructure every aspect of the problem until you are an expert. When you get to that point, creative solutions will shortly, intuitively, follow.¹⁴

While the specific attributes of the detail-oriented mission analysis that Boyd recommends are outside the scope of this monograph, leaders must understand and

¹⁴ Robert Coram, *BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 322.

embrace this painstaking endeavor in order to nurture a creative thinking environment. This attention to detail, fact collecting, risk identifying, deeply inquisitive approach should encompass the daily workings of an organization as well as its contingency planning. It applies to basic communication, running meetings, office management, and operational mission planning. It requires an understanding of one's capabilities, but even more so, of limiting factors and single points of failure. This approach requires disciplined and focused behavior that minimizes wasted effort. Working in this mission analysis-focused environment lends itself to time savings as issues are understood earlier and with more clarity, enabling timely selection and implementation of full spectrum solutions.

An example of this laborious, detail studying, education-oriented approach to creative problem solving occurred in Major General Sacolick's (then a Colonel) unit that he commanded in Iraq. Looking to increase effectiveness in the tactical pursuit of high value insurgents, Major General Sacolick's men broke the targeting process into its various parts of finding, fixing, finishing, exploiting, and analyzing (F3EA), then conducted a resource-unconstrained analysis, in excruciating detail, of each. This deep scrutiny identified that between each of the elements there was an unintended pause, or "blink," that resulted all too often in missed opportunity. By reallocating assets, modifying tactics, techniques, and procedures, and gaining additional resources, Major General Sacolick was able to remove the "blinks" from the process, which resulted in a dramatic increase in operational speed that the enemy could neither understand nor react

to counter. The F3EA “unblinking eye” became a key element that turned the tide on the Iraq counter-insurgency.¹⁵

Summary

An uncertain future, likely containing reduced resources, hybrid threats and unclear situations requires the Defense Department to operate at the peak of its effectiveness. Subsequent to ensuring an environment of robust first principles, leaders should foster cultures that encourage intrinsic motivation and creative problem solving. Building on the model in Figure 2-1 that depicted the interdependence of the first principles, in Figure 5-1 the model grows to incorporate the interdependence of first principles and priority elements, with an eye towards achieving balance with true motivation and creative problem solving.




Figure 5-1: Linkages between First Principles and Priority Elements

Finding the right balance for genuine motivation is often based on affording autonomy, requiring leaders to turn loose of control, and treat individuals as mature, capable, problem solvers. Shaping an organization by requiring and rewarding detailed,

¹⁵ Michael T Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L Cantrell, "Employing ISR: Best SOF Practices," *Joint Force Quarterly* 50, (3rd Quarter, 2008), 56-61; Sacolick, personal communication.

persistent, creative problem solving will also enhance chances for success. By training for the known and educating for the unknown, organizations will maintain their structured, focused training, while developing an ability to prepare for hybrid and irregular threats on non-linear battlefields.

This Page Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER 6: BEYOND CULTURAL FIRST PRINCIPLES: SUB-ELEMENTS THAT MATTER

When considering organizational culture, an in-depth analysis beyond first principles and priority elements reveals several valuable sub-elements that are critical to understanding and enhancing a unit's ethos. Defense Department leadership manuals rarely go beyond identifying first principles or broad doctrinal guidance for individual leadership characteristics and attributes. Acknowledging Professor John Kotter's theory that to change culture first requires altering people's actions and behaviors, demands the identification of cultural sub-elements that a unit could attempt to change.¹ Delving into the details and finer points of a desired organizational culture highlights sub-elements and behaviors that increase one's understanding of the cultural domain and enable leaders to develop innovative solutions and options for improving an organization's culture.² Continued close examination of proven psychology concepts and practices of effective businesses and special operations organizations provides this understanding. This thesis identifies seven sub-elements and potential implementation options for leaders who desire to transform the cultural attributes of their organizations. These sub-elements are: positioning talented individuals; providing organizational focus; decentralizing execution to the correct level; promoting collaboration; reducing organizational bureaucracy; using information technology effectively; and utilizing high levels of candor.

¹ This application is consistent with John Kotter's theory for altering culture as previously mentioned in Chapter 3. See, Kotter, *Leading Change*, 155-156.

² This idea combines Major General Sacolick's recommendation for great introspection and an eagerness to change as mentioned in Chapter 3 and Colonel Boyd's theories for innovative problem solving discussed in Chapter 5, which calls for detailed analysis of a problem as a means of facilitating creative thinking.

While there are certainly other sub-elements leaders may identify for an organization's specific situation, these seven sub-elements are particularly significant and worthy of further consideration and scrutiny. All are connected, some more directly than others, but none-the-less so tightly intertwined that adjusting one affects the other six. Unlike first principles, but similar to the priority elements, these sub-elements require balance and the changing of practices or behaviors over time, dependent on the situation. Imagine these sub-elements on a continuum, with unit leadership responsible for adjusting the amount or saturation of the element within the unit, that when combined with the other elements create the exact right effect. Much like a master-chef creating a gourmet meal, a leader must determine when to apply the correct amount of each ingredient, in the right order, to reach the desired result.

Understanding this complexity provides insight into the challenges of initiating actions intended to improve a unit's culture. While a leader should ease into the process of change, to begin with only one sub-element with the intent to fix one thing at a time ignores the interdependencies within a unit's culture. The one at a time, overly simplistic approach to altering unit culture dismisses the complexity of intertwined sub-elements and the actuality that adjusting one facet of unit culture cannot help but affect several other areas. For example, leaders will become frustrated in their attempts to provide workers with more autonomy over their time if they do not address the repetitive and redundant bureaucratic processes that limit the practice of that autonomy.

One must also understand the concept of diffusion when implementing cultural change. When a leader implements new practices, he or she will likely observe a watering down of effect for varied reasons. The fog or ambiguity resulting from trying to

communicate the reasons for change and desired effects to successive levels within the unit, combined with the resistance inherent with implementing change, can adversely affect the outcome of untold other factors. Examples, such as individuals without full buy-in or general poor implementation techniques, can detract from initiatives to improve culture. Also, best practices will rapidly become average practices, even when there was initial improvement, as a new normal state or status quo becomes the norm.³ This effect reinforces the need for continuous change and adjustment to find the exact right balance of behaviors.⁴ Not every action will work as desired. Leaders must implement a corrective action, determine its value and effectiveness, and then reinforce those actions that succeed and not dwell on those that fail.

To understand fully the intricacies of these sub-elements of effective culture, this chapter defines each sub-element, and discusses the finer details of each, including unbiased counter-arguments that may detract from the importance of a stated relevant sub-element. Following the explanation of the sub-element, the thesis provides practical ways to implement or influence the particular sub-element and considers the risk implications of manipulating the sub-element. The risk discussions are particularly important since they present the dangers of getting the balance wrong, thereby creating more harm than good. The necessity for balance calls for measurable assessments a leader can utilize to gauge progress. A starting point for this deeper introspection into organizational culture begins with ensuring that an organization positions its most talented individuals where they can have the greatest impact.

³ Bryon E. Greenwald, "Understanding Change: An Intellectual and Practical Study of Military Innovation" (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2003), 63.

⁴ This concept is derived from Major General Sacolick's recommendation to constantly reinvent one's unit to remain relevant and reach organizational potential.

First- Position Talented Individuals, the “Who”

There is consensus between academics, businesses, and special operations leaders that the first priority when attempting to establish positive organizational culture is to focus on getting the “right” individuals in key positions within the organization. Netflix attempts to run its business like a professional sports team rather than a children’s recreational league. Netflix offers high salaries simply because it is a good way to attract the best talent. They “hire, develop, and cut smartly” to ensure they “have stars in every position.” The Netflix “keeper test” for managers is to ask, “which of my people, if they told me they were leaving in two months for a similar job at a peer company, would I fight hard to keep at Netflix?” Netflix offers individuals who do not meet that standard a generous severance to open a slot to try to find a star for that role.⁵

As Jim Collins explains in his analogy of the organization as a bus, focusing on placing the best available individuals in key positions is a threefold process. A leader must get the right people on the bus, and in a few situations, remove a few underperforming people from the bus; but he or she must spend the majority of effort repositioning people to the right seats on the bus. Collins stresses that people are not the most important thing in an organization, rather, putting the right people in the right positions is most important. By trying to match individual abilities with job requirements—providing clarity of requirements, and working hard to develop the individuals—the organization will increase its chance for exceptional performance. Even so, leaders will sometimes make positioning mistakes. At such times, leaders must assume responsibility and acknowledge their role in the mistakes. If there is any doubt as

⁵ Netflix Corporation, “Reference Guide.”

to whether the individual is in the wrong position versus wrong for the organization, Collins believes that the tie always goes to the worker, with the employee getting another opportunity in a different position.⁶

Special operations organizations take great effort to hire and train the right individuals, with the primary focus being on a candidate's character, instead of experience, skill, or rank. Records scrubs identify qualified individuals before they are invited to a special operations unit job interview or selection process, which itself can take a month or longer to complete. Individuals then often enter a training regime that can take up to a year to complete before they are allowed to join a unit at entry level positions. Before an individual is afforded the opportunity to fill a position of importance and influence, he will have proven himself and been vetted multiple times.⁷

Special operations units frequently adhere to two tenets that reflect the importance of hiring the right individual: "when in doubt, do not hire"; and "if you have made a hiring mistake, correct it immediately." During the hiring processes, if there is doubt regarding whether the individual is right for the unit, the default is to not hire the individual, since the unit would rather have a shortage of personnel than hire the wrong individuals. Once an individual is hired, he is continually assessed, and if found wanting, is let go without prejudice. While this may seem unnecessarily callous, this technique results in high confidence in the capabilities of a fielded unit.⁸

General (Retired) Luck reinforced this methodology during his identification of best practices for Joint Forces. Having the "right" individuals in key positions is simply the number one priority when establishing a positive climate. "Without exception, we find

⁶ Collins, *Good to Great*, 41-64.

⁷ Sacolick, personal communication.

⁸ Ibid.

that command centric organizations outperform staff centric organizations.”⁹ Ultimately, even with the right people, if individuals are in the wrong positions, the unit will not perform to the high level it would have if unit leadership had placed talent in key positions. When the right people are in the right positions, they are self-motivated, empowered, accept personal responsibility, and have an inner drive to strive for a higher standard of success. They will feel they are a contributing factor to the success of the team and if a change in direction is needed, the organization will have the right people in positions to execute the change.¹⁰

Counter-Argument:

Some leaders may argue that this concept is not viable for conventional or general purpose force organizations. They could assert that they lack the autonomy and authority to hire whoever they want and easily fire individuals who do not meet their standards, which is not the case with private businesses and special operations units. Further, one could argue that frequent repositioning of key individuals within an organization creates unnecessary turmoil and avoidable instability. Moreover, disregarding traditional techniques that reduce the importance of making personnel placement decisions based on rank or time-in-grade is not fair for individuals who have waited for their turn, ultimately detracting from morale and overall unit discipline. While these points are likely valid in many situations, one could overcome them with carefully implemented methods of repositioning a unit’s most talented individuals.

⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 3, 6.

¹⁰ Collins, *Good to Great*, 42, 45.

Practical Methods of Implementation:

Implementation of this “first who” approach requires selecting the best individuals for the positions of importance, repositioning others (area of the greatest effort), and methodically culling the substandard individuals from positions of influence. Unit leadership must assume the responsibility for repositioning talent, with little input from the masses, to prevent perceptions of individual popularity influencing personnel decisions. When determining important positions where a unit cannot assume risk by empowering the wrong individuals, leaders must look beyond traditional leadership positions, also identifying informal positions that have significant impact on the implementation and enforcement of desired behaviors. This review includes finding the high visibility positions that the majority of the unit must have dealings with internally as well as positions that externally reflect the organization’s values and attributes. Identifying the right individual for a job is more than finding who holds the highest rank, who is a “good guy,” or worse, whose turn it is for a position of responsibility. Organizations must place a premium on finding and employing “agile, multiskilled pentathletes who have strong moral character, broad knowledge, and keen intellect.”¹¹ But since a unit will rarely have enough “pentathletes” to fill its key positions, leaders must truly figure out what the unit needs from particular positions, and then match available talented individuals with the critical positions.

While leaders should methodically identify and place the right individuals in key and influential positions, leaders must also take immediate action to replace key individuals

¹¹ Quoting General Peter J. Schoomaker in his introduction letter for the Army’s capstone leadership field manual; U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Foreward.

who exhibit sub-standard performance.¹² When a unit collectively observes its senior leadership make personnel changes when necessary, unit members receive reassurance and validation that the command is serious about having an exceptional unit and is willing to make needed changes. During World War II, General Eisenhower reinforced this concept to General Patton, stating that, "...you must not retain for one instant any man in a responsible position where you have become doubtful of his ability to do the job....I expect you to be perfectly cold blooded about it."¹³ The moment a leader feels the need to increase supervision of a subordinate filling a key position, the leader should begin to question his or her hiring or positioning decision. The best people in great organizations do not need to be managed, just simply led.¹⁴

While there is some truth in the "counter-argument" section, the statements are not relevant to the point that a conventional unit cannot take positive action to position the best individuals in key positions. If an organization's leaders cannot control the hiring and firing within their unit, then leaders must control what is in their power, which is often the positioning of talent. The quality of people in conventional units is very high, with more than enough high performing individuals available to place in key positions. A unit will develop elite qualities when well placed, talented individuals reinforce and reward disciplined behavior. This outcome is possible in any organization. Humans tend to assimilate into their surroundings, so when moderately disciplined individuals are placed in highly disciplined units, they often increase personal standards of discipline to fit in with the collective group of their new unit's culture.

¹² Sacolick, personal communication.

¹³ Advice from General Eisenhower to General Patton upon Patton assuming command of II Corps in 1943. See, Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 401.

¹⁴ Sacolick, personal communication.

Risk

To highlight the importance of this concept, consider the toxic environment that results from having the wrong individuals in positions of influence. There are few faster ways to de-motivate an otherwise energetic worker than to put him or her under the charge of incompetent, ineffective leaders. Incompetent leaders often feel threatened and insecure, and subsequently may exhibit their misgivings by taking authoritative measures intended to demonstrate their dominance over an environment, with an immediate effect of damaging positive organizational culture.

There is also risk if a leader says one thing, but then does another. If a leader states he or she places great importance on only allowing high quality individuals to fill critical positions and then lacks the courage to make needed changes, the unit will suffer a loss of trust and confidence in its leadership. If a leader says something is important, his or her actions must confirm these words.

In keeping an appropriate balance, leaders must avoid an environment where individuals are constantly in fear of losing their jobs. If a unit experiences a few individuals being fired or removed from key positions within a short period of time, an environment of wondering “who is next?” may emerge. This concern is likely overstated, since the majority on workers will flourish and thriving individuals will not have the perception that they lack job security. Usually this uncertainty is reserved for those who have a reason to wonder about their status. A tinge of apprehension regarding job security can increase personal introspection and enhance job performance. Appropriately placed positive reinforcement by leadership also helps to ameliorate this worry. As a unit finds a healthy balance regarding positioning talented individuals, a

simultaneous rise in unit performance will become visible, especially when the organization focuses its efforts on accomplishing unit priorities.

Second- Provide Organizational Focus, the “What”

While unit leadership hires the right individuals and repositions others, ensuring they fill all key positions with the best people possible, they must simultaneously focus the unit on accomplishing its priorities. Many successful leaders have realized that in order for their organization to reach maximum effectiveness, they must identify and acknowledge the areas where they wish the unit to excel and then execute a focused plan designed to meet stated goals. Jim Collins’ detailed study of the elements that enabled some businesses to make the leap from being good to becoming great reveals that all of the great organizations had developed concentrated institutional objectives. The corporate leadership then took great effort to direct organizational energy toward accomplishing the objective.¹⁵

Transitioning this concept to military units has historical as well as current relevance. In his teaching to “direct all energies,” Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the highly respected WWI and WWII leader remarked, “The same difference can often be found between the academic and fighting soldier. One of the most important factors—not only in military matters, but in life as a whole—is the power of execution, the ability to direct

¹⁵ Jim Collins’ study of the 11 companies (out of 1,435) which made the leap from being good companies to becoming great companies, revealed that all clearly identified what it was they wanted to become “great” at, and communicated their focus in what Collins dubbed their “hedge hog concept.” Collins derived the hedge hog concept from Isaiah Berlin’s essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” where despite the many crafty attacks the fox attempted, the hedge hog was able to remain unscathed because he knew one big thing extremely well, self protection. Applied to the business world, if a company operates as a hedge hog, it will focus on becoming the best in the world at a specific thing, becoming immune to trends and events that adversely affect less prepared companies. See, Collins, *Good to Great*, 90-92.

one's energies toward the fulfillment of a particular task.”¹⁶ Leaders must carefully evaluate competing tasks, identify those that are critical, and then put all energies into fulfilling the primary mission. General Luck repeatedly emphasizes this approach stating, “clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience, instinct, and intuition are ingredients always found in high performing units.”¹⁷ Major General Sacolick agrees with the premise, arguing leaders should combine an “honest assessment” of what it is that they want to be the best at, with “supremely focusing” assets, resources, and time to ensure the organization “lives its priorities.” Of note, a unit’s priorities are not only visible by examining what an organization does, but also by observing what an organization does not do, or stops doing.¹⁸

Jim Collins recognizes that focusing an organization’s efforts on expertly accomplishing a limited number of tasks, inherently means that a business must shed tasks of lesser importance. Collins recommends actually identifying tasks that an organization will no longer accomplish. The key to focusing limited resources is to identify and prioritize every task that an organization does or should do. As the priorities become apparent, so should the tasks that the organization should discontinue. This effort enables an organization to allocate more resources to its priorities. For every “to do” objective, an organization must have a “stop doing” objective.¹⁹

¹⁶ Erwin Rommel and Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *The Rommel Papers* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1982), 288.

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 6.

¹⁸ Sacolick, personal communication.

¹⁹ Collins, *Good to Great*, 139-141.

Counter-Argument:

Taking efforts to “supremely focus” an organization’s objectives may appear contradictory to the earlier discussion of needing to counter hybrid threats and seem unrealistic when considering the complexities facing many military organizations. General Mattis calls for organizations to switch capably and effortlessly from conventional to irregular warfare as a matter of course, which does not lend itself to doing a limited number of things well.²⁰ Additionally, current wartime requirements force many forward deployed task forces to organize with multiple occupational specialties and numerous divergent operational capabilities, employed over vast geographical areas. These realities counter the recommendation for an organization to concentrate only on doing a very limited number of tasks. However, while these counter-argument issues seem initially relevant, they lose footing when considering the alternative of failing to focus a unit’s priorities. A consideration of implementation techniques diminishes concerns regarding overly prioritizing a unit’s objectives.

Practical Methods of Implementation:

While the positioning of talent discussed earlier is almost exclusively an issue for unit leadership to handle, the focusing of organizational efforts is a combined responsibility between leadership and feedback from junior leaders and workers from within various sections of the unit. The larger organization must have specific overarching objectives to focus on and each section within the organization must refine its focus to the sub-tasks it will strive to accomplish. Some necessary tasks are obvious, but prioritization for individual sections requires a give and take between leadership and the work force to ensure a clear understanding of the overarching organizational goals

²⁰ Mattis, “Irregular War,” 2009.

and requirements. This exchange effectively ensures common understanding and will gain early buy-in of the tasks that the sections must accomplish to a high standard. Just as importantly, it will identify and state the things that the unit will no longer do. This bottom-up feedback will also help “flatten” the unit, which is a desired attribute discussed later in this chapter.

Once an organization identifies the overarching tasks and individual section tasks that it will master, the unit must exercise high levels of discipline to live with its priorities. These priorities will appear in command messages and unit themes as well as mission statements, commander’s intent statements, and commander’s critical information requirement statements. The priorities will become part of the unit fabric and vernacular. Often in training meetings or planning activities someone should ask the question: “Does this support the stated unit priorities?” and if it does not, the unit should quickly drop the issue and move on to something that supports agreed upon priorities.

Once an organization identifies the specific tasks to focus its assets on, it must continue to consider the changing situation to ensure its focus remains valid. Major General Sacolick believes that, “once you have a situation that you understand, always ask yourself, what has changed?”²¹ Organizational leadership can enhance this understanding by persistently sharing knowledge of ongoing developments, thereby ensuring unit members maintain a higher understanding of where the unit is and where it needs to go.

Effectively using knowledge management technology can also ensure the organization remains focused on priorities. Besides the routine and consistent appearance of unit priorities in organizational briefings and products, the priorities should maintain

²¹ Sacolick, personal communication.

the most prominent position on organizational web page portals. Any change or adjustment of priorities must rapidly spread throughout the organization by every digital and analog means available.

In response to claims of overwork or too many tasks, when tasks are broken down to the level of actual execution, very few times must a unit or section execute numerous complex tasks. Whether fighting an irregular or conventional force, many of the actual techniques and tactics remain similar, with the majority of differences residing in the operational planning and mental preparation. Additionally, if units adopt inherent problem solving capabilities as recommended in Chapter 5, they will skillfully transition between prioritized tasks.

It is this very complexity and the requirement to execute several difficult tasks to a high standard that necessitates a concentration of efforts. By clearly delineating what is most important, a well trained organization can concentrate efforts on the most critical, sensitive, or highest risk missions. This clear focus also makes complex and difficult tasks or situations seem manageable. Major General Sacolick believes that the best leaders make difficult problems seem easy. “The primary job as a leader is to take complex issues and make them seem simple and understandable.”²²

Risk:

The obvious risk assumed by inadequate support of organizational priorities is a waste of limited unit resources. While loss of physical resources is a factor, such resources can often be recovered or reallocated. However, the most valuable resource, time, is not easily recovered. Time lost by training tasks that the unit may not need or

²² Sacolick, personal communication.

that do not reach a high threshold of importance can greatly detract from overall unit readiness.

Leader focus is critical when supporting this general concept. Leaders risk having an ineffective or dysfunctional organization if they do not find a balance between leading and managing. Leaders who spend too much time managing often become distracted and caught up with the day to day organizing, planning, and executing of tasks. The unit will also suffer from lack of focus and direction, since a “managing” leader rarely has time for strategic planning or big picture orientation. However, a leader who extracts himself from over-managing is capable of providing clear and consistent guidance. This removal of the boss from micromanagement allows subordinates to focus on executing the mission, which leads to the next critical sub-element of effective organizational culture: ensuring that the execution of tasks and authority for making decisions resides at the correct level.

Execution- Responsibility and Authority at the Right Level, the “How”

The first sub-element discussed focused on positioning talent, or getting the “who” right, while the second sub-element stressed the importance of determining precisely “what” the organization was going to focus its efforts on. The third sub-element concentrates on the manner in which the organization actually functions, or the “how.” How an organization functions is a direct reflection of the trust and confidence the organizational leadership has in the individuals who actually execute tasks. Organizations that retain authorities too high up the hierarchy suffer from a lack of operational agility that often results in missed opportunity. Providing subordinate leaders and organizations with the flexibility to execute missions as the situation and

environmental realities dictate affords units their best chances to succeed. Successful outcomes rarely follow initial plans, but rather a path as adjusted and affected by the enemy, weather, adversity, and any number of unpredictable elements of fog and friction. Rarely are the immediate decisions required to seize opportunities communicated effectively through hierarchical consultations or bureaucratic approval processes. Many Defense Department senior leaders believe that most units retain execution authorities too high within organizational hierarchal structures.

General (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, was perhaps the first senior leader to recognize the need to push execution responsibility down to a lower level.²³ General McChrystal frequently instructed subordinate leaders to “decentralize until you are uncomfortable,” and then as he observed results, pushed them even harder to “decentralize until it hurts.” General McChrystal acknowledged the natural “discomfort” that commanders felt when they were not in complete control of the execution of critical and dangerous missions. Yet he recognized that this uncertain feeling often restricted leadership from decentralizing control to a level that maximized a unit’s effectiveness and ability to function at its highest capacity.²⁴ Other senior leaders share General McChrystal’s beliefs.

General Luck wrote that, “decentralized execution is the only way to be agile enough to take advantage of opportunities in today’s operational environment...decentralize where possible to retain agility and speed of action...too much structure can be the enemy.”²⁵ General Mattis believes that technological developments have driven leaders

²³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 3.

²⁴ Stanley McChrystal, General (Retired), personal communication with the author, 2002-2011.

²⁵ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 6.

to believe inaccurately they can control operations from their level—a harmful and mistaken expectation.

American's tendency to centralize in order to achieve efficiency will no longer work. Technical command and control systems make centralized decision making a single point of failure. Our operations must occur at the speed of trust, technical systems will be under attack and will go down...we must operate off of commander's intent and generalized instructions not detailed orders...we will gain coherence of effort through focused initiative, not through a constant flow of uninterrupted instructions. Commanders must shift from command and control to command and feedback.²⁶

Academics and business leaders also support concepts that push decentralized authorities and responsibilities lower than previously thought a good practice by supervisor-centric organizations. Netflix and Google are among the companies that demonstrate decentralized philosophies by providing workers with high levels of autonomy. As mentioned by Daniel Pink in his interpretation of studies on intrinsic motivation, workers who control the manner in which they conduct their work are more productive and are able to meet organizational goals effectively.²⁷ Stephen Covey devotes an entire book, *The Speed of Trust*, to highlighting the efficiencies gained when supervisors trusted subordinates to execute tasks as they see fit, with less heavy-handed implementation or controlling measures.²⁸ As an enduring element of his philosophy, Daniel Pink recommends that organizations should allow highly talented individuals to determine “how” they will accomplish tasks.²⁹

Counter-Argument:

²⁶ Mattis, “Irregular War,” 2009.

²⁷ Pink, *Drive*, 85-108.

²⁸ As his primary hypothesis throughout the book Covey describes trust as a cultural element that has a significant effect on organizations. Trust within organizations enhances their ability to operate at higher speeds, in an efficient and effective manner, where the work force places organizational concerns ahead of individual considerations. Externally, trusted organizations enjoy positive reputations that enhance the organizations ability to endure through ambiguous and difficult times. See, Covey, *The Speed of Trust*.

²⁹ Pink, *Drive*, 94-98, 101-104.

Some leaders may not believe they have the ability or the need to loosen control over their unit's actions. Technological advancements allow for greater visibility and control over greater distances than at any time in history. Many commanders believe that an experienced leader should not knowingly allow subordinates to make poor decisions or all manner of mistakes when the commander has the ability to make decisions and control the mission from his level. After all, military organizations conduct missions with life and death significance. As such, control over these actions should remain at the highest level to protect critical assets and give the mission the best chance of success. However, even with technological advancements that extend the range of communication infrastructure, the need for agile reactions and anticipatory adjustments remain a key component of effective organizations. The best technology today provides a mere soda straw of situational awareness that does not transcend the situational understanding of leaders at the impact point of operational execution. Implementing techniques that lower the level of execution responsibility increases the chance of success.

Practical Methods of implementation:

Applying methods that push authority and execution responsibilities to lower levels continues the implementation trend of the first two sub-elements, requiring even less input from organizational leadership. Empowering subordinates to determine "how" they will accomplish the mission places the responsibility at the correct level, the unit's work force. The unit leadership can then focus on creating the conditions that enable subordinates to succeed as subordinate leaders take control of executing tasks in a decentralized environment.

While many individuals promote the value of decentralizing execution, there is little advice indicating to what level one should decentralize or how to maintain balance. Applying the same rationale that U.S. doctrine provides for commander's intent could also pertain to determining the right level to assign responsibility and authority. Joint doctrine states that subordinate levels of an organization should know and understand the purpose and desired end state of an operation.³⁰ Army doctrine provides additional specificity, stating that a commander's intent should "be clearly understood two levels down."³¹ Broadly speaking, a subordinate must know and understand the intentions of a commander two levels up and should have the inherent responsibility and freedom of action to execute tasks as needed to meet that intent. In high-performing special operations units, this attribute transcends an implicit approval to act and becomes an expectation of initiative.³² Leaders should also recognize that some missions inherently call for more decentralization than others. Missions with less structure, which occur during times of ambiguity or weak communication links, require the assignment of the best talent, and the greatest autonomy.

Routine decisions should rarely require querying a higher headquarters for approval. Daily, a unit must execute known tasks as a matter of routine, without needing to wait for approval or impetus from higher. Generally speaking, leaders should approve early what they can, and emplace measures that only push decisions higher when a situation significantly changes. Without over relying on it, technology can play a helpful role in decentralizing the execution of tasks. As General Mattis states, "high tech allows us to

³⁰ U.S. Joint Staff, *Joint Operations; Joint Publication 3-0*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), xx, GL-9.

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process, Field Manual 5-0*, (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), B-13.

³² Sacolick, personal communication.

centralize or decentralize our approach to war.”³³ Effective use of technology can allow quick approval mechanisms as well as visibility of subordinate unit activities. This visibility keeps higher headquarters well informed and allows a supervisor to intervene by exception.

Risk:

Perhaps more important than any other sub-element, leaders must achieve balance when attempting to decentralize execution. Commanders are likely to feel very vulnerable, enough so that they never truly decentralize authorities to appropriate levels. However, a unit with inadequate decentralization may develop a risk averse atmosphere. Despite the fact that the individuals conducting the missions often understand capabilities and limitations better than the decision maker, decision makers get uncomfortable when they do not know the finer mission details and often default to the most cautious path. This action can detract from the intended effects, thereby losing significant mission payoff. It can also slow the operational momentum to the point where the opportunity is lost altogether.

Acknowledging that some critical missions require control at high levels, General Mattis warns against an overreliance on technology as a method of retaining centralized control. General Mattis believes that technology used in this role is becoming a major weakness.

Leaders will need to act more on their own initiative, for we will either decentralize decision making to increasingly junior officers as a matter of policy and training, or we will be forced to do so when our vulnerable C2 systems are disabled. Decentralized decision making calls for greater education and training at lower levels, so leaders are set up for success.

³³ Mattis, “Irregular War,” 2009.

We have no option...war's fundamental nature will force this change on us if we don't recognize our electronic Achilles heel.³⁴

Lack of confidence in subordinates' decision making ability becomes much less of a concern when leaders ensure that they implement the two sub-elements discussed earlier. Allowing freedom of action to highly talented, correctly positioned individuals who are focused on organizational priorities creates an environment where the unit can flourish regardless of challenges that arise.

Higher headquarters must accept the role of maintaining visibility and awareness of situations and decisions, only interjecting by exception, as a new normal state. A leader can reach down and pull the assumption of risk to his or her level as a support and protection mechanism, but he or she should provide the individuals conducting the mission with the flexibility to execute the tasks as they see fit. When implementing these methods that empower individuals unaccustomed to having freedom of action, a leader can expect an increase in low level mistakes. A leader must remain comfortable underwriting mistakes, providing the top cover that assures subordinates that they have protection from retribution by higher headquarters. Subordinates empowered in this manner must understand that increased autonomy does not equate to decreased accountability. An individual who has full autonomy, but does not reach or make progress towards stated goals, is still accountable for those actions or lack thereof. If an individual repeatedly makes similar mistakes or seems unable to thrive in an autonomous environment, a leader must take responsibility for a positioning mistake. One key indicator that a subordinate is a good fit is his ability and likelihood to provide constructive, collaborative feedback and input to his higher headquarters.

³⁴ Mattis, "Developing and Retaining," 2010.

Promote a Culture of Collaboration- Flatten the Organization

Positioning leaders at all levels who have the confidence to push power down, and receive input up, produces a healthy, collaborative environment that will grow a highly effective organizational culture. Units that receive bottom-up input as a normal practice develop a workforce that feels empowered, as individuals embrace autonomy and observe the direct impact of their efforts. An organization can limit itself by relying on the outlook and foresight of a few individuals at the top to determine the path ahead or it can expand its options and opportunities by drawing from the best ideas of many fine thinkers at all levels. This is not to say that all ideas from varied levels of the organization are credible and good. A leader will likely field more unrealistic and naive ideas than credible, innovative options. Still, seeking input from a vertical slice of the organization and drawing on the collective brain power and experience of dozens of adults invariably provides a unit its best chance for success.

Major General Sacolick believes that if a unit takes the time to ensure its hiring process only brings great talent into the organization, then bottom-up collaboration will become an essential element within the organization. Who better to have the primary voice in the plan for a complex operation than the very individuals with the most experience who also shoulder the responsibility for making the upcoming operation a success? Additionally, the individuals who are going in harm's way need flexibility to execute the mission as they see fit. While this is a tactical application of collaboration, Major General Sacolick believes that this practice should also carry over to every other area within the organization.³⁵

³⁵ Sacolick, personal communication.

In recent years, academics have realized the importance of establishing collaborative environments within organizations. Internationally recognized Fortune 500 consultant Evan Rosen writes that “without a culture of collaborative, the best processes, systems, tools, and leadership strategies fall flat.”³⁶ Gone are the myths of a self-sufficient “single cowboy” who can “achieve smashing success without help from anybody.”³⁷ Rosen agrees that a collaborative culture is primarily a bottom-up driven process. “Imagine the irony in ordering people to collaborate.” The best strategy is usually a combination of bottom-up ideas with a senior level champion to assist the particular idea or process.³⁸

Jim Collins agrees that collaboration is essential within high performing organizations, but warns against blindly seeking high levels of collaboration. Like so many elements within organizational culture that require leader manipulation, collaboration “comes with a vitally important, counterintuitive message: good collaboration amplifies strength, but poor collaboration is worse than no collaboration at all.”³⁹ Author and University of California Professor Morten Hansen believes that leaders must seek a balance by knowing “when to collaborate and when not to,” but primarily must keep in mind that the goal is to obtain great results, not simply to collaborate for the sake of collaboration.⁴⁰ Despite his cautions, Hansen lauds “good” collaboration and provides three “levers” that facilitate collaboration. Unifying people towards a common goal, encouraging “T” shaped management styles that thrive laterally and well as vertically, and creating nimble networks across the organization all produce

³⁶ Evan Rosen, *The Culture of Collaboration* (San Francisco: Red Ape Publishing, 2007), xii.

³⁷ Ibid., xi.

³⁸ Ibid., 137-139.

³⁹ Collins quote from his Forward to Hansen’s book. Morten T. Hansen, *Collaboration* (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009), ix.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 23-27.

effective collaborative efforts while empowering individuals to seek innovative solutions and improvements.⁴¹

This empowerment results in a horizontal flattening effect on unit hierarchy, which can create information flow efficiencies and a general increase in organizational effectiveness. In his ground-breaking book, *The World is Flat*, Thomas Friedman states that flat organizations benefit from efficiencies in speed of communication, horizontal collaboration, and constant innovation.⁴² The free flow of information reduces ambiguity between what leadership thinks and wants to happen and corresponding workers' concerns and inputs to the processes. Organizational flatness describes an environment devoid of the protocol and bureaucracy that tends to reduce effectiveness. In a flat organization there are fewer levels between deciders and operators, with every level committed to the overall higher purpose of meeting unit goals.

Flat organizations require self-assured leaders who seek input in areas where they are weak. These egoless leaders often surround themselves with diverse individuals who offer disparate views and opinions. For this collaborative sub-element to become ingrained, unit members may need to adjust how they see their role in the unit. To change the way people operate, individuals must change the way they see their role in the organization. If they see their role as part of the process and as having an opinion that matters, they will embrace this concept, resulting in increased initiative and innovative contributions. This professional and social commitment to new roles can have a dramatic impact, particularly in renovating business practices or planning future operations.

⁴¹ Ibid., 71-115.

⁴² Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 426-431, 339-441.

Counter-Argument:

Some would argue that flat, bottom-up driven organizations that focus on establishing a collaborative atmosphere may operate with little regard for traditional hierarchical levels. These units could develop inferior conditions characterized by a lack of discipline and chaotic environments. Good order and discipline is not best left to chance application by individuals who may not care to make it a priority. Combat units that blur hierarchical lines may encounter difficulties when faced with situations requiring unquestioned, immediate obedience. Flat organizations have easily accessible senior leaders who can undermine mid-level managers responsible for supervising the workforce. A flat organization with a bottom-up input philosophy would require an uncommon percentage of highly disciplined individuals to function effectively in a diverse and complex operational setting.

While these statements contain elements of truth, they also imply that the application of hierarchical structure automatically results in discipline and high performance. This thesis suggests that the best organizations rely on the good ideas of many individuals at various levels, not the ideas of a few individuals at the top of the organization. Finding creative ways to promote the vertical flow of information and ideas can positively impact an organization's performance.

Practical Methods of implementation:

To implement techniques that promote feedback successfully and offset the concerns mentioned, a unit must first and foremost embody a culture of discipline. Unit leadership must find the balance between free flowing information with little formality and a detrimental loss of too much structure. Individual leaders must maintain professional

limits within the rank structure, while displaying the attitude and personality traits that encourage bottom-up feedback.

Leaders must become the most inquisitive question-askers and best listeners in the unit. A leader must listen and learn from the internal reference and context of others, without ascribing his personal meanings or prejudices. This deep listening, in an inclusive environment that strives for diversity, will unveil original thought and creative solutions, which would have otherwise been missed in traditional organizational frameworks. This striving for diversity ensures contact with and representation from all levels and specialties within the organization. Planning conferences, meetings intended to determine or adjust unit goals, and after action reviews, are examples of when unit leaders must ensure full representation from across the organization. Including key subordinate formal and informal leaders in important meetings and decision cycles will increase the emotional “buy in” of unit members and facilitate achieving unity of effort.⁴³ How the leader receives information is also critical. Subordinates will alter, shape, and adjust information to fit what they think the boss wants to hear. This phenomenon is especially true for the supervisor who shows emotion when receiving bad news. As the saying goes, during the initial receipt of information, leaders must “take good news well and bad news better.”

Technology can play a role in encouraging bottom-up feedback. The development of software tools such, as “dropbox” and “evernote,” provides domains that encourage collaborative input from throughout an organization.⁴⁴ The Defense Department created

⁴³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*, 2008, 18-19.

⁴⁴ These collaborative tools provide great benefit to organizations that seek input from all levels. While security concerns invariably prevent DoD from using these tools, to not use them unnecessarily cedes technological advantages to the hybrid enemy threat which does not self-impose such restrictions.

similar tools, but logon restrictions and cumbersome utilization limitations based on security measures make the tools unwieldy and mostly ignored.⁴⁵ While the Defense Department remains slow in adopting technological solutions that promote collaboration, the use of these tools helps build a culture that draws on talent from all levels, especially the younger, more technological savvy population.

Many younger service members are more comfortable providing thoughts and ideas via electronic forums than directly through supervisors. If a unit truly cares to receive the younger generation's feedback, it will create opportunities that encourage their input. Also, a unit can use technology to assist communicating a common operating picture. Consistently providing full disclosure of unit priorities and objectives will ensure the leadership communicates clearly without the perception of hidden agendas or ulterior motives. Word of mouth and e-mail communication used in conjunction with a functional portal based web site and collaborative software tools will afford a unit the best chance of communicating to the masses without risking misinterpretation or mistranslation by intermediate leaders.

Risk:

There is little risk and significant payoff to employing techniques that encourage collaborative, bottom-up input. While organizations must find balance when seeking unfettered input from all levels of the unit, maintaining equilibrium is not an issue if the unit adheres to its first principles and does not compromise traditional discipline and

See, Dropbox, "Dropbox," 2011, <https://www.dropbox.com/> (accessed February 11, 2011); Evernote Corporation, "Evernote," 2011, <http://www.evernote.com/> (accessed February 11, 2011).

⁴⁵ Defense Knowledge Online (DKO) and Army Knowledge Online (AKO) both provide tools to form collaborative groups and participate in blogs. Convenience and ease of use are key requirements for collaborative tools to work well. One can access online tools such as "dropbox" and "evernote" from any computer or smart phone, simultaneously sharing information with others and synchronizing multiple devices. In addition to the DKO and AKO systems soon requiring Common Access Card logon, they lack other wireless access and synchronization abilities.

good order. Supervisors must recognize that just because they are accessible and will openly discuss ideas and thoughts, they cannot make impulsive decisions that encroach on junior leaders' decisions and policies. Nor can they make decisions on a single source or the latest input. As trust builds across the rank structure, leaders at all levels will understand each other's roles and boundaries.

Reduce Bureaucracy- Everyday

Bureaucracy within large organizations is necessary and in certain circumstances it creates efficiencies. Although first practiced by the French prior to the French Revolution, bureaucracy as it is known today, came into its own following WWI as a method for governments to manage operations and move from "rule of thumb" to a system of regulation based on "best practices." Bureaucracy was intended to employ new systems of scientific management that evenly shared workload and standardized procedures.⁴⁶ Employed correctly and in a limited manner, bureaucracy can establish guidelines and regulations that assist managers to bring order to the accomplishment of their duties. But this is not the case in many situations when bureaucratic limitations are established to control the actions of many individuals. By its nature, the Defense Department attracts bureaucratic rules and limiting regulations. While comparing the Department of the Treasury, the State Department, and the Navy, President Franklin Roosevelt commented that,

...the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy....To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like

⁴⁶ Max Weber was an early advocate of studying and improving business practices. See, Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1921/1968), 956-958; Many experts throughout history have advocated improved business practices through bureaucratic means, including Frederick Winslow Taylor, who is recognized as the father of scientific management. See, Accel Team, "Historical Perspectives on Productivity Improvement," *Scientific Management and Fredrick Winslow Taylor*, 2010. http://www.accel-team.com/scientific/scientific_02.html (accessed December 18, 2010).

punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.⁴⁷

Still today, bureaucracy is sometimes unintentionally misused as a management tool to exert control over large numbers of individuals and processes. When bureaucracy reaches the extreme, as it commonly does both in military organizations and businesses, it can become a parasitic encumbrance that gets in the way of the effective accomplishment of tasks. As George Rathmann, a co-founder and Chief Operating Officer of the prominent biotechnology company Amgen, states:

The purpose of bureaucracy is to compensate for incompetence and lack of discipline, a problem that largely goes away if you have the right people in the first place. Most organizations build their bureaucratic rules to manage the small percentage of wrong people in the organization, which in turn drives away the right people, which increases the percentage of wrong people, which increases the need for more bureaucracy to compensate for incompetence and lack of discipline, which then further drives the right people away, and so forth.⁴⁸

Major General Sacolick is equally critical of bureaucracy within military organizations, citing its ability to create rampant ineffectiveness that envelops the entirety of organizations.⁴⁹

Counter-Argument:

Bureaucratic practices remain relevant in certain situations, such as managing high volumes of administrative data or setting broad guidelines for management. Managers can solve some problems by creating or enacting processes or rules to avoid preventable mistakes. Creating bureaucratic administrative procedures is a time proven technique to

⁴⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt as quoted in Graham Allison and Philip Zelinkow, *Essence of Decision Making*, 174.

⁴⁸ Collins, *Good to Great*, 121.

⁴⁹ Sacolick, personal communication.

sets rules and regulations for large groups. The results often build efficiencies and increased safety measures that benefit the organization.

Practical Methods of implementation:

A simple two-fold approach to stopping the creation of new bureaucratic processes and indentifying, then removing existing bureaucratic processes will begin to reduce a culture of bureaucracy and increase a culture of accountability. First and foremost, unit leadership must establish a common command theme of understanding and removing unnecessary administrative procedures and workflow redundancies. To stop the enforcement of new bureaucratic processes, leaders must warn and guard against the impulse reaction of mid-level leaders emplacing bureaucratic administrative procedures to account for the mistakes of a few individuals, thereby encumbering the masses. Initially this action will likely cause the mid-level leaders to think that higher leadership is interfering with the execution of their responsibilities, until they see and understand the greater good of establishing a culture of discipline and accountability. Recognizing the need to stymie the creation of new bureaucratic processes and remove unnecessary existing processes, Secretary Gates stated:

...we are eliminating nearly 400 internally-generated reports that over the years have consumed vast amounts of staff time and energy, often to produce documents that are of questionable relevance, value, and in many cases, have been rarely read. Nearly a third of the total reporting requirements originated decades ago and in some cases date back to the 1950s. Overall, this reduction in DoD's internal reporting burden – about 60 percent of all non-statutory reports – when coupled with a reduction in funding for studies, represents an estimated \$1.2 billion in savings over the next five years. I am instructing that, effective next April, the requirement for any internal report with a commissioning date prior to 2006 will be cancelled.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Gates, Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, 2011.

While Secretary Gates was able to dictate the elimination of numerous bureaucratic processes, removing unnecessary managerial practices already present within the organization is usually a longer term process that is best accomplished through the initiative of the individuals who actually administer the processes. Leaders who visibly recognize and reward individuals who identify bureaucratic processes will make immediate progress. One technique is for a leader to end each staff meeting with the question: “Who has identified a bureaucratic process within our organization, and what is it?” The ensuing discussion will enable the leader to reinforce the culture of reducing bureaucracy, while evaluating whether or not this particular process is needed. Once individuals at all levels within an organization actively begin to identify unneeded bureaucratic processes, they may also notice unnecessary processes outside of the organization.

While identifying external bureaucratic processes is a sign of health that one’s unit is actively reducing bureaucracy internally, it can become a detractor if individuals become overly concerned with external issues beyond their control. Deciding when to fight external bureaucratic processes should remain a high level discussion and should only become a priority if the process is so cumbersome and time consuming that it significantly detracts from the unit’s mission accomplishment. For example, regardless of the absurdity of the particular process, if it takes less than a few minutes to complete, one could give an external supervisor an alternative method or recommendation, but leave it at that, with no further expenditure of organizational energy.

Risk:

Similar to emplacing mechanisms that increase collaboration, there is little risk in implementing measures that reduce bureaucracy within Defense Department organizations. Eliminating bureaucratic processes creates immediate payoffs in cost and efficiency and sends a positive message concerning the need for personal responsibility and accountability. However, an organization that outwardly portrays the discipline to remove bureaucratic processes can earn a reputation of being overly critical of other organizations. It can be counterproductive to become known as a unit of contrarians, difficult to work with, always complaining about the way others choose to accomplish their duties. Leaders must ensure that their subordinates focus on what they can control as opposed to the manner in which others conduct their business. Focusing internally on efforts to reduce bureaucracy and streamline processes as much as reasonable will result in an organizational structure that increases operational speed and personal responsibility, emphasizes results and mission accomplishment, and minimizes attempts to control groups.

Use Information Technology Effectively

In considering ways to utilize information technology effectively, this thesis focuses on the organizational use of communication and information systems that invariably defines many cultural aspects of how a unit functions. Integrating technological “improvements” into a workplace environment causes considerable consternation and is arguably both the most loved and most hated action that an organization must endure. Much of the argument is lost (and wasted) on the “technology is good” versus “technology is bad” argument, which primarily only exposes a cultural divide between

generations. Technology zealots, supported by the robust military-industrial complex, would defer to a technologically advanced solution for every existing and imagined problem, sometimes “solving” issues that never existed. However, concentrating on the effective use of technology moves beyond the “more” versus “less” technology argument, instead focusing on gaining the maximum benefit from the use of technological advancements. Since technological advancements are the primary physical capability that separates America from the hybrid threats, to argue for abandoning technology or halting future gains is both counterproductive and unrealistic. The Defense Department must find the balance between gaining technological advantage and an overreliance on technology that makes it a liability or single point of failure. General Mattis recognizes this need for balance stating, “We must moderate and diminish our penchant for technological solutions while maintaining our technical superiority.”⁵¹

Within academia, Jim Collins recognizes both the benefit and limitations of technology. None of the “good” companies that Collins studied that made the leap to becoming “great” companies mentioned technological advancements as singularly resulting in greatness. Collins recognizes technology as an enhancer of speed, both in a positive and negative sense.

If technology cannot make or break a company's level of greatness, but only serves as an accelerator of greatness or demise already in progress, then why did everyone fall in love with technology for technology's sake during the 1990s? Why is there so much hype and fear about new technologies, and what can you do to view new technologies with objective equanimity?⁵²

⁵¹ Mattis, “Irregular War,” 2009.

⁵² Jim Collins, *Jim Collins*. May 1, 2006. <http://www.jimcollins.com/tools/discussion-guide.html> (accessed January 11, 2011).

Collins recognizes, as does General Mattis, that more technology does not automatically result in improved performance. The realization that “more” does not equate “better” is critical to establishing a balanced approach to implementing technological advancements. Remaining able to operate effectively in the absence of technology provides compelling rationale to avoid an overreliance on technology, yet it still does not provide justification for ignoring advancements.

Military organizations must operate ably in austere environments devoid of technology, yet primarily plan to execute operations during the higher percentage of time when technology is available. To “dumb down” military operations for the vastly smaller percentage of time that technology is not available needlessly levels the operational playing field with a hardened and determined enemy by taking away the advantages that technology can provide. Conversely, to apply technology ineffectively or to lose organizational focus by concentrating on technologies that do not provide significant advantage, will also level the playing field. Overreliance on technology creates vulnerabilities that the enemy may target or takes an otherwise highly capable force and bogs it down with misplaced focus on manipulating the technology instead of aggressively pursuing execution of the mission at hand. Therefore, to use information technology effectively requires a somewhat counterintuitive persistent refinement of emerging information technologies, but in a controlled manner that often limits the application and reliance on technological solutions.

Counter-Argument:

Individuals on each end of the spectrum will continue to argue their points regarding a need for more investment and reliance on technology or the need to revert to the basics

with reduced focus and reliance on modernization. To argue against any further modernization, one could maintain that America is already vastly more advanced than its enemies, and that to further complicate America's comprehensive military capability with additional technological advancements only detracts from mission focus. When arguing for unlimited technological advancements one could maintain that America will only reach her full potential with an unmitigated rush towards possible improvements, and to do anything less fails to seize opportunity. Furthermore, if a commander maintains an increasing proclivity for more information, his staff should utilize all technologies and methods to meet his information requirement.

There is little disagreement regarding advancements that provide for basic needs such as administrative computer support, body armor, or weapon optical sighting devices. The systems that cause concern generally involve the expensive major programs that provide limited increase of capability in areas where America is already superior, or the unrelenting proliferation and reliance of communications and information management systems. The communications and information management systems add capability, but also complexity and vulnerabilities. These systems can require additional staff expertise and effort as well as an increased staff capacity to obtain and disseminate virtually unlimited amounts of information. This need can progressively require an unsustainable staff effort to meet the higher headquarters' insatiable appetite for information and an even more precise understanding of subordinate organizations' operations.

Practical Methods of implementation:

As stated in the first section of this chapter, senior leaders must identify key positions that influence the organization internally and externally. To assist an

organization use available information systems effectively, yet maintain balance that prevents an overreliance of technology, an information technology administrator may be one of those informal positions where leaders should position a talented individual. Once the senior leadership positions the correct person, they must focus the individual by setting information technology utilization goals that they intend the officer to obtain. A key requirement within the goals is the setting of limits or the establishment of technological rules of engagement (ROE) that frame an organization's technological control measures.

The priority of an organization desiring to use information technology effectively is the establishment of a one-stop location for current information. Utilization of a web portal can meet this desired end state. As the Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, General McChrystal's personal involvement in the development and format of his unit's web portal drove the disciplined application of a knowledge management solution that focused on information sharing and ensured efficient communication. General McChrystal's portal provided a chronological format that, in one glance, met his information requirements for ongoing operations and priority staff actions. Not only did the portal enable General McChrystal to keep abreast of actions quickly to support his demanding schedule, but it clearly communicated to the overall organization his critical information requirements and unit priorities.⁵³

Correctly used, a web portal will focus on critical information and unit priorities. It should further include the use of a common calendar, where events are hyper-linked with more detailed information, increasing understanding while reducing questions regarding previously published information. The portal should support the design premise that

⁵³ McChrystal, personal communication.

users should not need to “search” the portal for information. Beyond an intuitive nature of design, users should use the portal as a “push” system of information flow where users decide what is important to themselves, then establish “alerts” that automatically notify them of operational updates or other significant changes. In the case of loss of web access, electricity, or other reduction of technological capability, the unit’s operations section must transition smoothly to alternate, tertiary, and emergency techniques of communicating critical information.

Establishing portal ROE requires organizational discipline to keep the single point location for information accurate and updated. It also requires subordinate leaders to check the portal daily to receive current changes and to ensure dissemination of critical information. The information technology administrator must design the portal intuitively so that all information is available in no more the three mouse “clicks.” Although the organization’s calendar must remain under the strict control of a few, the portal should have liberal permission for leaders’ input. Units must resist the tendency for the portal to become a document dumping ground that requires lengthy searches of document lists, instead relying on common drives for data storage functions. The ROE further applies to document naming conventions and any other area that contributes to the application of disciplined procedures within knowledge and information management processes.

Moving beyond the effective use of a web portal, any organizational activity that consistently requires unit members to expend time using communication and information systems should have limitations attached to prevent uncontrolled growth and expansion of technological expectations. Briefings (primarily briefs that utilize PowerPoint

software), use of e-mail, and basic administrative and operational order formats are primary areas that benefit from establishing ROE.

If not controlled, PowerPoint briefings rapidly exhaust organizational energy. Few briefings should require more than ten slides or take longer than an hour. Establishing the ten slide, one hour meeting limitation will focus staff effort and force individuals to determine what is truly important, thereby preventing excessive time expenditures, both in the creation of slides and in the giving and receiving of briefs. Guy Kawasaki, a noted author and venture capitalist consultant, recognizes the effectiveness in creating limits to briefing techniques. Kawasaki urges briefers to adopt his 10-20-30 rule. A brief should contain no more than 10 slides, should last no more than 20 minutes, and should use no smaller than a 30 pitch font. According to Kawasaki, abiding by his 10-20-30 rule increases the effectiveness of the briefer and enhances the likelihood the audience will remain engaged and receptive.⁵⁴ General Mattis takes this restriction to the extreme, prohibiting the use of PowerPoint entirely, except in specific or unusual circumstances.⁵⁵

Limiting e-mails so that the reader can view all of the critical information on a single computer screen also focuses unit communications and affords significant time savings. Following the critical information, a writer can include elaborative data that extends beyond a single computer screen, but an organization that establishes a one screen limit will increase communication efficiencies that positively affect other aspects of how the unit functions. Likewise, limiting memorandums and operations orders to one page documents, focusing on content instead of traditionally mandated correspondence formats will increase the likelihood that subordinate sections will actually read and adhere to the

⁵⁴ Guy Kawasaki, *The Art of the Start* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 48-56.

⁵⁵ As related by USMC Major General Kenneth F. McKenzie the U.S. Central Command J5, in a group discussion on February 18, 2011.

information.⁵⁶ Shortening higher headquarter input to subordinate organizations also ensures higher guidance stays implicit, letting subordinate units figure out execution methods and techniques as they desire (execution responsibility and authority at the right level.)

Much of these prescriptive measures appear top driven, with the primary aim of providing critical information to subordinate units. However, subordinate organizations that develop similar information management methods will gain increased freedom of action from their higher headquarters. A subordinate unit that, through the effective use of technology, meets its higher headquarter's information requirement, while openly providing visibility on their actions and operations will enjoy greater autonomy to execute its operations and day-to-day business. The application of ROE goes both ways regarding information flow, with higher headquarters agreeing not to interfere when the subordinate units meet previously established information requirements.

The Defense Department would benefit if already established Professional Military Education courses dedicated instructional time to teach the precise and concise written and briefing skills mentioned earlier. However, if a leader believes his unit lacks these skills, taking the time to train the unit will clearly convey the leader's rational and intent, while immediately and directly improving communication techniques.

⁵⁶ Simply put, refining data to as little paper as possible increases the chance that subordinate leaders will read and adhere to the information. Master chiefs, first sergeants, and other key executors of tasks will be more likely to inculcate the data and adhere to the instructions if they are presented in a easily digestible format. Colonel (Retired) Jon Antal wrote extensively on refined orders processes that, for the most part, were accepted as techniques and procedures for U.S. Army operational units, but were not adopted as doctrine. The most recent version of U.S. Army FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, contains a matrix order that closely replicates Antal's recommendations of 1990. Regardless of doctrinal acceptance, one-page formats have become the norm for many organizations. See APPENDIX B for examples of one-page documents from FM 5-0 and documents taken from an operational unit. See, John, F Antal, "Combat Orders: An Analysis of the Tactical Orders Process" (Master's Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1990); U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, E-27.

Regardless of the methods and behaviors a unit establishes to ensure the disciplined flow of information, the organization must ensure that it can still function with reduced levels of technological support, to include the complete absence of electricity. While it may seem counterintuitive to state that a unit that relies on a web portal must capably operate without electricity, the establishment of primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) options ensures that a unit thinks and plans for the times when it must operate in austere conditions. It also ensures that the technological solutions employed have backup systems and do not become so elaborate that they require robust infrastructure. All technological systems and methods must also be deployable on short notice. The technology and techniques should primarily support deployable requirements, with small adjustments to accommodate garrison activities, instead of the opposite where supporting garrison requirements is the normal state of affairs.

Risk:

An organization's culture determines how effectively it utilizes technology to meet knowledge management requirements. An organization that fails to establish methods to utilize technology to manage and enhance communication will suffer in many areas. Incomplete and untimely information flow will dramatically inhibit an organization's ability to meet operational requirements. Recognizing that utilization of more technology is not synonymous with better performance, units should establish control measures that focus on unit priorities and prevent the unadulterated expansion of and unnecessary reliance on technology.

Regardless of the methods and techniques a unit employs, an organization must ensure that it meets its higher headquarter's information requirement and meets the needs

of the units it supports as part of its mission requirements. Even if the best techniques fit well within an organization's structure and capabilities, if the methods do not synch with or support others, wasted effort and frustration will result. Likewise, leadership must ensure that established capabilities and procedures are deployable and easily replicated when systems fail, and the unit is able to function without the technology for short periods of reduced resources.

Candor- Live It

Candor is a critical sub-element found in many highly successful organizations. Famed military strategist and theorist J.F.C. Fuller reflected on the healthy effects of candor stating that "...it is only through free criticism of each other's ideas that truth can be thrashed out."⁵⁷ Major General Sacolick defines organizational candor as "the professional honesty predicated upon the sincere belief that there is a better way of doing things, and that you have ideas and recommendations."⁵⁸ Candor is a key element that enables the previously discussed bottom-up feedback, which is consistent with "flat" organizations.

Major General Sacolick elaborated on the importance of candor and professional honesty within organizations relating that it is important to create a climate where subordinates feel comfortable arguing and professionally disagreeing with a leader's ideas, resulting in an atmosphere of "conflict over harmony." Major General Sacolick believes that the day subordinates stop providing their recommendations is the day a unit stops being effective. Leaders must be able to engage in a professional argument with

⁵⁷ J.F.C. Fuller, *Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier* (London: I. Nicholson and Watson, 1936), 417-418.

⁵⁸ Sacolick, personal communication.

their subordinates with the confidence that once the leader makes a decision the unit will execute it with precision.⁵⁹

Corporately speaking, according to business consultant Stephen Covey, seeking feedback and acting on it is a hallmark of a growing and improving organization. What differentiates the good organizations from the bad is not simply to ask questions, but rather, how an organization responds to the answer and learns from mistakes. Making mistakes and then recovering from them is a hallmark of an outstanding organization. An organization that desires to improve must have the candor and the courage to discuss all manner of weaknesses and failings, regardless of how painful.⁶⁰

Counter-Argument:

High levels of candor within organizations will detract from traditional hierarchical structure, causing the unit to suffer from reduced effectiveness due to a constant questioning of authority. Discipline will invariably suffer when arguing about even the minute aspects of operational plans and administrative actions becomes the organizational norm. Some individuals are incapable of fully supporting decisions they have argued passionately against, which reduces chances for mission success.

Practical Methods of Implementation:

Establishing candor within an organization is a sub-element that is best lived and practiced every day rather than only spoken of or encouraged. It becomes readily apparent that candor is welcome when honest input occurs as a matter of course as individuals invest in the organization's purpose and mission and see their roles evolve into contributing members whose opinions matter. However, leaders can increase the

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Covey, *The Speed of Trust*, 136-138.

chance for candor to take hold if they ensure that they and their organization's subordinate leaders not only request honesty and input from others, but require it, when making significant decisions. Jim Collins mentions the corporate leader who, when he received notification from his executives that all were in agreement stated, "...then I suggest that we postpone this decision, until we generate some genuine disagreement, so that we might know what the decision is all about."⁶¹

The manner in which leaders receive information will also indicate their willingness to encourage candor. As stated earlier, leaders should receive "good news well and bad news better" to ensure subordinates never delay bringing forth difficult issues or disagreements. Leaders who reverse previous decisions when confronted with convincing information or arguments will send a positive message that it is acceptable to make mistakes or miscalculations. Possibly the most important thing a leader can do is readily admit, in public, when he or she is wrong, going farther than merely saying "I was wrong," but additionally, "you are right."

Leaders should particularly look for candor in the planning of emerging requirements and in the After Action Review (AAR) processes. Unit members should not view planning environments as an orderly execution of what the boss wants, but rather it should resemble the argumentative "conflict over harmony" atmosphere Major General Sacolick suggests.⁶² Similarly, the manner in which an organization conducts AARs speaks volumes regarding the prominence of candor. Not only should organizations conduct AARs following all activities, but leaders must ensure they include all participants and do not shy away from difficult issues. All units that participated in the

⁶¹ Jim Collins, *Jim Collins*. May 1, 2006. <http://www.jimcollins.com/tools/discussion-guide.html> (accessed January 11, 2011).

⁶² Sacolick, personal communication.

event must have representation at the AAR, which leaders must conduct in a “rankless” manner that does not pull punches or gloss over underlying issues.

Risk:

Organizations must understand the issues discussed in the “counter-argument” sections and guard against regressing into an environment devoid of discipline and professional conduct. Organizations that fail to achieve balance with the appropriate amount of candor can gain a reputation of being contrarian, argumentative, and difficult to work with. Even more harmful than a unit with too much open and frank debate is the organization that lacks sufficiently candid discussions. These organizations will invariably fail to maintain a path of constant improvement that emanates from internally focused honesty.

Summary

This chapter highlights seven critical sub-elements of organizational culture that deserve consideration by any leader who desires to modify organizational behaviors with the intent of improving his or her unit’s general performance. Some of these sub-elements may not apply, while other considerations not listed in this analysis may have relevance. Leaders must assess their organization with brutal introspection to identify areas where performance is lacking. Leaders must then determine the patterns and underlying causes, which will provide insight into specific sub-elements that apply. Continuing to build a new cultural model, Figure 6-1 integrates the sub-elements with the first principles and the priority elements added earlier. As the model increases in complexity, it begins to depict the complex environment of organizational culture. While this model may assist in understanding culture, it still lacks providing prescriptive

suggestions or fundamental ways a leader may choose to alter people’s behaviors and actions to gain needed balance within the cultural elements.




Figure 6-1: Linkages between First Principles, Priority Elements and Sub-Elements

When implementing or manipulating cultural sub-elements, leaders will benefit from taking Secretary Gates’ recommendation to “maintain balance as a guiding principle.”⁶³ The prescriptive path this thesis takes in providing “Practical Methods of Implementation” gives insight into the detailed actions leaders may take to achieve balance with critical sub-elements. Though this thesis does not elaborate into specific measurement techniques, leaders must also continuously employ assessment methods to evaluate if their unit has a healthy balance that promotes the performance they desire.

⁶³ Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” 28.

This assessment will prevent their unit from exhibiting extreme behaviors, thereby ensuring any risk they assume remains within acceptable levels.

CHAPTER 7: INCREASING UNDERSTANDING: A NEW MODEL

Written definitions, descriptions, and elaborations of culture and the factors influencing it are necessary to gain understanding, yet fall short of depicting the intricate and complex nature of organizational culture. Particularly for visual learners, utilizing models can help explain and give visual interpretation to complex issues. Models elaborate on structures and relationships and can depict processes that occur within a domain. Models designed to illustrate process show movement, transitions, and relative effects caused by the adjustment of an element. Existing leadership and organizational cultural models from academia, the business world, and the Defense Department attempt to represent key aspects of effective unit culture with the intention of providing leaders with tools that will assist them to improve the effectiveness of their organizations.

Legacy Leadership or Organizational Culture Models

Neither academia, the business world, nor the Defense Department, use models that assist leaders in grasping the complexity of organizational culture. Academia and businesses use models to depict various aspects of a particular discussion, but do not utilize a model that adequately depicts organizational culture.¹ The Defense Department models contain quality content, but almost completely focus on individual professional development, not providing detail beyond listing leader competencies or traits. The U.S. Navy's Stockdale Center for Leadership web site provides valuable substance through the use of numerous case studies, but does not show visual representations of the organizational environment in which it expects its leaders to excel.² The U.S. Air Force

¹ Academia and business models are depicted in APPENDIX C, Figures C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4.

² U.S. Naval Academy Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, *Ethical Leadership for the Junior Officer*, <http://www.usna.edu/ethics/ELJO.htm> (accessed January 30, 2011).

also uses case studies, some with figures depicting and force development constructs and processes.³

As the primary land component combat forces, the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army devote great time and effort to building organizations. The U.S. Marine Corps' leadership manual, *Leading Marines*, contains combat vignettes describing inspirational actions of Marines overcoming adversity and is a "must read" for leaders at all levels. However, it also remains at a high level, listing leadership principles without showing the true intricate nature of organizational culture.⁴ The U.S. Army's capstone leadership field manual provides the most detailed source for building leaders, presenting a comprehensive leadership development document. The U.S. Army manual relies on numerous tables and figures to aid leaders' understanding, yet also falls short of visually depicting organizational culture.⁵

There is potential harm, especially within the Defense Department, if leaders at all levels do not understand and recognize the complexity of organizational culture. Even worse than not understanding organizational culture, is proclaiming understanding and simply listing a set of principles or checklists as the answer. To understand organizational culture is to understand the human dimension, and this is not done through lists of principles and checklists.⁶ U.S. Navy Captain Brett Pierson, the creator of the complex Afghanistan counter-insurgency model, agrees that to over-simplify complex

³ U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development*, 15, 19. See APPENDIX C, Figure C-5.

⁴ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Leading Marines*, 103, 105. See APPENDIX C, Figure C-6 and C-7.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 2-7; U.S. Department of the Army, *Battle Focused Training*, 1-4. See APPENDIX C, Figures C-8 and C-9.

⁶ Concept derived from discussions with U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Wayne Pollard, a former supervisor and long time mentor of the author.

issues usually results in “proposed solutions that appear simple and are usually wrong.”⁷

To depict the leadership environment within a neat, tidy, linear model or table is misleading and counterproductive, especially for junior leaders. It is best to recognize organizational culture for what it is, a convoluted, messy, and potentially chaotic environment that requires study, understanding, and thoughtful approach, for a unit to reach full potential.

A New Organizational Culture Model

Typical model formats do not portray the intricacies of organizational culture acceptably. The construct of the model is of paramount importance, since the structure of the model contains the meaning as much or more than the content. Captain Pierson’s “spaghetti” or “hairball” model, originally developed to explain the complex counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan, is a suitable type of model to depict the organizational cultural environment.⁸ While Captain Pierson developed his model through the use of sophisticated modeling software, one can construct an analog version of a different domain, in this case organizational culture, by using the same overarching design concept.⁹ The construct of the Afghanistan counter-insurgency model allows for the breakout of first principles, priority elements, and sub-elements of culture defined in this thesis as well as their interrelationships, associations, and linkages.

Professor John Kotter, from the Harvard Business School, espouses a similar modeling theory relating to organizational culture. Kotter describes organizational

⁷ Copy of original PowerPoint presentation and video presentation of Captain Pierson briefing the construction of the Afghanistan Stability / Counter-Insurgency Dynamic Model provided courtesy of Captain Pierson. Brett Pierson, Captain, “Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan,” Washington DC:, October, 2009.

⁸ Ibid., APPENDIX D, Figure D-1.

⁹ Ibid., With the assistance of a defense contractor, Captain Pierson utilized STELLA modeling and simulation software to apply the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency field manual to the Afghanistan domain.

culture as having elements that relate with varying levels of dependence and interdependence. As depicted in Figure 7-1, in systems with only independent parts, one can adjust one part without affecting other parts. In systems with some interdependency, to adjust one part will affect a few other parts. In highly interdependent systems, as is the case with organizational culture, to adjust one part will affect many other parts.

Creating Change in Systems of Varying Interdependence




Figure 7-1. Creating Change in Systems of Varying Interdependence¹⁰

The elements that connect with numerous other elements within a culture acquire high levels of interdependence and subsequent complexity. This complexity creates the

¹⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 137.

requirement for a comprehensive plan for a unit desiring to change its environment since it must change many related areas to gain a specific desired effect in a particular element.¹¹

Combining Captain Pierson’s visual and functional interpretation of the Afghanistan Stability and Counter-Insurgency dilemma with Professor Kotter’s theory of interdependence provides the rationale for a new model to depict organizational culture. The new model represents direct and indirect relationships between the elements that define how a unit functions and the process of how the pulling on one strand can affect multiple other areas or elements. When building the model, identifying important aspects and relationships between elements from the definitions and discussion earlier in the thesis became key to determining model connections and linkages. Focusing on the larger issues and more significant linkages kept the model manageable, while still conveying the complexity that is organizational culture. Scrutinizing the first principles, priority elements, and sub-elements, and how they affect each other, revealed the need to identify several “fundamental ways” (APPENDIX D, Table 4) to attain desired effects.¹² Critically assessing the relationship between the first principles, priority elements, and sub-elements, and then applying the linkages with the fundamental ways, provides a more complete understanding of organizational culture than previous models.


There are several ways to view the connectors and linkages between the elements in the new model. While the lines have arrows that indicate the flow of information and

¹¹ Ibid., 134-139.

¹² The “fundamental ways” (listed in APPENDIX D, Table 4) are the 33 items in the smallest text within the complete model, Figure 7-2. Initial scrutiny of the first principles, priority elements, and sub-element resulted in a list of more than 275 “fundamental ways.” Detailed study of the model resulted in a pairing down of the “fundamental ways” to the 33 that show up in the model. Refer to APPENDIX D, Tables 2 and 3 for the final breakout of the various elements of culture and the relationships to the fundamental way needed to reach desired effects.

effects, this may not always be the case. Considering the linkages as fixed cables attached to some elements and rubber bands attached to others is possibly a more accurate interpretation. Also, one should consider the likelihood of tension and slack between elements, which a leader must adjust in order to obtain desired balance.

Figure 7-2. The Interdependent Complexity of Organizational Culture



Learning From the Model

The associations and linkages between the first principles, priority elements, and sub-elements, depend on the definitions of the fundamental ways identified as critical to reaching desired effects. Since defining each of the 33 fundamental ways requires detailed study beyond the scope of this thesis, this model takes on a subjective quality based on the author's beliefs and perceptions. Regardless, the model provides increased understanding and remains a credible tool for a reader who wishes to internally define the terms or use other fundamental ways that pertain to a specific situation.

Analyzing the complete model revealed that regardless of where one entered the model, he or she would reach all 49 elements, confirming that culture is a highly interdependent environment. Each element has primary, secondary, tertiary (and so forth) connections as one follows connectors from a particular element to other elements within the model. For example, in its first level of connectors, "purpose" is directly connected to responsibility, conformity, and true motivation, as well as several fundamental ways. The primary connectors of responsibility, conformity, and true motivation are the second level connectors for "purpose." By progressing two additional levels (four levels total) into the model, purpose will have reached all 49 elements. Two points of entry, "trust" and "creative problem solving," enable one to reach all of the elements in only three levels. It warrants further exploration and study whether focus or concentration on "trust" and "creative problem solving" would have the greatest impact on positively affecting culture.¹³

¹³ Refer to APPENDIX D for a consolidated list of the progressions through the model by element and level as well as additional assumptions that the model may indicate.

Additional analysis of the model revealed disparity between the number of linkages that terminate at cultural elements. Compared to the first principles, priority elements, and sub-elements, the “fundamental ways” have the greatest number of terminal points. This supports previous presumptions that the fundamental ways provide practical options for implementing or altering cultural elements. One could assume that an organization would be well served to pay particular attention to the fundamental ways that depict the most terminal points. In other words, as indicated in Table 1, a unit leader should consider focusing on “individual accountability” as a way to achieve the greatest and most immediate impact on organizational culture.

Table 1. Fundamental Ways with the Most Terminal Points¹⁴

Individual Accountability	9
Common Goals	7
Disciplined Behavior	7
Increased Autonomy Over Time/Task/Technique	7
Underwrite Mistakes	7
Subordinate Initiative	6

Summary

While one should not expect a model to provide a precise answer or no-fail solution, the use of a model can increase understanding and comprehension of complex issues. Previous models designed by the Defense Department, academia, and businesses do not adequately depict organizational culture. Applying a model first used to enhance understanding of the complexities of the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan will help leaders grasp the intricacies of organizational culture. The model suggested in this chapter possesses an inherent subjective quality based on the author’s definitions and applications of cultural elements. Though the first principles, priority elements, and sub-

¹⁴ Refer to APPENDIX D, Table 4 for a consolidated list of terminal points.

element described in this thesis will not apply to all units or situations, the application of this model contributes to the overall knowledge in this field of study. Any leader wishing to better understand his organization and determine a path ahead for improving unit performance could apply the modeling rationale suggested in this chapter to his or her specific situation.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Equal parts of learning from the past and anticipating the future provide perspective as America prepares to face future challenges. All indications show that America is entering an interwar period of reduced resources and eroded support for the Defense Department. A significant difference between today and previous interwar periods is America's continued involvement in two wars. Never before has America demanded massive cuts in defense spending while her forces remained engaged in combat. To worsen the situation, America is also threatened by numerous hybrid threats across the globe. The hybrid threats anticipated to threaten America are ill-defined and difficult to pinpoint. Long gone are linear battlefields with their predictable enemy doctrine and troop formations, replaced instead by irregular terrorist networks and asymmetric threats that require an adaptive approach and an agile application of force to counter.

In the last decade of war the military has made numerous improvements in aspects of training, equipping, manning, and executing military operations, but the military has also been slow to adapt to needed changes. It is the culture of the Defense Department that prevents proactive solving of emerging problems and an adaptive approach to complex environments. The only way the Defense Department will counter future challenges ably is through altering its culture to anticipate and adapt to whatever adversity it encounters. Were the Defense Department to develop a culture that expected and projected change, it would adapt to the challenges of the next decade, even given reduced resources and complicated conditions.

Besides realizing benefit from a new organizational culture that embraced change, the Defense Department would also benefit from moving away from the overreliance on

the development of individual leaders as the sole method of developing effective units. Shifting analysis and efforts to finding methods and techniques to improve the manner in which organizations function provides increased understanding. A study of what academics have learned and how successful businesses and highly effective special operation organizations operate proved an effective method for learning ways to improve the function of general purpose Defense Department organizations.

Demonstrated precedence exists that proves the Defense Department can change its culture to become more adaptive to future challenges. Academia, highly effective businesses, and exceptional special operations organizations continue to outperform their peers despite difficult conditions. Applying the concepts of academia and replicating performance characteristics of businesses and special operations organizations illuminates a path ahead. A study of these three areas revealed seven first principles, two primary elements, and seven sub-elements that assist in understanding the complexity that is organizational culture. Recognizing that the way to create cultural change is through altering individual behavior and adjusting unit norms revealed thirty three fundamental ways one could employ to adjust a unit's culture to meet its particular challenges and requirements.

Further investigation revealed that one could relate these elements in a version of a model not previously applied to organizational culture. The complexity of the model recommended in this thesis replicates the complicated nature of organizational culture. Beyond presenting an accurate structure of organizational culture, the model revealed additional considerations one could use as a starting point to undertaking a deliberate effort to alter his or her unit's culture.


Much like an orchestra conductor composing and overseeing an artistic creation, a leader must embrace the challenge and complexity of making his or her unit more effective and efficient. A conductor must know and apply exactly the correct sequence of notes, with the right combination of instruments, at the right concentration, to create the best possible harmony. The harmony must meet the immediate need, yet be capable of rapidly adjusting to meet the melody required in the next movement. Similarly, a military leader must determine the most appropriate approach to improving his or her unit's culture, accentuating the most connective fundamental ways, while adhering to necessary first principles and primary elements, and never losing sight of the interdependent nature of the culture he or she seeks to alter.

Adjusting organizational culture is as difficult of an undertaking as any that a Defense Department organization could attempt. Yet, establishing an agile culture is as important as any requirement a unit faces. Leaders should apply the concepts of this thesis to ensure their unit is capable, agile, and flexible enough to meet emerging requirements of the next century.

This Page Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX A: Senior Leader Correspondence

There is something gained from viewing copies of the actual documents written by American senior leaders demonstrating responsibility and loyalty at critical times in military history.



Our landings in the
Chenouy - Have now
have failed to gain a
satisfactory foothold and
~~I have with pleasure~~
~~the troops have been~~
~~withdrawn.~~ This particular
operation | my decision to
attack at this time and place
was based upon the best
information available, and
the troops, the air and the
Navy did all that ~~was~~
Bravery and devotion to duty
could do. If any blame
or fault attaches to the attempt
it is mine alone.

July 5

Figure A-1

General Eisenhower wrote this letter assuming full personal responsibility in case the Normandy invasion failed, intending to release it to the public. Of note, he erroneously dated it July instead of June.¹

¹ Eisenhower, "National Archives," *Teaching With Documents*.

CONGRESSMAN MURTHA

Please show this to President Clinton and
Sec Aspin. I request that you not make it a public
document.

Operation on 3/4 Oct '93 in MOE.

I The authority, responsibility and accountability
for the Op rests here in MOE with the TF
Ranger Commander, not in Washington.

II Excellent Intelligence was available on the
Target.

III Forces were experienced in AREA as a result
of six previous operations.

IV Enemy situation was well known
• Proximity to BAKARA Market (SNA strong point)
• Previous reaction times of SADF guys

V Planning for Op was bottom up not top down. Assaulters
were confident it was a doable operation. Approval
of plan was retained by TF Ranger Commander.

VI Technique, tactics and procedures were appropriate
for mission/target.

VII Reaction forces were planned for contingencies
A. CSAR on immediate standby. (UH60 with medics
and security)
B. Ranger COG as ground reaction force in remote Hamvees
C. 10th MED DIV (PRF (coordinated with unit organic))

Figure A-2

Written in Somalia, immediately after the battle of October 3-4, 1993, Major General Garrison's loyalty to his nation and his unit enabled him to willingly accept blame, thereby allowing America to move forward instead of regressing to unhelpful figure pointing.²

² Garrison, "The Philadelphia Enquirer"; Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 337-338.

VIII Loss of 1st Holo was supportable. Pilot penned in wreckage ~~was~~ presented problems.

IX 2d Holo crash required response from the 10th Mtn QRF. The area of the crash was such that the SNA were there nearly immediately so we were unsuccessful in reaching the crash site in time.

X Rangers on 1st crash site were not penned down. They could have fought their way out. Our creed would not allow us to leave the body of the pilot penned in the wreckage.

XI Armor reaction force would have helped but casualty figures may or may not have been different. The type of men in this task force simply would not be denied in their mission of getting to their fallen comrades.

XII The mission was a success. Targeted individuals were captured and extracted from the target.

XIII For this particular target, President Clinton and Sec Aspin need to be taken off of the blame line.

Wm F Garrison
William F. GARRISON
MG
Commanding

Figure A-2 Continued

This Page Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX B: Examples of Effective Written Formats

TASK ORGANIZATION				
TF Control	A/2-22 IN	B/2-22 IN	C/2-22 AR	D/2-22 AR
Sniper Sqd/HHC/2-22	1/A/2-22 IN 2/A/2-22 IN 3/C/2-22 AR	1/B/2-22 IN 2/B/2-22 IN 3/D/2-22 AR	1/C/2-22 AR 2/C/2-22 AR 3/A/2-22 IN	1/D/2-22 AR 2/D/2-22 AR 3/B/2-22 IN
HHC	HN Civil Authorities (DIRLAUTH)			
Scout PLT/2-22 IN Mortars/HHC/2-22 Medical/HHC/2-22	None			
MISSION:				
TF 2-22 conducts a cordon and search in AO COURAGE NLT 120900ZJAN07 to capture anti-coalition forces (ACF) and seize weapons caches in order to limit the attacks on coalition forces.				
COMMANDER'S INTENT:				
Simultaneous occupation of outer cordon checkpoints (CKPs) to isolate search objectives and prevent ACF exfiltration or infiltration. Lead with information for and companies postured for future operations. Detainee Collection Point for processing and evacuation. End state is OBJ's LEWIS, DRUM, BRAGG and CAMPBELL free of ACF host-nation population and property while conducting thorough searches. Immediate evacuation of ACF personnel to BCT dissemination of information themes and messages. Exercise patience, discipline, and respect and companies postured for future operations.				
EXECUTION – TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS:				
A/2-22 IN	TF Decisive Operation: Secure OBJ DRUM (inner cordon) and conduct search to capture ACF and seize weapons caches in order to limit the attacks on coalition forces.			
B/2-22	IN Secure OBJ BRAGG (inner cordon) and conduct search to capture ACF and seize weapons caches in order to limit the attacks on coalition forces.			
C/2-22 AR	1. Secure OBJ CAMPBELL (inner cordon) and conduct search to capture ACF and seize weapons caches in order to limit the attacks on coalition forces.			
D/2-22 AR	1. Secure the outer cordon at CKPs 1-6. 2. Secure AA KANSAS, for HNCA occupation.			
HHC (-)/2-22	1. Secure TF tactical command post and TF Forward Aid Station in OBJ LEWIS.			
Sniper/HHC/2-22	1. Occupy AA GEORGIA and provide observation and surveillance of OBJs DRUM, BRAGG, and CAMPBELL. 2. O/O deliver precision fires to destroy ACF.			
Acknowledge: A/2-22 IN, B/2-22 IN, C/2-22 AR, D/2-22 AR, HHC/2-22, Sniper/2-22 IN				

Figure B-1: Example of Overlay Order¹

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Operations Process*, E-27.

OPORD 07-02-XX (COMMEX)	FOUO Classification	12FEB XX– UTC Date of Operation	6 FEB XX Date of Order
--------------------------------	-------------------------------	---	----------------------------------

TASK ORGANIZATION:

X-XX CAV –
 - A Troop - B Troop
 - C Troop - D Troop
 - E Troop - HHT

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces – N/A
- b. Friendly Forces – N/A
- c. Attachments and Detachments – NONE

2. MISSION:

X-XX Cavalry conducts Maintenance Communications Exercise (COMMEX) in the Squadron Motorpool the 2nd and 4th Squadron Maintenance Day (motor stables) of the month beginning on 12 Feb XX to conduct periodic maintenance IOT identify and improve the Squadron's communication capabilities.

3. EXECUTION:

Commander's Intent:
 Key Tasks:
 - Conduct operator and unit level PMCS
 - Report unit level deficiencies to Squadron S-6 for disposition
 - Conduct proper radio procedures
 Endstate:
 COMMEX complete with the identification of radio deficiencies and initiation of appropriate corrective actions with 100% equipment accountability.

a. Concept of Operations:
 The operation will occur in two phases:
 Phase 1: Begins with installation of radios in vehicles. Each Troop is responsible for installation and PMCS on radio systems to identify, correct and/or refer to unit level maintenance any deficiencies. During this phase operators will complete internal radio checks and maintenance. Phase 1 ends prior to 1030L with each operator monitoring SQD CMD frequency, standing by for Net call.
 Phase 2: Begins at 1030L at which time stations will conduct a radio check with the NCS, XXXXXXXX TOC, on the Squadron Command frequency. Radio checks will be performed at the discretion of the calling station. Phase 2 ends at 1130L, when all stations have reported in or are accounted for by NCS.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units and Staff:
 (1) A, B, C, D, and E Troops
 (a) Provide organic RT-1523s to support Troop AN-VRC 92 and AN-VRC 89 systems.

(b) Provide operator for each system
 (c) Conduct Troop internal radio tests and maintenance prior to Squadron Net Call.
 (2) HHT
 (a) Provide organic RT-1523s to support the systems as follows:
 - SCO – AN-VRC 92 (2)
 - SXO – AN-VRC 89 (2)
 - CSM – AN-VRC 90 (1)
 - S2 – AN-VRC 92 (2)
 - S3 – AN-VRC 92 (2)
 - S4 – AN-VRC 92 (2)
 - S6 – AN-VRC 92 (8)
 - DOC – AN-VRC 90 (1)
 - HHT – AN-VRC 90 (1)
 (b) Provide operator for each system
 (c) Conduct Troop internal radio tests and maintenance prior to Squadron Net Call.
 (3) S6: Transport RT-1523s to motorpool to be issued to HHT operators.
 c. Coordinating Instructions:
 1. All operators will list the RT-1523s on the designated 5988-E for turn in to the Squadron Commo Shop.
 2. Radio operations will be conducted in FH mode, Cipher text.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:

NONE

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command: N/A	
b. Signal:	
SQD CMD – 500	
HHT - 502	A - 504
B - 506	C - 508
D - 510	E - 513

6. ANNEXES/APPENDICES:

N/A

POC
 1LT (P) XXXXXX, S-6, X-XX CAV
AUTHORITY
 MAJ XXXXXX, XO, X-XX CAV

Figure B-2: Example of Single Page Administrative Order²

² Document taken from author's personal files.

OPORD 07-02-XX (Operation XXXXX)		XXXXXX Classification	12FEB XX- UTC Date of Operation	10 FEB XX Date of Order
---	--	---------------------------------	---	-----------------------------------

TASK ORGANIZATION:

X-XX CAV

- A Troop(-) (1 x SWT)
- C Troop(-) (1x SWT)
- D Troop(-) (DART)

1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: See Annex B
b. Friendly Forces: X-XX, XBCT, XXXXXXX
c. Attachments and Detachments: B/X-XXX (DART/1x UH-60) (o/o OPCON)

2. MISSION:

X-XX CAV conducts XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X XXXXXXX XXXX XXXX X XXXXX. XXXXX
XXXX XXXX XXX XXX XX

3. EXECUTION:

Commander's Intent:

Key Tasks:

- Conduct Troop-level mission planning IAW X-XX CAV TACSOP
- Conduct XXXX
- Conduct XXXXX
- Conduct XXXXXXXXXXXX
- Conduct XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
- Ensure solid communications throughout

Endstate: X-XX
BCTXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.

a. Concept of Operation: The operation will occur in 3 phases:

Phase 1 Planning: Begins with receipt of this OPORD. It consists of Troop-level mission planning, liaison with
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX and Troop OPORD Brief. Phase 1 ends when aircraft depart from
XXXXXXXX XXX.

Phase 2 Execution: Phase 2 begins with deployment XXXX XXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX conduct battle handover and redeploy as SWTs. Phase 2 ends when SWTs are redeployed to XXXXXX XXXX.

Phase 3 Recovery: Begins when aircraft are shut down and MC after returning to XXXX XXXX. It includes recovery operations, 's and ends when all personnel and equipment are reset and poised for future operations.

b. Tasks to Subordinate Units and Staff:

(1) A Troop

(a) Provide one SWT from 071100-1230R FEB 07 IOT ensure maximum coverage of block time.
(b) Conduct Handover with C Troop.
(c) DIRLAUTH with C Troop.
(d) Brief the SCO on Troop concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver NLT 11 FEB.
(2) C Troop
(a) Provide one SWT from 071230-1400R FEB 07 IOT ensure maximum coverage of block time.
(b) Conduct Handover with A Troop.
(c) DIRLAUTH with A Troop.
(d) Brief the SCO on Troop concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver NLT 11 FEB.
(3) D Troop
(a) Provide DART team (2 hour recall) from 070600-UTCS FEB.
(b) BPT provide ground DART in case of inclement weather.
(c) DIRLAUTH with B/X-XXX AVN, CW2 XXXXX (XXXXXXX).
(d) Brief the SCO on Troop concept of support NLT 11 FEB.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) X-XXXX (XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) XXXXXXXXXXXX
(2) Timeline:
7 FEB
1100-1230R A/X-XX CAV (SWT) on station
1230-1400R C/X-XX CAV (SWT) on station
d. Fire Support
(1) While R/W aircraft are on station X-XX MTRs will be in check fire.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Supply
(1) Class I (Sust): Troops provide for aircrews (DIRLAUTH w/ for MREs)
(2) Class III (POL): Troops will coordinate for fuel at XXX (XXXXXXXX XXXX and XXXXXXXXXXX XXXI, XX), both require PPR.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. Command: Per SOP
b. Signal: See Annex H: Signal (COMGRID)

6. ANNEXES/APPENDICES:

Annex C: Operations
Annex B: Intelligence
Annex H: Signal (COMGRID)

POC
CW3 XXXXXXX, A/S-3 TACOPS, X-XX CAV

AUTHORITY
MAJ XXXXXXXX, S-3, X-XX CAV

Figure B-3: Example of Single Page Tactical Operations Order³

³ Document taken from author's personal files.

This Page Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX C: Examples of Previous Culture Models




Figure C-1: Competing Values Culture Model¹

¹ Robert Quinn and John Rohrbaugh, "A Competing Values Approach to Organizational Effectiveness," *Public Productivity Review* 5, (1981): 122-140.

The four models taken from academia were created for specific purposes by highly respected authors and academics. This thesis does not aim to disparage the models, for they fit precisely the concepts for which they were designed. This thesis only suggests that the models do not depict the complexity of organizational culture, nor has academia or businesses created other models that adequately portray organizational culture.

 Corporate Culture Adaptive versus Unadaptive Corporate Cultures		
	ADAPTIVE	UNADAPTIVE
Core Values	Most managers care deeply about customers, stockholders and employees. They also strongly value people and processes that can create useful change.	Most managers care mainly about themselves, their immediate workgroup or their product. They value the orderly and risk-reducing management process much more highly than leadership initiatives.
Common Behavior	Managers pay close attention to all their constituencies, especially customers, and initiate change when necessary to serve their legitimate interests, even if that entails taking some risk.	Managers tend to behave somewhat insularly, politically and bureaucratically. As a result, they do not change their strategies quickly to adjust to or take advantage of changes in their business environments.
Source: "Corporate Culture and Performance", Kotter, J.P. and Heskett, J.L. 1000ventures.com		

Figure C-2: Comparison of Adaptive and Unadaptive Corporate Cultures²




Figure C-3: The Circuit of Culture³

² John P. Kotter and James L. Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 51.

³ Paul Du Gay, *Production of Culture/Cultures of Production* (London: The Open University, 1997), 10.

CULTURE IN AN ORGANIZATION




Figure C-4: Culture in an Organization⁴



Figure C-5: USAF Force Development Process⁵

⁴ Kotter and Heskett, *Corporate Culture and Performance*, 5.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development*, 19.



Figure C-6: USMC Leadership Traits⁶




Figure C-7: USMC Leadership Principles⁷

⁶ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Leading Marines*, 103.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

Leads	Leads Others	Extends Influence Beyond the Chain Of Command	Leads by Example	Communicates
	•Provide purpose, motivation, inspiration. •Enforce standards. •Balance mission And welfare of Soldiers.	•Build trust outside lines of authority. •Understand sphere, means, and limits of influence. •Negotiate, build consensus, resolve conflict.	•Display character. •Leads with confidence in adverse conditions. •Demonstrate competence.	•Listen actively. •State goals for action. •Ensure shared understanding.
	Creates a Positive Environment	Prepares Self	Develops Leaders	
	•Set the conditions for positive climate. •Build teamwork and cohesion. •Encourage initiative. •Demonstrate care for people.	•Be prepared for expected and unexpected challenges. •Expand knowledge. •Maintain self-awareness.	•Assess developmental needs. Develop on the job. •Support professional and Personal growth. •Help people learn. •Counsel, coach, and mentor. •Build team skills and processes.	
Achieve	Gets Results			
	•Provide direction, guidance, and priorities. •Develop and execute plans. •Accomplish tasks consistently.			
Develops				

Figure C-8: Eight Core Leader Competencies and Supporting Behaviors⁸




Figure C-9: Army Training and Leader Development Model⁹


⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, 2-7.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Battle Focused Training*, 1-4.

This Page Intentionally Blank

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics

Figure D-1: Afghanistan Stability and Counter-Insurgency Dynamics Model¹



WORKING DRAFT - V3

¹ Pierson, Captain, "Dynamic Planning."

This Page Intentionally Blank

Table 2. Consolidated List of Linkages and Connectors

First Principles	Purpose <u>Responsibility</u> <u>True Motivation</u> <u>Conformity</u> Work Matters Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior Subordinate Initiative Personal Buy-in Introspection Higher Calling Commitment	Responsibility <u>Purpose</u> <u>Trust</u> <u>Execution at Right Level</u> True Motivation Disciplined Behavior Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Tech Individual Accountability Subordinate Initiative Underwrite Mistakes	Loyalty <u>Trust</u> <u>Integrity</u> <u>Execution at Right Level</u> Underwrite Mistakes Leader Consistency Others Get Benefit of Doubt Peer Enforced Norms Commitment Common Goals
	Trust <u>Loyalty</u> <u>Responsibility</u> <u>Execution at Right Level</u> <u>Reduce Bureaucracy</u> Disciplined Behavior Leader Consistency Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Tech Individual Accountability Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior Others Get Benefit of Doubt Underwrite Mistakes	Integrity <u>Courage</u> <u>Loyalty</u> Candor Individual Accountability Leader Consistency Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior Peer Enforced Norms	Conformity <u>Purpose</u> Commitment Common Goals Confidence In Self & Others Higher Calling Inclusion Peer Enforced Norms Personal Buy-in Work Matters
	Courage Candor Common Goals Introspection Conflict Over Harmony	Integrity Disciplined Behavior Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior	Commitment Individual Accountability Professional Honesty
Primary Elements	True Motivation <u>Purpose</u> <u>Creative Problem Solving</u> <u>Culture of Collaboration</u> <u>Position Talent</u> <u>Focus Talent</u> Candor Execution at Right Level Common Goals Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Technique Individual Accountability Introspection Personal Buy-in Subordinate Initiative Underwrite Mistakes Work Matters		Creative Problem Solving <u>True Motivation</u> <u>Execution at the Right Level</u> <u>Culture of Collaboration</u> <u>Use Information Technology Effectively</u> Candor Common Goals Education Centric Extremes & Opposites Inclusion Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Technique Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior Seek Diversity Seek Input Underwrite Mistakes
	Position Talent <u>True Motivation</u> <u>Focus Talent</u> Execution at Right Level Candor Confidence In Self & Others Disciplined Behavior Hire-Fire Occasionally Individual Accountability Leader Consistency Re-position Best Talent Seek Diversity		Execution at Right Level <u>Responsibility</u> <u>Loyalty</u> <u>Trust</u> <u>Creative Problem Solving</u> Culture of Collaboration Confidence In Self & Others Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Tech Individual Accountability Risk Cost-Benefit Analysis Subordinate Initiative Underwrite Mistakes
Sub-Elements	Culture of Collaboration Candor <u>True Motivation</u> <u>Creative Problem Solving</u> <u>Reduce Bureaucracy</u> Seek Input Seek Diversity Inclusion Increase Autonomy Over Time/Task/Tech Subordinate Initiative Underwrite Mistakes Peer Enforced Norms Leader Consistency	Reduce Bureaucracy <u>Trust</u> Responsibility <u>Use Information Technology Effectively</u> <u>Culture of Collaboration</u> Disciplined Behavior Individual Accountability Leader Consistency Stop New Processes Remove Existing Processes Stop-doing Objectives To-Do Objectives	Use Information Technology Effectively <u>Reduce Bureaucracy</u> <u>Creative Problem Solving</u> Common Goals Disciplined Behavior Keep Tech Advantage To-Do Objectives Tech Limiting ROE Tech Systems PACE Stop-Doing Objectives
	Candor <u>Courage</u> Conflict Over Harmony Subordinate Initiative	<u>True Motivation</u> Professional Honesty Seek Input	<u>Culture of Collaboration</u> Seek Diversity

Underline = Arrow Goes Both Ways

Table 3. Progression Through the Model

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5
Purpose	Responsibility True Motivation Conformity	Trust Execution at Right Level Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Position Talent Focus Talent	Loyalty Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy Candor	Integrity Courage	
Responsibility	Purpose Trust Execution at Right Level True Motivation	Conformity Loyalty Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Position Talent Focus Talent	Integrity Information Technology Candor Reduce Bureaucracy	Courage	
Loyalty	Trust Integrity Execution at Right Level	Responsibility Courage Candor Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration	Purpose True Motivation Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy	Conformity Position Talent Focus Talent	
Trust	Loyalty Responsibility Execution at Right Level	Integrity Purpose True Motivation Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration	Courage Candor Conformity Position Talent Focus Talent Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy		
Integrity	Courage Loyalty Candor	Trust Execution at Right Level Culture of Collaboration	Responsibility Creative Problem Solving True Motivation Reduce Bureaucracy	Purpose Information Technology Position Talent Focus Talent	Conformity
Conformity	Purpose	Responsibility True Motivation	Trust Execution at Right Level Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Position Talent Focus Talent	Loyalty Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy Candor	Integrity Courage
Courage	Candor Integrity	Culture of Collaboration Loyalty	True Motivation Reduce Bureaucracy Trust Execution at Right Level	Purpose Creative Problem Solving Position Talent Focus Talent Responsibility Information Technology	Conformity
True Motivation	Purpose Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Position Talent Focus Talent Execution at Right Level Candor	Responsibility Conformity Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy	Trust Courage	Loyalty Integrity	
Creative Problem Solving	True Motivation Execution at Right Level Culture of Collaboration Information Technology Candor	Purpose Position Talent Focus Talent Trust Reduce Bureaucracy Courage	Responsibility Conformity Loyalty Integrity		

Table 3 Continued

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Position Talent	True Motivation Focus Talent Execution at Right Level Candor	Purpose Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Trust Courage	Loyalty Responsibility Conformity Information Technology Reduce Bureaucracy	Integrity
Focus Talent	Position Talent Execution at Right Level True Motivation	Trust Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration Purpose	Loyalty Responsibility Information Technology Candor Reduce Bureaucracy Conformity	Courage Integrity
Execution at Right Level	Trust Creative Problem Solving Culture of Collaboration	Loyalty Responsibility True Motivation Information Technology Candor	Integrity Purpose Position Talent Focus Talent Reduce Bureaucracy Courage	Conformity
Culture of Collaboration	Candor True Motivation Reduce Bureaucracy	Courage Purpose Creative Problem Solving Position Talent Focus Talent Execution at Right Level Responsibility Information Technology	Integrity Conformity Trust	Loyalty
Reduce Bureaucracy	Responsibility Information Technology Culture of Collaboration	Purpose Trust Execution at Right Level True Motivation Creative Problem Solving Candor	Conformity Loyalty Position Talent Focus Talent Courage	Integrity
Use Info Technology Effectively	Reduce Bureaucracy Creative Problem Solving	Responsibility Culture of Collaboration True Motivation Execution at Right Level Candor	Purpose Trust Loyalty Position Talent Focus Talent Courage	Conformity Integrity
Candor	Courage Culture of Collaboration True Motivation	Integrity Reduce Bureaucracy Purpose Creative Problem Solving Position Talent Focus Talent Execution at Right Level	Loyalty Responsibility Information Technology Conformity	Trust

Miscellaneous Notes:

- Regardless of where one enters the model, he or she will eventually reach all of the model elements by the fifth level, including reaching all of the 33 fundamental ways.
- Some elements, such as “trust” and “creative problem solving” rapidly disperse into the other elements, reaching all elements quickly. Others, such as “conformity” and “candor” ease into the model, not reaching most elements until reaching later levels.
- First principles make up most of the elements reached at the later levels (25 of the 37 elements reached in levels four and five are first principles.) This possibly supports the earlier assertion that deficiencies in first principles may not be immediately visible, but will manifest during times of adversity.

Table 4. List of Fundamental Ways Including Total Number of Terminal Points

Commitment	4	Peer Enforced Norms	4
Common Goals	7	Personal Buy-in	3
Confidence In Self & Others	4	Professional Honesty	2
Conflict Over Harmony	2	Remove Existing Processes	1
Disciplined Behavior	7	Re-position Best Talent	1
Education Centric	1	Risk Cost-Benefit Analysis	1
Extremes & Opposites	1	Seek Diversity	4
Higher Calling	2	Seek Input	4
Hire-Fire Occasionally	1	Stop-doing Objectives	3
Inclusion	3	Stop New Processes	1
Increased Autonomy Over Time/Task/Technique	7	Subordinate Initiative	6
Individual Accountability	9	Tech Limiting ROE	1
Introspection	3	Tech Systems PACE	1
Keep Tech Advantage	1	To-Do Objectives	3
Leader Consistency	6	Underwrite Mistakes	7
Legal/Moral/Ethical Behavior	5	Work Matters	3
Others Get Benefit of Doubt	2		

Miscellaneous Notes:

- Originally beginning with approximately 275 fundamental ways, repeatedly running the model resulted in the identification of these 33 as the most important. Although some of these only have one terminal point, they still resound as critically important to practical implementation of the first principles, primary elements, and sub-elements of this thesis.

- All of the terminal points that end at "commitment" and "legal/moral/ethical behavior" originate from first principles. To influence the first principles one may wish to focus behaviors measurements on these two fundamental ways.

- For the model to have increased applicability one should add and delete fundamental ways as desired to affect the cultural goals one desires for his or her organization. When doing so, one should also clearly define each element used in the model to increase consistence and create as an objective model as possible. In the absence of sophisticated modeling software, one should run the model several times to ensure consistency of results. Maintaining consistent definitions of various elements as well as a high level of objectivity is critical to actionable results.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Theses

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelinkow. *Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc, 1999.

Antal, John, F. "*Combat Orders: An Analysis of the Tactical Orders Process*." Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1990.

Atkinson, Rick. *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002.

Bowden, Mark. *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999.

Collins, Jim. *Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don't*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001.

Coram, Robert. *BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002.

Covey, Stephen M.R. *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That Changes Everything*. New York: Free Press, 2006.

Deyoung, Karen. *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

Du Gay, Paul. *Production of Culture/Cultures of Production*. London: Open University, 1997.

Emelander, Stanley J. *A Study of Burnout and Intrinsic Needs Fulfillment Among Project Managers*. Dissertation, Capella University, 2011.

Friedman, Thomas L. *The World is Flat*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

Fuller, J.F.C. *Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier*. London: I. Nicholson and Watson, 1936.

Giese, Jon F. "Military Innovation: Sources of Change for United States Special Operations Forces." Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1999.

Gladwell, Malcolm. *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2005.

- Greenwald, Bryon E. "The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation." *The Land Warfare Papers*, September 2000.
- _____. "Understanding Change: An Intellectual and Practical Study of Military Innovation." Unpublished PhD Disertation, Ohio State University, 2003.
- Hansen, Morten T. *Collaboration*. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009.
- Kawasaki, Guy. *The Art of the Start*. New York: Penguin Group, 2004.
- Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston: Harvard Bussiness Press, 1996.
- Kotter, John P., and James L. Heskett. *Corporate Culture and Performance*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
- LeGault, Michael R. *Think: Why Crucial Decisions Can't Be Made in the Blink of an Eye*. New York: Threshold Editions, 2006.
- Pink, Daniel H. *Drive: the Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us*. New York: Riverhead Books, 2009.
- Rommel, Erwin, and Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart. *The Rommel Papers*. Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1982.
- Rosen, Evan. *The Culture of Collaboration*. San Francisco: Red Ape Publishing, 2007.
- Rosen, Stephen P. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.
- Schein, Edgar H. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.
- Tsouras, Peter G. *The Book of Military Quotations*. St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2005.
- Weber, Max. *Economy and Society*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1921/1968.
- Winters, Richard D., and Cole C. Kingseed. *Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters*. New York: Penguin Group, 2006.

Academic Journals, Magazine Articles, Papers, and Presentations (print and online)

- Allaire, Y, and M.E. Firsirotu. "Theories of Organizational Culture." *Organization Studies*, 1984: 193-226.

- Accel Team. "Historical Perspectives on Productivity Improvement." *Scientific Management and Fredrick Winslow Taylor*, 2010. <http://www.accel-team.com/scientific/scientific02.html> (accessed December 18, 2010).
- Ashforth, Blake E, and Fred Mael. "Social Identity Theory and the Organization." *Academy of Management Review* 14, no.1 (1989): 20-39.
- Becker, H.S., and B. Geer. "Latent Culture." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, September 1, 1960: 303-313.
- Bloomberg Business Report. *Ford Image Goes Way Up for not Taking Taxpayer Money*. May 1, 2009. http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/brandnewday/archives/2009/05/ford_image_goes_way_up_for_not_taking_taxpayer_money.html (accessed January 15, 2011).
- Chron.com Special Report. *The Fall of Enron*. March 6, 2009. <http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/> (accessed January 15, 2011).
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. General. "National Archives." *Teaching With Documents*. <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-message/images/failure-message.gif> (accessed January 15, 2011).
- Flynn, Michael T, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L Cantrell. "Employing ISR: Best SOF Practices." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 50 (3rd Quarter 2008): 56-61.
- Garrison, William T Major General. "Blackhawk Down." *The Philadelphia Enquirer* <http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/dec14/garrison.asp> (accessed January 15, 2011).
- Gates, Robert M. "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age." *Foreign Affairs* 88, no.1 (January 1, 2009): 28.
- Lewis, Mark R. "Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus." *Armed Forces and Society*, 2004: 63-93.
- Louis, M.R. "Organizations as Culture-Bearing Milieux." *In Organizational Symbolism* (JAI), 1980: 84.
- Maze, Rick. "Webb: Don't cut military pay or bennies." *Army Times*, November 8, 2010: 8.
- National Defense University. "National Defense University." *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making*. December 20, 2010. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/cont.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).
- NYDailyNews.com. *Bernard Madoff*. January 1, 2011. <http://www.nydailynews.com/topics/Bernard+Madoff> (accessed January 15, 2011).

- Ouchi, William G. "Markets, bureaucracies and Clans." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25, 1980: 129-141.
- Quinn, Robert, and John Rohrbaugh. "A Competing Values Approach to Organizational Effectiveness." *Public Productivity Review* 5, 1981: 122-140.
- Ricks, Thomas E. "Younger Officers Quit Army at Fast Clip; Study Finds Little Trust in Senior Leadership." *The Washington Post*, April 17, 2000.
- Rogin, Josh. "Experts Debate Rumsfeld's Transformation Legacy." *Federal Computer Week*, October 13, 2006. <http://fcw.com/articles/2006/11/13/experts-debate-rumsfelds-transformation-legacy.aspx> (accessed January 14, 2011).
- Schweitzer, Tamara. "Inc. Online Magazine." *The Way I Work: Blake Mycoskie of Toms Shoes*. June 2010. <http://www.inc.com/magazine/20100601/the-way-i-work-blake-mycoskie-of-toms-shoes.html> (accessed December 07, 2010).
- Smith, Perry M. "Learning to Lead." *Marine Corps Gazette*, 2001: 36-40.
- Von Drehle, David. "Rumsfeld's'S Transformation; There's Been a Small Change in Plan." *The Washington Post*. February 12, 2006. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/11/AR2006021100836.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).
- Wingfield, Nick. "Netflix Boss Plots Life After the DVD." *The Wall Street Journal*, June 23, 2009.
- Wong, Leonard. "Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officers Corps." 2000.
- _____. "Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today." 2002.

Online Resources

- Amgen Corporation. *AMGEN*. 2011. <http://www.amgen.com/> (accessed January 16, 2011).
- Collins, Jim. *Jim Collins*. May 1, 2006. <http://www.jimcollins.com/tools/discussion-guide.html> (accessed January 11, 2011).
- Dropbox. *Dropbox*. 2011. <https://www.dropbox.com/> (accessed February 11, 2011).
- Evernote Corporation. *Evernote*. 2011. <http://www.evernote.com/> (accessed February 11, 2011).

Google Corporation. *Google*. 2011. <http://www.google.com/corporate/> (accessed January 16, 2011).

Netflix Corporation. *Netflix Overview*. <http://ir.netflix.com/index.cfm> (accessed November 17, 2010).

_____. "Reference Guide on our Freedom & Responsibility Culture." *Slideshare, Present Yourself*. January 1, 2011. <http://www.slideshare.net/search/slideshow?Searchfrom=header&q=netflix> (accessed January 6, 2011).

Rommel, Erwin, Field Marshal. *Famous Quotes*. January 1, 2010. http://www.famousquotesandauthors.com/authors/field_marshal_erwin_rommel_quotes.html (accessed January 10, 2011).

TOMS Shoes. *TOMS*. 2011. <http://www.toms.com/?keyword=toms%20shoes&network=g&matchtype=e&mobile=&content=&search=1&gclid=CIq2kcfMwaYCFQUSbAodtBm-Gw> (accessed January 16, 2011).

U.S. Military Academy. *Office of the USMA Chaplain, Cadet Prayer*. <http://www.usma.edu/chaplain/> (accessed January 15, 2011).

U.S. Naval Academy Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership. *Ethical Leadership for the Junior Officer*. <http://www.usna.edu/ethics/ELJO.htm> (accessed January 30, 2011).

Defense Department Manuals and Government Reports

U.S. Department of The Army. *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile, Field Manual 6-22*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

_____. *Battle Focused Training, Field Manual 7-1*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003.

_____. *Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

_____. "The ATLDP Officer Study Report to The Army." *The ATLDP Officer Study Report to The Army*. June 30, 2003. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA 415810&Location=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2011).

_____. *The Operations Process, Field Manual 5-0*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

U.S. Department of the Air Force. *Air Force Instruction 11-202 Volume 1*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

_____. *Leadership and Force Development, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

U.S. Department of the Navy. *Leading Marines, Field Manual 1-0*. Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Department of Defense, 1995.

_____. *Ready-for-Sea*. San Diego: Naval Reserve Intelligence Program, U.S. Department of Defense, 1999.

_____. *Systems Approach to Training*. Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Department of Defense, 2004.

U.S. Joint Forces Command. *Joint Operations: Insights and Best Practices*. Suffolk: Joint Warfighting Center, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008.

_____. *The Joint Operating Environment*. Suffolk: U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

U.S. Joint Staff. *Joint Operations: Joint Publication 3-0*. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.

Speeches, Transcripts, Memorandums, and Interviews

Fautua, David T., PhD, Interview by author, November 15, 2010.

Gates, Robert M. Secretary of Defense. "Statement on Department Budget and Efficencies." *Speech*. Washington DC: accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechID=1527>, January 6, 2011.

Mattis, James N. General. "Developing and Retaining the Officers We Need for the 21st Century." *Speech*. Washington DC, February 18, 2010.

_____. "Irregular War, Hybrid Threats and the future Role of Ground Forces." *Speech*. Washington DC, June 1, 2009.

McChrystal, Stanely, General (Retired). Working relationship and correspondence with the author, 2002-2011.

McKenzie, Kenneth F. Major General. U.S. Central Command briefing, February 18, 2011.

Mullen, Michael G. Admiral. "Landon Lecture Series." *Speech*. Manhattan, March 3, 2010.

Pierson, Brett. *Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan*. Performed by Brett Pierson. Pentagon, Washington DC October, 2009.

Pollard, Wayne A., Lieutenant Colonel (Retired). Working relationship and correspondence with the author, 1994-2011.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. "21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces." *Speech*. Washington DC: accessed at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183>, January 31, 2002.

Sacolick, Bennet S., Major General. Working relationship and correspondence with the author, 1998-2010.

VITA

Colonel Bontrager is a student at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk Virginia. He has served in numerous staff and command positions in various U.S. Army Aviation cavalry, attack, and research and development organizations. Colonel Bontrager's operational deployments include Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His previous academic accomplishments include undergraduate degrees in Political Science and Public Management from Austin Peay State University, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and a Master of Science in Adult and Continuing Education from Kansas State University.

Colonel Bontrager and his wife Kelly have two children: Zachary who is a senior at the Virginia Military Institute and Katie who is a sophomore at the University of Alabama.

Following completion of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School Colonel Bontrager will command the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.