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JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



NATO RELEVANCE: MILITARY IMPLICATIONS AND TRANSLATION OF THE
2010 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

by

Steven B. Snyder

Captain, U.S. Navy

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.


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
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ABSTRACT

NATO has published seven Strategic Concepts in its sixty-year history; the most recent one was delivered at the November 2010 Lisbon summit, as NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept (2010 SC). This thesis analyzes the two-part argument that a concise, relevant and actionable 2010 SC, which is effectively translated and aligned into military policy and guidance, will enhance NATO's continued relevance through the next century.

The initial focus delivers a historical summary of NATO and analyzes its first six strategic documentation efforts within their respective strategic environments, assessing their content, construct, and the degree to which they aligned with and contributed to the efficacy of the Alliance's efforts. The second focus of the thesis analyzes the 2010 Strategic Concept through three lenses: the background and method of its creation, the content and construct of the document itself, and the perspectives of several pundits. These three lenses provide an assessment of the document's concision and relevance. Finally, in order to enhance the degree to which the 2010 Strategic Concept is actionable, the author offers draft content for consideration in NATO's subsequent military translation of the Strategic Concept, leveraging an alignment with U.S. strategy.

The thesis concludes that the 2010 Strategic Concept positively contributed to NATO's future efficacy and relevance, however, it left gaps in several areas. It avoided requisite prioritization, was overly complex, and left large gaps in the force structure resourcing expectations. The draft content offered would mitigate those gaps in the ongoing military translation.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family and friends who displayed enormous patience and provided encouragement throughout.

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In addition to those subject matter experts interviewed during my research and cited in this thesis, many individuals provided valuable input to its development. I would like to thank Doctor Dianne Snyder for the sacrifice of her time on vacation to review and provide invaluable feedback. I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Colonel J.J. Torres for his advice and editorial support and Jeanne Marie Spurlin for her assistance in research and reference formatting. Finally, I would like to thank each of my thirteen classmates of JAWS 2010-2011 Seminar One. I have never before been affiliated with such amazing people, each of whom provided a uniquely valuable input to this thesis and my year in this program. I am honored to have been their classmate and will consider each one of them a friend for life.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Chartered in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a proven record as the most important global alliance in the modern era with an unmatched military capability.¹ Yet it is plagued by a persistent query as to its relevance, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union and communism writ large 20 years ago. Nevertheless, the Alliance's² relevance during the Cold War was validated through victory in 1989, and subsequent recurring global operations provided ample evidence of its continued impact on world events. In support of their Cold War actions and ensuing global operations, the Alliance's scope and methods of military employment have evolved through its sixty year history.

In order to codify and provide direction through that evolution, seven NATO Strategic Concepts have been published; the most recent one was promulgated at the November 2010 Lisbon summit. This thesis analyzes the two-part argument that a concise, relevant and actionable 2010 Strategic Concept (2010 SC), which is effectively translated and aligned into military policy and guidance will enhance NATO's continued relevance through the next century.

In Chapter 2, this thesis delivers a historical summary of NATO and analyzes its first six strategic documentation efforts within their respective strategic environments, assessing their content and construct, and the degree to which they aligned with and contributed to the efficacy of the Alliance's efforts. The analysis reveals a tendency for NATO strategy to simply project history into the future rather than forecast and influence

¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *NATO's New Strategic Concept: Report of the Group of Experts* (Brussels: Office of the NATO Secretary General, 2010), 6.

² The terms "NATO" and "Alliance" will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.

that future. It also concludes that force structure requirements, or the means, have proven to be the most persistent deficiency in Alliance strategy, with a prioritized threat assessment as a deficiency since the end of the Cold War.

In Chapter 3, this thesis analyzes the 2010 SC through three lenses: the background and method of its creation, the content and construct of the document itself, and the perspectives of several pundits. These three lenses provide an assessment of the document's concision and relevance, and present a foundation for the recommendations to maximize its actionability. The thorough examination delivers a clear interpretation of an adequate but unnecessarily complex document, identifies deficiencies in its threat prioritization and resource requirements, and reveals a diverse spectrum of opinions as to NATO's future.

Finally, in order to enhance the degree to which the 2010 SC is actionable, Chapter 4 offers draft content for NATO's subsequent military translation of the Strategic Concept leveraging an alignment with U.S. strategy. The four aspects of the recommended content are to simplify, prioritize, and clarify the content of the 2010 SC; specify the unspecified means identified in the 2010 end-ways-means analysis of Chapter 3; prioritize those means through the use of a threat analysis mechanism such as the U.S. Defense Planning Scenarios; and prioritize operational engagement expectations (scope and type) through a family of contingency plans analogous to those directed by the U.S. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

This thesis concludes that NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept was a positive step toward addressing past deficiencies, but its content was less than ideally concise and its relevance was impacted by the secretive manner in which it was developed. The input

recommended to support further specificity and prioritization in an effective military translation enables the actionability of the concept.

CHAPTER II ORIGINS OF NATO'S STRATEGY

The events that transpired during the years following World War II created a compelling requirement for several nations of the North Atlantic region to form an alliance to counter the growing Soviet Union threat. The opposing stakeholders who would be adversaries in what would become the Cold War were motivated by history and circumstance that led to a forty year confrontation that legitimized the existence of the most persistent and effective alliance in modern history. That alliance was chartered by the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and it periodically published Strategic Concepts in order to provide further guidance to the organization shaped by the global environment in which it operated. This chapter examines the North Atlantic Treaty and the first six Strategic Concepts by providing a global environment description, content summary and relevancy assessment of each document; the content is pictorially summarized in Appendix 1.

Victorious in World War II, the path of the Soviet Union and her wartime allied partners diverged significantly soon thereafter. The United States embarked on a course that focused on addressing the nation's post-war economic challenges, while supporting (funding and leading) the reconstruction of the two principle wartime adversaries, Germany and Japan. United States spending on defense had dropped tenfold from its wartime peak to as low as 3.5% of gross domestic product by 1948.¹ Likewise, other Western allies such as France and Great Britain had to focus on national economic and infrastructure priorities over military capability recapitalization. Conversely, the Soviet

¹ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 45-52.

Union focused on post-war military development far in excess of that required to defend its territory. By the end of the decade, the Soviet military rivaled that of the United States and had the vast preponderance of conventional military power on the Eurasian continent.²

There were several root causes of the Soviet trajectory that included a growing sense of nationalism and their decision to refuse assistance through the Marshall Plan to help mitigate the economic devastation suffered through the war. The emergence of a Soviet ideology asserting the supremacy of socialism over capitalism and a reaction to the pattern of invasions suffered throughout Russia's history were additional influences on the Soviet trajectory. These root causes led to the dangerous Soviet development of a massive conventional military force, attainment of a nuclear weapon capability, and the creation of the communist Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe with expansionist aspirations.³

Reacting to this danger, epitomized and crystallized during the Berlin crisis of 1948, the Western allies embarked upon a series of steps to counter the growing threat. Redirecting (from countering a re-emergent Germany) and expanding (beyond France and the United Kingdom) the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk, five European nations signed the 1948 Brussels Treaty to counter the threat of a potential communist expansion. Notwithstanding the efficacy of the west's 1946 support of Iran sovereignty and the 1947 Truman Doctrine (preserving the autonomy of Greece and Turkey) during this period, it became apparent that the Soviet threat was to be deterred neither by any individual nation, nor by a western European alliance alone. As such, efforts to expand the Brussels

² U.S. President, *NSC 68; A Report to the National Security Council* (Washington, DC, 1950), 17.

³ Raymond E. Zickel, *The Soviet Union-- A Country Study* (Washington, Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1989), 77-80.

Treaty to include other critical stakeholders led to extensive dialogue between Canada, the United States, and the five signatories of the Brussels Treaty. This dialogue served to define the parameters that would guide the treaty ratified in Washington D.C. on 4 April 1949 by the original twelve members of what would become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁴

The North Atlantic Treaty

In less than twelve hundred words, the fourteen articles of the North Atlantic Treaty established mutual defense assurances between the twelve member-nations aligned with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations ratified less than four years earlier. Persistently ascribed as the core of the treaty, Article 5 states, “...an armed attack against one ... shall be considered an attack against them all...” The content can be grouped into several sections. The preamble and first two articles of the treaty espouse international conflict resolution through peaceful means. Article 3 directs the member nations to maintain and develop requisite military capability. Articles 4, 5 and 6 specify the geographic scope and expected responses to perceived military threats against the member nations. Articles 7 and 8 focus on the relationship with the UN Charter and other international treaties, and the remaining six articles define the governance, ratification and membership expectations.⁵

While not specifically mentioned in the treaty content, it was clear that the most feared source of a possible armed attack against which the members were to be protected was the increasingly aggressive Soviet Union. It was for this reason that carefully crafted

⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport: Praeger, 2004), 2-4.

⁵ NATO, *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Washington, DC, 1949).

language was used in the treaty to ensure that while deference to the authority of the United Nations was implied, the actions of the Alliance would not be constrained by the Soviet Union as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Specifically, the Treaty carefully avoided language that would lead the Alliance to be officially considered a regional arrangement, whose enforcement actions could be subject to the authorization and veto power of the Security Council's permanent membership.⁶

Shortly after ratification of the treaty, work began to define the implementation specifics of its Articles 3 and 5; this led to the initial Strategic Concept published by the Alliance's North Atlantic Defense Committee (DC) in December 1949. Titled *DC 6/1: The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area*, this document reaffirmed the Alliance's alignment to the UN Charter and a commitment to peaceful resolution to international conflicts, but directed a posture of deterrence and provided guidance for planning of military actions in the event of war.⁷

Strategic Concepts 1949 – 1999

Four Strategic Concepts were published by NATO during its initial forty years of existence during the Cold War, focused primarily on the persistent threat of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc defined by the Warsaw Pact. Two additional Strategic Concepts were produced in the two decades that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, in attempts to reshape the Alliance's mission and focus in a new world order. Each of these six documents were produced in a context of global events and Alliance relationships that shaped the documents' respective content; each was then in

⁶ Kaplan, 2-3.

⁷ Gregory W. Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969* (Brussels: NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1997), XI.

turn supported by documents produced to translate the concepts into further details of military implications, providing policy and guidance to the military leadership of NATO.

For each of the Strategic Concepts and subsequent military translations, the following six sections provide a review of the environmental context leading up to their creation; a content description and analysis through an ends-ways-means framework; and an assessment⁸ of the efficacy and relevance of the documents to Alliance actions and the global environment in which it operated. The content of these six sections will serve as a comparative frame of reference upon which to analyze the 2010 Strategic Concept and develop recommended content for its military translation. This analysis is not intended to be an exhaustive history of NATO during the period nor a detailed content description of the strategy that guided it. Instead this summary reveals informative insights into the Alliance's evolution, and provides a crucial backdrop to the current strategic environment and future expectations for the Alliance.

DC 6/1; 1 December 1949

Ratified in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty has proven to be unprecedented in its endurance, yet the Alliance that it created was founded in an environment in which it faced a menacing adversary with insufficient plans to counter that threat. The European members expected immediate U.S. military contributions to the Alliance's collective defense capacity, while the U.S. Congressional leadership demanded a documented plan to execute a reasonable defense of the threat as quid pro quo for the Article 3 based demands of the European allies. The initial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in September 1949 codified that expectation. The initial set of strategy

⁸ Unless otherwise specified, this assessment represents the author's opinion.

and planning documents was produced within NATO's initial organizational construct as shown in Table 2.1.⁹




Table 2.1 NATO Defense Organization June 1950

Source: Gregory W. Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*

Key global events surrounding this effort included the initiation of the Marshall plan, the confirmation of communist regimes in all Soviet occupied states of Eastern Europe, the 1948 Soviet blockade of Berlin, and the August 1949 Soviet nuclear weapon detonation.

While it did not name a specific threat, it was clear that DC 6/1 was written with the Soviet Union in mind. In addition to providing over-arching Alliance defense principles and objectives, the 1,600 words of DC 6/1 outlined the basic undertakings to implement the military measures of the defense concept if required. These included strategic bombing with “all types of weapons,” and tactical air, naval and ground operations to counter an enemy offensive. It included expected roles by each of the members based upon expected national capabilities and geographic realities, and defined

⁹ Pedlow, XII.

specific cooperative measures and inter-alliance standardization guidance to enhance the efficacy of the requisite military capability directed by Article 3 of the treaty.¹⁰

DC 6/1 further directed the development of detailed plans for use in the event of war, and within four months, two classified documents were produced to meet that requirement. Approved by the Military Committee (MC) in March of 1950, the *Strategic Guidance for Atlantic Regional Planning* (MC 14) provided each of the five regional planning groups a comprehensive framework to develop contingency plans through 1954. That framework provided an intelligence analysis, defined specific planning assumptions, and assigned common tasks and specific objectives. Approved shortly thereafter by the Defense Committee, the *NATO Medium Term Defense Plan – 1 July 1954* (DC 13) provided further details to include more detailed objectives, military force requirements, and an exhaustive adversary analysis, specifically the Soviet Union and its likely allies. These two classified documents complimented the Strategic Concept well, yet neither contained the word “nuclear”, leaving a void in a comprehensive force requirement.¹¹

During the initial year of its existence, NATO had produced and approved a comprehensive hierarchy of four documents (the North Atlantic Treaty, DC6/1, MC14, and DC13) that provided policy, strategy, and detailed plans to combat the adversary. The production of what could nearly be considered a grand strategy was an impressive accomplishment given the political challenges the Alliance faced in gaining consensus of its diverse twelve-nation membership. The threat posed by a well defined and imposing adversary proved a critical catalyst to this feat, just as it was for the parallel production of the U.S. NSC 68 document published nearly simultaneously. The persistence of this

¹⁰ Pedlow, 1-7.

¹¹ Ibid., 85-192.

threat contributed to the sustained relevance of both NSC 68 and NATO's initial Strategic Concept and its supporting military strategy and plans. However, global events of the early 1950s, the evolution of the Alliance structure and relationships, and nuclear force omission within its strategy drove the need for additional development.

MC 3/5; 3 December 1952

Recognizing the need for a more definitive command and control structure to execute the plans laid out by MC 14 and DC 13, NATO adjusted its organizational construct in September of 1950. Those adjustments included alignment of Defense Committee functions into the NAC; the creation of two Supreme Allied Commanders (SACs), one in Europe (SACEUR) and one in the United States (SACLANT); and the creation of a civilian Secretary General. The resulting NATO structure shown in Table 2.2, remained virtually unchanged through the end of the Cold War.¹²




Table 2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1952

Source: Gregory W. Pedlow, *NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969*

¹² Pedlow, XVI.

Additionally, Greece and Turkey were invited to join NATO in early 1952, and significant debate occurred among Alliance members with respect to the rearmament of West Germany and the role of a proposed European Defense Community (EDC).¹³ Meanwhile, in response to the June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces, the United States and other NATO nations deployed military forces in support of the three-year long Korean conflict. While the effect of the Berlin crisis had diminished, the communist threat persisted and grew as the Soviet Union signed a mutual defense agreement with China.¹⁴

In the fall of 1952, as a result of NATO's structural changes, a review of DC 6/1 was directed, and a new Strategic Concept (MC 3/5) submitted by the Military Committee was approved by the NAC in December 1952. In spite of the potential impact of global events, the only changes to DC 6/1 that MC 3/5 reflected were nominal, mostly centered on the elimination of the Defense Committee. It specified five regional planning groups and implied the inclusion of Greece and Turkey as new voting members through their endorsement of the Strategic Concept.

The subordinate classified military strategy and plans (MC 14 and DC 13) were also reviewed, updated and consolidated into MC 14/1, which was approved by the Military Committee on 9 December 1952 for submission to the NAC. MC 14/1 was far more detailed than MC 14, integrating much of the content of DC 13. It presumed an EDC creation, changed its planning timeframe from 1954 to 1956, and overtly reflected Greece and Turkey membership in the Alliance. While it continued to support a focus on

¹³ Kaplan, 16-17.

¹⁴ Raymond E. Zickel, *The Soviet Union-- A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1989), pp 77-80.

deterrence, it espoused a more definitive goal of, “the defense of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war...”¹⁵ Even with these changes, MC14/1 was directionally similar to its precedents, yet in its relative brevity, it lacked the military force requirements and an exhaustive adversary analysis detailed in DC13. It is also interesting to note that MC 14/1 contained no overt reference to the Korean conflict with its implicit potential impact of reduced available forces for the Alliance’s Article 5 mission. However, MC 14/1 did indicate a generic deficiency in the existing conventional force structure, thus setting the stage for a likely adjustment to the military strategy within a short period of time.¹⁶

While NATO’s Strategic Concept was not officially updated until 1957, the force structure deficiency and other key events required an updated military strategy and implicit Alliance strategic guidance. One of those key events was the disintegration of the proposed EDC, which ultimately led to West Germany’s 1955 admission into the Alliance. Additionally, the Soviet leadership transition following the 1953 death of Stalin and their detonation of a hydrogen bomb later that year influenced Alliance strategy, with an escalated focus on the use of nuclear weapons. As such, the dramatically modified military strategy, *MC 48 – The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength the Next Few Years*, was approved by the Military Committee for submission to the NAC on 22 November 1954. Acknowledging that further analysis and planning was still needed, MC 48 stated an expectation that an update would be required, and on 9 December 1955, MC 48/1 was approved by the Military Committee for submission to the NAC. These two documents represented an overt acknowledgement

¹⁵ Pedlow, 205.

¹⁶ Ibid., 193-227.

that a conventional war with the Soviet Union presented a threat that was unacceptable to the Alliance, thus anticipating and planning for escalatory nuclear war. As such MC 48 and MC 48/1 advocated not only a change in military strategy but also of the policies set forth in the 1952 Strategic Concept.¹⁷

By 1955, even though the Korean conflict was over, the gap between available NATO and Soviet non-nuclear forces continued to widen. The Soviet leadership transition did little to mitigate their adversarial political and military trajectory, and the proposed EDC had failed to come to fruition. Given those circumstances, MC 48 and MC 48/1 presented a logical approach as a complement to MC 14/1, but the three documents failed to provide the Alliance the comprehensive grand strategy it had with its initial set of strategic documents five years earlier. Furthermore it was apparent that NATO was operating with a disjointed military strategy that was not in alignment with its Strategic Concept published three years earlier, and the Alliance continued to evolve.

MC 14/2; 23 May 1957

West Germany was officially added as an Alliance member in May of 1955 as a result of the EDC failure, which created the need for German contribution to NATO's military force structure. Thus, NATO became the fifteen-nation organization that it would remain for the next twenty-seven years. The Soviet Union response to both NATO's rebuff of the Soviet's ironic 1954 request to join NATO and Alliance expansion was the creation of the Warsaw Pact based on the May 1955 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO); this codified the Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe. The Alliance found itself in a crisis over both European demands for access to U.S. nuclear weapons and the

¹⁷ Pedlow, 229-267.

U.S. confrontation with France and the United Kingdom over their roles in the 1956 Suez battle.¹⁸ These events provided a potentially contentious atmosphere as NATO continued its effort to update strategy and policy in the second half of the decade.

In April 1957, the NATO Military Committee approved *MC 14/2 – Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area* for submission to the NAC, which replaced both MC 3/5 and MC 14/1. This integration resulted in a more detailed Strategic Concept that specified and analyzed the persistent Soviet threat, but without mention of the new WTO. It also provided clear objectives of deterrence and a massive counter-offensive capability, documented the intended methods and a two-phased approach to attain those objectives, and defined the conceptual force structure requirements that continued an escalated emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons in addition to conventional forces. The guidance specified for use in the subordinate military strategy and planning continued to focus on the eleven geographic regions of NATO, but alluded to the possibility of out-of-area Alliance activities.¹⁹

Concurrent with NATO's new Strategic Concept, *MC 48/2 - Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept* was approved by the Military Committee in May 1957, which replaced both MC 48 and MC48/1. This military translation of the Strategic Concept documented a combination of methods and force types in its fourteen measures intended to support the objectives of the Strategic Concept. While it described a pattern of nuclear and conventional (or screen) forces, it failed to provide sufficient details that would facilitate force structure planning by the Alliance's member nations. Additionally,

¹⁸ Julian Lindley-French, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization; The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 23-30.

¹⁹ Pedlow, 277-313.

in its brevity, MC 48/2 lacked clear traceability to the details of the more comprehensive Strategic Concept.²⁰

With approval of MC 48/2 by the NAC on 23 May 1957, following the April 1957 approval of MC 14/2, NATO had reconciled its strategy into two documents, but again missed an opportunity to document fully a grand strategy, as it had in its initial year of existence. The Strategic Concept provided sufficient direction for the Alliance to continue its effective operations; however, absent were any attempts to resolve the contention within the Alliance caused by the nuclear weapon control debate and the Suez crisis. The subordinate MC 48/2 provided little amplification to the Strategic Concept and failed to further define force structure requirements that would have specifically included German forces from the new Alliance member. In spite of these ambiguities, the Alliance successfully navigated the next ten years without formally updating its strategy. This success was largely due to the persistence and clarity of the threat posed by the Soviet adversary that fostered the Alliance's survival and maturation.

MC 14/3; 16 January 1968

During the decade following the publication of MC 14/2 and MC 48, the danger of the Soviet led iron curtain grew, evidenced through key events such as the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Also, the Soviet's Sputnik launch led to their early domination of the space race, and the Brezhnev doctrine of overt intervention began with his assumption of power in 1964. Meanwhile the Alliance and her members faced further difficulties as first France and then the United States became embroiled in the Indochina conflict, President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, and contention

²⁰ Pedlow, 315-331.

continued over the evolving capability and control of nuclear weapons. Most dramatically, the 1958 de Gaulle assumption of French leadership led to its 1966 withdrawal from the Alliance's military structure and the expulsion of NATO Headquarters from France. The Alliance answer to the growing threat was a new Flexible Response policy, adopted by the Alliance's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) in December 1967. This new policy and the other global Alliance challenges were comprehensively captured in the exhaustive December 1967 Harmel report, the product of a year-long effort led by the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. The report's content laid the groundwork for the next Alliance Strategic Concept.²¹

From their new Brussels headquarters on 16 January 1968 the NATO DPC²² issued its *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area (MC 14/3)*. While not specifically mentioned in MC 14/3, the Flexible Response policy defined the escalatory objectives from deterrence through direct defense and deliberate escalation to a general nuclear response. Six methods of military execution are clearly articulated, as is guidance for conventional and nuclear force structure requirements. The concise threat analysis was no longer limited to the Soviet Union as it expanded to include the Warsaw Pact, and included an analysis of enemy capabilities and potential courses of actions. This Strategic Concept provided a strong foundation for the development of the military strategy and planning that followed.²³

On 8 December 1969, *Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept (MC 48/3)* was approved by the DPC and promulgated by the Military Committee. It provided an

²¹ Lindley-French, 30-35.

²² DPC (the NAC excluding France) was used in lieu of the NAC for Alliance military matters.

²³ Pedlow, 345-370.

effective translation of MC 14/3 into military objectives and a set of eleven measures intended to support attainment of those objectives. It described the principles of the force structure requirement and referenced subordinate documents that contained further details. Leveraging the threat analysis of MC 14/3, it derived regional implications for use in the specific subordinate planning efforts that it directed as roles and tasks for each NATO command.²⁴ MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 approached the re-establishment of an Alliance grand strategy due to the use of a comprehensive ends, ways, and means framework and flexible response posture to a clearly defined adversary.

In some ways France's departure from NATO's military structure reduced the contention within the Alliance and offered the opportunity to more clearly define its strategy.²⁵ This strategy served the Alliance well as it proved an appropriate approach to the growing Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat of the late 1960s. Yet it was flexible enough to sustain NATO through significant events over the next two decades, which ultimately led to the dissolution of its adversary and victory in the Cold War.

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept; November 1991

Even with the attempted introduction of détente as a diplomatic approach between the United States and the Soviet Union, the global events of the 1970s continued to prove volatile. The Vietnam and Yom Kippur wars served as proxy battlefields for the Cold War adversaries. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties signed in 1972 and 1979 (never ratified) slowed the nuclear arms race but failed to eliminate the danger and created further contention within the Alliance. A lack of clear conventional force structure

²⁴ Pedlow, 371-399.

²⁵ Kaplan, 33.

expectations between the United States and its European allies was one of the few shortcomings of the 1969 MC 48/3; this drove a continued source of Alliance tension.²⁶

The next decade dawned with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis, and boycotts of the 1980 and 1984 Olympics. Strife continued in the Alliance with sustained irritation over U.S. arrogance by European members and their search for defense alternatives to a dependence on NATO, and Alliance cohesion was tested by the 1982 Falklands conflict. Yet, the decade also brought signs of a dramatic shift in the global political landscape as Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in 1980, Spain joined the Alliance in 1982, and Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985. Diplomatic efforts between Reagan and Gorbachev, the Soviet economic deterioration, and their failure in Afghanistan were key drivers of the 1991 dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War.²⁷ The forty year threat that was the impetus behind the creation of NATO had been defeated; the stage was set for either the dissolution of the Alliance or a dramatically new Strategic Concept.

In the midst of significant debate over the necessity of NATO continuance and discussions of alternative European security solutions, the July 1990 NATO summit meeting in London produced an agreement to “transform the alliance to reflect the new, more promising era in Europe.”²⁸ The *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept* was approved at the November 1991 Rome Summit as the first unclassified Strategic Concept since 1952. The absence of the well-defined adversary of the previous forty years led to a disparate

²⁶ Lindley-French, 39-44.

²⁷ Ibid., 44-56.

²⁸ Kaplan, 114.

threat analysis but the assessed risk had fundamentally shifted from one of “calculated aggression” to that of “adverse consequences of instabilities.”²⁹ However, the Cold War legacy remained as those instabilities were forecast to originate potentially from former Warsaw Pact nations, including Russia due to their still uncertain future. It continued to advocate a policy of deterrence and defense, and added contingency crisis management as the Alliance objectives. While it was unclear as to how it would be used, force structure guidance retained requirements for both conventional and nuclear forces, but at levels lower than during the Cold War and with the European allies contributing a larger percentage. To complement this unclassified Strategic Concept, a classified companion document was required to further detail the intended military implementation.³⁰

One month later, *MC 400 – MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept* was approved by the Military Committee. This classified document contained further detail to the military mission elements specified in the Strategic Concept, principles of the command structure, and posture for both nuclear and conventional forces. Its April 1996 interim update (MC 400/1) had few significant changes other than a shift from specific mission elements to more general principle mission areas and a security environment description that reflected the unlikelihood of a Soviet and Warsaw Pact reemergence. MC 400 and MC 400/1 specified a first use of nuclear-weapons policy and clarified the implications of the mission set expansion to include a crisis management objective. The documents provided a description of the security environment, but lacked a detailed threat assessment, and deferred to the

²⁹ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *The Alliance’s new Strategic Concept* (London, 1999), para 9, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.html, (accessed 18 August 2010).

³⁰ Ibid.

complementary MC 317 and MC 324 documents for force requirement specifics and command structures respectively.³¹

The 1991 and 1996 strategic documents represented the Alliances attempt to define its role in the post Cold War era. They supported the Alliance's initial efforts to transform back to a more political organization with a more diverse mission set in support of a broader scope, to include operations beyond simply the security of its member nations. Specifically, the addition of crisis management to its objectives implied future military operations likely beyond the traditional Article 5 based defense against an armed attack. The events that followed demonstrated that the global political landscape continued to evolve, and that NATO would play a critical part in that evolution. However, its role was likely to be more complex than it had been previously, in large part due to its new mission set as defined by its post Cold War strategy.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept; April 1999

The decade in which the 1991 Strategic Concept guided the Alliance was marked by two seemingly contradictory trends, one that challenged NATO's relevance and one that reinforced it. American – European contention within the Alliance continued as France and a now unified Germany led the push for a European centric security solution which was crystallized in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that formally created the European Union (EU); the EU would henceforth serve as a persistently considered alternative to a possibly less relevant NATO. Meanwhile, the trend of significant Alliance expansion began with the April 1999 accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as the

³¹ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: the Battle for Consensus* (Brassey's Atlantic Commentary, London: Brassey's, 1997), 44, 105-106.

first former Warsaw Pact nations to join the Alliance. NATO's expansion provided solid evidence of the expectations for its current and future relevance.³²

Two conflicts and one key event of the 1990s reflected the Alliance's past and future. Although not technically a NATO commanded engagement, the 1991 Gulf War served to validate the Alliance's Cold War era anticipated conflict against a "calculated aggression" (albeit out-of-area) with participation from twelve of the sixteen allies (including France). The 1991 dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing Balkan conflict led to the first official NATO military engagement, which continues to this day, in support of its new crisis management role. In August 1998, a then little-known radical named Osama bin Laden orchestrated attacks at U.S. embassies in three African cities.³³ The Balkan conflict exemplified, and the embassy bombings foretold of the Alliance's future role: fighting the "adverse consequences of instabilities" as predicted in the 1991 Strategic Concept.³⁴ Surprisingly enduring in nature, the 1991 strategy served the Alliance well through what some had predicted to be its decade of demise.³⁵ However, the global landscape at end of the decade was very different than at the beginning, and NATO was to continue in a significant role. As such, in 1997, the Alliance directed a review of its Strategic Concept.³⁶

At its April 1999 Washington Summit, NATO approved *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, to reconfirm Alliance relevancy upon its fiftieth anniversary, and to account for

³² Lindley-French, 57-74.

³³ Ibid., 97.

³⁴ Kaplan, 110.

³⁵ Ellen Hallams, *The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 4.

³⁶ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *The Alliance's new Strategic Concept* (London, 1999), endnote 1, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm, (accessed 18 August 2010).

the “further profound political and security developments since [the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept].”³⁷ Its overarching objectives reaffirmed the Alliance commitment to Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the 1949 treaty through security, consultation, deterrence and defense, and reinforced the 1991 addition of crisis management. Moving beyond the 1991 threat assessment that was focused on the possible aftermath of the Warsaw Pact, the 1999 Strategic Concept forecasted a migration toward unconventional warfare and an arms proliferation risk very different than was experienced through the arms race of the Cold War. It advocated an operational model that increased dependency on partnerships outside of the Alliance to include the EU, UN, and former Warsaw Pact nations through the Partnership for Peace, and set the stage for future Alliance expansion. As a result of the threat diversity and broad potential operating environment, the force structure guidance was broad and ambitious, particularly for conventional forces, while it retained the requirement for a largely deterrent focused Alliance nuclear capability.³⁸ The 1999 Strategic Concept continued the unclassified nature of its immediate predecessor and thus mandated the update to the classified MC 400.

Approved by the Military Committee in May 2000, the classified *MC 400/2 – MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept* provided several categories of content. It reiterated most of the 1999 Strategic Concept content and provided slightly more specific force posture direction, yet provided little further specific and prioritized threat analysis as would have been reasonable in the classified document. The majority of the document focused on providing a more comprehensive

³⁷ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept* (Washington, DC, 1999), para 2, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, (accessed 18 August 2010).

³⁸ Ibid.

description of the four specified military missions: geopolitical integrity, independence and security of its members; security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area; crisis management operations; and cooperative activities and exercises to promote security.³⁹

MC 400/2 was a valuable complement to the Strategic Concept, as it provided sufficient additional clarity on Alliance military objectives and methods. However, its analysis of the environment lacked detail, specifically in its failure to prioritize threats, leading to an incomprehensive strategic assessment. This deficiency combined with the growing spectrum of potential operations created a difficult environment in which the Alliance had to execute force structure planning. Nevertheless, the strategic documents published at the turn of the millennium provided an adequate framework to permit the broad mission set it espoused. This breadth spawned the Alliance's diverse activities in response to the upcoming events that it would face, but its strategy deficiencies contributed to the persistent and growing challenge to NATO's necessity and relevance.

Strategic Concept Development Summary

The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the four Strategic Concepts, and respective military translations produced during the Cold War sufficiently guided the Alliance during that relatively simple period. The two subsequent concepts were broad enough to enable the disparate Alliance operations of the past two decades, but provided little direction to shape the decisions to engage in those operations with an insufficient threat assessment. Furthermore, the preceding analysis reveals an occasional tendency for

³⁹ NATO Military Committee, *MC 400/2 – MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept*, [http://joc.saclant.nato.int/wise/us2k/jpt reference documents/mc_400-2_-_military_decision_-_23_may_00.doc](http://joc.saclant.nato.int/wise/us2k/jpt%20reference%20documents/mc_400-2_-_military_decision_-_23_may_00.doc), (accessed 10 October 2010). While this cites a NATO classified document, accessed on the NATO Kronos classified internet, no classified material is in this thesis.

NATO strategy to simply project history into the future rather than forecast and influence that future, and a persistently deficient force structure requirements clarification.

CHAPTER III

THE NATO 2010 STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Effective strategy should shape the environment and that environment will shape an organization's strategy. This chapter describes the global environment and development efforts that led to the publication of the Alliance's 2010 Strategic Concept (2010 SC) and examines its content through both the use of a Yarger based strategic framework model and the leverage of a spectrum of perspectives espoused by subject matter experts or pundits. This examination, along with the analysis in Chapter 2, provides the basis for recommended inputs to subsequent military translation and alignment with U.S. strategy as described in Chapter 4. Marked by two major conflicts and multiple other Alliance operations, the first decade of the twenty-first century dawned with a catastrophic event that would radically alter the global environment and drive Alliance operations and evolution.

Global Environmental Summary Preceding the 2010 SC

Nearly every citizen of the United States, and most Alliance nations as well, can describe their exact circumstance as they witnessed the events of 11 September 2001, transforming "9/11" into the "Pearl Harbor" of its generation. For the first time in its history, NATO formally took military actions in support of its Treaty's Article 5 through eight specific measures of support that included airborne surveillance of U.S. airspace and counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean.¹ The threat to Alliance security was no longer a conventional one from a nation state at its borders, but was from an amorphous adversary, skilled in irregular warfare, operating in redefined battlespace, that would come to be known as the global commons. This led the Alliance to continue its

¹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*. (Brussels, 2006), 168.

proclivity toward conduct of out-of-area operations as it took the fight to the enemy in two major combat operations and a multitude of other global engagements.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Much like the 1991 Iraq conflict, the American led coalition invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had significant NATO member participation, but it was not, as some believed, a continuation of the Article 5 activation as an official Alliance commanded military operation. Officially established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not transition to NATO command until August 2003.² This served as an example of its inclination to out-of-area operations, officially endorsed at the 2002 Prague Summit.³ NATO leadership of ISAF in Afghanistan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is now projected to last at least through 2014, making one of the longest lasting conflicts in modern history.⁴

Originally focused on Taliban opposition, the defeat of Al Qaeda, and suppression of the terrorism that it sponsored, the initial six stated goals of OEF varied over time. While decisive military success was attained within months of hostility commencement, it became quickly apparent that a transition plan to subsequent phases for reconstruction was deficient. By the time Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) combat operations commenced in March 2003, OEF had lost its focus and adversary forces seemed to be on a trajectory to replicate their success against the Soviet forces fifteen years earlier.⁵

² NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 155.

³ NATO, North Atlantic Council Summit, *Prague Summit Declaration* (Prague, 2002), para 3, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm; (accessed 17 Jan 2011).

⁴ NATO, North Atlantic Council Summit, *Lisbon Summit Declaration* (Lisbon, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, (accessed on 16 January 2011).

⁵ Ellen Hallams, *The United States and NATO Since 9/11: The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 74-75.

Into this quagmire stepped a somewhat renewed NATO with its assumption of ISAF command in 2003; this was at the request of Germany and the Netherlands to mitigate the turmoil created by the six month ISAF national leadership rotation. Yet over the next six years the operation continued to struggle as the United States and other Alliance forces were distracted by a focus on OIF. ISAF's scope, purpose, and methods constantly changed, and in spite of numerous Alliance surge efforts, the insurgent adversary proved resilient and elusive. With the 2009 change in U.S. national leadership came a recommitment to OEF and an introduction of the counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine that had proven somewhat successful in OIF.⁶ Yet even with this refocus and asserted commitment to the operation by the Alliance at its 2010 Lisbon summit,⁷ the ultimate success of OEF remains uncertain; thus providing an essential component to address in NATO's revised 2010 SC and subsequent military translation.

While there was little debate within NATO that Article 5 response actions and subsequent operations in Afghanistan were appropriate responses to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Alliance solidarity was far from universal. This was driven by a lack of clarity in OEF objectives and methods, and a frustration over the continued perception of a U.S. failure to treat its allies as equal partners. As the operations in Afghanistan languished in 2003, Alliance internal friction grew further with the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, destroy their suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and remove Saddam Hussein from power.⁸

⁶ Hallams, 76-77.

⁷ NATO. North Atlantic Council Summit. *Lisbon Summit Declaration* (Lisbon, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, (accessed on 16 January 2011).

⁸ Hallams, 85.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Based on what was later proven to be inaccurate intelligence regarding Iraqi WMD capability, the decision that launched the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had very little public support from most NATO allies, with Great Britain and the new Alliance member Poland as the lone exceptions. Alliance member opposition and frustration was not only based upon the U.S. insistence to execute with questionable justification, but in the persistent nearly unilateral and arrogant approach that seemed to emblemize the international diplomacy of the Bush administration. The United States attempted, but failed to generate NATO support for the engagement by offering military assistance to several member nations, and rationalizing that concern over Iraq's border with Turkey legitimized activation of Article 5 of the Alliance's treaty.⁹

Even within the U.S., British, and Polish governments and populations, the Iraqi invasion decision was contentious, yet on March 2003, OIF was executed with remarkable military success as the Hussein regime was defeated within two months and Saddam Hussein was captured by the end of the year.¹⁰ In spite of this success, the irregular nature of the threat soon proved that the U.S. conventional approach to OIF with limited post hostility planning was insufficient to achieve its eight specified objectives,¹¹ particularly the longer term requirements for security and stabilization. What had been declared as a victory within months of its inception, attainment of the OIF desired endstates proved to be as challenging as the accomplishment of OEF objectives. Prior to

⁹ Hallams, 88-89.

¹⁰ Ibid., 92-96.

¹¹ Baker Spring, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Objectives Met," *Heritage Foundation Webmemo #261*, April 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/04/operation-iraqi-freedom-military-objectives-met>, (accessed 16 January 2011).

and during the first year of OIF operations, it remained unclear as to what, if any role NATO would play beyond the coalition participation by a very few of its members and indirect support by several others.¹²

NATO's initial participation in both OEF and OIF was quite limited, but for different reasons. The limited initial role played by Alliance command structure in OEF was driven mostly by U.S. aversion to the perceived bureaucratic decision making process during the Balkan conflicts of the previous decade. While the even more restricted role played by NATO in OIF was due to Alliance member reluctance to participate due to its distain for U.S. arrogance.¹³ However, despite the significant debate that continued within the Alliance regarding its potential roles in OIF, in July 2004, NATO committed to the establishment of a training implementation mission in Iraq. This was in direct response to the Iraqi interim government request for assistance shortly after it reassumed national sovereignty. The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) was intended to enable stable Iraqi security and governing structures through training of military and civilian personnel.¹⁴ It has since operated in mutual support of the U.S. led coalition operations through 2010 and NTM-I is expected to continue well beyond cessation of those operations in 2011 in support of the long term agreement signed between NATO and the Government of the Republic of Iraq in July 2009.¹⁵

The NTM-I mission could possibly fall within the crisis management or partnership objectives of the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, but it was certainly an

¹² Hallams, 90.

¹³ Ibid., 71, 87.

¹⁴ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 160.

¹⁵ NATO, *NTM-A Year in Review*, (Kabul: NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, 2010), <http://www.ntm-a.com/documents/enduringledger/el-oneyear.pdf> (accessed on 17 January 2011).

expanding mission set unforeseen at the time and that would require further clarity in the Alliance's 2010 SC, particularly in light of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) established as part of ISAF in 2009.¹⁶ The ongoing ISAF mission offers further evidence that Alliance operations have stretched beyond that envisioned at the time of the 1999 Strategic Concept publication. During their respective inceptions, both OIF and OEF were asserted as likely catalysts for NATO's demise,¹⁷ yet both proved to be examples of its continued importance. In addition to NATO's major ongoing operations in OEF and OIF, during the decade leading up to the 2010 SC, NATO was active in a multitude of other operations, with a continued trend toward out-of-area operations as explicitly sanctioned by the 2002 NATO summit in Prague.¹⁸

Other NATO Operations

The 1991 addition and 1999 reaffirmation of crisis prevention and management to NATO's objectives in the respective Strategic Concepts, along with the Prague summit's direction to, "meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come"¹⁹ led to functionally and geographically diverse Alliance military operations during the first decade of the new millennium. These operations ranged from high end warfare to humanitarian relief efforts. While certainly far afield from a core Article 5 justification and often well outside the Alliance's Euro-Atlantic area of interest, the degree to which the operations aligned to the 1999 Strategic Concept varied.

¹⁶ NATO. *NATO's Assistance to Iraq* (Bagdad: NATO Training Mission in Iraq, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51978.htm, (accessed 17 January 2011).

¹⁷ Hallams, 78, 87.

¹⁸ NATO, North Atlantic Council Summit, *Prague Summit Declaration* (Prague, 2002), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm (accessed 17 Jan 2011).

¹⁹ Ibid.

In addition to the significant efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO's initial military operations in the Balkans that began in 1995 continued to linger with security and stability operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina through 2004 and peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo in support of a 2008 UN Security Council resolution. Addressing Alliance security interests farther from the Euro-Atlantic area and in response to UN requests for protection of humanitarian assistance efforts, NATO led or contributed to three separate counter-piracy operations along the east coast of Africa beginning in 2008. The Alliance also provided direct humanitarian relief efforts in Pakistan in 2005, supported peace-keeping operations in Somalia and Sudan, and continue to support Africa Union's efforts to address other areas of instability on the continent.²⁰

In its breadth of scope, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept contains objectives that could provide justification for Alliance actions throughout the decade. The strategic aim of "keeping risks at a distance"²¹ could be used to justify OEF and NTM-A, and the security and territorial integrity of Turkey's border with Iraq along with the suspicion of its WMD served as rationale for OIF and NTM-I. Given the international nature of our global economy, "crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability"²² could include piracy and political instability in Africa, and the Pakistan earthquake was certainly a "humanitarian emergenc[y]."²³ In addition to the plethora of military engagements throughout the decade, the Alliance also embarked on significant organizational changes.

²⁰ NATO, "NATO Operations and Missions," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

²¹ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Washington, DC, 1999), para. 48, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm, (accessed 18 August 2010).

²² *Ibid.*, para. 48.

²³ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999*, para. 49.

NATO Structure

Consistent with Article 10 of the 1949 treaty and emphasized in the 1999 Strategic Concept,²⁴ Alliance membership growth continued as six additional former members of the Warsaw Pact joined the Alliance in March 2004,²⁵ and two more followed in April 2009,²⁶ ironically resulting in nearly fifty percent of Alliance membership composed of nations who had been adversaries at its inception. In order to better support its diverse operations and as further evidence of a migration away from the Cold War era, the Alliance significantly altered the military organization structure that had remained nearly unchanged since 1952. The resulting 2003 NATO military structure shown in Table 3.1 was dually motivated. First it was to accommodate the leadership of the diverse operational engagements globally under a transformed Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Secondly, it supported the continued Alliance transformation under a repurposed Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), renamed as Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT). Leadership within this new structure took an unprecedented path due to the 2008 French decision to end its forty-two year hiatus from NATO's military structure.

²⁴ NATO, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999*, para. 39.

²⁵ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, 187.

²⁶ NATO, North Atlantic Council Summit, *Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration* (Strasbourg/Kehl, 2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm, (accessed 16 January 2011).




Table 3.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization June 2003

Source: NATO website, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-01184E22-5EB8B349/natolive/structure.htm>, (accessed 21 February 2011). Reflects only Supreme Allied Commands and subordinates.

In 2009, French Generals assumed command of both Lisbon Joint Headquarters and the Supreme Allied Command Transformation, the latter marking only the second non-U.S. NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Alliance history.²⁷ The 2008 French decision and subsequent Alliance acceptance and execution was the result of 2008 French white paper on its defense and national security redefining its military strategy, to include a commitment to the “renovation of NATO.”²⁸ While lingering Gaullist sentiments caused a mixed reaction within France, this decision was broadly well accepted across the Alliance due to two primary benefits. First, a French integrated NATO would likely be more effective in its interactions with other international organizations such as the EU, and this supported the Alliance’s 1999 strategic objective to promote wide-ranging

²⁷ The only other instance being British Admiral Forbes, who commanded the U.S. based Alliance headquarters from 2002 to 2004 during its transition from SACLANT to SACT.

²⁸ Nikolas Sarkozy, *The French White Paper on Defense and National Security*, (Paris: 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/france/french-white-paper-defence-national-security/p16615>, (accessed 21 Feb 2011).

partnerships. Secondly, it officially added to NATO's military capacity, similar in effect as Germany's accession fifty-five years earlier.

These Alliance organizational changes, along with the diverse set of military engagements throughout the decade were permissible within the broad framework of the 1999 Strategic Concept, but much was clearly not anticipated. The word terrorist and terrorism were each mentioned only once in the eight thousand word document, yet NATO spent most of the following dozen years focused on a Global War on Terror. Furthermore, the Alliance that was created to focus on the Euro-Atlantic area conducted most of its military operations in either Asia or Africa, thousands of miles from most member nations.

Beyond simply projecting history into the future, effective strategy must forecast and influence that future. NATO's 2010 update to its Strategic Concept was an ideal opportunity to do just that with both its content and method of creation and socialization.

Alliance Activity to Develop Content for the 2010 SC

During the sixth decade of its existence, NATO's mission, operations, and structure had transformed significantly, and certainly the Alliance evolution and operational activity levels following the 1999 Strategic Concept were unprecedented. The Alliance leadership continued to adjust its strategy through the unpredictable decade to adapt to these events and circumstances through several venues such as notable declarations from the nine NAC Summits conducted prior to the November 2010 Lisbon event. The 2006 Riga Summit endorsed a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG)

document that essentially served as an interim update to the Strategic Concept.²⁹ An analysis of the potential security environment was offered through the Allied Command Transformation's April 2009 Multiple Futures Project Findings and Recommendations.³⁰ In order to maintain relevance, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept would have to codify those interim strategic adjustments and address several key requirements.

First, it would have to clarify its intent with respect to out-of-area operations in accordance with the 2002 Prague Summit; the precedent set during the Balkan conflict persisted with NATO's forward engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Darfur, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. Second, NATO would have to clarify its core tasks to confirm whether to continue its proclivity for diverse engagements that had included combat operations, security and stability operations, nation-building, peacekeeping operations, counter piracy and humanitarian relief. Third, with membership growth of nearly fifty percent in the previous decade, and a shifting landscape of potential global partners, the Alliance would have to clarify its future membership and partnership intentions. Fourth, it would have to analyze the evolved threat as one of the two recurring gaps in previous strategy efforts, and address the other gap by providing clear force structure guidance. Finally it would have to develop and socialize the content in a manner that sends a clear strategic communications message.

At the April 2009 Strasbourg / Kehl submit, the NAC appointed Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the new Secretary General and directed him to prepare a new Strategic Concept for submission at the 2010 Lisbon summit. Following the precedent set through

²⁹ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *Comprehensive Political Guidance* (Riga, 2006), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b061129e.htm>, (accessed 26 February 2011).

³⁰ NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, *Multiple Futures Project: Findings and Recommendations*, (Norfolk, 2009).

the 1967 Harmel report, Rasmussen selected a Group of Experts (GoE) in August 2009 to provide support for this NAC tasking. In September 2009, he provided further specific direction to develop and submit proposed content and context for the updated Strategic Concept by the spring of 2010.³¹

Group of Experts Report

Chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the GoE membership was comprised of representatives from twelve NATO nations. It was formally advised by twelve members of NATO's international staff and other civilians and informally advised by a broad spectrum of senior military personnel. The GoE socialized its efforts throughout the Alliance and with a number of key partners such as the European Union and Russia.³² In accordance with Rasmussen's direction, the GoE conducted four two-day topically focused seminars between October 2009 and February 2010. Those topics were Alliance fundamental security tasks, Alliance global engagements, Alliance partnerships, and Alliance transformation.³³ Including the four seminars, the July 2009 conference to launch the effort, and the partner meetings, over twenty GoE events, hosted by multiple Alliance and non-Alliance nations, were conducted during the ten month period. This deliberately broad distribution was intended to ensure that key partners and those Alliance nations not represented in the GoE were

³¹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, *NATO Strategic Concept Seminars* (Brussels: Office of the NATO Secretary General, 2009).

³² NATO. *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement* (Brussels, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_63654.htm; (accessed 15 September 2010), 1, 41-44.

³³ Rasmussen, *NATO Strategic Concept Seminars*.

overtly included in the efforts to create and influence the report's content produced and delivered in May 2010.³⁴

Part One of the forty-four page final GoE report offered an executive summary and concludes by reemphasizing essentiality of the Alliance. Part Two's five chapters provided more specific background, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations for each of the five broad topics. Those topics were the Security Environment, Core Tasks, Partnerships, Political and Organizational Issues, and Alliance Forces and Capabilities.³⁵ The following synopsis of each chapter summarizes its content and analyzes the degree to which that content was carried forward into the final November 2010 Strategic Concept.

The security environment assessed in Chapter 1 emphasized the uncertainty of the future while forecasting a broad range of possible threats in the global and regional trends that will likely influence NATO's next decade. It concludes that while the risk of conventional attack against the Alliance is low, attacks from unconventional threats are more probable, specifically from ballistic missile, terrorist, and cyber attacks.³⁶ The translation into the Strategic Concept resulted in the nine paragraphs of its security environment section, which initially echoed the unlikelihood of a conventional attack and then provided an unprioritized list of threats.³⁷ While the GoE report distilled its wide range of possible threats into a short list of most likely threats, the 2010 SC retained its post Cold War predecessors' inclination to document multiple components of a diverse potential threat environment without providing guidance on their respective prioritization.

³⁴ Hans Binnendijk, interview with the author by telephone, February 22, 2011.

³⁵ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

³⁷ NATO North Atlantic Council Summit, *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Lisbon, 2010), para 7-15, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm (Accessed 19 November, 2010).

In its rather pithy second chapter, the GoE recommended that the Alliance future mission be distilled into four core tasks: 1) an Article 5 based requirement to “deter and defend member states against any threat of aggression;” 2) “contribute to the broader security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area,” leading to the post Cold War goal of “a Europe whole, free and at peace;” 3) “security consultations and crisis management along the entire continuum of issues facing the Alliance,” derived from Article 4, but significantly expanded over the past decade; and 4) “enhancing the scope and management of partnerships.”³⁸ Translation of these into the initial section of the 2010 SC, resulted in the three defined core tasks of collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Expansion of these in later sections represent over a third of the Strategic Concept content, and much like its security environment analysis section offers broad diversity without sufficient prioritization in its potential operational engagements.³⁹

In contrast with the chapter that succinctly defined Alliance core tasks, the third chapter of the GoE report provided an expansive analysis of the fourth of its ascribed core tasks focused on partnerships, recommending an initial set of logical principles through which the Alliance should improve its partnerships. The report went on to extol the relational importance of an extensive list of a dozen global organizations ranging from the UN and the EU to the Shanghai Cooperative Organization. It also addressed potential Alliance relationships with dozens⁴⁰ of individual nations both proximate to (e.g. Russia, Georgia, Ukraine) and well outside of the Euro-Atlantic area (e.g. Australia,

³⁸ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 14-17.

³⁹ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 4, 16-26.

⁴⁰ Twelve nations were explicitly mentioned; many more were implied through statements such as, “democracies of Africa and Latin America.”

Japan, Korea).⁴¹ That diverse input was distilled into the 2010 SC's eight paragraphs addressing partnerships in support of its cooperative security core task, which focused on the priority UN and EU relationships and the four NATO sponsored partnerships, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Security Initiative (ISI). Only three nations were specifically mentioned, with Russia being the focus of a full twenty-five percent of the partnership section.⁴²

The fourth chapter of the GoE, addressed several critical, but somewhat unrelated political and organizational issues that seemed to represent simply an Alliance current interest list, or the miscellaneous chapter. An insightful analysis of the Alliance experience in Afghanistan led to a recommended set of eight relatively clear factors to be used in support of operational commitment decisions, cautioning that "NATO's commitments should never exceed what the Alliance can do; but what NATO can do should never be outpaced by NATO's security needs."⁴³ The chapter also included recommendations on Alliance organizational and decision-making reforms, re-endorsed NATO's open door membership policy tied to its treaty's Article 10 direction, and included a remarkably brief discussion of potential arms control recommendations.⁴⁴ The 2010 SC echoed the open door policy, expanded the arms control objectives by leveraging content from the GoE's final chapter, and alluded to the opportunity for organization for reform, but without much specificity. Unfortunately it did not retain the

⁴¹ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 17-25.

⁴² NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 28-35.

⁴³ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 27.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 25-30.

specific recommendations regarding criteria to be used in support of operational commitment decisions derived from OEF lessons learned.⁴⁵

The final topical chapter of the GoE report focused on a more detailed analysis of the essential and historically under-clarified guidance for Alliance force structure and capabilities. To complement the core tasks proposed in Chapter 2, it recommended four military missions: 1) an Article 5 based directive to deter, prevent and defend Alliance members against any threat of aggression; 2) a growing security environment mandated protection against a full range of unconventional security challenges; 3) deployment and sustainment of expeditionary (out-of area) military operations; and 4) execution of a broad range of security and stability operations.⁴⁶ In support of these missions, the report offered a set of conventional force structure development principles including a specific focus on opportunities for reform and efficiencies. The report reiterates a commitment to nuclear weapons capability and deterrence. With a mix of specific recommendations and general principles, it recommended development of capabilities to counter emerging and growing unconventional threats associated with terrorism, ballistic missiles, cyber and energy vulnerabilities, and climate change.⁴⁷ The 2010 SC translation of those force capability requirements produced three lists of a combination of required resources, methods or principles associated with each of its core missions, resulting in a total of twenty-seven unprioritized items to serve as guidance for military consumption and planning for force structure and posture.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 26-27, 36-37.

⁴⁶ Author's paraphrased interpretation of the GoE report's longer list of four recommended military missions found on page 32 of the document.

⁴⁷ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 30-40.

⁴⁸ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 19, 25, 26.

In the midst of its final chapter on military force structure analysis, the GoE report asserted a continued requirement for a comprehensive approach (civilian-military), introduced in NATO's 2006 CPG,⁴⁹ and highly emphasized within NATO staffs ever since. It was therefore somewhat surprising to discover its omission in the final 2010 SC, representing, along with the Afghanistan lessons learned as the most notable content exclusion from the GoE report. The report's concluding chapter and subsequent translation into the final concept document reiterated the importance of, and commitment to the Alliance.

Strategic Concept Final Production

The GoE report was delivered on 17 May 2010 to Secretary General Rasmussen, who led the final efforts to create the Alliance's Strategic Concept through a tightly controlled process, intended to avoid the typical Alliance bureaucratic drafting process. By early June, he had reviewed the GoE report and suggested a series of informal consultations to review early unofficial drafts of the concept. These so called "Away Days" sessions with the Permanent Representatives (Perm Reps) and the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC), along with private consultations with national capitals throughout the summer were used by Rasmussen as a foundation for his efforts to gain consensus and ownership across the Alliance. The first official draft was produced in September 2010 and delivered to the twenty-eight nations in a very restricted distribution, again more to gain their endorsement than their feedback. Specific topics were discussed in weekly NAC Perm Rep sessions through the fall, but the final version was only completed and made available to the public on 19 November 2010, upon the approval by

⁴⁹ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 35-36.

the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal. The secrecy of this seven month process was a stark contrast to the very open nature of the GoE report development process, and a source of frustration to the Alliance members.⁵⁰

The final section of this chapter provides a more structured end-ways-means analysis of the 2010 SC content to conclude with an assessment of its concision and relevance and the degree to which it addresses the five key requirements asserted at the beginning of this chapter. The preceding analysis reveals a variation in the correlation of the final Strategic Concept content to its GoE report input; this resulted in a varied attainment of the initial four key requirements. This initial analysis of the 2010 SC content reveals adequate clarity with respect to Alliance out-of-area operations, core tasks, and membership and partnership expectations. However, a lack of threat and resource requirement prioritization continues to plague the Alliance strategy. The final of five key requirements of the 2010 SC effort was an effective strategic communications message. Even with the transparency of the Group of Experts' efforts, the relative secrecy of the process that executed the content conversion from the GoE report to the final Strategic Concept was a missed opportunity for more impactful public and parliamentary endorsement of its content.⁵¹ The following section of this paper provides a summary of pundit perspectives on the 2010 Strategic Concept in order to inform the final assessment of the document's content that follows.

⁵⁰ Eva Verglas, interview with the author, Norfolk, VA, 11 March 2011. Ms. Verglas was on the staff of NATO's Allied Command Transformation, as a key resource working on the 2010 SC.

⁵¹ James Soligan, interview by author, Washington, DC, January 28, 2011.

Pundit Perspectives of the 2010 SC

Much was published by a variety of sources in the months leading up to the 2010 Lisbon Summit, offering perspectives not only on the content and necessity of the Strategic Concept, but equally to the continued value and role of the Alliance itself. The sources ranged from Alliance personnel such as the Secretary General, to think tanks such as the Atlantic Council, to publications such as the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times offering public opinion pieces. While the research revealed a broad spectrum of Alliance advocates to critics, there was little serious recommendation for its dissolution or against the necessity of an update to its Strategic Concept. To provide context for the specific ends-ways-means analysis that follows, this section gives a summary of the diverse inputs framed by two interdependent questions: What should be NATO's future scope and mission? How should NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept address that future?⁵²

NATO's Future Scope and Mission

While the vast majority of the perspectives published in the past eighteen months have been in response to NATO's plans to update its Strategic Concept, their content has been more focused on the mission and scope of the Alliance itself. The majority of the viewpoints revolved around a few critical items: the relationship between NATO and the EU, and the relationship between NATO and Russia, and the expected physical scope and mission of the Alliance operating environment. The subsequent discussion provides opposing perspectives and a synthesized conclusion on each.

⁵² All references are found in the bibliography, articles specifically cited are footnoted in the subsequent sections.

While NATO and EU had common roots dating back to the 1948 Brussels Treaty, the two organizations took vastly different paths, with NATO serving as the dominate organization throughout the Cold War. However, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the politically and economically focused EU has grown in stature throughout the past two decades, now standing as a peer with NATO on the world stage. The debate then becomes, what should the relationship be between the two?

On one hand, Atlantic Council's Sanwar Kasmeri argued for the subordination of NATO by integrating it with the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CDSP) to re-energize both.⁵³ Similarly, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, of the EU Institute for Security Studies, argued that NATO is no longer the "exclusive nor even the essential framework for transatlantic security cooperation," suggesting that the Alliance be viewed "as a component of a larger US-EU strategic partnership,"⁵⁴

Conversely, The Heritage Foundation's Sally McNamara argues that "EU's goal of an autonomous and separate defense undermines the prospect for fairer burden-sharing between the alliances," and that "the best way for the European Union to complement NATO is to offer the alliance its extensive civilian resources for NATO missions."⁵⁵

Without a doubt, both organizations will have essential roles in future global events, but in order to leverage the historical global operational success of NATO especially after the Cold War, and avoid the distraction of an EU more focused on

⁵³ Sarwar Kashmeri, "Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP," New Atlanticist, Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/save-nato-merge-it-csdp (accessed 16 November 2010).

⁵⁴ Álvaro de Vasconcelos, "Introduction: why an EU Perspective on the NATO Strategic Concept Matters," in *What do Europeans want from NATO?* (Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 9.

⁵⁵ Sally McNamara, "NATO Summit 2010: Time to Turn Words into Action," Backgrounder, No. 2498, The Heritage Foundation, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2498.pdf, (accessed 24 February 2011).

economic and political issues, they must operate as peers with different areas of focus as opposed to establishing hierarchical authorities. Subordinating NATO to EU would be analogous to the United States subordinating its Department of Defense to its Department of State.

Of the dozens of nations discussed in the Group of Experts report, none holds a more unique position than Russia, the legacy of the Alliance's Cold War adversary. Never completely out of NATO's wary vision, Russia has recently reemerged as a growing presence in the world stage, and opinions vary as to how the Alliance should respond. Acknowledging the importance of establishing relationships with the former Warsaw Pact nations, the Partnership for Peace has served since 1994 as a mechanism to partner with Russia on issues of common interest, and the 2002 Russia-NATO Council was expected to further build the partnership. Yet, the relationship remains uncertain as exemplified by the tension over the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the February 2010 Russian military doctrinal assertion that NATO is a source of military danger to Russia, and Russia's irritation over continued NATO enlargement.

A November 2010 *Stratfor* article asserted that NATO's preoccupation with other operations over the past two decades enabled Russia's resurgence as a primary threat to the Alliance and its members. The article offered that the Alliance is now divided into three positions on its relationship with Russia, ranging from an Atlanticist's renewed caution and suspicion, to Core Europe's desire to simply engender good relationship without provocation, to the Intermarium⁵⁶ region's hope for improved relations, but not at

⁵⁶ Intermarium is the post-WWI era name given to a grouping of countries that stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea that includes Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.

the expense of their security.⁵⁷ These views are neutral at best, and certainly none of them would lead to a revisit to the Soviet request fifty-five years earlier to actually join the Alliance, yet there are some who believe that is precisely the ideal solution.

In his May 2010 Foreign Affairs article, Charles Kupchan offered five key reasons why Russia should join NATO. Among them were an asserted capability and capacity enhancement to the Alliance's collective security core function and its continued out-of-area operations. Kupchan also argued that an Alliance with Russia would not only eliminate opposition to NATO's enlargement intentions, but also strengthen its competitive position with other global institutions such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).⁵⁸ Kupchan's proposition is interesting, even energized by the discussion of Russian contribution to the ballistic missile defense of Europe, and could be considered logical step toward a Europe whole and free. However, Russia's undemocratic governance derails that possibility, and its inclusion into NATO would be inconceivable to most Cold War veterans.

Since the end of the relatively stable Cold War period, NATO's scope of operations expanded well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. While the 2002 Prague Summit declaration officially endorsed this expansion, the debate continued with respect to the degree this should be expected in the future.

Representing the voice of the EU, de Vasconcelos argued that "NATO should remain predominantly a regional alliance," with operations outside of the Euro-Atlantic

⁵⁷ Marko Papic, "NATO: An Inadequate Strategic Concept," Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101121_nato_inadequate_strategic_concept (accessed 23 November 2010).

⁵⁸ Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO's Final Frontier," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 100-113.

area serving as the exception rather than the rule.⁵⁹ Echoes of similar sentiments included Sarwar Kashmeri's recommendation that the Alliance should, "revert back to its original purpose of protecting Europe."⁶⁰

Conversely, Sally McNamara's argument that the Alliance must "protect its borders *and* act beyond its geography to ensure its security"⁶¹ was clearly in alignment with the Alliance's leadership assertion that its "territorial defence must begin beyond [its] borders."⁶² Preceding much of this debate was a rational balance from Daniel Hamilton's 2009 observation, "For the past 15 years, the Alliance has been driven by the slogan, 'out of area or out of business.' Today, NATO operates out of area, and it is in business. But it must also operate in area, or it is in trouble."⁶³

Alliance issues that begged clarification in the 2010 Strategic Concept included intended geographic scope of operations, degree of partnership between NATO and EU, and the relationship between the Alliance and Russia. The preceding discussions offer a spectrum of perspectives on each, and the subsequent discussion addresses perspectives on the efficacy of the concept itself as the primary mechanism to address those topics.

Content and Development of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept

The need to update NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept was argued persuasively in Kugler and Binnendijk's *Toward a New Transatlantic Compact*, in which they listed seven deficiencies with the existing strategy. They assessed the impact of which to be

⁵⁹ De Vasconcelos, 3.

⁶⁰ Kashmeri.

⁶¹ McNamara.

⁶² Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "Connecting NATO to the Broader International System," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly*, 2 (April 1, 2010): 75.

⁶³ Daniel Hamilton, *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century* (Washington NATO Project, February 2009), http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/NATO-AllianceReborn.pdf, (accessed 16 January 2011).

sufficiently problematic as to justify the Alliance investment required to produce and socialize a new Strategic Concept.⁶⁴ With the 2009 Secretary General's direction to move forward with the Strategic Concept, critics argued the inadequacy of its content and of the GoE process that developed it.

An October 2010 *Stratfor* article highlighted the concept's inadequate analysis of the threat,⁶⁵ followed by a November article asserting that, "if a mission statement requires [4000] words, it probably means the mission is not easily understood or agreed upon."⁶⁶ The observation of the Alliance's deficient threat analysis was echoed in November 2010 articles in the *New York Times* and *The Economist* respectively titled "NATO Reluctant to Say Who Enemy Is"⁶⁷ and "Fewer Dragons, More Snakes."⁶⁸ In addition to his bias toward EU supremacy over NATO, expressed in the previous section, Kashmeri questioned the value of the GoE efforts asserting that they, "chose to overlook NATO's dysfunction and diminished value."⁶⁹

Conversely, obvious strong support for the Strategic Concept's content and development method came from NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen and GoE advisor Dr. Hans Binnendijk. Rasmussen asserted that "... the Alliance's long-overdue new

⁶⁴ Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk, *Toward a New Transatlantic Compact* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2008), <http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2052%20NATO%20Concept%20and%20Compact.pdf> (accessed 9 March 2011).

⁶⁵ Marko Papic, "NATO's Lack of a Strategic Concept," *Stratfor*, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101011_natos_lack_strategic_concept (accessed 23 November 2010).

⁶⁶ Papic, "NATO: An Inadequate Strategic Concept."

⁶⁷ Steven Erlinger, "NATO Reluctant to Say Who the Enemy Is," *New York Times*, 3 November 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/world/03nato.html> (accessed 20 November 2010).

⁶⁸ *The Economist*, "Fewer Dragons, More Snakes," (11 November 2010), <http://www.economist.com/node/17460712> (accessed 20 November, 2010).

⁶⁹ Sarwar Kashmeri, "Save NATO: Merge it with CSDP," *New Atlanticist*, Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/save-nato-merge-it-csdp (accessed 16 November 2010).

Strategic Concept [is] one of the most important structural security issues in the western world,”⁷⁰ and Binnendijk asserted the efficiency and effectiveness of the distillation of the GoE report into the final Strategic Concept.⁷¹ Additionally, McNamara not only endorsed the Strategic Concept’s key tenets, but also offered constructive steps, leading to the reestablishment of “primacy of NATO in the European security architecture.”⁷²

Finally, former SACEUR Commander General John Craddock offered very concise advice on the development of the 2010 Strategic Concept in his 2009 testimony to the U.S. Senate. Asserting the need for a classic strategic framework, he avers the need to “address a vision of the endstate, the ways possible to accomplish that vision, and the means or resources needed to create the required capabilities.”⁷³ He also encourages active military operational input throughout the development process, arguing that this will better ensure that “the Strategic Concept, unlike its predecessor address[es] the ways and means.”⁷⁴ SACT’s February 2010 *Building the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept: Allied Command Transformation Reflections* served as that military input;⁷⁵ the degree to which it was incorporated is debatable. The next section’s analysis reveals that General Craddock’s advice regarding an ends-ways-means framework was not fully followed.

⁷⁰ Rasmusson, “Connecting NATO to the Broader International System,” 75.

⁷¹ Hans Binnendijk, interview with the author by telephone, February 22, 2011.

⁷² McNamara.

⁷³ John Craddock, “NATO’s Strategic Concept,” *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly*, 1 (January 1, 2010): 1114.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 1114.

⁷⁵ Abrial, Stéphane. *Building the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept: Allied Command Transformation Reflections* (Washington DC: 2010).

Ends-Ways-Means Analysis of the 2010 SC

In its essence, strategy is the application of critical thinking to thoroughly analyze a problem set and provide guidance and direction for further planning and execution. Effective strategy uses an intellectual framework defining the desired objectives (or ends) intended methods (or ways) and expected resources (or means) while assessing and mitigating risk and threats in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous international and domestic environment.⁷⁶ To maximize its impact, NATO's 2010 SC had to account for the input provided by the GoE and reconcile the various published perspectives as was analyzed in the previous sections, and include all components of a comprehensive strategy, with a focus on the gaps in earlier Alliance strategy. Analysis of the Alliance 2010 SC through this framework provides an assessment of its anticipated efficacy and for recommended content to its subsequent military translation.

2010 SC Threat Assessment

The Concept's nine paragraph security environment section identified an interwoven set of adversarial actors, potential threats, domains, and vulnerabilities that clearly depict an international landscape in which the Alliance must operate that is full of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The four inferred interdependent dimensions of the concept's assessed security environment have been clarified and reorganized by the author in Table 3.2. Those dimensions are as follows: actors, or potential adversaries to the Alliance; threats, or the capabilities those actors might use against the Alliance; domains, or the potential areas of operation in which confrontations

⁷⁶ This strategic framework aligns largely with Yarger's model. Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).

may occur; and vulnerabilities, or the factors of the threat that may increase its likelihood or exacerbate its impact.⁷⁷

Table 3.2. Alliance Security Environment

Actors (who) • Nation states • Regional organizations • Terrorists / Extremists • Trans-national criminal organizations	Threats (what) • Conventional • Nuclear and other WMD • Ballistic missiles • Terrorism • Cyber attack
Domains (where) • Euro-Atlantic region • Areas of strategic importance • Cyberspace • Global lines of communications	Vulnerabilities (what if) • Weapons proliferation risk • Alliance energy dependency • Global environmental factors (health, climate, water)

Source: Data adapted from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 7-15.

While assessed as unlikely, it does not dismiss the legacy threat of conventional ways and means from a nation-state adversary in the traditional Euro-Atlantic region. Yet it expanded the list of potential adversaries and threats, and the inclusion of “areas of strategic importance” and global lines of communication (“communication, transport and transit routes”) reinforced an expectation to continue the trend toward out-of-area operations. While the inferred vulnerabilities enumerate several high-risk environmental circumstances, the concept does not offer concrete mitigation strategies.⁷⁸

This construct offers a reasonable framework to view the environment, much like its 1999 predecessor, and the 2010 SC defined its security environment diversely enough so as to account for many different potential future battlespaces. While this flexibility can enable Alliance agility, much is left to interpretation with neither an overt prioritization within each dimension nor a forecasting of the vast potential scenario permutations across the four, possibly resulting in the same disparate unplanned set of

⁷⁷ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 7-15.

⁷⁸ Ibid., para 7-15.

operations experienced by the Alliance in the previous decade. As offered in further detail, Chapter 4 recommends that the military translation of the concept include clear guidance to develop contingency plans for a discrete number of prioritized potential scenarios. Finally, the GoE's report provided a model of distinct factors⁷⁹ or criteria to evaluate likelihood of Alliance engagement. This model would offer an informed framework of not only when and where the Alliance will engage, but when and where it will not; unfortunately it was not carried into the 2010 SC and therefore should be overtly included in the military translation.

2010 SC Ends

In its preface and first paragraph, the 2010 SC explicitly defined the Alliance two-fold strategic endstate rather simply as “an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values” and “the freedom and security of all its members.” Implicit objectives included those further detailed within the three specified core tasks (or strategic means) of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.⁸⁰

The desired endstate of collective defense was the protection and defense of Alliance territory and populations against attack. Alliance crisis management sought either crisis prevention, or crisis conclusion with conditions for lasting stability. Cooperative security efforts defined a focused aim of “...a safer world for all ... [with] conditions for a world without nuclear weapons,” and also captured the desire for increased Alliance membership across Europe, and matured and clarified partnerships

⁷⁹ NATO, *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, 27. The eight factors were: the extent and imminence of danger to Alliance members; the exhaustion or apparent ineffectiveness of alternative steps; the ability and willingness of NATO members to provide the means required for success; the involvement of partners in helping to ensure an effective and timely remedy to the problem at hand; the collateral impact on other NATO missions and needs; the degree of domestic and international public support; conformity with international law; and the foreseeable consequences of inaction.

⁸⁰ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 16,22,24,26.

with nations and other organizations as not only operational methods, but as ends in and of themselves.⁸¹

The 2010 SC provided two strategic level endstates, consistent with the “stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” objective of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and five operational level endstates, that provide an adequate framework to describe requisite Alliance methods and resources. The subsequent section explores those ways and means, while Chapter 4 offers recommendations to clarify the concept’s desired ends.

2010 SC Ways and Means

The ways and means to achieve these objectives was less clearly identified, and the distinction between them was often blurred into a requisite capability, thereby leaving it up to the audience to interpret. Not uncommon for strategy documentation, this lack of clarity led to a heavy focus on the methods, thereby implying, but avoiding clear direction to specific resource requirements. The final reform and transformation section did provide a discussion of Alliance resource requirements, but it was limited to resource principles and characteristics without defining specific functionality or capacity. The following three parts of this chapter each contain an interpretation of the ways or means (or both) specified for the capabilities asserted as required for the three core tasks. This ways and means analysis describes the actual content, provides analysis as to its efficacy, and identifies recommended adjustments or subsequent Alliance actions as applicable, which are then codified in Chapter 4.

Expanded in paragraphs sixteen through nineteen of the 2010 SC, the core task of collective defense was broadened to include deterrence, and the required resources were

⁸¹ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 16,22,24,26.

summarized as “an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons.” While failing to define the term appropriate, the concept implied a requisite capacity in its summary ways as the “ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at a distance.” Nuclear methods and resources were discussed further in the cooperative security section, but the conventional force requirement was amplified as a “robust, mobile, and deployable conventional forces to carry out Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance expeditionary operations... with necessary levels of defence spending, so that [Alliance] forces are sufficiently resourced.” Critical analysis of the additional requisite ways and means delineated in the concept’s nineteenth paragraph produced the clarified summary of Table 3.3. Clearly evident was an emphasis on the ways, with an insufficient accounting for the requisite means.⁸²

⁸² Paragraph content and Table 3.3 drawn from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 19.

Table 3.3. Alliance Requisite Capabilities for Defense and Deterrence

Ways	Means
• Expeditionary operations	• NATO Response Force
• Training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange	• Unspecified
• Collective defense planning on nuclear roles	• Unspecified
• Defense of Alliance populations and territories against ballistic missile attack	• Russian cooperation (implied means)
• Defense against the threat of WMD	• Unspecified
• Prevention, detection, defense against and recovery from cyber attacks	• Alliance member national cyber defense capabilities (implied means)
• Detection and defense against international terrorism	• Enhanced analysis of the threat • Consultation with Alliance partners • Appropriate military capabilities (unclear) • Local forces to fight terrorism themselves
• Protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines	• Cooperation with partners (implied means)
• Assessment of the impact to Alliance security of emerging technology	• Unspecified
• Review of NATO's overall deterrence and defense posture	• Unspecified

Source: Data adapted from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 19. These ways and means support the implied defense and deterrence objective or ends of, “the protection and defense of Alliance territory and populations against attack,” as was defined in the previous section.

Sub-divided into the four components of crisis prevention, crisis management, post-conflict stabilization, and reconstruction support, the core task of crisis management was expanded in the concept's twentieth through twenty-fifth paragraphs. As extrapolated in Table 3.4, that expansion implied some degree of requisite capability, but offered more of a set of operating principles than tangible ways and means, and continued the inclination to focus on ways, without sufficient accounting for the requisite means.⁸³

⁸³ Paragraph content and Table 3.4 drawn from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 20-25.

Table 3.4. Alliance Requisite Capabilities for Crisis Management

Ways	Means
• Monitoring / analysis of the international environment to anticipate crises	• Unspecified
• Management of ongoing hostilities	• Robust military forces deployed and sustained in the field
• Contribution to stabilization and reconstruction at conflict conclusion	• Cooperation with other relevant international actors (implied)
• Enhanced intelligence sharing within NATO	• Unspecified
• Effective civilian partner interface • Planning, employment and coordination of civilian activities (temporary)	• Appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability
• Integration of civil-military planning	• Unspecified
• Training and development of local forces in crisis zones	• Unspecified
• Rapid deployment of civilian specialists	• Trained specialists from member states
• Broad and intense political consultations among Allies and with partners	• Unspecified

Source: Data adapted from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 20-25. These ways and means support the implied crisis management objective or ends of, “crisis prevention or crisis conclusion with conditions for lasting security,” as was defined in the previous section.

The third core task of cooperative security was focused in the concept’s twenty-sixth paragraph on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, mostly with respect to nuclear weapons. The analysis provided in table 3.5 shows that the description of the means to support this narrow set of methods was unclear, possibly depending on the flawed logic that the methods implied an elimination of, rather than a requirement for means. NATO enlargement and partnership expectations were expressed as both ends and ways of cooperative strategy, and perhaps means for arms control in the case of partnerships. In addition to reflecting that potential linkage, Table 3.5 includes emphasized details of the partnership method, and again demonstrates in this final core task an uncertain accounting for the requisite means.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Paragraph content and Table 3.5 drawn from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 26-35.

Table 3.5. Alliance Requisite Capabilities for Cooperative Security

Ways	Means
• Strategic and short-range nuclear weapons reduction for the Alliance and Russia	• Unspecified; perhaps partnerships?
• Conventional arms control in Europe	• Unspecified; perhaps partnerships?
• Contribution to international anti-proliferation efforts	• Unspecified; perhaps partnerships?
• Open door policy to Alliance membership	• Unspecified
• Cooperation between NATO and the UN	• 2008 UN-NATO declaration
• NATO and EU strategic partnership	• Practical cooperation in operations • Broadened political consultations • Capability development cooperation
• NATO – Russia cooperation, consultation and reciprocity	• NATO-Russia founding act • NATO-Russia Council
• Cooperation with, and expansion of: ○ Partnership for Peace (PfP) / Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)⁸⁵ ○ Mediterranean Dialogue ○ Istanbul Cooperative Initiative ○ Other individual nations' partnerships	• Unspecified ⁸⁶

Source: Data adapted from NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 26-35. These ways and means support the implied cooperative security objective or ends of, “a safer world for all with conditions for a nuclear free world; increased Alliance membership across Europe; and matured and clarified partnerships with nations and other organizations.” as was defined in the previous section.

The concepts final two pre-conclusion paragraphs offered an attempt to mitigate the inadequacy of the documented resource requirements to support the various operational methods for each of the three core tasks. Curiously found within the cooperative security core task segment, the two-paragraph Reform and Transformation section addressed resource expectations beginning with a rather lofty requirements statement of sufficient Alliance “military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military

⁸⁵ With common membership EAPC is a multilateral forum; PfP is a set of bi-lateral agreements.

⁸⁶ The 2010 SC did not specify means to leverage these partnerships, but other Alliance documents define the expectations of the various venues to a varying degree.

command structure.” Supplemental expected characteristics of these forces were provided that included maximum deployability; duplication avoidance and force modernization through coherence in defense planning; joint (multi-national) capability development; commonality of capabilities, structures and funding; and reformation for streamlining and efficiency.⁸⁷

The 2010 SC provided a sufficient menu of methods to achieve its desired endstates, but consistent with its predecessors, it fell short of providing comprehensive direction with regards to the resources required to execute those methods. This surprised few and now presents a challenge and an opportunity for the Alliance. While much work is required to supplement the 2010 Strategic Concept with more substantial resource direction, the Alliance military leadership has spent considerable effort leading up to and following the Lisbon Summit to fill that gap. This will be culminated with an updated MC 400 document and subsequent capability gap closure documents. Chapter 4 analyzes that effort and offers recommended input to those documents.

Equally important to this content development is the manner in which it will be developed and communicated to mitigate the consternation caused by the relative secrecy in which the final 2010 SC development efforts were executed. Chapter 4 also describes four mechanisms in an action plan intended to provide that detail, three of which will be classified; this will complicate the challenge of communications transparency. Therefore, a deliberate communications strategy must complement that action plan.

⁸⁷ NATO, *Strategic Concept 2010*, para 36-37.

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY TRANSLATION OF STRATEGY

NATO's documented strategy over its initial fifty years has adequately defined policy derived objectives and comprehensive methods, yet has provided inconsistent threat assessment and resource or force structure direction. The 2010 Strategic Concept was a positive step toward addressing those deficiencies and the two relationship issues raised by the pundits, but absent further specificity and prioritization through an effective military translation, many gaps will remain.

This chapter begins with a parallel analysis of the U.S. strategic documents and their military translation to serve as a comparison to the Alliance efforts, and to define U.S. mechanisms that might be leveraged by the Alliance. It ends with a description of NATO's military translation plan and provides recommended content for inclusion.

United States Strategic Alignment

As NATO's strategy and strategic documents have evolved, so has that of its most influential member. At the strategic pinnacle, the U.S. Constitution and NATO's 1949 treaty each defined their respective enduring interests, and Constitutional amendments and Alliance summit declarations provided further guidance with policy direction when needed. At the next level, the NATO Strategic Concept and the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) have provided more temporal policy guidance, and attempted to serve as broad organizational strategies within their respective, often similar operating environments. The U.S. 2010 NSS suffers from similar deficiencies as its Alliance equivalent, and attempts to mitigate them through a complex military translation process that begins with a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report and a National Military Strategy (NMS).

Military Translation of U.S. National Strategy

The 2010 U.S. QDR¹ provided sufficient and traceable translation of a military strategy into subordinate ends. The QDR's ways and means (employment of a rebalanced and reformed force) were clearly articulated, but it lacked a clear plan for funding sustainability, similar to NATO's challenge that must be addressed in its military translation. Subordinate to the QDR, the unclassified 2011 U.S. NMS translated the NSS and QDR guidance into the four military objectives and provided more specific regional analysis for each of the six U.S. geographical Combatant Commanders.

The QDR and NMS serve as the transition from U.S. national strategy to its subordinate military translation and sit atop a complex Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).² Two relevant components of the JSPS are the operational planning direction provided to the combatant commanders through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the military capability development direction provided through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).

Informed by the regional analysis of the NMS, classified direction is provided to the Combatant Commanders through the bi-annual JSCP. This direction guides the development of a family of contingency operational³ and theater campaign plans. These plans document comprehensive ways, means, threats, and risks to desired objectives,

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC), 2010.

² The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary method supporting the title 6, 10, 22, and 50 requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the principle military advisor to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). While the JSPS directly supports the CJCS, it is more of a system of systems that operates in a broader strategic framework that includes other key stakeholders such as the SECDEF, NSC, Combatant Commanders and the individual Services. The products and process within the JSPS can best be categorized as direction, advice or assessments; these three threads serve as the CJCS' vehicle to ensure national level strategy is effectively translated into effective planning with appropriate feedback loops.

³ It is through an operational plan assigned to one the combatant commanders that the U.S. accounts for its expected military force contribution to NATO.

serve as the foundation for U.S. military operations globally, and inform the required resources and capabilities for the future.⁴

The JCIDS supports a force structure Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process that provides capabilities required of both the JSCP directed operational plans and a series of Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS). Through these, the United States can forecast potential future military engagements, prioritize the potential threats and risks across the multiple dimensions of the security environment, and estimate capabilities required to achieve its military objectives.

No construct can perfectly plan for the future, and the construct by which the United States translates its national strategy into military plans and operations is no exception, but it does provide an effective mechanism to refine the threat analysis and forecast capabilities required of its force structure. As such, it offers a valuable parallel for the Alliance to leverage as it maximizes the impact of its 2010 Strategic Concept.

Military Translation of NATO's Strategic Concept

The Alliance has an opportunity to address weaknesses and clarify issues assessed in Chapter 3 and avoid errors of its past assessed in Chapter 2. This section summarizes NATO's action plan following the 2010 Lisbon Summit, and offers content for the outputs produced through that plan.

NATO's Action Plan

In the twenty-four months that follow the 2010 Lisbon summit, several key products will have been developed by NATO's political, defense and military

⁴ Managed through the Adaptive, Planning and Execution (APEX) process, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCSI 3141.01D: Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans* (Washington, DC, 2008).

communities in accordance with direction from the Lisbon Summit declaration, and following the developing NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP). The calendar of critical planned outputs is as follows: Political Guidance in the spring of 2011 (approved March 2011); MC 400/3 in the summer of 2011; Capabilities Requirement Review (CRR) in the summer of 2012; and a Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), is expected in time for the 2012 NATO Summit.⁵

The Alliance's 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance served essentially as an interim Strategic Concept. Whereas, the unclassified 2011 Political Guidance (PG) is to be more narrowly focused providing more specific requirements for military capability improvement and direction for military implementation of the Strategic Guidance; this will serve as the output of the first step in the NDPP.⁶

One year after the publication of its 1999 Strategic Concept, the Alliance published a classified MC 400/2 as the second update to the MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. On a similar timeframe, the Military Committee expects to release the third update, providing more detailed guidance for military execution of the concept within less than a year of its publication.⁷

Directed by the Lisbon Summit declaration and further informed by the 2011 PG, the classified DDPR will more specifically examine the Alliance's nuclear posture, conventional and missile defense capabilities, and policies for arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. While no specific timeframe was assigned by the NAC,

⁵ Eva Verglas, interview with the author, Norfolk, VA, 11 March 2011.

⁶ NATO, North Atlantic Council Summit, *Lisbon Summit Declaration* (Lisbon, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, (accessed on 16 January 2011).

⁷ Verglas.

terms of reference were set in early 2011, and the DDPR is expected to be released within two years of the concept publication that it informs.⁸

Alliance defense capabilities and gaps defined in the *2005 Defence Requirements Review (DRR)* were updated and refined by a *2009 NATO Bi-SC Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA)*⁹ document. This effort to reconcile overall Alliance requirements with member nation's capabilities through country chapters will continue over the next two years to culminate in a *2012 Capabilities Requirements Review (CRR)* as step two of the NDPP.¹⁰

These four military translation components of NATO's Strategic Concept offer a sound framework to plug the gaps in its existing strategy. The content and timeline of that plug will influence how effective the Alliance can operate as it faces the challenges of operating in its seventh decade.

Recommendations for Military Translation

Clarity and prioritization consensus within an organization is difficult; it is nearly inconceivable among twenty-eight diverse partners, yet that is exactly what the Alliance must do. The recommendations for the Strategic Concept military translation are as follows: 1) clarify, prioritize, and simplify the content of the 2010 SC; 2) specify the unspecified means identified in Chapter 3's end-ways-means analysis; 3) prioritize those means through the use of a threat analysis mechanism such as the U.S. Defense Planning Scenarios; and 4) prioritize operational engagement expectations (scope and type) through a family of contingency plans analogous to those directed by the U.S. JSCP.

⁸ Verglas.

⁹ Bantz Craddock and J. N. Mattis, *NATO 2009 Bi-SC Priority Shortfall Areas*, SACEUR, Casteau, BE, and SACT (Norfolk, VA, 2009).

¹⁰ Verglas.

Clarify, prioritize, and simplify the 2010 SC. While the 2000 MC 400/2 reiterated and expanded much of the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, MC 400/3 must begin in the opposite direction by resolving the 2010 SC's excessive complexity and providing a succinct interpretation of the military objectives and methods. This will not only inform the subsequent details of a military implementation, but also will serve to mitigate the missed strategic communications opportunity by providing a message to be published for public and parliamentary endorsement. MC 400/3 would start with a clearly structured objectives hierarchy as follows:

Strategic Alliance Objectives

- An unparalleled community of freedom, peace and security, and shared values
- Freedom and security of its members

Alliance Military Objectives

- The protection and defense of Alliance territory and populations against attack
- Crisis prevention or crisis conclusion with conditions for lasting security
- A safer world for all with conditions for a world without nuclear weapons
- Increased Alliance membership across Europe
- Matured and clarified partnerships with nations and other organizations

This would be complemented by a clearly depicted subordinate ways and means as depicted in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 to complete the end-ways-means construct. The addition of explicit prioritization to Table 3.2 would complete the message with a clear and concise analysis of the security environment.

Specify the unspecified means. 2010 SC's ways and means depicted in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are obviously incomplete with fifty percent of the resources required to execute the methods assessed as "unspecified." While the 2012 CRR should provide a comprehensive appraisal of the required Alliance resources and gaps, interim content defining the specific means should be included in both the 2011 PG and MC 400/3. Likewise, the NAC direction to develop a DDPR implies an acknowledgement of

insufficiency in the 2010 SC for both the ways and means to achieve the first and third military objectives listed earlier in this section. The DDPR should effectively address this gap, but given the acceleration of change in the global security environment, eighteen additional months is an unacceptable time gap. Therefore, as an interim measure, MC 400/3 should include the next level of detail for Alliance nuclear posture, conventional and missile defense capabilities, and policies for arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament.

Prioritize the specified means. The Alliance will reconcile the acknowledged resource and capability deficiencies identified in the 2009 Bi-SC PSA through the 2012 CRR efforts. A framework of scenarios to shape that effort should be developed, similar in intent to the U.S. JCIDS driven Defense Planning Scenarios. The Alliance should leverage the content of its Multiple Futures Project output as a source of those scenarios. The threat analysis defined in Table 3.2 offers a mechanism to prioritize the threat with various permutations of the four dimensions. This detailed prioritized threat analysis projected through several scenarios will lead to defined force requirements with baseline standing forces and COA based surge capability by 2012.

Prioritize operational engagement expectations. Few would have predicted the scale and simultaneity of the tumultuous effects in the Middle East and North Africa that occurred in first few months of 2011. This placed NATO in the position of trying to decide its degree of engagement with little prior planning and therefore engaging to some degree because it can, not necessarily because it should. Following a U.S. JSCP process, a family of plans with contingencies for these type engagements could be identified by geographic area. These plans would include courses of action developed to better enable

a logical response, and predefined decision criteria as offered in the GoE's Afghanistan lessons learned section. Summarized in MC 400/3, this family of plans should be included in an update to the NDPP, leveraging the rigor of the U.S. APEX construct.

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

Unprecedented in its persistence and efficacy for any modern era international coalition, NATO, through its 1949 treaty, established that its enduring Alliance interest was simply the security of its member nations. The six Strategic Concepts and supporting military translations published over the subsequent five decades consistently reinforced that enduring interest, provided additional amplification of the methods and means of execution, and evolved and expanded the objectives of the Alliance. The degree to which these documents have provided value to Alliance strategic and operational execution and relevance in its global environment has varied; an assessment of that value and relevance provides a framework for analysis of NATO's current and future efficacy based upon current strategy development.

Within one year of its inception, the Alliance had published a comprehensive set of strategic documents: The North Atlantic Treaty; DC 6/1; MC 14; and DC13. They provided the Alliance strategic and operational military objectives, intended methods of execution, and conventional force requirements, thus defining the Alliance strategy's ends and ways, but only partially its means. They also provided a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet threat and effectively enabled subsequent planning efforts by assigning objectives and planning assumptions to regional planning groups. The failure to overtly specify the nuclear component of its force requirements, along with a restructuring of the Alliance led to its production of a series of documents intended to refine and complete its strategy.

By May 1957, NATO had consolidated its strategy into two documents, the Strategic Concept (MC 14/2) and its military translation MC 48/2. These two overtly

addressed the nuclear force requirement and updated the analysis of the threat, which had evolved and grown as a result of 1955 Warsaw Treaty. However intra-alliance tension, in part caused by global events such as the Suez Crisis, debate over German rearmament and Alliance member engagement in out-of-area military operations continued to limit its ability to define force requirements and expectations fully.

In large measure, these deficiencies were resolved by 1969 through the Alliance publication of MC 14/3 (Strategic Concept) and MC 48/3 (military translation). The comprehensive nature of these two documents and the persistence of the threat served the Alliance well as it navigated the subsequent two decades, leading ultimately to the demise of its adversary. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact raised the question of continued Alliance necessity, but its enduring interest as specified in the 1949 treaty, the security of its member nations, remained. The threat to that security had changed and grown more complex, thereby providing a legitimate rationale for NATO's continued existence.

NATO's 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts and their respective military translations (the MC 400 series) reflected that complexity and fundamentally changed the nature of the Alliance and its strategic documents. The higher level concepts, now unclassified, served more as political strategic communications documents than actual strategy to direct Alliance execution. Their classified military translations were then left to provide the specifics required of execution in an unclear threat environment. That lack of clarity contributed to the diversification of NATO operations over the next two decades, challenged force requirement precision and operational planning, and fueled the debate over continued Alliance relevance.

During its initial sixty year history, NATO has been effective and instrumental in defining world events and shaping the global environment. Yet Alliance perceived efficacy has varied over its sixty year history caused, in part, by the degree of clarity and thoroughness in its articulated strategy. Of all the essential elements of an effective strategy, force structure requirements, or means, have proven the most persistent deficiency in Alliance strategy. The strategic assessment of its external environment was relatively straight forward until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact two decades ago; this escalated a prioritized threat assessment as the other most deficient element of the Alliance strategy. Finally, the internal environment element, defined as relations between Alliance members, while turbulent, has been effectively managed thus far, but the politics of a diverse twenty-eight member organization will likely present challenges in the future.

The Alliance's third attempt to clarify its post Cold-War strategy issued at NATO's November 2010 Lisbon Summit continued Alliance inclination to occasionally define its strategy by simply projecting its history into its future, insufficiently prioritizing its threat, and avoiding a commitment toward specific force structure requirements. Again, written broadly enough, it provides a convenience framework upon which endorsement of a wide spectrum of operations could be legitimized.

Replicating the process used for the 1967 Harmel report, the development process of the 2010 SC through a Group of Experts (GoE) forum offered an outstanding opportunity for Alliance-wide engagement and global endorsement. Furthermore, the GoE report delivered comprehensive content that could have been effectively and transparently refined into a succinct strategic concept; unfortunately these opportunities

were not fully realized. The GoE's definition of factors to inform Alliance operational engagement decisions as a part of their OEF lessons learned was regrettably omitted from the final concept. The process transparency of the GoE development did not carry forward into the final concept development, thereby missing a chance to obtain universal Alliance endorsement and global international respect. Finally, the GoE's effort to prioritize Alliance threats did not translate into the concept's Alliance security environment assessment.


As the pundits offered through 2010, the efficacy and necessity of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and of the Alliance itself is easily debated, yet the Alliance persists and it has an opportunity to mitigate strategic deficiencies through a military translation. That translation should include the following actions: 1) clarify, prioritize, and simplify the content of the 2010 SC; 2) specify the unspecified means of the Strategic Concept identified in Chapter 3's end-ways-means analysis; 3) prioritize those means through the use of a threat analysis mechanism such as the U.S. Defense Planning Scenarios; and 4) prioritize operational engagement expectations (scope and type) through a family of contingency plans analogous to those directed by the U.S. JSCP.

Just as it has over its first sixty years, NATO's future impact in an ever-evolving global environment will be defined to some degree by the clarity and thoroughness of its current strategy to support future efficacy. In order to maximize that impact and quiet the skeptics, the 2010 Strategic Concept should have more clearly and simply articulated NATO's objectives, methods, and intended scope of operations. Its subsequent military translation must now fill that void and provide direction for effective force structure planning and a comprehensive strategic assessment of the external environment to

include a rigorous, prioritized threat analysis. Also important is the process by which the content of these documents are developed and communicated throughout the Alliance to address critical factors to the internal environment dimension of its strategic assessment.

One only needs to look at the April 2011 NATO commitment to lead the U.N. endorsed coalition efforts to suppress Muammar Gaddafi's antics to conclude that, first NATO remains relevant, but secondly, it would benefit from a more clearly documented hierarchical framework of strategic direction. Therefore, analysis of the original thesis argues that through its content and development method, NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept was a positive step forward, but fell short of its potential for concision, relevance, and actionability. However the efforts planned through 2012 to translate that concept into military policy and guidance offers ample opportunity to mitigate current deficiencies.

APPENDIX A - NATO Evolution: Strategy, Events & Operations



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In 1987, CAPT Snyder reported to VA-176 based at NAS Oceana, VA, deploying aboard USS Forrestal (CV-59). In 1990, he returned to VA-42 as a Flight Instructor, but then augmented VA-35 in 1991, deploying aboard USS Saratoga (CV-60), flying combat missions in Operation Desert Storm; at the end of hostilities, he resumed his Flight Instructor duties. In 1993, CAPT Snyder reported to CCG4 as Strike Operations Officer, coordinating strike ops and weapons training for deploying Carrier Battle Groups.

Transitioning to the Navy Reserve in 1995, CAPT Snyder served as Operations and Executive Officer for TACRON 2186. In 1998, CAPT Snyder was assigned to the Second Fleet Reserve JFACC unit, serving as the Plans Director (J5) and Executive Officer through 2003. CAPT Snyder has served as the Commanding Officer of TACRON 2186, Strike Force Training Atlantic (RC), and NR NATO ACT HQ. Concurrently, from 2007 to 2010, he led the US Navy's Maritime Operations Center project. He is currently enrolled in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College.

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