

The seal of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is a large, circular emblem in the background. It features an eagle with a shield on its chest, holding an olive branch and arrows. The shield has vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a sunburst with stars. The text "SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL" is written in English and Arabic around the top half of the circle, and "IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION" is written around the bottom half.

**IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: POLICE
TRAINING PROGRAM DEVELOPED
SIZEABLE FORCE, BUT CAPABILITIES
ARE UNKNOWN**

**SIGIR11-003
OCTOBER 25, 2010**

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SIGIR

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

Summary of Report: SIGIR 11-003

Why SIGIR Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for managing the program to assist the Government of Iraq (GOI) develop police forces capable of maintaining internal security. The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM), under U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), is responsible for managing the program for DoD. On October 1, 2011, management responsibility for the program is to transfer to the Department of State's (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). DynCorp International, under a contract with INL, provides police advisors who assist with the training. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) oversees the Iraqi police forces in 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces with the Kurdistan Regional Government responsible for the remaining three provinces. Because of the program's significance in terms of U.S. investment and Iraqi security, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) examined program outcomes, DoD's management and oversight, status of the transfer, and issues facing GOI that impact the capability and effectiveness of the police forces.

What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR has a number of recommendations for the Commanding General USF-I that pertain to improving oversight and management of police advisors and working with the GOI to assess the capabilities of the Iraqi police.

Management Comments and Audit Response

USF-I and the Department of the Army Office of the Provost Marshal General concurred with the report recommendations. USF-I and INL provided technical comments that we have addressed as appropriate

October 25, 2010

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: POLICE TRAINING PROGRAM DEVELOPED SIZEABLE FORCE, BUT CAPABILITIES ARE UNKNOWN

What SIGIR Found

Since 2003, the United States has spent about \$7.3 billion on a program to help the GOI train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order and deny terrorists a safe haven in Iraq. The program was unprecedented in its magnitude and conducted in a hostile environment with ongoing combat operations. In addition, the existing Iraqi police forces in 2003 were in very poor condition, and a new Iraqi government was in development. Despite these impediments, DoD reports that over 400,000 Iraqi police have received training and are on the force. However, the capabilities of these forces are unknown because no assessments of total force capabilities were made.

There were weaknesses in program management in (1) program planning and assessments, (2) communications and coordination between organizations performing the training, and (3) oversight of contract police advisors. The impact of these weaknesses on the program is difficult to quantify but undoubtedly led to inefficiencies and waste. For example, there was no comprehensive plan to guide the program to desired results or assessments to determine if the program was on track. Because of the frequent rotations by military personnel, a comprehensive plan would have provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and out of Iraq. Also, police advisors, who were critical to the training program, were not always effectively monitored and utilized.

DoD is in the process of establishing Stability Transition Teams (STT) to advise and assist MOI and its forces over the next year. The STTs will be responsible for day-to-day management of the police advisors while ITAM will be responsible for tracking them. This split in responsibilities was not well coordinated in the past and needs to be effectively managed in the future. Moreover, since DynCorp will be self reporting on the utilization of police advisors, these reports need monitoring to check the validity of the information and to ensure police advisors are productively employed.

A significant challenge ahead will be effectively and efficiently transitioning the police training assistance program from DoD to DoS in 2011. To their credit, the two Departments are working collaboratively on the transfer. However, DoS will be assuming responsibility for the program to advise and assist the police forces when the capabilities of those forces have not been assessed in any comprehensive way.

The long-term success of the Iraqi police training program is dependent on sustainment by the GOI and its ability to mitigate force structure, corruption, land ownership disputes, and other issues adversely impacting the force. DoD and DoS need to continue to work with GOI officials to help them address these problems.



SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 25, 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are Unknown (SIGIR 11-003)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It discusses the U. S. Department of Defense program to help train Iraqi police. We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory responsibilities contained in Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This law provides for independent and objective audits of programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for reconstruction of Iraq, and for recommendations on related policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR Project 9028.

U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Department of the Army Office of the Provost Marshal General provided written comments on a draft of this report, and the comments are included in Appendix D. We also obtained technical comments and addressed them in the report as appropriate.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the report, please contact Glenn Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General

cc: U.S. Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
U.S. Secretary of Defense
Commanding General, U.S. Central Command

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Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, but Capabilities Are Unknown

SIGIR 11-003

October 25, 2010

Introduction

Since 2003, the United States has spent about \$7.3 billion to support a program to help train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order and deny terrorists a safe haven in Iraq. The program has been managed by Department of Defense (DoD) military organizations in Iraq, but management is scheduled to transfer to the Department of State (DoS) on October 1, 2011. The Government of Iraq (GOI) is responsible for training and equipping the police, and DoD continues to advise and assist the GOI with the training. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) performed this audit because of the program's significance in terms of U.S. investment and Iraqi security and the pending transfer of the program from DoD to DoS.

Background

DoS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is responsible for developing policies and managing programs to strengthen law enforcement and other rule of law institutional capabilities outside the United States.¹ The Bureau was initially assigned responsibility for the Iraqi police training program and was assisted in that effort by the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP). However, responsibility for that program was transferred to DoD in 2004 due to the security situation, the scale of the task, and to ensure unity of command. On May 11, 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36² assigned the mission of organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's security forces, including the police, to the U.S. Central Command until the Secretaries of State and Defense agreed that DoS should take on that responsibility. In accordance with the Presidential Directive, on October 1, 2011, DoS is scheduled to assume responsibility for the program from DoD.

The U.S. Central Command designated the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, under the overall direction of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, manager of this effort. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq created the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team to train and equip Iraqi police and other civilian security forces. In June 2009, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team transitioned to the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM). In January 2010, the Multi-National Force-Iraq transitioned to the U.S. Force-Iraq (USF-I) and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq transitioned to the Deputy

¹ Presidential Decision Directive 71, February 24, 2000, directed DoS to strengthen criminal justice systems in support of U.S. peace operations and other complex contingencies. The Secretary of State designated INL as the primary focal point for rule of law matters.

² United States Government Operations in Iraq, 5/11/2004.

Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG–A&T). Figure 1 shows DoD’s management structure and the organizational transitions.

Figure 1—DoD’s Management Structure and Organizational Transitions



Source: SIGIR prepared from DoD documents 8/2010.

Although our audit covers periods during which the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq were in existence, we use ITAM, USF-I, and DCG-A&T throughout the report to refer to them and their predecessor organizations.

ITAM was responsible for providing the Iraqi police with academic training whereas USF-I utilized U.S. military units to provide on-the-job training of the police at the local level. Both ITAM and the military units utilized police advisors to assist with the training. Although advisors were provided by a number of U.S. government organizations (including the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice), other nations (including Italy and the United Kingdom), and U.S. contractors (including DynCorp International), our reference to police advisors refers only to the DynCorp advisors. We focused on the DynCorp advisors because they were the largest group of advisors working for the U.S. government.³ ITAM was responsible for providing the guidance and oversight for DynCorp police advisors. Personnel from the military units and their police advisors were organized into police training teams.

By December 2006, the GOI had assumed responsibility for most of the academic training, but ITAM continued to advise and assist at the police training centers, and the police training teams advised at the police stations, districts, and provinces. By December 2008, the GOI had assumed responsibility for all academic training and most of the advanced training courses. U.S. military and police advisors continued to assist by providing advice and quality control. Other U.S. federal agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and international

³ The DynCorp advisors are provided under a contract with INL. DoD transferred funds to DoS for the contractor support, and INL managed the contract that provided U.S. police advisors and logistical support for those advisors. DynCorp continues to provide advisors under the INL contract. SIGIR last reported on INL’s management of the DynCorp contract in January 2010: *Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program*, SIGIR 10-008, 1/25/2010.

contributors, such as the United Kingdom and Italy, also provide the Iraqis with police training assistance.

Iraq Ministry of Interior Oversees Most Police Forces

The Iraq Ministry of Interior (MOI) oversees Iraqi police forces in 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces.⁴ The major police forces it oversees include:

- **Iraqi Police Service:** composed of patrol and station police, as well as specialists such as forensic specialists, assigned throughout 15 of Iraq's provinces. Its mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The Iraqi Police Service comprises police officers, who conduct investigations and make arrests, and "shurtas,"⁵ who perform functions such as traffic management and crowd control.
- **Federal Police:** a bridging force between the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army, which allows MOI to project police capabilities across provinces. It could be used to counter large-scale disobediences and for national emergencies.
- **Border Police:**⁶ staff border forts and ports of entry to protect Iraq's borders from unlawful entry.
- **Oil Police:** provides security for Iraq's oil infrastructure.
- **Facilities Protection Services:** protects Iraqi government buildings.

U.S. Funds Provided through Multiple Appropriations

DoD has spent about \$7.3 billion from three U.S. funds appropriated for the total program. The three funds are the Iraq Security Forces Fund (\$5.7 billion), Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (\$1.6 billion), and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (\$2.8 million). DOD tracks funds for the total police program and does not separately track funds for the components of that program such as training, equipment, facilities, and related support services.


Figure 2 shows the reported funds spent from the Iraq Security Forces Fund to support the police training program. The expenditures totaled about \$5.7 billion. Funds were primarily used to provide equipment; supplies; services; training; and facilities repair, renovation, and construction.

⁴ The Iraq MOI does not oversee the police forces in the Kurdistan region. Those forces are overseen by the Kurdistan MOI. Future references to the MOI will be limited to the Iraqi MOI, unless noted.

⁵ The literal translation of "shurta" is "police" in Arabic. However, USF-I and Iraqi officials refer to Iraqi police who are not officers as "shurtas."

⁶ Officially known as the Directorate of Border Enforcement and the Ports of Entry Directorate.

Figure 2—Reported Iraq Security Forces Fund Expenditures by Fiscal Year Appropriation and Activity, as of June 31, 2010 (\$ in millions)



Notes:

Training and Operations: Police training, institutional development, instructor support, medical and office equipment, training aids, aircraft support, and information technology equipment and services.

Equipment and Transportation: Equipment and transportation of police, contracted security, force protection (including vehicle modifications), vehicles, organizational clothing, office furniture, and communications equipment.


Infrastructure: Facilities for police units, training academies, and headquarters expenses.

Sustainment: Weapons, ammunition, and contracted activities such as logistics support, maintenance, and other services.

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer.

Figure 3 shows the reported funds spent from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund to support the police training program. The expenditures totaled about \$1.6 billion.


Figure 3—Reported Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Expenditures by Project from Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriations, as of April 2010 (\$ in millions)



Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System.

Figure 4 shows the reported funds spent from the Commander's Emergency Response Program to support the police training program. The expenditures totaled about \$2.8 million. The funds were used primarily for construction of police stations and border forts.

Figure 4—Reported Commander's Emergency Response Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year Appropriation and Types of Facilities, as of March 2010



Note:

SIGIR has pointed out in numerous reports that the Iraq Reconstruction Management System database suffers from inconsistencies in data quality, accuracy, and overall usefulness.

Source: Iraq Reconstruction Management System database.

DoD also provides U.S. military personnel, life support, and security that benefit the program at costs that are significant but that are not readily available. In addition, other U.S. government

agencies, national governments, and international organizations have contributed personnel and funding to the Iraqi police training program.


For example, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives all provide various forms of specialized training as needed or requested. MOI has requested assistance from the FBI to develop an FBI academy. The Department of Homeland Security has been involved in Iraq since 2005 to train Iraqi personnel on a variety of skills including: physical security; port operations; threat assessments; document analysis and search techniques; and how to develop border, customs, and immigration courses. The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives has had a continuous presence in Iraq since 2003 and has provided support to the Iraq police training program in an advisory capacity at crime scenes; in training development/delivery; and as subject matter experts in firearms, explosives, and other areas as requested.

Other countries and international organizations have also provided support to the Iraqi police training program. For example, the United Kingdom spent approximately \$229 million for such assistance as sponsoring forensics programs, providing forensic laboratories, and providing specialized training on leadership and management, criminal investigations, community policing, and curriculum development. Australia spent about \$21 million in areas such as developing a curriculum tailored to the Iraqi policing environment and forensic training. The European Union spent about \$54 million to provide MOI training in such areas as confidence building, mutual respect, and operational cooperation between the different branches of the Iraqi criminal justice system.

Ministry of Interior Reported Expenditures Exceeded \$14 Billion

According to ITAM, MOI spent about \$14 billion from 2005 through 2009 on salaries, equipment, facilities, goods, and services, with most of MOI's expenditures for the Iraqi police. Figure 5 shows MOI's reported expenditures for 2005 through 2009 by type of expenditure.

**Figure 5—MOI Reported Expenditures 2005-2009, as of March 20, 2010
(\$ in millions)**



Source: ITAM.

As the figure shows, the reported expenditures have increased every year since 2005 with the last two years accounting for about 63% of the 5-year total. Over 80% of total expenditures are for salaries. The table does not include Kurdistan expenditures because the Kurdistan Regional Government receives its funds from the Ministry of Finance. We requested the Kurdistan expenditure data but did not receive that information.

With ITAM's assistance and support, MOI developed its first 3-year budget and completed its 2010 budget, which includes over \$5.8 billion for MOI.

Objectives

This report examines police training program outcomes, DoD management and oversight of the program, status of the program's transfer from DoD to DoS, and issues facing the GOI that impact the capability and effectiveness of the police forces. Our audit was adversely impacted by incomplete files and the lack of historical knowledge of the program by U.S. military personnel. Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records management have often been cited by SIGIR in past audits as program management weaknesses.

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see Appendix A. For a list of acronyms, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see

Appendix C. For a copy of management comments, see Appendix D. For the SIGIR mission and contact information, see Appendix E

Iraqi Police Training Program Developed a Sizeable Force, but Total Capabilities of That Force Are Unknown

The situation faced in Iraq by individuals tasked with establishing a police training program was considerably worse than originally envisioned in terms of the operating environment, the condition of the existing police force, and the size of the training force that would be available. That situation forced a significant change in program goals and objectives.

Starting with a police force that was in extremely poor condition, U.S. forces and coalition partners have helped MOI build a sizeable force and transition this force to the control of the GOI. According to DoD, over 400,000 Iraqi police have received training and are on the force. Initially, U.S. trainers had responsibility for training recruits; however over time, the U.S. transferred full responsibility to MOI for developing and maintaining the police training program including operating its training centers and colleges. At the time of our audit, MOI was operating all training centers and police colleges located in 15 provinces in Iraq. The U.S. and international partners were providing police advisors who mentored the trainers and advised Iraqi police leadership. The training program had shifted to more advanced training such as criminal investigations and forensics.

The capabilities of the Iraqi police are unknown. Since June 2009, Iraqi security forces have been responsible for the internal security of the country as U.S. military forces were repositioned to military installations in Iraq. The Iraqi police forces in June 2009 were reportedly more capable than the police forces the coalition members began training in 2003. However, the extent of those capabilities then and at the time we completed our field work in July 2010 were unknown because no assessments of total force capabilities were made.

Almost all senior Iraqi police training officials we spoke with in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basrah expressed satisfaction with the program and U.S. assistance. Also, according to USF-I, just under 60% of the Iraqi public believes the Iraqi police is controlling crime.

Major Difficulties Adversely Impacted Program Beginning

After the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, an international police team assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority assessed the state of the Iraqi police and reported⁷ that the Iraqi police had suffered years of neglect, coupled with a “repressive command structure that prohibited training, proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts toward modernization of the police. Unless redesigned and redeveloped, the Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, supportable or sustainable police service for a free Iraq.” The report described the Iraqi police as the only institution that remained intact following the conflict, but in the opinion of many citizens, the police were “inextricably linked with a cruel and repressive regime” and were “corrupt, unprofessional and untrustworthy.” The report further stated that the Iraqi police displayed “the results of poor

⁷ *Iraq Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future*, Coalition Provisional Authority-Interior Ministry, 5/30/2003.

standards, inadequate expectations of performance, absence of an understanding/appreciation for human rights, poor management and insufficient or inadequate training.”

This assessment illustrates the institutional and psychological challenges that DoD had to overcome to change the mindset of the Iraqi police and the Iraqi communities’ perception of the police because the police need community support and consent to conduct civilian policing. Adding to these challenges was the 2004 to 2006 peak of insurgency, which adversely impacted training operations. Police training centers, stations, and personnel were often the targets of attacks.

According to U.S. government officials involved in international police training assistance programs, including the early years of the Iraq program, the challenges faced in Iraq far surpassed those faced in other assistance programs such as Panama, Bosnia, and Haiti. Those challenges included a gross underestimation of program complexity and the number of individuals needed for the tasks ahead; a large population with no law enforcement on the street; a hostile security environment; and the remnants of a poorly trained and brutal police force under Saddam Hussein. The following examples illustrate the conditions encountered:

- The assessment conducted in early 2003 for the Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that a force of over 6,600 international police advisors would be needed to properly train, mentor, and advise the Iraqis. According to ICITAP officials, this was the same number of advisors used in Kosovo for a population half the size of Iraq. However, unlike Kosovo, the coalition members did not provide the trainers needed because they were unwilling to send advisors to Iraq due to the dangerous environment and lack of logistical support. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report⁸, only 50 police advisors had arrived in Iraq during the first six months following the invasion and 375 a year later.
- A July 2005 joint report by the DoS and DoD Inspectors General stated⁹, “The initial assumption was that the Iraqi police training programs would be conducted in a post-conflict environment. Contrary to these expectations, the IPS [Iraqi Police Service] is evolving in an environment of high-level violence and terrorism intermingled with a problematic insurgency movement.”
- SIGIR reported¹⁰ in *Hard Lessons* that by the time the Coalition Provisional Authority assessment team of experts arrived in May 2003, “looters had destroyed most of the Ministry of Interior, as well as many police stations across the country, leaving the police force infrastructure in tatters. Gerald Burke, a member of the six-person team assigned to assess the police, said their conclusions could be summed up in one sentence: The police need everything.”

According to the U.S. government officials, the situation in Iraq in 2004 forced a significant change in program goals and objectives. The focus shifted from long-term organizational development to training large numbers of police in a short period of time for counterinsurgency operations. Organizational development would have entailed building a police force that was

⁸ *Policing Iraq: Protecting Iraqis from Criminal Violence*, U.S. Institute of Peace, 6/2006.

⁹ *Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training*, Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72 and Department of Defense Report No. 1E-2005-002, 7/15/2005.

¹⁰ *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, 2/2/2009.

fully integrated into a functioning justice system, developing standard policies and procedures, and incorporating policing concept of a free society.

The situation also required a change in training curriculum in 2004. According to the same joint report by the DoS and DoD Inspectors General,

The curriculum used was a revised ICITAP course originally developed for training in Kosovo. From the beginning Coalition planners intended the eight-week basic course to serve as a starting point and not as the ultimate training solution. A field training and mentoring program was to have supplemented the rudimentary basic training course. Given the April 2004 rise in the insurgency, it became apparent that the field training envisioned in the original concept could not be executed. Yet the coalition was reluctant to increase the length of basic training because of the urgent need to build IPS [Iraqi Police Service] capacity and get policemen on the streets. As the IP [Iraqi Police] increasingly became targets of the insurgency, MNF-I [Multi-National Force-Iraq] recognized the need to change the direction and emphasis of the training. The basic recruit curriculum was changed to focus on officer survival skills in an insurgency.

Because of the hostile situation in Iraq and the need to train large numbers of police in a short period of time, the Coalition Provisional Authority arranged with the Government of Jordan for the U.S. to build an academy there to train Iraqi police. From November 2003 through February 2007, as part of a bilateral agreement with the Government of Jordan, the U.S. and international partners operated the Jordan International Police Training Center. U.S. military and Justice Department officials, contractors, and coalition partners trained Iraqi police at the Center. At the request of the GOI and ITAM, the basic police training program at the Center ended in February 2007 and the police training effort shifted to the training centers in Iraq that were also being used in conjunction with the Center in Jordan to train Iraqi police. During its period of operation, over 54,000 Iraqi police graduated from the Center.

The Training Center was constructed under a contract between INL and DynCorp. The amount expended for the construction totaled \$70.4 million. An additional \$53.3 million was expended for operating and maintaining the facility. That facility has since been turned over to the Jordanian government.

Iraq Police Training Program Has Built a Sizeable Force Which Now Emphasizes Specialized Training and Manages Training Facilities

The Iraqi police training program has built a sizeable force since 2003. According to the May 2003 assessment of the Iraqi police force conducted for the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Iraqi police force under Saddam Hussein numbered about 58,000. DoD reported that as of May

31, 2010, there were 412,000 police in the force.¹¹ SIGIR has reported on the problems in obtaining the true number of assigned and trained police.¹²

Whereas under Saddam the police were poorly trained and had no appreciation for human rights, a senior MOI official told us that all police in the current force had, at a minimum, completed eight weeks of basic police training on a modern, democratically based curriculum. Although coalition forces initially managed and conducted the training program, MOI now manages the program, and the Iraqi police conduct all of the basic training and most of the advanced training. Police advisors from the U.S. and other countries provide advice, assistance, and specialized training.

Numbers of Police Increased To Include Women Police Officers

According to the joint audit report by the DoD and DoS Inspectors General, coalition planners reviewed the per capita police-to-population ratios in neighboring Islamic countries to arrive at a proposed personnel level of 135,000 for the Iraqi police. Over the years, the GOI has increased the number and types of forces to be trained. As of May 31, 2010, DoD reported that 297,000 provincial police forces and 115,000 federal forces were assigned to MOI. According to ITAM, all police had, as a minimum, received basic recruit training.

ITAM and MOI have promoted the inclusion of women in the Iraqi Police Service. This resulted in the first class of 50 women officer graduates from the Baghdad Police College in December 2009. Although these women were segregated from the men during the training program, the curriculum was the same, and they graduated with the same rank, lieutenants, as the male graduates. Their inclusion in the force is significant even though Iraqi women comprise less than one-half a percent of the total officer corps (approximately 50 of 18,000). MOI has demonstrated that including women was not an isolated occurrence by training a second class of 85 female officers. Figure 6 shows a SIGIR auditor with Iraqi women police trainees at the Baghdad Police College, and Figure 7 shows the college. We have blurred the faces of the police trainees to protect their identities.

Figure 6—SIGIR Auditor with Iraqi Women Police Trainees



Source: SIGIR photo taken during visit to Baghdad Police College, 4/26/2010.

¹¹ *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Department of Defense Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, 6/2010.

¹² *Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, SIGIR 08-015, 4/25/2008; and *Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue*, SIGIR 09-002, 10/21/2008.

Figure 7—Baghdad Police College



Source: SIGIR photo taken during visit to Baghdad Police College, 4/26/2010.

Training Emphasis Has Shifted from Numbers Trained to Specialized Training

As stated earlier, during the program's initial years, the emphasis was on the number of persons receiving training and basic survival skills. Over time, the program shifted to emphasize more specialized skills, including advanced policing techniques and policing in a free society, however, the number of persons receiving training remained a key metric of the program's progress.

All shurtas (Iraqi police who are not officers) are required to receive two months of training that includes courses on human rights, firearms, and basic policing skills. The length of the required officer program depends upon the individual's prior education. Officer candidates who are college graduates have a 1-year program and those with no college degree have a 3-year program. The officer programs include courses on leadership, law, investigations, evidence collection, and human rights. Figures 8 and 9 show police trainees in various training scenarios, and Figure 10 shows a SIGIR auditor with an Iraqi canine police trainee.

Figure 8—Counterinsurgency Training for Police Service Forces



Source: SIGIR photo taken during training center visits, 4/13/2010.

Figure 9—Riot Control Training for Police Service Forces



Source: SIGIR photo taken during training center visits, 4/24/2010.

Figure 10—SIGIR Auditor with Canine Police Trainee for Police Service Force



Source: SIGIR photo taken during training center visit, 4/26/2010.

ITAM provided guidance to MOI officials through the creation and final approval of the MOI police training curriculum. MOI has 92 approved curriculum courses including specialized courses for all police services. This curriculum is the only approved police training instructional material recognized by MOI. The MOI approved curriculum helps ensure police training in the 15 MOI controlled provinces is standardized.¹³ Table 1 provides examples of these courses and their length.

Table 1—Examples of MOI Specialized Training Courses

MOI Courses	Length (in weeks)
Specialized Policing Skills	
Advanced Criminal Investigation	2
Intelligence Analyst Course	6
Violent Crime Investigation	1
Community Policing	Varies
Leadership	
Administration and Leadership	2
Civil Disorder Management	2
Police Management	
First Line Supervisor	2
Sergeant Commissioner Course	12
Instructor Development	
Field Training Officer Course	2
Provincial Training Officer Course	5

Source: ITAM.

¹³ According to ITAM officials, the curriculum in the Kurdistan controlled provinces is almost identical to the MOI curriculum.

Even though MOI does not oversee Kurdistan police, ITAM has encouraged MOI to include the Kurdistan police in joint training. For example, the Kurdistan police are included in classes at the Baghdad Police College.

To meet the needs for more specialized training, the curriculum now includes advanced training in areas such as crime scene analysis, evidence collection, forensic evidence, white-collar fraud, gang task forces, and DNA testing. U.S. military officers stated that the proper collection of crime scene evidence is a priority training area because it has possibly the most dramatic impact in helping to strengthen the link between police arrests and criminal prosecution. To address this need, ITAM constructed five forensic laboratories to train students on how to compare and analyze evidence. Preserving evidence for analyses is critical to effective prosecutions. Moreover, proper evidence collection and analysis should help reduce the Iraqi judicial system's heavy reliance on confessions to achieve convictions, which has led to charges of human rights violations and high acquittal rates. Figures 11 and 12 show police trainees in training on the collection and analysis of forensic evidence.

Figures 11 and 12—Training Sessions on the Collection and Analysis of Forensic Evidence



Source: SIGIR photo taken during training course, 4/24/2010.




Source: SIGIR photo taken during training course, 4/21/2010.

MOI Manages Police Training Program and Training Facilities

MOI is now responsible for police training. Although coalition forces initially managed and conducted the police training, in 2006 they transitioned the management for all police training centers, colleges, and stations to MOI. MOI currently funds, staffs, and manages training centers, colleges, and police stations in 15 of 18 provinces in Iraq. Iraqi police instructors lead classroom instruction, and Iraqi deans manage all college programs. At the time of our audit, the Iraq MOI operated 3 police colleges and 28 training centers, and the Kurdistan MOI operated 2 police colleges and 6 training centers. Figure 13 shows the location of these training centers and colleges.

Figure 13—Police Training Centers and Colleges



Notes:

IPS = Iraqi Police Service

TC = Training Centers

DBE = Directorate of Border Enforcement

Source: ITAM, 12/2009.

The Iraqi police now conduct all of the basic training and most advanced training utilizing Iraqi police trainers and instructors. U.S. and other countries' trainers continue to teach highly specialized training courses. According to ITAM, MOI had about 5,500 trainers and instructors as of March 2010. ITAM assists MOI to develop target numbers of police trainers and instructors needed in each police service for MOI to sustain its police forces.

Capabilities of the Iraqi Police Force Are Unknown

On June 30, 2009, the Iraqi military and police forces assumed responsibility for the security of Iraqi cities, villages, and localities. At that time, U.S. military forces were repositioned to military installations in Iraq. Although the Iraqi police forces in June 2009 were reportedly more capable than the forces the coalition members began training in 2003, the extent of those capabilities was unknown. The capabilities were not known because ITAM's assessments were

focused on quantitative (such as numbers trained) rather than qualitative factors (such as skill levels) and the assessments did not include the total force. The information available in July 2010 was more limited than that available in 2009 because USF-I had stopped using its capabilities assessment instrument for the Iraqi Police Service and, according to ITAM officials, the assessment function had been turned over to the three U.S. military divisions—North, Center, and South—to decide how they will assess the Iraqi Police Service.

We obtained a classified assessment of the Border Police that was conducted in 2010. The assessment is based on numerous border stations that had limited or no coverage. We could not determine how or whether similar assessments are performed for the other police services.

To a limited extent, USF-I used Operational Readiness Assessments to assess the capabilities of the Iraqi police. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Assessments were compiled from Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMR) which were focused on quantitative factors such as numbers of trained personnel and equipment on hand. U.S. forces began using PSMRs in mid-2006 to measure capacity of the Iraqi Police Service at the station, district, and provincial levels.

Military leaders of police training teams and their police advisors were required to complete the PSMRs. Using the PSMR information, objective Operational Readiness Assessment levels were derived. In addition, the military leaders were to provide subjective Operational Readiness Assessment levels of their stations. There were four Operational Readiness Assessment levels. The best was level 1 (police station capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent law enforcement operations), and the worst was level 4 (police station forming or incapable of planning, executing, and sustaining law enforcement operations).

PSMR evaluations and Operational Readiness Assessments were to be summarized into district level evaluations, and the district level evaluations were to be summarized into provincial level evaluations. Because of criticism by users that the PSMR evaluation had too many questions to complete, USF-I streamlined it in 2009. The revised PSMR was focused on seven critical performance measures required to establish a “Rule of Law” police agency. The performance measures were based on international democratic policing standards. The seven international policing critical performance measures are: leadership, administration, operations, logistics, investigations, facilities, and training.

Based on available information, the revised PSMR was used for only a few months after September 2009. According to an ITAM contract employee, neither the PSMR nor the Operational Readiness Assessments are now used because the police training teams no longer provide assistance at the police station level but concentrate their assistance at the district and provincial levels. Although ITAM plans to have a common assessment instrument at some undetermined point in the future, the responsibility for assessing Iraqi Police Service capabilities has been turned over to the U.S. military divisions. The divisions will decide how capabilities will be assessed and police advisors will complete the assessments.

We found a number of reasons the PSMRs and Operational Readiness Assessments did not provide meaningful assessments of the Police Service’s capabilities. First, PSMRs were not available for most police stations. For example, although all military units were required to prepare PSMRs, we found for September 2009 that military units completed only 466 of 1,935

required PSMRs, or 24%, throughout Iraq. Second, Operational Readiness Assessments for some provinces were based on a limited number of PSMRs. For example, one province received an Operational Readiness Assessment of 1 (the highest rating) based on only 1 assessment of 28 police reporting units in the province. Third, we were told by an ITAM contract employee that some military units did not use the PSMR but used their own assessment tools. For example, the Marine Corps units in Al Anbar Province used “Valuation Assessments Reports” to assess police capabilities.

ITAM also conducted other assessments, but they also have limited usefulness in evaluating the capabilities of the Iraqi police services. For example, USF-I required that ITAM complete assessments of the police forces on a quarterly basis. The assessments were to be used for informed, timely decision making. We asked ITAM officials for all assessments completed since 2003, and they provided a total of three—two for 2009 and one for 2010. The evaluations assessed the current status of measures of effectiveness and performance of certain tasks.¹⁴ According to an ITAM official, these are subjective evaluations. Under the task, “Advise and assist the MOI in establishing professional and capable Police forces,” there are nine measures of performance. ITAM evaluated eight of the nine in 2010 and all eight received the lowest capability rating. Table 2 shows ITAM’s latest assessment for six of the eight rated measures of performance.¹⁵

Table 2—ITAM Assessment of Measures of Performance for Iraq Police Forces (February 2010)

Description	Status
Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential capability in protecting the population and fighting crime	Capability in fewer than 3 provinces
Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential capability in investigations and crime scene management	Capability in fewer than 3 provinces
Iraqi Police Service have minimum essential capability in counter explosives	Capability in fewer than 3 provinces
Oil Police, Facilities Protection Service, and Electric Police capable of protecting critical infrastructure	Capability in fewer than 3 provinces
Federal Police capable of providing federal reinforcement to Iraqi Police Service in counterinsurgency, special event security, and major crimes as required	Federal Police brigades in fewer than 3 provinces
Border Police capable of securing borders with reinforcement of Iraqi Army	2 or fewer regions capable

Source: ITAM, 2/25/2010.

¹⁴ Measures of effectiveness assess progress of operations toward achieving objectives. Measures of performance assess changes in capability as a result of tasks performed.

¹⁵ The other two measures of performance relate to the capabilities of internal affairs/inspector general and first responders.

According to ITAM, over the past two years, ITAM and an MOI Joint Assessment Team have collaboratively developed and implemented a comprehensive Iraqi Police Service training center performance and operational capabilities assessment process. On June 1, 2010, the MOI finalized and began to implement the assessment process. In late September 2010, the MOI Joint Assessment Team was to perform its first independent assessment of an Iraqi Police Service training facility. ITAM stated that an objective of the assessment process is for the Joint Assessment Team to identify training centers that need additional support, are under-utilized by the provincial Iraqi Police Service, and that are not performing to expectations. Once these are identified, the Joint Assessment Team can provide direction and guidance to the centers' leadership and staff to encourage improvements. Follow up assessments will be performed to determine if performance or operational capabilities have improved, and, if not, recommendations will be made to the MOI for further corrective actions or for closing the centers. SIGIR did not have the opportunity to review this assessment process prior to issuing this report.

MOI Officials Expressed Satisfaction with the Training Assistance Program

Many MOI officials, police trainers, and police with whom we spoke expressed satisfaction with the training assistance program and the U.S. contribution to the program. A top official at Baghdad's Training and Qualification Institute stated that Iraq is very grateful to the U.S. government and military for their full backing of the police training program. He emphasized, "If the U.S. was not there to help us every step of the way, we could not have done it alone." He also said the U.S. is providing expert mentoring and support in all aspects of the program. An Iraqi trainer described the students as enthusiastic and eager to learn. The Provincial Deputy Chief of Police in Kirkuk and the Dean of the Kirkuk Training Center each described U.S. advisors as "family."

According to USF-I data, almost 60% of Iraqis believe the Iraqi police is controlling crime and 45% of Iraqis said they would go to the Iraqi police first to report a serious crime.¹⁶

¹⁶ *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Department of Defense Report to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, 6/2010.

Weak Program Management and Oversight

DoD's controls over the training program were weak. SIGIR could find no comprehensive plan for the police training program and believes the absence of such a plan was a key factor that led to weaknesses in program management and oversight. A comprehensive plan would have provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and out of Iraq. SIGIR believes that such a plan should have clearly articulated USF-I's specific goals for the program, a timeframe for accomplishing its goals, how it would accomplish those goals, how much it would cost, what resources would be required, and how it would measure its progress. Instead, what we found were elements of plans and programs that changed from one year to the next with no explanations for the changes. As a result, the numbers of persons trained and amount of equipment distributed became the primary measures of program progress and success.

Although USF-I should have ensured that academic and local training efforts were coordinated to improve overall program effectiveness and efficiency, this was not done. As a result, (1) local training conducted by military units did not always support the curriculum taught at the training centers or was not well coordinated with training at the centers, (2) police advisors were not always effectively monitored and utilized, and (3) police training teams were not always effectively organized. Changes were made to correct these problems, but new problems could occur under recent organizational changes.

Program Lacked a Comprehensive Plan with Goals and Objectives and Metrics to Measure Progress

According to individuals associated with the program during the early years, a comprehensive plan for the program was not developed. Moreover, SIGIR found no evidence that such a plan was ever developed. According to a military official who worked on the program when it first began and more recently, the annual changes of commands created significant disconnects as each new command had its own agenda. Moreover, the official described the program as six one-year programs over six years with no continuity. Another official stated that the reporting on program progress tended to change frequently because of personal preferences. Our ability to document these changes was adversely impacted by incomplete files and the lack of historical knowledge of the program by U.S. military personnel who were in Iraq during our audit. Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records management have often been cited by SIGIR in past audits as program management weaknesses.

Early Years of the Program (2003–2005)

According to a senior police advisor who was associated with the program during its early years, there were several unsuccessful attempts to develop a comprehensive plan. Program goals, objectives, timelines for numbers of police to be trained, and other program information were presented in briefing slides. Similarly, DoD's program performance measures concentrated on outputs (numbers of Iraqis provided training) rather than program outcomes (capabilities of the force). The individual stated that outcomes are far more difficult to measure because the desired results need to be identified and appropriately assessed to measure progress towards those

desired results. SIGIR was unable to find documents related to these planning attempts or briefing slides.

Planning Initiatives (2006–2007)

The Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG-A&T) established 2006 as the “Year of the Police.” Briefing slides identified that ITAM was to “provide the Ministry of Interior and its forces the capability to establish civil security in Iraq based on Rule of Law and respect for human rights,” and three objectives: build ministerial capacity; man, train, and equip the civil security force; and develop and institute a professional development system for MOI forces. The briefing slides relevant to the police was heavily focused on numbers (e.g., number of or percent of forces provided training/to be provided training and equipment; training teams; and facilities constructed). Although DCG-A&T’s focus was to be on building a civil security capability based on Rule of Law and human rights, there was no discussion of how that would be accomplished, what resources would be required, or how DCG-A&T would measure progress.

DCG-A&T’s 2007 Campaign Action Plan was titled “The Year of Logistics and Leaders.” According to the plan, the desired end state was:

Iraq at peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis. Security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists. Conditions set for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to transform its ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] to provide for the full spectrum of security missions. Iraq politically, economically, and militarily partnered with the Coalition in the War on Terror and cooperatively engaged with the U.S. and Coalition on security issues in Iraq and the region.

The 2007 Campaign Action Plan had two “Lines of Operation,” or major efforts, directed at the Iraqi Security Forces. The first was “Generate a Capable ISF – and then transition to – Assist the ISF with Force Development” and the second was “Develop a Professional ISF.” The Plan’s Annex A describes DCG-A&T’s implementation plan and includes six lines of operation for ITAM. Under each line are key tasks for 2007. For example, a line of operation for ITAM is to “Complete Generation of Capable CSF” [Civil Security Forces]. A key task under that line of operation is to “Enable the CSF in enhancing its operational capability.” Lead responsibility for this task was to be determined. Another line of operation for ITAM is “Improve National Police Capability.” A key task under that line of operation is “Complete basing of the National Police in support of Year of the Police Completion.” Lead responsibility for this task was to be determined. Although the DCG-A&T’s plan has more specificity than previous documents we were able to locate, it still lacked key elements such as how DCG-A&T would accomplish its goals, how much it would cost, what resources would be required, and how it would measure its progress.

Planning Shifts to Supporting MOI’s Program (2008–2009)

USF-I’s Operation Order 08-01 described the “commander’s intent” for the police forces as assisting the Iraqi MOI in generating forces to meet immediate requirements while simultaneously growing their capacity to generate forces on their own and perform the institutional functions necessary to support and operate those forces. The desired end state was

that MOI would be able to function independently with little or no assistance in the most critical aspects of force management, acquisition, training, sustainment, development, resources, and leadership. However, USF-I did not include a date when that end state would be achieved. The order identified four conditions and supporting program objectives. The conditions that the program planned to achieve were: force generation on track, improved capability of the force to operate independently, improved institutional performance, and strengthened professionalism and reduced sectarian behavior. The objectives were primarily focused on tasks to be accomplished by the end of 2008. For some objectives, specific numbers were identified. For example, the force generation objectives provided numbers of police to be trained and equipped by the end of 2008. Specifically, the goal was for MOI to generate a total police force of 420,000 and 4,580 new police officers by the end of 2008. For other objectives, the goals were unspecified degrees of improved capability. For example, the condition to improve the capability of the force to operate independently included an objective to improve the police capabilities in border security, ports of entry, forensics, explosive ordinance disposal, and intelligence, but it did not include indicators of success. The order continued to lack the necessary details of a comprehensive plan such as how goals would be accomplished, how much it would cost, what resources would be required, and how progress would be measured.

USF-I's Operation Order 09-01 describes the desired end state for the Iraqi police as achieving sustainable police primacy with minimal assistance in seven police performance measures: leadership, administration, operations, training, investigations, logistics, and facilities. Only two of the measures—training and leadership—were the same as those identified in the operation order for the previous year. We found no explanation for the change in measures. The order identified four conditions and supporting objectives for the police training program. The conditions were: ministerial capacity enhanced, force capacity enhanced, force professionalization/specialization, and rule of law. Again, we found no explanation for the change in conditions from the previous year. Each condition had objectives, effects, and finally tasks. We found the objectives, effects, and tasks limited to a single year context rather than an overall program plan.

Plans Change Again in 2010

USF-I's Operation Order 10-01 provided the overall guidance for the program starting in 2010. The order identified "objectives" rather than "conditions." The two objectives that affected ITAM were focused on internal security and security transition and had four sub-objectives: (1) transition of MOI and police training and advising mission to INL to be completed no later than October 2011, (2) set the conditions for police primacy, (3) facilitate the development of self-reliant ministries with enduring systems and leadership that enable the programming, budgeting, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining of security forces, and (4) police forces trained, manned, and equipped to maintain internal security with Iraqi Army reinforcement as necessary. In early 2010, ITAM developed tasks to accomplish each of the sub-objectives.

Poor Communications and Coordination Resulted in Inefficiencies

Because academic training assistance was ITAM's responsibility and local training assistance was the responsibility of military teams, communications and coordination among the organizations was key to program unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, the efforts were not well coordinated, resulting in police training teams that were not always

effectively organized, academic training and local training that was not well-coordinated, and police advisors that were not always fully utilized. Changes have been made over time to correct these problems. However, new organizational changes and organizational responsibilities have recently occurred that reinforce the need for good communications and coordination among organizations.

Police Training Teams Were Not Always Effectively Organized

According to ITAM officials, there was no standard structure for the ITAM-led teams working with the training centers and colleges. In some instances, the teams consisted only of police advisors. This was possible when the facilities were collocated with the advisors' home units or in low-threat environments, such as the Kurdish region, where protection was not required. Otherwise, advisors would be accompanied by a military escort. The advisors working with training centers and colleges reported directly to ITAM personnel.

At the local level, police advisors worked on police training teams led by military personnel. During most of our fieldwork, the military team members were from the 49th Military Police (MP) Brigade. The teams were embedded with U.S. combat units and relied on those units for their protection. The police training teams were responsible for reinforcing police skills by accompanying the Iraqi police during operations and by assisting and advising the local police and provincial chiefs of police.

According to senior leaders with the 49th MP Brigade, the unit was in Iraq in the 2005/2006 period and returned in 2009. During its tours in Iraq, the Brigade was responsible for managing the police training teams in most provinces. When the Brigade left Iraq in 2006, military commands in the field were made responsible for staffing the police training teams with military members and managing the teams operating in their areas of responsibility. According to a 49th MP Brigade senior leader, the composition of the police training teams suffered during the period the Brigade was not in Iraq and responsibility for police training was dispersed to military commands in the field. The Brigade senior leader stated that some field commanders did not view the police training mission as a priority or really understand the roles of the police advisors. Although the military field commanders sometimes had MPs that could have been assigned to the police training teams, the commanders assigned them to other priority missions and assigned personnel with no policing experience, such as infantry or artillery specialists, to the police training teams. We were told this created a chaotic environment for the affected teams.

In July 2010, the 49th MP Brigade left Iraq, and the police training teams were converted to stability transition teams (STT). The STTs will be assigned to Advise and Assist Brigades. The STTs were to continue to comprise police advisors and members of military units deploying to Iraq; however, the military members would not be from one unit, such as the 49th MP Brigade. In addition, the advisors assigned to work at the training centers and colleges were incorporated into the Advise and Assist Brigades. According to ITAM officials, all advisors will be tracked by ITAM, but local military commanders will have responsibility for overseeing the advisors and providing them with transportation and protection.

Because of the recent organizational changes and prior problems with the management and oversight of police advisors, we requested from ITAM copies of instructions and guidance issued

to Advise and Assist Brigades on the utilization of advisors. ITAM did not provide the requested documents.

Academic Training and Local Training Were Not Well Coordinated

Because ITAM was responsible for providing policing advice at academic training centers, and military units were responsible for providing advice and assistance at the local level, effective coordination and communications were essential to ensure local mentoring was aligned with classroom training. According to police trainers, local police advisors and academic advisors can enhance training quality through effective coordination and communications. For example, when police training team advisors at the local police stations inform the police advisors at the training centers about deficiencies in academic training, the centers can make changes to improve their academic programs. We were told by representatives of the 49th MP Brigade that no formal feedback communication mechanisms existed but there were informal communications between advisors. Police training advisors we spoke with indicated that communications were informal or did not occur.

We found the resulting lack of communication and coordination impaired the delivery of feedback on performance and requirements from the street to the training centers and impaired the execution of a consistent mentoring process. Poor communications sometimes led to local training that was not supportive of MOI training center curriculum. For example, some police training teams provided ad hoc police training at the local police stations. Such training could be on any topic requested by the local chiefs of police but might not be formalized in the MOI curriculum. Therefore, even though police training teams provided certificates of completion, MOI would not approve the training, and the recruits received no recognition for their efforts.

Officials with ITAM and the 49th MP Brigade became aware of the coordination challenges and took action in 2009. We were told that the unit made an effort to check the MOI curriculum prior to conducting any field training. If the requested training was not part of the approved curriculum, the local chief of police was given the option to approve the non-certificate training. Also, in April 2010, a conference was held to coordinate and plan the way ahead for the training program in the context of the U.S. military drawdown. Police advisors and representatives of ITAM and U.S. military units from all over Iraq participated in the conference.¹⁷ The conference provided a chance for ITAM leadership to engage U.S. military units who are responsible for supporting training throughout Iraq.

Police Advisors in Police Training Teams Were Not Always Fully Utilized

According to senior leaders with the 49th MP Brigade, upon the Brigade's return in September 2009, the Brigade personnel found that neither ITAM nor USF-I knew where the police advisors were located nor what they were doing. For example, a senior Brigade leader noted there were 12 police advisors in the Dhi-Qar province that neither ITAM nor USF-I knew were there. Another Brigade senior leader stated that he learned that a police advisor had been assigned to his headquarters three months earlier even though he had not seen the individual during that time. According to the senior leader, the advisor told him he had been working in his trailer

¹⁷ SIGIR representatives attended the conference.

when in reality he had not been assigned to any job. One senior Brigade leader attributed this loss of control to a lack of coordination among USF-I, ITAM, INL, and DynCorp.

To improve its accountability of police advisors assigned to the Brigade, the Brigade initiated daily tracking reports in March 2010. The tracking reports are compiled by a DynCorp employee from daily activity reports submitted by police advisors. According to a Brigade senior leader, DynCorp had required police advisors to prepare daily activity reports, but the reports were previously not available to military units because DynCorp considered them proprietary. The Brigade discussed the matter with DynCorp officials who agreed to provide the Brigade with detailed information from the activity reports such as employee name, assigned location, current location, military contact, days engaged with Iraqis, and reasons if not engaged. To help ensure that the information submitted on the activity reports is accurate, the Brigade also required that the police training teams' military leaders sign the reports.

The tracking report process should help identify the magnitude of another problem raised by Brigade senior leaders and others with whom we spoke: that in some instances police advisors could not travel to perform their missions. According to senior leaders with the 49th MP Brigade, U.S. military commanders responsible for the forward operating locations where police training teams were assigned decided whether those teams could perform their missions. We were told of instances where the commanders diverted maneuver units to other priorities rather than providing security and support to the police training teams. Without maneuver units, the teams could not travel to their assigned stations/districts/provinces. For example, a police advisor we spoke with in Kirkuk stated that his training team could not perform their mission when the U.S. military brigades were focused on supporting the Iraqi national election in March 2010. The advisor stated the lack of movement impaired the police training's progress in the area. It also prevented the advisors from doing their jobs. However, because of the weaknesses in the processes for tracking police advisor activities, it is uncertain to what extent this occurred over time or to what extent training funds may have been wasted.

Copies of the tracking reports were to be submitted to both ITAM and to the Brigade prior to the Brigade's departure from Iraq in July 2010. ITAM, which is responsible for tracking all police advisors, is to continue to receive the tracking reports. DynCorp is to continue to maintain the daily activity reports, but we were told by a Brigade senior leader that copies of reports can be requested, if needed.

Program in Transition from DoD to DoS in Planning Phase

ITAM plans to transfer the police training assistance program to INL on October 1, 2011. In preparation for that transfer and in coordination with USF-I's drawdown, ITAM plans to reduce the number and locations of police advisors over time and concentrate its assistance on helping the Iraqi police develop managerial, administrative, and specialized policing skills. By October 2011, INL plans to be operational from three locations and to concentrate its assistance at training academies and provincial headquarters levels. Although INL is planning for a downsized assistance program, its total requested start-up and operational costs are about \$812 million for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 combined.¹⁸ A large part of that cost will be for security and logistics support.

Transition Planning Underway by DoD and DoS

ITAM and INL representatives brief the USF-I Commanding General monthly on the October 1, 2011, transition status. The briefings identify various transition tasks with associated risks and planned action. Both organizations expressed satisfaction with the coordination process. To improve coordination, INL has added two INL directors to ITAM's police training headquarters and ITAM has added a military planning officer at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

During the period leading up to the transfer, DoD plans to draw down its more extensive program to meet INL's planned program level. At the time we completed our field work in July 2010, USF-I was consolidating its police advisors into STTs. By September 2010, it planned to have all STTs consolidated at six regional training centers supported by Advise and Assist Brigades. According to an ITAM official, the Advise and Assist Brigades will have day-to-day operational authority over the police advisors but ITAM will be providing overall guidance and will monitor their location and utilization. ITAM, in conjunction with the U.S. military divisions, is to determine the specialized skills required of police advisors and how many advisors each brigade will need to complete its mission.

An ITAM official stated that each Advise and Assist Brigade will have a military police unit. The brigades will be responsible for providing the police advisors with protection, movement, and logistical support. That organizational structure is to transition again from the six regional centers to three locations in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil by October 1, 2011. At the transition, INL will be responsible for providing protection, transportation, and logistical support. At this point, INL plans to use DoS-contracted security and logistics personnel.

INL has developed a hub-and-spoke concept of operation. Police advisors are to be located at the three central (hub) locations and would travel out to provinces and Iraqi training academies (spoke sites) from the hubs. Training and assistance is to include higher-order training such as forensics, investigative skills, use of information technology in policing, and program

¹⁸ According to an INL official, the fiscal year 2011 estimate is only for the 4th quarter, July 1 through September 30, 2011.

management. The hub-and-spoke concept is designed to allow INL to scope the size of the program up or down depending on available funds and Iraqi needs.

By October 2011, INL plans to have about 200 police advisors distributed among the hub locations, a reduction of 150 advisors from INL's original plan of 350 advisors. According to an INL official, the reduction in advisors is due to budget constraints. The INL plan would represent a substantial reduction in advisors from 2009 when there were about 500 advisors distributed among multiple locations.

INL has outlined specific criteria for the selection of police advisors, and INL will continue to shift the training focus away from basic training to advanced training in various specialties and to personnel management. In addition, INL will move from training at the local station level to advising and institution-building at the provincial and national levels. Consistent with this strategy, INL will not renew the contracts of some police advisors. According to an INL official, INL plans to retain advisors that can provide the training envisioned and that have established good rapport with the Iraqis. It plans to supplement those advisors with new hires who have the requisite experience and subject-matter expertise.

According to an INL official, it is working to develop metrics to assess the output and outcomes of its training assistance program. According to the same official, DoD's focus has been on measuring outputs. Moreover, INL developed its plan to best facilitate the transfer of full responsibility of the police development mission to the Iraqi government over a 3- to 5-year period. Program length will be determined by available funds and the progress of MOI police forces.

USF-I and INL have identified resource requirements for the transition and submitted budgets for congressional approval. INL estimated it would require about \$517 million for fiscal year 2010 and \$294 million for the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2011 for startup and operation costs relating to the transition of the police program. These funds are to cover the necessary base camp and aviation facility upgrades, security infrastructure, the procurement of aircraft for transportation between program hubs and field locations, and initial funding for the recruitment and training of key personnel, including security, contract management, and oversight personnel.

As part of the supplemental appropriation request, INL requested \$517.4 million for startup costs for fiscal year 2010 and \$294 for operational costs for fiscal year 2011. It received \$450 million or \$67.4 million less than requested for fiscal year 2010 and \$200 million or \$94 million less than requested for fiscal year 2011.¹⁹ According to an INL official, INL is adjusting its plans based on the congressional reduction. The official stated that the reduction for fiscal year 2010 will likely result in INL purchasing fewer helicopters to transport advisors to the spoke locations.

INL expects other countries and international organizations to continue to provide various levels of international police assistance, including assistance from the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Italy, the European Commission, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

¹⁹ Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2010, Public Law 111-212, 7/29/2010.

Issues Facing the Government of Iraq

Based on comments by U.S. military personnel and senior MOI officials, issues such as corruption, infiltration by ex-militia members, and “ghost” employees continue to impact the capability and effectiveness of the Iraqi police forces. The extent of these problems is unknown but represents issues that U.S. and GOI officials must address as they continue to engage in discussions concerning police force development. Additionally, the ultimate success of the Iraqi police training program is also very dependent on the GOI’s sustainment of existing forces, capabilities, and infrastructure. We identified issues that could adversely impact those sustainment efforts, if not addressed. Those issues pertain to an MOI hiring freeze, land ownership conflicts between MOI and the Ministry of Defense, and uneven support from provincial police chiefs.

Force Structure and Corruption Issues Remain

According to U.S. military officials and MOI police training leadership, there are significant force structure and corruption issues facing the police force and the police training program, despite efforts to limit them. These issues involve ex-militia members within the police force, “ghost” employees, and bribes. The extent of these problems is unknown.

Some Ex-militia Members in the Police Force

Three senior MOI officials expressed concern about the high number of ex-militia members employed by the police. One official indicated as many as 3,760 police officers are ex-militia members who are more loyal to the militias than to their police chain of command. The officials also noted that the ex-militia officers are placed in high positions in the police when they are not qualified, resulting in poor management. The official further added that high ranking GOI officials directed the MOI to integrate the ex-militia members into the police force. U.S. military officials are aware of this issue and have contacted MOI officials to express their concerns.

Salary Sharing and Ghost Employees in the Iraqi Police Services

A senior MOI official acknowledged that some Iraqis receive pay despite not reporting for work. This is allowed to occur by supervisors who demand payment from the absent employees and is known as “salary sharing.” The absent employee can then work at a second job to supplement his MOI salary. An MOI official stated that the MOI cannot resolve this problem since technically the person is on the payroll, and there is no way to find out how much of his salary he is sharing with his supervisor.

Another official commented on instances where police officers are hired by MOI and receive a salary but are told they do not need to report to work. He told SIGIR that his colleague was recently hired at the Facilities Protection Services at MOI and was assigned four bodyguards. When he reported to work and inquired about his assignment, his superior told him he would get paid but did not have to report to work. The official emphasized there is extensive waste and abuse at the Ministerial level.

Another major issue at MOI and certain police centers, provinces, and directorates has been non-existent or “ghost” police on their force and the salaries they collect. An MOI official indicated that the problem mainly occurs in the Federal Police and Border Police directorates and is primarily attributable to their large size and semi-independent nature. The MOI Inspector General stated that his office is working to rectify this problem by requiring that every employee get a finger stamped to validate receipt of salary. The Inspector General stated that last year his office recovered almost \$17 million in “ghost” employee salaries.

The March 2010 DoD report to Congress²⁰ also referred to the MOI Inspector General’s effort in combating this issue. The report stated, “The MoI conducted a comprehensive audit process in 2009 to validate employee rolls and to identify and remove ‘ghost’ employees from its personnel system. Additional audits at the provincial level continue to identify deserters, no-shows, and additional inefficiencies within the personnel reporting system.”

Some Police Demand Bribes

Representatives of the U.S. Central Command stated that bribery occurs within the Iraqi police despite efforts to eliminate this practice. Senior Iraqi officials stated bribery is common and that there is corruption at all levels. In a June 2009 letter to the Washington Post²¹, Minister of the Interior Bolani defended his ministry’s actions to combat bribery and wrote, “My ministry alone has fired more than 60,000 employees on corruption charges and concerns. This month we announced that more than 40 police officers would face charges after an investigation into prison abuse found that inmates had been incarcerated without warrants and the rights of other inmates had been violated.”

In an interview with the BBC in September 2009, General Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq is reported to have said, “The endemic corruption within the Iraqi system—not only the security forces, but the system—is still probably the biggest problem facing Iraq.”

Sustainment Issues Need To Be Addressed

The success of the Iraqi police training program is also dependent on GOI sustainment. We identified three issues that could impact that sustainment: an MOI hiring freeze, land ownership conflicts between MOI and the Ministry of Defense, and uneven support from provincial police chiefs.

MOI Hiring Freeze Limits Replacement of Personnel

MOI is currently enforcing a hiring freeze to address budget concerns. The freeze will likely remain in place until Iraq forms a new government resulting from the March national election. The hiring freeze limits MOI’s ability to replace police officers who leave the program. In addition, assassins continue to target Iraqi police and the death toll is heavy. A senior Iraqi official at the Training and Qualification Institute stated that some of the explosive ordinance disposal specialists have been lost due to targeted attacks against them. ITAM and MOI reported that between March 2009 and March 2010 there have been 12,726 policemen killed and 10,573 deserters. Police advisors emphasize the importance of hiring Iraqi officers in key management

²⁰ *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, DoD Report to Congress, 3/2010.

²¹ *Interior Minister Bolani: Mission Not Yet Accomplished in Iraq*, Washington Post, 6/30/2009.

positions with specific skills and qualification. However, given the freeze, MOI is required to promote from within the police force which can lead to less qualified personnel in key management positions.

Ministry of Defense Holds Deeds to Land Supporting Police Training Centers

ITAM and Iraqi police officials stated some police training centers are located on land owned or controlled primarily by the Ministry of Defense.²² As a result, MOI is reluctant to invest funds to improve infrastructure, including new construction and improvements to water and electrical utilities, fearing the Ministry of Defense may reclaim the facilities in the future for its own use. Senior Iraqi officials and DynCorp advisors at police training centers in Kirkuk and Basrah stated the land ownership issue adversely impacts the growth and sustainment of the program, although training continues. The Dean of the Kirkuk Training Center stated his facility will continue to persevere and train under adverse conditions, but he expressed frustration stating that the situation could be resolved by a mere transfer of ownership, something his office has been trying to obtain for two years.

Senior U.S. police training officials stated they are aware of this issue and that part of the problem is the historic tension between the Ministry of Defense and MOI in providing internal security. Over time, the role of the Iraqi police has expanded, and the quality of the police has improved. However, the Ministry of Defense has been reluctant to surrender primacy over internal security as evidenced by the land conflicts.

Uneven Support by Provincial Police Chiefs

A senior police advisor in Basrah stated a major impediment to the success of the police training program is that MOI provides funds to the provincial police chiefs who allocate the resources. While this approach supports decentralization of management, the police advisor stated that if a particular chief does not support police training in the province, the training center and the program will suffer from the lack of necessary funds. Conversely, in the Kurdish region, the Kurdistan MOI funds the Kurdistan police colleges directly, allowing each school to operate with its own budget. According to the police advisor, the predictable funding stream to the Kurdish police colleges and training centers allows the schools to operate much more efficiently.

U.S. military officials and police trainers stated cultural issues exacerbate this problem. According to police trainers, Iraqi leaders at training centers will often tell them of items they need from the provincial chief, but will refuse to make those requests to the chief because in Iraq such requests are considered a sign of weakness and an indication that the training center dean has failed because he cannot make do with what he has.

²² In 2008, SIGIR reported on a similar issue concerning MOI's difficulties in securing deeds to properties where the U.S. government planned to construct police stations: *Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security Forces Infrastructure Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains*, SIGIR 08-022, 7/26/2008.

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned

Conclusions

Since 2003, the United States has spent about \$7.3 billion on a program to help the GOI train, staff, and equip Iraqi police forces to maintain domestic order and deny terrorists a safe haven in Iraq. The program was unprecedented in its magnitude and conducted in a hostile environment with ongoing combat operations. In addition, the existing Iraqi police forces in 2003 were in very poor condition, and a new Iraqi government was in development. Despite these impediments, DoD reports that over 400,000 Iraqi police have received training and are on the force. However, the capabilities of these forces are unknown because no assessments of total force capabilities were made.

There were weaknesses in program management in (1) program planning and assessments, (2) communications and coordination between organizations performing the training, and (3) oversight of contract police advisors. The impact of these weaknesses on the program is difficult to quantify but undoubtedly led to inefficiencies and waste. For example, there was no comprehensive plan to guide the program to desired results or assessments to determine if the program was on track. Because of the frequent rotations by military personnel, a comprehensive plan would have provided a foundation for program continuity as military units rotated in and out of Iraq. Also, police advisors, who were critical to the training program, were not always effectively monitored and utilized.

DoD is in the process of establishing STTs to advise and assist MOI and its forces over the next year. The STTs will be responsible for day-to-day management of the police advisors while ITAM will be responsible for tracking them. This split in responsibilities was not well coordinated in the past and needs to be effectively managed in the future. Moreover, since DynCorp will be self reporting on the utilization of police advisors, these reports need monitoring to check the validity of the information and to ensure police advisors are productively employed.

A significant challenge ahead will be effectively and efficiently transitioning the police training assistance program from DoD to DoS in 2011. To their credit, the two Departments are working collaboratively on the transfer. However, DoS will be assuming responsibility for the program to advise and assist the police forces when the capabilities of those forces have not been assessed in any comprehensive way.

The long-term success of the Iraqi police training program is dependent on sustainment by the GOI and its ability to mitigate force structure, corruption, land ownership disputes, and other issues adversely impacting the force. DoD and DoS need to continue to work with GOI officials to help them address these problems.

Recommendations

Because DoS is to assume responsibility for the Iraqi police training program, and a comprehensive assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi forces should be a key input for that

continuing effort, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq in consultation with the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, take the following action:

1. Work with the Ministry of Interior to help assess the capabilities of the Iraqi police forces and provide that assessment to INL.

Because DoD will continue to manage the program for the next year under a new management structure for police advisors, and because of prior problems with the management and oversight of advisors, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq direct the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission to take the following actions:

2. Provide guidance to the STTs on their roles and responsibilities regarding police advisors.
3. Develop and implement procedures to periodically check the validity of the information received from DynCorp by comparing daily activity reports to summary information from those reports.
4. Monitor the activity reports to ensure that police advisors are productively employed and, if advisors are underemployed, seek corrective actions.

Lessons Learned

DoD's experiences in the Iraqi police training program provide invaluable lessons learned that should be captured and applied in other contingencies, such as Afghanistan. Specifically, it needs to consider the adequacy of (1) its planning for and assessments of the training program, (2) guidance to organizations implementing the program, and (3) management and oversight of police advisors.

Management Comments and Audit Response

USF-I and the Department of the Army Office of the Provost Marshal General provided SIGIR with written comments. Both concurred with SIGIR's recommendations. In addition, USF-I and INL provided technical comments that SIGIR addressed where appropriate.

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

Scope and Methodology

In September 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 9028 to assess the program to train Iraq's police forces. This report examines the police training program outcomes, the Department of Defense's (DoD) management and oversight of the program, status of the program's transfer from DoD to the Department of State (DoS), and issues facing the Government of Iraq (GOI) that impact the capability and effectiveness of the police forces. SIGIR performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from September 2009 through August 2010 in Baghdad and other locations in Iraq and the Washington, D.C. area.

Our audit was adversely impacted by incomplete files and the lack of historical knowledge of the program by U.S. military personnel. Frequent turnover of personnel and poor records management have often been cited by SIGIR in past audits as program management weaknesses.

To determine the outcomes of the police training program, SIGIR requested from military organizations in Iraq evidence of program outcomes. We obtained briefing slides and other documents which showed such information as numbers and types of police trained and number and type of training facilities. We interviewed program officials at the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM), the 49th Military Police Brigade, and Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). We also interviewed officials with DynCorp and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI). We visited training centers and colleges in Baghdad, Basrah, and Kirkuk. At the centers, we observed classroom instructions, training exercises, exams, graduations, and assembly formations. We interviewed police training team members, including U.S. Military Police and police advisors. We interviewed Iraqis at the training centers, provincial headquarters, and police stations.

To evaluate DoD's management and oversight of the program, SIGIR requested from U.S. Central Command and military organizations in Iraq the information they had on plans relating to the police training program. We interviewed ITAM and 49th Military Police Brigade officials to discuss available planning documents. We reviewed available documentation of plans and assessments that were used throughout the history of the program. We also attended the police training team conference on April 1 and 2, 2010.

To determine coordination and communication among program management elements, SIGIR requested copies of instructions and guidance issued to performing organizations. We reviewed documents provided to organizations and individuals participating in the program. We also interviewed ITAM and 49th Military Police Brigade officials to discuss roles, responsibilities, and coordination between the organizations. We also discussed actions to correct problems with coordination and communications.

To determine program transition status, we discussed with ITAM and INL officials efforts underway to plan for the transfer from DoD to DoS. We obtained and analyzed documents describing those efforts.

In performing our work, we were told of issues facing the Government of Iraq. We reviewed available reports concerning those issues.

We conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Use of Computer-processed Data

The computer processed data we obtained was not critical to our findings, conclusions, or recommendations. Therefore, we did not test the accuracy of the data because it was used for background purposes only.

Internal Controls

We reviewed the specific controls used by DoD organizations to manage the program. The report identifies weaknesses in those controls.

Prior Coverage

We reviewed the following reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability Office, Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors' Office of Inspector General, and Department of Defense's Office of the Inspector General.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State's Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program, SIGIR 10-008, 1/25/2010.

The U.S. Has Reduced Its Funding for the Iraqi Security Forces, but Continued Support Will Likely Be Necessary, SIGIR 09-012, 1/26/2009.

Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue, SIGIR 09-002, 10/21/2008.

Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security Forces Infrastructure Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains, SIGIR 08-022, 7/26/2008.

Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, SIGIR 08-015, 4/25/2008.

Progress on Recommended Improvements to Contract Administration for the Iraqi Police Training Program, SIGIR 08-014, 4/22/2008.

Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program, SIGIR 07-016, 10/23/2007.

Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support, SIGIR 06-029, 1/30/2007.

Government Accountability Office

Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Assessment of Iraqi Security Forces' Units as Independent Not Clear Because ISF Support Capabilities Are Not Fully Developed, GAO-08-143R, 11/30/2007.

Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issue for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP, 1/2007.

Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation, GAO-06-1094T, 9/11/2006.

U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General and U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General

Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training, Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72 and Department of Defense Report No. IE-2005-002, 7/15/2005.

Appendix B—Acronyms

Acronym	Description
DCG-A&T	Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GOI	Government of Iraq
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
ITAM	Iraq Training and Advisory Mission
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MP	Military Police
PSMR	Police Station Monthly Reports
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
STT	Stability Transition Team
USF-I	U.S. Forces-Iraq

Appendix C—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include:

Meredith P. Baumeister

Michael A. Bianco

Art Granger

W. Dan Haigler, Jr.

Nancee K. Needham

Robert L. Pelletier

Nadia Shamari

William E. Shimp

Appendix D—Management Comments



REPLY TO:
ATTENTION OF

IRAQ TRAINING AND ADVISORY MISSION
UNITED STATES FORCES- IRAQ
UNION III, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09348

12 October 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: SIGIR Draft Report (CT-1004-001) "Iraqi Security Forces: Police Training Program Developed Sizeable Force, But Capabilities are Unknown"

1. (CT-1004-001) requested that ITAM Directorate review the SIGIR Draft Report and respond to report recommendations utilizing a prescribed response shell. ITAM Directorate was also required to provide and other technical comments, as required, and have the responses approved by at least an O-6 on official letterhead.
2. A review of the SIGIR Draft Report was conducted, and the following recommendations are submitted: (see below)

CONCUR/ NON-CONCUR


MARIA R. GERVAIS
Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff, ITAM

**SIGIR DRAFT REPORT
11-003**

**"IRAQI SECURITY FORCES: POLICE TRAINING PROGRAM DEVELOPED SIZEABLE
FORCE, BUT CAPABILITIES ARE UNKNOWN"**

**COMMENTS
TO THE DRAFT REPORT
(see page 35 of the draft report)**

Because DoS is to assume responsibility for the Iraqi police training program and a comprehensive assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi forces should be a key input for that continuing effort, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, take the following action:

1. Work with the Ministry of Interior to help assess the capabilities of the Iraqi police forces and provide that assessment to INL.

Because DoD will continue to manage the program for the next year under a new management structure for police advisors, and because of prior problems with the management and oversight of advisors, SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq direct the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission to take the following actions:

2. Provide guidance to the STTs on their roles and responsibilities regarding police advisors.
3. Develop and implement procedures to periodically check the validity of the information received from DynCorp by comparing daily activity reports to summary information from those reports.
4. Monitor the activity reports to ensure that police advisors are productively employed and, if advisors are underemployed, seek corrective actions.

USF-I RESPONSE: for each recommendation 1-4, state if USF-I concurs/partially concurs/non-concurs with information provided in this report. (If you partially or non-concur, briefly summarize why and provide supporting documentation. Specific, line-by-line corrections, clarifications should be listed in the general comments section.) Provide completion dates for corrective actions as required.

=====

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. (U) Page 30. Recommend the following changes to paragraphs:

(Para 1)

ITAM plans to transfer the police training assistance program to INL on October 1, 2011. In preparation for that transfer ~~and to accommodate INL's planned smaller program,~~ "in coordination with USF-I's drawdown in personnel, and to posture for the transition of the mission to INL;" ITAM plans to reduce the number and locations of police advisors "over time" and concentrate its assistance on helping the Iraqi police develop managerial, administrative, and specialized policing skills. ~~For example, ITAM plans to gradually reduce its operating sites to three and "By October 2011, INL will be Full Operational Capability in three operating sites and" concentrate its assistance at training academies and provincial~~

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headquarters levels. Although INL is planning for a downsized assistance program "this program is downsized from INL's initial plans," its total projected start-up and operational costs are about \$832 million for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 combined. A large part of that cost will be for security and logistics support.

Transition Planning Underway by DoD and DoS

(Para 2)

ITAM and INL representatives brief the USF-I Commanding General monthly on the October 1, 2011, transition status. The briefings identify various transition tasks with associated risks and planned action. Both organizations expressed satisfaction with the coordination process. To improve coordination, ITAM "INL" has added two INL directors to its "at ITAM's" police training headquarters and INL "ITAM" has added a military planning officer at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

(Para 3)

During the period leading up to the transfer, DoD plans to draw down its more extensive program to meet INL's planned program level. At the time we completed our field work in July 2010, USF-I was consolidating its police advisors into STTs "Civilian Police Training Teams (CPTT) and Training Center Support Teams (TCST)". By September 2010, it planned to have all STTs consolidated at six regional training centers supported by Advise and Assist Brigades. According to an ITAM official, "the police advisors are TACON" to the Advise and Assist Brigades "will have day-to-day operational authority over the police advisors but "remain OPCON" to ITAM "who" will be providing overall guidance and will monitor their location and utilization. Each brigade is to "ITAM, in coordination with the USDs, will" determine the specialized skills required of its advisors and how many advisors it needs to complete the mission in its region.

(Para 4)

An ITAM official stated that each Advise and Assist Brigade will have a military police unit. The brigades will be responsible for providing the police advisors with protection, movement, and logistical support. "As part of the USF-I drawdown," that organizational structure "will gradually shrink and the CPAs will transition again" from the six regional centers to three locations in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil by October 1, 2011. At the transition, INL will be responsible for providing protection, transportation, and logistical support. At this point, INL plans to use DoS-contracted security and logistics personnel.

The following comments were provided to SIGIR during initial draft screening, but were not incorporated into latest edition:

2. (U) Page 16. ITAM Police submitted the following revision to paragraph supporting figure on page 16 of current draft, but did not get incorporated:

"ITAM Police provided guidance and advice to the Iraqi MOI Technical Qualifications Institute (TQI) through the ITAM-Police TQI training team. All curriculum and training undergoes an MOI review process at the TQI. The TQI -TT provides SMEs and advises the process. MOI has over 92 approved curriculum courses including specialized courses for all police services. This curriculum is the only approved police training instructional material recognized by MOI and authorized to be taught at the Provincial Training Centers. The MOI

approved curriculum helps ensure all police training in the 15 MOI controlled provinces is standardized.¹ Table 6 provides examples of these courses and their length.”

3. (U) Page 17. ITAM Police submitted the following revision to paragraph on page 17 that was not incorporated into latest edition of SIGIR draft:

“ITAM has encouraged MOI to include the Kurdistan police in joint training. For example, the Kurdistan police forces from the KRG are included in classes at the Baghdad Police College.”

4. (U) Page 25. ITAM Police submitted the following comments regarding ‘Program Lacked a Comprehensive Plan with Goals and Objectives and Metrics to Measure Progress’ section, but were not incorporated into latest edition:

“Over the course of the past two years, ITAM and the MOI Joint Assessment Team (JAT) has collaboratively developed and implemented a comprehensive Iraqi Police Service training center performance and operational capabilities assessment rubrics/matrix process. On 24 February 2010, MOI Deputy Minister Ayden officially sanctioned the training center assessment process and compelled all IPS training venues to begin utilization. On 1 Jun 2010, the MOI-JAT team assumed full operational responsibility and control for utilizing this assessment matrix to determine the performance capabilities of their 39 IPS training facilities. In late September 2010, the MOI-JAT team will perform their first independent assessment of an IPS training facility. This independent assessment will be performed at the Habbaniyah IPS training center in the Al Anbar province.

Beginning in late December 2009, the ITAM and MOI-TQI jointly performed four training center assessments. The MOI-TQI JAT team modified the JAT assessment reporting documents so they align with Iraqi operational standards and expectations. On 1 Jun 2010 the MOI-TQI finalized their version of the JAT assessment process and began independent implementation.

The MOI-TQI JAT has a secondary objective to identify IPS training venues that they lack the ability to support, are under utilized by the provincial IPS and those that are not performing to established expectations. Once the MOI-TQI JAT assessment team identifies these training venues that are under-performing, the team will provide direction and guidance to the training leadership and staff to encourage improvement. A follow up assessment will be performed to determine if the performance or operational capabilities have improved, if not a recommendation will be made to the MOI for further corrective action or for the training venue to cease operations.”

APPROVED BY:
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Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff, ITAM Director
SVOIP:243-1849

PREPARED BY:
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CIV
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
2800 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2800

DAPM-MPO

OCT 20 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITS, 400 ARMY
NAVY DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22202

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Forces Police Training Program (SIGIR 11-003)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report assessing DoD management of the Iraq Police Service (IPS) program.
2. As the Multi National Corps-Iraq Provost Marshal during 2006-2007, I have personally managed the close coordination needed among multiple Iraqi and U.S. participants to train, assess, and resource Iraq police capabilities and to oversee the program's police training advisors. The SIGIR report generally depicts many of the challenges of providing effective program oversight among multiple DoD and interagency organizations responsible for various segments of the program.
3. The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) concurs with the broad SIGIR findings and recommended actions for the Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq to take in preparation for the upcoming police training program transition from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. The report could have assisted USF-I by better capturing the breadth and complexity of specialized training requirements within police organizations and the inherent linkages and parallel development necessary across an integrated Justice or Rule of Law program. There would be additional value to DoD in assessing the policing skill-set of the military personnel used to support this program through its phases, beyond the one brigade cited; specifically comparing the relative impact of using senior military police officers with officers without a background in police organization and services at the National and Provincial police headquarters level.
4. Points of contact for this action are COL Kevin Palgutt at (703) 693-9478 and MAJ David Christy at (703) 692-5488.

COLLEEN L. MCGUIRE
Brigadier General, USA
Provost Marshal General

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information

SIGIR’s Mission	Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective: • oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations • advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness • deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse • information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people through Quarterly Reports
Obtaining Copies of SIGIR Reports and Testimonies	To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil).
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Programs	Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: • Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html • Phone: 703-602-4063 • Toll Free: 866-301-2003
Congressional Affairs	Hillel Weinberg Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4704 Phone: 703-428-1059 Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil
Public Affairs	Deborah Horan Director of Public Affairs Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 400 Army Navy Drive Arlington, VA 22202-4704 Phone: 703-428-1217 Fax: 703-428-0817 Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil
