Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years
Abstract
The previously published RAND monograph Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in COIN. One of the core findings of that effort was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 good factors or practices minus 12 bad factors or practices perfectly predicted case outcomes in the data. Cases in which COIN forces were able to maximize the presence of good factors and minimize the presence of bad factors resulted in COIN force success. Specifically, cases with a good-minus-bad score of +5 or greater were always won by the government, and cases with a good-minus-bad score of zero or lower were always won by the insurgents.1 The current research effort involved developing and conducting an expert elicitation exercise to complete the scorecard for operations in Afghanistan in early 2011. A panel of 11 experts on Afghanistan were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the scorecard factors. Based on consensus results for the scorecard, early 2011 Afghanistan scores +3.5. This score is lower than the lowest-scoring COIN win in the past 30 years (which was +5), but it is higher than the highest-scoring loss (which was 0). This highlighted that certain factors are absent whose presence would likely increase the prospects for success.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA545973
Entities
People
- Christopher Edward Paul
Organizations
- RAND Corporation