

Procedural Control: The Future of the Provincial Reconstruction Team

**A Monograph
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Abstract

PROCEDURAL CONTROL: THE FUTURE OF THE PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM, SAMS MONOGRAPH by LCDR Marc E. Davis, US NAVY, 48 pages.

President Karzai, in his February 2011 speech to the Munich Security Conference, argued that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) have performed below expectations due to conflicts in goals and coordination among the various organizations, specifically among parallel PRT command and control structures. These parallel command and control structures resulted in major command and control issues. The issues were a lack of flexibility and coordination, which counter the two command and control tenets of timeliness and coordination. The doctrine on positive control however, stressed the flexibility and coordination benefits of this method. The apparent failure of the PRT control method (positive control) to correct these command and control issues raised questions about the effectiveness of the positive control method.

The ballistic missile defense (BMD) structure used the other control method (procedural control) to resolve issues associated with parallel command and control structures. The BMD structure used this method to provide flexibility to react to multiple priorities and provide seamless coordination during changes in these priorities. Since the ballistic missile defense structure also has parallel command structures, yet inflexibility and lack of coordination do not appear prevalent in this structure, can the ballistic missile defense control method (procedural control) be used to correct some of the PRT command and control issues?

The study concluded that the use of procedural control (BMD) may successfully resolve the PRT's command and control issues of flexibility and coordination. These two issues were not solved by the use of positive control (PRT), as discovered by the analysis of successful command and control tenets. The prescriptive nature of positive control (PRT) hindered the flexibility and coordination necessary to overcome these issues. The descriptive nature of procedural control (BMD), on the other hand, minimized the effect of these issues and proved capable of resolving these issues within its parallel structure.

In order to understand the scope of the problem, it was necessary to examine the PRT and BMD structure. The PRT review focused on the command and control structure and described the parallel structure of the PRT. Since the flexibility and coordination issues noted within the PRT's command and control structure appeared to counter the two command and control tenets, the criteria of "flexibility" and "coordination" were used to evaluate the control performance. To support the comparison, these two criteria focused the review of the BMD command and control structure on flexibility and coordination among partners. This study compared the critical findings from the PRT section and the BMD section to determine whether the use of procedural control (BMD) improved the command and control issues experienced by the PRTs.

Based on this conclusion, procedural control (BMD) should be the preferred method to direct future PRTs. If this type of control had been used in directing the PRTs in Afghanistan, the PRTs would have had greater success. This finding is important to senior leaders because it provides an option when dealing with parallel structures. Simplifying these structures may not always be feasible, so it is important to value procedural control as a method that improves command and control flexibility and coordination in complex environments.

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Introduction

Achieving our 2015 vision depends on our total national commitment to building an effective state and an inclusive economic, social and political order. While our international partners have been generous with their assistance, our efforts have not always been goal oriented, coordinated or reinforced across the security, governance and development domains. We have both made mistakes. As the success of the security transition depends upon building the institutions of a state bound by rule of law, we must judge all our efforts by whether they are enhancing the capability and effectiveness of the Afghan state, or if they are actually reducing its capability.¹

President Hamid H.E. Karzai's speech at the 47th Munich Security Conference in February 2011 addressed the issues facing the Afghan-international team. President Karzai acknowledged the importance of building security, governance and development in stabilizing a country, yet stressed the importance of strengthening the Afghan government. President Karzai's speech touched upon the parallel structures of the PRTs, which undermine the authority of the Afghan government. He argued that the PRTs have performed below expectations due to conflicts in goals and coordination among the various organizations, specifically among parallel PRT command and control structures. Therefore, he advised transferring the PRT mission to an Afghan centric organization or removing them altogether. President Karzai's assessment of the PRTs is important, because it identified critical shortfalls of the PRT command and control structure. The parallel structure for any future reconstruction program is a necessary evil based on the complexities of the national and international environment. Instead of focusing on

¹Hamid H.E. Karzai, "Statement by H.E. Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan At the 47th Munich Security Conference." Afghan Mission NY, 06 February 2011. http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2011/02/statement-by-his-excellency-hamid-karzai-president-of-the-islamic-republic-of-afghanistan-at-the-47th-munich-security-conference-msc/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PermanentMissionOfAfghanistanToTheUnInNewYork+%28Permanent+Mission+of+Afghanistan+to+the+UN+in+New+York%29 (accessed on 18 February 2011), 3-4.

eliminating these structures, it is more valuable to identify control methods that improve these types of structures. If a better control method was used to direct the U.S. led Afghanistan PRTs, the dramatic action of removing them entirely would not be necessary.²

Background

The parallel PRT command and control structures resulted from multiple organizations involved in the PRT mission.³ These organizations included the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United States Department of Defense (DoD), United States Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and various other agencies. The requirement to work for multiple leaders, with different priorities and views, within a single mission, generated multiple parallel chains of command. The presence of parallel chain of command frequently caused civil to military and military to military command and control issues. The command and control issues in the PRTs were documented in several congressional reports. They included failure of unity of effort, unity of coordination and unity of design. Since no cross-agency method of dealing with

²Karzai, "Statement by H.E. Hamid Karzai," 4-5; Joshua Foust, "Actually, Karzai is Right About PRTs." *Foreign Policy*, 08 February 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/08/actually_karzai_is_right_about_prts (accessed on 18 February 2011). Of the 26 PRTs currently in Afghanistan, only ten are U.S. led.

³Parallel chains of command are the presence of multiple simultaneous structures, which direct and supervise the missions of the PRT. *Joint Publication 1-02* defines parallel chains of command as "a parallel system of command...wherein corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of all components to facilitate coordinated planning for, and execution of...operation." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, *Joint Publication 1-02*, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 2011), 277.

these issues existed, the PRTs relied on personal relationships between coordinating components to resolve disagreements rather than a control method.⁴

The major command and control issues experienced by the PRTs were a result of the parallel command and control structures. The lack of unity of effort resulted from a lack of consensus in priorities and a lack of coordination within the command and control structure above the PRT. Because the PRT's mission focused on governance, reconstruction and security, it was important to identify the priority between these areas to focus the PRT's efforts. Without a consensus on these priorities, a lack of coordination resulted from stakeholders who were in disagreement. Though consensus of the priorities would resolve many of the command and control issues above the PRT, the nature of a structure with multiple stakeholders, limited the ability to achieve full consensus.⁵ Therefore, it was important for the PRT to be capable of shifting from one priority to another in a timely manner while maintaining a high level of coordination with other stakeholders.⁶ The lack of unity of coordination resulted from a lack of achieving

⁴Robert M. Perito, "The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation," US Institute of Peace, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI101807/Perito_Testimony101807.pdf (accessed on 11 November 2010), 5-6; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook*, Edition 4, <https://www.cimicweb.org/Lists/PRT%20Handbook/AllItems.aspx> (accessed on 20 October 2010), 21, 94-96; Joseph A. Christoff, "GAO-09-86R Provincial Reconstruction Teams," U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC. <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R> (accessed on 18 November 2010), 8; Ryan Brewster, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Interviewed by author, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 05 January 2011. Mr. Brewster served on multiple PRTs in Afghanistan.

⁵Stakeholders in this monograph refer to organizations that have direct authority over the PRTs missions.

⁶U.S. House of Representatives, "Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," (Washington,

consensus on the priorities, which the current structure did not stress. The major command and control issues discussed above can really be narrowed down to a lack of flexibility and lack of coordination. A critical component of a command and control structure is the control method designed to mitigate issues such as flexibility and coordination.⁷

Doctrine and Theory

Several theorists identified two methods of control throughout history, prescriptive control and descriptive control.⁸ The U.S. military identifies two methods as well, positive control and procedural control. The theorists used the terms prescriptive and descriptive control to refer to the ideas of positive and procedural control respectively. U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy doctrine documented the advantages and disadvantages of both positive and procedural control.

Theorists postulated that prescriptive (positive) methods of control could have negative effects on operations. Aleksandr Svechin, in his book, *Strategy*, explained that the methods of command for the Soviets relied primarily on direction (procedural control) vice directives (positive control). Directives were prescriptive orders, while direction, consisting of “guidelines and advice,” was descriptive in nature. Svechin argued that this method of control provided the flexibility necessary to adapt quickly to

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2009), http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2010); Ryan Brewster interview.

⁷U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes,” Perito, “The US Experience,” 5-6; *ISAF PRT Handbook*, 21; Christoff, “GAO-09-86R,” 8.

⁸The theorists which will be discussed are Aleksandr A. Svechin, Shimon Naveh and Edward A. Smith and their views regarding prescriptive and descriptive control.

the changing situation. He also noted that this method of direction was the preferred method, but required well-trained subordinates. Therefore a certain amount of risk was accepted and mitigated by training subordinates to operate in this manner. Shimon Naveh, in his book *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, argued that in the Soviet Union during World War II, “Deep Theory” subordinate commanders operated, not in a prescriptive (positive) environment, but in a descriptive (procedural) environment consisting of rules, which the commanders could operate within to achieve the aim of their senior commanders. He also stressed that the Soviet method placed synchronization and coordination as a key element of this descriptive environment. Edward Smith, in his book *Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War*, argued that “efficiency is as much a function of how we organize, train, and equip our forces as it is of how the information flows.” This concept stated that for a command and control method to be successful, information and tasking must flow quickly, with as little impediments as possible.⁹

Theorists supported a descriptive (procedural) method of control instead of prescriptive (positive) method because of several advantages, specifically flexibility and coordination. Though PRTs were not around when the theorists wrote, the main thrust of their arguments was that military operations are enhanced through descriptive methods of control. The theorists’ view begs professionals to wonder whether the prescriptive method of positive control used to direct the PRTs is the most useful.

⁹Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, Edited by Kent D. Lee, (Minneapolis: East View Publications, first published in 1927, edited 1992), 327; Shimon Naveh, *In the Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 232-3; Edward A. Smith, *Effects Based Operation: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and Conflict*, (Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 2002), 83.

While theorists tended to be in agreement regarding prescriptive (positive) and descriptive (procedural) control, U.S. doctrine contained contradictory views on positive and procedural control. Positive control, defined by *Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, is “a technique of regulating force that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them.” Simply stated, positive control is the command and control method in which units execute specific tasks delineated by the commander, and guidance is prescriptive in nature. This method stressed the need for approval from senior leadership before taking new actions allowing the commanders the greatest amount of flexibility. This method also attempted to improve coordination among all subordinate units. As a result, the Army recommends positive control to deal with complex realities during military operations, because it gives the commander control to direct the operations.¹⁰

Air Force and Navy doctrines highlighted the disadvantages of positive control. *Command and Control, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8* and *Naval Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control* noted that positive control requires direct control by a commander.¹¹ This direct control required senior leadership approval, effectively slowing down the command and control process. In an environment requiring

¹⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, August 2003, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2003), 3-21.

¹¹U.S. Department of the Air Force, *Command and Control, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8*, 01 June 2007, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 June 2007); U.S. Department of the Navy, *Navy Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19 May 1995). *Command and Control, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-8* is the publication that directs the Air Force command and control method. *Naval Doctrine Publication 6, Naval Command and Control* is the publication that directs the Navy command and control.

flexibility and speed, the Air Force and Navy doctrines expressed the negative impact of this type of control on operations and did not recommend it.¹²

Alternatively, the Air Force and Navy doctrines discussed the advantages of procedural control. Air Force doctrine recognized the need to provide subordinate commanders procedures and guidelines to facilitate rapid execution of actions within the commander's intent. The Navy's *Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 6, Naval Command and Control*, also recommended procedural control as the preferred method of command and control, which is in line with the Air Force's method. Navy doctrine identified an advantage of procedural control as flexibility to adapt to changing threats with minimal input from senior leaders. The doctrine expressed the need for this flexibility in order to improve response time. In addition it identified this method of control as an improved process to ensure coordination at all levels, minimizing confusion and delay. As a result, the Air Force and Navy doctrines recommended the use of procedural control for its forces.¹³

The Army doctrine highlighted the disadvantages of procedural control. Procedural control was defined by *FM 6-0* as "a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures." Army doctrine stressed the inflexible and restrictive nature of procedural control, based on limitations and constraints of a procedure. This understanding opposed the Air Force and Navy views. The different views, between the services, on positive and

¹²U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Countering Air and Missile Threats. Joint Publication 3-01*, (Washington, DC: DoD Printing, February 5, 2007), I-11; *AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*; *FM 6-0*, 3- 20, 3-21, ch3.

¹³*AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*.

procedural control reflected a cultural bias.¹⁴ The recommendations of the service specific doctrine are important because they explained the control method tendencies of each service.¹⁵

Despite the difference of opinion between service doctrine and theorists regarding positive (prescriptive) and procedural (descriptive) control, it was important to recognize the commonly agreed upon attributes of a successful command and control method.

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 identified timely decision-making and coordination mechanisms as command and control tenets. Timely decision-making resulted in a “quicker tempo of operations and gain a decided military advantage” and decision-making should be flexible to allow for timely decisions.

Coordination mechanisms “facilitate integration, synchronization, and synergistic

¹⁴The cultural bias between the services, though not easy to explain, resulted from a difference in training. Though important to note this difference, the specifics of this argument are not critical to the current discussion.

¹⁵*JP 3-01*, I-11; *AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*; *FM 6-0*, 3-20, 3-21, ch3. The use of centralized control and de-centralized execution is fairly standard across the U.S. military services. The U.S. Army *Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* also discusses the use of centralized control and de-centralized execution. The U.S. Army’s *Field Manual 6-0* describes the concept called procedural control in greater detail in chapter 3. The Army describes two types of control in this chapter, positive control and procedural control. Positive control defined by *Field Manual 6-0* as “a technique of regulating force that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them.” Procedural control defined by the same publication as “a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.” The Air Force and Navy’s doctrine and procedures support the Army’s definition of procedural control. The *Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-8, Air Forces Command and Control*, and the Navy’s *Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 6, Naval Command and Control*, explains their versions of procedural control, a term only found in Army doctrine. The Air Force does not specify categories of control; they just refer to the concept of centralized control and de-centralized execution using procedures to improve reaction time by subordinates. The Navy discusses procedural and positive control, but defines it as mission control and detailed control respectively. Throughout this study control will be discussed using the Army terms of procedural and positive control, for simplicity. Both the Air Force and the Navy doctrine support the idea of procedural control.

interaction” within a command and control structure. Timeliness and coordination of a command and control structure were useful methods to evaluate the effectiveness of a control method. Though the services disagreed on which is the preferred method, the command and control tenets of a successful control method remained constant.¹⁶

The flexibility and coordination issues noted within the PRT’s command and control structure appeared to counter the two command and control tenets. The lack of flexibility hindered the ability for timely decision-making, slowing the speed of action of the PRT. The lack of coordination identified the need for better coordination mechanisms to improve the command and control efficiency. These issues, identified as command and control tenets within U.S. military doctrine, are overcome by the use of a control method. The apparent failure of the PRT control method to correct the command and control issues, questioned the effectiveness of the control method. The prescriptive method of control was used to direct PRT action in Afghanistan. This form of control, recommended by Army doctrine, appeared to unsuccessfully achieve the tenets of command and control within the PRT structure.¹⁷ The other type of control, procedural control, claimed to achieve the tenets of command and control. But does procedural control resolve flexibility and coordination issues, or does it fail in effectiveness as well?

¹⁶U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Services of the United States, Joint Publication 1*, (Washington, DC: DoD Printing, March 20, 2009), IV-16-17; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0*, (Washington, DC: DoD Printing, March 22, 2010), III-3; *JP 3-01*, I-11; *AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*; *FM 6-0*, 3-20, 3-21, ch3.

¹⁷*JP 1*, IV-16-17; U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes;” Ryan Brewster interview; Perito, “The US Experience,” 5-6; *FM 6-0*, 3-20, 3-21, ch3.

To answer this question the ballistic missile defense example of procedural control was used as a comparison tool.¹⁸

The joint ballistic missile defense command and control structure used procedural control. The ballistic missile defense structure used this method to resolve issues associated with parallel command and control structures. The ballistic missile defense structure used procedural control to provide flexibility to react to multiple priorities and provided seamless coordination during changes in these priorities. The flexibility of this procedure-based command and control structure attempted to cover various tactical tasks within one operational mission.¹⁹ To facilitate and limit the scope of the research, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ballistic missile defense (BMD) structure was selected as a comparison.²⁰ The BMD command and control structure within PACOM inherently caused varying priorities and lack of coordination due to the presence of parallel command and control structures. Much of the PACOM BMD research written before 2007 discussed the difficulties associated with not having one clear chain of command, a result of the parallel structures. Having parallel chains of command is inherently more complicated than a single chain of command. The multiple combatant commanders, foreign partners and services involved each have their own priorities and must coordinate

¹⁸*JP 1*, IV-16-17; *JP 3-0*, III-3; *JP 3-01*, I-11; *AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*; *FM 6-0*, 3-20, 3-21, ch3.

¹⁹Functional area refers to a strategic mission with multiple tactical missions associated.

²⁰PACOM was chosen because its geographic area of responsibility provided the most complicated BMD command and control structure, resulting from the need to coordinate with other combatant commanders and foreign partners serves as a better comparison with the PRT structure.

with multiple stakeholders. These key similarities between the BMD structure and the PRT structure supported the comparison value of this study.²¹

Problem and Hypothesis

The presence of parallel command structures to direct the PRTs in Afghanistan caused inflexibility and a lack of coordination. The PRT control method (positive control) does not appear to solve the PRT command and control issues. The ballistic missile defense structure also has parallel command structures, yet conflicting priorities and lack of coordination do not appear prevalent in this structure. Can the ballistic missile defense control method (procedural control) be used to correct some of the command and control issues of the PRT? This study argues that by changing the U.S. led PRTs' in Afghanistan control method, the U.S. military can resolve the command and control issues experienced in Afghanistan. Despite the common view that further coordination at various levels will solve this problem, this study argues that the use of the current ballistic missile defense control method (procedural control) might solve some of the Afghanistan PRT command and control issues.²²

²¹Daniel P. Sauter III, "Global Missile Defense: Time to Change the Current Command Construct," (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 26, 2009); LCDR Dwight Davis, Pacific Afloat Training Group, Hawaii, Interviewed by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 10 January 2011. LCDR Dwight Davis monitors training of all U.S. Pacific Command naval BMD assets. The similarities of the structures are based on the complicated nature of the PRT and BMD structure. Both structures have parallel command and control structures, multiple priorities or missions, and require a great deal of coordination to successfully complete missions.

²²*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 21-22.

Methodology and Structure

In order to understand the scope of the problem, it was necessary to examine the command and control aspects of the PRT in the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Command and Control section. This review focused on the command and control structure and described the parallel structure of the PRT. This study only focused on the U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan to increase the value of the conclusions to U.S. military leaders. The identification of the PRT issues of flexibility and coordination was a critical finding. The argument then focused on the management of the PRT through positive control. The research supported the finding that positive control did not appear to minimize the flexibility or coordination issues, despite doctrinal views. To support this finding, it was necessary to analyze the PRT structure with two criteria of “flexibility” and “coordination”. These criteria tied the successful attributes identified in doctrine with the command and control issues experienced within the PRT. The analysis revealed that positive control might be unsuccessful in minimizing flexibility and coordination issues within the PRT command and control structure.

The two criteria of the analysis, “flexibility” and “coordination,” linked two tenets of command and control to the issues of PRT command and control. The first criteria, “flexibility,” defined as the ability of the command and control structure to shift between priorities based on tactical task requirements, quantified the timeliness of the PRT to adapt. Since timeliness could mitigate priority consensus issues in a parallel structure this criteria was selected. “Flexibility” in shifting priorities was analyzed by time, based on the speed of the structures’ ability to shift to another priority. In September of 2010, Capt. Tristan Hinderliter, a U.S. Air Force public affairs officer stationed with a PRT in

Lagham province, identified the need for this flexibility. He explained the importance of being able to shift between tasks quickly and effortlessly. For example, PRT members alternated between building footbridges across rivers (reconstruction) and building stability (security) within the Lagham province. The second criteria “coordination,” defined as the ability to synchronize efforts between partners when priorities shift, qualitatively compared PRT and BMD missions. Because each mission was completed using various protocol, examining the effectiveness of successful “coordination” methods was key.²³

To support the comparison, these two criteria focused the review of the BMD command and control structure on priority flexibility and coordination among partners. The Pacific Command Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control section began with a general review of the structure, which provided the groundwork for the analysis and identified the inherent issues with the parallel structure. Reviewing the control method of the BMD structure (procedural control) revealed that the issues with the parallel structure appeared to be overcome. The analysis of the BMD structure using the “flexibility” and “coordination” criteria supported this assessment.

This study compared the critical findings from the PRT section and the BMD section to determine whether the use of procedural control (BMD) improved the PRT command and control issues. The current PRT control method of positive control did not appear to mitigate the PRT command and control issues of flexibility and coordination. These issues, critical to the successful operation of the PRTs, must be resolved to

²³Capt. Tristan Hinderliter, DOD Live Blog, <http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2010/08/wednesday-warfighter-what-is-a-provincial-reconstruction-team/> (accessed on 05 February 2011).

improve the success of the PRTs in Afghanistan. Other control methods existed, specifically procedural control, which may alleviate the same issues in the similar BMD structure. Focus on the control method of the PRTs and the possibility of other successful methods, such as procedural control, might resolve the current issues experienced by the PRTs in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team Command and Control

The Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) appeared unable to complete projects efficiently because of the control methodology in use. The command and control structure of the PRTs in Afghanistan revealed the complicated nature of parallel command structures, which the control methodology must overcome. The PRT control method (positive control), supported by current U.S. Army doctrine, was hailed as a flexible and adaptive method of control. Examples of the PRTs using this method portrayed a different view. The analysis of positive control, in controlling the PRTs, revealed the inflexibility and lack of coordination of this method.²⁴

Structure

It was impossible to frame the correct command and control issues of the Afghanistan PRTs without an understanding of the structure. Knowing the purpose and mission of the PRTs was necessary before any discussion of the current structure occurred. Only then was a review focused on the PRT command and control structure, including the major organizations above the PRT, valuable to the argument. In order to

²⁴*FM 6-0*, ch 3.

simplify the discussion of the PRT command and control structure, the PRT structure was discussed first, followed by the organizations above the PRT. Identifying the organizations above the PRT helped to appreciate the parallel structures and the type of control used to direct the PRTs.²⁵

The purpose of the PRT was best described by congressional reports. In 2007, Robert Perito, the director of the Security Sector Governance Center in the U.S. Institute of Peace, investigated the PRTs' performance as part of a congressional subcommittee and provided congressional testimonial. According to his report, the purpose of a PRT was to "help extend the authority of the Afghan government into the provinces in order to develop a stable and secure environment, enable security sector reform and economic and social development." According to a 2008 Congressional Study conducted on the PRTs in Afghanistan, only minimal guidance concerning the purpose of the PRTs was available. This lack of specific guidance was an intentional decision to maximize flexibility in a complex environment. The 2008 study noted that senior leaders acknowledged that the lack of specific guidance caused confusion among the PRT members. The specific missions and objectives depended on the PRTs composition and the area in which they operated.²⁶

The mission of the PRTs was simply stated within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Handbook, which quoted the ISAF Operational Plan, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of

²⁵Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan Project, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS)," <http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/provincial-reconstruction-teams-pts> (accessed on 15 November 2010); *ISAF PRT Handbook*, 21, 94-96.

²⁶Perito, "The US Experience;" U.S. House of Representatives, "Agency Stovepipes."

Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.” Though the ISAF role with respect to the PRTs is covered in detail during the review of the PRT chain of command (page 20-22), it was important to note that the ISAF Handbook is the guiding document for all action within all PRTs in Afghanistan. The *ISAF Handbook* attempted to establish “common objectives and increased convergence between the activities of all PRTs.” Under this mission statement, PRTs executed action in three areas or priorities: governance, reconstruction and security.²⁷ Any PRT command and control structure must be capable of completing projects in the three priorities of governance, reconstruction and security.²⁸

The current command and control structure within the PRTs was a mixture of military and civilian leaders in charge of military and civilian personnel. A military commander of a PRT directed the military members, but not the civilian members. The civilian leader of a PRT directed the civilian members who belong to the same agency, but not the other agency civilians or the military personnel. By leaving the organization adjustable, the leaders hoped to provide critical flexibility to adapt to shifting priorities, based on the conditions in the area of operation.²⁹

²⁷Perito, “The US Experience,” 4-5. PRT governance support in Afghanistan consists of working closely with provincial leaders and law enforcement officials. At a minimum they provide financial and logistical assistance. Reconstruction involves projects that improve villages quickly to improve military perception in the area. Security covers defensive force protection capabilities within the region assigned. To increase the security of the region PRTs can only fund local police forces to assist. Perito, 4-5.

²⁸*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 2-3, 1.

²⁹U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes,” Lara Olson, and Gregorian, Hrach, “Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges And Opportunities In Afghanistan And

The actual task organization of the PRTs was best described in *Handbook 07-34*, which was the U.S. version of the *International Security Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook*. This handbook contained a figure (reproduced below as Figure 1) within Appendix B, which displayed the PRT task organization.




Figure 1. PRT Core Task Organization³⁰

The focus on the PRT structure remained at the leader level, since this was critical to understanding the influences and command and control complications affecting the PRT

Beyond,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2007, Vol. 10, Issue 1, www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/34/32 (accessed on 05 February 2011).

³⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *Handbook 07-34, Appendix B*, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-34/annex-b.asp> (accessed on 05 November 2010), 3.

leadership. The Integrated Command Group led the PRT as an integrated leader. Note the four members of the integrated command group; military commander, DoS representative, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). These four leaders are critical to ensuring projects are planned and coordinated among the four agencies. The success of this integrated command group was dependent upon the relationships between these four equally positioned individuals. Lessons learned pointed to the inability of the integrated command group to reach consensus or gain appreciation for supporting agencies. The *ISAF PRT Handbook* supported the necessity of this relationship and emphasized the need for consensus among the command group.³¹

However, the leadership was not that simple. Certain leaders within the integrated command group and their agencies became the lead decision-maker, depending on the focus of the current project. Although this leadership provided a built-in checks and balance system, it also resulted in command and control ambiguity. For example, the PRT DoS leader was the political advisor for governance projects, with DoD in direct support to build capacity. USAID was the lead for reconstruction projects that supported USAID programs, while other departments and agencies were in direct support. If the reconstruction project was not a USAID program, then the agency or group who funded the project became the lead. DoD was the lead for security programs and efforts. In addition, DoD was also the lead for interagency coordination, resulting in a perception of greater authority. USDA served as the lead for programs that develop the agricultural

³¹*Handbook 07-34*, 3; U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes,” *ISAF PRT Handbook*, 23.

capacity of the region. The resulting leadership ambiguity of this structure required a senior chain of command that was responsive to the flexible structure.³²

The PRT chain of command was complicated because the PRT served multiple masters, depending on which agency was in the lead. The command and control elements above the PRT fell into four distinct chains of command, DoD, DoS, USAID and USDA. Each of these agencies, acting as the lead for certain priorities, controlled the actions of the PRTs. Additionally, the Afghanistan government, though given no authority to control, definitely had influential power to shift the PRT priorities. Each of these chains of command and the Afghanistan influence generated parallel chains of command for the PRTs. Though each chain of command was interesting, DoD was the only chain of command compelling to this discussion, because of its role as the lead for interagency coordination.³³

The DoD chain of command directed the military personnel within the PRTs in Afghanistan. The senior DoD commander for Afghanistan was U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM was responsible for all U.S. military action within Afghanistan and reported to the Secretary of Defense. Officially the military leaders in the PRT are directed by CENTCOM and ISAF. The U.S. resolved this dual chain of command by assigning two roles to the ISAF commander; one as the NATO military commander in charge of all PRT action, and two as the senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan. Figure 2, reproduced from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's

³²Christoff, "GAO-09-86R," 8; Olson, "Civil-Military Coordination."

³³Christoff, "GAO-09-86R," 8.

(NATO) ISAF – Afghanistan website, was included to provide clarity to this discussion.




Figure 2. ISAF Upper Command Structure³⁴

ISAF was a NATO controlled force since August 2003 and assumed responsibility of all the PRTs in Afghanistan at the end of 2006. Under the ISAF headquarters is the International Joint Command. The joint command was responsible for directing U.S. and NATO action through the various regions within Afghanistan, yet was a component of the ISAF command. The regions consisted of the regional Command North, South, East, West and Capital. These regional commanders were responsible for directing the PRTs assigned within their region. This military chain of command was effective in directing

³⁴International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan, NATO,
<http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-command-structure.html> (accessed on 30 November 2010).

the PRTs, specifically in regards to security priorities, but proved cumbersome while coordinating with other agencies.³⁵

To resolve the coordination required to implement PRT priorities correctly, ISAF developed management structures. The *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook* discussed the PRT management structure, which is clarified in figure 3. The management structure led by an ambassador/minister level Executive Steering Group was composed of senior civilian representatives from the countries that provide manpower to the PRTs. The group was co-chaired by both the Minister of Interior and the commander of ISAF. The Minister of Interior provided the Afghanistan government interests and the ISAF commander

³⁵*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 2, 94-96; U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes.”

provided the NATO/U.S. interests.




Figure 3. Control of the Afghanistan PRTs.³⁶

The key members of this group were ambassadors (of nations that have troops within the PRTs), the Minister of Finance, Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General, NATO Senior Civilian Representative, and European Union Special Representative. The ambassadors provided their nation's perspective and priorities. The Minister of Finance, responsible for the

³⁶Figure created by monograph author, January 2011. This command and control chart linked the narratives from the *ISAF PRT Handbook*, *Handbook 07-34* and the ISAF – Afghanistan website. The author was unable to find a single source graphic representation that would clarify the direct control and relationships influencing the PRTs in Afghanistan. *ISAF PRT Handbook*, 2, 94-96; *Handbook 07-34*, 3; International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan, NATO.

management and coordination of the international assistance to Afghanistan, provided the priorities established by the Afghan government to the Executive Steering Group. The Minister of Reconstruction and Rural Development, who leads the nation's reconstruction efforts, ensured the PRT actions meet the national objectives. The United Nations, NATO and European Union representatives ensured their organizations interests and priorities were considered through this group.³⁷

The multiple members of the Executive Steering Group, with varying priorities, attempted to establish guidance and priority consensus. The Executive Steering Group “endorses policy notes that give specific guidance on PRT support for certain elements of security sector reform and reconstruction and development.” This management group established the priorities of the PRTs. However, because USAID and USDA were not represented, disagreements about priorities often develop. When consensus was finally established, the PRT priorities were assigned in the form of tasks in one of the three priorities of governance, reconstruction and security. This direction was prescriptive in nature and could only be adjusted by the Executive Steering Group.³⁸

Below the Executive Steering Group were the PRT Working Groups, which “resolve operational issues.” The PRT Working Groups work for the Executive Steering Group to identify issues, projects and information for the Executive Steering Group. In addition, the PRT Working Group acted as the point of contact for the PRTs. The PRTs made proposals to the PRT Working Groups, who then fed the information to the

³⁷*Handbook 07-34*, 1; *ISAF PRT Handbook*, 21; Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance Afghanistan Website, Introduction Page, <http://www.mof.gov.af/> (accessed on 29 January 2011).

³⁸*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 21; Ryan Brewster interview.

Executive Steering Group. Through this structure, the PRTs had limited influence over the Executive Steering Group. The “Head of the PRT Section at the MOI [Ministry of Interior]” led the PRT Working Groups. Members of this group consisted of the ambassadors, Afghanistan government representatives, United Nations representatives and ISAF representatives. Since the members of the integrated command group worked for different departments and agencies, these management groups were established to provide oversight to the PRTs, to reduce the friction and competing interests. This oversight was important in coordinating priorities between the PRTs and with other members of the PRT Working Groups. Once again it was important to note the lack of senior USAID and USDA representatives in the PRT Working Groups. The management structures explained how ISAF attempted to generate consensus regarding priorities, and improve coordination of the PRTs, despite limiting the members of these groups to national level participants.³⁹

A similar concept used by the U.S. government managed and coordinated the priorities of the PRTs. A figure reproduced from Appendix B of the *Handbook 07-34*, included as figure 4, simplified the Afghanistan PRT management structure used by the

³⁹*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 20-22.

U.S. government.




Figure 4. Major U.S. Interagency Afghan assistance Coordination Mechanisms⁴⁰

The Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group is the interagency components designed to coordinate the policies and actions of the PRTs. Under this component were the Department/Agency Offices for Afghanistan and the U.S. Embassy Country Team. Though coordination between these two management groups occurred, consensus was not necessary since each agency could directly control the actions of their agency

⁴⁰Handbook 07-34, 1.

members within the PRT. This coordination effort, though a valiant attempt, possibly limited successful coordination without a specific command and control hierarchy.⁴¹

The command and control structure above the PRT revealed the complicated nature of assigning priorities and developing coordination within parallel command and control structures. The Integrated Command Group of the PRTs provided flexibility and coordination at the PRT level; but the supporting military organizations, ISAF management groups and U.S. government management groups lacked the membership to guarantee priority flexibility and coordination. Though using the two management groups together attempted to resolve these discrepancies, it limited the ability to impose flexibility and coordination. The control method used to direct the PRTs, positive control, may have corrected these concerns.

PRT Control Method

Positive control was the control method used to direct the PRTs in Afghanistan. The use of this method, supported by U.S. Army doctrine, highlighted that flexibility and coordination were attributes of positive control. However, actual experience proved otherwise. Management of the PRT's in Afghanistan illustrated the possible inflexibility and lack of coordination of positive control.

It is not surprising the PRTs use positive control, since this was the recommended method by U.S. Army doctrine, the predominant military presence in Afghanistan. Ryan Brewster, a USDA employee with an expertise in agriculture, was a member of a PRT in the Qandahar province during 2008. His experience was useful in examining the use of

⁴¹*Handbook 07-34, 1; U.S. House of Representatives, "Agency Stovepipes."*

positive control as the primary control method in controlling the PRTs. As a member of multiple previous PRTs, he was familiar with the intricacies of the PRT command and control structure. During his 2008 experience, he assisted the Afghanistan government in improving its knowledge and expertise in solving agriculture issues. His project to assist the government and some locals was similar to the projects he had completed in the past, some within the same province of Qandahar. However, despite the similarities of the projects, he could not begin working with the government officials until the Executive Steering Group established the priority and approved the project package. This package was prescriptive providing strict guidance regarding project priorities and parameters. The delay from submission to authorization was six weeks.⁴² A military security force within the PRT initially supported Ryan Brewster; however, delays plagued his project as the military and DoS leader within the PRT's Integrated Command Group argued over conflicting priorities assigned by their respective leaders. The argument resulted in the military priorities supported first and the DoS priorities second, with no thought to coordinate with the USDA projects. Only when military personnel were available to support the USDA priorities did his project produce results. His personal experience supported the view that the prescriptive methods (positive control) used by the senior leadership to control the PRT caused delays and lack of coordination, making this particular diplomatic effort ineffective and inefficient.⁴³

The use of positive control in directing the Afghanistan PRT appeared to compound the inherent complications associated with the PRT command and control

⁴²Ryan Brewster interview.

⁴³Ibid.

structure. Though doctrinally positive control was a recommended method, the experiences by members of the PRT told a different story. The critical assumptions that subordinates are military, and that the commander had direct authority over subordinates; posed significant obstacles for a commander. As a result, the positive control method in directing the PRTs led to inflexibility and lack of coordination. An analysis of the PRT control method, to include the “flexibility” and “coordination” criteria, was necessary to further support this argument.

PRT Control Analysis

Positive control does not appear to improve the flexibility and coordination issues found in the parallel command and control structures in Afghanistan. The analysis of positive control focused on the benefits and negative aspects of this method. The use of the “flexibility” and “coordination” criteria supported this analysis.

The use of positive control to direct the PRTs provided some benefits. Benefits included ensuring the actions are in the best interest of all organizations, having a guaranteed and correct focus of resources, and improving the standardization of all PRTs in theater. These benefits directly resulted from the use of the Executive Steering Group and PRT Working Group as management tools. Positive control was also designed to maintain unity of effort, especially when the unity of effort was established at a level higher than the PRT.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, these benefits were not visible within the PRTs in Afghanistan. The issues of lack of flexibility and coordination remained despite efforts to improve

⁴⁴Ryan Brewster interview; *FM 6-0*.

management of the PRTs. These issues were linked to the nonstandard organization of the PRTs, existence of parallel chains of command, and the inability to adapt to changing requirements. Positive control appeared to increase problems in the nonstandard organization, by not allowing experts within the PRT to perform tasks as their outside organizations would expect. DoS, USDA and USAID members continuously expressed frustration with DoD leadership for directing specific actions in manners or methods that ran counter to their agencies expectations. Positive control also did not perform as doctrine explained, since commanders did not have authority over subordinates. Using positive control without authority resulted in a command and control tug of war, where the most forceful senior won. Within the PRTs, the most forceful agency assigned in the project either controlled the project or ensured that progress was excessively delayed. The inability to adapt to changing priorities within the PRT was not improved by the use of positive control, since positive control, in this case, was not flexible. In addition, the presence of multiple stakeholders complicated the coordination issues between agencies. Positive control did not minimize these coordination issues, and in some respects may have increased them.⁴⁵

The “flexibility” of the PRT, which could mitigate the need for priority consensus, proved slow. The PRT routinely received direction from multiple agencies, ISAF and other foreign partners. Once an agency or ISAF recommended a new project for the PRT, it was discussed and researched by the PRT Working Group, which met “approximately once a month.” The PRT Working Group then submitted its findings to

⁴⁵Ryan Brewster interview; Olson, “Civil-Military Coordination.”

the Executive Steering Group, which provided the final authorization. This authorization was then sent back to the PRT Working Group, who directed the PRT to begin preparing for the project. The time allotted from the idea of a new project to the order to begin always depended on the circumstances, but was measured in months if not in days. This remained true even if the new project was similar to another project the PRT completed. As such the “flexibility” of the PRT remained fairly slow (days to months) despite the noted necessity by congressional reports, doctrine and experience to shift priorities in a timely manner.⁴⁶

The “coordination” of the PRT, expressed by the lack of coordination between the parallel command structures above the PRTs, resulted from terminology barriers and project priority disputes. The terminology barrier was problematic between all partners, but was especially frustrating between U.S. departments and agencies. Positive control did not require the establishment of common ground by agreeing to a term and its associated definition. As such, the Executive Steering Group did not set a solid framework for future projects; delaying approvals and generating continued dissention. The project priority disputes resulted in coordination issues because of the influence U.S. departments and agencies had on the projects assigned to the PRT. Each U.S. department and agency had its own set of priorities, and disagreement caused a lack of coordination. Since positive control did not require consensus prior to action, the coordination between the partners was often based on whether the supporting agencies approved of the project

⁴⁶*ISAF PRT Handbook*, 32; Ryan Brewster interview; Perito, “The US Experience,” 2-5; U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes.”

priorities. The lack of consensus in this parallel structure severely limited the level of coordination possible.⁴⁷

Upon further analysis, the use of positive control did not minimize the flexibility and coordination issues of the PRT, given the parallel nature of the PRT command and control structure. The parallel structure resulted in a lack of flexibility and coordination, due to the presence of multiple stakeholders. The purpose of the control method was to minimize or alleviate these issues. Positive control was unsuccessful in resolving these issues, because the PRT was composed of military and civilian personnel and the military commanders did not have direct authority over all subordinates. Positive control did not appear to be the right method to direct the PRTs. Could the ballistic missile defense structure, which used procedural control, correct these command and control issues?

Pacific Command Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control

The ballistic missile defense (BMD) units within U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) used procedural control, as a command and control methodology, to set/adjust priorities and improve coordination among multiple stakeholders. This parallel command and control structure resulted from the involvement of multiple combatant commanders, foreign partners and multiple services. The BMD structure was inherently similar to the PRT structure because its parallel nature caused issues with flexibility and coordination. This assertion was supported by current U.S. military doctrine and BMD experience. An analysis of the BMD structure and method revealed that despite the similarities of the

⁴⁷Ryan Brewster interview; Perito, “The US Experience,” 4-5; U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes;” Olson, “Civil-Military Coordination.”

structure, the differences in management of the procedural method possibly corrected the inherent flexibility and coordination issues.

Structure

The BMD command and control structure within PACOM inherently caused varying priorities resulting in flexibility and coordination issues. The multiple combatant commanders, foreign partners and services involved each had their own priorities. The lack of coordination was also inherent to the structure based on the need to coordinate with multiple stakeholders. The purpose and mission, unit structure and senior chain of command were critical to understanding the inherent issues caused by the BMD command and control structure.

The BMD purpose and mission was clearly identified in various unclassified documents. The BMD purpose, as defined by the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, was to protect the homeland, allies, U.S. forces and “develop flexible capabilities that can adapt as threats change.” The BMD mission was composed of two tasks, conducting ballistic missile warning and ballistic missile engagement. The key services participating in this joint mission area were the U.S. Army (Army), U.S. Navy (Navy) and U.S. Air Force (Air Force).⁴⁸ Each service had different assignments within the two BMD tasks. The Air Force’s task was only ballistic missile warning. The Army’s task was ballistic missile engagement. The Navy’s tasks were ballistic missile warning and engagement.

⁴⁸U.S. Department of Defense, “Ballistic Missile Defense Review-Quadrennial Defense Review,” March 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010usdproloutbrief.pdf> (accessed on 10 December 2010), 4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database, Washington, DC, 15 January 2009, (accessed on 02 January 2010), http://www.securedesigns.com/Members/admin/ujtl_tasks.pdf; JP 3-01, I-11.

The organizations of the BMD units differ within each service based on the task assigned. No common task organization existed for BMD units, which is why the need to understand the command and control structure above the BMD units became critical.⁴⁹

The overall BMD structure, designed with parallel chains of command for coordination and integration at higher levels, attempted to instill integration, flexibility and responsiveness in a mission area that required timely action by multiple service subordinate units. Combatant commanders were responsible for the planning and execution of BMD missions within their area of responsibility (AOR), and threats that cross AORs required extensive coordination with other combatant commanders. JP 3-01 clearly stated that U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), through Joint Force Component Command – Integrated Missile Defense, was overall responsible for this planning coordination. As a result Combatant Commanders generated possible options to counter ballistic missile threats, integrated through USSTRATCOM.⁵⁰

Understanding the parallel command and control structure above the BMD units was vital to drawing similarities with the PRT structure. Beginning the BMD command and control structure discussion from the most senior levels simplified the explanation process. The structure depicted in figure 5 identified the command and control relationships within the PACOM BMD structure.

⁴⁹UJTL Database; *JP 3-01*, I-11.

⁵⁰*JP 3-01*, I-9-12.




Figure 5. Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control.⁵¹

The senior military leaders above the BMD units were the Combatant Commanders, in this case PACOM, who were responsible for the planning and execution of theater BMD missions. PACOM ensured this planning also supported the global BMD missions that STRATCOM was responsible to plan and execute. In addition to STRATCOM, PACOM also supported NORTHCOM in some ballistic missile operations, which add another

⁵¹Figure created by monograph author, January 2011. This chart merged the command and control narratives and charts from multiple sources into a single chart to highlight the relationships and control within the U.S. Pacific Command BMD structure. JP 3-01, Kevin T. Campbell, LTG, “Globally Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense,” 2007, <http://www.aiaa.org/pdf/industry/presentations/campbell.pdf>; (accessed on 10 January 2011); United States Strategic Command Website, www.STRATCOM.mil. (accessed on 02 December 2010); Joel D. Babbitt and Mike H. Miklaski, “A Methodology for Developing Timing Constraints for the Ballistic Missile Defense System,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003; U.S. Missile Defense Agency, *Ballistic Midcourse Defense System Booklet*, 5th Edition, (Washington, D.C.: Missile Defense Agency, December 2008); Sauter III, “Global Missile Defense.”

parallel chain of command. The parallel chains of command, supporting and supported relationships between the combatant commanders are identified in Figure 5. Each combatant commander supported the others and was supported by the others. These parallel structures inherently caused conflicting priorities. Under PACOM, the component commanders directed the actions of the BMD units through standard service chains of command. Since three services were involved, this resulted in three chains of command that feed information to PACOM. Since each chain of command had multiple levels of command, the reporting and orders process appeared extensive and time consuming. To successfully complete the BMD mission, coordination between the services was critical. In Figure 5 the relationships between the component commanders, operational commanders and the unit were identified as direct control. Direct control was defined specifically for this paper as the control authority provided by combatant control, operational control and tactical control. The figure and this paper did not differentiate between these three controls.⁵²

The parallel nature of the BMD command and control structure within PACOM inherently caused similar issues with flexibility and lack of coordination. These issues resulted from the involvement of multiple stakeholders in the BMD missions, each with their own focus of the problem. Since these issues resulted from the BMD command and

⁵²Campbell, “Globally Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense;” LCDR Dwight Davis interview. The three control authorities of combatant control, operational control and tactical control are not differentiated, because any senior commander who was one of these authorities over their subordinates can directly control them and has authority over them. To focus on the similarities between the PRT and BMD command and control structure, it is necessary to lump all these directive controls into the one category of direct control. The definition of direct control is specifically for use in this paper, because it simplifies the discussion by minimizing confusion between the three types of formal control.

control structure, it was incumbent upon the BMD control method to minimize or alleviate them.

BMD Control Method

Procedural control, the command and control method used to direct BMD units in PACOM, appeared to mitigate the inherent issues of lack of flexibility and coordination. The BMD command and control structure follows the Air Force's command and control doctrine, because Air Force commands are assigned as JFACC in charge of the primary domain for these operations.⁵³ Using procedural control in directing the BMD units in PACOM revealed the flexibility and improved coordination resulting from this command and control method.

To attempt to minimize the impact of the parallel command and control structure, PACOM BMD missions used procedural control. Lieutenant Commander Dwight Davis, stationed at the Afloat Training Group in Hawaii, was responsible for ballistic missile training in the PACOM area since 2010. He discussed how procedural control, in the form of tactical procedures, helped to improve the timeliness to a level necessary to make quick decisions. Each Combatant Commander developed these procedures, based on how they wanted to execute BMD missions within their AOR. The units trained and operated under these procedures and allow commanders to make tactical decisions without upper chain of command involvement if the conditions of the procedures are met. Tactical BMD units, which affect multiple AORs, trained and operated under procedures from multiple Combatant Commanders. Figure 6 identified the procedural control relationships

⁵³ *JP 3-01*, II-1.

in the PACOM BMD command and control structure.




Figure 6. Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control.⁵⁴

As units trained and operated they provided feedback and changes to the procedures. This method allowed for more inclusive procedures and resulted in improved knowledge by the BMD units. These procedures increased the timeliness of each service's response and structured the critical integration required between the services. Note the information sharing relationships in Figure 6. This integration did not include communications between the service BMD units. This communications was considered unnecessary

⁵⁴Figure created by monograph author, January 2011. This chart merged the command and control narratives and charts from multiple sources into a single chart to highlight the relationships and control within the U.S. Pacific Command BMD structure. JP 3-01; Campbell, "Globally Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense," STRATCOM Website; Babbitt, "A Methodology for Developing Timing Constraints," *Ballistic Midcourse Defense System Booklet*; Sauter III, "Global Missile Defense."

because the tactical procedures developed at the Combatant Commander level were already integrated. This early integration at the Combatant Commander level ensured all subordinate BMD unit responses were integrated.⁵⁵

Managing BMD units with procedural control within PACOM appeared to mitigate the flexibility and coordination issues associated with the parallel BMD command and control structure. Doctrine and experience supported this assertion, while a lack of clear theory regarding procedural control caused doubt as to the true validity of this method. An analysis of the procedural control method, “flexibility” and “coordination” criteria resolved this dilemma to determine whether this method mitigated the inherent issues.

BMD Control Analysis

The use of procedural control minimized the flexibility and coordination issues, despite the parallel nature of the BMD command and control structure. The qualitative analysis of the structure and methodology revealed that the initial lack of priorities and coordination were corrected through the use of procedural control. The analysis of the “flexibility and coordination” criteria proved the evaluation correct. The findings suggested the command and control method was successful in resolving the inherent prioritization and coordination complications.

The procedural control method utilized by PACOM BMD units is not a perfect methodology, and its positive and negative attributes are critical to the analysis. Though initially this command and control structure appears complicated, the use of procedural

⁵⁵LCDR Dwight Davis interview.

control from the theater combatant commander, the neighboring Combatant Commanders and STRATCOM minimizes the need for direct communication and increases response time. The unit receives sets of procedural controls with multiple individual procedures to account for missions and defended area priorities. These priorities, based on the coordination and integration between PACOM, STRATCOM and Northern Command, make this complicated command and control structure timely. The key element when dealing with multiple commanders with differing priorities is to ensure integration occurs at the commander, in this case the Combatant Commander, level. Assigning the responsibility of coordination and integration to STRATCOM minimizes the delay resulting from positive control in theater BMD operations, since all theater BMD operations became procedural control. Minimizing priority confusion preemptively, allows for better training and better-prepared units tactically. It also allows units to test the procedures to provide feedback.⁵⁶

The use of procedural control increased the training requirements for units within the PACOM's BMD command and control structure. This negative attribute, of training, requires a large amount of specific and focused training by BMD units prior to operations. This training required extra personnel and financial resources beyond normal training. Part of this training included senior commanders embracing the centralized planning and decentralized execution concept to its least restrictive extent. This concept

⁵⁶*AFDD 2-8; JP 3-01, I-11.*

though officially embraced by all services, is executed to various degrees and must be standardized across all stakeholders.⁵⁷

The BMD command and control method of procedural controls increased timely shifting of priorities, improving “flexibility”. When the new mission falls within the parameters of previously approved procedures, then the mission was executed immediately. Time from idea to execution was measured in minutes if not seconds.⁵⁸ When the new mission falls close to previously approved procedures, the combatant commanders requesting the new mission modified the procedures. This new procedure was then approved by the combatant commanders providing the resource, the BMD unit, and transmitted to the unit. Idea to execution was measured in days if not hours.⁵⁹ When the mission was completely new, the combatant commanders developed new procedures. The combatant commander sent this new procedure to other combatant commanders for approval and placed in its pool of approved procedures. The time from idea to execution was typically weeks if not days.⁶⁰ Because of the need for procedures when exercising procedural control, Combatant Commanders became efficient at generating these procedures quickly, even if foreign partners were involved.⁶¹

The “coordination” of procedural control was determined by the success of the coordination between the combatant commanders, foreign partners and multiple services. Regardless of priority changes, the coordination remained consistently good, due to the

⁵⁷LCDR Dwight Davis interview; *JP 3-01*, I-11; *AFDD 2-8*; *NDP 6*; *FM 6-0*.

⁵⁸LCDR Dwight Davis interview.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

⁶¹*Ibid.*

pre-approved procedures. The procedures required coordination between Combatant Commanders for approval. (If foreign partners are included, then their approval is also necessary.) As a result all stakeholders used the same terminology and had similar priorities. The use of procedural control forced coordination at higher commands and this coordination directed, through procedures, to the BMD units. The BMD units did not normally coordinate verbally with each other, like the combatant commanders, but the use of information sharing provided the coordination necessary to successfully execute missions.⁶²

Further analysis of the BMD command and control structure and use of procedural control revealed that procedural control minimized flexibility and coordination issues of BMD units. The parallel BMD command and control structure resulting from multiple stakeholders, caused priority and coordination issues. The control method of procedural control appeared to minimize these issues, despite the flexibility and extensive coordination requirements spanning multiple combatant commanders, foreign partners and multiple services.

The analysis of the PRT and BMD command and control structures and methods revealed two structures, both inherently complicated, due to the presence of parallel command and control structures. The analysis and experience of positive control (PRT method), revealed its inability to remain flexible and effective because of long delays in adjusting priorities and lack of coordination. The analysis and experience of procedural control (BMD method) revealed that, though faced with similar issues, flexibility and

⁶²Ibid.

coordination were successful. Comparing the two structures and the associated control methods formed the primary conclusion of this study.

Conclusions

The analysis of the Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) ballistic missile defense (BMD) control methods revealed that resolving PRT command and control issues with procedural control is beneficial and effective. Implementing several key recommendations will efficiently correct the PRT's current command and control issues.

The most important conclusion was that the PRT method of positive control required post-mission consensus and coordination, while the procedural control of BMD units conducted this consensus and coordination before the mission. This resulted in issues of flexibility and coordination in the PRT command and control structure. The flexibility issues stemmed from the inability of the PRTs to adjust quickly from one mission to another because of the parallel layers of structure directing the action. The coordination issues evolved from the lack of consensus required by these parallel layers. These issues were not experienced in the BMD command and control structure, despite the presence of parallel structures. The positive control of the PRT required days to months of planning for even the simplest or most repetitive project, while the BMD procedural control required seconds to minutes. PRT and BMD members experience in procedural (BMD) and positive (PRT) control supported the conclusion that procedural

control (BMD) was more flexible in responding to changes in priority. Flexibility was critical to successful PRT operations and was a tenet of effective command and control.⁶³

Though the PRT and BMD missions are different, the parallel structure was inherent, causing coordination issues in both structures. Both structures, analyzed using the coordination criteria, highlighted the importance of their specific control method. Positive control used while directing the PRTs in Afghanistan, experienced coordination issues. Positive control (PRT) only initiated coordination after a mission was in progress. Coordination only improved after significant time had elapsed, typically months. On the other hand procedural control, used to direct the BMD units, solved the inherent coordination issues. By instigating coordination before the start of a mission and requiring procedure approval, procedural control (BMD) negated coordination problems. The experiences of PRT and BMD members supported the finding that procedural control (BMD) was more effective than positive control (PRT) in developing coordination.⁶⁴

The analysis suggested that the use of procedural control used in directing BMD units may successfully resolve the PRTs command and control issues of flexibility and coordination. These two issues, critical to the success of PRT projects and tenets of successful command and control, were not solved by the use of positive control. The prescriptive nature of positive control (PRT) hindered the flexibility and coordination necessary to overcome these issues. The descriptive nature of procedural control (BMD),

⁶³Ryan Brewster interview; LCDR Dwight Davis interview; Perito, "The US Experience;" U.S. House of Representatives, "Agency Stovepipes;" Institute for the Study of War, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS);" Olson, "Civil-Military Coordination."

⁶⁴Ryan Brewster interview; LCDR Dwight Davis interview; Perito, "The US Experience;" U.S. House of Representatives, "Agency Stovepipes;" Institute for the Study of War, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTS)."

on the other hand, minimized the effect of these issues and proved capable of resolving these issues within its parallel structure.⁶⁵

Based on the conclusions drawn from the analysis, procedural control (BMD) should be the preferred method to direct the PRT. If this type of control had been used in directing the PRTs in Afghanistan, the PRTs would have had greater success. This finding is important to senior leaders because it provides an option when dealing with parallel structures. Simplifying these structures may not always be feasible, so it is important to value procedural control as a method that improves flexibility and coordination. The following recommendations identify critical requirements for implementing procedural control within a PRT.

Recommendations

The first recommendation of this study is to implement procedural control as the command and control method for directing future PRTs. To execute this recommendation, five changes should occur. First and foremost is the development of common procedures for the PRTs. The consensus of all stakeholders on these procedures is a critical requirement. This process, though slow and painful, provides direction and consensus for priorities and is a step toward correcting coordination issues. The second change is that PRT members should then provide feedback of these procedures to ensure maximum understanding of intent and to correct any disagreements. Once again this is a difficult process, but the end result is a set of thorough procedures understood by all

⁶⁵Ryan Brewster interview; LCDR Dwight Davis interview; Perito, “The US Experience;” U.S. House of Representatives, “Agency Stovepipes.”

stakeholders. The third change is that these finalized procedures must be consolidated and provided to the training facilities of the departments and agencies that provide PRT members. This also includes foreign partners. This process will ensure proper training is conducted prior to the deployment of PRT members. Though it is not always possible to train as a PRT unit prior to arrival in Afghanistan, at least individual training can be accomplished. With a set of thorough procedures, the usefulness of individual training is multiplied. The fourth change is the implementation of a permanent feedback mechanism. This feedback mechanism is critical to the success of procedural control because it provides an avenue for critique and adjustment of procedures depending on the changing situation. This feedback mechanism is also responsible for developing new procedures and maintaining the extensive library of procedures. Maintaining this library of procedures is the fifth recommended change. The maintaining of this library provides a source of documents that future PRT missions in other regions can use as a starting point for adapting procedures. This process minimizes the adjustment period of PRT command and control when faced with a new region or country.

The final recommendation is that military leaders, who direct PRTs, embrace the concept of centralized planning, de-centralized execution in its least restrictive form. This concept, though supported through doctrine by all services, is executed differently by each service. It is time to allow subordinates to use initiative and creativity in solving problems, by relinquishing some of the control senior military leaders hold dear. In constantly changing situations, only subordinates can make decisions with enough speed to meet the commander's intent. The use of positive control (PRT) to control subordinates will continue to cause problems, because it is a time intensive method which

results in a loss of initiative. It is time to swing the pendulum closer to procedural control (BMD) to harness the resource of leadership. This shift results in risk, but proper training in how to think mitigates this risk.

To fully complete the research, it is necessary to provide an example of procedures, which would benefit the PRTs in Afghanistan. The parallel nature of the PRT command and control structure requires one generic procedure and three supporting procedures focused on the three mission areas of security, governance and reconstruction. The generic procedure should focus on prioritizing the three missions of the PRT.

The priorities of these missions should be assigned and approved in the following order; security, governance and reconstruction. Any change to this prioritization should require approval from the Executive Steering Group. The Integrated Command Group should resolve all conflicts regarding the priorities. If resolution is not obtained, the conflict should be presented to the PRT Working Group for decision. If the PRT Working group is unable to determine the correct course, the Executive Steering Group should resolve the issue. The Integrated Command Group should ensure all participants, to include all agencies and departments involved in the PRT missions, are provided a forum to voice concerns and issues. No member of the Integrated Command Group will have override authority, since the PRT mission is a unified effort. Maintaining focus on the approved plans is critical to maintain continuity, focus of efforts and coordination. Each mission area should have one procedure explaining the priorities, focus and intent of the mission, as well as an approved plan. The narrative associated with each procedure and plan is included below for clarification.

The mission of security, while the number one priority, is to enable improvements in governance and reconstruction. Security forces will operate under the authority of the military forces in the area. Coordination with other local forces and teams is mandatory. Security will focus on providing general area security, while simultaneously providing localized security for governance and reconstruction missions. Localized security should not be neglected in order to improve general security. The security of the region is less than desirable, but too much focus on area security will hinder the governance and reconstruction capacity. The Security Plan should be executed as approved by the Executive Steering Group. Changes to the plan's priority must be submitted to the Executive Steering Group for approval prior to execution. Deviations are authorized if the priority and intent are maintained, but must be reported to the Executive Steering Group.

The mission of building governance capacity is set as the second priority because it is critical to building capacity to achieve the strategic goals. Governance teams will operate under the authority of Department of State or Department of Justice. The lead department will be identified prior to a project commencing. This priority focuses on building governance capacity within the area, which will strengthen the support of the people. Support of the people will indirectly influence the security of the area, reducing the need for area security. The Executive Steering Group should approve the Governance Plan prior to execution. Changes to the plan's priority must be submitted to the Executive Steering Group for approval prior to execution. Deviations are authorized if the priority and intent are maintained, but must be reported to the Executive Steering Group.

Reconstruction, though successful and measureable in the near term, does not necessarily support the long-term vision. Focus in this area should be minimal unless excessive gains have been made in governance. The Reconstruction Plan must be executed as approved by the Executive Steering Group. Changes to the plan's priority must be submitted to the Executive Steering Group for approval prior to execution. Deviations are authorized if the priority and intent are maintained, but must be reported to the Executive Steering Group.

The use of these procedures helps to focus priorities, allows for flexibility and develops coordination. Improving these areas, while directing the PRT using procedural control, solves the PRT command and control issues. By changing the control method of the PRTs, senior civilian and military leaders can develop and direct a unit capable of operating in a parallel command and control structure. This capability is essential to resolving unstable situations in complex environments.

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