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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Developing A Professional Afghan Army: A Key for Successful Transition to Democracy in
Afghanistan**

by

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LCDR, SC, USN

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed
by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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04 May 2011

Abstract

Developing A Professional Afghan Army: A Key for Successful Transition to Democracy in Afghanistan.

The acceptance of the mission to rebuild the Afghan National Army by the United States is not complete with the fielding of a merely capable force. To support the development of a western style democracy in Afghanistan, the army will be required to achieve professional competency. This paper seeks to define the characteristics of professional competency based on theories advocated by authorities on military professionalism and demonstrate how they can be instilled in the Afghan Army, using historical examples of effective and ineffective military professional development in Latin America. Finally, the paper draws conclusions regarding the requirement for the United States to commit to an increased timeline and expansion of forces for training in order to achieve this objective.

The start of the War in Afghanistan in October 2001 saw the United States-led coalition launch Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in response to the September 11 attacks. The stated goal was the removal of the threat of Al-Qaeda by eliminating its use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorist operations. The Bush administration, which had campaigned against nation building, initially had envisioned a campaign that removed the Taliban from power, curtailing their ability to protect Al Qaeda leadership and its training bases, but did not result in the United States rebuilding Afghanistan.¹ However, the quick and complete collapse of the Taliban left the administration with a war weary Afghan population that seemed ready to accept a democratic, representative government for the first time in their history.²

One of the critical requirements for the formation of a new democratic style government was the institution of security throughout Afghanistan. Initial internal security could be established using the Coalition forces, but long term security could only be achieved through the creation of indigenous Afghan security forces. At the Tokyo conference in January 2002, the United States agreed to be the lead nation for the recruitment and training of a capable Afghan National Army, a responsibility that appeared relatively easy for the United States to accomplish with its economic resources and capacity for providing training personnel.³ However, unless the United States fully commits the time and forces necessary to instill and foster the growth of a professional character into the Afghan National Army, the promise of real democracy in Afghanistan is doomed.

The definition given by each nation of a capable military force may be slightly different, but a consensus as to the core elements of such a force is relatively easy to reach. In order to be considered capable, a force must be able to defend its nation against an outside aggressor. This requires that force to be able to recruit or draft personnel who are capable of being trained in the

technical concepts of a functioning military using the equipment the nation has provided them. This force is then able to use these skills and knowledge, either in war or peacetime, to carry out its responsibility to defend the nation.

The process of identifying when a force has moved beyond capable and into the realm of professional is more difficult to define. The discussion of whether or not the military is a profession, and if so, codifying what constitutes a professional military force has proven to be a controversial topic that has been examined by academic and military leaders without a complete consensus being reached. This paper will not address if the military is a profession, but will instead attempt to arrive at a definition of what constitutes a professional military using three different sets of constructs advocated by three different highly respected scholars of military professionalism. While many scholars have published various descriptions of what constitutes a profession and how an organization demonstrates professionalism, no one source captures the essence of military professionalism as well as a blended summary of the best of each. When one examines the concepts of professionalism advocated by these three different intellectuals, a commonality of the demonstrated qualities and capabilities that a professional force exemplifies becomes more readily apparent.

Samuel Huntington, one of the earliest proponents of the concept of military professionalism, theorized that the military professional was a manager of violence who took pride in his skills, spent a third of his career attaining education in his specialty and recognized the responsibility to use his skills, subject to the political control of the government, for the betterment of the people or the state.⁴ Another theory of professionalism offered by political scientist Frederick Wirt concentrates on professional societies such as medical, law, and clergy, and breaks down the requirements for a profession into four areas. First, a profession requires a

highly generalized and systematic knowledge base applicable to the field, which drives the second requirement--that only a formally qualified person can provide the service. Third, the service or skill provided benefits a society not the profession, and fourth, substantial autonomy will be given to the individual or organization to bring this service to the society while remaining responsible to that same society.⁵

Patrick Mileham, who equated quality with professionalism for potential European Union member military forces, proposed six broad disciplines that could be used to measure the quality of a military force with the result that the requirements of a professional force could be codified. The disciplines include civilian control, comprehensive military doctrines, fielding of military forces designed to support collective defense and security, integrated relationships with other national institutions, technical expertise that maximizes the force's capability, and the development of highly educated and trained personnel. He argued that civilian control was the most critical and that doctrine demonstrated that practical rationale was used in formulating defense operations. Integration with other national institutions is a fundamental requirement to develop successful solutions for external and internal security, and increase technical expertise to achieve the most effective use of the force. Finally, he argued that the foundation of any profession is a highly educated or trained force, capable of applying the doctrines and technology of the profession within the appropriate legal and moral restraints.⁶

Looking for the common ideas in the concepts advocated by these authors, the main requirements for professional competency in the Afghan military appear to be that the army recognizes that it is subject to the objective control of civilian authority and that its service and skills are to be used for the benefit of the entire Afghan society. Secondary requirements are that the army needs to maintain its autonomy while at the same time integrating itself with the other

national and international organizations that will foster a democratic Afghanistan. Moreover, it must develop the institutions and doctrine required to build technical expertise that ensures the most effective employment of the army and encourages the continuing education of its members. These secondary requirements are part of the structure of a professional force, but more importantly, intertwine with the requirement for objective civilian control.

As human beings, we tend to view the events taking place around us in the world as a series of circumstances that are unique from that which has happened before, and believe that the effects of these events will be significant in the course of history. When we view our current endeavors in Afghanistan through this myopic lens, it is easy to forget that the United States has acquired an enormous amount of experience and lessons learned from both our assistance in counterinsurgency and development of military forces in support of emerging democracies in Latin America. When these previous activities in building partner nation military capacity are reviewed, there are numerous examples that demonstrate that a merely capable force is not enough to foster a democratic government and that the achievement of a more professional force is not accomplished in a short duration.

The first challenge that the United States must overcome to ensure the Afghan Armed Forces understand that their service is for the benefit of the entire Afghan people and subservient to civilian control of the central government is the existence of two principal power structures that inhabit the same space. The first is the power that is formed by the state, and the second is the power of Afghan society, though the terms "state" and "society" require further clarification when used in conjunction with Afghanistan. The term "state" reflects the institutions that exist or are in the process of being constructed to support the creation of a strong central government,

while the term "society" reflects the multitude of ethnicities and traditional tribal forms of governance that have existed in the past.⁷

This tribal society, which has existed for several millennia in Afghanistan, has resulted in the development of allegiances to leadership or factions that are not recognized as part of the formal centralized government. They have formed based on familial ties, where the local leader is chosen from family elders and leadership of the tribe has passed from generation to generation, excluding tribal outsiders and allowing them to feel protected by this isolation. Militaristic societies have also developed in which local warlords have emerged and raised their own armies to provide defense against outside invaders, most recently during the Russian invasion, and for mutual economic gain such as the collaboration for poppy production. The recruitment of personnel for the Afghan National Army comes from many of these same groups and will require the breakdown of the allegiance of tribal societal ties before recruits can be expected to place the Afghan society, as a whole, ahead of the interests of their own tribal society.⁸

The United States can encourage the breakdown of these clannish allegiances by ensuring the recruitment of personnel into the military forces is representative of all the different factions, and requiring that the individual units train together to gain recognition and acceptance of the differences among the diverse tribal societies. The unit cohesion that develops among soldiers who train and work together will encourage the belief that their service and skills are to be used for the benefit of everyone within their unit, regardless of tribal affiliation. The use of a standing military to introduce societal change is not unique, but the interaction of such units with the local population will encourage the suppression of tribal loyalties across the entire population of Afghanistan. The implementation of such change will require the United States forces to serve as a referee and mentor while these units learn to train together. The animosity and distrust that

different groups feel for each other have formed over generations and any plan to reverse them needs to acknowledge that it will take years to change ingrained prejudices and at least a generation to begin to see new military recruits that haven't been raised with those prejudices.

The breakdown of the tribal societies is also critical to developing civilian control of the military. The military and civilian leadership need to develop a strong partnership, and each must believe that the other is representing the interests of all the people of Afghanistan. Mistrust of the altruistic intent of either institution may lead to the military redefining its own role in order to defend the nation from a perceived internal threat posed by the central government. This type of mistrust can also lead to the military not meeting one of its primary responsibilities to advise the executive on matters of national defense. In discussing the emergence of a new civilian democracy from a military dictatorship in Argentina, Bruce Farcau pointed out that the mistrust that existed between the military and executive caused the executive to ignore the army's advice on matters of national defense. The removal of the responsibility to advise the executive resulted in the military not having a clearly defined role and feeling left out of the political process, which led to the military attempting to expand its role in the government through force.⁹ The United States, in its advisory capacity in Afghanistan, can help both institutions overcome any mistrust that exists by serving as an interface between them to foster a strong working relationship with each other, encouraging each institution to clearly recognize and fulfill its national role. The United States will be unable to withdraw from the responsibility to serve as the interface between these two institutions, however, until they demonstrate mutual trust and an understanding of their individual roles, a responsibility that could take decades.

One difference between Afghanistan and Latin America countries in fostering a developing democracy is that many of the new democracies in Latin America were transitioning

from military authoritarian regimes, so the military was a source of stability or power to enforce the transition. In Afghanistan, the Taliban, which was the source of stability, has been overthrown and the United States is building a new army while establishing a new government. Harold Trikonas recognized that emerging democracies suffer from a lack of leverage and legitimacy that makes it difficult for them to force the acceptance of civilian control of the military and can result in the executive pursuing compromise to appease military commanders in order to ensure the administration survives. Several methods to avoid weakening the civilian government by these actions were successfully pursued in Venezuela, including dividing the army by leveraging internal rifts within the military and the development of a paramilitary police force to counter an increasingly more independent army.¹⁰ Targeting internal rifts in the Afghan Army would undermine the effort to instill a sense of cooperation among the different tribal societies, but the effective development of a paramilitary force like the Afghan National Police would provide a counterbalance to the power of the military. The need for the police to play a role in establishing internal security in Afghanistan by quelling insurgent activity drives them to be more of a paramilitary force, which makes them a natural counter balance to the army. The requirement for national police to be a more military force has already caused the United States to increase forces needed for training and will increase the time that trainers for both the army and police have to spend training the two institutions to work together.

The remaining two requirements, identified as qualities of a professionally competent force, are important as specific individual qualities of a professional force but are also elements that serve as an integral part of crafting civilian control of the military. The first of these two remaining elements is that the army needs to maintain its autonomy while at the same time integrating itself with the other national and international organizations that will foster a

democratic Afghanistan. A certain amount of autonomy is required for a military force to demonstrate proficiency and professional mission planning; if that same military force achieves a level of autonomy that allows it to select its own missions, while curtailing government oversight, its autonomy will render the civilian government meaningless.¹¹

The existence of insurgent forces operating within Afghanistan creates the opportunity for the Afghan National Army forces to become involved in military offensive operations against the local populace. This is a mission that should fall to the Afghan National Police, who along with the court system, need to maintain the rule of law. The demonstrated capability of the Afghan National Police to enforce the rule of law would strengthen the civilian control of the military by limiting the role of the army in internal security. A capable police force also serves as a counter balance to the army and provides deterrence against a possible military coup.¹² In Afghanistan, because the insurgency can be heavily armed and militarily capable, the national police often find themselves in need of support to carry out their mission to maintain internal security. When this occurs, the Afghan army is called out to help, a situation that encourages the military to expand beyond its institutional role and encroach on the institutional territory of the national police.

In Bolivia and Paraguay, Farcau concluded that military coups that occurred in the 1930s were the result of the interpretation of the mandate that the military had been given to protect the nation. These military forces had been trained and armed to wage a war against external forces, but their mission gradually changed to quelling unrest domestically. The army sought a larger voice in national strategy and resource allocation, without interference from the civilian government, to carry out the mandate to protect their nation as the army's role in internal and external defense increased.¹³ There is an internal security problem in Afghanistan encouraged by

insurgent forces that are receiving external aid. The requirement for the army to assist the police in maintaining internal security could cause the army to usurp the role of the central government as in Bolivia and Paraguay, believing the Afghan Army should be the protector of the nation for both internal and external defense. Reducing or excluding the army from internal security operations would diminish the possibility that it would usurp the central government's authority, but would remove a key element of support that the national police relies on in combating the insurgency. The most realistic approach would be the creation of a paramilitary organization within the Afghan National Police comprised of personnel from both the army and police. Creating a unit modeled after a Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) or Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), but on a larger scale and outfitted with more military equipment with greater lethality than the average SWAT or HRT Team, would enable the police to deal with the insurgent threat without having to rely on direct military reinforcement. This would allow the police to maintain a strong liaison with the military, providing them the equipment and knowledge that the operations against the insurgency require, but allow the military to distance themselves from internal security and instead concentrate on defense of the nation against outside threats. Once the threat of insurgent activity has been reduced or eliminated this unit could be downsized and its military personnel returned to the military, while the remaining police personnel could fulfill the traditional SWAT role. The development of a paramilitary force would require the United States to augment current forces in order to train these additional personnel and would increase the time required to complete its advisory mission.

The final element is that the army must develop the institutions and doctrine required to build technical expertise that ensures the most effective employment of the army and encourages the continuing education of its members. The introduction at the beginning of the United States

Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual describes doctrine as the "engine that drives the other key elements of an institutional military."¹⁴ Those other key elements include organization, training, personnel and leader development--all integral to the development of a professionally competent military. The establishment of formal schools will provide for the indoctrination of new recruits in the skills and technical expertise required to perform their military mission, but the development of institutions and programs for continuing education will ensure that the concepts of these key elements are instilled throughout the force. The United States will need to establish institutions such as service academies for officer accession and education, mid-level schools for field grade officers, and mid-level and senior enlisted continuing education centers for reinforcing professional competency and serving as centers for the development of doctrine. The establishment of these institutions may be done relatively quickly using United States forces as military advisors; however, development of the institutions into enduring centers of professional military education will require the long-term commitment of United States expertise for teaching at these institutions and mentoring future Afghan military educators.

The United States has been committed to providing long term professional military education before its involvement in Afghanistan through the establishment of the International Military Education and Training program. This program has been offered to international forces by the United States for over 50 years, including the ability to take classes in Spanish for our allies in Latin America.¹⁵ It can be assumed that these same opportunities will be available for the Afghan National Army to send personnel to this training, but the use of the International Military Education and Training program will need to take place in conjunction with the development of indigenous institutions.

An excellent example that the United States may need to commit to insure a professionally competent military is the United States Military Assistance Program (MAP), established in 1952. Through this program, the United States has provided training using collaborative military exercises, formal personnel exchange programs and advisory programs to the Colombian military to foster internal security and strengthen the civil military relationship.¹⁶ Though the circumstances in Colombia do not mirror those in Afghanistan, they are similar in that both countries' central governments are trying to foster a democratic style government while overcoming an internal security threat. The Colombian military continues to demonstrate its professional competency in supporting the central government by suppressing illicit drug cartels and their influence within the political arena, while in Afghanistan the military must demonstrate its professional competency by supporting the government through suppression of the Taliban and Al Qaida influence in the region.¹⁷ The United States continues today to provide training and aid to the Colombian military and government to build professional capacity; only time will tell how long Afghanistan will require the same.

The existence of strong military educational institutions also supports the establishment of doctrine, which ensures that both the military and the executive know how to employ the military. This will enable the military to understand how its institution should interact with the executive, clearly defining its national role and ensuring that the civilian leadership will include the military in the political process, which reduces the chance for the military to decide to override the executive either by force or by lack of cooperation.

The institutions that need to be developed outside of formal education and training to support professional competency are not so readily apparent. There are three main institutions, other than the military, that are required to support the concept of state building. A police force

that provides protection from internal threats, a judiciary that establishes the rule of law, and the administration and government performed by the bureaucracy. However, a tertiary institution that will increase Afghan military professional competency is the establishment of a centralized banking system. The challenge of breaking down tribal allegiances includes instilling a willingness for the members of the army to serve in areas away from their tribe or ethnic group. This difficulty is further exacerbated by the lack of a centralized system for members of the armed forces to send their paychecks home to their families when serving away from those families. This type of problem may cause forces to question the government's awareness of their concerns and increases the likelihood of desertion, an obvious obstacle to maintaining and training a professional force.¹⁸ The United States can work to develop a credible central banking system, but a government that is perceived as corrupt increases the time that it will take to accomplish this task.

The foremost concern that must be addressed in advocating the creation of an Afghan National Army that moves beyond capable and achieves professional competency, is if such a force increases the likelihood of failure in bringing democracy to Afghanistan because it will interfere with the civilian government. An impotent central government that struggles to overcome suspicions of favoritism and corruption in validating its legitimacy provides an environment ripe for intervention by a military force that recognizes the opportunity to escape the limitations imposed by the civil military relationship responsibilities expected of a professionally capable force.

Felipe Aguero writing "The Military and the Limits to Democratization," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, identified that several South American military forces, including Chile, Argentina and

Venezuela, pursued becoming professionally competent while transitioning from military dictatorships to civilian regimes. The modernization of their forces and training to upgrade their combat capability occurred in an environment of increased tensions based on renewed regional boundary disputes, to which the military most likely contributed. The civilian governments in these countries hoped that by increasing professional competency in order to address external security threats, they would remove the threat of the military reinserting itself in the domestic political arena. These military forces, particularly in Argentina, while continuing their expansion of professional competency, expanded their role in the political spectrum, believing they were more capable of properly employing the military forces and determining the appropriate mission without subordinating themselves to civilian control.¹⁹

The majority of the countries in Latin America were not democracies in the 1960s, but many were ruled by civilian governments that had been instituted by authoritarian military regimes seeking to introduce a democratic form of government. However, the militaries in many of these countries, while seeking to increase their professional competency, remained ready to reassume a role in politics, and forces in several countries did stage military coups. The indoctrination in the 1960s and 1970s of these Latin American forces by the United States in counter insurgency and civic and political action, convinced the militaries that the policy of the United States was to eliminate the threat of communism by any means available. The result was the belief by these militaries that it was their responsibility to assume leadership for national defense if they felt their nation's internal defense was threatened by weak civilian governments.²⁰

The development of a professionally competent Afghan force that perceives the threat of insurgent activity within Afghanistan weakens internal security, or that views the existence of a decades-old border animosity between Afghanistan and Pakistan as an external security threat,

could reach the same conclusion. Additionally, if the Afghan National Army feels that the central government is making decisions based on maintaining its power rather than for the security of the nation, it may decide that it can do a better job of determining the correct mission than the civilian government. This could encourage the military to become more involved in the political process or lead to an overthrow of civilian authority even as the military increases its professional competency.

The simplest way to counter these concerns is to evaluate what would exist without a professionally competent military. The Afghan National Army is being reconstructed using individuals from various tribes and ethnicities who have never really fought to defend the entire nation. During the Russian occupation, select groups did come together to fight the invaders, but even the consolidated fighting forces that developed during this time centered around specific regions and tribal alliances within Afghanistan. An Afghan National Army that is merely capable would be comprised of these same tribal and ethnic divisions and could be easily exploitable by individuals within the military or government who sought to promote the welfare of select groups within the nation. This would likely lead to the disintegration of both the national military and the central government and result in the reemergence of several armed factions headed by different warlords, as occurred during the Russian occupation. With the history that Afghanistan has of guerilla tribal forces, this type of outcome poses a more significant threat to the existence of a strong civilian government than the possibility of a military coup from a professionally competent one.

As we move into the tenth year of the war in Afghanistan, and public pressure to complete our mission and drawdown our forces grows stronger, nobody wants to be the voice that advocates the need for a longer, more-drawn-out commitment in Afghanistan. However, the

most challenging operational factor in developing an Afghan National Army that moves beyond capable and into the realm of professional competency will be time.

Professional competency implies that boundaries exist between government institutions which a professional military will recognize, restricting itself only to activities that are required for the armed defense of the nation. However, the respect of those boundaries is dependent upon the other institutions establishing and fulfilling the requirements to maintain their boundaries. With a nascent democratic central government and a police force that is responsible for establishing the rule of law and maintaining internal security against an insurgent threat, the military must embrace and maintain the boundaries of a professionally competent force that is essential to a democratic nation. The threat posed by the insurgency will be diminished by a professionally competent military force that recognizes its responsibility to remain within these boundaries, by reducing the sectors of the population that are disenfranchised and likely to be open to recruitment by the insurgents. The United States can build the institutions and provide the forces that offer training to instill the values of the professional force, but only time will change generations of tribal and ethnic distrust and internecine warfare.

The tribal society that resides throughout the Afghan countryside can only be gradually changed by a continued inculcation of professional values. The establishment of a formal education will help plant the seeds of a professional force, but the transition of the force will only happen with continued exposure to an armed force that demonstrates its subservience to civilian control and the daily routine that instills the values of a professional force. Even with continued exposure to a professional force, the process will not be quick; the very nature of state building requires that institutions other than the military become stronger, in order to strengthen the military's position in the framework of the nation as well as provide the necessary counter

balance to a military that could become too strong as an entity or too involved in the political process.

The United States has been involved in the process of building professional militaries that strengthen democratic institutions in Latin America for decades. The military and economic aid that the United States has provided to Colombia since the 1950s has created a more stable military institution that has largely removed itself from the political arena, but this stability has taken several generations and is still ongoing today. The presence of United States forces in Afghanistan will be required for an extended period of time to ensure that the Afghan National Army becomes a professionally capable military institution and continues to be an organization that serves for the benefit of all Afghan society. Without the presence of United States forces, the ability for one segment of the population to manipulate a merely capable force for their own self-interests will continue to exist.

Notes

1. In the October 11, 2000, debate between George W. Bush and Al Gore, Bush noted; "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win wars." See Commission on Presidential Debates, Debate Transcript: The Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, October 11, 2000, quoted in Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires, America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 113.

There is controversy between the use of the terms *nation building* and *state building*, which are sometimes used interchangeably in the United States. They each have a fairly narrow and different definition in political science, the first referring to national identity and the second referring to the institutions of the state. These definitions become more confusing due to different schools of thought on state building. President Bush, though using the term *nation building* was more likely referring to *state building*, defined as an activity undertaken by external actors (foreign countries) attempting to build, or re-build, the institutions of a weaker, post-conflict or failing state, usually following some form of intervention such as a UN peacekeeping operation. This definition was found using search "Nation Building vs State Building", located at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State-building>, accessed 5 March 2011.

2. Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, Perseus Book Group, 2002), 323.

3. Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York, NY, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2009), 137-138.

4. Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 1957), 13-18.

5. Frederick Wirt, "Professionalism and Political Conflict: A Developmental Model." *Journal of Public Policy* 1, no. 1 (Feb., 1981): 64.

6. Patrick Mileham, "Amateurs, Conscripts, Citizens, Professionals: How Do Armed Forces Measure Up?" *Defense & Security Analysis* 21, no. 2 (June 2005): 213-214.

7. Justin Mankin, "Gaming the System, How Afghan Opium Underpins Local Power." *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no.1 (October1,2009):197.

8. There is a multitude of sources that discuss how dreams of colonization and expansion of empires by other nations have created the tribal society that exists in Afghanistan today. Three excellent sources that discuss how actions taken by those nations have influenced the development over the generations of these societies are *In the Graveyard of Empires*, by Seth Jones and *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* and *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, by Peter Hopkirk.

9. Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America; The Role of the Military* (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1996), 149.
10. Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3 (Autumn, 2000): 78-82.
11. Ibid., 81.
12. Ibid., 83.
13. Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America; The Role of the Military* (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1996), 154-155.
14. U.S. Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24. (Washington D.C. Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006), xxxv.
15. Ibid., 205.
16. The decision to allow poppy cultivation is an economic one that exemplifies the challenges that the Afghan government must confront in establishing its legitimacy, but is an issue that of itself requires an in depth examination. The long term effects of the Afghan central governments' decision to allow the continued cultivation of poppies by Afghan farmers as a cash crop will not become apparent for some time. There can be no doubt that by allowing the practice to continue the governments legitimacy will be questioned both internally and by governments of other nations. This challenge to the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan could weaken the civilian control of the military and have long term implications on the military achieving professional competency.
17. Richard L. Maullin, "Soldiers Guerillas and Politics in Colombia." R-630-ARPA, (Advanced Research Projects Agency, Santa Monica, CA. Rand December 1971), vii-ix.
18. Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Group USA, 2008), 197-203.
19. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 168-174.
20. Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America; The Role of the Military* (Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1996), 14-18.

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Comment [DH1]: What's this in parentheses?

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