

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-05-2011		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE C2 and the American Way of War: Getting it Right from the Start				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) James H. B. Peay IV, MAJ, U.S. Army Paper Advisor: James McGrath, COL, USMC				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT After assuming command of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and NATO ISAF, GEN McChrystal was requested by the Secretary of Defense to provide his assessment of the war in Afghanistan. In less than two months, after conducting an in-depth assessment of the entire campaign to-date, GEN McChrystal and his staff produced his <i>Commander's Initial Assessment</i> , outlining the way forward for all U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. His assessment outlined and highlighted significant changes to the force structure and force employment. The third paragraph of GEN McChrystal's assessment briefly summarizes: "Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by training harder or by 'doubling down' on the previous strategy. Additional resources are requested, but focusing on the force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate." Future Joint Task Force Commanders in comparable, protracted conflicts must rapidly recognize the changing nature of a conflict and establish functional and adaptable command and control structures and relationships that allow them to implement successful strategies. Command and control is the most important operational function. Once the command and control structure is correct, everything else will follow. The proper command and control structure allows a commander to set the "tone" or craft the appropriate operational culture for the campaign. When the operational culture must change, having the correct command and control structure and relationships in place allows the commander to do so, effectively and efficiently					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Command and Control; Operational Planning; Operational Art; Operational Culture; The American Way of War					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 24	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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C2 and the American Way of War: Getting it Right from the Start

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

4 May 2011

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ABSTRACT

C2 and the American Way of War: Getting it Right from the Start

After assuming command of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and NATO ISAF, GEN McChrystal was requested by the Secretary of Defense to provide his assessment of the war in Afghanistan. In less than two months, after conducting an in-depth assessment of the entire campaign to-date, GEN McChrystal and his staff produced his *Commander's Initial Assessment*, outlining the way forward for all U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. His assessment outlined and highlighted significant changes to the force structure and force employment. The third paragraph of GEN McChrystal's assessment briefly summarizes: "Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by training harder or by 'doubling down' on the previous strategy. Additional resources are requested, but focusing on the force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate."

Future Joint Task Force Commanders in comparable, protracted conflicts must rapidly recognize the changing nature of a conflict and establish functional and adaptable command and control structures and relationships that allow them to implement successful strategies. Command and control is the most important operational function. Once the command and control structure is correct, everything else will follow. The proper command and control structure allows a commander to set the "tone" or craft the appropriate operational culture for the campaign. When the operational culture must change, having the correct command and control structure and relationships in place allows the commander to do so, effectively and efficiently.

INTRODUCTION

After assuming command of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and the NATO International Security Assistance Force, General Stanley A. McChrystal was requested by the Secretary of Defense (through the CENTCOM Commander) to provide his assessment of the war in Afghanistan. In less than two months, after conducting an in-depth assessment of the entire campaign to-date, GEN McChrystal and his staff produced his *Commander's Initial Assessment*, outlining the way forward for all U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. His assessment outlined and highlighted significant changes to the force structure and force employment. The third paragraph of GEN McChrystal's assessment briefly summarizes: "Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by training harder or by 'doubling down' on the previous strategy. Additional resources are requested, but focusing on the force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate."¹

Past commanders involved in protracted conflicts have also been compelled to change how their forces were operating to ensure mission success. Generals Petraeus and McChrystal both assumed command of forces involved in protracted conflicts, the former in Iraq and the latter in Afghanistan. To significantly change the direction and momentum of these conflicts, more was required than "simply trying harder or 'doubling down' on the previous strategy."² To achieve their objectives, each commander drastically changed the operational culture of the force under their command to create conditions more conducive to the accomplishment of their objectives. The change in operational culture was critical, but instituting this change was not possible until the command relationships were organized in a manner that allowed the force to adapt to the evolving nature of the conflict. Future Joint

Task Force Commanders in comparable, protracted conflicts must rapidly recognize the changing nature of a conflict and establish functional and adaptable command and control structures and relationships that allow them to implement successful strategies.

BACKGROUND

When it comes to war, gaining and maintaining American public support is challenging. Generally, Americans prefer high-intensity, short-duration conflicts with clearly stated and understandable objectives. They can support a cause with a high degree of assumed-morality, built on a large, multinational coalition, which engages the enemy in a conventional force-on-force battle. These conditions influence “strategy and policy derive(d) from a variety of factors, including national political culture, geography, historical military experience, and comparative strategic advantages and preferences.”³ Desert Shield/Storm, Panama and Grenada are excellent, modern-day examples of the type of warfare Americans prefer. These conflicts exemplify the “American Way of War.”

Americans do not favor low-intensity, protracted conflicts that incorporate and/or resemble irregular or insurgency warfare. Vietnam, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, to name a few, represent the type of war Americans wish to avoid. These conflicts initially resembled high-intensity warfare and employed highly technical, conventional weapon systems archetypical of the “American Way of War.” At some point however, the center of gravity of these conflicts shifted without the American/Coalition forces taking heed or being fully cognizant of the change. By not adapting to the changing center of gravity, the wars turned into protracted conflicts.

The “American Way of War” defines the American operational culture of warfare. A force’s operational culture must change with the style, the time, and the type of warfare being conducted. Operational culture is not a constant, but a variable; it is adaptable, and should change with the operational requirements during a campaign. The operational culture is the way the force is thinking, structured, and conducting operations. The way the force is structured and task organized greatly influences the operational culture. When an operational culture fails to adapt and evolve during a protracted conflict, it is a recipe for mission failure.

Command and control is the most important operational function. Once the command and control structure is correct, everything else will follow. The proper command and control structure allows a commander to set the “tone” or craft the appropriate operational culture for the campaign. When the operational culture must change, having the correct command and control structure and relationships in place allows the commander to do so, effectively and efficiently.

In March 2003, the American-led invasion of Iraq was vastly different than the response in Afghanistan, in late 2001, early 2002. The operation in Iraq was conventionally led, and organized for a force-on-force engagement. It was largely a U.S. operation with a small contingent of coalition support, commanded by a single Joint Task Force Headquarters. Initially, the enemy was well-defined, and led by a notorious, but well-established, head-of-state, Saddam Hussein. As the war progressed, the leader disappeared, the Iraqi forces shed their uniforms and blended into the populace, and the enemy began to employ irregular methods of warfare in predominantly urban environments. As civil unrest and sectarian violence grew, aided by an influx of foreign fighters, the fight in Iraq became a full-fledged insurgency that occupied the major cities and the urban centers. It took U.S. forces too long

to realize that the nature of the conflict had evolved from conventional warfare to irregular warfare, and then into an insurgency; an evolution that changed the operational center of gravity. Once the U.S. realized that there was a shift in the adversary's center of gravity (from fighting Iraqi military forces to fighting an insurgency among the populace), things began to change.

Prior to January 2007, the command structure in Iraq was substantially reorganized, creating several functional headquarters that had designated specific missions and a delineated chain of command. Starting in January 2007, the U.S. "surge forces" began to arrive in Iraq. The surge was more than just an increase of troops and major resources; it was not meant to "double down" on a failed or failing strategy. The surge was intended to provide the commander the means and the time to create a more secure and stable environment. The surge allowed the commander to considerably shift operations and drastically change the operational culture of the force being employed. Forces would no longer live on giant Forward Operating Bases and "commute" to the areas they were responsible for patrolling and maintaining security. The strategy that accompanied the surge directed that battalion-sized organizations deploy into districts within Baghdad and other major urban centers and live on smaller operating bases among the Iraqi population. Simultaneously, Joint Security Stations were constructed for company-sized U.S. forces, partnered with Iraqi Army and Police forces, to assist with the collection and sharing of intelligence/information while supporting security and patrolling of local areas. In September 2007, GEN Petraeus testified before Congress regarding the ongoing positive effects that had been accomplished since January 2007: "Our forces and our Iraqi counterparts focused on improving security... [and] employed counterinsurgency practices

that underscore the importance of living among the people...”⁴ Just as the center of gravity had changed in Iraq, it would also change in Afghanistan.

The American military response to the terrorist attacks on September 2001 in Afghanistan was initially conducted by teams of widely dispersed special operation forces supported by a small conventional ground force and a large supporting air component. The ground forces relied heavily on expensive, highly-technical weapons to deliver overwhelming fire support when required. There were numerous headquarters commanding the various ground elements and supporting other government agencies, essentially operating in “stovepipes” and not synchronizing their efforts. The enemy was barely known and hard to pin down. From the beginning, the enemy fought almost entirely with unconventional methods and operated mostly in the rural/tribal areas of the country. As the war in Afghanistan appeared to successfully achieve the initial objectives and became secondary to the mission in Iraq, the fight languished, lacking the resources and direction required to quell the expanding violence. Since the mission in Iraq began to drawdown, additional forces and resources have become available, permitting the conflict in Afghanistan to be resourced in response to the drastically changed situation.

Beginning in the fall of 2009, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and the NATO International Security Assistance Force, undertook to fundamentally change how the war had been fought for the previous eight years. GEN McChrystal had recognized that the center of gravity in Afghanistan had changed from the insurgents to the Afghan people. To protect the Afghan people (the center of gravity in the war), GEN McChrystal changed the operational culture of the force. To do so, he first reorganized the commands and the forces under ISAF. By significantly changing the command and control structure, the commander bolstered and

reinforced the change to the operational culture that was “require(d for) a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.” GEN McChrystal went on to state, “This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with secure environment.”⁵ Although additional resources were being committed to Afghanistan, there would not be an immediate surge force as there had been in Iraq for GEN Petraeus. GEN McChrystal used the time available to change the operational culture and set the conditions for the arrival of the additional forces. Thus, to change the operational culture, the command provided the force with new guidance and repositioned those forces within Afghanistan in preparation for the force uplift. Troops were moved from border outposts in distant, rural areas where the fight was enemy-focused, to more-populated areas where they began to execute a population-centric security approach. As in Iraq, troops were moved from large operating bases to small contingency bases and company outposts positioned amongst the populace. By fixing the command and control structure while providing new guidance, and reorganizing the forces in Afghanistan, GEN McChrystal was able to implement a remarkable shift in operations and change the operational culture of the force.

Generals Petraeus and McChrystal reorganized their command and control structures in their respective theaters. By fixing the command and control issues, both commanders were then able to do three crucial things: first, they changed the operational culture; second, they were then able to implement the change of operational culture on the operational force; and third, they could then assess the changes taking place during the protracted conflicts. In doing so, the commanders significantly shifted the focus of the force to the security of the population, thus changing the conditions on the ground and increasing the probability of the

mission's success. If the command and control function had not been fixed, neither commander could have changed the operational culture of his force and would not have been/be able to succeed in his mission.

DISCUSSION

Initially, Iraq and Afghanistan were theaters of operations that allowed for the successful application of the “American Way of War.” Although, the missions and the type of forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan could not have been more different at the beginning of the two conflicts, both theaters eventually became mired in similar circumstances on parallel tracks. Both theaters had/have a large conventional force operating in conjunction with unconventional forces, assisting a very inexperienced indigenous security force, and operating in mixed-intensity environments that devolved into protracted conflicts. Both Joint Task Force Headquarters and their commanders had significant problems and challenges with the command structures and the task organizations of the forces they employed. By prioritizing and then fixing the command and control issues, the Joint Task Force Commanders were able to focus on the remaining operational functions and ongoing challenges in their area of operations. The urgent necessity of recognizing and resolving the command and control problem in not one, but two, recent conflicts, highlights a systemic problem that, if not corrected, will continue to create inefficient organizations and result in the loss of more lives and resources.

Command and Control Structures

A Joint Task Force Commander must properly set up and organize his Command and Control architecture to ensure that he has the appropriate level of command authority, control

and relationships (with the units and organizations operating within and affecting the joint area of operations) in order to achieve his objectives. Effective and efficient command and control is the most critical function, underpinning all other operational functions.

Individually, the remaining functions could operate; but without the proper command and control structure and relationships in place, the commander will not be able to achieve unity of effort nor synergy while attacking the center of gravity and accomplishing the mission's objectives.

Structure and task organization is the most important function of command and control. Without the right structure in place, the headquarters will not be able to function properly. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the command and control structures that were initially in place were adequate enough to execute the initial invasions and major combat operations. Time revealed, however, that the headquarters were not properly setup to evaluate and accomplish the mission when confronted with an insurgency. When the nature of the conflict and the center of gravity changed, neither headquarters properly identified the evolving conditions and continued to execute their initial strategies with devastating results. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the initial command and control structures and relationships were designed to execute major combat operations that resembled the "American Way of War," but were not capable of executing a counterinsurgency strategy that involves all lines of operations, not just the military.

Prior to being selected as the Multi-National Forces-Iraq Commander, General Petraeus testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. After being asked "what he [GEN Petraeus] considered to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq," he referred to the command structure that had been in place "for the first 15 months

or more in Iraq as an inadequate military structure...and it took too long to transform V Corps into CJTF-7...and even when we had a CJTF HQ, it was not capable of looking both up and down (i.e. performing both political-military/strategic functions and serving as the senior operational headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations)...”.⁶ Not only was the headquarters inadequately structured to simultaneously coordinate and synchronize the operating force and the strategic efforts in theater, they were not prepared and “took too long to recognize the growing insurgency and (take) the steps to counter it...”.⁷

Creating separate headquarters, each with a specific mission, provides the commander flexibility and allows him to concentrate on providing guidance and resources to subordinate commanders. Commanders can then focus his and his staff’s effort at their respective missions. GEN Petraeus’ testimony referred to the single CJTF HQ that existed before the creation of the Multi – National Forces – Iraq Headquarters (MNF-I, currently U.S. Forces – Iraq). MNF-I commanded all of the subordinate commands within the Iraq Theater of Operations and was responsible for overall strategic – national issues in Iraq. Underneath MNF-I was Multi – National Corps – Iraq, which was the operational level headquarters and responsible for “war fighting.” Additionally, MNF-I established two more headquarters with specific missions, Multi – National Security Transition Command – Iraq was responsible for the training of the Iraqi security forces and Task Force – 134 was responsible for detainee operations. By creating separate headquarters, the command and control structure was now in place that allowed MNF-I commander to concentrate on the overall theater-strategic objectives and his subordinate commanders to concentrate on their operational objectives.

GEN McChrystal had similar concerns about the command and control structure in Afghanistan. His first major recommendation from his assessment was “to change and focus

on that which ISAF has the most control of: ISAF.”⁸ GEN McChrystal knew he had to change the focus and the operational culture of ISAF. He understood that the best way to change the operational culture was to physically change the way ISAF was organized. First, he wanted to improve unity of command within ISAF and increase unity of effort with the international community. To do so, GEN McChrystal created new subordinate headquarters. A three-star headquarters, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), was formed in between ISAF and the Regional Commands. IJC’s mission was to conduct the daily, operational level warfighting and coordinate the efforts of the Regional Commands. Simultaneously, the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) was created to unify the efforts of US and all of the NATO training teams responsible for building and developing the Afghan National Security Force. Additionally, GEN McChrystal successfully argued to have Operational Control of U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) performing Foreign Internal Defense tasks, similar to the NATO command relationship that he exercised over NATO forces assigned to ISAF SOF.⁹ GEN McChrystal fixed the command and control relationships by reorganizing and aligning the subordinate commands under this new command relationships architecture, allowing him to change the operational culture of the force and increase the unity of effort towards one mission.

Command and Control Relationships

Once the command and control structure is established, Joint Task Force Commanders must focus on the various command relationships and determine how to leverage those relationships to ensure that all organizations are focused on the objective. At the higher operational levels of war, command and control does not just pertain to military organizations but to all organizations that are operating in the Joint Task Force Commander’s

Area of Operations. This includes, but is not limited to, the Department of State, non-governmental agencies and allied nations supporting a coalition operation. Not all of these organizations will fall directly under a military commander for operational or tactical control. In most protracted conflicts, however, the military will be supporting the non-military organization. Getting the proper command and control structure in place will ensure that the correct command relationships are in position, and will thereby clarify how organizations should interact to achieve the stated mission's objectives without wasting resources or creating unnecessary duplication of effort.

GEN Petraeus correctly believed that the "CG MNC-I is the senior operational level commander and the commander MNF-I has a wider responsibility which covers strategic issues and the political/military interface, working with the US Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign...".¹⁰ GEN McChrystal had similar beliefs. He believed that by establishing the IJC to execute the operational level functions, it would "enable the ISAF Headquarters to focus on strategic and operational matters and enhance coordination with GIRoA, UNAMA and the International community."¹¹ By relieving the senior headquarters of the responsibility of the day-to-day operations, they could now focus on long-term strategy issues. One of the best capabilities to come from the relationships formed by the senior operational level commander and the host nation leaders was a partnering plan.

Partnering programs are designed to train the host nation's military capability and their force. This mission has strategic importance. Once a host nation is able to secure its own people, U.S. and coalition forces will not be required to do so. Partnering with host nation forces works at many levels. First, it places a host nation face on the military.

Second, by partnering with a U.S. or Coalition member, the partnering force looks credible and competent to the local populace. Third, the partnering program allows for each force to learn from one another. By working together, the U.S. and Coalition forces are helping to build a stronger military for the host nation. The partnering program is a force multiplier and greatly contributes to mission success.

Host nation partnering comes in many forms. In both Iraq and Afghanistan there have been embedded training teams who are responsible for replicating cadre-like duties in the course of training the host nation forces. These teams receive guidance for training the host nation forces from the training headquarters but receive tactical instructions from an operational headquarters. Two commands might seem counter-productive to the command and undermining unity of command, but what it provides is unity of effort on the training side to ensure there is uniform training being conducted and unity of effort on the operational side because the training teams can act as liaisons between the battle space owners and the host nations.

In Iraq, partnering was not just conducted with the host nation, GEN Petraeus created partnerships at multiple operational levels throughout Iraq. At his appearance before the Senate Armed Service Committee, he discussed how he wanted to enhance the partnership and “to improve interagency cooperation, I applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Brigade Combat Teams...this will provide synergy...in partnership with the Ambassador, to ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop capacity.”¹²

The Department of State and Department of Defense partnered reconstruction teams and Brigade Combat Teams together to maximize the effort and ensure that the

reconstruction tasks are in line with mission's objectives. When there is another nation supporting the reconstruction effort, we try to have U.S. representative on the teams to assist. The PRTs report through the Department of State working in conjunction with the battle space owner. It is the command relationship at the top, either the COM ISAF or COM USF-I, who works directly with the Ambassador as the U.S. Chief of Mission. The partnership programs have become a force multiplier that strengthens the entire force and increases the overall capacity that a force can deliver in the area of operations. Together, they ensure there is a unity of effort taking place and time and resources are not wasted. Again, by having the correct command and control architecture in place, the goal is to achieve the highest degree of unity of command, but when unity of command cannot be achieved, the command relationship at least achieves a high degree of unity of effort.

Getting Command and Control Right

After studying the most recent protracted conflicts, several lessons emerge. First, we can expect over time that the nature (and the enemy) of the conflict, i.e. the center of gravity of the conflict, will adapt and adjust, counter to the direction that we, as an American and/or Coalition force, want. Second, when the nature of conflict does change, the enemy's method of attacking our (friendly) center of gravity will change as well, regardless if our (friendly) center of gravity changes or not. Third, however friendly forces are deployed in the initial phases of the conflict, those forces will need to be reorganized in later phases in order to continue to be an effective force if the nature of the conflict changes.

Iraq and Afghanistan were two conflicts where the enemy evolved and adapted over time. In each of the theaters, it took a long time to recognize that the nature of the conflict and the enemy had changed. After the forces realized that a change had occurred, it took

additional time to determine what exactly the enemy looked like, what the center of gravity was, how to adapt to the enemy's change and then, finally, how to attack it. The headquarters in those theaters were not properly organized or resourced to execute the size and scope of the mission they were assigned after the conflict evolved. Ideally, a Joint Task Force Commander should identify the change in the conflict and gradually change with it. If the Commander is able to identify the change in the conflict, having the correct command and control structure in place will allow him to change his operational culture at each level to match or to get ahead of the change in the conflict. The best outcome, however, would be for the commander to influence the change in the conflict to support his objectives.

Counter-argument

True proponents of the "American Way of War" will support and defend the idea that increasing resources will enable the Joint Task Force Commander to achieve his objectives. In recent conflicts "more resources" has translated into expensive weapons and platforms partnered with highly trained special operation forces or a large contribution by coalition partners. These assets and forces are the hallmarks of high-intensity, short-duration conflict and epitomize the American Way of War. Many will also say there is no need to change the operational culture or the current operational plan. They will defend current strategy and blame the lack of resources as the reason for mission failure and the inability of the Joint Task Force Commander to complete and accomplish his objectives.

What the defenders of "more" have failed to realize is that, sometimes, more is just more. More forces cause escalation, not promote resolution. In 2004 and 2005, if the CJTF HQ in Iraq would have had more forces on the ground, the headquarters could have placed soldiers on every corner on every street and could have secured the neighborhoods, but the

headquarters itself would still have lacked the ability to “look up and down.”¹³ The command and control structure was broken and no amount of troops on the ground would have solved those problems. If the proper command and control structure and relationships are not in place, then more resources will simply produce more of the same results.

Although both Generals Petraeus and McChrystal utilized additional forces that were provided to them; both commanders first had to ensure the correct command and control structure and relationships were in place. Once the commanders had established the needed force structure, they were then able to change the operational culture of their forces. More forces and resources are not required to significantly change the operational culture, but if the proper command and control structure is not in place, then no matter how much the commander wishes to change the way his organizations are operating, the message will not properly be distributed from higher to lower. The additional forces on the ground provided the population security and created additional time for the commanders to implement a change in their forces operational culture.

The proper command and control structure also ensures that relationships are established at the proper places. The senior commanders establish relationships with the senior political advisors and with the host nation’s leaders. Their respective subordinates at lower levels then establish relationships with their counterparts. The structure enables the proper relationships to be effective and directed towards unified objectives. These relationships increase the effectiveness of the mission and the ability to achieve the objectives through unity of command and unity of effort. If more forces and resources were added to this equation without the proper structure and established relationships in place then the forces would be wasting time and energy because there would not be a unified effort.

This was clearly seen in the Afghanistan training mission prior to the creation of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan. Before the NTM-A was established, each deploying unit, regardless of the county, would receive a training mission task, but none of those tasks and missions were synchronized. Adjacent units would be training to different standards and different tasks; every new unit coming into theater would start over. After the headquarters was established, training standards for the instructors were provided and guidance has been given to the training teams. The results have been incredible. The host nation is now fielding an effective force that works in conjunction with the coalition force and is beginning to take the lead on operations.

CONCLUSION

By focusing on the Command and Control architecture and ensuring that it is properly organized to address the nature of the conflict, the Joint Task Force Commander can achieve his operational objectives during a protracted conflict. Getting the command relationships correct was just as important in Iraq, four years ago (with an American force) as it was in Afghanistan, two years ago (with a Coalition force). Unity of command and unity of effort are timeless tenants of war and the operational function of command and control is paramount among the other operational functions. This is especially critical when the nature of the conflict evolves from conventional operations to counterinsurgency.

Getting command and control structures and relationships correct is the most important task for a Joint Task Force. Once the structures for subordinate units are setup, and relationships with non-military organizations are established, everything else will fall into place. “Doubling down on previous strategies” and adding additional resources¹⁴

without the proper command and control structures and relationships in place will not achieve the commanders' objectives, and will only waste time and resources. Having the proper command and control structures and relationships in place provides the Joint Task Force Commander with the incredible degree of flexibility that is required to command his forces and provide guidance to change the operational culture of the force when necessary.

Conventional war allows for simple command and control architectures that focus on executing the military line of operation. When conventional war becomes protracted, however, the headquarters then takes on massive responsibilities with the majority of effort focusing on the diplomatic, economic and information lines of operations. Command and control architectures will fail if not properly setup for these additional requirements. By getting it right from the beginning, the commander will avoid a long, drawn out conflict, maintain support on the home front and prevent loss of life and resources.

NOTES

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. McChrystal, *COMISAF'S Initial Assessment*, 1-1.
2. Ibid, 1-1.
3. Record, "The American Way of War," 3.
4. U.S. Congress, *To Receive Testimony on the Situation in Iraq and Progress made by the Government of Iraq in meeting Benchmarks*, 2.
5. McChrystal, *COMISAF'S Initial Assessment*, 1-1.
6. U.S. Congress, *To Consider the Nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus*, 6 & 8.
7. Ibid, 8.
8. McChrystal, *COMISAF'S Initial Assessment*, 2-11.
9. Ibid, B-1.
10. U.S. Congress, *To Consider the Nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus*, 2.
11. McChrystal, *COMISAF'S Initial Assessment*, 2-14.
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14. McChrystal, *COMISAF'S Initial Assessment*, 1-1.

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