Policy Failures in the Graveyard of Empires: How Policymakers Let the Soldiers Down in the British, the Soviet, and the American Wars in Afghanistan
Abstract
This monograph examines the role of policy makers in guiding the British, Soviet, and U.S.-NATO wars in Afghanistan. Set in the context of Afghanistan's history and its sociocultural environment, the study critically analyzes the negative impact of policy failures -- acts of omission as well as commission -- on the conduct and outcome of these three wars. Holding Afghanistan's physical environment constant, the monograph examines numerous policy variables, including the evolution of grand strategy, resource allocation, governance, and security force assistance. Analysis of selected aspects of the First Anglo-Afghan War and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan highlights several policy missteps and miscalculations that today's policy makers could have avoided in Afghanistan. The author contends that the incompetence and myopia of the policy makers overseeing the U.S.-NATO effort in Afghanistan are responsible for squandering the military gains made there and for the failure to guide these wars to their strategic end-state. In conclusion, the author sets forth a set of recommendations for both policy makers and operational artists.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 19, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA546320
Entities
People
- Mehar O. Khan
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College