

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) (04-05-2011)		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Adapting Clausewitz to the Information Age: How Traditional News Media and Social Networking are Combining to Expand the Triangle				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major David Eric Violand Paper Advisors: CDR James Dalton, Prof. Paul Romanski				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Office of the Provost Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
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15. SUBJECT TERMS Clausewitz, Information, Media, Social Networking, Nature of War, Trinity					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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Newport, R.I.**

**Adapting Clausewitz to the Information Age: How Traditional News Media and
Modern Social Networking are Combining to Expand the Triangle**

by

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Major, United States Army

**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

Signature:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David Eric Violand', written over a horizontal line.

4 May 2011

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Abstract

While advancing technology has not altered the intangible attributes that define war's nature, it has changed and expanded the tangible contexts that contain those intangible attributes. As such, Clausewitz's triangle is no longer sufficient by itself to account for evolving information conduits and the tangible players who influence and direct that flow. This paper redefines the term "media" to include both traditional global news media and individual persons who, being social networking participants, serve as both producers and consumers of news. It introduces a new construct—a pentagon—that provides a more modern and useful means of examining war's nature. It examines the changing dynamic of the military-media relationship as it relates to Clausewitz's triangle from the Vietnam War to the current Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the paper draws conclusions on the implications of expanding the triangle and makes recommendations for the necessary evolution of Defense Department policy and joint doctrine on information management and media interaction.

INTRODUCTION

A little less than two hundred years ago, Carl von Clausewitz proposed that the nature of war was best represented by the complex interaction between the trinity of passion, rational calculus and chance. As example, he described an object suspended between three magnets, whose random pattern of rotation belies the notion of predicting let alone controlling such patterns, and supports the chaotic essence at the center of his nature of war.¹ Yet while this trinity, paired with the fog and friction inherent in combat represents the closest one can hope for understanding the true nature of war, Clausewitz provided an example of more physical aspects by which his abstract principles might be better understood and utilized.²

In this example, the metaphysical tendencies—passion, chance, rationale calculus—find their representations in the interconnected and equally complex interactions of three aspects: the people, the military and the government. These aspects and their interactions with one another are collectively referred to as Clausewitz’s triangle.³ But unlike the trinity, the shape representing the interaction of these physical actors retains no rigidity. To expand upon the shape neither alters Clausewitz’s original theory nor redefines the interaction of the tendencies that exist within the physical construct. In this way, calls to “square the triangle” by adding a material dimension in light of the advances brought about by the Industrial Revolution can be viewed as a practical update to the triangle, a reimagining that is both necessary and proper with the passage of time.⁴

The implication of this reasoning is that while advancing technology has not altered the intangible attributes that define war’s nature, it has changed and expanded the tangible contexts that contain those attributes. This is especially true for the way in which those

tangible players—people, government, and military—interact with information, and the evolving means by which that information is generated, filtered, and received within the public domain. The conduits by which people (as components of all aspects of the triangle) receive their information—their news—have changed. As such, Clausewitz’s triangle is no longer sufficient by itself to account for evolving information conduits and the tangible players who influence and direct that flow.

The term “media” is thus re-defined to include both traditional global news media and individual persons who, being social networking participants, serve as both producers and consumers of news.⁵ This definition of media offers a more modern, useful, and necessary view of war’s nature and an innovative centerpiece around which Defense Department policy and joint doctrine on information management and media interaction must themselves evolve in the 21st century.

I. THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF A “MASTER OF WAR”⁶

“[P]art of the professional military value of reading On War is that it forces the reader to ponder Clausewitz’s ideas. By engaging in this rewarding process, the reader develops his own concepts and emerges with more profound insights into the various aspects of warfare.”⁷

Clausewitz hoped that his theory would serve as a source of illumination, a means by which the constituent elements of war could be broken down and their separate parts discerned and further analyzed.⁸ In this way, his theory would “act as a guide to anyone who wanted to learn about war from books,” easing progress, training judgment and helping to avoid pitfalls.⁹ His trinitarian analysis offers a foundation that captures the ambiguous nature of war as “more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”¹⁰ Within this context, Clausewitz introduces his three dominant tendencies that, despite these uncertain conditions, persist in every case.

In his own words, Clausewitz defines these tendencies as “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.”¹¹ Together, these intangible attributes act as a keystone upon which all further analysis should gain strength and stability, leading Clausewitz to conclude that “[the reader’s} task...is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies,” and creates a “conception of war... [that] will be the first ray of light into the fundamental structure of theory.”¹² The idea of his conception of war as but the *first ray of light* should not be dismissed as mere colorful language. In building upon the trinitarian keystone, he almost invites the reader to amplify and strengthen the complexities that augment their understanding of the nature of war, and the triangle provides the perfect means by which to accomplish this challenge.

II. MATERIAL, INFORMATION AND A DEFINITION FOR MEDIA

Before discussion in support of elevating media as an equal aspect of the triangle can occur, three problematic areas that run counter to that proposition must be addressed. First, the issue of utilizing Michael Handel’s “material dimension” as a genesis for further expansion. Second, the argument for expansion using the concept of information in lieu of media. Third, the problem of defining the term *media* and thus shaping the aspect.

The first issue stems from the problematic means by which Handel attempts to modify Clausewitz’s triangle with the addition of “a fourth dominant tendency comprised of a material, economic and technological dimension.”¹³ Note the choice of *dominant tendency* as the addition and not *aspect*. Handel argues that since war is ultimately a clash of physical forces, “it cannot be understood without its physical, economic and technological

dimensions.”¹⁴ Handel then forms a counterargument to his own proposal by noting that “there is no need to add a fourth dominant tendency if we simply examine Clausewitz’s trinity against a material dimension” but counters that “adding a fourth dimension seems more precise because it puts the material environment on equal footing with the other three dominant tendencies.”¹⁵

While the logic behind Handel’s proposal for the addition of a material dimension is sound, he errs in his proposed expansion of the trinity and not the amplification of the triangle. This error is clearly demonstrated in his graphic portrayal of “squaring the triangle.” On each side of his triangle is placed a tendency of the metaphysical trinity, in this case primordial violence (passion), chance, and political calculations (rational calculus). Each of these tendencies is married to the respective aspect to which Clausewitz assigned them, violence to people, chance to military and political calculations to government. From here, Handel draws an arrow to his newly introduced square, where the tendencies of passion, chance and reason have been removed and only the people, military and government remain with the awkward addition of “economic and financial strength, technology (the material dimension).”¹⁶

To elaborate, each of the aspects works because of its nature as a physical actor, giving the metaphysical tendencies that comprise Clausewitz’s trinity form and function. While the addition of a material aspect to the triangle is completely acceptable, a much more logical and beneficial additive in support of Handel’s argument would have been either Industry or the independent Contractors that are so relevant to the material and economic issues that bear upon the modern discussions of war and armament. The addition of these *physical aspects* would negate “Clausewitz’s general omission of the material aspects of

war” that Handel cites as a major weakness without altering the trinity directly.¹⁷ More importantly, a model for future expansion that focuses on the aspects of the triangle is more clearly constructed.

But which aspects should be added? In our current age, myriad joint military publications, field manuals and doctrinal writings espouse the importance that information plays on the modern battlefield.¹⁸ The concept of information, its control, dominance and management is a known and embraced field within the military that appears much more suited towards elevation than media. Indeed, even the title *Information Age* seems to lend support to this notion. From this perspective, the weight of evidence seems to point towards expanding the triangle in this way. But this notion is fallacy; to proceed in this direction produces a construction on par with Handel’s demonstrated error.

The best counter to this argument is the use of an oversimplified example; in this case, the metaphor of the tree falling in the woods, with no one around. Does it make a sound? While the logical answer is yes, the point remains both valid and useful as a comparison between information and media. To extend the metaphor, suppose that our tree is found after several hours by a villager with certain preconceptions about the world in which he lives. He continues his travels out of the forest and relates a story of the tree’s falling to the next villager he meets, expanding upon *how* the tree fell down and what the sound of the crash *must have been* like. The fact that he was not there to witness the actual action is irrelevant at this point, as is the tree itself. Nor can he be accused of lying outright; his extrapolation of events may even be exact but even this is of relative importance. The fact remains that the information carries little weight when compared with the manner and medium by which it is transferred. In this light, the value of information as an aspect is

lessened when viewed in comparison with the other aspects of people, government and military. Like Handel's material dimension, information permeates throughout the relationship between all of these actors; to separate it as an independent aspect would have the effect of lessening its value to each of them.

How then is the term media defined? While definitions of information and the operations that support its management and control exist throughout the military, no Joint publication, Army, Navy or Air Force manual has a definition for the term media. In the Merriam-Webster dictionary it remains limited to its origin as a plural of the word medium, while the connotation with news media is acknowledged it is cited as improper English language. In the vernacular, the term media is used synonymously with a number of other terms—mass media, news media, global media, modern media—which each have slightly different meanings and connotations.


If media is to assume a position on equal footing with the other aspects of Clausewitz's triangle, it must have a definition that captures more than just the familiar mediums of modern television, print and radio news media. It must be broadened to encapsulate the social networking that is changing the way in which the information constituting news is produced, transferred and consumed. To put another way, the web blogger who is posting his or her thoughts on the Internet has as much right to be called media in the modern era as does the CNN anchor giving television updates to a much larger audience. Advancing technology and the ever-decreasing transfer time from message producer to message consumer have made this a reality. Emerging definitions such as personal social networks (Facebook), blogs (WordPress), micro-blogs (Twitter), audio (BlogTalkRadio), video (YouTube), collaborative tools (GoogleDocs), and wikis (TWiki)

must be accounted for.¹⁹ Thus is the term media broadened and re-introduced. In support of its elevation as an aspect of the triangle, media is defined as *a collective term for the public and/or private entities, persons and organizations that communicate messages, stories or events to a broader/larger population with the intent to influence other public and/or private entities, persons and organizations.*²⁰

Influence, in this case, need not be limited to pure financial gain,²¹ it can just as easily be a desired expansion of one's personal contacts or the intent of merely gaining additional readership. And the question of what constitutes *news* is of limited relevance in a world where the daily activities of a Hollywood starlet are given equal or more weight than a multi-country bombing campaign in northern Africa. Armed with this definition, and a focus clearly aimed at a physical vice metaphysical expansion, the stage is set for elevating media as an aspect whose influence, importance and interactions are equal to those of the people, military and government in amplifying our understanding of the modern nature of war.

III. A NEW SHAPE EMERGES

Acceptance of a redefined media into a relationship of equality with the triangle's previous aspects generates a new construct—a pentagon—that accounts for the increased independence and influence this entity exerts upon the



other physical actors. This pentagon is comprised of the three original aspects of government, people and military, and the additional aspects of media and industry. The new construct offers several advantages to its predecessors. First, the inclusion of industry captures Handel's material argument and accounts for the economic and industrial players whose impact and influence were missing from Clausewitz's original construct.²² Of equal importance, the construct in no way alters the intangible attributes that comprise Clausewitz's trinity. The tendencies of chance, passion and rationale calculus remain battered about inside of the pentagon, moving in a random and uneven pattern between the increased numbers of physical aspects. To utilize Clausewitz's original example of the object suspended between three magnets, the three tendencies become three distinct objects while the five aspects serve as an increased number of magnets. The result is an increasingly chaotic motion that introduces the possibility of occasional collision between the suspended objects and offers a more realistic and modern view of the interaction between the aspects and the tendencies that define the nature of war. Finally, the new construct accounts for the importance of the information field, not as a separate realm, but as an ethereal element that is critical to the interaction of all of the physical aspects.²³ In doing so, the construct accounts for the role which the media plays in influencing this process.

Media has always held a special relationship in interacting with the people, government and military. The American military experience in particular is tightly bound in relationship to the concept of a free and independent press; from Concord and Lexington to San Juan Hill the media has been a constant influence and dynamic shaper of decision-making by military and government leaders.²⁴ But while this influence may be found throughout history, the critical factor for expanding the Triangle is the dramatic decrease

between activity and reporting that has come about due to the technological revolutions of the Information Age. This growth process, beginning with the advent of television reporting, a formative transition to global broadcasting, and the ongoing expansion towards internet and satellite based social networking, serves as the major catalyst for transitioning to the pentagon construct.

IV. TELEVISION AND THE MEDIA IN VIETNAM

“Historians must only guess at the effect that television would have had during earlier conflicts on the future of this nation: during the Korean War...or World War II, the Battle of the Bulge, or when our men were slugging it out in Europe...” –President Lyndon B. Johnson, addressing the National Association of Broadcasters in April 1968, one day after announcing he would not seek re-election.²⁵

Vietnam is referred to as the Television War.²⁶ For the first time in history, streaming images blasted to a fascinated national audience in near-real time presented a dynamic that political and military leaders, let alone the public themselves, had not previously been forced to deal with. *Seeing is believing* and *a picture is worth a thousand words* are useful in this instance for the emotive power they help to communicate. These idioms capture the power of communication that television represented, a power dominated not by the government or military, but by an independent press with an independent agenda.

While the media’s role in driving military or political decisions should not be overemphasized it would be equally ignorant to deny the impact of television on each of the aspects of the triangle. Indeed, Johnson’s famous “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America,” statement merits little question as to the value he placed on the influence of the press.²⁷ And while the media is hardly to be blamed for the social upheaval and violence occurring throughout America that was so critical a factor in shaping collective public perception of the government’s handling of the Vietnam War, to diminish the media as merely an unbiased reporter of events is equally unsound.

The military-media relationship in particular, grew to be adversarial. Television coverage of the TET offensive in particular has left a popular memory of “a hyperbolic account of a battle that cost the Vietcong huge losses but that undermined American confidence.”²⁸ Michael Sweeney brilliantly captures the changing military-media dynamic by titling respective chapters on WWII and Korea/Vietnam “On the Team” and “The Great Divorce.”²⁹ The credibility gap that developed between what journalists “heard from military spokesmen and what they saw when accompanying troops into battle” shaped a combative military-media relationship that would persist for the next twenty years.³⁰

Adopting the pentagon construct offers a unique perspective on the conduct of the war that better captures the significance of the U.S. media’s role without assigning culpability. This perspective is enhanced by adopting Handel’s suggestion that a complete understanding of war’s nature can only be achieved in analyzing the interacting aspects unique *to all parties* in the conflict.³¹ Hence, it is the relationship *between* the media and government, military, people and industry that provides insight into the nature of the war. To complete this insight, a complex comparison that takes into account the pentagons of then North and South Vietnam as well as the pentagons of China and the Soviet Union would be constructed, demonstrating the true impact of the media as an independent actor influencing each party to the conflict. This dynamic would grow increasingly complex as technology advanced.

V. GLOBALIZED MEDIA AND TWO WARS IN THE GULF

“This was a new, tough age for the military, fighting a war as it was being reported. We could not, in a country pledged to free expression, simply turn off the press. But we were going to have to find a way to live with this unprecedented situation.”—General Colin Powell³²

If Vietnam signaled the origin of a transformative era in military-media relations, the first Gulf War represented the convergence of that genesis with the globalizing potential that

arose from the “flattening of the world”³³ and the ever-shrinking time between action and reporting. The idea of media as an external factor to be marginalized and controlled came to dominate the attitudes of senior military leaders and was evident during both the Grenada and the Panama crises.³⁴ When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, those attitudes remained. U.S. Central Command’s policy during the early days of Operation Desert Shield fixated on controlling media access through the use of constant escorts, rampant censorship and inflexible press pools that offered a narrow view of fighting.³⁵ Yet for all these protocols, media control was an elusive reality.

The broadcast deregulation of the 1980s had altered the landscape of television networks, creating larger corporations that incorporated many of the smaller, locally owned stations.³⁶ Ted Turner’s Cable News Network (CNN) was one of these corporations. From its founding in 1980, CNN offered round-the-clock news on cable, with updated news cycles every fifteen minutes.³⁷ When the bombing of Baghdad commenced in January 1990, television viewers had a real-time connection to events occurring within the enemy capital.³⁸ Indeed, “Americans learned of the start of the war not from their government but from their televisions.”³⁹

From start to finish, this war would be prosecuted in a “live” manner, with the media playing an important role in the decision-making cycles of all three aspects of the triangle. Well known cases of media coverage demonstrate this impact, from the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker and the resultant military decision to limit targeting within Baghdad, to the air strikes against fleeing Iraqi military columns jammed to a halt along the Mutlah Ridge.⁴⁰ In the latter case, the media’s portrayal of these tactical actions resulted in discussions that influenced the decision to cease the offensive and end the war, even at the cost of certain

military factors.⁴¹ Then National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft went so far as to say in his memoirs, “We had all become increasingly concerned over impressions being created in the press about the ‘highway of death’ from Kuwait City to Basra.”⁴²

The media’s increased influence on the government and military stemmed from the power of real-time message transfer as well as the globalization of the professional field that was beginning to occur. Trans-national corporations, aided by satellite technology and the advent of the internet, found themselves suddenly able to “bypass national regulations and boundaries and get foreign programming and information into countries which had previously tried to limit foreign messages.”⁴³ In this reality, sentiment like that of CNN’s Peter Arnett who said he was “‘in Baghdad for the people who watch CNN’ and not the American government” took on a whole new meaning.⁴⁴ The relationship between media, government and people was not immune to the growing reality of a flattened world where *the people* had become a much more globalized concept that had little to do with nations or ethnicities. The transfer of information to audiences across the globe was, from a military and governmental perspective, becoming an increasingly difficult entity to influence and control.

It took the shock of terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 to generate an acceptance of this reality on the part of the military. The lessons of Vietnam were replaced with the lessons of the first Gulf War, and the war in Iraq would not be a rehash of the demonstrated poor policies of pools, escorts and censorship.⁴⁵ Instead, the concept of “embedding” professional journalists within military units came to serve as the backbone of the military’s efforts to “tell the factual story—good or bad—before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions.”⁴⁶ In doing so, the military hoped to obtain not only

American public support of their efforts but also support of “the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition, and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement.”⁴⁷

While media members enjoyed a more open environment from which to report on the war, the newly liberated environment quickly demonstrated that western media conglomerates held no monopoly on reporting. Emerging media outlets such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya began to tell a story that was inherently foreign and often at odds with that of their major western-based competitors. Out of this more global competitive system came well known stories— the Abu Ghraib abuse story, the “double tap” of a wounded Iraqi in Fallujah, the chaos and violence of nighttime raids into Iraqi homes and others like them—that within the United States, drove not only military change, but dramatically influenced the interactions of the people and government as well.⁴⁸

VI. SOCIAL NETWORKING AND AFGHANISTAN

“With the internet being the primary source of information for individuals born after 1987, social media is quickly becoming mainstream media.” –CJCS 2010 Social Media Strategy⁴⁹

If viewed alone, the globalized media and its demonstrated ability to influence the people, government and military would warrant a shift to the pentagon construct. But to view media in this limited manner would be to deny the importance of the ongoing expansion of social networking and the rising impact of individuals acting as media. Dr. Mark Drapeau and Dr. Linton Wells II capture the essence of this changing media dynamic in their article Social Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment. “Communication on the Internet,” they write, “is no longer a controlled, organized, exclusive, product driven monologue; it is an authentic, transparent, inclusive, user-driven dialogue.”⁵⁰ They go on to

state that “increasingly, people who habitually use the Internet are not only browsers or readers, but also providers and participants.”⁵¹ This is the basis of the social networking revolution, one in which “an increasingly fragmented media, combined with a technologically empowered public within which everyone has the ability to act as a collector, analyst, reporter, and publisher leaves more opportunities—and pitfalls—to engage than ever before.”⁵² Indeed, “the people participating in these conversations,” write Drapeau and Wells, “have less trust in mainstream media messaging and traditional advertising, and more trust in word-of-mouth conversations within their social networks.”⁵³

The ongoing war in Afghanistan provides a useful tableau for understanding the implications of this shift and highlights the increasing importance that media holds in shaping modern wars. Indeed, the case of counter-insurgency warfare in a fragmented nation-state provides a highly effective example for demonstrating the value of the new pentagon construct. In examining Afghanistan under this model, the people, government and military aspects align both with the pro-American Karzai state as well as the Taliban led insurgency, both constructs seemingly sharing the people aspect in an attempt to gain influence and support over the other.

For the Karzai government, the industry aspect becomes foreign investing as well as Afghan led attempts at creating economic stimulation, for the Taliban this aspect is dominated by the opium trade and foreign financial support. Returning to the media aspect, the Afghan pentagon is much more complex than that of its Taliban counterpart; the former having concern for internal media, social networking and western and global media. The Taliban meanwhile, have the advantage of a much simpler focus—that of the Afghan populace themselves. With the additions of the U.S. and Coalition pentagons, neighboring

states with a vested interest and non-state actors who may have their own means and reasons for influencing the nature of the war, one quickly develops a sense for the complexity of the war.

The result of this paper geometry is a realization that the changes inherent in the shift to a social networking- centric news exchange have rendered the accepted view of media-military interaction obsolete. Only by elevating the importance of the media aspect and adopting the pentagon construct can the true impact of media's influence on the nature of war be acknowledged. This fact sets the stage for a serious discussion on how US military leaders must readdress the dominating views of both information operations and public affairs (PA) interaction.

VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING THE TRIANGLE

“Rather than message consumers, audiences exchanging messages in the new media sphere are called prosumers because they both produce and consume messages.” –Timothy Cunningham, Deputy Program Manager at the DNI Open Source Center⁵⁴

The expansion from Clausewitz's triangle to the pentagon construct offers a centerpiece around which the current policy and joint doctrine governing information management and media interaction must evolve. The means through which people communicate is changing. This reality is necessitating a change in the way the military to press interaction that currently remains tied to a view of these instances as means of delivering a message to a target audience.⁵⁵ In actuality, press conferences and prepared statements are fast becoming “incomplete actions” that neglect “the follow-on conversation that takes place in the new media sphere once the press conference has concluded.”⁵⁶

The military's understanding of information management is flawed in that it fails to account for the diminishing importance of information messaging that moves from producer

through professional news filter to consumers. While individual leaders within the military have recognized the changing dynamic and established modern media accounts such as Twitter and Facebook, they still trend towards viewing these accounts as a means for messaging on behalf of their respective organizations, woefully ignorant of the shift towards individual-based communications dialogue.⁵⁷ This failure stems from a misunderstanding of the new media systems as alternate means for messaging when they actually represent a broader change. Put a different way, whereas previously the concept of creating a unified narrative was deemed as more important than the individual story, the new reality finds the individual story as more important than the unified narrative. This is true for a number of reasons, the most prevalent being the change to an information exchange environment where the dialogue has become a more important feature than the message.⁵⁸

How then does the military succeed in this new media arena? By individualizing the messaging and creating a de-centralized narrative that arises not from top-down guidance but from bottom to top layering, what Timothy Cunningham has termed “*delegation thru distribution*.”⁵⁹ While this concept exacerbates the idea of management, it accounts for the reality that media consumers who are also producers will be much more inclined to accept influence from individuals vice organizations. The sheer volume of information flow that will result from removing the constraints against individual messaging and allowing our best assets—our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines—to actively become our media outlets offsets the risk that arises from loosening control at the top. There is also room to re-imagine the current PA construct⁶⁰, expanding the branch in all services to focus on training and education and pushing the organization even further down into our military structures. One can easily see the benefit of this in a country like Afghanistan, where the segmented

population has driven the institution of concepts like the district support team that incorporate State Department and USAID experts—why not media capability as well?

A paradigm shift is already occurring. The necessary question becomes whether military leaders will remain focused on management of information as the nexus of this paradigm shift, or broaden their views to encompass a dissection of the causal factors that are behind the change. If such a dialogue does occur the pentagon construct provides a necessary nexus, missing from previous examinations of information operations and media interaction, around which the true value of media and its increasing importance in defining the nature of war should be centered.

CONCLUSION: JOINING THE DIALOGUE

“I just saw 12 sites virtually conducting a cordon/search from Bn to individual key leader engagement w/intelligent avatars. We're learning.” –GEN Martin Dempsey, Army Chief of Staff on his Twitter Site.⁶¹

Despite globalization, information value remains largely dependent on a person's point of view—perception is still reality. Put another way, “truthiness” or “truth that comes from the gut” and not from books,⁶² is arguably as important as the truth itself. Technology has exponentially multiplied the amount of information available to create these individual accounts of truthiness and while these changes have not altered the basic tendencies that define war's nature—violence, chance, and the rationale calculus that must seek to control these metaphysical notions—they must be accounted for. The expanded construct of the pentagon offers a means to achieve this end. The US military should embrace this construct in as much as it can and push for a renewed approach to media relations. When consumers are also producers, every perspective matters. By joining the dialogue and expanding the perspective with which Clausewitz's theories are approached, the *truth* of his argument is amplified and military leaders are better prepared to confront the reality of future wars.

NOTES

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

² Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (2nd Edition, Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996), 106-11.

³ *Ibid*, 104.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ Timothy Cunningham, "Strategic Communication in the New Media Sphere," *JFQ*, no. 59, (4th qtr, 2010), 110-112, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/strategic-communication-new-media-sphere.html>, (accessed 3 May 2011).

⁶ Handel, *Masters of War*. Taken from the title of his book.

⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Who is Afraid of Carl von Clausewitz?*, 6th Edition (1997), www.clausewitz.com/readings/Handel/Handlart.htm, (accessed 3 May 2011).

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 89.

¹¹ Clausewitz, as interpreted by Christopher Bassford, "Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity," *The Clausewitz Homepage*, section 28 (2007), <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm>, (accessed 3 May 2011).

¹² *Ibid*. Emphasis added.

¹³ Handel, *Masters of War*, 109.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 107.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 109.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 110.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 109.

¹⁸ Information Operations are addressed in Joint Publication 3-13, Army Field Manual 3-13 and Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.10.

¹⁹ Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II, *Social Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment*, National Defense University, April 2009), 1-2, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497525 (accessed 3 May 2011)

²⁰ It remains to be seen how the emerging impact of individuals functioning as creators of news will impact the concept of press as a profession. It is also unclear how the concepts of individual privacy and freedom of the press will be dealt with in terms of libel and expectation of privacy within the courts.

²¹ Shirley Biagi, *Media/Impact: An Introduction to Mass Media*, Eighth Edition (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 11.

²² Handel, *Masters of War*, 106-110.

²³ Tina S. Kracke, "Mass Media: The Ether Pervading the Clausewitzian Trinity," School of Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), 1-3.

²⁴ Johanna Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 41-69.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 170. The quote was given the day after President Johnson's public announcement that he would not run for reelection.

²⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, "Vietnam: The Television War" *Daedalus*, Vol. 111, No. 4, (Fall, 1982), www.jstor.org/stable/1903610, (accessed 3 May 2011).

²⁷ Neuman, 179.

²⁸ Michael S. Sweeney, *The Military and the Press: An Uneasy Truce* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2006), 146.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 93, 121.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 140.

³¹ Handel, *Masters of War*, 106-107.

³² Colin Powell and Joseph Perisco, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 433.

³³ Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 1-12.

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- ³⁴ Sweeney, 151-8.
- ³⁵ Ibid, 160.
- ³⁶ Biagi, 240.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Sweeney, 166-7.
- ³⁹ Ibid, 166.
- ⁴⁰ Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 324-28, 418.
- ⁴¹ Ibid, 404-18.
- ⁴² George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998), 485.
- ⁴³ Hamid Mowlana, "Globalization and Mass Media: Opportunities for the South," *Cooperation South*, no. II (1998), 24, ssc.undp.org/uploads/media/cop9826.pdf
- ⁴⁴ Sweeney, 169.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, 184.
- ⁴⁶ Phillip Seib, *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 52.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, 53.
- ⁴⁸ Jackie Northam, "The Lasting Impact of Abu Ghraib," *Morning Edition*, National Public Radio, 8 min., 28 April 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4622786> (accessed 3 May 2011).
- ⁴⁹ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs, *Social Media and Online Strategy for 2010*, March 23, 2010, 1, <http://www.slideshare.net/DepartmentofDefense/chairmans-2010-social-media-strategy>, (accessed 3 May 2011).
- ⁵⁰ Drapeau and Wells, 3.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² Ibid, 31.
- ⁵³ Ibid, 3.
- ⁵⁴ Cunningham, 111.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid, 110-112.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid, 112, emphasis included in quotation.
- ⁶⁰ Public Affairs operations are addressed in Joint Publication 3-61 and in Army Field Manual 46-1.
- ⁶¹ Martin E. Dempsey, Chief of Staff of the Army, posted on Twitter at 3:40 AM, Feb 24th via Mobile Web, (accessed 3 May 2011).
- ⁶² Stephen Colbert, *The Colbert Report*, Comedy Central, 30 min., October 17, 2005.

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