Lessons for Libya? Flawed Policy and the Inevitability of Military Failure: The Anglo-French Suez Expedition of 1956
Abstract
If war is an extension of policy, then it can be naturally derived that wars will not succeed if based upon poor policy. No doubt the use of force in the modern geo-political environment is a delicate matter and, should armed intervention be advocated, the realization must exist among decision-making principals that no amount of tactical brilliance can overcome either gross political miscalculations or ambiguous strategy. The sum effect of bad policy is failure. Perhaps no lesson demonstrates this axiom more than the Suez crisis of 1956. The disastrous outcome of the Anglo-French expedition of that year was not the result of tactical incompetence, but rather a consequence of flawed policy. Fundamentally flawed policy will inherently manifest itself in poor campaign design. The Anglo-French Suez expedition of 1956 - known as Operation REVISE - may have proven largely successful tactically, but its greater failure was a result of myopic administration at the national level. By not allowing the conduct of a military operation of scope necessary to achieve stated strategic objectives, the failure of REVISE was preordained. Political limitations are expected in the conduct of military operations; however, should those limitations become too great it becomes prudent to pursue other alternatives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 28, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA546444
Entities
People
- Brian C. Collins
Organizations
- United States Special Operations Command