Vulnerability of C2 Networks to Attack: Measuring the Topology of Eleven Dutch Army C2 Systems
Abstract
Effective Command and Control (C2) depends on a reliable networking infrastructure. Under current Royal Netherlands Army doctrine, C2 networks are designed to provide the connectivity, bandwidth, and low latency needed for military operations. Additionally, best practice provides redundancy against hardware and software failures. It is implicitly assumed that this redundancy also protects against the effects of enemy action. A recent development in mathematical network theory is the investigation of network resilience. Research shows that, depending on the topology, network robustness can differ greatly according to the way in which nodes or arcs are removed. In particular, scale-free networks are robust when nodes are removed randomly, but are vulnerable to targeted attack. To apply these results to the military domain, we need to measure the topology of existing C2 networks. In the 12th ICCRTS, Grant et al (2007) speculated that C2 networks, like the Internet and the World Wide Web, are scale-free networks. The purpose of this paper is to report the results of measuring the topology of eleven Royal Netherlands Army C2 systems, modeled as networks. These measurements confirm our speculation, with modeling guidelines emerging as a by-product of the research. We discuss the implications and make recommendations for doctrine and for further research. The presentation includes briefing charts.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA546904
Entities
People
- B. C. Buizer
- R. J. Bertelink
- T. J. Grant