Deception Detection in Multicultural Coalitions: Foundations for a Cognitive Model
Abstract
Decision makers in command and intelligence centers need better methods of dealing with deceptive information before it influences and degrades the outcome of command decisions. Deception poses unique threats to coalitions that are less likely to occur with individual forces. The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II outlines an ontology of deception; Section III describes deception theory and presents common deception themes; Section IV explores cognition and the use of heuristics; Section V describes a high-level deception-detection model called the Preparation, Deception, and Reaction (PDR) model; Section VI presents some observations and hypotheses; Section VII discusses the importance of deception detection in coalition command and intelligence centers, and provides some examples of practical use of the PDR model; Section VIII discusses group bias and detection challenges; Section IX considers deception detection with regard to group membership; Section X describes the larger infrastructure necessary to support the use of the PDR model, specifically an open-systems environment supported by a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA); and Section XI suggests directions for future research in this area. The presentation includes briefing charts.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA546908
Entities
People
- James B. Law
- Joan Kaina
- Kevin Liu
- Marion G. Ceruti
- Scott C. Mcgirr
Organizations
- Naval Information Warfare Systems Command