

A TALE OF TWO ARMY DOCTRINES: WHICH WAY FORWARD?

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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WHICH WAY FORWARD?**

by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines two strategies for fighting limited wars and attempts to illustrate how the context of the conflict and the ethos of the United States should fashion an appropriate strategy. The two strategies juxtaposed in this paper are Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency. Although similar in application at the tactical level of war, these two strategies vary widely at the strategic and operational level of war and impact significantly on the legitimacy of the intervening parties, international support, and the host government. Through an examination of American history, values, and biases this study concludes that a strategy of peace operations is more effective at delivering a lasting stability and eventual peace than counterinsurgency operations. Peace operations allow for legitimate self-determination and a lasting peaceful resolution of the underlying cause of the conflict.

A TALE OF TWO ARMY DOCTRINES: WHICH WAY FORWARD?

Introduction

The year is now 2011 and the United States has been at the current round of active conflict since 2001 in Afghanistan and since 2003 in Iraq. Throughout the course of these conflicts the debate among strategists; academics; military and civilian practitioners; and educational and political think tanks as to what the appropriate strategies, operations, and tactics should be to protect the United States citizens and their interests has yielded an intense debate that has at times become polarizing among the groups mentioned. Part of the polarization stems from not having properly dissecting what it is that we are trying to achieve in light of who we are as a nation and where we find our perceived interests threatened.

In the midst of these debates, the military, specifically the Army and Marine Corps, developed a purportedly new doctrine called Counterinsurgency (COIN) that was published in December 2006. Arguably this doctrine began influencing the fighting forces in mid to late 2007 as the military formations began their train-up for their respective rotations into Iraq and Afghanistan. At this juncture Afghanistan was relatively peaceful and apparently a success story. Throughout 2007 and 2008 the fight in Iraq captured the attention of the world as several disparate factions escalated sectarian violence in Iraq to unprecedented levels. This escalation of violence was nearly concurrent with the publication of the Counterinsurgency manual and commensurate with a significant surge of United States military forces to Iraq. Although subsequent to the surge of 2007 Iraqi security forces continued to be formed, a significant base of Iraqi Security Force formations were fielded that had been recruited,

trained', and formed beginning in 2003. The intermediate success of reducing violence during the surge of 2007 was realized in no small measure from the indigenous forces, developed based on peace and stability operations doctrine from 2004 to 2006, which were just completing their fielding schedule. The hailed COIN success of the surge coincided with the surge of prepared indigenous Iraqi Security forces and no change in applied doctrine.

Now that there is precarious success in Iraq with Operation New Dawn and a counterinsurgent approach evolving in Afghanistan that commenced with the surge of 2009, it appears as if COIN is given credit as the strategy and tactic that have enabled success. If counterinsurgency has become the latest "aphorism or slogan which provides the premises for policy decisions", it certainly would not be without precedence.¹ In most circles of the United States Government COIN has become the currency of the realm. The key proponents of this doctrine have been the leadership in the Central Command area of responsibility, specifically Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS. While it is commonly accepted that the proximate cause of our success in the "surge" was the adoption of COIN doctrine given the inertia that already existed in the United States military and the timing of the doctrinal assumption of command of Field Manual 3-24, perhaps the very assumptions that underlie COIN doctrine limit its appropriateness as a strategy to support US interests and do not adequately account for an appropriate environmental analysis of the struggles we are facing in many parts of the world.

As we approach the question that is the title of this paper, it is important to deconstruct the problem. First we will reexamine the nature of war, deduce why entities

make war, consider the context of conflict of war today, and examine whether ethno-national conflict is a counterinsurgency, and the appropriateness of a Counterinsurgency doctrine to facilitate and further the US national interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Defining War

Let us start with the question: What is war? Before we tackle this one head-on we ought to either address the meaning of peace, war's antithesis, or frame the two in a relative context; this paper argues that peace and war are the extreme poles of human existence and their difference is only a relative one on a scale of continual conflict. This position assumes that conflict is the natural state of man. Edward Luttwak states in *Strategy*, his recently updated treatise on the logic of war and peace, with an analysis of the Roman maxim; "If you want peace, prepare for war". His premise is that this contradictory argument is a paradox and that it is contradictory only if one views them as achievable opposites.² If one accepts that conflict is the natural state of human existence, then peace and war are relative to the degree and type of conflict that humans are engaging in at a particular time. So, what we have in the human condition would be a degree of conflict, the lesser of the extremes is closer to what we would call peace and the greater war. Therefore, peace, conflict, and war are the same, they only vary by degrees. On the war end of the spectrum it is typified by armed conflict and on peace end by preparing for armed conflict and in the middle a diplomatic or economic conflict or perhaps a policing action or small scale military operation.

But, what is conflict or war? We still struggle even today with a commonly accepted definition of war or conflict. According to Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the most famous theorist on warfare, "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do

our will.”³ Most military practitioners accept this definition. The US military apparently views the term "war" as having a self-evident definition; therefore it does not put to words any specific meaning that is not commonly accepted. It is then safe to assume that the common dictionary definition of war, "the struggle between opposing forces or for a particular end,"⁴ and Clausewitz's combine adequately to represent the doctrinally accepted usage of the term.⁵ Therefore this paper proposes the following definition: War is an act of force between opposing people(s) in pursuit of a desired goal, condition, or objective.⁶

Why We Fight ?

Why do we desire things that put us at odds with other humans and the existing power structure to get into the position of power? Given that war and peace are on a continuum of human conflict, understanding the dynamics that inspire conflict is essential to developing a theory to deal with the myriad locales on the scale of human conflict. Arguably, there are two reasons that people fight from a conscientious or active point of view. The first is security or self preservation and the second is self interest. There may be a third reason that is unconscious or reactive, but that will take some further research and analysis and is not necessarily germane to this discussion from a practical cause and effect analysis in that it is reactive and generally facilitating but not a motivating cause. Breaking the two active motives into distinct groups does not place them in an exclusive position. Often conflict will evolve or harbor aspects of both motives simultaneously. This makes the job of the historian and theorist very difficult in describing accurately what happened and why it happened. Therefore, it makes the position of the strategist and military planner nearly impossible at the operational and strategic level of war in addressing the nature of conflict and developing

a coherent and efficient strategy. We plan and think fundamentally in a Jominian fashion that is very linear and apparently logical.⁷ This is a soothing phenomenon that addresses things on a linear plane with a distinct beginning and end. If you accept that war and peace are constant and the same, it is readily apparent that we will have difficulty applying a linear campaign plan or strategy to effectively address the underlying causes of conflict. Without this context it would not be much more than chance that any strategy would attack the appropriate ends, ways, and means of our threats. Knowing ourselves is as important as knowing the enemy; it is how we provide context to our strategy and use the appropriate elements of national power wisely. A great advantage we have is in knowing that we are all humans and have a striking degree of similarity. Aside from the scientific fact that there is little genetic difference between all races of man there is a tendency to routinely focus on the differences of varying groups of humans. Despite the tendency to dwell on differences there are points of commonality.

For example, the rule of three, trilogy, or tripartite is a common form to denote the human condition, human mind, human nature, and to describe human conflict (war). Plato would offer in the *Republic* that it is the balancing of justice through his tripartite soul of man (appetite or workers and laborers, spirit or warriors and guardians and reason or the rulers and philosopher kings)⁸; Freud would describe the structures of the mind (id, ego, superego)⁹; Thucydides talks of the three reasons Athens advanced its empire (fear, honor and interest)¹⁰; JFC Fuller would indicate his trinities for everything from the mind to military formations in *The Foundations of the Science of War*, but specifically his biological causes of war (security of life based on pugnacity,

maintenance of life based on the instinct of hunger and continuity of the race based on the instinct of sex)¹¹ ; and Clausewitz, in *On War* denotes his paradoxical trinity for war (primordial violence, hatred and enmity of people, chance or the commander and his army, and reason or the government).¹² One could even add Thomas Jefferson's Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness as the things that strike eternal when describing the human construct.

Although each of the "trinities" have slight variations in explanation and subject matter, they have all hit on the essence of human conflict. Accordingly, one could group the aforementioned trinities in the following manner: 1) Appetite, Identity, People, Fear, Life and Self-Preservation. 2) Spirit, Superego, Honor, Commander and the Army, Warriors and Guardians, Liberty, Maintenance of Life, and 3) Reason, Government, Pursuit of Happiness, Interests or Profit, Self-Perpetuation, or Continuance of the Race (Group). In an informal sense, this synthesis is illustrative of commonalities in the perpetual machine of human conflict and why we fight. The active aspects of this trinity are numbers one and three and the inactive or reactionary is number two. Why we fight is the active aspect and the reactive or inactive aspect is more akin to the means with which we fight or protect ourselves and therefore is part of our nature, but is subject to the influences of the other drives in a Freudian sense. If one were to draw a parallel using the mystery of the trinity in Christianity it would be that the active was the Father and Son and the reactive would be the Holy Spirit (that which enables the Father and Son or the Ways).

The catalogue of trinities suggests there are only two active reasons why people fight. Man is motivated to initiate conflict through his action or reaction to just two

influences. Self preservation or security of a civilian group and their social interests (identity), and security of economic ends, ways and means (stability and prosperity) are the two reasons conflict develops. This could also be stated more simply as self preservation and self interests. If one party or group feels that the other is disinterested in their situation or feels that the other threatens their identity in some way, in either reality or perception, their security is at risk. This is true for economic security as well. If certain groups of people feel that they may not share equitably in a states' wealth due to an actual or perceived prejudice, cause for concern and anxiety is natural.¹³ If not stabilized the situation may devolve into violent conflict.¹⁴

Context of Conflict Today

Given the current state of conflict since the end of the Cold War it is probably not a stretch to note that the rise in terrorism and non-state actors are arguably an emerging form of ethno-national conflict.¹⁵ The conflict inspired by identity preservation is primarily ideologically based and is not prone to secular rationality. This is not to say that there is no rationality, but that it is based on an ideology or canon. In addition, economic globalization has fostered a fertile ground for non-state attempts at self determination to protect themselves from genocide or subjugation. This has emboldened ethno-national groups to reassert themselves due to a sense that they will either be assimilated or subjugated by another ethnic group. The conflict in Moldova that led to the Transdniester War, conflicts in the Balkans that led to the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions, and the Arab-Israeli conflict that led to the Multinational Force in the Sinai are some examples that show that ethnic conflict can be state on state, non-state on state, terror on either state or non-state, or any combination thereof, but in all cases ideological in essence.

In the book, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, by Thomas Friedman, the Lexus car represents the future, change, and progress; the olive tree represents the past, stability, and identity. Although Friedman is examining globalization in his book, he also captures the ever-present dichotomy between new and old; and this divide provides the fertile ground for the cultivation of ethnic nationalism. When this nationalism goes too far, ethnic violence may be sparked.¹⁶ Friedman's "olive tree" is mostly about ethnicity:

Olive trees [ethnicity] are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us and locates us in the world—whether it be belonging to a family, a community, a tribe, a nation, a religion or, most of all, a place called home. Olive trees are what give us the warmth of family, the joy of individuality, the intimacy of personal rituals, the depth of private relationships, as well as the confidence and security to reach out and encounter others. We fight so intensely at times over our olive trees because, at their best, they provide the feelings of self-esteem and belonging that are as essential for human survival as food in the belly. Indeed, one reason that the nation-state will never disappear, even if it does weaken, is because it is the ultimate olive tree—the ultimate expression of whom we belong to – linguistically, geographically, and historically. You cannot be a complete person alone. You can be a rich person alone. You can be a smart person alone. But you cannot be a complete person alone. For that you must be part of, and rooted in, an olive grove.¹⁷

Therefore, one could postulate that for the foreseeable future conflict is likely to be typified by fledging ethno-national movements that are primarily intra-state, trans-state and non-state groups that could threaten larger state structures if not contained. Given that most of the conflicts in the modern era are arguably inspired by ethno-national movements where a group's identity is threatened (reason one for fighting) and that the rise of an ethnic or national group is a threat to the interest of many state actors (reason two for fighting). While the rise of a group could use any number of means to initiate conflict, terrorism and insurgent activities come to mind immediately (the third reactive and enabling pillar of the trilogy).

As we migrate from the why people fight to examining the strategy itself it is imperative to examine the type and nature of the conflict or war. This should be done both empirically and rationally to ensure that one form of philosophy does not deny the other its usefulness. If this approach is not adopted then it is likely that cognitive biases will not be mitigated by reason and rationalization will not be moderated by historically empirical information. This balance is critical; conflict often evolves to a state that does not resemble what it was at the outset and the reasons for fighting it are linked to the type, scale, and context of the conflict as it evolves.

Several recent operations, including Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan provide an appropriate case study for illuminating contemporary conflicts that the United States is involved in, and those most likely to involve the use of military force to compel an adversary or entity towards our will for the foreseeable future. In all of these case studies, the United States could field dominant military forces either regionally or globally unilaterally or as the lead in a coalition. The use of force in a preemptive manner was and is currently considered nationally acceptable and legitimate despite an international or regional cohort that may view the action as unacceptable or illegitimate. This is a key aspect to peace operations and preemptive war.

A selective historical, strategic, and operational-level campaign analysis of these conflicts should serve to illuminate the importance of thoroughly examining, framing, and analyzing a national strategic interest and objectives prior to deciding that the use of military force to compel an entity is desirable. There are two obvious non-exclusive outcomes that could result from this perspective analysis. The first outcome may be a revelation or realization that the national interest or objective is not vital or desirable and

the second outcome may be an alternative application of the elements of national power that may not include the use of the military to compel as the primary tool or may direct a new military approach or doctrine. The acme of success in strategy and operational art is to accurately predict and portray the future rather than provide fodder for failure. Our case study will address the alternate application of the elements of power by addressing two distinct ways of waging war and their doctrines. Although there is a lot of commonality between these methods, they influence the ends (aim or objective) in a subtle but significant manner.

In response, the basic strategic approach could be one of two that have been adopted in the past fifty years of US military operations. The first is a general peace operation with peace enforcement or peace keeping being the key overarching implementation strategy. Peace operations "... encompass multiagency multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions...contain conflict... support reconciliation...rebuild and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance".¹⁸ In broad terms it includes peace keeping, peace building, peace enforcement, peacemaking, and conflict prevention; these terms are incidentally part on the terms used in the United Nations Charter and are commonly accepted to refer to authorities and scope of peace operations.¹⁹ It consists of tactical offensive and defensive security operations and counter terrorism operations as an offensive subset to a more general set of security operations oriented on the opposing force, faction separation, the government, area or resource that needs to be protected. This strategy is currently being utilized in the Sinai, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In the Sinai, it is termed a peace keeping operation stemming primarily from

Chapter 6 of the UN Charter and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 242 and the 1981 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that established the Multinational Forces and Observers mission in the Sinai.²⁰ Peace keeping operations are defined as “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement... and support diplomatic efforts to reach long term political settlement.”²¹ In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo the authority for these operations comes from Chapter VII of the UN Charter; UNSCR 1031 for Bosnia and UNSCR 1244 for Kosovo, authorizing peace enforcement operations.²² Peace enforcement operations are defined as “the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order”.²³ The fundamental difference between peace keeping and peace enforcement is one of authority and function. In the first, the function is more as a mediator and in the second it is more as an arbitrator of conflict. Stability operations encompass the key tactical and operational missions the United States military executes while conducting peace operations at the Joint Operational echelon and above. Stability operations include “various military missions, tasks and activities conducted...in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief”.²⁴ The safe and secure portions of this mission mainly consists of tactical offensive and defensive security operations and counter terrorism operations as an offensive subset to a more general set of security operations oriented on the opposing force, faction separation, the

government, area or resource that needs to be protected. In general terms this is primarily an area security operation at the tactical and operational levels. Edward Luttwak would describe this as a “point defense” theater strategy that has been adopted in response to guerilla and insurgent forces; this is a strategy that has been used extensively since the time of the Roman Empire.²⁵ In all of these approaches the key ingredient is a common interest concurrence between the population and the security forces that are facilitating stability and security. Stability operations facilitate the physiological needs of individuals and security operations facilitate the security needs of individual and this in turn serves the first two needs in Maslow’s hierarchy and provides for interest concurrence.²⁶

The second approach that has been utilized by the United States is a counterinsurgency strategy. This is the current strategy that is being utilized in Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁷ Doctrinally counterinsurgency is a subset of the larger category of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is on par with peace operations in military hierarchical terms and is defined as a “violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.”²⁸ Additionally, foreign internal defense, combating terrorism, support to an insurgency, and unconventional warfare are distinct components of irregular warfare.²⁹ As we discussed in the introduction to this paper, the relatively recent ascendancy of COIN as the strategy that saved Iraq and is our best chance for success in Afghanistan is remarkable given that both these conflicts were well underway when this new doctrine emerged and was adopted. Counterinsurgency is the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency”.³⁰ Indeed, for the United States to be

conducting a counterinsurgency as its primary strategic and operational mission it entails identifying ourselves with the existing government of the conflict state or establishing a government resulting from a regime change that cannot control its population. In any event, interest divergence is a given when executing a counterinsurgency. The security forces are protecting a government that the insurgents are trying to modify and change to some degree. The needs of the population are therefore not always in consonant with the security forces. The United States is concurrently executing two divergent strategies in different parts of the world: peace keeping in the Balkans and the Sinai and COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course it is important to examine the actors involved with these conflicts and determine if the nature of these threats is similar; if the *casus belli*³¹ are similar in a general sense; and are the conflicts mentioned primarily ethno-national in nature or are they primarily small disenfranchised groups that are disruptive to an established central government but primarily of the same ethno-national grouping. Like the Vietnam War or the current conflict in Colombia, perhaps the true political insurgencies are those with an enemy that is primarily of the same ethnic sect and they share a similar cultural heritage and national identity. In the Balkans it is Croat versus Bosnian versus Serb and Muslim versus Christian ethnic groups. In the Sinai it is Jew versus Muslim. The Iraq conflict has primarily been Sunni versus Shiite and a Kurdish group establishing an autonomous area that facilitates their self determination. In Afghanistan, tribal war has been perpetual and conflict in the region has been sponsored by its neighbors and other international interlopers for over thirty years with a principal catalyst of radical Islam. The fledgling government currently is precariously grasping for a unifying national

identity that was erased over the past thirty years and replaced by a theocratic regime that was subsequently supplanted by the same interlopers that indirectly facilitated and sponsored its rise to power. Ethnic tensions are rife in Afghanistan and the only unifying nationalism lately has been the very theocratic regime that was overthrown by the interlopers.

Casus Belli and the role of the military

If the casus belli for many of these wars is ethno-national rivalry that has a long history of conflict associated with it, perhaps we are defining the very conflict inappropriately. Given the scope of conflict and sectarian violence these types of conflicts are more like civil wars than insurgencies.³² Of course, these wars are handled quite differently at the policy level and are not mere small minorities that disavow loyalty to a government. These conflicts are for self determination and are driven by the ethno-national fear, honor and interests. Allowing that these may all provide a degree of impetus for initiating conflict there is one that is predominate at any given time on the continuum. This creates an interest asymmetry from the outset that frames the nature of the conflict for all parties involved. The peace operations umbrella allows for a strategy that can embrace both ethno-national populations from a neutral position that lends itself to legitimacy as a security force. By adopting a counterinsurgency strategy the party not in the majority will not view the external security force as impartial and therefore illegitimate and this by extension will make the government seem illegitimate and incapable of protecting the population's interest.

The three functions of military power are deterrence, compellence, and reassurance.³³ Examining these three functions from the whole of the population perspective should give us an indication which strategy gives the security forces the

greatest flexibility and range of influence. In counterinsurgency operations the military forces can clearly deter and compel. Generally, the ability to reassure is reserved for the government and those in power not the minority. The element to be protected in this approach is the government. In peace operations all three of the functions of military force are applicable to the entire population and this facilitates stability and allows for the other elements of national power to act. Reassurance is the critical function in these type of conflicts in that it has a regional and global impact by boosting confidence in stability. A strategy of peace operations therefore affords greater flexibility in the application of military power.

Examining the American Way of war

One of the key tenets of military planning and battle command is to know yourself as well as your enemy. Russell F. Weigley's 1973 book, *The American Way of War*, is still a very applicable caution to remind the United States that to understand strategy in light of your culture and ethos is important. Ironically, a UK national Colin Gray has taken on the contemporary mantle of examining the American way of war and has developed a framework for the describing the 13 characteristics of the American way of war involving irregular warfare. Using Gray's 13 characteristics, one can assess what would be a more appropriate strategy for the US Army to adopt: peace operations or COIN? Gray's characteristics are noted parenthetically to indicate whether these are mainly strategic (S), operational (O), or tactical (T) in nature and applicability. Gray's characteristics are as follow: apolitical (S), astrategic(S), ahistorical(S), problem-solving and optimistic(S), culturally challenged(T), technologically dependent(T), focused on firepower(T), large-scale(O), aggressive and offensive(T), profoundly regular(S),

impatient(S), logistically excellent(O), and highly sensitive to causalities(S).³⁴ Seven of these traits are applicable and appropriate at the policy and strategic level.

Apolitical: A rather short sighted approach to the policy ends which the United States tries to achieve are perhaps driven by our four-year presidential electoral cycle. These ends are often juxtaposed with a set of reasoned ends that may describe a longer, more expensive, and more uncertain end state; therefore they are often politically unpalatable. Gray paraphrased this as follows: "Americans are wont to regard war and peace as sharply distinct conditions ... waging war for the goal of victory, paying scant regard to the consequences of the course of its operations for the character of the peace that will follow..."³⁵ Considering the *jus pos bellum* is perhaps the key point of this characteristic and is illustrative of the clear aversion for long conflicts and a rush to win and declare victory. Peace operations acknowledge the necessity for an unlimited time-line and they are necessarily conditions-based -- the condition being sustainable stability and resolution of the *casus belli*. We remain in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai with minimal forces and have remained focused, with our allies, on the conditions of the peace by addressing the causes of the conflict in an impartial manner. The character of the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan is anything but certain and is precarious. If we leave before the underlying causes of the conflict are addressed perhaps a risk for a civil war and regional instability is likely. COIN strategy supports a government retaining control of an area, but does not necessarily support stability. Stability is the political objective, not control.

Astrategic: In the United States, strategic policy emanates from the executive branch. The strategic linkage of means (resources) and ways (application of resources)

to the political ends (objective or aim) is performed more in the uniformed establishment than the National Security Council (NSC). The refinement of the strategy, specifically the application of means often devolves to a military centric process at the geographic combatant commands (GCC) according to the Unified Command Plan (UCP)³⁶ and Chapter 6 of Title 10 of the United States Code (USC).³⁷ Additionally, the Joint Staff refines planning and estimates for achieving policy ends, but is legally removed from any command function according to UCP and Title 10 (USC). This reinforces Gray's observation that: "Strategy is ...the bridge that connects military power with policy... [If we] wage war as a largely autonomous activity, leaving worry about peace and its politics to some later day, the strategy bridge has broken down. The conduct of war cannot be self-validating."³⁸ The strength of our peace operations conducted with the United Nations and NATO has generally redressed this shortfall. The collective policy position serves to prevent a hubristic approach and forces a logical and rational collective strategy to garner support for an operation. Here we can look at Afghanistan and the ongoing difference between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), composed mainly of international forces, and the primarily American manned and led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) strategies. ISAF is clearly conducting peace operations and OEF is performing an offensively oriented COIN strategy.³⁹

A historical: This posit is illustrated in the presidents introduction to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) by linking democracy with peace and ignoring the empirical conclusion that nearly all democracies in recorded history have been inherently unstable as they form and have not been any more peaceful than any other form of government. A focus on selective historical American values that tend to

rationalize that continual betterment of the nation is inevitable is also illustrated in the introduction to the NSS.⁴⁰ Gray's description of ahistorical is almost verbatim in the next to last paragraph of the introduction to the 2010 NSS: "As a future-oriented... country, one that has a founding ideology of faith in, hope for, and commitment to, human betterment... Americans [are generally] less than highly respectful of what they might otherwise be inclined to allow history to teach them. A defense community led by the historically disrespectful..."⁴¹ This trait has arguably two components.. One is the ideological aspect that things are different and new and this promotes a tendency to focus on something like COIN and discount our lessons in the Balkans or it allows us to embrace a approach to democratization and liberty that is almost imperialistic in its arrogance as perceived by much of the world, particularly the middle east.⁴²

Acknowledging the impact of occupation of a country once regime change has occurred and the inherent struggle of nation building and establishing a government foments conflict and places the occupying power at a disadvantage. If you change a regime you inherit the role of government; this is something that historically is not desirable and propagates anti colonial and anti imperial sentiments that historically we abhor and facilitated the dismantling of the European colonies through promotion of self determinism.⁴³ This is inherently at odds with a counterinsurgency strategy. When we address the actions we are taking in a literal manner are we also preventing in reality or actuality the natural process of self determination and are therefore imposing or maintaining a rather artificial environment.⁴⁴ Historically, the landmark inclusion of peace enforcement authority in the United Nations Charter, as already discussed, provides us with a complete historical rational for choosing peace operations and

cautions us against a policy of regime change followed by counterinsurgent activities akin to the French in Algeria.⁴⁵ Counter insurgency operations are often a catalyst to creating humanitarian hardships for the disenfranchised, labeled as insurgent and discriminated against portions of the population, by making it difficult for them to approach the government for redress of grievances or to operate economically within the structure without aligning with radical factions for protection. The disaffected often ally with those also in opposition to the government to prevent their being exposed by the extremists and thereby being at risk for targeting by the government and its military. Peace operations do not take sides and therefore facilitate freedom of expression for all of the population without fear of collusion between the foreign security forces and the government.

Problem solving and optimistic: Since the founding of the United States, the nation has been optimistic and displayed extraordinary innovation in industry. The United States had: "an optimistic public culture...the problem-solving faith, the penchant for the engineering fix, has the inevitable consequence of leading U.S. policy, including its use of armed force, to attempt the impossible."⁴⁶ As the conflict in Iraq was degenerating by 2006 the new optimistic counterinsurgent doctrine came to dominance at Fort Leavenworth. It had become the new problem-solving to apply in the future. The framework and catchphrases that are chosen to be used to design an operation or strategy are important because they infer intent laterally as well as horizontally. In our haste to choose a new path and coin a new strategy we did not consider our culture and link this strategy with our way of war; instead we formulated national policy and interagency governmental policy by adopting the latest tactical ideological panacea of

the military. Most recently this has occurred in Afghanistan with the 2009 troop surge. Perhaps a fundamental flaw of COIN doctrine is its presumption of grand strategic direction, regardless of the context of the conflict. In other words, our military presumption that our focus is to protect and defend a government by suppressing opposition rather than providing security for a population to self determine.

Profoundly Regular: Although the United States society often romanticizes about the irregular nature of their rugged frontiersmen and the cowboys of the west in their literature, since the time of General Washington in 1775 the country has energetically fought this tendency in their military establishments. This trait has been constant from the beginning to the present: “American soldiers have been overwhelmingly regular in their view of, approach to, and skill in, warfare. In other words, a good regular army has been assumed to be capable of turning its strengths to meet irregular enemies, whereas the reverse would not be true.”⁴⁷ The primary purpose of the US military forces is to “protect and defend the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic”.⁴⁸ By adopting an irregular approach to war fighting it is possible that we could create an existential crisis in the military. Therefore, the inherently large-scaled coalitions attendant to most peace operations allows us to leverage our regular nature of waging war towards security for a population and facilitating stability operations for the international community.

Impatient: Founded on strong isolationist tenets, the United States still has a low tolerance for long wars and foreign entanglements. This tone in US foreign policy today can be illustrated by the constant dialogue of timelines for withdrawal of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. Americans have traditionally approached warfare as a regrettable

occasional evil that has to be concluded as decisively and rapidly as possible. That partially moral perspective has not always sat well with the requirements of a politically effective use of force.”⁴⁹ Many of these characteristics are intertwined with one another. Particularly, the impatience of our culture to have decisive and objectively measurable actions drives us to search for a new and different strategy that supports our ideological bent and pays little heed to history and the wider world political environment. Peace operations take a long time and a large initial investment in forces that draw down significantly over time. Regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq was quick and small scale in terms of military forces. The apparent refusal to accept the large scale force necessary to occupy and conduct peace operations has arguably led to belated ‘surges’ and force increases as a result of increased instability due to lack the appropriate number of effective security forces.

High sensitivity to casualties: In terms of blood and treasure the United States seems to be more acutely sensitive to the blood aspect than the treasure.⁵⁰ To this end, no cost is spared to reduce American deaths on the battlefield. “Beyond the issue of cost-effectiveness [referring to excessive expense of American soldiers and their training]... however, lies the claim that American society has become so sensitive to casualties that it is no longer tolerant of potentially bloody ventures in muscular foreign governance.”⁵¹ Moreover, as the per capita cost of training and maintaining an American soldier in Afghanistan and Iraq is approaching one million dollars; this may make a counterinsurgent strategy fiscally irresponsible but acceptable to a public inherently abhorrent to combat casualties.⁵²

This characteristic forms a particularly powerful cultural bias in our strategic character as a nation; it is strong enough to force us into a counterfactual reasoning. Prior to supporting the Sunni awakening and the birth of the Sons of Iraq, these were the insurgents whom the US had fought against in Iraq for since 2003, the disenfranchised Sunni insurgents were responsible for a significant portion of the attacks in Iraq. One could argue that the United States military facilitated, funded, and rearmed an insurgency in waiting through the Sons of Iraq program. Perhaps this was inspired in part by a need to reduce casualties in an effort to regain domestic support in America. In summary, as violence increased and casualties mounted the United States public aversion to casualties forced an abandonment of the offensive counterinsurgency strategy for a peace operations strategy of incentivizing an armistice of sorts.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not concluded and history has yet to report on the success or failure of those endeavors. The peace is tenuous and the discussions about withdrawal of forces seem to be driving policy more so than regional stability. The conflicts in the Balkans and the Sinai have not concluded either and there is a general international consensus that regional stability is not in jeopardy and yet there is almost no discussion about withdrawal of forces. There are some lessons that can be divined by examining these conflicts to better inform our policy decisions. Reminding us of the nature of war and conflict, why conflict exists, and acknowledging the casus belli of these conflicts will allow for a coherent policy to strategy linkage.

A strategy of peace operations, offers the United States a more flexible application of military force; greater collaboration with our allies; stronger intergovernmental partnerships; and a more inherently legitimate jus ad Bellum.

Counterinsurgency clearly has some tactical principles that are useful in these conflicts, but they are tenets that are shared by security and peace operations and therefore are not unique or original to the COIN tactic. Counterinsurgency as a strategy presupposes one has picked a side thereby enhancing their perceived legitimacy and subsequently their ability to strategically implement and communicate the jus ad Bellum. In the final analysis, a strategy of peace operations is less likely than counterinsurgency to undermine the very peace sought.

Endnotes

¹Bernard Brodie, *World Politics, Strategy as Science* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1949) this reference was taken from the ASAP Strategic Theory Module selected readings (AY 2011), 209. Although this quote is taken from an examination of the influence of the military on policy decisions post World War II, it is a strikingly familiar caution that perhaps should be considered in light of the Ping-Pong strategies being adopted and debated with regards to Iraq and Afghanistan.

²Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2003), 1.

³Carl Von Clausewitz, Michael Howard et al, ed., *On War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

⁴*The Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc.,1997), 827.

⁵In neither JP 1.02, FM 101-5-1, or FM 3.0 is any definition of the word war provided. The term is used to describe various aspects of doctrine and is used in conjunction with other words in a defining or descriptive manner. For the purpose of this monograph the author feels that it is necessary to define the term in a manner that is supported by a preeminent military theorist and common language usage. In JP 3.0 the term war heads a paragraph that describes war but offers no definition, and the description is rather vague.

⁶Keith A. Barclay, "ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN MOLDOVA", Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS:, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 27.

⁷Steven Knott, "Theory of War and Strategy, on Jomini," lecture, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, September 13, 2010. He describes that the DNA of the US military is derived from Jomini.

⁸Plato, *Republic* in *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*, ed. Steven M. Cahn, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 70-84.

⁹Kendra Cherry, "The Id, Ego and Superego, The Structural Model of Personality," <http://psychology.about.com/od/theoriesofpersonality/a/personalityelem.htm> (accessed December 20, 2010).

¹⁰Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler ed., *The Landmark Thucydides*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996), 43.

¹¹J.F.C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 66.

¹²Carl Von Clausewitz, ed. Michael Howard et al., *On War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

¹³Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 1.

¹⁴Barclay, "Ethnic Violence in Moldova," 27-28.

¹⁵James A. Nathan, *Soldiers, Statecraft and Diplomacy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002) in passim.

¹⁶Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Random House Books, 2000), 30-33. and Barclay, 6-7.

¹⁷Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, 30-33. and Barclay, "Ethnic Violence in Moldova," 6-7.

¹⁸U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-8.

¹⁹*Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, (San Francisco: 1945) 8-11. <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf> (accessed December 20, 2010).

²⁰"United Nations Security Council Resolution 242", <http://www.defensibleborders.org/gold.htm> (accessed December 20, 2010); "Mission Statement," linked from *Multinational Forces and Observers Home Page*, <http://www.mfo.org/> (accessed December 20, 2010).

²¹U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-8. This reference was cited from JP 3-07-3 in FM 3-0.

²²"Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina," linked from *NATO Home Page*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm (accessed December 20, 2010); "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244", 1999, linked from NATO's *Role in Kosovo Home Page*, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm> (accessed December 20, 2010).

²³U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-9. This reference was cited from JP 3-0 in FM 3-0.

²⁴U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 312. This reference was cited from JP 3-0 in FM 3-0.

²⁵Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy, The logic of war and peace*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 154-157.

²⁶Kendra Cherry, "Hierarchy of Needs, The Five Levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," <http://psychology.about.com/od/theoriesofpersonality/a/hierarchyneeds.htm> (accessed January 8, 2011).

²⁷U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-11. In the definition of counterinsurgency paragraph 2-55, this doctrine specifically states that Counterinsurgency is the dominate joint operation in Operation Iraqi freedom and Enduring freedom.

²⁸U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-10 paragraph 2-45.

²⁹U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-10 paragraph 2-45.

³⁰U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February, 2008), 2-11. This reference was cited from JP 1-02 in FM 3-0.

³¹*Merriam Webster Dictionary*, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/casus%20belli>, (accessed 8 Jan 2011). Casus Belli- causes or actions that justify or allegedly justify a conflict or war.

³²"Why There Is No Insurgency in Iraq," *Spiegel Online*, Interview with US Iraq Advisor Stephen Biddle, May 17, 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,483396,00.html> (accessed January 9, 2011).

³³Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War", *Survival*, Winter 1994/1995, vol 36, no 4, pp 161-166 (165)

³⁴Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

³⁵Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

³⁶George W. Bush, *Unified Command Plan 2008*, (Washington, DC: The White House, December 17, 2008) 2. <http://info.publicintelligence.net/UCP-2008.pdf> (accessed February 15, 2011).

³⁷Chapter 6, Title 10, United States Code, linked from Cornell University Law School Home Page at "US Code," http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode10/usc_sup_01_10_10_A_20_I.html (accessed February 15, 2011).

³⁸Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

³⁹Dominik Knill, *Peace Operations and Counterinsurgency: Complementary or Contradictory*, (ETH Zurich: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, April 2007). 47-54.

⁴⁰Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington DC: The White House, May 2010), 1-3. This is cited from the Presidents introduction.

⁴¹Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

⁴²Gregory A. Raymond and Joel H. Rosenthal, "After Iraq: The Imperiled American Imperium," May 30, 2007, <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5439.html> (accessed January 9, 2011); Patrick Martin, "US imperialism, 9/11 and the Iraq War," November 28, 2009, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/nov2009/pers-n28.shtml> (accessed January 9, 2011); Max Boot "American imperialism? No need to run away from label," May 5, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2003-05-05-boot_x.htm (accessed January 9, 2011).

⁴³To a large extent, post WWII the establishment of the United Nations facilitated the self determinate policy of the non self governing territories.

⁴⁴Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, *World Politics Continuity and Change Since 1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7. Taken from USAWC AY 11 NSPS, vol 2, 327.

⁴⁵Gordon K. Lee, *International Organization and the United Nations Security Council*, (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 3-4.

⁴⁶Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

⁴⁷Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

⁴⁸Taken from the oath of office of all military officers and enlisted personnel.

⁴⁹Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

⁵⁰Christopher Gelpi, et al., *Paying The Human Costs of War*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 1-2.

⁵¹Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 30-49.

⁵² Dr. John A. Nagl, "Is President Obama's Afghanistan Strategy Working?" (Washington DC: CNAS, May 9, 2010), <http://www.cnas.org/node/4451> (accessed January 8, 2011). Although this refers to Afghanistan it is illustrative of the high costs of US troops.

