Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication
Abstract
Clausewitz asserted war is politics by other means. Therefore, in the American democracy, war is an extension of the people's will, expressed through their elected leadership - Congress. In Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the framers clearly delineated authorities for declaring war and vested them specifically in the legislative branch. Since the end of WWII, the United States has intervened on the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia, Kuwait, and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq with large, protracted military actions absent formal congressional declarations of war. This absence is a result of both unchecked executive initiative and congressional abdication. The framers of the U.S. Constitution did not intend for Congress to forfeit its oversight by allowing the executive branch to commit the United States to war without deliberation and consent. As a consequence, executive usurpation of the nation's war-making authority has led to inadequate popular support and confusing political objectives for recent U.S. wars. This executive overreach and congressional abdication places war strategy itself at risk. Second- and third-order effects of the nation's dubious war-making jeopardize the pursuit of the nation's grand strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 24, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA547427
Entities
People
- Joseph V. Gallagher Iii
Organizations
- United States Army War College