

PARADIGM CHANGE: TARGETING ENEMY LEADERSHIP
IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

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by

WILLIAM H. SHOEMATE, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY
B.S., University of the Ozarks, Clarksville, Arkansas, 1998

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Name of Candidate: Major William H. Shoemate

Thesis Title: Paradigm Change: Targeting Enemy Leadership in a Complex Environment

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
LTC Jeffrey W. Kilgo, M.A.

_____, Member
Terry L. Beckenbaugh, Ph.D.

_____, Member
David T. Weaver, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

PARADIGM CHANGE: TARGETING ENEMY LEADERSHIP IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT, by Major William H. Shoemate, 77 pages.

As the United States (US) continues operations to neutralize terrorist activity and prepare its military for future hybrid threats, operations to target enemy leadership, in a counterinsurgency environment, have grown in complexity and importance. Over time, insurgent networks have adapted their evasion techniques to counter a superior technological foe. Insurgent networks are providing protected seclusion, constant surveillance, and disruption effects while gaining information superiority. Operating as a network has allowed the Taliban and other terrorist organizations to resource and train a force capable of operating without hierarchy orders. Terrorist organizations have capitalized on social networking to evade existing counterterrorism.

Identifying and locating high payoff targets (HPTs) or high value targets (HVTs) remain key factors for achieving counterinsurgency success. Counterinsurgency is effective when the insurgency is controlled by the geographical terrain. Today's, insurgent networks operate globally while targeting efforts to apprehend these insurgents are confined to the geographical location of the military force executing operations. Given the global expansion of localized insurgent networks, the US military must establish networks to target insurgent leadership on a global scale. To do so, the US military must adapt doctrine, organization, and training to develop hunting teams within conventional counterinsurgency forces.

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ACRONYMS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
FM	Field Manual
HPT	High Payoff Target
HVT	High Value Target
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
KGB	National Security Agency for the Soviet Union
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
MOP	Measures of Performance
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
US	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

If you entrench yourself behind strong fortifications, you compel the enemy to seek a solution elsewhere.

— Karl Von Clausewitz

As the United States (US) continues operations to neutralize terrorist activity and prepare its military for future hybrid threats, operations to target enemy leadership, in a counterinsurgency environment, have grown in complexity and importance. Over time, insurgent networks have adapted their evasion techniques to counter a superior technological foe. Insurgent networks are providing protected seclusion, constant surveillance, and disruption effects while gaining information superiority.

In his article, “It takes a Network,” Lieutenant General (Retired) Stanley McChrystal, explains the networking advantage displayed by the Taliban;

While a deeply flawed insurgent force in many ways, the Taliban is a uniquely 21st-century threat. Enjoying the traditional insurgent advantage of living amid a population closely tied to them by history and culture, they also leverage sophisticated technology that connects remote valleys and severe mountains instantaneously. This allows them to project their message worldwide, unhindered by time or filters. They are both deeply embedded in Afghanistan's complex society and impressively agile. And just like their allies in al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more a community of interest than a corporate structure.¹

Operating as a network has allowed the Taliban and other terrorist organizations to resource and train a force capable of operating without hierarchy orders. Terrorist organizations have capitalized on social networking to evade existing counterterrorism

¹Stanley McChrystal, “It takes a Network,” *Foreign Policy* (March-April 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network (accessed 15 March 2011).

policies. A new paradigm is needed to find, fix, and finish insurgent leadership. David Kilcullen, a leading counterinsurgency theorist and former counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus, describes the need for a paradigm change in counterinsurgency.

Therefore, countering global insurgency does not demand the destruction of every Islamist insurgent from the Philippines to Chechnya. Rather, it demands a strategy of disaggregation (delinking for dismantling) to prevent the dispersed and disparate elements of the jihad movement from functioning as a global system. Applying this approach to the current war generates a new and different range of policy options and strategic choices.²

Given the globalization of insurgent networks and recognizing the need for a change in counterinsurgency methods, the following research questions were developed.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

How does the US military adapt to operate among globalized insurgent networks to target enemy leadership?

Secondary Research Questions

1. Is counterinsurgency an effective counterterrorism method?
2. How do insurgent networks protect their leadership?
3. How does the environment impact network behavior patterns?
4. With the given costs of persistent conflict, what assets can be applied to target enemy leadership while achieving strategic success?

Identifying and locating high payoff targets (HPTs) or high value targets (HVTs) remain key factors for achieving counterinsurgency success. Counterinsurgency is

²David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford Press, 2010), 167.

effective when the insurgency is controlled by the geographical terrain. Today's, insurgent networks operate globally while targeting efforts to apprehend these insurgents are confined to the geographical location of the military force executing operations. Given the global expansion of localized insurgent networks, the US military must establish networks to target insurgent leadership on a global scale. To do so, the US military must adapt doctrine, organization, and training to develop hunting teams within conventional counterinsurgency forces.

For this thesis, hunting teams will be defined as a five to eight soldier team with highly developed training to find, fix, and finish HPTs or HVTs. Additionally, all references to HPTs, HVTs, fugitives, or enemy leadership being hunted are presumed guilty of executing a hostile attack against the United States on foreign or domestic soil.

Publically, the US military discounts hunting as the form or method for locating HPTs or HVTs. In peacetime, domestic policy looks for convincing guilt before targeting an individual. In declared war, hunting the adversary, to capture or kill them, is the primary task. Methods to find, fix, and finish an adversarial targets have evolved with greater detail. For example, the examination of behaviors and patterns has allowed precision strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); most notable, the predator drone.³

Superior technology and actionable intelligence allow precision strikes to take place. On 5 August 2009, two hellfire missiles assassinated Batilluah Meshud. Meshud, a prominent leader in the Pakistani Taliban, was lounging on his rooftop enjoying a clear Afghanistan morning. He was not planning an attack or issuing orders. He was executing

³John Woo, *War by Other Means* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 47-49.

his normal routine.⁴ This form of actionable intelligence was derived from persistent over watch. Like an obstacle shaping defensive operations, actionable intelligence is only useful if it has constant over watch. Hunting teams provide the capability to thoroughly, by all means necessary, locate individuals of national interest in a complex environment. The operational environment is transcending.

Asymmetrical or unconventional warfare is not going away. This form of warfare has remained persistent and its effects are being employed globally. Moreover, unconventional tactics are being employed by conventional firepower. As Israeli Defense Forces learned in the 2006 war against Hezbollah, more tanks and aerial bombings proved useless against a decentralized network with conventional support. In my opinion, a single division, with embedded hunting teams, could have fixed the decentralized Hezbollah networks in sector allowing for precision air strikes to achieve strategic success.

This chapter has introduced hunting teams as the new paradigm for targeting HPTs and HVTs in today's operational environment. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of the literature reviewed to develop this thesis. Chapter 3 will highlight the methodology applied to provide recommendations for change. Chapter 4 will provide a historical overview of four operations, utilizing forms of hunting teams or agencies, to target enemy leadership. Chapter 5 will provide recommendations for implementing hunting teams to advance US Army operations in a complex environment.

⁴Erik Rosenbach and Peritz, Aki, "The New Find, Fix, Finish Doctrine," *Joint Force Quarterly* 61 (2nd Quarter 2011): 94-100.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

This chapter will highlight the literature used for establishing the thesis. The literature for this thesis was examined in four categories; primary theorists for increasing or establishing hunting capabilities; historical references prior to 9/11; historical references post 9/11; and US counterterrorism policy developments following 9/11. In studying methods to target HPTs and HVTs, literature was not limited to US operations.

Primary Theorist(s)

One of the primary theorists for increasing a hunting capability within the US Armed Forces is George A. Crawford. In his book, *Manhunting, Reversing the Polarity of Warfare*, Crawford examines tactics, techniques, and procedures for increasing manhunting capabilities. Experienced within his field, Crawford served twenty plus years in special mission units as an intelligence officer. His operational experience is vast with multiple deployments in the Balkans and Central Asia. To implement the capability; he identifies policy and force development changes.⁵ Although Crawford provides excellent examples in introducing the capability, his methodology falls on a single structure of establishing a manhunting organization. This thesis will provide recommendations to an existing capability without creating new organizations in a time of unlimited constraints.

⁵George Crawford, *Manhunting; Reversing the Polarity of Warfare* (Baltimore, MD: Publish America, 2008), 27-29.

In the book, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders*, Stephen T. Hosmer, provides a detailed report on the effects of US operations to hunt enemy leadership.⁶ Hosmer identifies operations against enemy leaders as; operations to attack the person; operations to overthrow the leader; and operations to utilize foreign services to eliminate the leader. Hosmer's report takes into account 24 case studies planned and executed by the US and other nations. Hosmer's primary purpose is to provide planning guidelines for operations to target enemy leadership. He characterizes this as; assumptions surrounding the employment of hunting enemy leadership; prerequisites for success; potential deterrents; the value of hunting enemy leadership; and the reason why hunting enemy leadership may fail.⁷

Dr. Graham H. Tubiville, Jr.'s book *Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations* provides a deep study into numerous operations to target enemy leaders.⁸ Furthermore, Dr. Tubiville discusses the importance of establishing measures of determining success in hunting enemy leadership. Dr. Tubiville allows the reader to draw the connection between hunting enemy leadership and its impacts on national security strategy. Although critical of policy makers, it provides valuable lessons in failed applications and lessons learned for applying to future hunting capabilities.

⁶Stephen Hosmer, *Operations Against Enemy Leaders* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), iii.

⁷Ibid., 37.

⁸Graham Tubiville Jr., *Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations* (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2007), vii.

As mentioned in chapter 1, David J. Kilcullen's background in the study of counterinsurgency is extensive. From serving on embeds with ground troops to advising General David Petraeus, Kilcullen is a forward thinker on the complexities of operating in a counterinsurgency environment. In his book, *Counterinsurgency*, Kilcullen highlights the 28 articles for company level counterinsurgency. Similar to other premier theorist on counterinsurgency, Kilcullen sees purpose in hunting teams that act within local laws to protect the population.⁹ Furthermore, article 13 of the 28 articles provides the purpose behind social networking within a counterinsurgency.¹⁰ Networks of trust have similar meaning to "hearts and minds." Social networks who trust one another will inherently accept each other's goals and objectives. An advantage for one is an advantage for all.¹¹

Pre 9/11

For a historical overview, of hunting operations prior to 9/11, literature was focused on two operations; Operation Wrath of God and the hunt for Pablo Escobar. In Gordon Thomas's book, *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad*, Thomas highlights the making of Israeli special mission units to eliminate future threats, and the manhunts that developed as an integral element to Israeli counterterrorism policy.¹² Most notable to those who read this thesis is the Israeli response to the 1972 Munich Olympic

⁹David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford Press, 2010), 7.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 37.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Gordon Thomas, *Gideon's Spies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

Massacre. George Jones' book, *Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team* describes the creation of the hunting team, their operational actions, and the results of their operations.¹³ Unique to other pieces of literature on the subject are heavily argued in today's environment, this book asserts itself as a first-hand account to the operation.

Predominately used throughout this thesis is Ami Pedahzur's book, *The Israeli Secret Services and the struggle against terrorism*. Pedhazur, a citizen of Israel, offers critical insight into the counterterrorism methods used by the Israeli government. From its inception through the Al Aqasa Intifada, Israel's approach to counterterrorism is the war model. Pedhazur provides detailed analysis on the Israeli methods of establishing and executing operations to target enemy leadership.¹⁴

In, *Killing Pablo, The Hunt For the World's Greatest Outlaw*, Mark Bowden provides the primary research tool in studying the hunt for Pablo Escobar. Pablo Escobar managed to evade coalition capture for years. Throughout, Bowden highlights the United States efforts, using multiple agencies and a combined coalition, to influence operations to capture Pablo Escobar. For example, Bowden explores the capabilities of Centra Spike. Centra Spike was the fundamental intelligence agency for hunting Pablo Escobar.

¹³George Jones, *Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005).

¹⁴Ami Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (New York: Columbia Press, 2009), 14-20.

This unit operated without notice while establishing actionable intelligence for the coalition.¹⁵

Post 9/11

Literature reviewed post 9/11 was focused on two hunting operations; the Second Intifada and the hunt for Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. In Timothy Naftali's book, *Blind Spot*, Naftali highlights the catch-up process, for US security advisors, in understanding and applying previous lessons learned to the on-going hunt, prior to 1 May 2011, Osama Bin.¹⁶ Naftali identifies a steep learning curve for National Security Agencies. The failure in the transfer of lessons learned from hunting operations to neutralize Abu Nidal, Abimael Guzman, and Carlos the Jackal. Naftali feels that the successes were not exploited and ultimately leading to the failure in finding Osama Bin Laden.¹⁷

In George A. Crawford's monograph *Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization for Irregular Warfare*, Crawford highlights the doctrinal and legal policy issues associated with hunting enemy leadership post 9/11.¹⁸ Legal aspects of operating organizations that support or execute hunting operations are highlighted in Michael Smith's book; *Killer Elite, The Inside Story to America's Most Secret Special Operations*

¹⁵Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo, The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).

¹⁶Timothy Naftali, *Blind Spot; The Secret History of American Counterrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 202.

¹⁷Naftali, *Blind Spot*, 205.

¹⁸Crawford, *Manhunting*, 1-125.

Team.¹⁹ Furthermore, Smith provides insights into the selection process of America's most elite intelligence service. Special skills physical and mental are key factors in identifying the right person to perform and excel in special mission units.

The Al Aqsa Intifada or the Second Intifada was a violent hybrid war between Palestine and Israel. In their book, *Between Terrorism and Civil War, The Al-Aqsa Intifada*, Clive Jones and Ami Pedhazur explore the complexities of the operational environment and its impacts on state legitimacy within the Middle East.²⁰ With an understanding of the environment, Ami Pedhazur's book, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, Ami Pedahzur provides operational insight into the making of Israeli targeted assassination policy during the Al Aqsa Intifada.²¹

Several literature documents highlight the beginning stages of the hunt for Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Peter Blaber's book, *The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander*, highlights the original target packaging of Osama Bin Laden.²² Further historical literature on design and make-up of the hunting force for Osama Bin Laden, post 9/11, is highlighted in Dalton Fury's book, *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted*

¹⁹Michael Smith, *Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008).

²⁰Clive Jones and Ami Pedhazur, *Between Terrorism and Civil War* (New York: Routledge Press, 2005), 1-8.

²¹Ami Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (New York: Columbia Press, 2009).

²²Peter Blaber, *The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander* (Berkley, CA: Berkley Trade, 2010).

Man.²³ These two books highlight the hunt from conception through execution.

Furthermore, they provide reflection of how Osama Bin Laden got away from Special Forces inside the Tora Bora Mountains.²⁴ Prior to Dalton Fury's arrival, Gary Berntsen was directing operations. Gary Berntsen, the Central Intelligence Agency top operator in Tora Bora, provides detail on in the operation in his book, *Jawbreaker*. In providing a firsthand account, Berntsen describes the strategic and operational approaches in hunting Bin Laden.²⁵

Today's environment has intriguing complexities in the hunt to locate HPTs or HVTs. Methodology for targeting HPTs and HVTs are derived from advancements in counterinsurgency doctrine. These methods are not new. For example, one can conclude the Mossad utilized aspects of Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess (D3A) to eliminate the cell behind the disaster in Munich, 1972.²⁶

Another example would be the use of soft power and hard power to influence actions on lethal and nonlethal targets.²⁷ Literature review on hunting operations would not be complete without understanding the enemy's viewpoints.

²³Dalton Fury, *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009).

²⁴Blaber, *The Mission, The Men, and Me*, 145; Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 167.

²⁵Gary Bernsten, *Jawbreaker, The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander* (New York: Crown Publisher, 2005), 34-65.

²⁶Department of the The Army, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006); Jones, *Vengeance*.

²⁷Jones, *Vengeance*.

Barak Mendelsohn's, *Combating Jihadism*, provides insight into cooperation of a united front to disrupt jihadist advancement through disrupting terrorism financing and eliminating their ability to secure weapons of mass destruction.²⁸ In *Future Jihad*, Walid Phares examines terrorist strategies against the west. Throughout his book, Phares provides the reader with historical knowledge on the roots of jihadist, and methods for countering terrorism. Moreover, Phares highlights persistent thought on what is next from these organizations.²⁹

In *From Pablo to Osama; Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation*, Michael Kenney provides insightful developments of networks overtime. Terrorist networks and drug cartels utilize enterprises to overcome technological superior forces. Furthermore, Kenney describes these networks as superior learning organizations.³⁰ This is an organizational leadership trait that is studied consistently by the US Army.

Counterterrorism Policy

9/11 brought the revamping of US counterterrorism policy. Of note to this thesis, is the policy of targeted assassinations. John Yoo, former legal counsel to President George W. Bush, explains in, *War by Other Means*, policy development following the

²⁸Mark Mendelsohn, *Combating Jihadism* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2009), 3-5.

²⁹Walid Phares, *Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 1-11.

³⁰Michael Kenney, *Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

attacks on 9/11. The outlining difficulty for Woo and his team of legal counsel to President Bush, was defining the problem of how to wage war against an enemy who does not abide by the rules of war?³¹

In studying Israeli hunting operations, it was imperative to study Israeli counterterrorism policy. Israeli counterterrorism policy has been impacted by decades of adjustments to a persistent enemy. In *Generals in the Cabinet Room*, Yoram Peri, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, describes how Israeli policy has been shaped by senior military leadership's targeting operations during the al-Aqasa intifada.³²

In summary, this chapter highlighted the primary sources used to frame the thesis, provide historical references, and analysis to provide recommend changes for inculcating the theory of creating hunting teams. The next chapter will discuss the methodology used to examine the literature, provide analysis, and recommend change.

³¹John Woo, *War by Other Means* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).

³²Yoram Peri, *Generals in the Cabinet Room* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will provide the methodology used to analyze the material and provide recommendations for establishing hunting teams. A historical case study review was utilized to examine operations to find, fix, and finish HPTs or HVTs. The case studies were not limited to US operations. For example, prominent Israeli HVT operations were examined. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the methodology applied.




Figure 1. Methodology

Source: Created by author.

Persistent throughout the case studies are six characteristics. These characteristics, when applied, were vital to the organization or hunting team's success. They are

historical knowledge, less is more; cultural awareness and cultural understanding; trust from the top down; social skills, and accessibility to supporting agencies. These characteristics are described in the following paragraphs.

Historical Basis. Historical knowledge, as the author sees it, is information collected to apply a methodology for analyzing patterns. From Israeli to US operations, hunting teams were afforded historical target packets to analyze patterns and establish surveillance. Methods and practices, of previous hunting operations, were included. As the teams prepared for future operations, historical lessons provided descriptions on methods for success.

Less is More. From operations in Mosul, Iraq to the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan, teams have survived on their lack of identity. Smaller echelons allows for immediate integration within the enemy population. Lager forces portray an occupational mindset. Massive movements cause disruption which leads to population seclusion. Population seclusion limits network capability. For example, Israeli leadership utilized the less is more approach when designing Operation Wrath of God. Each team member was capable of operating independently among complex environments to gather intelligence for future targets. At an early point in the operation, the Israel team leader was operating among the German populace while his team was planning operations in London.³³

Cultural Awareness and Cultural Understanding. Similar to an education in the historical make-up of the insurgency, there is an inherent need to understand the insurgency's operational culture. For example, Delta Force operators, in the hunt for Al

³³Jones, *Vengeance*, 67.

Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, deployed with the capability to conduct key leader engagements without insulting the supporting rebel force. Moreover, David Kilcullen in his book *Counterinsurgency* highlights the importance of understanding how the local population thinks.³⁴ As demonstrated in the case studies, senior level officials and planners understood the need for an operational hunting team to consume the local lifestyle. From safe house location, food consumption, and social entertainment, the operational teams must fit in among the local society.³⁵

Trust. Mission command formerly known as command and control, is limited when deploying hunting teams. Establishing higher headquarters on location diminishes the trust and the less is more principles. As noted in Afghanistan, two special operating battalion task forces were commanded at a higher level than needed. Many would argue the justification of an increased mission command presence in the Afghanistan terrain. Yet, the vast area of influence required timely decision making on the ground.³⁶ Time slipped away to decision making authorities with limited information. Israeli leadership, during the Al Aqsa Intifada, trusted their operational teams to achieve mission success by limiting the amount of leadership involved.³⁷

Al Qaeda is a network that operates on trust. Each individual has the ability to collect information, process it, and action upon it. Within minutes, networks are

³⁴David Killcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford, 2010), 223.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Anonymous, *Hunting al Qaeda* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith, 2004), 11.

³⁷George Jones, *Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005); Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*.

providing resources to exploit an identified vulnerability. There is not wait time. Like the enemy, hunting teams must have the inherent right to operate in this fashion.

Social Skills. Similar to cultural awareness and cultural understanding, hunting operations are people centric. Individuals with the right make-up are selected. During the Al Aqasa Intifada, warriors from sea base operations were asked to execute land based targeting. Their inherent skill, developed over time, allowed for immediate seclusion into an urban environment.³⁸ An insurgency is a social system that operates along a spectrum of skills.³⁹ Hunting teams use their social skills to penetrate the spectrum.

Accessible. Uniquely challenging, is the demand for less oversight and, the ability to utilize higher level resources. Increasing the number of players, will elevate competition. During the hunt for Pablo Escobar, Centra Spike and the Central Intelligence Agency battled for information. Each party wanted the prestige of being known as the agency that got Pablo. Without unity of effort and tireless collaboration, on ground elements would have been limited to their actionable intelligence. Fortunately, the ground elements received information pushes timely and consistently.⁴⁰

This chapter has highlighted the methodology used to make an argument for establishing hunting teams. A comparative case study approach was utilized to identify trends in hunting operations to provide recommendations for a paradigm change. In chapter 5, lessons will be applied to the force modernization model of; Doctrine,

³⁸Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*.

³⁹Killcullen, 2010, 194.

⁴⁰Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001).

Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to provide recommendations for implementing hunting teams. The next chapter will provide the reader an overview of historical hunting operations. The chapter will begin with operations prior to 9/11 and then transition to operations post 9/11.

CHAPTER 4

HUNTING OPERATIONS

The previous chapter described the methodology used to analyze the literature associated with Hunting Operations. This chapter will provide an historical overview of four hunting operations to target HPTs or HVTs. The historical overview will set the conditions for applying lessons learned to the DOTMLPF model in chapter 5. The overview will highlight the hunting team characteristics, operational design, and methods for targeting persons of national interest. The four case studies are Operation Wrath of God; the hunt for Pablo Escobar; the Al Aqsa or Second Intifada and the hunt for Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. It is necessary to begin analysis with the Israeli response to the 1972 Munich Massacre. During this time frame, US policy discounted operations to hunt enemy leadership. The overview, extensive for some and less for others, allows the reader to gain understanding of each operational design process from team selection to methods of execution.

Operation Wrath of God

Of those who are interested in the high profile targeted assassinations, Operation Wrath of God is a familiar case study. Operation Wrath of God demonstrates the characteristics, mentioned in Chapter three, for successful hunting operations. From mission conception, the Israel Prime Minister, Golda Meir, understood the importance of limited oversight. More importantly, the leader of the nation understood the need for persistent actionable intelligence to eliminate future threats. Warfighting functions; movement and maneuver, intelligence, logistics, protection, and mission command were

solely left to one five man team to execute. Operational funds were delivered without question, and the team was afforded the opportunity to accomplish their assigned mission.

Background. Up until 1972, terrorist operations lacked the dramatic flair of an international stage.⁴¹ From 1968 to 1972, terrorist operations outside of Israel and the US achieved their effect; however, the effect would not cause a dramatic counter by their perceived oppressor. Enemy operations needed an overhaul on its measures of effectiveness. On 5 September 1972, a dramatic event hit the world stage. Members of Black September, a Palestine Liberation front organization (PLO), targeted Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games.

In the early morning of 5 September 1972, eight members of Black September, dressed as Middle Eastern athletes, began its infiltration into the Olympic Village. Several Olympic athletes, who missed curfew and assumed the terrorists were other athletes, unwittingly aided in the infiltration. The infiltration went quickly and the Palestine Organization had the Israeli athletes in custody.⁴² The hostage situation was underway. The event impacted the psyche of many nations.

The end state for Black September was the release of 200 hundred Palestine prisoners. German authorities, who were known to carry soft punishment against terrorists, agreed to negotiate with Black September. In an attempt to counter the negotiation talks, German officials were planning a rescue operation. The rescue

⁴¹Alan Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 41.

⁴²Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 40.

operation eventually failed and the hostages were killed. Five Black September members were killed and three other members were caught. Eventually, Black September members would be bargained in a deal with West Germany. Years later, the West Germans were targeted for coactions with the PLO. Although the Black September organization did not meet its objective for releasing the Palestine prisoners, it did gain an asymmetrical advantage. Their efforts brought terrorism into the home of everyone who viewed the Olympic Games. The world was watching and Israel needed to respond. They responded swiftly by establishing a clear purpose behind the operation. Israel targeted terrorism at its source.⁴³

Operations. Within two months of its conception, Operation Wrath of God found success.⁴⁴ In order to target effectively and immediately, Israeli leadership needed to design a team capable of operating with guidance. For example, Israeli leadership wanted individuals capable of executing operations in a complex environment for months or even years. Finally, each individual brought a composite set of skills. Each individual was an expert in escape and evasion, explosives, logistics, and weapons. This team needed to build its own network therefore; social skills were a dominant characteristic. Israeli leadership understood the definition of decentralized operations to achieve covert success. Five men were picked for this assignment. From the beginning, this operation was to remain hidden from Israeli leaders and the public.⁴⁵

⁴³Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 40.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Jones, *Vengeance*, 65-70.

The target package delivered to the team consisted of nine leaders. Each with a significant role in the planning the Munich Massacre. The targets were: Ali Hassan Salameh (the architect for the Munich Massacre); Abu Daoud—(explosives expert of Black September); Mahmoud Hamshari (an intellectual, diplomat, and spokesman for the Palestinian cause); Wael Zwaiter (a key spokesman for the Palestinian cause); Dr. Basil al- Kubaisi (law professor and purchaser of weapons for Dr. Hachash's Popular Front); Kamal Nasser (public relations chief for Al Fatah; official spokesman for the PLO); Kemel Adwan- (in charge of sabotage operations for Al Fatah in Israeli occupied lands; Mahmoud Yussuf Najjer (responsible for liaison between Al Fatah and Black September); Mohammed Boudia-strong leader; Hussein Abad al-Chir (PLO's main contacts with the KGB); Dr. Wadi Haddad (universal mastermind of terrorism).⁴⁶ This thesis will examine mission conception through the execution of the first three targets executed.

For immediate action, the team divided their targets into two lists, soft and hard targets. Soft targets were comprised of those targets that used their cover for protection. For example, these targets were role playing in a separate society. They were poets, actors, and politicians. Soft targets were an actionable target within a few days. Surveillance established a lifestyle pattern for exploitation. A soft target's capability to rapidly fall back into its societal role would determine his operational success. Hard targets were those targets that relied upon protection for concealment. They were known for traveling with armed protection and would need to be coveted by their peers for future

⁴⁶Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 40.

operations.⁴⁷ This clear distinction of targets allowed Operation Wrath of God to begin swiftly.

Within sixty days following the Munich Massacre, the team had established an operational network. As the team set-up their operational safe house, they began to conceptualize their individual pieces to the puzzle. What would be their individual role in executing operations against the assigned targets? Methods of execution would be different for each target, and the team understood it. They supported each other as the primary executioner.⁴⁸

Small unit operations rely on the team's ability to conceptualize and conform to one plan. Dissenting viewpoints may extend the planning process. Once the course of action is chosen, dissenting views are stored. Team buy-in is a must for complex operations. Rehearsed over time, the operational plan becomes second nature. Dissenting views, during operations, disrupt the structure of the plan. A team is nested through persistent training and development.

To begin their social networking, the team began establishing contracts for information. Operational money was allocated among the members. This allowed the team to operate at multiple locations. All major cities, they operated in, needed to provide contacts, safe house and bank accounts. Each location must be capable of decentralized

⁴⁷George Jones, *Vengeance: The True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 112.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 112-115.

operations. The team could operate without dependence on each other moreover; they could operate without support from the Israeli secret service.⁴⁹

Before commencing on targeting execution, it is important to gain a clear understanding of the operational design developed by Israeli officials and the team involved. Immediately following the events in Munich, Israeli officials began implementing the four goals of the design process; understanding ill-structured problems, anticipating change, creating opportunities, and recognizing and managing transitions.⁵⁰ Is not difficult to understand Operation Wrath of God as an ill-structured problem. The brilliance behind the mission lies in their understanding of anticipating changes and creating opportunities. A small team with unlimited capability to operate decentralized was their center of gravity. Israeli leadership was responsible for goal four. Transitioning counterterrorism policy to deter future events. While policy adapted, the team hit its first target.

The first target was Aedel Wael Zwaiter. Prior to arriving in Rome, the operational team was provided a targeting package on Mr. Zwaiter. The targeting package placed the team inside the functional make-up of their target. Zwaiter served as the PLO's representative in Rome. In disguise, Zwaiter was a poet. From his birth place to his current lady friend, the operational team exploited his patterns of behavior. He was the predictable soft target. He evaded capture by camouflaging himself within society.⁵¹

⁴⁹Jones, *Vengeance*, 113.

⁵⁰Norman Wade, *The Battle Staff Handbook* (Lakeland: The Lightning Press, 2010), 1-5.

⁵¹Jones, *Vengeance*, 104-5.

Mossad, the lethal arm of Israeli secret services, viewed Zwaitter as the man who launched terrorist operations in Europe. Understanding he did not carry a weapon, the operational team would encounter him at the entrance way of the apartment complex. By this time, Zwaitter was always alone. He would have just completed his grocery store stop. The team prediction was correct. Zwaitter made his walk to the elevator; two members of the Israeli operational team approached him and made confirmation of the target. Multiple shots were fired and Zwaitter lay dead in the elevator corridor. Without hesitation the team executed its egress plan to perfection.⁵² The elimination of target number four, sent shockwaves across the PLO. They were being targeted. Their behavior began to shape their actions.

Shaping enemy behavior is a key measurement of operational success. Observing the target's human behavior allows hunting teams to develop their effects based operations. For example, an individual who uses one credit card to make all their purchases has allowed a hunting team to track their movements and expenditures. A pattern has been established. Routine behavior is vulnerable.

The Israeli team, known as the Avner team, understood the complexities of its environment. The complexities required the team to network. Networking began shaping the enemy behavior allowing the Avner team to learn from its targets. Learning their methods of evasion allowed the team to designate its targets. A successful start would maintain team morale. Zwaitter was the soft target needed to move forward.

The second target, Mahmoud Hamshari, was an intelligent leader. He was the PLOs representative in Paris. Operating similar to Zwaitter, Hamshari camouflaged his

⁵²Ibid., 106-110.

terrorist ties as a diplomat. He lived a middle class life in a middle class neighborhood. Hamshari fell under the cover as a diplomat.⁵³ The team studied Hamshari's patterns through constant surveillance. As a diplomat, the team recognized Hamshari's involvement with the printing press. Constant interviews and telephone conversations were a part of Hamshari's life. To get close, the team would adopt this lifestyle and set up an interview with the diplomat.⁵⁴

Following a convincing interview with Hamshari, the team developed their plan. The surveillance team provided the daily routine to exploit. His wife and daughter left the apartment around 0800 every morning. Mrs. Hamshari did not return until she picked their daughter up from school. Hamshari remained in the apartment until 0900. Then he received a few phone calls before departing for his daily activities. Once he departed, the team could establish its execution method. The morning phone calls were Hamshari's exit. A telephone activated improvised explosive device was emplaced by the team.⁵⁵ Hunting teams have a trained ability to use enemy tactics against them. Improvised explosive devices have and continue to be the number one killer in today's complex environments. Adapting and using asymmetrical tactics against an enemy cause's confusion and uncertainty.

As predicted, Mr. Hamshari was alone and the phone rang. Hamshari answered and a loud explosion occurred. Again the egress plan was activated, and the team departed the area without recognition. Later that evening, the team discovered Hamshari

⁵³Jones, *Vengeance*, 144.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 148-9.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 150-3.

still alive. He was badly wounded, but capable of answering his hospital phone. Hamshari identified himself to the team. Following the event, the team remained in Paris for a few days. This allowed the situation to muffle and their regress out of Paris not to be compromised by an anxious airport security guard. Hamshari died of the inflicted wounds.⁵⁶ Although the direct impact did not kill Hamshari, the PLO countered the Israeli action. Escape and evasion are primary skills for hunting teams. Operations to target enemy leadership are executed among the populace. Blending in with the local society through cultural awareness and cultural understanding allows for evasion.

Two weeks following the Hamshari assassination, the PLO infiltrated the Israeli embassy in Bangkok and took six hostages. Negotiation commenced for release of the hostages. The Israeli operation continued to shape the enemy counter-action. PLO became a counter-action lacking effectiveness. Effectiveness being measured by the psychological impact on a nation. Israel remained focused on its mission by building on its resiliency to withstand these small scale terrorist attacks.⁵⁷

Target number three, was Hussein Abad al-Chir. Through an established social network, the team leader would identify the location to exploit Hussein. An identified hard target, Hussein served as the PLO's contact with the KGB (National Security Agency for the Soviet Union).⁵⁸ Hussein travel patterns allowed him to be characterized as a hard target. Eventually, the team located him in Nicosia, Cyprus.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Jones, *Vengeance*, 155-7.

⁵⁷Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 42-3.

⁵⁸Jones, *Vengeance*, 158-9.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 163.

Capitalizing on lessons learned from the first three targets, the team identified the need to be centrally located near the target. In similar fashion, a good safe house provided surveillance opportunities. Understanding the persistence of monitoring your target, the team decided to place a team member in the hotel room adjacent to Hussein's room. The execution method was brilliant but dangerous.⁶⁰

Through persistent surveillance, the team identified a nightly routine for Hussein. The execution method would be pressure plate triggered explosive placed within the box spring of Hussein's mattress. At the predicated time, and a short conversation with the team member in the adjacent room, the bomb exploded. Unlike Hamshari, this explosion tore through the hotel. Again, the psych of the PLO was damaged.⁶¹

For seven years, Operation Wrath of God sought out and eliminated twelve PLO activists. The original intent of the operation, to eliminate terrorism at its roots, achieved minimal success. The PLO would counter each event with an attack on Israeli embassies and secret service officials. Operation Wrath of God was successful in shaping its enemy behavior by striking at the heads of the Black September leadership.

Lessons Learned. From mission conception, Israeli Officials' operational design identified the hunting team as the center of gravity. From the characteristics of each team member to how they were financed led to their successful execution of their targets. The operational design and mission for the team did not change. The persistent counter-action from the PLO did little to alter the operational success of the team's mission. Second, less achieved greater success. The ability to synch smaller operations and smaller execution

⁶⁰Jones, *Vengeance*, 165.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 169.

methods, limits impacts on the local populace. The silence of the strike far impacted the enemy more. A sniper round eliminating a leader will have greater impact on the enemy than any explosive charge causing collateral damage. As we see in current operations, collateral damage will bolster public opinion for the enemy.

Hunting Pablo Escobar

To study the dynamics for targeting an elusive enemy, in a foreign country, the hunt for Pablo Escobar defines complexity. Moreover, Pablo Escobar was supported by a network similar to today's insurgent networks. His operation was global. His global impact invited several agencies into the hunt. Although the agencies involved had the same mission, they all wanted glorified results. Columbian Security Forces and American intelligence agencies challenged each other.

Background. The Medallion Cartel, the most powerful narcotic organization in the world, used its wealth, dominating influence, and horrific tactics to terrorize the Columbian people. Pablo Escobar, an influential leader in the Medallion Cartel, was the dominant face of the narcotic scene. Eventually, the US would call him ~~the~~ greatest outlaw.”⁶²

After his involvement in the assassination of Columbian presidential candidate Carlos Galan, President George H.W. Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher authorized operations to hunt Columbian drug cartels.⁶³ US and British Special

⁶²Mark Bowden, *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), 45-68.

⁶³Michael Smith, *Killer Elite, The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 159.

Operations forces were tagged as part of a combined effort with Colombian security forces to hunt down these cartels with one major goal. They were to capture or kill Pablo Escobar.⁶⁴ Centra Spike, a special mission unit within the US Army arsenal, would play a huge role in targeting Pablo.⁶⁵

Centra Spike specialized in locating targets. Two unique skills made Centra Spike effective. First, Centra Spike could blend in without interest. Second, they could penetrate from any distance. Technology advances in signal intelligence collection (SIGINT) allowed Centra Spike to locate the target within 100 meters.⁶⁶ To hunt Pablo Escobar, Centra Spike needed patience and supporting networks to uncover the puzzle of the Medellin Cartel.

Although US and British Special Operations played a significant role, the Colombian Police, known as Search Bloc, was identified as the center of gravity. From original design, US Special Forces were deployed to train the Colombian Security Forces. The complexities of the environment required US involvement outside of a normal training level. Basically, you could apply the current US Security Force assistance training motto of “Through, By, and With” to this operation.⁶⁷ Search Bloc was the supported agency, but the critical capabilities to target Pablo Escobar were organic to the

⁶⁴Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 74.

⁶⁵Smith, *Killer Elite*, 159.

⁶⁶Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 75.

⁶⁷Department of the The Army, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006).

supporting US agencies. Although not small in agencies involved, each capability, from collection to action, required small team elements.

Operations. Within their first months in Bogota, Centra Spike moved frequently. The team bounced from hotel to hotel causing it to change the members' identity. In order to allow the equipment, small airplanes with SIGINT equipment, to operate without suspicion, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established Falcon Aviation Company. Officially, Falcon Aviation Company was contracted to conduct aviation safety surveys for ground transmitters to allow pilots to locate runways.⁶⁸ This false operation allowed Centra Spike to gather actionable intelligence.

As the operation began in the fall of 1989, the Medallion Cartel leadership was camouflaged by financial reports in key US magazines. *Fortune Magazine* listed the Medallion Cartel leadership as top competitors to the richest in the world. The problem; who is the leader of the Medellin Cartel; who calls the shots? Eventually, Escobar stood out, but he was not the first target.

Jose Rodriguez Gacha's outspoken attitude and prominent appearance allowed Centra Spike to assume he was the leader. He was careless with his cell-phone, and was found immediately by Centra Spike. Centra Spike pinpointed his location on hilltop and the Colombian air force was notified. The Colombian air force launched fighters to destroy the hilltop house. In mid-flight, the fighter pilot commander called off the mission, and Gacha fled the scene. Several of Gacha's lieutenants were arrested, but were later released. Controversy arose between agencies within the Colombian Security

⁶⁸Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 77-79.

Forces.⁶⁹ Several networks were competing against each other. Their collaboration was non-existent.

Mr. Alzate, the hired suicide bomber, flipped the switch and 110 passengers were dead. The Medellin Cartel missed their target, but the intent was loud and clear. Two individuals on the flight were American. Immediately, President Bush declared the two known leaders of the Medellin Cartel, Escobar and Gacha, as marked men directly threatening the United States.

Since 1974, Executive Order 12333, targeted assassinations of foreign citizens for advancements in foreign policy was forbidden. Immediately after President Bush took office in 1989, W. Hays Parks, the chief of international law within the US Army Judge Advocate Corps, re-clarified Executive Order 12333 easing the clandestine community. Parks developed a memorandum that allowed for clandestine operations. The operation was allowable if they targeted combatants, guerilla forces, or terrorist networks of another nation.⁷⁰ Important here is how policy shaped the operational environment. Through policy, the US opened the door for operations to target enemy leadership.

As the drug war intensified, Centra Spike's operations picked up and Gacha would be pinpointed again. On 15 December 1989, Gacha was gunned down by US Army Special Forces. Immediately following the public display of Gacha's body, Pablo Escobar began to intensify his cell phone use. He was talking and Centra Spike was listening. For weeks they listened, and it became clear. Pablo Escobar was in charge. Articulate and soft-spoken, Escobar was looked up to and was constantly concerned of

⁶⁹Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 80.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 82.

his public opinion.⁷¹ Escobar's elusiveness and public perception would be the backbone of his evasion tactics. For Escobar, his center of gravity was the public. His critical capability was the financial aid he provide the public. However, his critical vulnerability, public opinion, eventually led to his downfall.

During operations to track Pablo, Centra Spike captured a conversation between Pablo and a hired a hit man to target a presidential candidate. The tip was relayed to Columbian security forces. As the Columbian security forces scrambled to protect the candidate, Bernando Jarmillo, was gunned down inside the Bogota International Airport. With the tip provided by Centra Spike, the Columbian government accused Escobar. He denied his involvement. This incited the US to fight back. The US shot back without realizing what it was about to jeopardize. US Intelligence Services backed the acquisition, against Pablo, by emphatically stating that they heard Escobar discussing the assassination on secret listening devices. Escobar was tipped and the manhunt intensified.⁷²

As the hunt persisted, operations were accelerated to include an insurgency aiding the Columbian government. The network known as the People Persecuted by Pablo would emerge as a premier hunting force. This network was a conglomeration of Escobar's harsh tactics. This insurgency began to assassinate targets identified by Centra Spike. Once these operations came to light, senior officials began to question US

⁷¹Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 84.

⁷²Michael Smith, *Killer Elite, The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team* (New York: St. Martin's Press., 2008), 165.

involvement in the operation. Oversight and competition to hunt Escobar intensified among US agencies.⁷³

US agencies tracking Mr. Escobar were in competition for information. Every organization wanted to prove itself as the main effort for future manhunts. Competing against Centra Spike was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). There was a frenetic race for information. The name attached to the information would be the senior leader's concerns. Budget constraints would lead to more competition in 1993. Lack of credit to the CIA or Centra Spike would diminish dollar amounts for future operations. Actions by the operators began to be questioned and not trusted. Operators on the ground would be thoroughly prosecuted daily.⁷⁴

Throughout the hunt, Escobar would attempt to turn himself in on numerous occasions. His correspondence through written or oral communication aided in pinpointing him. Although Mr. Escobar wished for sympathy, his messages were viewed as a man comfortable with his actions. He portrayed a sense of gamesmanship. His success against the tracking teams inflated his ego. Patience is the key here. Operations to target enemy leadership require persistence through patience. Ultimately, patience will draw the enemy in. For example, the Taliban has used patience to wait out an aggressive opponent.

Several raids followed, and the raids led to more intelligence. On 2 December 1993, Escobar made his final phone call.⁷⁵ As Pablo continued his conversations with his

⁷³Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 173.

⁷⁴Ibid., 173.

⁷⁵Smith, *Killer Elite*, 170-4.

family, Centra Spike and Search Bloc were on their way to Los Olivos neighborhood.⁷⁶ The assault team waited patiently as Escobar continued his conversation while members of Search Bloc drove through the area. Silhouetted in the second floor window, Pablo's face shined like the sun. Instantly, the chase was on. Pablo was shot several times as he fled across rooftops. Eventually, one fatal shot dropped Escobar. Who killed him? Was it the Americans? Was it Search Bloc? Contrary to claiming glorious accolades on the fatal shot, the hunt was over. The mission was accomplished.⁷⁷

Lessons Learned. The hunt for Pablo Escobar provides examples of how networks can override technological superiority. Despite all the technological tracking devices used to capture Pablo, Pablo managed to move and survive within the local populace by providing financial assistance.

As Michael Kenney highlights in his book, *From Pablo to Osama, Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation*; adaptation is the key to evading pressures from targeting agencies.

Drug trafficking in Columbia, then and now, occurs in fluid social systems where intergroup networks, buttressed by interpersonal ones, expand and contract according to market opportunities and law enforcement pressure. Trafficking networks-be they wheels, chains or variations on a theme-are fundamentally dynamic. They change over time owing to internal developments and external stresses.⁷⁸

⁷⁶Bowden, *Killing Pablo*, 243.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 247.

⁷⁸Michael Kenney, *Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 46-7.

When examining this case, external stresses for friendly forces, mainly US policy, were adapted to aid in targeting Pablo Escobar. Although originally tasked to train Colombian Security Forces, US Special Forces became intertwined in information collection and action. Centra Spike operated within Colombian society through a network created by the CIA. The network, an aviation company, provided concealment and evasion to the hunting teams.

The Al Aqsa Intifada or Second Uprising

When studying hunting operations, the policy backed operations, during the Al Aqsa Intifada, provides a clear example for strategic doctrinal solutions to targeting in a hybrid conflict. It provides examples for applying the key principles mentioned in chapter 2.

Background. Initially, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) attempted to deter the riots, fighting and kidnappings. Knowing this would not achieve great effect, Israeli Prime Minister Arie Sharon began to listen to those policy makers advocating for old methods. These methods, similar to Operation Wrath God, would be focused on targeting and killing the leadership who provide orders to the executioners of the suicide bombs. Although policy makers briefed the method in new terms, all parties understood the true terminology for action.⁷⁹

The underlying difference in the new approach versus the old approach was the Israeli Prime Minister and the head of the General Security Service held decisional

⁷⁹Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 117.

authority on who would be executed.⁸⁰ Once the decision was made, operational teams conducting the execution were provided all means to achieve their objective. From November 2000 to June 2006, Israel executed nineteen prominent leaders within Fatah, Hamas, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. The Israeli Defense Forces averaged an assassination every three to four months.⁸¹

In comparison to the counterinsurgency environment of Iraq, the Al Aqsa Intifada required creative and critical thinking in developing targets. Ultimately, the center of gravity for Israeli success was their ground force. Hunting teams would set conditions for ground troops by disrupting insurgent or terrorist network leaders. The Palestine Islamic Jihad's, center of gravity was its squad size elements operating within the Gaza strip. Its critical vulnerability was the leadership providing the orders. In application, Israeli forces recognized the leadership as the HPTs. Without precise orders, from their top leaders, the attacks would be limited in scale.

Operations. Raed Karami, an officer within the Palestine General Intelligence, was extensively involved with attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians. Most notably, Mr. Karami called the shots for an assassination attempts on Israel Colonel Barak. Israeli officials wanted Karami dead and out of the decision making cycle. The surveillance began and Karami pattern of life was exploited. Karmi walked to his destinations and he visited his mistress frequently. Israeli security agency teams identified a corner wall for concealment. Underneath the wall, a bomb awaited the signal from an unmanned aerial vehicle. (UAV). In accordance with the surveillance package, Karmi left his house, on

⁸⁰Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 118.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 119.

foot, to visit his mistress. Visual contact was made from the UAV, and the signal was sent. Karmi was assassinated on 14 January 2002.⁸² Organizations targeted by the Israelis would focus on Israeli soldiers.

In February 2002, shortly after the Karami assassination, Palestine Security Forces approached an Israeli checkpoint. Disguised as taxi drivers, the Palestine forces opened fire and killed the Israeli soldiers manning the checkpoint. In both ends of the operation, Israeli and enemy, the operational teams applied terrorism tactics in a hybrid environment. Who was more effective? Arguably, loss of any soldier is a distraction to any unit. Destroying leadership has a greater effect on an organization. During major combat operations, leaders are intimately involved in the execution, planning, and tracking of operations. Leaders make decisions and soldiers execute. The basic infantry soldier is trained to shoot, move, and communicate. A leader is developed over time. The loss of a leader requires years of training to replace. The loss of a soldier requires less than one year in replacing.

When examining a list of those leaders assassinated, the significance is overwhelming. Among the nineteen leaders assassinated were the head of the Hamas Wing in the West Bank to Head and the Hamas military wing in the Gaza strip.⁸³ In terms of money allocated for recruiting and training these leaders, the overall effect was devastating. Organizational hierarchy, unconventional or conventional, relies on the individual to perform his associated task. Successful to their tasks are the individual's ability to operate without orders. Take away the leadership of a group incapable of

⁸²Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 118.

⁸³Ibid.

operating without orders; you have a small scale insurgency. Assassinate the leadership of an organization that operates in a decentralized manner allows you to shape their next move. They have the freedom to counter your action. The intelligent aggressor achieves greater success. Israeli actions achieved a greater impact.

Another important element in studying Israeli targeting, is their use of special mission units. Unique to the Al Aqsa Intifada is the extreme intensity of violence.⁸⁴ At a moment's notice, a riot could escalate into full scale guerilla warfare. To capture enemy leadership, from a known location, the Israeli's could have used conventional forces. Similar to a battle space for an infantry unit in Iraq, the Israeli's could have utilized a particular unit to accomplish the task. Israeli leadership understood the environment and the need to utilize experienced operators to infiltrate a hostile location and seize an objective. Intelligence and capabilities far exceeded those of the conventional elements.⁸⁵

An example of combining intelligence and special skills is the use of the Shayette 13, a naval commando unit, used to execute land based executions in the West Bank.⁸⁶ Although the unit's mission was sea based, the Shayette 13 had begun preparation for land based operations years before. The Shayette 13 commander, understanding the situation, divided his elements into task forces. Experienced sea operators would remain at base location to continue training. Elements trained in guerrilla warfare ascended upon the West Bank to orchestrate the capture of HVTs.⁸⁷ High value targets assassinated by

⁸⁴Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 114.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 114-116.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 115.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 121.

Israeli during the Al Aqsa Intifada consisted of ten Hamas leaders; three Fatah leaders; three members of the Palestine Islamic Jihad; one Population Front for the Liberation of Palestine leader; and one member of the Popular Resistance Committee.⁸⁸

Lessons Learned. As the US Army settles upon its newly found focus of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), the before mentioned episode is an example of how to prepare for hybrid threats in the form of hunting teams. Special elements with special skills are keys to networking within an insurgency. Israeli leadership understood the need to train forces on full scale operations. At a moment's notice, special mission units could execute riot control operations, and quickly transition to search and rescue operations. Organizational leadership, training, and doctrinal applications must apply to develop hunting capabilities, and to ensure operational teams remain relevant in FSO.

The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden

The hunt for Osama Bin Laden has haunted the American society for years. Osama Bin Laden, America's number one target, was killed 1 May 2011. Until that fatal day, operations to target Bin Laden have been deflected or stalled by Bin Laden's supported networks.

Background. Following 9/11, American leadership prepared to brief President George W. Bush on operations to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. To capture Bin Laden, the US would need an established network. On 17 September, President Bush signed a waiver to remove all barriers allowing targeted killings against Osama Bin

⁸⁸Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism*, 121.

Laden.⁸⁹ The plan was to utilize the Northern Alliance, CIA paramilitary operators, and US special operation forces. The Northern Alliance became the network to find Bin Laden.⁹⁰

Regardless of perceptions on placing the Northern Alliance face on the operation, the agencies involved established hunting teams capable of operating in complex environment under little supervision. Once the Northern Alliance was determined as the friendly center of gravity and the source to locate Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, anticipating changes and developing options became critical to mission success.

Shortly after President Bush's declaration to hunt Bin Laden, CIA operatives and money flew into the Panjshir Valley to establish the network. Immediately, operatives began sourcing Northern Alliance leaders to provide and support the hunt for Bin Laden. Similar to Centra Spike, in the hunt for Pablo Escobar, a special mission unit of intelligence was on ground sourcing and networking. The networks were developed to track the movements of Bin Laden. How was Bin Laden moving? Where is he operating and how are orders being delivered? Intelligence sources and the CIA had established an information flow to prepare US special mission soldiers to begin operating though, by and with the Northern Alliance.⁹¹

⁸⁹Smith, *Killer Elite*, 216.

⁹⁰Gary Bernstein, *Jawbreaker, The attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A personal account by the CIA's key field commander* (New York: Crown Publisher, 2005), 28-65.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 66-89.

When targeting an evasive enemy, opportunities do not exist often. On ground leaders needed the authority to execute.⁹² From this point, this case study will be presented through the accounts of the on ground Delta Force Commander, and the CIA lead for mission command in Afghanistan. Critical to mission success, these two individuals operated seamlessly. Collaboration would lead to opportunity. Opportunity was actionable intelligence provided by the Northern Alliance. How these assets were used shaped operations. Ironically, interagency collaboration, on the ground, led to mission success. Eventually, information was overlooked by higher command. Individuals on the ground, from the CIA to Special Forces, would be limited by resources needed to achieve their end state.

As the CIA leader on ground briefed, the Northern Alliance Commander, General Ali, would engage in casual conversation without getting to the heart of the engagement. The Delta team knew the importance of relationship building, and was prepared to wait out General Ali's stories. Eventually, General Ali briefed the competencies of his soldiers and the key terrain of the Tora Bora mountains.⁹³ Although frustrated with the General Ali's storytelling, the Delta commander maintained his situational understanding of the local culture. Again, knowing friendly behaviors is equally important to knowing your enemy. Interrupting General Ali would have jeopardized the key leader engagement objective.

⁹²Dalton Fury, *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009), 124.

⁹³Ibid.

Bin Laden is devoted Muslim who claims he lived through the Prophet Muhammad. To understand him, a review of Muhammad's tactics, in war, would be of great importance. Historical understanding played a big role in anticipating changes. General Ali briefed the location of Bin Laden and how he would wait out battles in the Tora Bora mountains. In the Battle of Badr, middle 17th century era, Muhammad and his men knew defeat lay in the hands of Allah. They sacrificed everything. Bin Laden knew this theory of warfare and General Ali knew he would not surrender. Bin Laden remains devoted to his cause.⁹⁴

Historical awareness provides an excellent method for understanding how an enemy may use the geographical terrain. For instance, Afghanistan terrain has witnessed centuries of warfare. Prior to 9/11, the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, would consistently rely on the Pansher Valley to evade Taliban strongholds. More relevant, was the Mujahedeen's use of the Pansher Valley to defeat a superpower. Bin Laden recognized this as well. Tora Bora's severely restricted terrain would shape his opponent's operations.⁹⁵

The team commander and his men asked General Ali for a look at Tora Bora. Eventually, the team would get their eyes on the prize. Tora Bora was the known Bin Laden safe haven. After arriving within visual distance, General Ali noted the key terrain and how Al Qaeda established an engagement area. Mortars and snipers awaited the passing of the bombers to welcome the Delta Team.⁹⁶ In a second reconnaissance, the

⁹⁴Ibid, 125.

⁹⁵Bernsten, *Jawbreaker*, 28-65.

⁹⁶Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 126.

enemy mortar positions would welcome them. Networks into the Tora Bora sanctuary were treated like an obstacle. The enemy provided constant over watch to achieve their obstacle effect. The silhouetted provided would determine the effect sent.

Constant over watch is the effective measure for observing a target. Al Qaeda and Bin Laden understood this simple but genius concept. Camouflaging yourself, while maintaining eyes on target, allows deception to shape enemy behavior. Evidently, Al Qaeda was in a learning environment capable of operating against any enemy who recognizes key terrain and its impacts on mission success.

After linking up with a second escort, an Eastern Shura leader, the team embarked on its second reconnaissance. Gathering more data on the terrain and enemy positions would allow for an examination of how Bin Laden could escape Tora Bora. As the team and the security detail pushed to Tora Bora, the large patrol scattered dust everywhere. Camouflage was non-existent. The less is more approach was not applied, and this signaled the Al Qaeda stronghold. The mortars were ready for fire. Shortly after arriving on site, a mortar round landed. It was clear to the Delta Team, the enemy was well adverse in establishing an engagement area with tied in support by fire positions. To center a target quickly displayed strong technical skills.⁹⁷

The team of forty operators and their equipment consumed the command out post, yet the team managed to work a deal with their mini coalition. Although forty may seem large in the context of less is more, the vast terrain would dictate the size. Eventually, the

⁹⁷Fury. *Kill Bin Laden*, 133.

operation to capture and seal off Bin Laden would require conventional forces.⁹⁸ The hunting teams shaped the method of delivery, but conventional forces were needed.

After conducting reconnaissance to understand and visualize the environment, the team began laying out its plan to infiltrate Tora Bora. Intelligence was pouring into the command out post. An analysis of supporting elements, within Tora Bora, yielded several ethnicities. Bin Laden was and still is supported by terrorist organizations in Jordan, Algeria, Yemen, and Egypt. Those supporting the cause flocked to Tora Bora. This information was fed by networking General Ali. Money was the weapon system to establish the network.⁹⁹ How trustworthy was this information and what was it telling the team?

After understanding the networking established by the US agencies operating with the Northern Alliance, the team gathered a synopsis of Bin Laden's perimeter within Tora Bora. Up to Tora Boar, Bin Laden was running garrison operations. Entry and exit points were controlled and tied into over watching positions. He was fortified.¹⁰⁰ General Ali and his fighters were ready for action.

Although the combined team was ready for action and persistently let the situation develop, higher headquarters began pocking the beast.¹⁰¹ From the highest levels, commanders wanted details on position locations. From the words of the on ground of the Delta commander; —This is exactly why we will never be as good as the Israelis at killing

⁹⁸Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 139.

⁹⁹Ibid., 139-41.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 141.

¹⁰¹Bernsten, *Jawbreaker*, 202-243.

terrorists.”¹⁰² The Delta commander is correct. Israeli selective targeting policy is designed to save lives. The policy provides the means for the hunting teams, the way, to provide security through the dismantling of terrorist leadership.¹⁰³ US policy is fixated on the now, and Israeli policy is strategically designed for prolonged stability. Similar to Israel, the US has a persistent enemy. US targeting policy must adapt to provide long-term strategic goals.

Technology superiority was awaiting a thunderous drop onto Tora Bora. Leveraging that superiority required the establish networks to provide the targeted locations. The first blast, an attempt to gut the entry, was off target, but three JDAM’s followed. Eventually, targets were hit but not to the precision a technologically superior force was supposed to hit. Al Qaeda was awake.¹⁰⁴ Actionable intelligence drove the operation.

After the lack of precision, the Delta team looked to influence operations. To advance intelligence gathering, the team would exploit observation posts previously occupied. These observation posts were unused by Bin Laden elements. Precision would be guided by operators at the out posts. As the outposts observed 13 hours of thunder onto Al Qaeda positions, preparations were underway for the assault.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰²Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 148.

¹⁰³Gal Luft, “The Logic of Israel’s Targeted Killing,” *Middle East Quarterly* (Winter 2003): 3-13.

¹⁰⁴Fury. *Kill Bin Laden*, 149-53.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 165.

Moving forward in the operation, the operational commander was now in a scenario many leaders train for; your mission or men? The operational commander convoy pushed toward Bin Laden's location, the Northern Alliance fighters were pushing out. General Ali and his men were done for the day. The commander made his decision, Bin Laden would stay and fight therefore, and he needed to get his men to safety.¹⁰⁶

After securing his men, the operational commander made the decision to continue the fight and brief his higher later. At the time, it was the right thing. When targeting enemy leadership, awaiting approval is time lost that will never be gained. To elaborate, an elusive enemy needs only seconds to escape and invade into a deescalate network of protection. There is not time for waiting. A commander with adequate situational awareness and understanding can achieve this type of decision making. Again, the target observed is only actionable by constant over watch.

For several days, the operational team impacted damage onto Tora Bora. Al Qaeda armor was penetrated and their outposts destroyed. Although damage was being inflicted, Bin Laden's voice was in seclusion. Bin Laden had begun his evasion. As one of the operators linked up with coalition fighters, they briefed on sighting Bin Laden on a white horse. He was escorted by a large party of Egyptian security guards. As the operator found out, this source was trustworthy. He shared battle with Bin Laden. Their blood lay on the same battlefield.¹⁰⁷

Apparently, Bin Laden was moving from village to village. Instructions were provided to villagers as he passed through. Brilliantly executed but frustrating, Al Qaeda

¹⁰⁶Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 198.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 263.

had ordered the village members to stay indoors until authorized to come outside. Bin Laden knew any sighting would point to a pattern to exploit. The press picked-up Bin Laden's escape and began reporting it nationally.¹⁰⁸ To this day, Bin Laden remains at large.

Lessons Learned. As the battle of Tora Bora ended for the operational team, with success gained on the war on terror, the team agonized at missing their target. They missed their target because they were constrained. Fundamentally, technological superiority has taken away decision making. Commanders looked for technological solutions. The Command Post of the Future (CPOF), a battle command system for tracking current operations, is not going to spit out a decision to apply forces left or right. It will shape your situational understanding, but the commander on the ground, awaiting the decision, has the best answer. The forgotten question by senior commanders is; ~~What~~ "What does the situation tell you?" Immediately, the commander has given the decision making authority to the commander or soldier on the ground.

Prior to the battle of Tora Bora, the mission was given to ~~kill~~ "kill Bin Laden." The mission as it was translated in time read; ~~provide~~ "provide tactical over watch to the Northern Alliance fighters." Bin Laden was removed from the equation. Furthermore, Dalton Fury is spot on with his assessment of cultural understanding. Why would the Mujahedeen kill Bin Laden and face a lifetime of scrutiny from Bin Laden loyalists? Killing a low level Al Qaeda operative is easy to overcome, but kill a supporter to expelling the Russian

¹⁰⁸Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 263-70.

Bear leaves a Muslim desolate from his own kind.¹⁰⁹ Cultural awareness and cultural understanding are keys to operational success.

This chapter has provided an historical overview to support the introduction for increasing hunting capabilities within the US Army framework. The case studies provide substance for the key fundamentals of establishing hunting teams. Less is always more when operating in a complex environment. People centric skills executed by functional teams allow for societal integration. An enemy that operates decentralized requires an opposing force to operate as independent entity supported by a conventional mission command decision-making held by the commander on the ground. If a hunting team need assets to engage, they become priority.

In addition establishing key principles, the overview recommends a review of US counterterrorism policy. As the fight continues, does US leadership pick and choose when to target enemy leadership, or does the US authorize the right individuals with full authority to defend by way of targeted assassinations? Unfortunately, the US can no longer rely on massive oceans to deter infiltration. Infiltrations must be targeted and eliminated. To force the issue, the US Army must adopt hunting teams to shape the operating environment.

¹⁰⁹Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 293.

CHAPTER 5

CREATING THE TEAM

This chapter will combine lessons from Chapter four, characteristics from Chapter three, and current force design through doctrine, organization, and training to encourage the argument for establishing hunting teams within US Army formations. The US Army force model of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) is a compilation of functions that will enable the creation of a new capability or program. A top down process, policy shapes doctrine. As policy continues to develop measures to address targeted killing or selective targeting, US Army leadership can develop hunting teams within their formation to execute both lethal and non-lethal targeting. Application of the following recommendations allows maneuver units to capitalize on existing DOTMLPF solutions.

Doctrine

Doctrine, the backbone for how the US Army operates, is a continuous process. FM 3-0, *Operations*, and F-M 5-0, *Operations Process*, are constantly updated to reflect changes to the current operational environment. Today, the doctrinal focus has shifted to Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). Rightly understood, the shift towards FSO doctrine will allow for a ready force capable of executing operations within an ill-structured environment to major combat operations. The following paragraphs will highlight existing doctrine applications to support hunting operations; recommendations for incorporating hunting operations; and how US National Security Policy shapes the doctrinal environment.

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. FM 3-0 is the stage setter for introducing hunting doctrine. Hunting operations are successful when nested with warfighting functions. Hunting operations are interoperable with intelligence and maneuver. Intelligence drives operations. It is continuous throughout operations. Networking sources creates actionable intelligence. Hunting teams, when applied, are continuous surveillance for the ground commander. Hunting teams have the ability to provide timely intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). FM 3-0 outlines three key movement and maneuver tasks associated with hunting team actions. They are to deploy, occupy and employ. The teams must arrive with enough time establish networks and employ effects.¹¹⁰

Field Manual 5-0, *The Operations Process*. When developing hunting team doctrine, FM 5-0 provides essential mission command fundamentals. Mission command is the operations process applied to commander activities. Commander activities are understand, visualize, describe, direct, and assess. These activates are nested with the core hunting team characteristics developed in chapter 3. Understanding your environment requires historical knowledge through cultural awareness and cultural understanding of your target. Describing actions to your team require commander's to employ the most effective force applicable. Less is the most efficient and effective employment of hunting teams. Directing and assessing requires the commander to action the intelligence provided. Hunting teams, through decentralized operations, have the

¹¹⁰Department of the Army, *Operation* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2008), 3-1.

inherent capability to target immediately. Effective targeting requires knowledge of the enemy.¹¹¹

Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. COIN doctrine sets the conditions for operating within an insurgency. Successful counterinsurgency is dependent upon how the insurgency is understood. If random countermeasures are applied, the insurgency will overcome them with little action required. Insurgents operate decentralized among networks. These networks provide operational support to achieve operational objectives. Hunting teams must operate among the insurgency to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Hunting teams, when employed among the insurgency, have the ability to set conditions for achieving strategic success.¹¹² FM 3-24 provides relevant understanding of insurgent actions; however, hunting doctrine must extend its relevancy from US National Security Policy.

FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in a Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24.2 provides a foundation for applying measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP). These measurement techniques are essential to the development of hunting team doctrine. Developing MOE's and MOPs will guide commanders in the effective employment of hunting teams. Figure 2 provides an overview of applying MOE and MOP to hunting operations. Figure 2 demonstrates the nesting of hunting team operations with maneuver

¹¹¹Department of the Army, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 1-3.

¹¹²Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), 1-17.

forces. Networks are created and measured by their ability to develop actionable intelligence.¹¹³

Hunting teams measure their success using several indicators. As figure 2 demonstrates, a key task for hunting teams is developing sources within the population. This, the task, is a measure of performance. Measuring the effectiveness is the number of sources created. An indicator of the effectiveness is the number of targets developed from each source. Nested throughout this task are effects on the maneuver force and the population. The population identifying targets is a clear indicator of performance effectiveness.




Figure 2. Hunting Team MOE and MOP

Source: Created by author.

¹¹³Department of the Army, *Tactics in a Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), 5-27.

Organization and Personnel

In his book *Manhunting, Reversing the Polarity of Warfare*, George Crawford presents an excellent argument for a single operation agency focused on manhunting.¹¹⁴ Rightfully argued, a single agency would bring synchronization across US agencies. Today's operational environment has developed inter-agency collaboration while placing financial strain on the Department of Defense.

Today's organizational structure provides maneuver commanders key enablers for managing stability operations. Maneuver commanders have the resources for establishing hunting teams. In operation, hunting teams are interdependent capabilities to influence activities, enhance protection, enable operations effects, and build networks

Soldiers are the essential ingredient for hunting teams. Soldiers, within special mission units, are capable of performing above and beyond their duties, as a team, and as an individual to meet mission success. Today's operational environment has developed the conventional soldiers skill set. For example, an engineer route clearance platoon has performed the role of a light infantry platoon to cordon a city block. Furthermore, every soldier understands their role in intelligence collection.

If today's soldiers consistently operate outside their trained skills and master other skills without discomfort, these soldiers carry the special characteristics needed to operate in a hunting team. There are three personnel traits of soldiers operating within a hunting team. They are mental capacity, physical fitness, and social skills. The following paragraphs will discuss these personnel traits.

¹¹⁴George Crawford, *Manhunting; Reversing the Polarity of Warfare* (Baltimore: Publish America, LLP, 2008), 27-29.

Mental Capacity. Today's operational environment requires a higher level of understanding. Mental capacity is defined as the —sufficient understanding and memory to comprehend in a general way the situation in which one finds oneself and the nature, purpose, and consequence of any act or transaction into which one proposes to enter.”¹¹⁵ Operating within a complex environment requires the mental aptitude for applying operational variables to gain situational understanding of the environment; visualize the needed direction; describe the action; and direct the action.¹¹⁶ At the lowest level, soldiers are executing this seamlessly in today's complex environment.

Physical Fitness. The high altitudes, of Afghanistan, require soldiers to perform at a high level of physical readiness. The Department of the Army has recognized the need for increased physical training. Hunting teams require soldiers with high levels of physical and mental tolerance. Operations in and among the population require quick action to maintain or disengage contact. Furthermore, soldiers are required to enhance their mental readiness by maintaining language proficiency. Hunting operations are focused outside the continental US therefore, language skills are a necessary navigation tool for survival.

Social Skills. Social networking allows hunting teams to source information. Insurgents have mastered the art of social networking. Networking is the means to achieving a social end. John Walker Lindh, an American citizen captured while fighting for the Taliban, used his networking skills to achieve his endstate, full acceptance into the

¹¹⁵Catlin, Software, LLC, —Dictionary!” 11 July 2010, <http://catlinsoftware.com> (accessed 1 April 2011).

¹¹⁶Norman Wade, *The Battle Staff Handbook* (Lakeland: The Lightning Press, 2010), 1-5

Taliban. Moreover, John Walker Lindh networked well enough to arrange a meeting with Osama Bin Laden. Hunting teams are social warriors. The following narrative highlights the importance of social networking.

Hidden Capability

The team of special warriors collected the rest of their operational gear and began initial preparations for the assault. For months, the team dissected the operational variables focusing on the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) available in the given environment . Meanwhile, the team commander headed to a briefing in the mission command center.

The team commander briefed the brigadier general on his upcoming insertion. The insertion was a targeting operation to capture a high value target (HVT). At the beginning, questions were minimal from the brigadier general. The brief was executed by secure video tele-conference, and the brigadier general was comfortably enjoying the brief from his air conditioned room. At the twenty-minute mark, he began interrupting the team commander. From that point on, he continued to hammer the team commander. The team commander was beside himself. The plan was sound. Firsthand knowledge was coming from the leader on the ground, not Tampa, Florida. Why was the brigadier general questioning the on-ground knowledge? At the conclusion of the brief, the brigadier general added difficulty to the operational team. The team commander was directed to receive soldiers from the Alabama National Guard. The guidance was simple, the conventional elements, of the National Guard, would assist the team's infiltration.

In the spirit of duty, the team commander acknowledged receipt and moved out to brief his team. As he walked into his operations cell, the additional soldiers were already

present. The team commander pondered on not accepting the team, but realized the troubles surrounding a rejection. Immediately, the assault was delayed.

As night fall arrived, the team commander began his assessments of the assigned soldiers. Many of them were from small rural towns, but their hidden capabilities needed exploitation. Could these soldiers inject themselves within the civilian populace? Could they obtain intelligence for future operations? Observing there woodsmen's accent, the commander asked for the hunters in the crowd. All attached soldiers raised their hands with eagerness. Were experiences in hunting the only capability available to exploit?

The additional soldiers brought a wealth of personnel experience in scouting and hunting of wild game. The team commander was thrilled and he began interviewing them one by one. The team commander sent the last soldier out of his office and called in the senior team sergeant. The sergeant informed the commander of one last interview.

The last soldier sat down in front of the commander. Unlike the other soldiers, this soldier was shy and seemed to lack initiative, but he answered questions eloquently. The commander saw this one as the runt of the bunch. The shy soldier seemed looked as the others, but just did not have the type alpha personality found in special unit soldiers. The interview transitioned from military background to education and hobbies. The introvert answered the question. Hidden beneath the shy soldier was a talent ready for employment.

The introvert left the room and the team sergeant began his frantic brief back to the commander. The introvert was the networking source they needed. A Georgia Tech graduate in Computer Engineering, the introvert had joined the National Guard to pay for

additional college costs. The team commander, a computer geek himself, interrupted the team sergeant and called the introvert back into his office.

For several hours, the commander discussed the social networking of the targeted leadership. The enemy leadership utilized the internet to recruit new members and facilitate meeting locations and orders. Moreover, the commander felt the enemy leadership was using this method to operate decentralized. Orders were not needed among the insurgency. The leaders hid behind the network.

The operational team's mission was to capture or kill the networks leader. The discussion continued and the sergeant injected his understanding of social network. His three teenage girls lived on Facebook. The commander asked the introvert on his experiences with creating networks or network design. The introvert's personality began to grow with excitement. At Georgia Tech, the introvert was the network king. At any given point, he could analyze and predict social gatherings. His fraternity crowned him king social.

The introvert asked the commander to see the intelligence on the insurgent network. Instantly, the commander escorted him to the fusion cell. The fusion cell briefed the introvert on the terrorist networks, and their social patterns. The introvert asked for 24 hours to interface with the network.

The commander paced his office through ought the day. Finally, 24 hours was up and the introvert awaited the commander's arrival into the fusion cell. In front of the commander were the team linguists. The linguists were networking with the terrorist groups on a modified network page. The introvert had used the intelligence gathered and the language experts to create a network ready to support the insurgency. While the

commander was being briefed, the lead linguist grabbed him and pointed to the screen. The introvert had just established a meeting with the local insurgent cell leaders to discuss potential donations. The network was penetrated.

Training and Material

Hunting teams skills are perishable. Daily training is required to perfect the before mentioned skills. Units must provide the capability for the hunting team soldier to develop. Hunting team training should be developed in three phases consisting of social, technical and tactical. Social training develops the whole person; understanding of one's self, the enemy, and the physical terrain. Technical skills would consist of special requirements for receiving and processing information. Finally, those skills would come together in tactical training on shoot, move, and communicate. Examples of these types of training are; language training; tracking; network management; and computer software training. Personnel and funds should be set aside to increase a unit's capability to target both lethal and non-lethal. Resources are available with interagency and other US Army special mission units to enhance hunting team readiness.

For example, the US Army bridged the conventional and special mission training gap by developing the Asymmetric Warfare Group. The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) provides training opportunities along full spectrum operations to enhance the capabilities of US Army units. Training opportunities are available to enhance targeting skill sets.¹¹⁷ Equipping the hunter is unlimited.

¹¹⁷AWG, <https://portal.awg.army.mil/portal/server.pt/community/awgnet/446> (accessed 28 April 2011).

Maneuver commanders, right, wrong, or indifferent find themselves focusing on manning the equipment. For hunters, equipping the hunter is the focus. Recent developments in biometrics, optics, and weaponry have afforded comfortable protection for the maneuver soldier. Hunters are unique to the mission and so is their equipment. Material solutions for highly skilled professions require constant revision. In special mission units, you can find this revision in research and development squadrons. Developed hunting teams bring this quality to a unit. Constant training and development allow for quality assurance on selected equipment. This benefits the entire organization. For example, advancements in scope design, for the M4 rifle, benefits all soldiers assigned an M4.

Leadership

Leadership must adapt to an era of decentralized operations. An operational team commander in the hunt for Al Qaeda, this anonymous author describes the senior leadership mission command perception;

The command overhead became so huge it diminished our ability to accomplish the mission. It was unnecessary, in indeed counterproductive, to set up an entire three star command with only two battalions in the field. The original 5th Group teams had conquered the entire country back in late 2001 because their teams were encouraged to do whatever it took. They operated independently without much direct supervision on some of the hardest terrain on earth and accomplished the mission. Their feats are now stuff of legend. Was it because they were different? No, it was because they were allowed to do their job as they were trained. They were given a mission, and they accomplished it by being able to adjust quickly and decisively to the tactical situation on the ground without interference from the higher headquarters.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Anonymous, *Hunting Al Qaeda* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 237-239.

Situational understanding is key to decentralized operations. Commanders must trust their subordinate leaders decision making abilities. If there is any second guessing of the leader's capabilities, then that leader is untrained. Trust the soldier on the ground. His or her understanding is much greater than the digital common operating picture presented before the commander in the tactical operations center.

Throughout this thesis, key characteristics have been identified for achieving success in hunting operations. When developing small teams, the leadership requirements model provides an excellent guide for identifying the right leader to command hunting teams. Hunting teams require a leader with character, presence, and intellectual capacity. Character allows the leader to relate to his or her team members. Presence allows for a resilient approach to a prolonged process. Intellectual capacity allows for sound judgment in applying assets to target.¹¹⁹

Facilities

Facilities for hunting teams in inherent with existing force structures. Although these facilities are existing structures, there are need enhancements. For example, most special mission units have indoor ranges or shooting trailers. Simulators have increased marksmanship capabilities across the US Army formation. Yet, advancements in facilities to utilize live rounds are limited. As units prepare for future threats, instillations must lean forward in advancing training facilities.

¹¹⁹Department of the Army, *Army Leadership; Competent, Confident, and Agile* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), 2-3.

Conclusion

This thesis has expressed a need for a paradigm shift in operations to target enemy leadership within a complex environment. Successful targeting operations are centered on a unit's ability to operate decentralized with the right people. To do this, leaders must understand the importance of less is more. Hunting team's provide a trained enabler for decentralized operations within a complex environment.

Hunting teams are observers of behavior. While observing behavior patterns, commanders must afford full implementation of key characteristics for success. This thesis highlights those characteristics proven over time. Before operating within complex environment, a hunting team examines the historical knowledge surrounding the case. Sequentially, the hunting team is obtaining key cultural awareness and cultural understanding.

Less is a greater impact for hunting teams. From the size of the team to its lethal effects. Minimizing collateral impact leads to successful operations. Ironically, large force occupations have calmed centrally located insurgency. Insurgents have countered troop advancements with smaller dispersed networks. Teams targeting enemy leadership must operate in this manner. Smaller equals greater freedom maneuver within a complex environment.

Identifying and locating high payoff targets HPTs or HVTs remain key factors for achieving counterinsurgency success. Given the global expansion of localized insurgent networks, the US military must establish networks to target insurgent leadership on a global scale. To do so, the US military must adapt doctrine, organization, and training to develop hunting teams.

Trust the hunting team's trained abilities. Although commanders are eager to engage in the on ground decision cycle, they lack clear situational understanding. They may have an awareness of the complexities facing the on ground commander, but their understanding of the current situation lies in the leader on ground. Commanders argue for timely situational report to aid in the decision cycle.

Operating within a complex environment of varying cultures requires advanced social skills. These skills are developed overtime, but a basis exists before training. The narrative provided, Hidden Capability, highlighted the possible hidden skills within your basic maneuver unit. Understanding how to employ these skills falls in the development of hunting teams. Similar to stability operations, major combat operations will require task to skill set. An admin clerk capable of orienteering over restricted terrain can serve as the point man on patrol. The sniper with computer engineering skills has the ability to support intelligence collection through social networking. Hidden talents are there. Leaders find them and exploit them through critical application.

To conclude, hunting teams require unlimited accessibility to enabler support. Successful collaboration was demonstrated in the hunt for Pablo Escobar. Although collaboration was successful, information hoarding developed over time. Commanders became greedy for success. Success is the timely capture or killing of the target as witnessed on 01 May 2011. A small team tracked and killed America's most wanted man, Osama Bin Laden.

GLOSSARY

DOTMLPF. The US Army force generation model for developing and creating new capabilities.

High Payoff Target. A target when captured or kill degrades the enemy chances for success.

High Value Target. An individual the enemy commander requires for success.

Hunting. The process or method of pursuit to find, fix, or finish the targeted objective.

Hunting Team. A team consisting of 6-8 highly trained soldiers capable of locating a high value target of high payoff target through persistent engagement.

Selective Targeting. The process or method of analyzing HPTs and HVTs to determine priority.

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DMH
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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. David Weaver
DLRO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301