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THESIS

GOVERNING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: SOCIAL FIT

by

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GOVERNING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY: SOCIAL FIT

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ABSTRACT

The growing interconnectedness of nations through globalization, and the threat of international terrorism as a destabilizing force, has increased the international community's concern for stable governance in the developing world. In an era of globalization, with near instantaneous information flow, and a global court of international opinion, the options for governing a society in a post-conflict environment are limited. History is filled with rebellions, insurgencies, coups, invasions, and occupations, which result in regime change or some sort of post-conflict intervention by the international community. In each case, prior to conflict, there was an established order, or form of governance. After conflict, a new order or form of governance, has to emerge. In these societies, a preconflict political and social order was disrupted, and a new post-conflict political and social order established. Ideally, the crafting of a new political and social order into effective governance requires the acceptance of the governed. As the United States remains committed to assisting nations with establishing governance and fostering stability, policymakers should consider the social acceptance of a post-conflict government by the people.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CFC-A	Combined Forces Command Afghanistan
COIN	Counterinsurgency
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
GIROA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IJC	Islamic Jihad Council
IROA	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USAMGIK	United States Government in Korea

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I. INTRODUCTION

*For an arbitrary government to be legitimate, it would therefore be necessary in each generation for the people to be master of its acceptance or rejection.*¹

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1762

The growing interconnectedness of nations through globalization, and the threat of international terrorism as a destabilizing force, has increased the international community's concern for stable governance in the developing world. In an era of globalization, with near instantaneous information flow, and a global court of international opinion, the options for governing a society in a post-conflict environment are limited. History is filled with rebellions, insurgencies, coups, invasions, and occupations, which result in regime change or some sort of post-conflict intervention by the international community. In each case, prior to conflict, there was an established order, or form of governance. After conflict a new order, or form of governance, has to emerge. In these societies, a preconflict political and social order was disrupted, and a new post-conflict political and social order established. Ideally, the crafting of a new political and social order into effective governance requires the acceptance of the governed. As the United States remains committed to assisting nations with establishing governance and fostering stability, policymakers should consider the social acceptance of a post-conflict government by the people.

In early 2007, the United States-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) transitioned to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Under the leadership of ISAF, tactical units began an effort to "connect the population of Afghanistan to the government" in the hope of selling a democratic form of governance to the Afghan people. Efforts focusing on strengthening the Afghan state continue today. It is a widely held belief that a strong centralized state will bring stability to Afghan society.

¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract* (Hackett Pub Co, 1988), 20.

In February 2007, Taliban insurgents operating in northern Konar and Nuristan provinces routinely attacked Afghan Border Police outposts, police stations, district centers, and U.S. occupied firebases. In an effort to limit the population's support for the insurgents and facilitate effective governance, one U.S. Army Special Forces detachment, the Afghan district police chief, and the Afghan district sub-governor traveled to the village of Helgal. The Special Forces detachment had credible intelligence reports indicating Helgal was being used as a "rest site" by traveling insurgents and foreign fighters in the area. The detachment's objectives were:

- Introduce village leadership to district Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IROA) officials
- Explain the functions of the government officials to the villagers
- Encourage support for the government officials
- Discourage support for insurgents and foreign fighters

As the detachment and accompanying police officers moved slowly into the valley, intercepted Taliban radio transmissions indicated that insurgents were preparing to ambush the detachment and the Afghan police officers. The detachment commander asked the police chief if Taliban insurgents made the radio transmissions. The chief replied "No, just Afghans being Afghans. They do not know us, and we are armed, therefore they must try to defend their village."² The detachment commander immediately called a halt to the column and asked the police chief to explain over the radio to the Afghan villagers the reason for the detachment's presence. For the next 45 minutes, the chief explained over the radio that the detachment did not seek a fight and only wanted to talk with the elders. After some negotiation, the unseen village representative agreed to allow the detachment and police officers to enter the village.

When the coalition of soldiers and police officers reached the village, the six elders and other village males gathered around in a half circle. The elders exchanged greetings with the coalition members and served tea. Through a Pashtu-speaking

² Discussions held with the author, Helgal, Afghanistan 2007.

interpreter the detachment commander thanked the village elders for their hospitality. The commander then introduced the Afghan government representatives and explained that, as members of the government, the officials' job was to perform administrative functions for the people of the district. The commander described the functions of government, the idea of constituents, the services the government could provide, and why it was necessary to support the government. The commander specifically addressed infrastructure improvement: road construction, wells, electricity, and the possibility of micro-hydro projects. Most importantly, the commander discussed the nature of the relationship between elected officials and their constituents in a democracy. Essentially, the citizens elect the officials through voting, and the officials have a responsibility to represent the interests of their constituents. In concluding, the commander asked the villagers to support their government and to discourage those who sought to attack and destroy it.

After a brief deliberation, the elder with the longest, whitest beard began to speak. He welcomed the detachment, police chief, and sub-governor. He stated matter-of-factly, "If my people need a well we will dig it, if my people need an improved road we will build it. The road you traveled on to get here we built. There is no need for the government here."³ One villager, who appeared to be of moderate status in the village, stated, "I have a small field that I farm, I have three wives and many children, I have elders who tell me what I need, why do I need to vote?"⁴

The senior elder thanked the detachment and Afghan officials for their visit. He stated, "You are welcome to stay in my guest house. We will slaughter a goat, and you may stay and rest as long as you like. You must understand, the people you speak of who attack you, are also welcome to stay here and rest."⁵

Combat units across Afghanistan face similar situations every day. These situations shed light on the greater problem facing U.S. efforts in the developing world.

³ Discussions held with the author, Helgal, Afghanistan 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

How does an international force assist a nation in establishing governance that is consistent with the social values and norms of local populations, will thus be accepted by members of the society, but will still provide enough structure to foster stability?

A. BACKGROUND

Considering the global nature of security concerns in an era of terrorism, the United States has a direct interest in the ability of governments around the world to maintain order. As a leader of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. finds itself engaged in nation-building. First in Afghanistan, after toppling the Taliban government that harbored Al Qaeda, the group responsible for planning and coordinating the September 11, 2001 attacks, then in Iraq, after the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath political party. If the recent history of U.S. post-conflict actions is any indicator of future post-conflict actions, and, particularly if the absence of a capable government threatens stability and facilitates the activities of terrorists, then the U.S. must anticipate nation-building in support of regime change elsewhere as well. Unfortunately, the United States' success in nation-building appears inconsistent at best. While arguably successful in Japan, Germany, and South Korea, the United States post-conflict intervention experience since the end of the Cold War in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, has produced mixed results.⁶

Ultimately, the U.S. intent at the outset of each of these efforts was to use the military to institute a process of democratization. Success was defined as the "ability to build, promote, and transfer enduring democratic institutions" to the host nation.⁷ U.S. policymakers believed democratization would lead to stability. However, democratization has become less about the "growth of political freedoms and liberties, self-government and sovereignty," and more about establishment of a "civil society" according to Western values and norms.⁸ In effect, the form of governance that would

⁶ James Dobbins, *After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush*, illustrated edition. (RAND Corporation, 2008), 84.

⁷ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 1st ed. (RAND Corporation, 2005), 2.

⁸ David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, Second Edition. (Pluto Press, 2000), 4.

best provide stability for a given society became less important than the altering of society to reflect Western ideals. To underscore this point, consider the example of a society enacting legislation through a democratic process that dictates that individuals found guilty of adultery shall be put to death. Is that society undemocratic because it does not respect the freedom of individuals? Or is it democratic since it arrived at the punishment through a democratic process?

Currently, a conglomeration of U.S. and foreign agencies, led by the United States military, are in the midst of two counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. strategy has hinged on establishing democratic governments. The results vary, but without question the U.S. has found itself battling insurgents who are intent on defeating the established fledgling democracies. In Iraq, the COIN efforts appear to be somewhat successful and the new Iraqi government appears to be growing in competence and popular acceptance. Conversely, success in Afghanistan appears less likely, with limited progress against the insurgents and the decreasing effectiveness of the Karzai government—why? This thesis aims to explain this variance in stability and to explore the role of governance in achieving it.

Over the past ten years, literature on counterinsurgency has exploded. The military has developed new doctrine describing what and how operations are to be conducted in a COIN fight. Though disagreements exist, many if not most experts acknowledge or agree that COIN is a population-centric struggle and popular support is critical to achieve ultimate victory.⁹ However, the same literature does not address the significance of establishing a government that the population will be most (or more) likely to support. The literature instead simply cites governance as a component of best COIN practices. Ultimately, however, the practitioners of nation-building and the executioners of COIN would be better served by asking: What is the impact of an ill fitting post-conflict governance structure on ongoing nation-building efforts? In other words, even if all tactics and operations follow accepted COIN best practices, can an ill-fitting post-conflict government still be successful?

⁹ David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, *U.S. Army U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Signalman Publishing, 2009), 1–2.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

From the Western perspective, democracy is often perceived as the way to achieve political stability.¹⁰ However, in post-conflict environments, it seems that whatever system of governance resonates best with the society is most likely to succeed. This leads to the question: how does the alignment of a system or method of governance with the underlying social structure and norms affect stability?

C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the significance of attaining a ‘social fit’ in post-conflict environments. ‘Social fit’ in the context of this thesis means that “citizens provide the ultimate source of legitimacy for a social order” when it comes to governance.¹¹ Specifically, this thesis will articulate how the willingness of the population to accept the establishment of social order by the government is critical for lasting stability.

Consequently, this thesis will identify social factors that contribute to, or inhibit, effective governance. Our working hypothesis is that how a government fits society, or how able a society is to establish its own form of governance, will limit the potential for further conflict or resistance, thereby fostering stability.

D. THESIS OUTLINE

Post-conflict situations present difficult challenges for establishing stable governance, particularly when the responsibility lies with a foreign force. We contend that social fit is integral to fostering stability. In order to provide a clearer way of thinking about social fit when analyzing specific post-conflict governments, this thesis takes into account three components: ideological resonance, expectations of the social contract, and comfort and familiarity. Chapter II broadly discusses the significance of social fit, as well as identifying and defining the three components of social fit. Each

¹⁰ Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, Reprint. (Harper Perennial, 2010), 7.

¹¹ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 126.

subsequent chapter identifies and analyzes more specifically how each component of social fit affected stability in a specific case. Chapter III provides an example of social mis-fit, where societal values are not reflected in the government, resulting in escalating violence. Chapter IV outlines the role of social fit in an environment free of violence, but suffering from political stagnation. Chapter V provides an example of achieving social fit. Chapter VI offers future policy implications and recommendations. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that the relationship between social fit and resulting stability should guide future policy and strategy where the U.S. has to contend with helping to stabilize a post-conflict society.

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II. WHY SOCIAL FIT?

*Societies are not made of sticks and stones, but of men whose individual characters, by turning the scale one way or another, determine the direction of the whole.*¹²

Socrates, The Republic by Plato 375 BC

Sustainable political order in the developing world has been a frequent topic among practitioners and scholars of stability and COIN operations. There appears to be general consensus in the international community that instability can affect the peace and prosperity of all nations. By-products of an unstable environment include: terrorism, international crime, genocide, starvation, as well as internal and external war. The structure of the nation state and its application of governance are seen as the mechanisms by which societies may achieve stability, peace, and prosperity.¹³

Current literature devoted to post-conflict stabilization and nation building indicates that there are three main areas of focus for establishing effective stable governance: democratization, economic improvement, and massive international intervention. Most scholars typically advocate some combination of all three, but differ largely in where they place emphasis. For instance, while some believe that the establishment of democracy will foster the necessary conditions for stable governance, this assertion is also frequently challenged.¹⁴ In many cases in the developing world, the application of democracy can lead to less stable governance.¹⁵

Other scholars argue economic development is the cornerstone of stable governance, with many of these making a fundamental assumption that material wealth

¹² Plato, *The Republic*, 2nd ed. (Penguin Classics, 2007), 277.

¹³ W. C. Opello and S. J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, illustrated edition. (Cornell University Press, 2004).

¹⁵ Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, Reprint. (Harper Perennial, 2010), 11.

and comfort are the preeminent desires of all humans.¹⁶ It is generally accepted that a post-conflict society that can produce wealth for the population will be stable. As Paul Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University states, “poor is dangerous.”¹⁷ His argument is that an effective economy and economic policy can increase the stability of post-conflict governance.

Scholars who advocate democratic or economic solutions vary little in their recommendations for how to establish both democracy and economic development. The most common recommendation for establishing stability and transforming societies in the developing world involves large-scale international intervention by international peacekeeping forces, United Nations commissions, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The advocates of massive international intervention differ little except on the mechanics. Essentially, the goal of intervention is to teach and educate people, in the hopes that one day they might transform themselves into a functioning state.¹⁸

As is now commonly acknowledged, most post-colonial states were created with no regard for the often vastly different societies within their borders. Overcoming ethnic and tribal differences in establishing stable governance in post-conflict environments is thus significantly more difficult than in states where societies are relatively homogenous. Therefore, minimal ethnic diversity or relative homogeneity across certain key dimensions can increase stability in a post-conflict environment.

As a society recovers from conflict, a political power structure invariably emerges. This, in turn, influences capacity. According to Joel S. Migdal, effective states attempt to develop capabilities that include “the capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”¹⁹ The degree that this is possible depends, first, on the type of governance prior

¹⁶ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 12.

¹⁷ Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 125.

¹⁸ Ibid., 214.

¹⁹ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.

to conflict. If the society was successfully governed prior to hostilities, then the likelihood is higher it can be governed effectively again. In other words, a positive pre-existing governance experience can increase the stability of post-conflict governance.

A. DEVELOPING SOCIAL FIT

In establishing post-conflict governance, remnants of the old political order may conflict with the new political order in determining who will wield political power. Disputes over post-conflict governance can be used to mobilize people, leading to new, or renewed, social conflict. Lewis Coser defines social conflict as “a struggle over the values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to gain desired values, but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.”²⁰ According to Migdal, of the factors affecting a state’s ability to survive, “none has been more important in marshaling strength for the state, though, than the ability to mobilize the society’s population.”²¹ In effect, Migdal finds that the support of the society is the key factor in determining the survival of the state. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that if an insurgency requires mobilization of some portion of a society, then the opposite may also be true; in order for a government or governance structure to succeed it must mobilize support from some portion of the population it intends to govern. Thus, a post-conflict government *should* seek support from society and/or reduce the factors that would encourage mobilization against it.

Given the implications whenever a population is mobilized for or against a post-conflict government, it seems to only make sense to create a government the population will support, or at least won’t oppose. Social movement and mass mobilization theories point to factors that can contribute to achieving this. Both theories acknowledge the importance of congruence between the nature of government and the target society. By reviewing classic social movement theory, resource mobilization theory, and some

²⁰ L. A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (The Free Press New York, 1967), 232.

²¹ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 22.

aspects of framing, it becomes apparent how necessary it is to consider social fit when establishing a post-conflict government and to do so without assuming that a standard type of governance can be applied.

Classic social movement theory states that the presence of antecedent conditions creates a structural strain on society. This strain causes a disruption within society. The disruption, in turn, leads to a social movement.²² Different models exist within classic social movement theory, but each model offers the same overall framework. According to mass society theory, for instance, the lack of an effective structure for integration into political and social life results in social isolation, causing “alienation and anxiety,” thereby leading to a social movement.²³ According to the status inconsistency model, the proximate cause of a social movement is cognitive dissonance caused by a discrepancy in a person’s status: his/her rankings according to education, income, occupation, aren’t aligned.²⁴ The collective behavior model, on the other hand, focuses on a social strain caused by socially disruptive processes such as industrialization, urbanization, or some other significant social change, leading to a feeling of widespread disruption of the social order. This strain causes “normative ambiguity,” which results in collective action and a social movement.²⁵

Differing from classic social movement theory, resource mobilization theory claims that an insurgency does not directly result from a rise in discontent, but emerges when there is an increase in the level of resources available for counter-state activity. The term ‘resource’ can refer to material resources such as money and weapons, as well as non-material resources such as legitimacy and habits of industry.²⁶ Of course, if resources can be considered critical for effective counter-governance activity, the same may hold true for government activity. In other words, the availability of resources has to be critical for both sides.

²² Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 1st ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1999), 7.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 8.

²⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁶ Ibid., 32.

While mobilization theories argue that social movements result from various objective conditions, the relatively new concept of framing points to something more subjective, such as perception, playing a critical role in social movements. The application of framing to social and mass movement theories also provides insight into defining social fit. Two originators of framing, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, describe framing this way:

...the articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of events, experiences, and existing beliefs and values, most of which are existing ideologies...from a framing perspective, ideologies constitute cultural resources that can be tapped and exploited for the purpose of constructing collective action frames... Following Swidler (1986), we are arguing that if culture is best conceived as a “bag of tools,” then clearly ideologies function in this fashion in relation to collective action frames...²⁷

While social movement scholars use framing to describe the “production of mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas,” Benford and Snow use framing to develop the impact of frame alignment on social movements. Benford and Snow’s comments recognize and emphasize the importance of beliefs and values in constructing collective action frames. The degree of resonance is critical to effectiveness, or the “mobilizing potency” of a collective action frame.²⁸

While the causes of social movements and mass mobilization are subject to debate, what is important to note for the purposes of this section is the need to take social fit into account. Each theory describes conditions that lead to mobilization, or movement, within society. Ideally upon inception, the governing body should avoid creating conditions that will inspire mobilization or movement against it, instead establishing conditions that encourage the society to accept it. The more it can do this the more likely achieving stable governance becomes.

Mass society theory highlights how important it is to avoid social isolation, which can lead to alienation and anxiety. According to the status inconsistency model,

²⁷ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 9.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 620.

cognitive dissonance is caused by resentment about one's status. The collective behavior model suggests why it is important to avoid normative ambiguity, or the disruption of normative behavior. Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the significance of maximizing available resources to foster pro-government activity. Amplifying beliefs and values that resonate with society is probably best achieved through proper framing.

B. DEFINING SOCIAL FIT

Given the significance of these insights, it becomes possible to think of social fit in terms of three critical components: ideological resonance, expectations regarding the social contract, and comfort and familiarity. The argument this thesis presents is that the greater the ideological resonance, the more closely aligned society's expectations are with that of the government, and the more comfortable and/or familiar society is with the governance structure, then the greater the social fit. The greater the social fit, the greater the likelihood that the post-conflict government will be stable.

1. Ideological Resonance

By ideological resonance, we refer to the degree to which the governing system does or does not resonate with the population's values. Richard Hyse defines ideology as the "prescriptive belief systems with a preferred view of what human behavior ought to be."²⁹ Resonance is defined as a "corresponding or sympathetic response or, the power or quality of evoking or suggesting images, memories, and emotions."³⁰ For the purposes of this thesis, we use ideological resonance to mean the degree to which a post-conflict government's preferred view of how humans should behave corresponds with the view of the governed. The more these views align, the greater the ideological resonance.

Different societies hold different beliefs and values important. Thus, it is necessary for a government recovering from, or born out of, conflict to embrace or reflect these values and beliefs. However, looking at different post-conflict environments

²⁹ R. Hyse, *Markets, Power, And Wealth: A Critique of an Ideology* (Xlibris Corp, 2005).

³⁰ "Oxford English Dictionary resonance, n.," n.d., http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50204166?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=resonance&first=1&max_to_show=10.

around the world, it is not always possible to accurately identify what might be the critical beliefs or values of each society. At most we can say that they must exist. In some societies, respect for a particular religion may be critically important; in other societies protecting individual rights may be essential. The purpose of this thesis is not to establish which beliefs or values are critical in which specific societies, but to recognize that the alignment of a post-conflict government with its constituent society's critical belief(s) or value(s) may have a significant impact on that government's success.

2. Social Contract: Expectations

The second component of social fit is the social contract. The term 'social' means "of, belonging to, or concerned with the organization of society; that constitutes society."³¹ A 'contract,' is a mutual agreement between two or more parties that something shall be done or forborne by one or both; a compact, covenant, bargain.³² Thus, a social contract is the agreement between the government and those it governs that delineates the expected functions and/or performance of both parties: government as well as citizens.³³ Inherent in this agreement is the voluntary acceptance by individuals of the government's rules and laws.³⁴ In establishing post-conflict governance, it is critical to ask what citizens expect from their government and what government expects of them.

In line with this approach, two additional questions emerge. The first has to do with scope or capability: is the government providing the service(s) required by society? An illustration of a poorly aligned social contract is when citizens desire education, but the government focuses on providing electricity. The second question relates to capacity or strength: is the government adequately providing the service(s) required? Using the same example, when the government focuses on building schools to assist with

³¹ "Oxford English Dictionary social, adj. and n.," n.d., http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50229731?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=social&first=1&max_to_show=10.

³² "Oxford English Dictionary contract, n.1," n.d., http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50048674?query_type=word&queryword=contract&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=G8GV-zxS6tf-8161&hlite=50048674.

³³ Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, 23.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

education, but is unable to build enough schools to adequately address the problem, that, too, points to problems with the social contract. The more a post-conflict government is able to provide the functions desired by members of society to the degree expected, the greater the likelihood there will be a tight social fit.

3. Comfort and Familiarity

The third component of social fit is comfort and familiarity. ‘Familiarity’ refers to the degree to which members of a society are comfortable and/or familiar with the day-to-day processes used by the government to conduct its affairs. Because ‘structure’ refers to “public institutions and policies created by governments as a framework for economic and social relations,” it is worth thinking about familiarity in relationship to structure.³⁵ The framework adhered to can be considered the mechanism by which the government distributes or provides its services. State services typically include, but are not limited to: the delivery of material goods, such as water and electricity, the delivery of essentials, such as education, the ability to coordinate security, legislate, apply the rule of law, and / or provide justice.

Regardless of the critical resource, service, or function provided, ‘comfort and familiarity’ implies that it will be distributed or undertaken using means with which members of society are already comfortable and familiar. One method of ensuring that people are comfortable with the government’s actions or intent is to facilitate maximum participation. Achieving familiarity requires assessing local history and culture. For example, if the government establishes a centralized political system that does not incorporate traditional leaders, then members of society may feel resentful due to the loss of status of their traditional leaders. Citizens are less likely to participate in a political process that does not incorporate traditional power structures, with which they are most familiar. In contrast, if a government incorporates traditional leaders, members society would more likely be able to appreciate what the government is used for and how to use it.

³⁵ G. Daniel, and others, “Global foreign direct investment flows: the role of governance infrastructure,” *World development* 30, no. 11 (2002): 1899–1919.

The rejection of a governing body by members of society in a post-conflict situation will result in their refusal to participate in the political process, or, worse, society's return to resistance or insurgency. This is much less likely if the government's ideology resonates, the social contract is mutually agreed to, and the members of society are comfortable and familiar with the procedures and processes by which the government conducts its business. Our contention is that creating these conditions in a post-conflict-environment will more likely foster stability and effective governance. The next chapter analyzes the post-conflict situation in Afghanistan.

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III. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT FIT SOCIETY: AFGHANISTAN

*The beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of government they thought fit.*³⁶

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 1690

The United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to establish governance in Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban Regime have been undermined by a resurgence of the Taliban. The primary goal of the United States Government in Afghanistan, as stated by President Obama in his speech to the nation on December 1, 2009, is “to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”³⁷ Given the current strategic focus of building a centralized stable Afghanistan that is capable of securing and controlling its population, it is crucial to consider what type of governance would provide a social fit for Afghan society. Considering social fit in of itself is paramount; however, social fit alone is not the sole answer to the problems facing Afghanistan.

Four major factors have historically prevented Afghanistan from achieving long-lasting political stability. First, socio-cultural “cleavages” are characterized by differences in ethnicity, language, sectarianism, tribalism, and race.³⁸ Second, Islamic doctrine has been blended with local customs. Third, communal loyalty and identity take precedence over “higher order identity formations.”³⁹ And fourth, the country’s mountainous terrain “isolates and magnifies the distance of the people from the government.”⁴⁰ These conditions shape the Afghans’ preferred view of governance.

³⁶ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, Reprint. (Hackett Pub Co, 1980), 52.

³⁷ “Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan | The White House,” n.d., <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/way-forward-afghanistan>.

³⁸ Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*, 1st ed. (University of Washington Press, 2001), 12.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 12–14.

Understanding these factors is paramount to designing a government that fits Afghan society. Despite Afghanistan's rocky political history, elements of social fit existed previously during periods of stability.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In 1919, Amir Amanullah, the ruling leader of Afghanistan, entered into negotiations with the British that eventually led to the signing of a treaty guaranteeing Afghanistan's complete independence in 1921.⁴¹ Independence from British influence provided an opportunity for Amanullah to establish governance in Afghanistan, free from colonial influence. From 1921–1924, Amir Amanullah circulated Afghanistan's first written constitution.⁴² In the document, Amanullah attempted to develop a framework that defined the relationship between the monarchy and the government, as well as the relationship between religion and the state.⁴³ Amanullah's primary aim was the "secularization and modernization of the Afghan state and Afghan society."⁴⁴ However, Amanullah's attempts to reform Afghan society eventually led to his downfall. Social reforms promoting the rights of women and secular education threatened the traditional power structures held by the tribal and religious leaders of Afghan society.⁴⁵ Whereas religious and tribal leaders traditionally held power sufficient to influence all matters concerning Afghan society, Amanullah's programs of secularization and modernization limited those powers. As a result, Amanullah made numerous enemies among the religious and tribal elites.⁴⁶ This disruption of societal norms alienated nearly every segment of Afghan society.⁴⁷ Sir Martin Ewans sums up Amanullah's failure:

⁴¹ Jeffery Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan* (Praeger, 2003), 41.

⁴² Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics* (Harper Perennial, 2002), 128.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 127.

⁴⁵ Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*, First Edition. (I. B. Tauris, 2006), 87.

⁴⁶ D. S. Richards, *The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars*, 3rd ed. (Pan Books, 2002), 171.

⁴⁷ Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan*, 44.

Amanullah should have been well aware that control of Afghanistan required a strong central authority, as well as a Machiavellian ability to handle the tribes and maneuver them toward an acceptance of rule from Kabul.⁴⁸

In Ewans' assessment, Afghanistan requires a strong central authority; however, the cycle of reform, followed by rejection of the reform, and the eventual ouster of the government has continued to this day. Essentially, secularization, modernization, and social reform dictated by a central government alienate traditional Afghan society.

1. The Monarchy

A period of lawlessness followed Amanullah's ouster. A new King emerged with the support of the religious and tribal leaders. In 1929, Nadir Khan accepted the endorsement of the tribal Jirga and became known as King Nadir Shah.⁴⁹ Nadir's family, known as Musahibans, would rule Afghanistan through 1978.⁵⁰ The challenges Nadir Shah faced in regaining control were immense. In describing the situation following Nadir's rise to power, then-British minister to Kabul, Richard Maconachie reported:

Throughout the country the advantages of anarchy seem to have been better appreciated than its drawbacks, and the tribes were asking themselves why they should resign the freedom which they had enjoyed for the past year, and submit again to a central authority which would inevitably demand payment of land revenue, customs duties and bribes for its officials, and possibly the restoration of arms looted from the government posts and arsenals.⁵¹

In an effort to regain support from the religious leaders and tribes, Nadir abolished all secular legislation enacted by Amanullah, he also endorsed the enforcement of Islamic law through religious courts, and revoked women's rights.⁵² He further established control through brutish tactics of intimidation and repression. In 1931, he

⁴⁸ Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 134.

⁴⁹ S. Tanner, *Afghanistan: A military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (Da Capo Pr, 2003), 222.

⁵⁰ Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 195.

⁵¹ Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 139.

⁵² *Ibid.*

established a new constitution, but, as the supreme leader, maintained authority to appoint and remove cabinet members, and veto legislation or write legislation unilaterally.⁵³ Nadir pursued a delicate balancing act of placating conservative religious and tribal leaders, while at the same time implementing limited reforms that adhered to the tenets of Islam. Nadir faced limited opposition from some remaining members of the Amanullah regime, as well as a limited number of disenchanted tribesmen. Nadir dealt with challenges to his power ruthlessly. Arrest, imprisonment, and executions were commonplace.

In 1932, Nadir executed a former Anamullah supporter, Ghulam Nabi, for subversive acts. One year later, King Nadir Shah was assassinated, allegedly in revenge for the Nabi execution.⁵⁴ Nadir's son Zahir Shah replaced his father as the King of Afghanistan. But, due to his age, Nadir's brothers (Zahir's uncles) ruled the country.

In retrospect, Nadir's most significant accomplishments as King came in the realms of economy and infrastructure development. Nadir was able to increase exports and imports sufficient to generate a steady revenue stream for the government. Nadir established Afghanistan's first bank. In addition, he focused on developing a system of governance where by "local authority was to be neither resisted or questioned."⁵⁵ Though it is not entirely clear, it appears that Nadir understood that challenges to local authority by the central government would ultimately lead to dissension and revolt. He therefore implemented a pattern of governance by which the regime would provide "security of life and property in exchange for obedience."⁵⁶ Beyond this authority, Nadir left governance to the people. The King's policy was that new institutions and social ideas should evolve naturally "within the boundaries of Islam and the socio-cultural realities of Afghanistan."⁵⁷

⁵³ Roberts, *The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan*, 53.

⁵⁴ William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars: Second Edition*, Second Edition. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 13.

⁵⁵ Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, First Edition. (Cornell Univ Pr, 1972), 83.

⁵⁶ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 8.

⁵⁷ Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, 100.

After Nadir's assassination and under the rule of his son, Zahir Shah, Afghanistan maintained political stability for the next 40 years.⁵⁸ Thomas Barfield calls this period, from 1929–1978, “Afghanistan’s longest interval of peace and internal stability,” when the government “avoided both international conflicts and any significant internal rebellion.”⁵⁹ Although Afghanistan was officially a monarchy, historians often refer to this period as rule by an autocracy due to the significant power exercised by the prime ministers.

The policies of limiting reform and responding to threats with brute repression initially adopted by Nadir Shah continued to assist in preventing the development of any significant internal threat to the regime. The regime attempted change on a small, incremental scale by first testing anything new in Kabul, and only then in the more conservative rural areas of the countryside. As an example, the mandatory veiling of women, a traditional Afghan custom, was relaxed.⁶⁰ The regime took the stance that women had the right to wear the veil just as they had the right not to wear it. This voluntary reform met some resistance, but, ultimately because it was not forced, it was accepted by society. Similarly, previous regimes taxed the rural population to generate revenue. Zahir's family lessened the tax burden by increasing tariffs on imports and exports.⁶¹ Lessening the tax burden while limiting central government interference in social matters were among the most significant reasons for political stability.

Under King Zahir Shah, power in Afghanistan passed from one family member to the next through a series of prime ministers. Nadir's brothers, Hashim Khan followed by Shah Mahmud, maintained the premiership from 1933 to 1953. Following Zahir's uncles, Daud Khan, Zahir's cousin, assumed the role of prime minister.

Daud's ambition for modernization and economic development led him to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union throughout his 10-year appointment as prime minister. At the time, Daud did not believe alignment with the Soviets would have any

⁵⁸ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 169.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 201.

⁶¹ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 14.

major impact on Afghanistan's sovereignty. According to Sir Martin Ewans, "He [Daud] was by no means blind to the risk of Communist subversion, but, in his view, Communism had no appeal within Afghan society: both the traditional and educated classes had a stake in the existing social order, while the people at large, with their adherence to tribal, Islamic ways, were far removed from the proletariat that was the accepted vehicle of a communist revolution."⁶² Diplomatic ties with the Soviets initiated by Daud would have lasting effects on Afghan society.

Daud's progressive agenda, along with Soviet influence, gave rise to a leftist movement, particularly in and around Kabul. Sensing a disruption in the status quo, King Zahir requested and received Daud's resignation. Instead of turning to a new prime minister to lead the country, however, King Zahir took personal charge of the state in 1963. In an effort to head off revolutionary advances, Zahir sought to institute a more democratic style of government and, in 1964, signed a new constitution, which was then ratified by the Loya Jirga.⁶³

2. Constitutional Monarchy

The 1964 constitution attempted to reduce the royal family's role in day-to-day operations of the government. It also sought to open the political process to public view, and define individual rights and liberties for ordinary Afghans.⁶⁴ New freedoms established by the constitution included the formation of village government institutions led by popularly elected representatives, as well as the creation of political parties. According to Richard Newell in *The Politics of Afghanistan*, "The attempt to bring formal instruments of representation and democracy to the peasant and nomad was an entirely new and experimental facet of modern political change."⁶⁵ Although the King made efforts to modernize Afghan society through the introduction of a more democratic

⁶² Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 153.

⁶³ Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan*, 99.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 111.

constitution, little modernization actually occurred. The new parliament engaged in numerous debates, but overall decision-making authority remained in the King's hands.⁶⁶

During this period, King Zahir attempted to escalate "trickle down social reform," though wherever the regime encouraged social reform and modernization in Kabul it did so without forcing it in the countryside.⁶⁷ The effect of these efforts served to increase divides already felt between the elite of the capital city and rural villagers. Two significant factors that served to deepen this schism were shifts in the role of women in society and state run education programs. Villages continued to cling to traditional values. Although the differences did not lead to outright resistance or violence, political stagnation and the "struggle of various social strata within the state apparatus, hastened the crisis of legitimacy of the state."⁶⁸

While Afghanistan experimented with the new constitutional monarchy, another less obvious threat to the regime began to take root. The strides made in education, to include opportunities in the Soviet Union and the United States, led to a rise in the number of students in Kabul. Unfortunately, they outnumbered the jobs available upon graduation. This disjuncture fostered different movements in and around the University of Kabul. At the same time, under provisions provided by the new constitution, new political parties began to develop. In 1965, communist Afghans, under indirect influence from the Soviet Union, established the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).⁶⁹ Nur Mohammed Taraki, one of the leaders of the new PDPA, was later alleged to have served as a Soviet KGB asset since 1951.⁷⁰

The Islamist movement also began to gain traction among students attending Kabul University. Islamists opposed the regime's liberalism, Pashtun nationalism, foreign influence in Afghanistan (whether from the Soviets or the West), and

⁶⁶ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 211.

⁶⁷ Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, And Mujahid*, Revised. (Basic Books, 2002), 48.

⁶⁸ Hafizullah Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan* (Praeger Publishers, 1990), 11.

⁶⁹ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 213.

⁷⁰ Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 169.

communism.⁷¹ They called for a return to traditional Islamic society governed by strict interpretations of shari'a law. The introduction of competing political parties in Afghanistan, made possible under the 1964 Constitution, helped sow the seeds for future destabilization.

3. Return to Autocracy

In July 1973, former Prime Minister Daud (King Zahir's cousin) seized power in a military coup, which ended constitutional development in Afghanistan.⁷² Political discourse in Kabul and fears of anarchy precipitated Daud's move. Daud consolidated his power through a series of executions, arrests and imprisonment of former administration officials. Sensing a shift in the political tide, Daud ignored the religious and tribal leaders, preferring to ally himself with the leftist elites in Kabul.⁷³ Initially supported by the PDPA during his coup, Daud became concerned about the level of the PDPA's and the country's dependence on the Soviet Union. In an effort to limit Soviet influence, Daud reduced the number of PDPA members in his administration and limited the number of Soviet advisors to the military.⁷⁴

As with most things Afghan, the PDPA at this time was not a unified organization. There were two factions. The first was the Khalq faction, led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin; the second was the Parcham faction led by Babrak Karmal.⁷⁵ The two factions differed in their method of reform. The Khalq faction supported revolutionary reform in order to establish a socialist state, while the Parcham faction preferred a more gradual approach to socialism.⁷⁶ Ironically, Daud's decision to exclude the PDPA from his administration led to unification of the PDPA in 1977.

⁷¹ Olivier Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 71.

⁷² Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan*, 52.

⁷³ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 214.

⁷⁴ Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 229.

⁷⁵ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 22.

⁷⁶ Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, Reprint. (W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 13.

4. Communism

In 1978 Afghan Army units, backed by the PDPA, launched a military coup. In the process, the presidential palace was surrounded and Daud was assassinated.⁷⁷ The military leaders responsible for the coup turned authority over to Nur Mohammed Taraki, former leader of the Khalq faction of the PDPA.⁷⁸ Following the coup, in late 1978, the PDPA introduced sweeping reforms to solidify its position. The new administration changed the Afghan flag from traditional Islamic green to communist red. In addition, the administration announced a plan to reform Afghan society that included land reform as well as equal rights and education for women.⁷⁹ Oliver Roy describes the implementation of these new reforms:

To achieve this they [the communist regime] adopted three means: repression, made possible by the existence of a loyal and well-equipped army; agrarian reform which, they thought, would win the support of the mass of people; and the elimination of illiteracy, in order to rescue the people from the influence of the clergy [Islamic] and to spread the new ideology.⁸⁰

In response to the planned reforms, rural Afghan society revolted. The new government responded to the uprisings with brute force. Mass executions, arrests, and imprisonments led to widespread desertions in the Afghan Army. As Larry Goodson comments in *Afghanistan's Endless War*, the mass uprisings "should have led the government to slow the pace of reform and attempt to win popular support."⁸¹ Instead, Hafizullah Amin seized control of the government from Taraki and continued the widespread repression. As the situation became increasingly unstable, the Soviet Union attempted to support the fledgling communist regime with additional advisors and equipment.

⁷⁷ Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 230.

⁷⁸ Bhavani Sen Gupta, *Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society : Revolution, Resistance, Intervention* (L. Rienner Publishers, 1986), 29.

⁷⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 231.

⁸⁰ Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, 84.

⁸¹ Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, 57.

Displeased with Amin's efforts to quell the rebellion following his ambitious removal of Taraki, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. Seeking a more amiable leader the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, former leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, as the new Afghan President. Repressive tactics, including executions, destruction of entire villages, mass arrests, and massive displacement of civilians continued throughout the ten year long Soviet occupation. Soviet efforts to counter the resistance and bring governance to Afghanistan failed. In 1986 the Soviets replaced President Karmal with Mohammed Najibullah. In 1989, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, leaving President Najibullah's communist regime clinging to power.

5. Theocracy: The Taliban

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 through 1992, the Mujahedin resistance movement continued to fight the Najibullah regime. As Soviet forces withdrew, and the United States lost interest in Afghanistan, President Najibullah's communist government struggled to maintain control. Without the support of the Soviet Army, Najibullah lacked the power to defeat the anti-Soviet Mujahedin. However, instead of waging a coordinated campaign, the Mujahedin fractured as pre-Soviet ethnic and political differences resurfaced.⁸² Seth Jones describes the disintegration of the Mujahedin:

Since Afghan state [communist] authority was too weak to provide order and deliver services, the objectives of opposition groups [Mujahedin] came to resemble those of competitive state builders. Each Mujahedin leader aspired to build an army and a financial apparatus capable of supporting it. Rival ethnic and political interests splintered the anti-Soviet Mujahedin coalition into competing factions, and fighting soon broke out.⁸³

In a bid for power and positioning in the future government of Afghanistan, the Mujahedin splintered into competing factions.

Faced with dwindling Soviet support and unable to defeat the Mujahedin, President Najibullah agreed to a UN brokered peace proposal. The proposal called for

⁸² Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, 43.

⁸³ Ibid.

the establishment of an interim government that would assume all authority from the Najibullah regime. However, the transition to this new authority was anything but smooth.

Competing factions within the resistance all laid claim to positions in the new government. Ahmad Shah Masoud, leader of the northern resistance, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the resistance in the south, halted on the outskirts of Kabul while resistance leaders in Peshawar attempted to determine the composition of the interim government.⁸⁴ Growing impatient, Masoud and Hekmatyar entered the city. Their factions engaged in heavy fighting over control of Kabul. In the end, representatives from the Islamic Jihad Council (Peshawar) arrived to receive the Najibullah regime's surrender.

The interim government, established by the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC) and led by Sibghatullah Mujadiddi, appointed Massoud as the Minister of Defense and Hekmatyar as the Prime Minister. However, Hekmatyar refused to serve so long as Massoud held a position in the government.⁸⁵ In accordance with the IJC's guidance, Mujadiddi transferred authority to Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-e Islami political party.⁸⁶

Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik, closely aligned himself with Massoud and the former northern resistance movement. Rabbani's presidency marked only the second time in Afghanistan's history that a non-ethnic Pashtun held the reigns of power in Kabul. Conflict and dissension grew over the composition of Rabbani's administration. Pashtuns rejected leadership by Tajiks and Uzbeks. The fledgling government spiraled out of control and inter-ethnic fighting broke out. According to Seth Jones, "Afghan commanders controlled fiefdoms, and each was supported by a neighboring country, such as Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and India."⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 247.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 248.

⁸⁶ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 63.

⁸⁷ Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, 45.

Amidst the anarchy of civil war, the Afghan people suffered terribly. Governance was non-existent. Lawlessness ensued. “Individual commanders abused the population at will, kidnapping young girls and boys for sexual pleasure, robbing merchants in the bazaars and fighting and brawling in the streets.”⁸⁸ It is alleged that in one such instance, when a local warlord raped several girls, the people of the village turned to Mullah Mohammed Omar for justice. Mullah Omar organized a group of his religious students to track down and execute the offender.⁸⁹ As the eventual leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar stated after the incident, “We were fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong. How could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women and the poor?”⁹⁰ Mullah Omar appeared able to provide order and justice. Thus, the Taliban movement arose.

Like Mullah Omar, former Mujahidin fighters who attended madrassas in post-Soviet Afghanistan found themselves disgusted by the rampant factionalism, lawlessness, and anarchy. They began to plan for the return of order to Afghan society. The group’s goals were simple in nature: restore peace, disarm the population, enforce shari’a law, and defend the Islamic character of Afghanistan.⁹¹

Never seeking personal aggrandizement, Omar and the Taliban’s desire to create a just, Islamic system in Afghanistan resonated with many members of the war-torn Afghan society. As the movement grew, Rabbani’s government in Kabul sought Taliban support as Hekmatyr attempted to wrest control of Kabul. Although Hekmatyr’s militia was predominantly Pashtun, the Taliban regarded it as a contributing factor to the country’s lawlessness, and attacked it.

As the Taliban proved able to win on the battlefield, neighboring countries began to take notice. Iran, concerned for the Shia minority in Afghanistan, backed the Shia-dominated Northern Alliance. Iran’s support for the Northern Alliance stemmed from its

⁸⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Second Edition*, 2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 2010), 21.

⁸⁹ Tanner, *Afghanistan*, 279.

⁹⁰ Rashid, *Taliban*, 25.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

perception that the Taliban would repress the Shia minority in Afghanistan. Pakistan, desperate to maintain influence over Afghanistan, backed the Sunni Pashtun-dominated Taliban instead.

By 1998, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan; Massoud was the lone holdout.⁹² In areas it controlled, the Taliban disarmed the population, enforced law and order, and opened roads to traffic, which resulted in an immediate drop in food prices.⁹³ Afghans guilty of criminal offenses were immediately and viciously dealt with. Executions were commonplace. The Taliban outlawed television, as well as other recreational activities, and forbade women from working outside the home or going to school. Although extremely repressive in nature, “There was no doubt that many Afghans did sincerely welcome the Taliban as providers of security.”⁹⁴

The Taliban regime’s contribution to Afghan stability was control and order through fear. In terms of actual governance or administration, it made no attempt to “mobilize resources systematically,” or provide essential services.⁹⁵ The Taliban saw urban areas as “cities of sin, to be ruled with a strong hand.”⁹⁶ Rural areas were considered less of a threat, and typically life was allowed to continue much as it always had.

As the Taliban attempted to consolidate control over the entire country, it received monetary and logistical support from interested donor nations, most notably Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.⁹⁷ In addition to external state support, the Taliban received financial support from Osama bin Laden in exchange for his ability to run terror training camps, formerly operated by Pakistani ISI for the training of Kashmiri insurgents.⁹⁸ Utilizing former Mujahedin Arabs who had stayed in Pakistan

⁹² Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War*, 79.

⁹³ Rashid, *Taliban*, 35.

⁹⁴ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 233.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 235.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 233.

⁹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (Viking Adult, 2008), 14.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden established the al Qaeda terror network. The hijackers responsible for attacks on the United States trained in these camps.

In response to the Taliban's support of Al Qaeda, the United States and the Northern Alliance waged a campaign against the Taliban regime from October—January 2001. Ultimately, the Taliban government was ousted, and the United States began a ten-year log effort to establish order in Afghanistan.

6. Establishing Political Order

After defeating the Taliban, Kabul was once again occupied by a non-Pashtun force, this time the Northern Alliance. If stability was to be achieved, the United States-led coalition realized it needed to act quickly to avert further ethnic conflict between the Pashtuns and the mostly Tajik Northern Alliance.

It was under this pressure that the United States turned to Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations Secretary General's personal representative, for assistance.⁹⁹ The United States Secretary of State, Colin Powell, appointed Ambassador James Dobbins to serve as a special envoy to the Afghan opposition. Brahimi and Dobbins became the primary architects of probably the most difficult diplomatic venture in recent history, the crafting of a new Afghan government. The prospects for peace and stability hinged on establishing a government that would both satisfy international actors as well as Afghan leaders and the Afghan people. The complexity of this venture cannot be overstated. Sir Martin Ewans describes the difficulties Brahimi and Dobbins would face:

[Any settlement regarding governance in Afghanistan] will have to accommodate the international communities requirement to end the threats that Afghanistan poses in terms of regional instability, drugs and terrorism, while accounting for the Afghans' ingrained intolerance of any interference in their affairs. It is entirely possible that such an accommodation may not be achievable.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Ewans, *Afghanistan*, 291.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 297.

Brahimi and Dobbins worked closely to organize a UN sponsored conference held in Germany, known as the Bonn Conference, in order to form the next Afghan government.¹⁰¹ Both men agreed that the conference should include representatives from all factions of the Afghan opposition. Among potential participants in the new Afghan government were four main groups. The two primary groups were 1) the Tajik, Uzbek, and Shia-dominated Northern Alliance; and 2) supporters of the former King, Zahir Shah. Secondary groups included a delegation of émigré leaders who resided in Pakistan (Peshawar Group) and opposition leaders with links to Iran, who Brahimi and Dobbins called the “Cyprus Group” based on meetings held there.¹⁰² Significant absentees from the conference included: the former King, Zahir Shah; the former President, Rabbani; resistance leader Hamid Karzai; and the powerful warlord Abdul Rashid Dostam.¹⁰³ Ultimately, each of the absentees would play a significant role in Afghanistan’s transition to a new government, but it is difficult to say what, if any, effect their presence would have had on the conference.

While organizing the conference, Brahimi and Dobbins disagreed on one particular point. Dobbins felt that all neighboring powers should participate in the conference. Brahimi was opposed to the inclusion of outside players. Dobbins’ reasoning centered on the tremendous influence neighboring states had exercised over Afghanistan during the previous 20 years. He felt that, without their participation and buy-in, the new Afghan government would be susceptible to subversion or undermining by them. Brahimi, on the other hand, believed non-Afghan participation would affect the perceived legitimacy of the Afghan government. In his view, isolation would enable the participants to arrive at a purely Afghan solution. In the end, the two diplomats reached a compromise: all powers would be invited to the conference and allowed access to the Afghan delegation but would not be permitted to attend private sessions held among the

¹⁰¹ Amb. James F. Dobbins, *After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan* (Potomac Books Inc., 2008), 36.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 269.

Afghan opposition groups.¹⁰⁴ The only non-Afghan in the actual meetings would be Brahimi, in order to moderate and ensure discussions progressed smoothly.

The conference was held from 27 November through 5 December 2001. It is not clear whether careful consideration was given to these dates, but as the Afghans arrived to undertake the arduous task of constructing a new government it became clear that someone should have checked these dates against the Islamic calendar. The conference fell during the holy month of Ramadan.¹⁰⁵ In keeping with their faith, the Afghan delegates fasted during the day and only ate after evening prayers. So, as the delegates began hours of intense deliberations, they did so on empty stomachs.

As the conference progressed, envoys from the “six plus two “ forum, comprising representatives from the six states bordering Afghanistan (Iran, China, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan), plus Russia and the United States, met with the Afghan opposition members during breaks in the negotiations.¹⁰⁶ As Ambassador Dobbins puts it, “The essentially Afghan nature of the negotiations was preserved, and at the same time the interested governments had an opportunity to influence the results.”¹⁰⁷ In reality, the Afghans never had an opportunity to exercise self-determination. Instead, Brahimi presented them with a draft interim constitution for consideration. According to Dobbins, “Brahimi took the lead in moving the Afghans toward our [international community] desired goals.”¹⁰⁸

Midway through the conference, a copy of the draft interim constitution circulated among the international envoys. In reviewing the document, international representatives noted that there was no mention of democracy or terrorism. In astonishment, one international delegate said, “The text makes no mention of democratic election; furthermore, the draft makes no mention of terrorism. Should we not insist that the new Afghan regime be committed to cooperate with the international community to combat

¹⁰⁴ Dobbins, *After the Taliban*, 70.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁰⁶ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 268.

¹⁰⁷ Dobbins, *After the Taliban*, 80.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

terrorism?”¹⁰⁹ Exercising diplomatic pressure, the international envoys were able to influence the contents of the interim constitution. Specifically, the international community ensured the Afghan delegation included democracy and human rights clauses in the final draft.

At the conclusion of the conference, the international community congratulated itself on the Afghans finally reaching an agreement. The Afghan government would initially have an interim administration, followed by a transitional government responsible for drafting an official constitution, after which point the country would hold national elections.

It is not clear exactly how much of this plan was derived by the Afghans themselves, or to what degree they actually intended to pledge it their full support. What is clear is that the international community exercised significant influence over the process, with the roadmap for stabilizing Afghanistan created in only seven days of meetings. The precedent for continued international interference in Afghan affairs was thus set. In the coming years, the Afghan leadership would continue to find itself pushed and pulled between the desires of the international community and those of its own people. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the nine years since the Bonn conference, governance in and over Afghanistan remains elusive. A resurgent Taliban, ongoing corruption, slow development of the security forces, and political stagnation all continue to plague Afghan society.

B. ANALYSIS

Monarchy, autocracy, constitutional monarchy, communism, theocracy, and, most recently, non-secular democracy all represent systems of governance. At the heart of each system lies the answer to one fundamental question: who will establish the rules that will create order for society? Or, stated more clearly, what system of governance will provide enough social control to foster stability? Of course, the answers to these questions only raise more questions. Since, after all, according to William Maley, “Stabilizing a post-intervention situation is not narrowly technical: it invariably raises

¹⁰⁹ Dobbins, *After the Taliban*, 83.

fundamental questions of political philosophy. Is a strong state preferable to a weak state? Should political power be concentrated or divided? Should state power be dispersed through local government with a federal system, or should there be regional autonomy?”¹¹⁰

As we have seen, Ammanullah, Daud, Taraki, and Najibullah all suffered the same fate as a result of their attempts to “employ state power to change Afghan society without the cooperation of their people.”¹¹¹ Each of these leaders attempted, in various ways, to socially and economically supplant traditional power structures with institutions created by the central government. Conversely, Nadir and Zahir Shah limited government intrusion into the lives of Afghans, except in cases of security and for the purposes of raising revenue. Instead of replacing existing traditional power structures at the village level, or utilizing government power structures to forcefully implement reforms, Nadir and Zahir Shah aimed to incorporate the traditional power structures “in order to prevent them from causing trouble.”¹¹² In effect, relations between the regime and the people consisted mainly of local power brokers monitoring village politics for hints of any internal threat. Even the Taliban respected the autonomous nature of rural Afghan society.

1. The Current Problem: Environment of Competition

In contrast to Nadir and Zahir’s approach, current efforts to govern Afghan society rely heavily on a framework influenced by liberalism and modernization theory.¹¹³ The widely held presumption is that liberal institutions established at the national level will eventually transform Afghan society into a stable society. Stability and reconstruction have become synonymous with modernization and progress in development.¹¹⁴ Yet, as seen throughout Afghanistan’s history, progress or

¹¹⁰ Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, 276.

¹¹¹ Barfield, *Afghanistan*, 173.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 220.

¹¹³ Rasul Bakhsh Rais, *Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and the State in Afghanistan* (Lexington Books, 2008), 122.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

modernization that is thrust upon the Afghan people only serves to foster resistance. Thus, one has to wonder: could there be some other way to achieve stability apart from modernization? Could the international community accept stable societies that might never modernize? Arguably, modernization and progress require a stable environment: Perhaps that has to be achieved first. Alternatively, Afghanistan's own history strongly suggests that the Afghan people have to be willing to accept changes, as well as those introducing the changes, or they are more likely to resist both those changes and the agents of change.

Right now, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) is caught between pressures exerted by the international community and the nature of Afghan society. The resurgence of the Taliban signals disillusionment with the government. The combination of a lack of security, a lack of justice, and corruption prevalent throughout the country has led villagers to a crossroads. From the villager's perspective, the fundamental question is: which form of governance, and which side, do I identify with more closely? Should I support a corrupt centralized non-secular democracy that is championed by a secular invading force? Or, do I throw in with the ruthlessly oppressive Taliban?

2. Ideological Resonance

Afghanistan is structured along tribal and ethnic lines. Traditionally, the tribal elders, warlords, and/or religious authorities have set the rules that guide Afghan social behavior.¹¹⁵ Joel Migdal refers to such informal leaders as "strongmen."¹¹⁶ In Afghanistan, the strongmen maintain the power to "make and implement the binding rules for the society."¹¹⁷ The current government in Kabul challenges this historical norm. Because President Karzai retains the power to appoint provincial and district governors as representatives of the state, the provincial governors and district governors represent the state's interests to the people, as opposed to representing the people's

¹¹⁵ Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton University Press, 1988), 31.

¹¹⁶ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 39.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

interests to the state.¹¹⁸ In this way, the Afghan state is actually in competition with local ethnic, tribal, and religious groups that all have different and competing policies regarding how social life should be ordered.¹¹⁹ Compounding this problem are social reforms pushed by the government and supported by the international community. In more conservative areas of Afghanistan, for instance, girls' education has become a significant point of contention. Afghans view policies focused on social restructuring as a threat to their way of life. This dynamic perpetuates resistance to the central government.

3. Social Contract: Expectations

As part of the social contract, members of a society have certain expectations regarding the functions of the state. Prior to the United States invasion, the political and social order in Afghanistan was rigidly controlled and enforced by the Taliban. Law, order, and justice were carried out ruthlessly. There was an order—a set of rules that all Afghans knew. The Afghan villager may well have hated the Taliban's methods and policies, but his knowledge of the rules allowed for a degree of security and predictability on a day to day basis.

In terms of the social contract, Afghan society benefited from Taliban rule in that the Taliban provided order. As part of the social contract, society's responsibility was mainly obedience in exchange for the order the Taliban provided. Swift justice for offenses committed against society, along with security writ more broadly, are the primary expectations held by Afghan citizens. If the government is unable, or unwilling, to punish criminals, there is no security. The external pressure on the Afghan state by the international community to adopt western versions of the rule of law, human rights, and democratic rule fosters a series of disconnects between the Afghan state and Afghan society. Here, it is worth bearing in mind that the Afghan government's dependence on the international community for security and aid drives policymaking.

¹¹⁸ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance* (DIANE Publishing, n.d.), 5.

¹¹⁹ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 28–29.

For example, in November 2008, President Karzai signed the execution order for nine convicted criminals.¹²⁰ The President's decision to sign the execution order was in response to pleas from Afghan citizens for justice.¹²¹ Immediately following the public hangings, the international community condemned the action as inhumane. In response to the international outcry, an Afghan administrative official explained, "The President has been thinking for some time how to reduce the death penalty in these cases to life in prison. But he couldn't find a way. So he has signed the execution orders."¹²²

The August 2010 stoning of two Afghans by their fellow villagers in Kunduz province serves to further highlight the discrepancy between state and society in Afghanistan. According to eyewitness accounts, two villagers were found guilty of adultery by a village mullah, and sentenced to death by stoning.¹²³ Members of the village carried out the sentence and stoned the man and woman to death. Reports indicate that family members of the accused and over 200 villagers participated in the executions.¹²⁴ In this case, the Mullah exercised traditional authority in administering justice. Yet, the Afghan government condemned the action, since the Afghan constitution also champions human rights and the rule of law.

Both these instances illustrate how the current Afghan government is not meeting the people's expectations for justice. Attempts to conform to the international community's standards for dispensing justice have instead created a perception within Afghan society that the state is unjust. Herein lies a major problem: the central

¹²⁰ Ron Synovitz, "Karzai Caught Between Foreign Donors, Afghan Voters On Death Penalty - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty © 2010," n.d., http://www.rferl.org/content/Karzai_Caught_Between_Foreign_Donors_Afghan_Voters_On_Death_Penalty/1348779.html.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Rod Nordland, "Afghan Couple Stoned to Death on Taliban Orders," *The New York Times*, August 16, 2010, sec. World / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/world/asia/17stoning.html?_r=1&hp.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

governments' perception of justice is not in synch with the population's expectations. The state is therefore failing to uphold its end of the social contract, at least as far as many Afghans are concerned.

4. Comfort and Familiarity

As outlined in Chapter II, comfort and familiarity center on the systems and processes the government uses to distribute services. The current processes used by Kabul to legislate, apply the rule of law, and provide justice are unfamiliar to Afghans. The Afghan constitution attempts to balance traditional Islamic law with typical western ideals of individual freedom. Essentially, Afghanistan's legal system is a hybrid mix between Islamic law and man made state legislation. For much of Afghan society, Shari'a, or Islamic law, is the basis for social order. In theory, the current constitution takes this into account. According to Chapter One, Article Three of the Afghan Constitution, "In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam."¹²⁵ One problem is, however, there are numerous, often conflicting interpretations of Shari'a. Compounding this is the method by which law has been traditionally applied in Afghanistan.

Historically, establishing social order in Afghanistan has been an informal affair. Formal state institutions have played a limited role, particularly in rural Afghanistan, when it comes to applying law or dispensing justice. In rural Afghan society, conflict resolution and collective decision making regarding everyday matters fall to the jirga or shura. The term jirga "refers to a local/tribal institution of decision making and dispute settlement that incorporates the prevalent local customary law, institutionalized rituals, and a body of village elders whose collective decision about the resolution of a dispute is binding on the parties involved."¹²⁶ Given the various interpretations of Islamic law and variances in local customary law, establishing state institutions for the purpose of applying universal law is extremely problematic.

¹²⁵ "Afghanistan Online: The Constitution of Afghanistan," n.d., http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html.

¹²⁶ Ali Wardak, "Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 41, no. 4 (2004): 10.

According to Chapter One, Article Six of the Afghan constitution:

The state is obliged to create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, realization of democracy, and to ensure national unity and equality among all ethnic groups and tribes and to provide for balanced development in all areas of the country.¹²⁷

Again, state institutions created to implement and uphold the principles articulated in the constitution find themselves at odds with the traditional decision making authorities. As an example of the difficulties this creates, consider: if the interpretation of Shari'a by the jirga in a given Afghan village dictates that women will not attend school, then that jirga is in violation of Afghan law according to equality clauses in the constitution. Similarly, in the case of murder, the jirga may invoke the customary law of badal (direct vengeance) to settle the dispute.¹²⁸ But, the sanctioned murder of an individual for offenses committed against another individual is, again, at odds with established state law.

According to Ali Wardak, the main reason Afghans prefer the jirga as a source of resolution is because the jirga is "conducted by respected elders with established social status and a reputation for piety and fairness."¹²⁹ As Wardak goes on to write, "elders reach decisions in accordance with accepted local traditions/values (customary law) that are deeply ingrained in the collective conscience of the village/tribe."¹³⁰ In essence, Afghans are most comfortable and familiar with the traditional process of dispute resolution via the jirga. The idea of state-administered due process or state imposed law is largely unfamiliar. The government's attempts to exert authority via legislation, the application of its laws, and its methods of administering justice thus create tensions between traditional governing structures and the state. This tension results in a social misfit for Afghan society.

¹²⁷ "Afghanistan Online: The Constitution of Afghanistan."

¹²⁸ Wardak, "Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan," 334.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 338.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 339.

C. CONCLUSION

In other words, the Afghan government is attempting to make and enforce rules for a society that do not resonate for those it intends to govern. As Professor Paul Collier, of Oxford University, writes, “The fundamental mistake of our approach to state building has been to forget that well functioning states are built not just on shared interests, but on shared identity.”¹³¹ In a well functioning state, the government typically reflects the ideals and values held in society; the society can therefore identify with its governing body. In Afghanistan, the society struggles to identify with the centralized government. Of course, some of the oppressive measures and methods imposed by local authorities in Afghanistan are, by the standards of Western countries, morally reprehensible, and possibly even evil. There is no question that stonings, hangings, amputations, and public executions run counter to the idea of human dignity as established by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹³² However, the issue of whether a society has the right to govern itself must be addressed, since if it does have that right, then does it not also have the right to define the ways in which it establishes social order and control?

In the next section, we will examine social fit in a stable society, void of violence, but plagued by political stagnation. While Bosnia remains under the defacto rule of the international community, its prospects of self-governance drift further out of its grasp.

¹³¹ Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 9.

¹³² “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” n.d., <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>.

IV. POLITICAL STAGNATION AND SOCIAL FIT: BOSNIA

*We are bound to admit that the elements and traits that belong to a state must also exist in the individuals that compose the state.*¹³³

Socrates, The Republic by Plato 375 BC

Similar to Afghanistan's plight as a battleground between regional state actors domestic Afghan factions, Bosnia also suffered through civil war brought on by competing players.¹³⁴ However, at least in the Bosnia case, the design of the transitional government, as well as the introduction of U.S. peacekeepers, was agreed to by the warring parties prior to implementation. Understandably, negotiating the peace and ending hostilities are frequently given the most consideration in conflict-ridden situations. Addressing the grievances that led to the conflict in order to avoid a country slipping back into war requires a delicate balancing act. Nowhere has this proven more true than in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the last 15 years, United Nations efforts in Bosnia have yielded mixed results. Members of the United Nations and the international community at large often refer to Bosnia as a great success; however, the Bosnian path to self- governance remains far from clear.

The resources provided to war torn Bosnia have far exceeded support given to any other post-conflict country.¹³⁵ Fifteen years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia—Herzegovina (GFAP), otherwise known as the Dayton Peace Accords, the future stability of Bosnia remains in question. The wartime concessions made in the name of peace in 1995 rightly focused first and foremost on ending the violence. However, the complex federal structure and the special powers given to the United Nations High Representative (OHR) have left Bosnia in a state of

¹³³ Plato, *The Republic*, 142.

¹³⁴ Dobbins, *After the Taliban*, 35.

¹³⁵ Marina Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices," *International Studies Perspectives* 4, no. 3 (2003): 317.

political stagnation, with little hope of reform.¹³⁶ The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the resulting brutal ethnic civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the ensuing international intervention shed light on the capabilities and limitations of the international community's ability to establish governance that fits the society to be governed.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bosnia and the greater Yugoslavia have a long history of ethnic conflict followed by periods of relative stability. The current conflict, as with all Balkan conflicts, resulted from the heterogeneous nature of Balkan society. Religious differences and nationalism have served as the precursors to vicious atrocities and instability in the region.¹³⁷ The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six semiautonomous republics up until its disintegration in 1991. The six republics included: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Within each republic pockets of three distinct ethnicities and their corresponding religions existed; Muslim Bosniacs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Christian Serbs.

Up until 1980, Josip Broz Tito, a communist former partisan resistance leader who fought against the German occupation during World War II, governed Yugoslavia.¹³⁸ Tito maintained stability and power through a "system of political musical chairs" in which political leadership rotated every few years to prevent any single leader from acquiring strength.¹³⁹ Tito's death in 1980 sparked a political power vacuum in Yugoslavia. While he lived, Tito failed to establish any political legacy to govern. With no authoritarian leader to guide the country, Yugoslavia fell into political stagnation, which gave rise to a return to ethnic nationalism.

¹³⁶ "Elmira Bayrasli: Electing an Independent Bosnia: The High Representative Must Go," n.d., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elmira-bayrasli/post_954_b_748019.html.

¹³⁷ Andre Gerolymatos and André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* (Basic Books, 2003), 4.

¹³⁸ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War & the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (Penguin (Non-Classics), 2001), 487.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 623.

In 1991, the increasing ethnic tensions led to war between Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs. In response to the growing violence, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnia found itself at the center of a power struggle between Croatia and Serbia. Both Croatia and Serbia each claimed territorial rights and responsibilities for their respective co-ethnics in Bosnia. Nationalism, inspired by leaders seeking political power, and the revived memory of past atrocities perpetuated against each other, led to numerous incidents of ethnic cleansing and genocide from 1992 through 1995.¹⁴⁰

The United Nations first deployed peacekeepers to the region in 1992 in an effort to provide humanitarian relief and protection for minorities in Croatia and Bosnia.¹⁴¹ However, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) proved ineffective at halting the violence due to ambiguous guidance, a lack of clear goals, and differing levels of support from each military's parent nation.¹⁴² In 1995, following three years of the worst atrocities seen in Europe since the end of World War II, the warring parties succumbed to international pressure and agreed to peace talks brokered by the United States, Germany, France, Britain, and Russia.¹⁴³

In November 1995, all parties gathered in Dayton, Ohio to outline what would become known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (GFAP). Similar to the negotiations that paved the way for governance in Afghanistan, diplomatic pressure would influence the outcome of the peace talks. Ambassador James Dobbins describes the complexities inherent in the civil administration of Bosnia:

While the ethnic groups often coexisted peacefully under Turkish, Austrian, or communist rule, Bosnia was subject to external or strong internal authority under these governments. Although nationalist leaders distorted and exploited ethnic grudges before and during the recent conflict, these grudges did have a basis in history and, when paired with

¹⁴⁰ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War & the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (Penguin (Non-Classics), 2001), 638.

¹⁴¹ "UNPROFOR," n.d., <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprofor.htm>.

¹⁴² Glenny, *The Balkans*, 642.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 647.

three years of bitter civil war, posed a significant challenge to prospects for reconciliation between the former warring parties.¹⁴⁴

Fervent nationalism, coupled with the emotional outrage over extreme atrocities, were significant impediments to reaching any agreements during the negotiations. Recognizing this fact, Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, forced all sides to come to an agreement. According to Misha Glenny:

The Assistant Secretary of State for Europe was brutal and blunt whenever necessary – cajoling, heckling, and insisting. He had to threaten all three sides – the Serbs with more bombing, and the maintenance of sanctions; the Moslems with the limits of American support (it is your right to continue the war,’ he told Alija Izetbegovic [Bosniac President] at one point, ‘but don’t expect the United States to provide your air force.’); and the Croats with a withdrawal of American diplomatic sympathy – one phone call from President Clinton to Franjo Tudman [Croat President], just as it seemed that Dayton was collapsing proved sufficient to save the talks.¹⁴⁵

While Holbrooke’s actions resulted in garnering peace, concessions made in the development of the post-conflict government did little to pave the way for future stability. “The documents from Dayton are incredibly complex, leaving room for both partition and some form of a united state.”¹⁴⁶ In effect, the agreement paved the way for continued political instability rather than stability. Compounding the ambiguous nature of the agreement itself, the signers of the document called into question its legitimacy. Immediately following the negotiations, “the Serbs and Croats argued that they did not sign the agreement, and the Bosniacs contended that they were coerced into it. Thus, each party was aggrieved even before the implementation process began.”¹⁴⁷

B. ANALYSIS

Although the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the deployment of peacekeeping troops brought an end to violence, underlying ethnic tensions and the desire

¹⁴⁴ Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 91.

¹⁴⁵ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, Third Revised Edition*, 3rd ed. (Penguin (Non-Classics), 1996), 290.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Dobbins, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 91.

for ethnically homogenous entities still exist among the three factions that make up Bosnia. The complexity of the political organization in Bosnia has resulted in a political stalemate, wherein each ethnic party blocks, stalls, or obstructs progress on issues of extreme importance.¹⁴⁸ Attempting to avoid political stagnation, the international community had to step in again.

In 1997, the United Nation's Office of the High Representative (OHR) was given the power to approve or disapprove public appointments in Bosnia, impose legislation, and remove public officials deemed obstructionists to progress.¹⁴⁹ These powers became known as the "Bonn Powers."¹⁵⁰ Francis Fukuyama describes the lasting effects of the Bonn powers on Bosnian society:

The country continues to be governed by the United Nations Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). There is no meaningful democracy in Bosnia, despite the holding of elections; the OHR uses its powers to dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, mayors, and other elected officials. It (OHR) passes legislation and creates new institutions without reference to the preferences of the Bosnian people. Much of the administrative capacity of the Bosnian government lay in the hands of international experts rather than indigenous civil servants.¹⁵¹

Essentially, the High Representative functions as the supreme leader of Bosnia, with the power to hire and fire elected representatives at will, strike down law enacted democratically by the Bosnian people, and remove democratically elected representatives. Currently, whatever stability maintained in Bosnia is a direct result of the special powers given to the OHR. According to the GFAP, the Bosnian Federal Government maintains the authority to establish a national banking system, national currency, national flag, identification cards, and automobile registration. However, all of

¹⁴⁸ Ho-Won Jeong, *Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies: Strategy And Process* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 103.

¹⁴⁹ "An Agenda For Bosnia and Herzegovina's Last High Representative" (Center for European Integration Strategies, January 26, 2006), 2, http://www.ceis-eu.org/publications/policy_briefs/2006/doc/02_2006_ceis_policy_brief.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Profile Books Ltd, 2005), 103.

these accomplishments and agreements occurred as a result of the OHR's powers to legislate unilaterally. In many ways, any progress at all has been a result of the OHR's actions.

Yet, the international community cannot administer a state forever. Considering the components of social fit should help to identify ways in which Bosnian society may ultimately establish self-rule.

1. Ideological Resonance: Nationalism

If we examine the current Bosnian state through the eyes of an individual Bosnian who has lived through ruthless conflict, his dilemma is clear. To a Bosnian Serb the current national government represents a conglomeration of his former enemies. He will likely resist a policy established by the government simply because it was decided by his former enemies. He will not see the government as *his* government. As long as the Bosnian government does not reflect Serb values, the Bosnian Serbs will be unlikely to accept it. The same goes for Bosniacs and Croats. Consequently, all anyone can expect is continued political stagnation and the required supervision by international entities.

As recently as 2009, the tenuous peace has shown signs of deteriorating. In May, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, published a list of 68 powers that the Bosnian state "has stolen from Bosnian Serbs" living in the Bosnian Republic of Srpska.¹⁵² The elected representatives of the Serb-dominated parliament listed powers such as control of the judiciary, the power to collect customs and duties, manage foreign trade, and deploy the police.¹⁵³ The Republic of Srpska national assembly then voted on a resolution to have these powers returned to it. In effect, the assembly passed a law declaring that these powers belonged to it rather than the Bosnian State. In response to these events, the current High Representative, Mr. Valentin Inzko, invoked the special "Bonn powers" to rescind this legislation.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Dan Bilefsky, "Bosnia Serbs and Envoy Are at Odds on Powers," *The New York Times*, June 20, 2009, sec. International / Europe, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/europe/20bosnia.html>.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Dan Bilefsky, "Bosnia Serbs and Envoy Are at Odds on Powers," *The New York Times*, June 20, 2009, sec. International / Europe, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/europe/20bosnia.html>.

Not only does this reveal political schisms in Bosnian society, but also as long as the United Nations Office of the High Representative possesses the power to veto laws enacted through democratic processes, the ethnicities that make up Bosnia will never achieve collective self-government. At the same time, while Bosnia might remain intact and stable, the international community will be unable to withdraw.

As stated in Chapter II, when the values of the people are reflected, understood, and shared by the governing authority, the government will ideologically resonate with members of society. When this occurs, members of society and the government will have achieved social fit. Identifying the values held by members of society can help identify what values the government should represent.

The values that resonate among the different factions in Bosnia are nationalistic and, to a lesser extent, religious. The Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs each value their ethnic identity and each seeks to be represented by those who share their ethnic and religious identity. It is tempting to say these differences can be overcome, and equality, peace, and cooperation will result; however, members of Bosnian society are the sole judges of this possibility. Or as one of Bosnia's three presidents, Haris Silajdzic, said in a Public Broadcasting exclusive aired in 2009, "We do have political tensions and that is because of two divergent concepts. The one is a multicultural country and the other a divided ethnic country."¹⁵⁵ According to Srecko Latal, a writer for the Balkan Investigative reporting network (also commenting in 2009), "Bosnia-Herzegovina right now is facing the most difficult crisis since the end of its war. We have come into the situation where local leaders don't want to make it work. I mean, they deliberately block the work of joint state and entity institutions. And, as a result, we are facing a major deadlock on almost a complete level."¹⁵⁶

Resistance to joint institutions and refusal to cooperate with former enemies clearly illustrate what matters to Bosnians. The current United Nations effort to force

¹⁵⁵ "In Bosnia, Tension Reigns Years After War's End | Online NewsHour | Nov. 18, 2009 | PBS," n.d., http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/july-dec09/bosnia_11-18.html.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

reconciliation and cooperation is out of synch with what people in Bosnia want. Nationalism, and the right to be governed by members of one's own ethnicity, clearly still resonates with most Bosnians.

2. Social Contract: Expectations

Bosnia, unlike Afghanistan, has limited security concerns. For the most part, peace and security exist. However, determining what, if any, expectations Bosnians have of government are difficult. Growing apathy and disenchantment with the political process perpetuate the current political stagnation. In Bosnia, there is an “extremely low level of regard of politicians and the political process itself.”¹⁵⁷ Some scholars view the level of apathy as a byproduct of Bosnia's socialist authoritarian past. But surely the absence of policy that effectively maintains, or improves, the standard of living contributes to this political apathy.

The latest figures indicate that the current unemployment rate in Bosnia is over 40 percent.¹⁵⁸ However, the unemployment data does not reflect the realities on the ground. Most Bosnians have resorted to pursuing “survival strategies outside of the formal economy, from subsistence agriculture to black market trade, they do not contribute to public revenues and receive little in the way of public services.”¹⁵⁹ Clearly, economic stagnation feeds further disinterest in the state.

In fact, it appears that Bosnians have learned to accept the declining standards of living brought on by weak economic policy. A lack of confidence in current state institutions, and mistrust of all things political, has resulted in lowered expectations. In a 2009 sample poll, 83 percent of Bosnians surveyed responded “none,” when asked “What

¹⁵⁷ *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Governance Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Berlin - Sarajevo: European Stability Initiative, n.d.), 7, www.esiweb.org.

¹⁵⁸ Ina Dimireva, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economy Overview — EU business news - EUbusiness.com,” Guide, n.d., <http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/bosnia/econ>.

¹⁵⁹ *Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 28.

political party do you think is best able to solve economic issues?”¹⁶⁰ Given responses like this, evaluating social fit according to expectations is difficult.

3. Comfort and Familiarity

Bosnia’s political arrangement outlined in the 1995 peace agreement includes a three-member collective presidency, in which each ethnicity maintains representation at the federal level.¹⁶¹ Currently, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly is evenly distributed with five Croats, five Bosniacs, and five Serbs serving as representatives.¹⁶² The Bosnian state is then further divided into two semiautonomous entities, primarily along ethnic lines, the Bosniac–Croat Federation and the Republic of Srpska.¹⁶³ The House of Representatives consists of 28 members representing the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 14 members representing the Republic of Srpska.¹⁶⁴ In addition, each republic maintains its own prime minister and national assemblies. Effective governance at the federal level hinges on the cooperation of all three political organizations.

Currently, communication and cooperation between the federal government and the republics is severely lacking. A report generated by the Center for International Private Enterprise outlines the difficulties inherent in the Bosnian government’s organizational structure:

The different governments operate in isolation from each other, hardly communicating, let alone developing joint policies or programs. There is considerable confusion as to who is responsible for what, particularly on the federal side, with different institutions overlapping and competing with

¹⁶⁰ National Democratic Institute, *Public Opinion Poll In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) October 2009*, Public Opinion Poll (National Democratic Institute, October 2009), 42, http://www.ndi.org/Public_Opinion_Poll_Bosnia_Herzegovina_1009.

¹⁶¹ J. Kim and Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, “Bosnia: Overview of Current Issues,” 2007, CRS 2.

¹⁶² Jeong, *Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies*, 100.

¹⁶³ Kim and Service, “Bosnia.”

¹⁶⁴ Jeong, *Peacebuilding In Postconflict Societies*, 100.

each other. This fragmentation of government weakens accountability: most citizens do not understand the system, and have no idea who to blame when they are dissatisfied.¹⁶⁵

A poll conducted in 2005 indicated that 72 percent of Bosnians feel the current constitution cannot work.¹⁶⁶ From this perspective, legislation enacted by the Republic of Srpska Parliament to limit powers of the federal government and increase its own power can be viewed as an effort to circumvent the complicated organizational structure of the federal system. Or, to reframe this somewhat: how can Bosnians be comfortable or familiar with a governance structure that they do not understand?

C. CONCLUSION

Given all the atrocities, ethnic cleansing, rape camps, torture, and murder, one has to ask: is a unified equitable Bosnian state that preserves the rights of all Bosnian citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, an achievable goal? Can individual Bosniacs, Serbs, and Croats achieve mutual forgiveness, redemption, and common understanding?

Although the violence has ceased, the High Representative routinely nullifies legislation passed through democratic processes. Much of this legislation is blatantly nationalist and Bosniac or Serb in its orientation. Meanwhile, current expectations are so low, that any sign of improvement in the standard of living would be welcomed. Yet, the organizational design of the Bosnian state deters political participation, largely because its set-up is too complex.

There is no question that halting atrocities and bringing an end to human suffering was a noble goal. In the short term, the international community achieved this. But what seems increasingly true is that long-term stability will only be achieved when members of all three of Bosnia's constituent societies feel the government fairly looks out for their interests. Unfortunately, throughout the peace negotiations in Dayton, little thought was given to what type of government would resonate across Bosnia's three warring factions.

¹⁶⁵ "Bosnia: Post Industrial Society and the Authoritarian Temptation" (Center for International Private Enterprise, January 18, 2004), www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/esi.pdf.

¹⁶⁶ G. Ó Tuathail, J. O'Loughlin, and D. Djipa, "Bosnia-Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Constitutional change and public opinion," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47, no. 1 (2006): 67.

If careful consideration had been given to the three components of social fit, from the perspective of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, then the building of a governing structure that could lead to long-term political stability and self governance without permanent international pressure might have been more likely. Clearly, this line of thinking may have required the development of an autonomous Islamic Bosnian state, the secession of Bosnian Serbs into greater Serbia, and the secession of Bosnian Croats into Croatia. Territorial disputes and the question of minority populations would be major sticking points for each faction. But, the likelihood of achieving some form of self-governance and future stability may have been higher.

In the next chapter, we examine how aligning social fit, even if by accident, can pave the way for stability in a post-conflict society.

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V. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FITS SOCIETY: POST-WORLD WAR II KOREA

*It is easier to rule a city that is used to self governing by employing its own citizens than by other means, assuming you do not wish to destroy it.*¹⁶⁷

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince 1513

In the previous chapters, we presented examples where social fit was not achieved and resulted in instability (Afghanistan), or where it was partially achieved resulting in fragile stability (Bosnia). In this chapter, we examine South Korea, whose post-war example is one where social fit was achieved and resulted in overall stability.

Some may contend that the case of South Korea, given its ethnically homogenous society, is relatively uncomplicated when compared to the more ethnically complex cases of Afghanistan and Bosnia and thus shouldn't be considered. However, such a view fails to acknowledge the effects of regional tensions on South Korea, known as *jiyeok gamjeong*. *Jiyeok gamjeong*, which translates to 'regional sentiment,' actually refers to regional discrimination.¹⁶⁸ Present throughout Korean history, *jiyeok gamjeong* exerts an immense negative pressure on Korean society and provokes political fissures and "economic alienation."¹⁶⁹ *Jiyeok gamjeong* creates fissures similar to those found in ethnically diverse societies in the following sense: it "has produced an unequal distribution of resources in politics and economic development. It affects an individual's job opportunities and promotions, marriage prospects, social relations, and other aspects of everyday life."¹⁷⁰

Another objection that might be raised vis a vis the South Korea case is that we are limiting the analysis of social fit to the period immediately following World War II.

¹⁶⁷ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Selected Political Writings* (Hackett Pub Co, 1994).

¹⁶⁸ K. Wang-Bae, "Regionalism: Its Origins and Substance with Competition," *Korea Journal* (2003): 8.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 9.

Without question, South Korea's adoption of a full democratic government in 1987 was the culmination of a long history. Also, North Korea's invasion of South Korea and the U.S. response probably did create an un-natural loyalty among South Koreans toward the United States. Similarly, North Korea's assistance to South Korea's communist movements may have further solidified South Korean devotion to the idea of democracy while simultaneously stalling South Korea's evolution toward democracy. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this discussion post-colonial South Korea presents a case that demonstrates the benefits of achieving or finding a social fit. Sometimes even inadvertently, the United States' actions while governing South Korea achieved conditions that allowed a successful transition of authority from U.S. governance to a South Korean government.

A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, Korea, formerly colonized by Imperial Japan, prepared for independence. Two of the "big three" allies, the Soviet Union and the United States, divided the Korean peninsula into two regions, North and South Korea, which were divided by the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union assumed responsibility for the northern half of Korea, which would become the country of North Korea, while the United States assumed responsibility for the southern region, later to become the country of South Korea. From 1945–1948, the United States Army Government in Korea, USAMGIK, was the official governing body of South Korea.¹⁷¹

B. ANALYSIS

At this point in its history, the United States government believed that the spread of communism posed its greatest national security threat. Containment of communism became the United States' first priority and, ultimately, drove many USAMGIK decisions regarding the development of the South Korean Government.¹⁷² Focused on preventing Soviet expansion, the United States determined that control of the South Korean

¹⁷¹ G. Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 19.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 13.

population was paramount to preventing the spread of communism. In pursuit of control, American authorities based their political decisions for Korea largely on whether or not they believed the policies would prevent a communist revolution.¹⁷³ Under this paradigm, the United States backed President Syngman Rhee, who led South Korea's first independent government after USAMGIK, from 1948 until 1960. Later, many critics would argue that the United States' policies prevented democracy from taking early root in South Korea, thereby ensuring a long struggle between the South Korean government and dissidents.¹⁷⁴ Perhaps this is so. But, the results today are a stable government and developed society. It thus seems worthwhile to examine how something that has yet to be achieved in either Bosnia or Afghanistan was accomplished in South Korea.

1. Ideological Resonance

Throughout much of its history, Korea had been forced to accept foreign hegemony thanks to its small size and compared strength to that of its neighbors.¹⁷⁵ For centuries, Korea was part of China's tributary system, and thus, was susceptible to the regional giant's influence. The adoption of both Buddhism and Confucianism are examples of foreign influence on Korean society.¹⁷⁶ In 1905, Korea became a Japanese protectorate following the Japanese-Russo war. Japan officially annexed Korea as a colony in 1910 and ruled through its defeat in World War II. In fact, well before this period "Koreans had acquired hundreds, if not thousands, of years of experience adapting foreign philosophies to their own needs and values."¹⁷⁷ Koreans' adaptability may have helped ease or soften the transition to government by USAMGIK authorities. But interestingly, the South Koreans deliberately adopted only American democratic

¹⁷³ B. Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, 1981), 136.

¹⁷⁴ Brazinsky, *Nation building in South Korea*, 8.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 6.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 7.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 6.

principles that matched their objectives.¹⁷⁸ Historians often suggest that the Koreans' prior experiences with occupying powers allowed them to more easily adapt to American influence.

While the adaptive nature of the Koreans may have facilitated USAMGIK success, there were still Korean values that required accommodation by USAMGIK authorities. Initially, U.S. occupiers planned to use former Japanese officials to help it govern at all levels. However, Korean contempt for the Japanese was so high that Americans in Washington and Tokyo were forced to remove all Japanese officials.¹⁷⁹ USAMGIK officials determined that failing to remove Japanese officials would prolong the establishment of effective governance and lead to resistance. Freeing Korea from Japanese colonial rule was regarded as being of the highest priority. Indeed, the greatest impediment to creating effective governance was the large number of Koreans who refused to work for Japanese supervisors. As H Merrell Beninghoff, the then State Department advisor to General Hodge, wrote in his first report:

...Although hatred of the Koreans for the Japanese is unbelievably bitter, it is not thought that they will resort to violence as long as American troops are in surveillance...All [political] groups seem to have common ideas of seizing Japanese property, ejecting the Japanese from Korea, and achieving immediate independence. Beyond this they have few ideas...Korea is completely ripe for agitators.¹⁸⁰

The Koreans' desire for independence from foreign influence was not limited just to ridding themselves of the Japanese. Post-colonial Koreans didn't want to be dominated by any other foreign state either.¹⁸¹ This suggests that while there was high contempt for the Japanese, there were strong sentiments on behalf of Korean self-rule. Emphasizing this point, General Hodge, the military governor of Korea under USAMGIK, reported on the conditions in Korea:

¹⁷⁸ Brazinsky, *Nation building in South Korea*, 8.

¹⁷⁹ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:152.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 1:143.

¹⁸¹ Brazinsky, *Nation building in South Korea*, 8.

The Koreans want their independence more than any one thing and they want it now...By occidental standards Koreans are not ready for independence, but it grows daily more apparent that their capacity for self-government will not greatly improve with time under current conditions.¹⁸²

Clearly, whatever form or system of governance USAMGIK established, it had to take into account the preeminent desires of the Koreans—it had to be Korean.

2. Social Contract: Expectations

While administering the fledgling South Korean state, USAMGIK authorities realized that they would have to address land reform. A perceived inequity in the distribution and ownership of land was a significant issue among the Koreans. In fact, every Korean political party expected some type of land reform.¹⁸³ Responding to fevered calls for land reform, and for the distribution of former Japanese property, the State Department announced a new objective, which would “reflect the wishes of the Koreans and their desire to replace wide-spread tenancy with full ownership of the land by the individual farmer.”¹⁸⁴

USAMGIK then published two land reform plans, one directed toward land formerly held by Japanese owners, and one directed toward Korean landlords.¹⁸⁵ Dividing the Japanese held land among Korean landowners and peasants addressed the first problem. The second problem was addressed by, Ordinance #9, which stated: “A national emergency in Korea is hereby declared to exist by reason of oppressive rents and interest rates payable under existing land relationships.”¹⁸⁶ Under Ordinance #9, rent was limited to 1/3 of the total crops harvested and landlords were prevented from arbitrarily voiding contracts with tenants.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸² Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:210.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 1:202.

¹⁸⁴ E. G. Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (King's Crown Press, 1951), 207.

¹⁸⁵ S. P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale Univ Pr, 2006), 376.

¹⁸⁶ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:202.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

The distribution of formerly held Japanese land “did much to reduce rural instability, it undermined communist influence among the peasants, increased their cooperation with the election process, and aroused expectations, later fulfilled, that land owned by Korean landlords would be disposed of similarly.”¹⁸⁸ Land reform policies enacted under USAMGIK proved popular enough that they were continued under the Rhee regime. Rhee’s motivations for continuing land redistribution were political in nature. Through redistribution, Rhee was able to reduce the power of rivals, while at the same time maintaining his support among peasants. In addition, the land reforms alleviated a critical source of social discontent.¹⁸⁹ By 1958, full or half tenancy dropped from 67.2 percent in 1945 to 15.3 percent.¹⁹⁰

3. Comfort and Familiarity

The United States’ primary goal while administering the South Korean state was to implement enough government controls to deter the spread of communism. Anti-communism was reflected in every American decision regarding the growth of the “new” South Korean government. Thirty-six years of Japanese colonial control proved useful in post-WW II South Korea, since Koreans had grown familiar with the concepts and processes of being governed. During colonial rule, Japanese officials introduced Koreans to heavy industry and exposed them to Japanese colonial bureaucracy.¹⁹¹ “Japanese colonialism exposed Koreans to a highly authoritarian model of development that continued to influence their thinking when they encountered American nation builders.”¹⁹² In effect, Korean society was accustomed to centralized governance.

Upon U.S. occupation, the government in South Korea was in disarray. Ninety percent of the bureaucratic work force was absent, and those few who remained would not carry out their duties. Most of the public departments could not function; and public

¹⁸⁸ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 376.

¹⁸⁹ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 19.

¹⁹⁰ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 386.

¹⁹¹ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 7.

¹⁹² Ibid.

services were cancelled.¹⁹³ The resulting complete disorder heightened the urgent need to establish a functioning government structure. While neither popular nor what it had originally planned to do, USAMGIK chose to maintain the structure put in place by the Japanese. This structure was at least composed of a bureaucracy that could exert control over key aspects of the economy and society. It also could subordinate people and other political parties to central government authority.¹⁹⁴ In other words, structure inherited from the Japanese, purged of the Japanese themselves, provided the Koreans with a functioning government and Americans with relatively immediate control.

We can see how this worked when we look at law and order. Towards the end of 1945, USAMGIK established the Korean Departments of Justice, Courts, and National Police.¹⁹⁵ This amounted to Koreanization; Koreans were simply put in charge of former colonial agencies, with little change to the underlying organizations. In fact, Americans made few significant changes in structure or personnel through the end of occupation. It appears that USAMGIK even retained Koreans formerly employed in the Japanese Bureau of Justice despite the concern that most were viewed as Japanese collaborators. The U.S. occupation forces also used a system of law codes and precedents created by combining Japanese law and USAMGIK powers; only the harshest and most improper colonial laws, such as those based on race, were adjusted by direction of the U.S..¹⁹⁶ In short, USAMGIK appropriated the existing organizations and laws.

While USAMGIK generally maintained the colonial-era government bureaucracy, there were instances when the U.S. attempted to introduce new policies. Often these resulted in unintended and damaging effects. For instance, in what was referred to as the “most unwise pieces of economic legislation ever decreed by the Americans in Korea,” USAMGIK removed Japanese controls on rice.¹⁹⁷ According to historian, Bruce Cumings, “the free market plan stands as a classic example of the costs associated with

¹⁹³ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:152.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1:143.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1:158.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1:159.

¹⁹⁷ Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, 66.

imposing assumptions and models developed in one setting and then pushed into another alien and radically different setting.”¹⁹⁸ Subsistence farming by Korean peasants and marketing by landlords continued but without the previous controls in place. Ultimately, this caused hoarding and overconsumption, inflation, near starvation, and an economic breakdown. Eventually, the U.S. military government suspended the free market on rice and revived the Japanese system of agricultural management.¹⁹⁹ In the wake of Japanese imperialism, the structure of government most familiar to the Koreans was authoritarian; anything more democratic than this would have felt uncomfortable. As counter-intuitive as it may seem, Koreans responded favorably to strong centralized rule.

C. CONCLUSION

The discussion of post-World War II South Korea could give the impression that U.S. intervention was overwhelmingly positive and enabled a smooth transition. This, however, is not the case; the U.S. made numerous mistakes and none paid more for it than the Koreans. In addition to tactical mistakes made by the military, the United States made poor policy decisions with long-lasting effects.

Although the transition from U.S. to Korean authority accomplished the goal of thwarting communism, it established an authoritarian regime in South Korea. Throughout the transition process, the United States sided with Korean conservatives, who previously had collaborated with the Japanese imperialists.²⁰⁰ Many Koreans viewed the U.S. backed conservatives as traitors and, thus, became wary of both the U.S. and Korean governments. The United States believed Syngman Rhee was the only figure politically strong enough to prevent the Korean leftists from gaining power.²⁰¹ As a staunch conservative and anti-communist, Rhee prevented the spread of communism, but also severely frustrated the spread of democracy.²⁰² Many Koreans viewed Rhee as nothing more than a dictator, who cared little for the people and needed to use heavy-

¹⁹⁸ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:203.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1:204.

²⁰⁰ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, 4.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 13.

handed methods to maintain security and control.²⁰³ In the end, the Rhee regime did little to develop South Korea, or advance Korea's interests. Like most dictators, Rhee focused on maintaining power and privilege.²⁰⁴ Regardless, his accession to power was a tacit recognition by the U.S. of South Koreans' desire for self-governance and allowed for a Korean solution to a Korean problem, which ultimately paved the way to political development and stability.

Given the fervent anti-colonialism in post-World War II Korea, simply establishing a governance structure led by Koreans ideologically resonated with most members of Korean society. Though a dictatorship, the Rhee Regime was Korean and incorporated Koreans into all government institutions. From the U.S. perspective, the transition from U.S. to Korean authority was a success.

Again, what helped make it a success was the way in which, USAMGIK addressed Koreans' expectations for land reform. Ultimately, the reforms reduced rural instability and communist influence. Had the authorities failed to address land reform, it is likely that South Koreans would have rejected the new government.

USAMGIK's decision to continue to make use of the formerly Japanese bureaucracy and laws provided a system that Koreans were comfortable and familiar with. A strong centralized government seemed largely effective in maintaining control. Additionally, the removal of Japanese supervisors and officials made this especially palatable. Had the Japanese officials remained, it is unlikely the government would have functioned, due to the unwillingness of the Koreans to work under Japanese supervisors. The economic chaos that resulted from removing Japanese imposed controls on the rice economy shows what happened when the U.S. deviated from a familiar and accepted practice to an unfamiliar free market. The unexpected result was near starvation. Revival of the Japanese control mechanisms returned balance and moved the South Koreans back towards a familiar structure.

²⁰³ Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*.

²⁰⁴ Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, 1:153.

The point here is not that USAMGIK made perfect decisions regarding governance, or that Syngman Rhee was an ideal leader, but rather that the system of government fit Korean society. Some decisions were made out of necessity and not through deliberate planning. Some decisions, such as the removal of controls on the rice economy, were incorrect and resulted in disaster, but once identified were reversed. Regardless of why these decisions were made, the end result was a set of solutions that created a social fit.

One counterfactual question that can be posed is whether USAMGIK could have been smarter by design rather than by accident. Recognizing and accommodating Korean core values allowed USAMGIK to make decisions that fulfilled South Koreans' expectations. While various circumstances drove USAMGIK decision-making, use of a guiding framework based on achieving a social fit, could have provided a more systematic and deliberate process for developing policy. Had USAMGIK understood the significance of social fit, and pursued courses of action that deliberately sought to achieve ideological resonance, and fulfill Koreans' expectations for a social contract that took into account what would feel comfortable and familiar, they could have anticipated and successfully made the same critical decisions, without having to rely on "luck."

In an effort to maximize ideological resonance, USAMGIK could have identified critical South Korean values and beliefs that were bound to affect governance. USAMGIK could have minimized the amount of time it would take to implement an effective transition to a Korean regime. Similarly, USAMGIK would have been able to anticipate how important it was to govern without former Japanese colonial officials.

To maintain the new government's social contract with the people, USAMGIK could have studied southern Koreans expectations' of a government. It would have immediately been able to identify land reform as a popular and expected function of government. USAMGIK's concern for land reform did provide the government with credibility. Potentially, earlier awareness could have better focused USAMGIK attention and resources towards significant endeavors such as land reform.

Recognizing what was familiar to the Koreans could have helped USAMGIK understand better that change in the system should only occur when and where absolutely necessary. The South Koreans understood how the Japanese system worked. It had already proven effective, and with the exception of Japanese supervisors, the Koreans were comfortable with it. Thus, prior to occupation, USAMGIK could have planned to use the pre-existing bureaucracy. Similarly, USAMGIK would have been able to avoid changing to a free market economy on rice, which was unproven and untested, and therefore bound to be upsetting at best; as we have seen it was disastrous.

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VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

*From this institution of a common-wealth are derived all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.*²⁰⁵

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1651

In the three cases presented: we have one instance of no social fit with instability; one instance of insufficient social fit with fragile stability; and one instance of social fit with stability. All three can be neatly arranged along a continuum with Afghanistan at one end, Bosnia in the middle, and South Korea at the other end. However, doing so pays insufficient attention to what constitutes social fit in each case. For example, in Afghanistan, social fit has been hard to achieve thanks to local versus central tensions, and in Bosnia, nationalism has been the problem, while in South Korea, it was land reform that helped to do the trick, but it would not have worked in the other two cases.

The current tensions in Afghanistan exemplify what can happen when a post-conflict government is imposed and does not socially fit the society. Ideologically, the Afghans struggle to support the central government's dominance over traditional tribal authorities and traditional local autonomy. Additionally, the rural Afghans largely resent social restructuring. The government's failure to adequately provide security and dispense justice does not meet most Afghans' expectations. Perhaps this is the consequence of Kabul trying to apply a system with which Afghans are neither comfortable nor familiar. The Taliban takes advantage of, and capitalizes on, these fissures between the Afghan state and society. Overall, the government requires heavy foreign oversight and intervention to assist it in combating a full-blown violent insurgency.

In Bosnia, the international community's political solution has failed to adequately address Bosnian desires for ethnic nationalism, specifically the desires for

²⁰⁵ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Penguin Classics, 1982), 226.

separate ethnically independent states. The complicated government structure engineered by outsiders appears to function, in that it has halted the violence, but deters participation by Bosnians and requires continuous foreign oversight.

Ironically, it is cold war-era South Korea that offers an example of social fit. In the wake of World War II, USAMGIK authorities created a post-conflict government modeled after the previous colonial power, whose form and actions fit South Koreans at that time. The South Koreans required a strong centralized government. USAMGIK removed previous Japanese administrators from their posts, despite their competence; USAMGIK did so in order to build trust or resonance with the Korean population. In addition, the government addressed land reform, which was among the most pressing issues for South Koreans.

As these three disparate cases should make clear, what ultimately constitutes social fit varies as widely as the post-conflict societies themselves. In Afghanistan, what matters is the tension between local and central authorities, in Bosnia it is ethnic nationalism, and in South Korea it was land reform. What worked in South Korea will not work in Bosnia or Afghanistan. History has shown that a repressive centralized regime modeled after the post-World War II South Korean Regime would only incite continued resistance in Afghanistan. Likewise, the costs associated with instituting caretaker/peacekeeping superstructure, as still exists in Bosnia, would be prohibitive in the significantly large much less developed Afghanistan. Thus, specific lessons learned from one case can't be applied to another. However, taking into account the three components of social fit could aid policymakers in determining which specific details to ascertain about a society in order to help it create a viable post-conflict government.

A. APPLYING SOCIAL FIT: AFGHANISTAN

Indeed, the only thing that could potentially ameliorate the situation in Afghanistan is a different form of governance that takes social fit into account. Transitioning to a bottom-up form of governance could reduce the likelihood of resistance to top down policy. Allowing Afghans within a village to determine what is or is not acceptable behavior would remove the perception of a threat or an assault on their

identity or way of life. Giving Afghans the local right to self-determine would carry certain inherent risks for the international community. There would be the real possibility of a return to draconian self-policing and administering of justice. The role of women and girls in society might change. However, as with the policies of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah, gradual social reform would still remain possible, particularly in urban areas. Similar even to what we see with societal norms in the United States, certain areas would likely maintain a more conservative approach to governance, while other areas would adopt a more liberal approach. Some areas of Afghanistan would likely subscribe to the strictest interpretations of Shari'a, while other areas might take on a more secular aspect approach. History has shown that gradual social reform can occur when it follows a natural progression.

Currently, power in Afghanistan is largely decentralized. The near xenophobic tendency of Afghan tribesmen almost necessitates a degree of autonomy. Again, history shows that any attempt to alter the status quo or reform society is often met with rapid resistance and instability. The option presented by focusing on social fit harnesses the strength of local power structures. Under the strategy of increased self-governance, Afghanistan would become a decentralized state in which the primary power would remain in several autonomous regions and the national government would essentially be federal in nature, or a hybrid mix between a federation and a loose confederation of the autonomous regions. A federal political order, where "political organization is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule," could potentially limit sources of resistance to centralized rule.²⁰⁶ A new Confederation of Tribes would likely govern on the basis of consensus. The process for transitioning to this model would doubtless be difficult, but not insurmountable.

The recommendations briefly described below provide additional ways in which the current Afghan government might achieve a better social fit with Afghan society. All of them focus on decentralizing while still maintaining an Afghan state. There is a

²⁰⁶ Andreas Føllesdal, "Federalism," n.d., <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/>.

balance that must be struck between decentralization and retaining state authority. Potential dangers exist when the state decentralizes too far; it might disintegrate.

1. Political Reform

Shifting away from centralization requires changes in the political dynamic. Currently, President Karzai's powers include the ability to "appoint cabinet ministers and members of the Supreme Court (subject to National Assembly confirmation), provincial governors and district governors, as well as local security chiefs."²⁰⁷ The National Assembly provides some checks on the powers of the President. However, the President also appoints one-third of the upper house.²⁰⁸ Under a centralized system, this political power makes sense. Nonetheless it also limits the incorporation of traditional tribal structures. If tribal councils retained the right to appoint district representatives to the federal government, it thus would bring them into the fold and help the political process attain greater legitimacy. Ideally, a village should determine who will serve as its representative (most likely an elder), a collection of villages should determine who will represent them to the district, and a collection of districts should determine who will represent the people to the province. National elections and individual votes need not occur. The representative process just described harnesses the socially accepted tendencies of Afghans to govern by way of consensus in accordance with Pashtunwali, and by utilizing the tenet of *jirga* (council based on the Greek form of democracy).²⁰⁹ Following this process would ultimately produce a Confederation of Tribes under a collective federal structure. Essentially, federalism would provide the means by which the autonomous nature of each region in Afghanistan would be acknowledged and respected, thus minimizing the possibility of political opposition to the state itself. Arguably, the most difficult task in implementing this transition would be incorporating warlords, the Taliban, and insurgents into the political process. However, each of these

²⁰⁷ Katzman, *Afghanistan*, 4.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁰⁹ Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 99.

mentioned entities maintains some degree of allegiance to the traditional power structures already, and therefore might be convinced to support efforts to create the Confederation.

2. Security

It has been said that brothers may fight each other, but when faced with the threat of a third party, the brothers will unite to face the threat. The threat can be physical, as in the introduction of foreign forces, but also may be a perceived loss of influence over their way of life.²¹⁰ This saying accurately describes what foreign forces often face in Afghanistan. The intervention of foreign forces often generates this unintended yet acute sense of resistance. Military mistakes resulting in civilian casualties, or the perception that the foreign force is favoring a corrupt political system, often serves to unify rather than pacify the opposition. In a recent HBO documentary entitled *The Battle for Marjah*, interviews with Afghans living in Marjah provide insight into this dynamic. As one Afghan lamented, “How can we stand against the Taliban? They are sons of Afghanistan. They provide justice and order. Who will provide this now? The Marines?”²¹¹

Attempts by international forces to solve local problems with international solutions are not likely to work. Instead, we should provide an opportunity for Afghans to solve what is fundamentally an Afghan problem. There is no doubt that, as foreign forces withdraw from localities, there will be violence as Afghans sort out their power structures. This is unavoidable, but necessary for Afghans’ pursuit of self-determination and self-governance. And, tools exist to minimize the extent of violence. For instance, the Afghan National Police, under the authority of the Confederation, would also decentralize. Similar to law enforcement in other countries, where local sheriffs and police provide most security, local police forces would exist under the authority of the

²¹⁰ Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, *Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty* (Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 99 and 98.

²¹¹ Anthony Wonke and Ben Anderson, “The Battle for Marjah,” Documentary (Marjah, Afghanistan: HBO, 2011).

jirga or shura for each village and district within a province. The Federal-Confederation would retain authority to deploy the National Army. As elsewhere, the National Army could exist to provide for the common defense of Afghanistan.

This is not to say that all foreign forces should immediately withdraw from Afghanistan. Afghans will continue to need advice and guidance. But as foreign forces remain, it should be as advisors at the provincial and division level with limited exceptions. This would compel Afghans to have to develop their own federal methods. NATO forces should stand by to support the Confederation of Tribes, but only when and where their involvement supports Afghan solutions. Current village stability operations provide an example of an exception where the employment of foreign forces can succeed in assisting Afghans with local governance and security issues.

Decentralization carries inherent risks in terms of international terrorism. It must be made clear to the new Confederation of Tribes that while the international community respects Afghanistan's sovereignty and supports its right to self-govern, any support for international terrorists will result in limited, yet surgical, military action by the international community.

3. Development and Revenue Sharing

Avoiding complete disintegration of the Confederation would require multiple, mutually beneficial, incentives to remain united. Economic cooperation may provide the basis for this. Contrary to popular belief, Afghanistan has significant natural resources. Eastern Afghanistan has large troves of timber, natural gas deposits, mineral deposits, and precious gem mines. Rugged terrain and the lack of security prevent the controlled harvest of these resources. It is estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration that there is 3.532 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Afghanistan.²¹² In addition, there are over 1000 known mines and mineral deposits in Afghanistan.²¹³ Emeralds, sapphires, rubies, and marble are but a few of the mineral to be found. Current practices in the

²¹² Energy Information Administration, *World Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Most Recent Estimates*, March 3, 2009, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html>.

²¹³ G. J. Orris and J. D. Bliss, *Mineral and Mine Occurrences in Afghanistan*, U.S. Geological Survey (Tucson, Arizona, 2002), 1–8, <http://geopubs.wr.usgs.gov/open-file/of02-110/of02-110.pdf>.

mineral and timber trades can be described as archaic. Timber, for instance, is often harvested using little or no technology. The Afghan Confederation could produce a relatively stable revenue stream if it regulated these natural resources. In a stable environment, foreign investment and the latest technological advancements could also be brought to bear.

Currently, Afghanistan is losing resources to smuggling. The landowners and warlords who control these resource-rich regions control the citizenry in these locations. Loss of revenue and a lack of social control in these areas is not the worst of it. It is widely believed that the Pakistan Taliban is reaping the benefits of these natural resources.²¹⁴

Under the authority of the Confederation of Tribes, the members of the confederation could negotiate partnerships with each other and the landowners in areas where resources exist. An example of ways in which this could occur includes licensing and leasing arrangements. Ultimately, control of revenue translates into social control.²¹⁵ If the Confederation controls the money and resources the citizens need for survival, then the Confederation may maintain enough strength to remain united.

4. Improve Transportation Infrastructure

In conjunction with gaining control of the Confederation's natural resources, transportation has to be improved. A more robust transportation infrastructure would facilitate the efficient movement of resources to market. Additional benefits include jobs to improve the roads, ease of travel for workers, and increased trade. Currently, it is reported that General David Petraeus will implement some form of transportation improvement as part of his regional development plan.²¹⁶ To the degree possible, the

²¹⁴ Animesh Roul, "Gems, Timber and Jiziya: Pakistan's Taliban Harness Resources to Fund Jihad - The Jamestown Foundation," n.d., http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34928&cHash=39d6075765.

²¹⁵ Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 57.

²¹⁶ Steve LeVine, "An Afghan trade route: What Could Possibly Go Wrong With That? - By Steve LeVine | The Oil and the Glory," n.d., http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/an_afghan_trade_route_what_could_possibly_go_wrong_with_that.

Afghan Confederation should run this effort with localized security. If the international community runs this, the unintended consequence will be to undermine Afghan control.

Invariably, the more the Confederation can do, the more the Afghans will rely on the Confederation for jobs and income. This co-dependence would affirm the social contract, which in turn would help strengthen the Confederation.

The recommendations just suggested are designed to address the fractures between state and society we identified in Chapter III. An Afghan central government based on a liberal framework represents an ideological mismatch and cannot satisfy Afghans' expectations. Policies and reforms driven from the top down by political appointees are completely unfamiliar to members of a society used to making decisions based on consensus. After 10 years of war, the competition between the Afghan state and the Afghan society is no closer to resolution than it has ever been. Considering social fit will likely change the environment from competition to cooperation.

B. BEYOND AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan would seem to epitomize a case where social fit was not considered—to our detriment. Now, consider what could be accomplished if social fit was used as a planning tool prior to a 10-year counterinsurgent struggle. For instance, the current uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa can be analyzed in terms of social fit. From our (Western) perspective, recent demonstrations appear to reveal a popular desire for freedom, and attract our sympathies. Should they attract our support?

To determine whether (or how) to intervene in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, or Libya should require first asking what form of governance fits each of these societies. In the case of Libya, 97 percent of Libyans identify themselves as Sunni Muslim from Arab-Berber descent.²¹⁷ We should be able to safely say the role of Islam will be a significant factor in the adoption of a new government. According to social fit, Islam ideologically resonates with Libyans. Should the Libyan state collapse, a political and social power vacuum will likely occur. In the absence of clear authority, law and order will

²¹⁷ “CIA - The World Factbook,” n.d., <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html>.

deteriorate. As occurred in Afghanistan following the collapse of the Nagibullah regime, lawlessness, disruption of essential services, and criminal activity will likely escalate.

On March 29, 2011, the Libyan opposition released “A Vision of a Democratic Libya,” in which democracy, human rights, and secularism are mentioned.²¹⁸ The parallels between the current Libyan situation and the Iranian Revolution are worth noting. Just as the liberal leadership of the current rebellion professes liberal ideals, the leaders of the Iranian Revolution in 1978 “called for the rule of law, the return of basic freedoms, respect for the dignity of the individual, and a concern for social justice.”²¹⁹ In Iran’s case, and now in Libya’s, each group’s conception of democracy and human rights is subject to local interpretation and implementation. In other words, we should not take pledges of these ideals at face value. Additionally, despite statements from the rebels’ self-appointed leaders, freelance jihadists and fundamentalists are infiltrating their ranks.²²⁰ Reporting indicates that members of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have joined the cause.²²¹

It is easy to see why Islamists would support the rebels’ efforts. Fundamentalists see the dictatorships in the Middle East as roadblocks to the advancement of the Caliphate.²²² The international community, meanwhile, wants the dictatorships to fall in order to pave the way for “Freedom.” Ultimately, the societies themselves will determine which way they will go. History suggests that it is unreasonably optimistic to assume that Western values and norms, individual rights, human rights, and secularization will

²¹⁸ “Libyan opposition sets out post-Gaddafi vision - Africa, World - The Independent,” n.d., <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libyan-opposition-sets-out-postgaddafi-vision-2256432.html>.

²¹⁹ Richard Cottam, “Inside Revolutionary Iran,” *Middle East Journal* 43, no. 2 (April 1, 1989): 170.

²²⁰ “‘Freelance jihadists’ join Libyan rebels - Washington Times,” n.d., <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/29/1000-freelance-jihadists-join-libyan-rebels/>.

²²¹ Greg Miller, “Libyan opposition includes a small number of al-Qaeda fighters, U.S. officials say,” March 30, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/libyan-opposition-includes-a-small-number-of-al-qaeda-fighters-us-officials-say/2011/03/29/AFR1XWyB_story.html.

²²² Scott Shane, “Islamists Are Elated by Uprisings, a Top Qaeda Figure Says,” *The New York Times*, March 30, 2011, sec. World / Middle East, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/middleeast/31inspire.html>.

gain more traction than will a system grounded in Muslim values.²²³ After all, the Koran and Shari'a provide the "doctrine" for instituting the order that Libyan society is most comfortable and familiar with. As in Iran in 1979, "when the constituted Iranian governmental institutions collapsed, mosque based organizations served the purpose of maintaining order, providing basic services, and defending the new revolutionary regime."²²⁴

So, if we look at Libya through the social fit lens, Islam ideologically resonates, and Shari'a is familiar to Libyans already. The freedom to espouse fundamentalist ideals, made possible by the collapse of the regime and in the absence of clear authority, could well pave the way for a theocratic state. Why would Libyans accept this? Ultimately, societies acceptance of non-democratic government may be directly tied to whoever can provide social organization and order, thereby ensuring social fit.

If the United States and the international community deem a theocratic state more valuable than the current regime, then intervention is the correct choice, since the rise of a religiously based resistance is the likeliest outcomes of our interference. If, however, a theocratic state is not desirable, then perhaps an alternative course of action is required. Understanding social fit does not provide the answer to these foreign policy questions, but merely highlights what should be considered.

²²³ Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11, no. 3 (May 1, 1982): 276.

²²⁴ Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," 169.

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