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THESIS

**MODERNIZATION THROUGH EDUCATION:
THE ANSWER FOR COMBATING TERRORISM?**

by

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June 2011

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**MODERNIZATION THROUGH EDUCATION:
THE ANSWER FOR COMBATING TERRORISM?**

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ABSTRACT

World leaders and international and non-governmental organizations, have invested millions of private and government funds into bringing secular education into remote regions of Afghanistan and other parts of the world in hopes of combating terrorism. This is an insufficient solution to a problem of that faces all religious, economic, and social communities of the world. Focusing on secular education alone without a larger political and economic reform brings a false sense of security because education without other inputs is not sufficient in combating terrorism. A comparative analysis in this thesis illustrates that education by itself does not prevent terrorism. Other causal factors must be considered when addressing individuals who do commit terrorist acts. This thesis will use the cases of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and eleven profiles of educated individuals who were involved in terrorist acts as counterexamples to the education-only theory. It will also discuss present U.S. operations in Afghanistan that focus on education, and present proposals to improve the social and economic conditions that are necessary aspects of reforms being neglected.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CAI	Central Asia Institute
CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CLTS	Community Led-Total Sanitation
CRS	Congressional Research Service
EPRLF	Eelam People's Revolutionary Front
ESDFP	Education Sector Development Framework and Program
ESDP	Education Sector Development Project
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
F.B.I.	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JHU	Jathika Hela Urumaya, or National Heritage Party
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, or Peoples Liberation Front
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
LCEP-2	Learning for Community Empowerment Program
LEBM	Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEP	Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, or Peoples United Front
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PLOTE	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
PRTs	Provisional Reconstruction Teams
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
SLMSS	Sri Lanka Maha Sangha Sabha
SNP	Sinhalese Nationalist Party

STAY	Skills Training for Afghan Youth
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
UNP	United National Party (or Eksath Jathika Pakshaya)
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	United Nations World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

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I. INTRODUCTION

We will challenge the poverty and hopelessness and lack of education and failed governments that too often allow conditions that terrorists can seize.¹
—George W. Bush

Countries such as the United States that are embroiled in a war against Islamic radicalism are reasserting the educational aspects of modernization theory. For instance, many world leaders now support the investment of millions of private and government funds into bringing secular education into remote regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the hope of combating terrorism. For instance, President Obama's National Security Strategy of 2010 addressed the need to promote America's goal of promoting global cooperation and development. This included strengthening relationships with countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan by improving their socio-economic development, which includes their education systems. President Obama also supports the rights of women and girls for empowerment and education to further their position in their respective societies.²

The 9/11 Commission Report of July 2004 emphasized the importance of educational opportunity in the Middle East and South Asia in uprooting terrorist ideology, and also of increasing congressional oversight of U.S. Aid programs to ensure Pakistan increased its education spending. According to Lisa Curtis's article, "U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism: Through Education Reform," U.S. assistance to primary education and literacy in Pakistan more than doubled from \$28 million in fiscal year 2004 to \$66 million in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) constructed and furnished sixty-five primary, middle, and high schools in five agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).³

¹ Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299, no. 5612 (2003): 1534–1536.

² President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (2010) DIANE Publishing, 2010.

³ Lisa. A. Curtis, *U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Countering Extremism through Education Reform*, Heritage Foundation, 2007.

Curt Tarnoff, in a Congressional Research Service (CRS), noted that the U.S. program in Afghanistan is intended to “stabilize and strengthen the Afghan economic, social, political, and security environment to blunt popular support for extremist forces in the region.”⁴ He noted that more than six hundred schools have been constructed or rehabilitated, teachers trained (more than 50,000 since January 2006), and millions of textbooks printed. The women’s dorm at the University of Kabul has been rehabilitated to ensure that female students can go to the university without fear from Taliban extremists. The American University of Afghanistan and the International School of Kabul were established, and literacy programs are being implemented nationwide as well.⁵ In addition, the U.S. has recognized the efforts of people like Greg Mortenson, the founder of Central Asia Institute (CAI), an NGO that focuses on educational development in the region and has established or assisted over 171 schools in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region.

Interestingly, the focus on education in U.S. Foreign Policy is not new or unique. In 1977, then Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his “Human Rights Policy” address mentioned the human right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food shelter, health care, and education. Secretary Christopher may not have been the catalyst of promoting the right to education throughout the world; however, he is proof that policy makers had the idea of promoting education before the current Afghanistan crisis.⁶

Modernization theorists, such as Francis Fukuyama, see middle-class societies as a product of universal education.⁷ According to Fukuyama, continual growth of industrial societies means a requirement of more skilled and educated workers to sustain it.⁸ One of his theories on modern education was that it “stimulates a certain tendency

⁴ Curt Tarnoff, “Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code R0699), 2010, 3.

⁵ Ibid., 7.

⁶ Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1996) 5–6.

⁷ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992) 116.

⁸ Ibid.

toward relativism, that is, the doctrine that all horizons and values systems are relative to their time and place, and that none are true but reflect the prejudices or interests of those who advance them.”⁹ In other words, education makes people more tolerant.

Similarly, Douglas Kellner, a Professor of Education at UCLA, also states that education provides the skills necessary to improve one’s life in order to make a better society as well as a more civilized and developed world.¹⁰ Social literacy programs should be taught in all educational systems with the goals of relating to others, negotiating differences, conflict resolution, and positive communication and social interaction in diverse situations.¹¹ His vision for educators were to understand the evolution of technology, conflicts between ethnicities, classes, genders, and religions in order to create an atmosphere of diversity, tolerance, and a strengthened democracy and society. He states that the final result desired is empowerment, and with empowerment comes a more modern and productive society.¹²

The current focus on education for resolving conflict is also highlighted in the work of individuals such as Greg Mortenson, author of *Three Cups of Tea, Stones into Schools*, and founder of the CAI who claims that secular education reduces the likelihood that individuals will be involved in terrorism. His efforts gained worldwide attention in the past decade, leading Admiral Mullen (Joint Chiefs of Staff), U.S. Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, and General Musharraf of Pakistan, to endorse Mortenson’s approach as one of the answers to combat terrorism.

Such works would also make some believe that terrorist indoctrination and training is conducted in isolated areas such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, where there are no established educational institutions. Greg Mortenson’s book, *Three Cups of Tea*, is a

⁹ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 306.

¹⁰ Michael A. Peters, *Education, Globalization, and the State in the Age of Terrorism* (Paradigm Publishers, 2004) 50.

¹¹ Ibid., 52.

¹² Ibid., 54.

depiction of his attempt to reach the K2 summit in 1993. Separated from his group and injured, he was found and nursed back to health from lack of food and exposure by the villagers in Korphe.

After recovering from his injuries, he promised that he would return one day to build a school after he noticed the lack of education and the plight of females in that village.¹³ In 1996, he built his first school in Korphe. He later proceeded to build twenty-eight additional school buildings, fifteen water projects and four women's vocational centers that are now in parts of northern Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.¹⁴ His book *Stones into Schools* is a continuation of his efforts in other remote areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To summarize his position, he writes, "I am dismayed by the West's failure or unwillingness to recognize that establishing secular schools that offer children balanced and nonextremist form of education is the cheapest and most effective way of combating this kind of indoctrination."¹⁵

Although Mortenson's efforts are courageous in locations where he built schools to advance the future of many children, terrorist operations are conducted all over the world, and secular education does not appear to be lacking in some of the areas in question. This thesis argues that the focus on education by many world leaders, as noble as it may be, is an insufficient solution to the problem of terrorist indoctrination. Such a focus on secular education without a larger political and economic reform brings a false sense of security to reformers because education without other inputs is not sufficient in combating terrorism. Larger socio-economic reforms, which take into consideration local political and economic settings, are required.

Several cases across the world illustrate the importance of recognizing that education without economic and political representation is not sufficient to solve the problems of terrorism. In fact, a further sense of deprivation may occur among the

¹³ Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism and Build Nations-- One School at a Time* (New York: Viking, 2006).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Greg Mortenson, *Stones into Schools: Promoting Peace with Books, Not Bombs, in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (New York: Viking, 2009).

educated who do not necessarily gain political representation and economic gains. This thesis illustrates this point by providing a comparative case of Sri Lanka, where the educated Sri Lankan Tamil community became embroiled in civil war with the Buddhist Sinhalese community over their rights to public goods, one of the most important being educational institutions. The case illustrates that lack of education was not the point of contention, but who had access to it and who did not given a specific type of job opportunities. The competition between the Sinhala and Tamil communities eventually lead to civil war, which lasted almost three decades.

A. BACKGROUND

A comparative analysis illustrates that education by itself does not prevent terrorism. Although lack of educational opportunities might play a factor into one's desire to resort to terrorist acts, illiteracy is not what leads to the final decision to engage in terrorist acts. Various studies in terrorism, the most famous being Marc Sageman's, illustrate that terrorism is not an act mainly perpetrated by the poor and the uneducated; it is the well-planned and coordinated targeting of a specific group, political or economic.¹⁶ Mohamed Atta, known as one of the major players of 9/11, came from a well-educated and wealthy family in Egypt.¹⁷ In Palestine, Hanadi Tayseer Jaradat, who was days away from earning her law degree from Yarmouk University, detonated a bomb in a restaurant in Haifa, Israel, killing herself and nineteen Israelis and injuring fifty others on October 4, 2003.¹⁸ Both events occurred in different parts of the world; however, both individuals were educated and decided to participate in terrorist acts.

This thesis will demonstrate that secular education does not combat terrorism by looking at the case of Sri Lanka, where education became a major factor that brought the country into one of the bloodiest and longest civil wars in South Asia. Sri Lanka is one

¹⁶ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

¹⁷ Paul Zarembka, *The Hidden History of 9-11-2001*, 1st ed. (Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier JAI, 2006).

¹⁸ La Voz de Aztlan, "Palestinian Women Martyrs Against the Israeli Occupation," http://www.aztlan.net/women_martyrs.htm (accessed August 1, 2010).

of the leaders in South Asia with regards to education; however, it is home to one of the most notable terrorist groups in the world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). There are several terrorist and extremist groups in Sri Lanka, but none have made their mark on the country, as well as the world, like the LTTE. The LTTE not only devastated a small country like Sri Lanka, but at one point, they led the world in suicide bombings. Sri Lanka's established education systems for both the Sinhala and Tamil population could not prevent civil war; in fact the nature of the college education and lack of opportunities associated with the educated became the focal point in grievances, which then manifested as an ethnic conflict.¹⁹

B. HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: SRI LANKA

Until 1969, university entrance in Sri Lanka was based on merit and Tamil students dominated the universities, especially in the science-based disciplines. However, 1974 was the beginning of the "standardization" of university admittance which switched the language of the test to Sinhala, which resulted in Tamil enrollment plummeting. The change in policy was due to pressures from the Sinhala ethnic parties that demanded the shift in the post-colonial phase in which the rural communities had not advanced at all economically. Tamils who were academically qualified to go to universities due to the presence of Catholic schools in Tamil areas were marginalized when the state passed The Sinhala Only policy. This solidified the sense of insecurity among Tamils about the Sinhalese authorities, which then led to further ethnic polarization.²⁰

The Tamil elite claimed that the Sinhalese government had deprived them of territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment, and education. By 1974, Tamil dissatisfaction had fostered a radical movement that would later be known as the LTTE. The goal of the LTTE was to establish "The free, sovereign,

¹⁹ S. T. Hettige, "5 Economic Policy, Changing Opportunities for Youth, and the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Economy, Culture, and Civil War in Sri Lanka* (2004): 115.

²⁰ Michael Edward Brown and Sumit Ganguly, *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia*, ed. (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government: The MIT Press, 2003), 131.

secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent in every nation.”²¹ This movement by the Tamils was to give notice to the Sinhalese elite of their rights to equality in Sri Lanka and that they were as entitled to it as any other group in the country. However, this movement only delayed the inevitable.

In 1978, an attempt by the Sinhalese to accommodate the Tamils came too late and was not sufficient enough to end the ongoing tension between the two ethnic groups. Although it claimed to provide more Tamil students with more educational opportunities, it provided minimal support towards school supplies and facilities. Books were inaccurate or written in the wrong language, and university requirements remained tied to Sinhalese, which ultimately eliminated the Tamils who were taught in English or Tamil schools.²²

A final breaking point occurred when the Jaffna Municipal Library was burned to the ground with 100,000 ancient and rare Tamil documents in 1981. This action solidified the belief to Tamils that the cultural, as well as educational opportunities, had become targets of the Sinhalese extremists. None of the Sinhalese perpetrators were held accountable. The lack of education was not the primary concern since education was deeply promoted by the post-colonial state as part of the larger modernization project. The fact remains that one community (Tamils) felt unqualified to gain jobs and elite representation over another (Sinhalese) in Sri Lanka was the central point of contention.

By the 1980s, the LTTE was to become one of the most violent separatist groups in the twentieth century.²³ The LTTE is the only terrorist group which possessed its own infantry, sea wing, and air wing in its campaign in Sri Lanka for a separate Tamil homeland in 1983. On January 10, 2008, the FBI reported that “The LTTE is one of the

²¹ Brown and Ganguly, *Fighting Words*, 132–133.

²² Ibid., 133–134.

²³ Neil DeVotta, *Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 168–170.

most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be concerned about other organizations they inspired including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.”²⁴

The LTTE was also first to introduce suicide bombings to their operations. It also introduced women as well as children into their operations. The LTTE women called “Birds of Freedom” carried out 30% of their suicide bombing attacks during 1987–2000.²⁵ Children were recruited heavily in orphanages by having shrines of martyrs set up where they could see them daily to entice them into joining LTTE suicide operations.²⁶ For recruitment, the LTTE infiltrated the education system by gaining access to schools in order to recruit students. LTTE members took over classes to indoctrinate children into their ideology, which led to new membership.²⁷

The case of Sri Lanka demonstrates that while ethnic-based indoctrination began in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, the origin of the conflict lay among groups that were educated in secular schools. Since the post-colonial phase, Sri Lanka continued its inherited British educational system. In fact, the secular education system was at the center of grievances listed by the Sinhala extremists that argued that it gave minorities like the Tamils an advantage over the Sinhalese. This case challenges theories that focus on education as a solution. Sri Lanka proves that well-established secular educational institutions can become problematic and a symbol of political conflict. The comparative analysis may be applied to the Afghanistan situation.

Terrorism is not isolated in remote areas in Islamic countries that the United States deems as a threat to national security. It is all over the world in areas such as Palestine, Indonesia, Lebanon, Israel, Spain, Turkey, and India; it is supported by numerous groups with many agendas. We see shades of it in the U.S. as well (for example, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing). In the current global context, terrorist

²⁴ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM> (accessed September 1, 2010).

²⁵ Anat Berko, *The Path to Paradise :The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and their Dispatchers* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 113.

²⁶ James J. F. Forest, *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).

²⁷ Forest, *The Making of a Terrorist*, 156.

organizations recruit from all socioeconomic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Mortenson's efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are to be commended, but building more secular schools without taking other factors into context is not a solution to terrorism.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Given the growth of the madrasas in Pakistan and Afghanistan, several scholars and policy makers suggest that educational issues are a priority. There is a belief that a Western approach of establishing secular education in places of conflict and underdevelopment would answer the problems of extremist indoctrination. This concept has been addressed by many scholars long before 9/11. The following literature review will illustrate how some scholars support the idea of education to combat terrorist indoctrination as well as illustrate early examples from other scholars, showing the correlation between education and a civil society. It will also show scholars who have done extensive research to prove that this policy lacks the holistic approach which may be problematic.

Greg Mortenson's *Three Cups of Tea* is an example of the most prominent approach to combating terrorism by education in this decade. His book is a depiction of a personal journey to reach the top of the K2 Mountains in Pakistan, which the author initiated as a tribute to his late sister, who died of epilepsy. Lost and separated from his group, he is found and led to the village of Korphe in Pakistan. The villagers nurse him back to health and treat him as one of their own. Inspired by the Spartan existence and lack of a school, Mortenson dedicates his life to helping Korphe by beginning a quest to build a school with personal and private funding. In making several visits to Korphe to build its first school and interacting with children and the village leaders, he concludes that secular education can reduce extremist behavior.²⁸

Mortenson's book, *Stones into Schools*, which came out in 2009 depicts Mortenson's continuing efforts in Afghanistan. Mortenson establishes schools in the

²⁸ Mortenson and Relin, *Three Cups of Tea*, 338.

Badakshan Province and the Wakhan Corridor. It also depicts how he built relationships with Islamic clerics, militia commanders, and tribal leaders, as well as how he experienced an eight-day armed abduction by the Taliban. At this point, Mortenson began to receive support from world leaders.²⁹

Yet, some important gaps are noticeable in Mortenson's writings. First, why does he believe that targeting females will alleviate the threat of terrorism? Since his efforts are not directed at male children, should we then assume that they will continue to be taught in madrasas? How then does this solve the problem? Would this not further contribute to gender divisions between in the region, or do the local males support this system? Second, many females funded by Mortenson, have furthered their education funded by going to universities; have they gone back to their villages to give back to prevent extremism taught in madrasas? There is no evidence of this.

Second, he suggests that the clerics in the area support his efforts. Do all the madrasas in areas that have new schools support Mortenson? Why has he not been able to expand to other places? Does it suggest that the areas where he is established were already open to different ideas and did not have extremist organizations? In addition, the madrasa way of education is part of the Muslim world for centuries so one should not defer to the notion that madrasa education means extremist indoctrination.

Mortenson also focuses on rural areas. Are rural tribal areas the only problem? This is also important since many terrorist acts, such as 9/11, were perpetrated by well-educated individuals that were not from tribal areas. For instance, Mohamed Atta, the organizer of the 9/11 attacks, was from Cairo, Egypt. His father was a lawyer and Mohamed was a graduate of Cairo University in 1986 with a degree in architecture. It was after graduation that he became involved in Muslim extremist politics. Al-Qaeda agents saw his educational background and commitment to radical Islam as the key to his recruitment, which would focus his mission to lead the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.³⁰

²⁹ Mortenson, *Stones into Schools*, 420.

³⁰ Stephen E. Atkins, *The 9/11 Encyclopedia* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 23–25.

Both of Mortenson's books would lead one to subscribe to the notion that terrorists are poor, displaced, and their indoctrination is given in remote locations in Muslim countries. This assumption is inaccurate because extremist behavior and indoctrination can occur anywhere in the world. His suggestions for the region do not examine the historical development programs in the region. Modernization projects were already operating in the region long before the U.S. began Operation Enduring Freedom.

Many NGOs already operate in Afghanistan; some successful, and some not so successfully. Nosheen Ali suggests that Mortenson's community-based, participatory education model envisioned in *Three Cups of Tea* was already in practice in the region by institutions like the Aga Khan Rural Support Program.³¹ In addition, it is not often recognized that the United States already provides assistance through Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that build schools, dig wells, and provide medical help.³² It is the implementation that is the problem, which requires a more political approach.

Such books are now required readings for the United States military. The message of "books not bombs" resonates stronger now since the war on terrorism is going on its tenth year and it has many questioning the war efforts of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mortenson's supporters such as Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy state, "By deliberately depriving young Muslims from receiving a good education, the fundamentalists ensure that the future of their potential recruits is bleak and the resulting frustrations make them easily susceptible to terrorist ideology."³³ Radical education was not a cause that led to political strategy by radical groups, but a result. Mortenson's work implies the reverse.

Some other, arguably more important scholars, point to similar roles of education in combating terrorism. According to these scholars, education promotes tolerance and development. Scholars like Fukuyama believed that inequality is a result of unequal

³¹ Nosheen Ali, "Books Vs Bombs? Humanitarian Development and the Narrative of Terror in Northern Pakistan," *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2010): 551.

³² *Ibid.*, 552–553.

³³ America.gov, "Terrorism and Children: Children Suffer from Terrorism and are Vulnerable to Extremist Recruiting," America.gov, <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/April/20080522172236SrenoD0.6154444.html> (accessed February 9, 2010).

access to education and that a lack of education is the surest condemnation to second-class citizenship. Fukuyama also believed that education makes a person more self-reliant, which leads to respect for their fellow citizens and from the state.³⁴

Samuel P. Huntington also supports the notion that education meant a more industrious and socially mobile society. Huntington believed that education leads to social mobility, which then produces a more powerful society.³⁵ With regards to modernization and human development, Huntington stated that both were produced, “by greater education, awareness, and understanding of human society and its natural environment produced sustained movement toward higher and higher levels of civilization.”³⁶

Mark Olsen views education as crucial for democracy. He sees schools as a connection to communities with the ability to empower families and involve minority groups in community projects. It encompasses the democratic norms of trust and political decision making. Olson did not view education as brainwashing or socialization with regards to development of a democratic society, but a “teaching of skills and establishing models of civic conduct based on tolerance, deliberation, conflict resolution, give-and-take, and trust.”³⁷ Such views are fairly common among modernization scholars and promote the notion of funding education to bring stability in societies.

The *World Development Report 2007* found that young people have the right to the knowledge and skills to become productive workers, parents, and responsible citizens.³⁸ This begins early in schools, which will mean a better citizen for society later on, especially with the rise of globalization and modernization throughout the world. However, education is not enough when there is no benefit for youths who participate in them. It is the responsibility of the government to develop a system of education that

³⁴ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 116.

³⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1st Touchstone ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 85–86.

³⁶ Ibid., 320.

³⁷ Peters, *Education, Globalization, and the State in the Age of Terrorism*, 170–171.

³⁸ *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation* (Washington, D.C; Oxford: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2006), 68.

gives the life skills and abilities to become productive members of their respective societies in this developing world. In other words, education systems have to be developed in the context of the regional economies.³⁹

Todd Schmidt supports that notion by stating:

The U.S. needs to undertake a major effort to reorient the madrasa system so that education in the Muslim world focuses less on reproducing repressive religious ideologies and more on teaching skills needed to develop and globalize their economies; think critically and act independently and exercise freedom of initiative.”⁴⁰ He also targets educating parents by proposing more literacy programs for Muslim parents.⁴¹ He concludes that, “Imams continue to man the front line, protecting and defending their faith; To the extent that we can help them realize that the most enlightened way to do so is through liberal, secular education, the better off we will be.”⁴²

The Saudi Program,⁴³ Turkish schools in Pakistan, and The Enlightenment Program in Iraq show that there has been some progress in combating terrorism. Sabrina Tavernise depicted how Turkish Schools in Pakistan made progress in changing the educational outlook for children in poor neighborhoods vis-à-vis radical Islamic teachings in madrasas by prescribing to a strong western curriculum.⁴⁴ Their belief is that it is an alternate approach that could help reduce the influence of Islamic extremists.⁴⁵

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, poverty and lack of quality education is a focal point for many in the international community. In Afghanistan, where over 90% of the world’s

³⁹ *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation* (Washington, D.C; Oxford: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2006)

⁴⁰ Todd Schmidt, “Reforming the Madrasah: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism,” *Military Review* 88, no. 3 (May/June 2008), 29.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴³ “International: Terrorists can be Rehabilitated,” *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service* (January 20, 2010), 1.

⁴⁴ Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkish Schools Offer Pakistan a Gentler Islam,” *New York Times* May 4, 2008, 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

heroin is grown and \$3 billion is pumped into the Afghan economy by its sales, the Taliban have destroyed schools, killed teachers and students, as well as targeted females to suppress the goal of empowerment for Muslim women.⁴⁶ In the past four decades, Pakistan received more aid than any country except India, Egypt, and Israel.⁴⁷ However, the country's infant mortality and female and secondary enrollment are the worst in the world; half of the Pakistani children are functionally illiterate.⁴⁸ Many blame the current situation on the government. However, the rise of the madrasa education is not the cause but a result of these social problems that the country currently faces.

Free room and board in modern cities and towns lures poor parents towards madrasa education. But, they do not realize that some of them teach extremist ideology, which targets Islamic youths to carry out their Jihadist operations.⁴⁹ However, do increasing secular schools solve the problem when there is no political will to change the overall environment where there is a shortage of jobs, as well as political views that sponsor extremism? Academic exiles from Afghanistan seeking a better life in Pakistan often end up in worse conditions and often seek asylum from western countries.⁵⁰

The inability of the state to accommodate its educated is not unique to the region, and therefore not an Islamic issue. A comparative case study of Sri Lanka will highlight how secular education did not solve the resource problem confronted by the new state in the post-colonial period, but created a hyper-competitive environment that highlighted the country's ethnic divisions leading to prolonged civil war. Several political and economic factors contributed to the conflict in Sri Lanka, as is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the problems are by no means limited to domestic lack of education

⁴⁶ Ahmed Rashid, "Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning?" *Current History* 106, no. 696 (January 2007): 17.

⁴⁷ Paul Blustein, "In Pakistan's Squalor, Cradles of Terrorism; Village Illustrates Challenge as U.N. Prepares to Address Poverty as Root Cause," *The Washington Post* March 14, 2002.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Rageh Omaar and Shiraz Maher, "Battle for Pakistan's Soul," *New Statesman* 136, no. 4853 (July 16, 2007): 32.

⁵⁰ Steve Le Vine, "For Afghanistan's Academic Exiles, Moving to Pakistan Offers Little Relief as Rebels Create Atmosphere of Fear," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 37, no. 6 (October 10, 1990): 43.

in rural areas. Sri Lanka has one of the higher rates of literacy in the South Asia Region; education policy has been a focal point of the conflict. Sri Lanka's civil war highlights points made by several scholars regarding the role the elite play in competing for resources. The role of the elite in the conflict is pointed out by several authors using comparative analysis.

Russell and Miller profiled 350 terrorists from eighteen Middle Eastern, Latin American, Western European, and Japanese countries in order to study whether universities provided a recruiting base for future terrorists.⁵¹ They discovered that two-thirds of those individuals came from upper middle class backgrounds, had parents who were professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers), and had a university background.⁵² Marc Sageman's famous study examines the educational background of 137 terrorist's.⁵³ With regards to the belief that a majority who went to religious schools, only 17% of his cases went to Islamic schools and the rest were educated in secular schools.⁵⁴ He identified that over 60% of those terrorists had at least some college education, which made them more educated than the average person worldwide and especially more educated than the majority of those in the third world.⁵⁵ His data on the Salafi Mujahidin refuted the widespread belief that terrorism is a result of poverty and lack of education.⁵⁶

Pape conducted a similar survey of 232 total Arab suicide attackers associated with Lebanon, Palestine, and al-Qaeda from 1980 to 2003.⁵⁷ His findings were that Arab suicide attackers were much better educated than the conventional profile would suggest.⁵⁸ He also noted that 54% had some post-secondary education, compared with

⁵¹ Bowman H. Miller and Charles A. Russell, "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 1 (1977): 17–34.

⁵² Ibid., 25–27.

⁵³ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 74–77.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 74.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 75.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 76.

⁵⁷ Robert Anthony Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2005), 213–216.

⁵⁸ Pape, *Dying to Win*, 213.

only a small fraction of their societies.⁵⁹ Seventy-six percent had working-class or middle-class jobs, which refuted the assumption that the majority of suicide bombers were uneducated or poor.⁶⁰ He concluded that suicide bombers are not mainly poor, uneducated, and religious zealots, but well-educated individuals who are politically conscious who might join a movement more likely than wayward adolescents or religious fanatics.⁶¹

Dr. Thomas Strentz of the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit profiled right-wing terrorist leaders and followers, which are almost identical to Sageman's sample. He identified a right-wing terrorist leader as college educated, thirty-five to fifty years old, urban and sophisticated, literate, highly verbal, well-trained and perfectionist, and politically active.⁶² For the follower, the characteristics included: limited formal education, 20- to 50-plus years old, unsophisticated, not verbal, untrained with poor work skills, and politically naïve.⁶³

With regards to poverty, Salil Tripathi stated, "There are many good reasons to eliminate poverty; but we should not expect terrorism to decline as a result."⁶⁴ Tripathi's analysis of Hezbollah recruits showed that a majority lived above the poverty line and had a higher education.⁶⁵ Claude Berribe's study among the Palestinians found no link between poverty and education associated with terrorism.⁶⁶ Harowitz's article, "You Might Be a Terrorist If...", agreed with the NYPD's 9/11 report that concluded that "There is no useful profile that one can use to spot a terrorist, because they come from

⁵⁹ Pape, *Dying to Win*, 213.

⁶⁰ Pape, *Dying to Win*, 214.

⁶¹ Ibid., 216.

⁶² Mike German, *Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent* (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2007) 52.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Salil Tripathi, "Don't Blame the Poor," *New Statesman* 136, no. 4853 (July 16, 2007): 52.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Claude Berrebi, "Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians," *SSRN Working Paper Series* (March 2005).

varied backgrounds.”⁶⁷ Scott Atran’s article, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” states that, “Suicide terrorists generally are not lacking in legitimate life opportunities relative to their general population.”⁶⁸

After conducting their own extensive research on terrorism, Kruger and Maleckova concluded that terrorism is a political and not an economic phenomenon.⁶⁹ One of their findings were that a lack of civil liberties is associated with higher participation in terrorism and that low income has no direct connection.⁷⁰ They state: “our review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully reduce international terrorism.”⁷¹ Another conclusion was that, “well educated, middle or upper class individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are impoverished illiterates because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be successful.”⁷²

Austin Turk, author of “Sociology of Terrorism,” stated that terrorist acts are political and rarely involve psychopathology or material deprivation.⁷³ He finds that terrorism is associated with relative affluence and social advantage rather than poverty, lack of education or other deprivation.⁷⁴ The typical terrorist in his view comes from well-civilized and elite parts of the world, motivated by political-ideological resentments rather than economic distress.⁷⁵ He also finds that the more educated and affluent their backgrounds, the more impatient they are with disappointments of political life.⁷⁶ With

⁶⁷ Sherry Harowitz, “You might be a Terrorist if,” *Security Management* 51, no. 10 (October 2007): 14.

⁶⁸ Atran, *Genesis of Suicide Terrorism*, 1534–1536.

⁶⁹ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 142.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 141.

⁷¹ Ibid., 142.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004): 273.

⁷⁴ Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism.”

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” 278.

regards to education he cautions that, “education, training, socialization (deliberate or not), may encourage the development of a self-concept as one who must fight against the threat to us.”⁷⁷

Robert J. Barro, professor of economics at Harvard University and senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, theorized that the poorest, least-educated persons make relatively ineffective terrorists. It is also likely that some forms of education, such as those practiced in the West Bank, Gaza, and other parts of the Middle East, tend to promote terrorism. He also stated that “it is naive to think that increases in income and education will, by themselves, lower international terrorism.”⁷⁸

Education appears to increase dissatisfaction and awareness about one condition. According to Sumit Ganguly, his *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*, Kashmiris with more access to education became more aware of the lack of free exercise of adult franchise in Kashmir compared to all other parts of India leading to their political mobilization. He concluded that as the literacy rates went up, individuals had a better comprehension of the social and political forces that affected their lives, which meant an increased awareness of politics at local, national, and international levels. This, as well as other factors, led to the insurgency in Kashmir. In short, Ganguly proved that as the Kashmiri’s gained more access to education, it made them smarter and bolder against their oppressors.⁷⁹

Interestingly, although a step away from terrorism, Paulo Freire who has argued for a major shift in political systems, encouraged revolution through education, challenging the modernization notion that education leads to acceptance of the system.

⁷⁷ Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” 280.

⁷⁸ Robert J. Barro, “The Myth that Poverty Breeds Terrorism,” *Business Week*, no. 3786 (June 10, 2002): 26.

⁷⁹ Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 31-33.

His main arguments lies in how education provided the foundation of mobilization that empowered individuals in their struggle against oppressive governments.⁸⁰ One of his conclusions was:

Education for freedom implies constantly, permanently, the exercise of consciousness turning in on itself in order to discover itself in the relationships with the world, trying to explain the reasons which can make clear the concrete situation people have in the world.⁸¹

The above counterarguments prove that education without shifts in the political and economic context will not prevent terrorism. There are several other factors (marginalization, racism, religious oppression, etc.) that can contribute to ones choosing to participate in terrorist activities.⁸² In the end, it is that individual's decision, not educational background that will determine if they will either live in peace or turn to terrorist activities.

D. METHOD

This thesis will use a historical study of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and eleven terrorist profiles of educated individuals as a counterexample to the theory education reduces conflict and terrorism. For Sri Lanka, it was not the lack of education that caused its bloody civil war, but a sense of marginalization among the Tamils due to, a language movement by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and Buddhist extremists who sought to reduce educational opportunities for the Tamil Minority that were better educated than the Sinhala under the British. The LTTE, founded by educated Tamils, became the most noted and feared terrorist organization in South Asia.

The eleven terrorist events spanned different times and locations. All the individuals involved had different agendas, goals and beliefs associated with their causes.

⁸⁰ Myles Horton et al., *We make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 117.

⁸¹ Robert Mackie, *Literacy and Revolution, the Pedagogy of Paulo Freire* (New York: Continuum, 1981), 59.

⁸² Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, "Some Roots of Terrorism," *Population and Environment* 24, no. 2 (November 2002): 183–192.

But one characteristic remained constant for all these events: the perpetrators as well as the masterminds involved came from educated backgrounds. This will erase the Western idea of how terrorists are poor, uneducated, and displaced persons from some Third World country.

The last chapter will show that although the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan, the people of the country still lacks access to basic needs, such as clean water, health care, food, and most of all the ability to have a steady income due to lack of jobs. The U.S. can boast that literacy rates are improving and education opportunities are expanding to females for empowerment in their society. However, unless there is a way to have the basic necessities provided to the majority of a population that is ranked one of the poorest in the world, education improvements will neither sustain nor improve the economic and social condition of Afghanistan. The last chapter will be followed by the conclusion. The final result desired in this thesis is to provide historical (and current) proof that modernization through education alone is not the answer to terrorist prevention.

II. SRI LANKA’S INDEPENDENCE, NATIONAL MOVEMENTS, THE LTTE, AND EDUCATION SYSTEM

This chapter provides a historical background on the post-colonial development of Sinhalese nationalism, which involved a language movement and a demand of preference in educational institutions. This movement produced Buddhist-led violence toward Tamils in Sri Lanka that led to Tamil marginalization, and finally a bloody civil war. The Tamils were a well-educated community, leading some of the Sinhalese to believe that the Tamil minority was favored by the British colonial phase. They sought to “return” the Buddhist Sinhalese to the prominent position which they felt it ought to reflect since they were the majority. This belief led to racism, and violence towards the Tamil minority that brought this country to a three decade long civil war and currently, presents a unresolved situation with thousands dead on both sides. Ironically, education policy became the point of contention along with language in this conflict. It was not the lack of education, but the distribution of education and employment related to it in the face of low development in other sectors. The rural Buddhist majority felt deprived when it came to the largest growing sector, the state bureaucracy and non-rural industrial sector.

A. THE END OF THE LTTE?

The year 2009 marked the end of the Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE. Its leader and founder, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed along with most of the organization’s command structure. In twenty-six years, the LTTE sustained the longest running suicide campaigns to date with thousands of casualties (both civilian and military). With a force of about 20,000 (at its highest) members, it waged havoc on Sri Lankan forces that were far more advanced and had more manpower. Although the

LTTE's forces, Air Tigers, and Sea Tigers, were the basis of their conventional forces, its strategic use of suicide bombings by their Black Tigers were the most effective in prolonging the civil war in Sri Lanka.⁸³

Although the LTTE was defeated, the Sinhalese government must still have to deal with thousands of displaced Tamils from the war, as well as answer to the United Nations (U.N.) and international community for human rights violations as well as accusations of ethnic cleansing. Currently, the Sinhalese government refuses to allow any U.N. or international organizations to investigate wrongdoing by the Sinhalese government or its security forces towards the Tamil population by what Rohan Gunaratna calls their campaign against the Tamil Tigers as a "humanitarian mission."⁸⁴ In order to understand the ethnic conflict and continued displacement and marginalization of the ethnic Tamils by the Sinhalese, an explanation of the roots of the Sinhalese resentment towards the Tamils is required. Once Great Britain gave independence to Sri Lanka in 1948, national and religious movements driven by Buddhist extremists led to racism, marginalization, and ethnic violence against the Tamils. These actions also led to the rise of the LTTE and the bloodiest civil war in South Asia.

B. THE SINHALESE VIEW OF POST-COLONIZATION

From the Sinhalese perspective, history is about a struggle to protect their ancient heritage. They viewed themselves as a Buddhist minority vastly outnumbered by Hindus of India, especially by the Dravidian masses of South India who are the closest proximity. The migration of Tamils into their lands for over a thousand years, including the several thousand Tamils who were brought in to Sri Lanka by the British to work in the tea estates provided the foundation of Sinhalese insecurities towards their bordering neighbors. During colonization, the Sinhalese endured second class citizenship to the British while other minorities, primarily the Tamils, gained economic and social

⁸³ Robert Anthony Pape, James K. Feldman and Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and how to Stop it* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 284.

⁸⁴ Jon Lee Anderson, "Death of the Tiger," *The New Yorker* 86, no. 44 (January 17, 2011), 53.

mobility.⁸⁵ While some western educated Sinhala did do well in Sri Lanka, many of them converted to Christianity adding to the sense of threat of being undermined.

For the Tamils, British rule meant benefits that included more education, which led to more civil-service jobs, university enrollment, and trade with the British. The Sinhalese witnessed the gains made by the Tamil minority with the belief that the Tamil's were threatening the Sinhalese way of life. Sinhalese fears came to an end when the British gave independence to Sri Lanka. Once independent of British rule, the Sinhalese began the process of creating a state that reflected and favored the majority. For the Tamils this meant marginalization by the Sinhalese government, that was led by a Buddhist movement.⁸⁶

Once independence was achieved in 1948, Buddhist extremists hoped to fulfill their mission of Sinhalese dominance. Once in power, secular minded Sinhalese felt compelled to show some consideration to the Tamil minority. However, Buddhist extremists did not approve those concessions, which led to hostility between the Sinhalese and Tamils. The memories of being second-class citizens during British rule played themselves out among the predominately Sinhalese population, leading to marginalizing of the Tamil population as symbols of obstacles to the formation of the Sinhalese nation-state.⁸⁷

C. BUDDHIST EXTREMISM, SINHALESE LANGUAGE MOVEMENT, AND TAMIL MARGINALIZATION

For the extremists, they believe that they are defending the last space for Buddhism in South Asia which was its birthplace. They view the Aryan Sinhalese people, defined by its language as the "lion race" imperiled by the Dravidian menace of Tamils). In addition, they also fear the loss of Buddhism by the overwhelming Hindu majority in India which is not too far away. They continue to express their concerns

⁸⁵Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Vol. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994), 773.

⁸⁶ Anderson, "Death of the Tiger," 44.

⁸⁷ Marty and Appleby, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, 773.

about the dangers they face as a minority within the South Asian region at the price of intolerance to the Tamil minority. Such insecurities evolved into a belief that only Buddhism can hold Sri Lanka together and preserve it as a nation.⁸⁸

The Buddhist extremist platform continues to influence Sri Lankan politics today, regardless of the defeat of the LTTE. First, they continue to justify their actions and beliefs based on the Sinhalese history of struggle, and the goal of a Sinhalese-only state of Sri Lanka. Second, Sinhalese monks, and the bikkus, use their positions as ritual leaders, in which followers cannot express dissent which validates influence of Buddhist monks in Sri Lankan politics. Third, politicians are continuously manipulated by extremist's sentiments in order to advance their own short term interests. Fourth, the two-party systems (SLFP and SNP) in 1956 only sustained Sinhalese Buddhist extremism due to their involvement in elections in which they would side with the one party who would benefit their beliefs.⁸⁹

D. BUDDHIST REVIVAL

The movement or “revival” of Buddhism began in the 1950s. This is important to remember because this was a precursor to the language movement, which in turn led to the marginalization and violence against the Tamils and future civil war with the LTTE. During this time, Buddhists made their presence known by ensuring that the Sinhalese majority supported their ideology. The following is the evolution of that movement, which led to a civil war with the Tamil minority.

1. Buddhist Theosophical Society in 1880 (Led by William Steel Olcott)

This society led by Olcott established a code of conduct for the emergent middle class and business interests that would soon make a significant contribution to Buddhist society after independence. One major focus was to revive past glories of Sinhalese civilization in order to find a nationalist identity and self-respect in the face of humiliations and disabilities suffered under the British rule and Christian missionary

⁸⁸Marty and Appleby, *Accounting for Fundamentalisms*, 775.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 776–777.

influence.⁹⁰ Although Olcott was one of the catalysts in reviving Buddhism, the man responsible for influencing radical change in Sri Lanka was Angagarika Dharmapala, who became the founder of the political Buddhist movement.

Dharmapala is called the father of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Although educated in Christian schools, he converted to Buddhism in his mid-twenties. He developed a hostile attitude towards anything non-Sinhalese and blamed the British for introducing alcohol and opium to the Sinhalese while claiming that no nation in the world had a brilliant history as that mirrored among Sinhalese Buddhists and sought to revive it in Sri Lanka. These attitudes were then directed towards the minorities of Sri Lanka who were educated and possessed advantages that the British did not afford to the Sinhalese. His influence would later spurn Buddhist monks and the bikkhus to step outside the monasteries to spurn the Sinhalese majority to follow Dharmapala's ideology.⁹¹

2. General Election of 1947 (Emergence of the “Political Monk” in Sri Lanka)

This election led to the growth of Marxist-oriented Buddhist monks that came in support of leftist parties, which were dedicated to secular politics. Labeled “The Vidyalkara Group,” they fanned fires of future ethnic and religious violence from 1956-1968 towards the Tamils. Following the writings of Walpola Rahula and K. Pannasara, they formed the Lanka Eksath Bhikkhu Mandalaya (LEBM) (Ceylon Union of Bhikkhus). However, it was the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike that spurned to the language movement that ultimately led to future conflict with the Tamil's and the formation of the LTTE.⁹²

⁹⁰ Martin E. Marty, R. Scott Appleby and American Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 590.

⁹¹ Neil DeVotta, “Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka,” (2007), 14–15.

⁹² Marty et al., *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 592–593.

3. 1956 Elections and the Beginning of Tamil Oppression

The year 1956 began a push to restore Buddhism to its pre-colonial status as well as the beginning of the marginalization of the Tamils. The year 1956 was the beginning of Sinhalese as its national identity and mother tongue for education and national culture. The All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress demanded that the government should protect and maintain Buddhism and Buddhist institutions. This demand led to the infamous report titled, *The Betrayal of Buddhism*, which attacked Christian education in schools (which many Tamils were enrolled in) as well as the secular party, and UNP's lukewarm attitude toward Buddhist restoration.⁹³

Bandaranaike's platform of "Sinhala Only" was focused on reminding the Sinhalese people of British colonization and their favoritism towards the Tamil population that led to their underrepresentation in civil service jobs, universities, armed forces, and other professions. It also reminded them of Tamil immigrants who came in with the British to run the tea estates. This movement against the UNP produced another major political party, the SLFP which then created a competing two party system, where the main tactics whose tactics involved ethnic outbidding and providing the needs of their ethnic kin at the expense of the minorities. This meant that the ethnic minorities had no real political influence and were at the mercy of the Sinhalese majority who had the Buddhist clergy on their side no matter which party was in power.⁹⁴ Hence, began the process of minority marginalization in the early phases of the post-colonial phase.

Following UNP's loss in the 1956 elections to Bandaranaike of the SLFP, linguistic nationalism and educational opportunities became the main theme that candidates would use to bolster support from the Sinhalese majority in the following elections. With Sinhalese leaders focused on Sinhalese-only policies, the Tamils were then forced to counter these policies with their own idea of nationalism against Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. Knowing that the Tamil population was beginning to lose faith in the present government and push for Tamil independence, Bandaranaike tried to

⁹³ Marty et al., *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 595.

⁹⁴ DeVotta, *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology*, 17.

accommodate the Tamils when he became prime minister rather than face a civil war. However, Buddhist monks led protests and hunger strikes against any Tamil concessions. This led to a major shift in the educational and government employment policy as university and civil service exams were conducted in Sinhala only, quota systems to benefit Sinhala students for universities were created and Sinhalese-language court systems in Tamil areas. This led to low Tamil representation in government service forming a building block for radicalization of the Tamils. The 1956 election therefore began Sri Lanka's transformation from a liberal democracy to an illiberal ethnocracy.⁹⁵

Once Sinhala became the official language of Sri Lanka, it limited the Tamil population's access to colleges, public service jobs, and government positions. Prior to this, the Tamils were the dominant ethnic group in colleges and universities. Even with attempts by the government to provide support to Tamils, The United Front of Monks protested the inclusion of a clause from the government permitting individuals who had been educated in English or Tamil to take public examinations in that language until 1967. This led to the first of many demonstrations by Tamils, and also led to violent clashes with the Sinhalese population.⁹⁶

4. 1958

The year 1958 marked the implementation of teacher training for Sinhalese-only and creating scholarships based on six-to-one ratio favoring the Sinhalese. These numbers reflected the population breakdown. However, due to Tamil protests, Badaranaiké was compelled to make some concessions to the Tamils by recognizing Tamil as a minority language in Northern and Eastern provinces, as well as control over local affairs through devolution of powers. However, the United Front and Sri Lanka Maha Sangha Sabha (SLMSS) protested against surrender to Tamil demands. Such concessions towards the Tamils began the bipolar oscillation in the politics of the

⁹⁵ DeVotta, *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology*, 19.

⁹⁶ Marty et al., *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 598.

Sinhalese majority. While Sinhalese politicians were being forced to acquiesce to Buddhist demands, more ethnic violence would occur during this time with Tamils being the victim of racial prejudice and violence.⁹⁷

5. 1960s

As the UNP SLFP grew closer ideologically, the government developed a bipolar division within its institutions that continued to rage against a Tamil minority which was either viewed as “an enemy or ally.” Monks of all sects, temples, and status leaned toward a spectrum of parallel support for both parties. The 1965 and 1970 elections focused on Buddhist social welfare issues and a centralization of the school system. This led to Buddhist organizations running private schools using Sinhalese as the primary language of instruction.⁹⁸ With regards to civil service jobs, 41% of civil servants were Tamil in 1941. By 1963, only 7% were Tamil, which could only be blamed on the Sinhala Only Act of 1956.⁹⁹

6. 1970s

In 1972, the Sinhalese government adopted a new constitution that made Buddhism the primary religion which was obviously favored and, most of all, protected by the state. The Tamil Hindu minority immediately believed this to be a threat to their religious autonomy. This action was viewed as a path to separatism by identifying one people (Sinhala) and one religion (Buddhism). At the same time, the Sinhalese government encouraged Sinhalese settlement in Tamil areas to weaken local Tamil majorities. These practices of discrimination to ensure that there would be no threat to the power structure in Sri Lanka only made it easier for the Tamils to begin their rise to militancy.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Marty et al., *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 598–599.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 600–604.

⁹⁹ Pape et al., *Cutting the Fuse*, 289.

¹⁰⁰ Pape et al. *Cutting the Fuse*. 289–290.

In January 1974, nine Tamils were killed during the fourth International Tamil Conference. None of the killers were held accountable by the government. Tamil mobilization in 1976 led to further strikes and boycotts towards the Sinhalese dominated government. The Tamil elite claimed that the Sinhalese government deprived them of territory, language, citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment, and education. The radical Tamil's began the movement to establish "The free, sovereign, secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination inherent in every nation."¹⁰¹

Although the LTTE was to be the face of Tamil revolution, it was Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) that began the movement for equality and access to universities and jobs that were being taken away from them by their Sinhalese counterparts. In 1976, the TULF was the first to demand a separate state of Tamil Eelam. Besides citing an array of grievances for justification of a separate state, they cited political-economic disenfranchisement, intentional altering of demographics in Tamil-dominated areas, restriction to higher education and governmental jobs, and most alarming, ethnic cleansing. Although the TULF was the first to make their demands on the Sinhalese government (which was ignored), it was the LTTE that would make their presence known to the Sinhalese government and Tamil population.¹⁰²

7. 1980s

One of the breaking points that led to the civil war was the burning of the Jaffna Municipal Library with 100,000 ancient and rare Tamil documents in 1981. No one was held accountable from the Sinhalese. Another was the 1983 riots (from the first LTTE actions), in which the Sinhalese government allowed heinous atrocities towards innocent Tamil's, who had no connection to the LTTE. During this time period, atrocities toward

¹⁰¹ Brown and Ganguly, *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia*, 132–133.

¹⁰² Pape et al., *Cutting the Fuse*, 290.

the Tamil population worsened due to the actions of the LTTE. In reality, the government needed to inflict damage towards someone since they could not easily defeat the LTTE.¹⁰³

As riots in Colombo were directed at Tamils in retribution for terrorist attacks by LTTE, many believed that monks incited crowds to exact revenge against Tamils. For the LTTE, these actions validated Sinhalese oppression; for the Sinhalese, these actions against the Tamils were meant to regalanize Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. As the Tamil Tigers targeted Buddhist temples and monks, Sinhalese civilians began to support the war against the Tamil separation and began protesting any tendency on the UNP to negotiate peace negotiations with Tamil insurgents. The first Peace Accord of 1987 acknowledged Sri Lanka as a multiethnic and multilingual plural society. However, the SLFP, MEP, and JVP decided to go against UNPs proposal, which led to the breakdown of talks between Tamil Tigers and Sinhala parties due to ambiguity and suspicion of interference from India.¹⁰⁴

8. 1990s

During the 1990s, Sri Lanka witnessed a continued growth of political activism by Buddhist monks. As the war between government forces and the LTTE raged on, Buddhist monks became more involved with the Sinhalese government. Their protests against the LTTE (as well as the Tamil minority) in favor of Sinhalese rights and a pure Sinhalese state put the Buddhist monk community in a different light with regards to Sri Lankan politics. Even with the possibility of a peace agreement with the LTTE and possible concessions with the Tamil population, Buddhist monks refused to back down on their demands of a pure Sinhalese nation with no regard to innocent Tamils who were either displaced or killed in the civil war. However, it wasn't until 2000 and beyond that the Sinhalese government witnessed the extent of Buddhist extremism.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Brown and Ganguly, *Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia*, 135-136.

¹⁰⁴ Marty et al., *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 606-610.

¹⁰⁵ Philip Broadhead and Damien Keown, *Can Faiths make Peace? : Holy Wars and the Resolution of Religious Conflicts* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 140.

9. 2000 and Beyond

The year 2000 began with Buddhist monks showing their political activism by staging a “fasting until death” in opposition to the Seventeenth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. The monks were loosely affiliated with the Sinhala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage) and other nationalist groups in Sri Lanka. The amendment was a reform package, which meant devolution of power from the central government to provincial administration (which would favor many minorities). However, the fasting and pressure from Buddhist monks made the Sinhalese government cave in to their demands.¹⁰⁶

In May 2000, monks urged the government to spurn negotiations with the Tamil Tigers and crush them with military force with the belief that the Buddhist religion and the Sinhala race were under siege from barbaric hordes. Many blamed Sri Lankan politicians for the military defeats. They believed that Sri Lanka's main political parties have given up too much to the Tamil minority and that it was their corruption and venality that brought the country to its current bloody impasse.¹⁰⁷

In August 2004, with the debate in Sri Lanka over the right of the Buddhist clergy to enter politics, a new controversy was created by a group of Buddhist monk-MPs who proposed laws to ban religious conversions. One of the main planks of the nine Buddhist monk-MPs representing the National Heritage Party (JHU) attempted to stop what they called widespread conversion of Buddhists by fundamentalist Christians. The JHU stated that they were forced into politics due to the inability of politicians to tackle the serious erosion of cultural values precipitated by a liberalized economy, rising corruption, sexual violence in society, and unethical conversions of Buddhists.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶Philip Broadhead and Damien Keown, *Can Faiths make Peace: Holy Wars and the Resolution of Religious Conflicts* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 140–141.

¹⁰⁷Dexter Filkins, “Monks Become New Line of Offense Against Rebels; Sri Lanka: Buddhist Clergy Urge Government to Spurn Negotiations with Tamil Tigers and Crush them Militarily,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 15, 2000.

¹⁰⁸Feizal Samath, “Sri Lanka: Monk Legislators Fight Religious Conversions,” *Global Information Network* (August 4, 2004), 1.

In June 2005, the deputy leader of the JHU, who was also parliamentarian monk, along with Dhambra Amila, JVP member and president of the National Sagha front, fasted to death in protest of the post Tsunami aid sharing with the Tamil Tigers.¹⁰⁹ In November 2005, Sinhala Buddhist monks aligned behind Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse during the presidential elections. Rajapakse had entered into an alliance with the Jathika Hela Urumaya, or National Heritage Party (JHU), led by Buddhist monks. The proselytizing Christian evangelists and the activities of aid and welfare agencies among poor Buddhist communities alarmed Buddhist monks which led to them entering parliament on JHU tickets.¹¹⁰

In 2007, the government, with the monks' support, was pressing a military campaign against Tamil rebels, scoring a string of victories, particularly on the contested and strategic eastern coast. Venerable Athuraliye Rathana (whose party in Parliament held nine seats) stated, "We have been not just preaching. We have been fighting." Asked about the involvement of Buddhist clerics in affairs of the state, he stated, "Is politics polluted? Was Mao Zedong polluted?...Was Mahatma Gandhi polluted?"¹¹¹

From the earliest Buddhist revival led by Olcott, The Sinhala Only Act by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the continued rise of Buddhist monks in Sinhala politics, all of these actions led to the breakdown of a peaceful coexistence between the Sinhalese and Tamil population. Those actions were galvanized by a Buddhist clergy who used their religious position among the Sinhalese majority to influence Sri Lankan politics. What they saw as a way to promote Sinhalese nationalism masked their true intent: to marginalize and control the Tamil minority by eliminating their chance of upward mobility in Sri Lanka. These actions only created hostility as well as revolutionary groups, most notably the LTTE.

¹⁰⁹ Broadhead and Keown, *Can Faiths make Peace?*, 147–148.

¹¹⁰ "Politics: Buddhist Monks Work to Sway Sri Lankan Election," *Global Information Network* (September 23, 2005), 1.

¹¹¹ Somini Sengupta, "Sri Lankan Government Finds Ally in Buddhist Monks," *New York Times*, February 25, 2007.

E. THE LTTE

Originally named the Tamil New Tigers in 1972, the LTTE was founded by Velupilli Prabhakaran in 1976. His first act of terrorism was assassinating a pro-government mayor in Jaffna (informal Tamil capital) in 1975.¹¹² This new organization was to become the principal military organization which dedicated itself to creating an independent Tamil Eelam. What the Sinhalese did not realize was the extent to which audacity and fanaticism for independence that this group would inflict on the country for almost thirty years.¹¹³

Unlike their Sinhalese counterparts, the LTTE has no secular agenda. Their primary goal is to establish an independent state in the northern and eastern region of Sri Lanka, Tamil Eelam. Although not religious in their mission, they do adhere to four “Thimpu Principles” (or cardinal rules) that were submitted to the Sri Lankan government in 1985. The four rules include recognition of:

1. Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.
2. An indentified Tamil homeland and the guarantee of its territorial integrity.
3. The inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil people.
4. The right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.¹¹⁴

The year 1983 marked the first violent actions of the LTTE in which they assaulted an Army camp that killed thirteen soldiers. Once this action concluded, the Sinhalese government realized that the LTTE was a legitimate threat. Not only did their violent actions target the Sinhalese forces, but politicians, police, and Tamils that were considered collaborators. Once word was passed of the attack on the Sinhalese compound, anti-Tamil riots broke out in the countryside in which hundreds of Tamils were killed, and hundreds of homes and business were destroyed. The passing of the

¹¹² Anderson, “Death of the Tiger,” 45.

¹¹³ Pape et al, *Cutting the Fuse*, 286.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 291–292.

Prevention of Terrorism Act by the Sinhalese government to suppress terrorist acts by the Tamil Tigers did not prevent numerous atrocities against Tamil civilians.¹¹⁵

At one time there were as many as thirty-seven militant Tamil groups in Sri Lanka. By 1983, the LTTE grew from fifty to over three-thousand active guerilla fighters. Like any other group, the LTTE had rivals such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF). However, by 1986 the LTTE eliminated any rival group by killing leadership as well as militants supporting their groups cause to establish their role as the dominant Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka. 1986 also marked the beginning of LTTE's most potent weapon against the Sinhalese: suicide terrorism.¹¹⁶

As previously mentioned, the LTTE began as a conventional military organization. However, the LTTE became more effective in their war against the Sinhalese with suicide attacks. Although the LTTE were inspired (and trained) by the Hezbollah, they would develop their own system of planning and execution of their suicide bombing operations that would even inspire groups like Al Qaeda in carrying out similar suicide attacks. Suicide bombings, as well as political assassinations, were carried out by the "Black Tigers" which used suicide belts, boats (Sea Tigers), Planes (Air Tigers), and vehicles (scooters as well).¹¹⁷ Table 1 shows the number of suicide bombings during the Eelam Wars and the casualties associated with them.

¹¹⁵ Pape et al., *Cutting the Fuse*, 290.

¹¹⁶ Pape et al., *Cutting the Fuse*, 290–291.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 308–310.

Period	Key Events	Attacks	Killed
Eelam War I, 1983-87	Sri Lankan Offensive to take Jaffna halted by pressure from India, IPKF occupies northern province (1987)	1	40
Indian Intervention, 1987-90	Civil war suspended, LTTE fights war with IPKF	0	0
Eelam War II, 1990-94	IPKF withdraws (1990), renewed fighting between LTTE and Sri Lanka ends in stalemate	15	402
Eelam War III, 1995-2001	Sri Lanka takes Jaffna (1995), fails to secure overland supply route	62	722
Cease fire agreement 2002-2005	Norway brokers peace deal leading to cease fire agreement (2002), LTTE splits (2004)	1	5
Eelam War IV, 2006-2009	Sri Lankan Forces take Eastern Province (2008), central Northern Province (2008), defeats LTTE (2009)	37	474

Table 1. LTTE Suicide Attacks in the Context of the Sri Lankan War¹¹⁸

Table 1 only explains the suicide operations that were conducted during the Eelam Wars in Sri Lanka. However, it does not cover the total loss of life from terrorist operations that the LTTE conducted against the Sinhalese Security Forces. Table 2 illustrates the casualty figures during the past ten years.

¹¹⁸ Pape et al., *Cutting the Fuse*, 295.

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
2000*	162	784	2,845	3,791
2001	89	412	1,321	1,822
2002	14	1	0	15
2003	31	2	26	59
2004	33	7	69	109
2005	153	90	87	330
2006	981	826	2,319	4,126
2007	525	499	3,333	4,357
2008	439	1,286	9,536	11,261
2009	11,111	1,315	3,139	15,565
2010	0	0	0	0
2011**	0	0	0	0
Total	13,538	5,222	22,675	41,435

*Data since March 14, 2000

**Data till February 13, 2011

Table 2. Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka Since March 2000¹¹⁹

On January 10, 2008, the FBI reported that “The LTTE is one of the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be concerned about other organizations they inspired including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.”¹²⁰ The LTTE was also the first to use women, as well as children, in their suicide bombing operations. The LTTE women were called “Birds of Freedom” and carried out 30-percent of their suicide bombing attacks during 1987–2000.¹²¹ Children were also recruited heavily in

¹¹⁹ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Sri Lanka Assessment 2010,” <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/index.html> (accessed September 3, 2010).

¹²⁰ South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”

¹²¹ Anat Berko, *The Path to Paradise*, 113.

orphanages by having shrines of martyrs set up where they could see them daily in order to entice them into joining LTTE suicide operations.¹²²

The LTTE infiltrated the education system by gaining access to schools in order to recruit students who were more than willing to participate in conventional and suicide operations. LTTE members would take over classes to indoctrinate children into their ideology which lead to new membership.¹²³ “Vani” joined the LTTE when he was 13. Although his family was unhappy with his decision, the LTTE not only educated him in understanding Tamil history, but he was trained by the LTTE as a computer programmer, whose mission was to translate books and literature from other languages into Tamil.¹²⁴ This example challenges the theory that secular education would deter individuals from committing or being involved in terrorist activities. Innocent Tamils were being subjected to numerous atrocities by government forces, including the raping of women, systematic executions of Tamil males, and burning of Tamil villages. These actions not only galvanized support and recruits for the LTTE, but gained international attention for human rights violations by the Sinhalese.¹²⁵

With regards to recruitment into the LTTE, the prolonged civil war provided economic incentives for individuals to join. Educated Tamils had little chance of earning a good living due to more than half of the job opportunities being given to the Sinhalese, which in turn made many youths forsake furthering their education in order to join the ranks of the LTTE. As farming was beginning to be the only source of income to the Tamils, the land distribution scheme by the Sinhalese insured that the income was minimal while the Sinhalese reaped the benefits. Although there are currently college students at Batticaloa, Malavai, and Tricomalee, many have doubts for productive futures

¹²² Forest, *The Making of a Terrorist*, 111.

¹²³ Ibid., 156.

¹²⁴ M. R. Narayan Swamy, *The Tiger Vanquished: The LTTE's Story* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010), 189.

¹²⁵ DeVotta, *Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 171.

while international organizations and NGOs, such as CARE, are attempting to help Tamil students prepare for an uncertain future in an unstable country.¹²⁶

On May 20, 2009, the Sinhalese Army entered the garrison town of Paranthan and captured Kilinochchi, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) political and administrative headquarters, which officially ended the Eelam War IV. This followed the May 18th deaths of LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, LTTE intelligence unit chief Pottu Amman, and Sea Tigers' (sea wing of the LTTE) chief Soosai. The government then announced its "humanitarian mission" to liberate civilians held hostage in a human shield by the LTTE for in Mullaitivu.¹²⁷

On May 22, 2009, the United Nations disclosed that between 80,000 and 100,000 people had been killed in the war since 1983. In one offensive from August 2006 to May 2009, 6,261 Security Force (SF) personnel, policemen and paramilitary troopers had been killed and 29,551 wounded. Since 1981, 23,790 SF personnel had been killed in the war. In 2008, the LTTE had revealed that the rebels had lost more than 22,000 cadres since the first guerrilla death in November 1982.¹²⁸

Although the LTTE has been defeated, the Sri Lankan government must answer to the State Departments report of three hundred incidents of abuse as well as suspicion of violations of international humanitarian law. The government has also been suspected of showing no interest of investigating war crimes, which has caused many in the international community to push an independent investigation without Sinhalese permission. If the Sinhalese government continues this path of non-compliance, it only solidifies the suspicion of war crimes by government forces.¹²⁹

There is no doubt that the LTTE (and other Tamil extremist groups) needs to be held accountable for their actions towards the Sinhalese government and civilian

¹²⁶ Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 65-66.

¹²⁷ South Asia Terrorism Portal, "Sri Lanka Assessment 2010."

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Stephen Kurczy, "Fonseka Convicted in Sri Lanka Amid Delayed Inquiry Over Tamil Tigers War," *The Christian Science Monitor* (August 13, 2010).

population. However, in proportionality, the Tamil population has suffered the most since post-colonization from the Sinhalese majority. Even with that fact alone, the Sinhalese will continue to use the LTTE's past actions on Buddhist monks, civilians, and government officials as a way to hinder any peaceful settlement with the Tamil's. It also does not help that Buddhist extremism will continue to influence Sinhalese politics.

Muthiah Alagappa viewed the state of Sri Lanka as "incapable of ensuring their security." From a Tamil's perspective, issues include: dealing with the security forces, name and birthplace as a source of suspicion, and, worst of all, not being accepted as citizen of Sri Lanka. For the Sinhalese prospective, their concerns have to deal with the current, political, and ethnic problems. Many from both sides feel that their homes are the last bastion from violence. However, their own homes can be targets from both the Sinhalese and Tamil extremists, which lead many to flee to other countries.¹³⁰

F. SRI LANKA'S EDUCATION SYSTEM

According to the World Bank:

Sri Lanka's Primary school completion rates increased from 90% to 95%; which meant that 100,000 more students completed primary school each year, using a modernized curriculum with child-friendly learning. 200,000 more students completed grade 9 each year (up from 59% in 1996 to 78% in 2004), with gender parity."¹³¹

Currently, Sri Lanka's literacy rate (defined by the CIA as individuals who are fifteen and over can read and write) are 92.3% male, 89.1% female and total population is 90.7%.¹³² In 2007, Sri Lanka led all of South Asia in secondary (62.4% to 52.3%) and tertiary (18.2% to 11.4%) gross enrollment.¹³³

¹³⁰ Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 376–380.

¹³¹ World Bank, "IDA at Work: Education for all in Sri Lanka," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21388004~menuPK:3266877~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html> (accessed September 1, 2010).

¹³² CIA: The World Factbook, "South Asia: Sri Lanka," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html> (accessed September 3, 2010).

¹³³ World Bank, "IDA at Work: Education for all in Sri Lanka, 1.

Sri Lanka designed a new Education Sector Development Framework and Program (ESDFP) based on a five year rolling plan. The initiatives included: an increase equitable access to basic and secondary education, promoting education quality, enhancing the economic efficiency and equity of resource allocation and distribution, and strengthening education governance and service delivery. The World Bank is supporting the ESDFP through the US \$60 million Education Sector Development Project (ESDP), which adopts a sector-wide approach. The ESDP became effective in February 2006, and has made satisfactory progress for Sri Lanka.¹³⁴

The above figures show the progression of Sri Lanka's education programs. However, the fact remains that these figures do not hide the scars that the Eelam wars inflicted for both the Sinhala and Tamils. Even with the World Bank's (as well as other international and NGOs) continued support for the education system, Sri Lanka still has to deal with its internal ethnic and religious strife caused by civil war. Showing progress for education in the South Asia region does not hide the reality of ethnic cleansing, marginalization, and racism towards the Tamil minority.

G. CONCLUSION

For the Sinhalese, Buddhist extremists viewed the Tamils as a hindrance to their goals of Sinhalese nationalism. The Language Act passed by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, which was supposed to promote Sinhalese nationalism, was ultimately the beginning of marginalization of the Tamil minority. Prior to the standardization of university qualification exams, the Tamil minority dominated and excelled in the universities and were more than qualified to attend them. As marginalization continued, more atrocities by the Sinhalese were inflicted on the Tamil's, which lead to the formation of Tamil extremist groups. As Tamil extremists began fighting back, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (which was to prevent terrorism in Sri Lanka) only led to innocent Tamils becoming victims of Sinhalese retribution and ultimately to civil war.

¹³⁴World Bank, "IDA at Work: Education for all in Sri Lanka, 1.

For the Tamils, the conflict with the Sinhalese came about not from a lack of education, but from opportunities for jobs and Sinhalese-only testing and quota systems for universities that were imposed by the Sinhalese government. This led to Tamil extremist groups, like the LTTE, which began as student movements that pushed for Tamil equality. It was only when marginalization and violence continued towards the Tamils that groups like the LTTE began their violent struggle for a separate state of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE started as a small organization which grew to be the most effective and deadliest terrorist group in the world. The LTTE infiltrated the education system and recruited women and children and made them more effective in their suicide bombing operations. Even with their defeat in 2009, there are still a small number of members as well as supporters to the LTTE. If there are no favorable concessions between the Sinhalese and Tamils, there is a strong likelihood that another Eelam War will occur in Sri Lanka in the near future.

This historical example of Sri Lanka disproves the notion that a well-educated society would be free of conflict. Sri Lanka gives credence to the theory that an educated society like the Tamils understood their plight in Sri Lanka and made attempts to improve their status among the Sinhalese majority. However, memories of favoritism by the British that gave educational and socioeconomic advantages to the Tamils drove Sinhalese nationalists to oppress the Tamil population. This only led to further marginalization, violence, and worst of all, a civil war that brought about the most deadly terrorist organization in the world—the LTTE.

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III. TERRORIST EVENTS CARRIED OUT BY EDUCATED INDIVIDUALS

The profile of eleven individuals that conducted terrorist activities highlights the importance of initiating reform that focuses on macro political economic conditions in the country. In this chapter, the author will provide evidence that those eleven individuals did not come from poor, uneducated, and displaced backgrounds, but from varied educated and economic backgrounds. Regardless of religion, economic, social, and ethnic background, these individuals were recruited, trained, and indoctrinated by groups like Hamas and Al-Qaida to carry out terrorist operations. This chapter will show that other causal factors besides education led to their participation in terrorist activities. By doing this, the author will illustrate the importance of focusing on promoting educational institutions that are suited for the local setting as part of reform that is at the macro level rather than secular education that may be a foreign product and may lead to uneven demand and development, creating a setting for further discontent.

On September 11, 2001, nineteen individuals hijacked four commercial planes and proceeded to commit the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history that killed over 3,000 people in New York City, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania.¹³⁵ This event ultimately led to the present war in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was weeks after the attacks that the background and nationality of the individuals that participated in the 9/11 attacks became apparent and shed a new light on who was involved. Prior to 9/11, most Americans assumed that those involved in those attacks were uneducated and poor Muslim males from Islamic countries. The leaders who commanded this operation and those who executed the operation illustrated how terrorism has been misunderstood.

A. MOHAMED ATTA (9/11)

Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta led the attacks on September 11, 2001. His actions included gathering his team in Hamburg, Germany, pilot training in Florida,

¹³⁵ Frank Shanty, Raymond Picquet and John Lalla, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 2003), 29–30.

and dry runs as passengers from Logan Airport prior to 9/11. His leadership and strict adherence to the mission of Jihad against the U.S. insured that three of the four planes that Atta and his teams hijacked accomplished what many thought would be impossible on U.S. soil.¹³⁶ Mohamed Atta was from Cairo, Egypt. He graduated from Cairo University in 1986 with a degree in architecture. After a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1995, he became active in Muslim extremist activities and made contact with Al-Qaeda recruiters, who at the time were looking for “intelligent and dedicated” individuals for their operations.¹³⁷ Al-Qaeda agents saw his educational background and commitment to radical Islam as the key to his recruitment, which would focus his mission to lead the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.¹³⁸ However, there is more to this story of Atta that provides insight into how this man led the largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

Family and friends described Atta as a shy, unassuming young man who struggled to make his mark. Born in Kafr El Sheikh, Mohamed was the son of a lawyer and a homemaker. His father characterized him as one who liked to play chess and disliked violent games. Viewed as scrawny (5 ft. 7 in.), thin and called “Bolbol,” by his father (Arabic slang for a little singing bird), Atta seemed overshadowed by his two sisters, a zoology professor and a doctor, respectively. His Cairo University peers viewed him as an average student.¹³⁹

Atta made few friends in school, and with regards to politics and religion, he offered only mainstream opinions. What baffled his few friends and classmates was that his first impressions of Islamic terrorists initially were “brainless and irresponsible people.”¹⁴⁰ Due to lack of jobs in Cairo, Atta enrolled in the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg, in northern Germany in 1992, with the goal of earning a degree in urban planning and then returning to Egypt. There, in 1993, he met Volker Hauth (a fellow student). Over the next few years they would travel and study together. Hauth was

¹³⁶ Atkins, *The 9/11 Encyclopedia*, 23–25.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 22–23.

¹³⁹ John Cloud, “Atta's Odyssey,” *Time Atlantic* 158, no. 15 (2009):1.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

the first to notice the Atta's change from meek in Cairo to a rigid individual in Germany. Hauth characterized Mohamed as "a guy searching for justice" as well as "offended by this broad wrong direction the world was taking."¹⁴¹

By the mid-'90s, Atta began disappearing from school as well as his job at a Hamburg consultancy for extended periods of time for either thesis work or a pilgrimage to Mecca (claimed by Atta). From mid-1997 to October 1998, Atta seemed to have disappeared from Hamburg entirely for "family reasons." But it is clear that during this time his transformation from aloof individual to extremist began. Returning to Germany with a bushy beard favored by fundamentalists, he was more serious with his new-found zeal towards Islam while losing touch with old friends he made prior to his extended absences. With a sullen view of having any prospect of having a promising future in Egypt, Atta (believed by German authorities) began touching base with a wide range of people connected to terrorism, most notably a Syrian businessman named Mamoun Darkazanli, who had power of attorney for a German bank account in the name of a man thought to be Osama bin Laden's finance chief.¹⁴²

Whatever he was doing behind the scenes or meeting individuals that were suspected of extremist activities, Atta began preaching the word of the Koran. In 1999, university officials gave him permission to form an Islamic student group; it was here, investigators believe, that he met future hijackers Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Samir Jarrah. The group of about forty members gathered to pray every day led by Atta. This was the beginning of how a meek boy from the Cairo had grown to a devout Muslim, surrounding himself with like-minded individuals, some of whom would follow him to train for and carry out the 9/11 attacks.¹⁴³

It is clear from this short story of Atta that from the beginning he was pressured to succeed by his upbringing and lack of self-esteem in the presence of his own sisters only compounded his psyche. Atta was a man that could not find that niche that would make

¹⁴¹ Cloud, "Atta's Odyssey," 2.

¹⁴² Ibid., 2-3.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 3.

him feel complete in the presence of his father, who did not help his self-image by giving him a nick-name fitting for a little bird. It was only when he left home, got involved with Muslim extremists, and became a very devout Muslim in search for justice that Atta became empowered with a sense of belonging and found himself on a mission to wage Jihad against those who attack Islam.

B. FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS IN PALESTINE IN 2002–2003

Wafa Idris, Henadi Tayseer Jaradat, Dareen Abu Aisheh, and Ayat Akhras were the first female suicide bombers in Palestine. Their actions killed twenty-five Israeli's and wounded nearly 240 more.¹⁴⁴ These actions sent a shockwave not only in Israel, but around the world by how Islamic extremism included females in a male-dominated political movement. These women did not simply decide one day to approach an Islamic fundamentalist group and volunteer to be suicide bombers. All of these women had reasons that pushed them to become suicide bombers. The lack of educational opportunities was not the reason for becoming suicide bombers. These women were bright and intelligent individuals with promising careers; however, personal experiences and external factors pushed them to end their lives abruptly by sacrificing themselves in the name of Islam.

On January 27, 2002, Idris, a paramedic for the Red Crescent, detonated herself in a shopping district in Jerusalem on Jaffa Rd. Two were killed and over 150 were wounded.¹⁴⁵ Her actions earned her the title of a modern day Jeanne d'Arc to being compared to Jesus Christ (by Dr. Adel Sadeq, head of Psychiatry at Cairo's Ein Shams University), and Saddam Hussein erected a memorial in her honor.¹⁴⁶ Regardless of whether her actions galvanized the Palestinian resistance or not, it is important to understand why she decided to sacrifice herself in such a manner.

¹⁴⁴ Rosemarie Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006), 126–129.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 126.

¹⁴⁶ Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers*, 137.

In Wafa's, being exposed to the early struggles against Israeli occupation started early for her. It is easy to assume that she was exposed to violence and witnessed friends and relatives being harassed and humiliated by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). However, by the age twelve, witnessing a friend losing an eye by the IDF was the breaking point for her that would begin her path leading to that fateful day in 2002. Although many of her own relatives believed that she would never want to be a martyr, they do believe that her upbringing in her young adult life and subsequent marriage at a young age may have been the driving factors that drove her to be one.¹⁴⁷

In 1991, Wafa (at age 16), married her first cousin. Although the marriage was amicable, she was unable to have any children which drove her husband to divorce her nine years later. After being told by a local doctor that she would never be able to carry a baby full term, she was forced to live with her family. To make matters worse, her husband took another wife and a year later had their first child. These actions drove her to work as a volunteer at the Red Crescent, helping those who were wounded by the IDF.¹⁴⁸

Working at the Red Crescent was her only refuge from the humiliation of a failed marriage and being unable to bear children. Being a financial burden on her family and not being able to remarry, Mira Tzoreff (Professor at Ben Gurion University) believes that her situation made it easier for recruiters from extremist groups to approach her with the promise for financial support for her family. Having no future as a Muslim female in the case of Wafa Idris probably made the search for the first female suicide bomber an easy one for any group in Palestine. The promise of financial and spiritual reward to families of martyrs made it much easier for women like Idris to step forward and support their cause.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2003), 40.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 42–51.

¹⁴⁹ Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers*, 138.

Henadi Tayseer Jaradat, a law student from Jenin, walked into a Maxim Restaurant in Haifa, Israel, and blew herself up, killing twenty-one and wounding sixty on October 4, 2003. She was known as religious, prayed daily and read the *Quran*. She was also described as a determined and self-confident woman focused in achieving her goals while pursuing success and high achievements.¹⁵⁰ A promising law career and a stable income that was to follow by being a lawyer did not prevent her from being the second suicide bomber for the Islamic Jihad.¹⁵¹

For Jaradat, it was she, not her brother, who was responsible for the family's income since her father was being treated for cancer. In service for her family, she postponed her own marriage so her brother would marry first, then she would marry her fiancé. However, both her brother and her fiancé were soon killed by Israeli forces, which left her alone seeking for revenge against those who pretty much ruined her life and left her with no family and no one to marry. For Jaradat, this was pure revenge, and for the Islamic Jihad, it was another recruit for their suicide operations.¹⁵²

Dareen Abu Aisheh, a student at Al-Najah University, blew herself up at an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank on February 27, 2002, wounding two. Unlike Idris and Jaradat before her, she willingly went to Hamas to volunteer but was turned down. Undaunted, she then went to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade where they obliged her request to be another *shahida*. Although viewed by her parents as religious, her motivation was in response to a gun battle in which Israeli troops killed four armed Arabs for an earlier attack on an Israeli that was politically motivated.¹⁵³

Ayat Akhras was a student and engaged to be married from Dehaishe refugee camp near Bethlehem. On March 29, 2002, she walked into Kyriat Hayoval, a Jerusalem supermarket, and killed herself along with two others, wounding twenty-eight more. This attack by Akhras was in response to Passover attacks on Arafat's headquarters. Her

¹⁵⁰ Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers*, 129.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁵² Cindy D. Ness, *Female Terrorism and Militancy : Agency, Utility, and Organization* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 136–137.

¹⁵³ Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers*, 127.

taped statement before she died heard her saying, “I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone.”¹⁵⁴

For Ayat, her hate for the Israeli’s motivated her to become a journalist so she could communicate to the world about the injustice of the Palestinians. Remembered as observant but not fanatically religious, she was enamored with western-style clothes that she would wear to school. Being bound only to home and school due to the restriction that Israelis imposed on her refugee camp, her parents introduced her to a young Shadi Abu Laban who took a hiatus from college to earn a living for his family. Ayat and Shadi were inseparable and were soon engaged to be married. Her goals were to have a traditional wedding and afterwards enroll in Bethlehem University to study journalism and work as a correspondent in the West Bank in support of the Palestinian cause.¹⁵⁵

Although Ayat had dreams of marriage and a bright future seemed in reach for her and her fiancé, two major events changed her way of life forever. First, her father was working for an Israeli company during the second Intifada of 2000. During that time, her father, as well as the rest of the family, was the target of threats and harassment from their own people because of the fathers ties with Israelis. What her father saw working to support his family to make sure there was food on the table (in which he was working for the same Jewish company for nearly thirty years) was viewed as traitorous against the Palestinian cause. For Ayat, she viewed these actions directed towards her family as a loss of honor in the community.¹⁵⁶

Second, she witnessed her neighbors (one of the leaders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Jamil Qassas) brother shot and killed by Israeli soldiers. At the funeral of her neighbors’ brother, she approached him believing that this event changed everything and it was a sign from Allah that she had to convince her father and the others that any contact with the Jews only meant bloodshed. With the harassment getting worse from

¹⁵⁴ Skaine, *Female Suicide Bombers*, 128.

¹⁵⁵ Victor, *Army of Roses*, 201–202.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 201–202.

neighbors, merchants not serving their family, and her father being forced to be a prisoner in his own home so he couldn't work for Jews, Ayat decided to act.¹⁵⁷

Ayat decided to approach the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade to become a suicide bomber. By sacrificing herself, she believed that the harassment would stop so her family could live a normal life among their own people without fear or disgrace. Motivated by the murder of an innocent boy at the hands of the Israelis and her family situation, Ayat recorded her last message at the home of one of the leaders of the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade at seven o'clock in the morning on March 29, 2002. No one in her family knew that before her own wedding, Ayat was to become another *shahida*.¹⁵⁸

For these four women, secular education did not prevent them from becoming suicide bombers. These women were driven by the loss of a loved one, witnessing a death of another, harassment by the Israelis as well as their own people, and in the case of Ayat, an end to harassment to her family in order to earn respect from the community. These four women were unfazed by their decisions, and understood the consequences and believed that their actions were the only way to fight back. These individuals were not influenced by a madrasa education or some radical cleric on television, as many westerners would believe. However, their constant exposure to harassment, marginalization, and racism by the IDF at an early age led them to finally give into violence as a way of not only helping the cause of their own people but a sense of vengeance against their oppressors as well.

C. MUNICH OLYMPIC GAMES 1972

In the early hours of September 5, 1972, eight terrorists from the Palestinian group Black September made their way into the athlete's village and, after killing two Israeli's, barricaded themselves in their quarters with nine additional Israeli hostages. After seventeen hours of unsuccessful negotiations, German authorities attempted a rescue mission, in which all nine Israeli athletes were killed in the firefight. Meanwhile,

¹⁵⁷ Victor, *Army of Roses*, 206–207.

¹⁵⁸ Victor, *Army of Roses*, 208–209.

three surviving terrorists were released and flown to Libya and welcomed as heroes.¹⁵⁹ This action that led to one of the most shocking events in Olympic Games history was coordinated and planned by Mohammad Dauoud Oudeh and Ali Hassan Salameh.

Mohammed Oudeh, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the kidnapping and murder of the Israeli athletes in Munich, claimed that he created the plan with Palestinian colleagues in Rome. Oudeh was from the Silwan quarter of East Jerusalem, where he taught mathematics and physics to Palestinian schoolchildren and qualified to work as a lawyer. He remained in Silwan until the 1967 war. After relocating to Amman, he joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and assisted in the formation of the PLO security apparatus in 1968. In a 2006 interview with the Associated Press prior to his death, Abu Daoud justified the actions in Munich by stating, “Before Munich we were simply terrorists. After Munich, at least people started asking, who are these terrorists and what motivated them? Before Munich nobody had the slightest idea about Palestine.”¹⁶⁰

Although Oudeh might have masterminded the Munich Games massacre, it was Salameh who executed the plan. A trusted lieutenant to Yasser Arafat and of the PLO, his coordination with Black September ensured the raid’s success leading to the deaths of the eleven Israeli athletes.

Ali Hassan Salameh was born in 1942 as a son of a prominent gang leader in Palestine, who was notorious for his actions in the Jewish-Arab riots in the 1930s. His father was killed during a battle in a village against Israeli forces; Ali was only 6 years old. Unlike other Palestinians who lived in refugee camps, Salameh’s family was rich and Ali initially had no interest in politics. He went to Germany to study engineering. However, this future right hand of Arafat did not start off right away as a revolutionary.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Shanty, Picquet and Lalla, *Encyclopedia of World Terrorism*, 247–249.

¹⁶⁰ Trevor Mostyn, “Mohammed Oudeh (Abu Daoud) Obituary: Mastermind Behind the Attack on Israeli Athletes at the 1972,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/04/mohammed-oudeh-abu-daoud-obituary> (accessed March 4, 2011).

¹⁶¹ Aaron J. Klein, *Striking Back : The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response* (New York: Random House, 2005), 213.

In the beginning, Salameh was enamored with the European ways of life including restaurants, nightclubs, dress, and women. Although pressured by his mother to move back to Egypt, Salameh was still clinging on to the European party scene. It was here that Salameh understood his duties not only to Palestine but living up to his father's legacy. Salameh, in an interview with Nadia Salti Stephan in 1976, understood that he was born and raised to carry the Palestinian cause. Salameh understood that as a son of a well known revolutionary, he had no choice but to follow his father's example. Once Salameh joined the PLO, his rise came with ease from Arafat, which led to Black September's attack in Munich.¹⁶²

The Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, made Salameh their primary target when operation Wrath of God was approved by Golda Meir. However, numerous attempts to kill him led to failures.¹⁶³ Undaunted by their past failures, the Mossad continued to monitor Salameh. On January 22, 1979, Salameh's convoy was hit by a high explosive bomb inside of a parked Volkswagen right next to the apartment that Erika Chambers, the English woman assigned to follow Salameh by Mossad rented at 3:45 P.M. Six years after the beginning of Operation Wrath of God, Salameh was dead; the Munich athletes were finally avenged.¹⁶⁴ Salameh from day one knew his mission and his position in the Palestine struggle against Israel. Although educated in Europe and enamored with western decadence, he understood and believed that his goal in life was to follow in his father's footsteps as well as dying for the cause of freedom in Palestine.

¹⁶² Klein, *Striking Back*, 213–214.

¹⁶³ TIME.com, "MIDDLE EAST: Death of a Terrorist," <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946209-1,00.html> (accessed March 4, 2011), 1–3.

¹⁶⁴ Simon Reeve, *One Day in September : The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation "Wrath of God,"* (New York: Arcade, 2000), 206–208.

D. THEODORE JOHN “TED” KACZYNSKI, “THE UNABOMBER” 1978–1985

For seventeen years, Kaczynski was remembered for sending well-concealed pipe bombs through the mail, or planted at universities, corporate and government facilities, and their personnel, causing many injuries and deaths.¹⁶⁵ Before he was apprehended by a federal task force, his rampage on U.S. soil left three dead and twenty-three wounded.¹⁶⁶ Prior to his arrest in 1996, Kaczynski was able to avoid detection by various methods, including: wearing double-soled tennis shoes that left an impression of footprints that would be different from his actual shoe size, several pairs of aviation sunglasses as a form of disguise when mailing his bombs, and using human hair from a bathroom and placing it in-between two pieces of electrical tape to mislead forensic scientists by finding DNA to link a particular individual to the bomb.¹⁶⁷ Long before 9/11, the U.S. was in the hunt for one man that spread terror throughout the countryside.

Ted Kaczynski was from Chicago and a son of a sausage factory worker. He graduated high school at age sixteen and earned a National Merit Scholarship to Harvard University. After earning his B.S. in mathematics in 1962, he continued his education at the University of Michigan, earning his M.A. in 1965 and Ph.D. in 1967. After graduation, he accepted the position of assistant professor of mathematics at the University of Berkley. In 1969, after having success as a teacher and researcher towards his tenure, Kaczynski abruptly resigned his position and moved with his brother David to Montana.¹⁶⁸

It was in Montana that Kaczynski began his rage against society. The final breaking point for him that led to his seventeen-year bombing campaign was when a logging road was constructed near his cabin. On May 25, 1978, Kaczynski’s first bomb

¹⁶⁵ Robert Burke, *Counter-Terrorism for Emergency Responders*, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton: CRC/Taylor & Francis, 2007), 510, 29.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 481-483.

¹⁶⁷ Joseph T. McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil : A Concise History of Plots and Perpetrators from the Famous to the Forgotten* (Boulder: Sentient Publications, 2006), 224.

¹⁶⁸ Stephen E. Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 149.

injured a security guard at Northwestern University. His last bomb in 1995 killed California Forestry Association president, Gilbert P. Murray, in Sacramento, California. In 1995, Kaczynski sent a 35,000-word manifesto to the *Washington Post*, which voiced his complaints on society and its devotion to technology, while threatening to carry out more bombings if it was not published. In the end, it was his brother, not the FBI, or any federal agency, that led to the apprehension of Kaczynski.¹⁶⁹ If not for his brothers informing federal agents that he was the Unabomber, Kaczynski may have eluded capture for several more years.¹⁷⁰

Clearly, Kaczynski had a severe mental disorder that was well-concealed in the mind of a prodigy. It was discovered that Kaczynski's early life was a prelude to his demise later in his adult years. Two key events that led to his depression and self loathing were skipping from fifth to the seventh grade (which led to his social awkwardness with older kids), and seeking psychiatric counseling at the University of Michigan that involved fantasies of becoming a female. It was during this second event that he had his first urge to kill (the psychiatrist who evaluated him) and that he did not care anymore about consequences of future actions now that his self-revelation gave him freedom to do anything without fear of death.¹⁷¹

For Kaczynski, his experiences as a child and adult led to his future terrorist actions that shocked the U.S. and baffled federal agents for almost twenty years. Whatever pushed him to the brink led him to that little cabin in Montana where he finally made true on his threats of death and destruction. He hoped that all his bombs succeeded in injuring or killing someone during his reign of terror. One phrase that summed up his rage and his quest for justice was:

I had hoped that the victim would be blinded or have his hands blown off or be otherwise maimed...At least I put him in the hospital, which is better

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 150–151.

¹⁷⁰ McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil*, 225.

¹⁷¹ Chris E. Stout, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 156–157.

than nothing. But not enough to satisfy me. Well, live and learn. No more match-head bombs. I wish I knew how to get hold of some dynamite.¹⁷²

E. TIMOTHY JAMES MCVEIGH, OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING, 1995

On April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a.m., a truck full of explosives detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. One hundred sixty people were killed (nineteen of them children) and nearly six hundred more were wounded and injured. Prior to 9/11, this attack was the worst in U.S. history. The perpetrators were Terry Nichols and Timothy McVeigh. Although Nichols participated in the planning of the bombing, it was McVeigh who drove the truck, lit the fuse, and walked away from the rented Ryder truck that destroyed the Murrah building.¹⁷³

Timothy McVeigh was born in Pendleton, New York, where his father worked in a radiator assembly plant in nearby Lockport, while his mother worked as a travel agent. Catholic in religious background, his mother left his father and moved to Florida, which negatively affected Timothy. A good student at Starpoint High in Pendleton, he began having an interest in guns and being a survivalist. After a short employment at a local fast food restaurant, he left his hometown to attend Bryant and Stratton College in Williamsville, New York, to study computer programming. However, he left college and returned home after only one semester.¹⁷⁴

It was during this time that McVeigh began reading white supremacist William Pierce's *The Turner Diaries*. After a short stint at an armored car service in Buffalo, New York, McVeigh joined the U.S. Army on May 24, 1998. McVeigh enjoyed early success as a gunner in a Bradley Fighting vehicle, as well as mastery of other weapons and excelling in training exercises. In 1990, he reenlisted for another four years and rose in the ranks with his exceptional performance as a soldier in his unit. In January 1991, he was deployed to the Persian Gulf in participation of the Gulf War against Iraq. In Iraq,

¹⁷² McCann, *Terrorism on American Soil*, 224.

¹⁷³ Barry M. Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism* (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2008), 54.

he was promoted to Sergeant and performed well under fire, earning many combat decorations. However, he discovered that killing others was personally hard to swallow.¹⁷⁵

Upon returning from the Gulf, McVeigh volunteered for Special Forces training. However, he was ill-prepared and dropped out after only two days. This event negatively affected McVeigh so much that he decided to leave the Army. While in the Army, he was exposed to anti-government propaganda, became a fan of the right-wing magazine *Soldier of Fortune*, continued to read and follow the guidance of the *Turner Diaries*, and briefly joined the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) where he met Terry Nichols and Michael Fortier who both disliked the Army and the federal government.¹⁷⁶

McVeigh found it very hard to adjust to civilian life after the Army. His only employment was the same job that he had before joining the Army: a security guard for the same armored car service. Although disgruntled about his past service in the Army, McVeigh did join the National Guard for extra money. After hearing about gun control legislation was being under consideration by the U.S. Congress and the liberal attitudes of his fellow co-workers, he quit his security job and followed local gun shows and talking to other anti-government activists. Over the next two years, he would attend about eighty gun shows.¹⁷⁷

The passing of the Brady Gun Control Bill and the Ruby Ridge Incident made McVeigh believe that the federal government was against its own citizens. However, the culminating event that led to the Oklahoma City bombing was McVeigh witnessing the Branch Davidian Siege in Waco, Texas in 1993. Sympathizing with the Branch Davidian's, McVeigh drove to the site of the siege and even made public statements to support their stand against the government. After the final confrontation between the Davidians and federal agents which led deaths of many followers, including children,

¹⁷⁴ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 197.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 198.

¹⁷⁶ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 198.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

McVeigh became so obsessed with Waco that it drove him to take revenge on the U.S. government by targeting the nearest federal building, which was the Murrah building in Oklahoma City.¹⁷⁸

Undaunted, McVeigh and Nichols started to collect enough material to create the bomb that would ultimately be used at Oklahoma City. He travelled to Kansas and Texas to collect ammonium nitrate and three barrels of nitro-methane fuel. For McVeigh, this mission to bomb the Murrah Building was given to him by the Branch Davidians themselves; and most of all, no federal employee was guiltless. His vision of punishing the U.S. government came to reality on April 19, 1995, two years after the Waco siege. McVeigh, however, was arrested that same day for a weapons charge, but wasn't identified as the perpetrator until several days later. On May 27, 1997, McVeigh was on trial in Colorado, and after nine weeks was found guilty and sentenced to death. On June 11, 2001, in Terre Haute, Indiana, McVeigh was executed by lethal injection. In a cruel twist of fate, the Twin Towers in New York, The Pentagon in Washington D.C., and Flight 93 over Pennsylvania will occur exactly three months later, making it the worst attack on U.S. soil.¹⁷⁹

F. OSAMA BIN LADEN

On August 17, 1998, a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, killing 292 (including twelve U.S. citizens) and injuring over 5,000 more. Nine minutes later, another truck loaded with explosives was driven into the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing eleven and wounding eighty-six more. Al-Qaeda was responsible for both attacks. On October 18, 2001, four members in connection with the attacks were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole by a federal judge in New York.¹⁸⁰

On October 12, 2000, off the coast of Aden, Yemen, a small boat carrying explosives rammed into the *USS Cole*. The blast killed seventeen U.S. sailors and injured

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 198-199.

¹⁸⁰ Rubin and Rubin, *Chronologies of Modern Terrorism*, 274.

thirty-nine more. Like the Embassy bombings in both Kenya and Tanzania, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack. The mastermind behind the bombing was identified as Yemeni Abdul Rahman Hussein Mohammed al-Saafani, who avoided capture by fleeing abroad. However, eight individuals were implicated in the attack and were put on trial.¹⁸¹

On September 11, 2001, nineteen individuals seized four commercial jets from U.S. airports. Two of them crashed into both World Trade Center Towers in New York, which collapsed after a few hours. One crashed into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., while the last jet prematurely crashed in a remote field in Pennsylvania due to the passengers and crew attacking the hijackers in a last stand. Nearly 3,000 people were killed and hundreds more injured, including scores of firefighters, police, and rescue workers who worked frantically to save lives in New York and Washington, D.C.¹⁸²

All three attacks were connected to Osama bin Laden. Although he did not participate in the events that killed many U.S. and other foreign nationals, his Al-Qaida organization had the funding and personnel to accomplish their mission: kill Americans and their allies. Although success was achieved in Iraq, the U.S. continues to have a military presence there as well in Afghanistan with hopes for a decisive victory. Although Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan, Al-Qaida continues to flourish in their terrorist activities with no real end in sight.

Osama bin Laden was one of fifty-four children of Mohamed bin Laden in Saudi Arabia. His family built a “unique and important partnership” with Saudi Arabia's royal family, engaging in an array of businesses including construction and road building. This partnership meant continuous financial security for Mohamed bin Laden. Their investments and land purchases in Europe, and especially the U.S. (from Florida to Beverly Hills), drew international attention.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 281–282.

¹⁸² Atkins, *Encyclopedia of Modern American Extremists and Extremist Groups*, 309.

¹⁸³ Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 671.

Osama attended Al Thagher School, which provided a British-style secular education with Islamic worship. He then attended King Abdulaziz University, where he studied business administration. During that time, he became deeply involved in the Muslim Brotherhood, which began to shape his Islamic beliefs. As he got older and left the university, the distance between himself and his family widened.¹⁸⁴

Prior to leaving the university, bin Laden was heavily influenced by Sheik Abdullah Azzam, a prominent radical Muslim. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to join the jihad. Bin Laden organized and funded mujahedeen activities including weapons, training camps, and infrastructure. When his friend Abdallah Azzam was killed by a car bomb, bin Laden created a new Islamic network called Al-Qaeda, or the base. The initial members were a collection of thousands of radical Muslims that he and Azzam had already trained throughout the years.¹⁸⁵

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1990, where he spoke critically of the government at various mosques and public gatherings. When the U.S. invaded Kuwait, bin Laden accused the Saudi government of an act against Islam by supporting U.S. military operations against Iraq. These actions led to the permanent separation between bin Laden and his family, as well as the Saudi royal family. With his inheritance, he then moved to Sudan and invested in local businesses. However, he also funded terrorist training camps that sent fighters to the Balkans, Chechnya, and other areas where Muslims were in conflict.¹⁸⁶

The Saudi government finally froze his assets in 1993 which were valued at \$200 million. Bin Laden renounced his Saudi citizenship which made him a renegade not only to his country but to his family who at the same time did not want to associate with him or his terrorist activities. During this time, Bin Laden began targeting the U.S., most

¹⁸⁴ Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 671.

¹⁸⁵ Harvey W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 72.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

notably the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 in which six were killed and 1,000 were wounded or injured. Although it was not proven that bin Laden was the architect of the bombing, the perpetrator was Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, who was a guest in bin Laden's house in Pakistan.¹⁸⁷

As bin Laden continued attacks on Americans and other nationalities, Washington began to pressure Sudan to revoke its protection of bin Laden. This then prompted bin Laden to move to Afghanistan, where his new headquarters and operations flourish today. Officially, on August 23, 1996, bin Laden declared jihad against Americans and Jews while calling Muslims to stand and expel them from holy lands. In 1998 bin Laden issued a *fatwa* calling for the death of all Americans. By 1999, the FBI placed bin Laden on its most wanted terrorists list. After being identified in the *USS Cole* attack and the two embassy bombings in Africa, the U.S. was in the hunt for bin Laden. However, bin Laden evaded several capture or assignation attempts and coordinated the most successful terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001.¹⁸⁸

G. CONCLUSION

These eleven individuals, during different times and in different locations throughout the world, proved that secular education did not prevent them from becoming terrorists. For some of them education did not matter at all; it was their duty to do so in service to their country and/or religion. Their economic, religious, and social background made no difference in their choice of turning to extremist activities. All the perpetrators chose to participate in terrorist activities for various reasons.

For Mohammed Atta, being in the shadow of his own sisters may have triggered a sense of insignificance in his family and becoming a terrorist most likely made up that void. For the female suicide bombers in Palestine, duty to restore the family honor, support for the struggle of Palestine, and pure rage and the need to take revenge was the motive that drove them to become *shahidas*. For Mohammad Dauoud Oudeh, it was

¹⁸⁷ Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 671.

¹⁸⁸ Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, 73.

making the world know that there was a Palestine and that Palestinians were suffering at the hands of the Israelis. Ali Hassan Salameh might have started his life as a playboy, but in the end he believed that his fate was to carry on his father's legacy and died for it.

Ted Kaczynski may have had mental issues growing up, but it did not stop him from his quest to attack those responsible and used his brilliant mind to not only create his weapons of destruction, but to elude capture for years. Timothy McVeigh's quest for justice was from what he believed was oppression from the Federal government. His Army background and obsessive following of the *Turner Diaries* as well as surrounding himself with people who had negative feelings of the U.S. only helped him channel his inner rage with people who would help him carry out his attack in Oklahoma City. For Osama bin Laden, his educated background and very rich family could not curb his feelings of jihad against America and creating the most effective terrorist group in the world today: the Al-Qaida terrorist network. Secular education did not stop any of these individuals and should not be the main focus of efforts in preventing extremist behavior.

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IV. THE UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN, POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN, PRESENT CONFLICT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, AND TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

In this chapter, the author will illustrate how much economic aid the U.S. has contributed to Afghanistan for education and other reconstruction efforts since 2002. It is critical to understand how the resources are divided, and the possible impact of a policy that focuses on one aspect of development versus another. The author will also illustrate that while education is one of the major areas of concern for the U.S., vital necessities like clean water, health care, food, and most importantly jobs are not receiving the funding needed that ensure economic and social future of Afghanistan. One cannot assess education effectiveness when poverty is prevalent throughout a country. In addition to assessment, a policy that focuses on education and employment as ways to prevent terrorism ought to also focus on job availability for the educated as well as their ability to get to work.

Access to clean water that can improve the health of the country as well as prevent disease, illness, and death of newborns are paramount, along with education and increased school enrollment. These basic necessities that are vital to any society in rural and urban areas will make a difference in the long run before education will. For a society to advance itself socially and economically, ensuring access to better health, clean water, food, and work opportunities are critical. Afghanistan has lacked these necessities for decades and the current policy does not effectively deal with such concerns.

This chapter will also illustrate that although the U.S. is sending millions of dollars to Afghanistan to improve their way of life, extremism and terrorism continues to plague the country. The U.S. is providing assistance in hopes of destroying Al-Qaida and Taliban forces while earning cooperation from the public along with the Afghan government in the war on terror. The reality is that attempts by the U.S. to improve Afghanistan through modernization methods such as educational opportunities are not

working. This thesis will illustrate this through macro figures that illustrate a rise in terrorism as well as a rise in illegal economic systems through opium production.

With regards to terrorism, there has been no change in Afghanistan and it appears that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan have only galvanized terrorist groups like the Taliban and Al-Qaida to continue its operations until the U.S. withdraws. Meanwhile, illegal trade activities continue to thrive in the region. What has not been discussed is where the future educated class is supposed to work in such a setting. As the Sri Lanka case illustrates, disparities between educated communities may lead to violence and ethnic conflict. Case profiles of terrorists presented in Chapter III illustrate that it is the educated who are frustrated at the system that in turn lead or follow terrorist organizations. What the uneven policy in the case of Afghanistan implies for the future has yet to be effectively addressed.

A. USAID TO AFGHANISTAN

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how money donated by USAID was utilized in Afghanistan from FY 2002–2009. From FY 2002–2007, Afghanistan received over \$5 billion dollars in aid from the U.S. Out of that \$5 billion: \$343 million was for education, \$422 million for health, and \$321 million for economic growth.¹⁸⁹ For other programs: \$53 million was for water, \$304 million for agriculture and \$0 for cash for work.¹⁹⁰ From FY 2008–2009, the U.S. contributed over \$2 billion in economic aid. Out of that \$2 billion: \$193 million was for education (which was about half of what was contributed from FY 2002–2007), \$206 million for health (less than half of FY 2002–2007), and \$247 million for economic growth.¹⁹¹ What makes these numbers worrisome is that clean water only received \$35 million for FY 2008–2009, agriculture received \$186 million and only \$100 million for FY 2009 for cash for work.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ USAID, “USAID Afghanistan,” USAID.gov, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget> (accessed April 2, 2011).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

Sector	FY02 Obligations	FY03 Obligations	FY04 Obligations	FY05 Obligations	FY06 Obligations	FY07 Obligations	Total FY02- FY07	%
Agriculture (including Environment)	\$27	\$56	\$50	\$77	\$27	\$67	\$304	5%
Alternative Development	\$3	\$1	\$5	\$185	\$121	\$229	\$544	9%
Roads	\$51	\$142	\$354	\$276	\$250	\$365	\$1,438	24%
Power	\$3	-	\$77	\$286	\$66	\$195	\$626	11%
Water	\$2	\$1	\$27	\$21	\$1	\$2	\$53	1%
Economic Growth*	\$21	\$12	\$84	\$91	\$46	\$69	\$321	5%
Cash for Work	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%
PRTs (including Civilian Assistance Program - Leahy)**	-	\$11	\$56	\$85	\$20	\$126	\$298	5%
State PRT (ESF)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	\$41	\$40	\$93	\$103	\$50	\$38	\$365	6%
National Solidarity Program (NSP)	-	-	\$10	\$15	\$10	\$15	\$50	1%
Support to GIROA/Cross-cutting***	-	-	-	-	-	\$19	\$19	0%
Democracy/Governance (including Civil Society)	\$22	\$34	\$132	\$88	\$17	\$82	\$375	6%
Elections****	-	-	-	-	-	\$52	\$52	1%
Strategic Communications (ESF)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%
Rule of Law	\$4	\$8	\$21	\$15	\$6	\$10	\$64	1%
Education	\$19	\$21	\$104	\$86	\$51	\$63	\$343	6%
Health	\$8	\$56	\$83	\$111	\$52	\$113	\$422	7%
Program Support	\$5	\$6	\$17	\$16	\$4	\$35	\$83	1%
IDPs	\$108	\$23	\$10	-	-	-	\$141	2%
Food Assistance	\$159	\$51	\$49	\$57	\$60	-	\$376	6%
TOTAL	\$471	\$462	\$1,172	\$1,511	\$779	\$1,478	\$5,872	100%

*The FY09 Spring Supplemental request includes \$20 million specifically for workforce development.

**After FY08, PRTs/Stabilization also includes Civilian Assistance Program (Leahy earmarked funds).

***Before FY06, Support to GIROA/Cross-cutting is captured under ARTF. Cross-cutting activities include gender, public outreach/information systems, and evaluation and M&E.

****Before the 2007 Base, Elections is captured under Democracy/Governance.

Figure 1. FY 2002–FY 2007 Obligation, in Millions of U.S. dollars, to Afghanistan by USAID

Sector	FY08 NOA	FY08 GWOT	Total FY08	%	FY09 NOA	FY09 Bridge Supplemental	FY09 Spring Supplemental	Total FY09	%
Agriculture (including Environment)	\$56	-	\$56	3%	\$30	-	\$100	\$130	6%
Alternative Development	\$111	\$65	\$176	11%	\$62	\$38	\$65	\$165	8%
Roads	\$74	\$200	\$274	17%	\$68	\$61	-	\$129	6%
Power	\$87	\$150	\$237	15%	\$69	\$65	-	\$134	6%
Water	\$16	-	\$16	1%	\$16	\$3	-	\$19	1%
Economic Growth*	\$69	\$7	\$76	5%	\$49	\$37	\$85	\$171	8%
Cash for Work	-	-	-	0%	-	-	\$100	\$100	5%
PRTs (including Civilian Assistance Program - Leahy)**	\$55	\$60	\$115	7%	\$84	\$55	\$106	\$245	11%
State PRT (ESF)	-	-	-	0%	-	-	\$30	\$30	1%
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	\$20	\$50	\$70	4%	\$60	-	\$90	\$150	7%
National Solidarity Program (NSP)	\$35	\$40	\$75	5%	-	\$20	\$70	\$90	4%
Support to GIROA/Cross-cutting***	\$21	\$3	\$24	1%	\$9	-	\$35	\$44	2%
Democracy/Governance (including Civil Society)	\$29	\$114	\$143	9%	\$62	\$72	\$75	\$209	10%
Elections****	\$20	\$70	\$90	6%	\$97	\$56	\$25	\$178	8%
Strategic Communications (ESF)	-	-	-	0%	-	-	\$50	\$50	2%
Rule of Law	\$6	\$25	\$31	2%	\$8	\$15	\$10	\$33	2%
Education	\$60	\$39	\$99	6%	\$88	\$6	-	\$94	4%
Health	\$77	\$36	\$113	7%	\$61	\$27	\$5	\$93	4%
Program Support	\$16	-	\$16	1%	\$29	-	\$15	\$44	2%
IDPs	-	-	-	0%	-	-	-	-	0%
Food Assistance	\$10	-	\$10	1%	\$47	-	-	\$47	2%
TOTAL	\$762	\$859	\$1,621	100%	\$838	\$455	\$861	\$2,154	100%

*The FY09 Spring Supplemental request includes \$20 million specifically for workforce development.

**After FY08, PRTs/Stabilization also includes Civilian Assistance Program (Leahy earmarked funds).

***Before FY06, Support to GIROA/Cross-cutting is captured under ARTF. Cross-cutting activities include gender, public outreach/information systems, and evaluation and M&E.

****Before the 2007 Base, Elections is captured under Democracy/Governance.

Figure 2. FY 2008–FY 2009 Budget, in Millions of U.S. dollars, to Afghanistan by USAID

Basic necessities, such as clean water, access to health care, funding for agriculture, and most of all a steady economy (which could ensure that urban and rural Afghans alike can have a chance at having some kind of employment), decreased, while the education system of Afghanistan was one of the USAID priorities. The most important issues that needed to be addressed are the present economic and health dilemmas that Afghanistan faces. A country that can provide food and water to remote areas for a majority of the population like Afghanistan will be far more beneficial in the long run than building schools because one country cannot advance itself without being able to sustain its own population.

B. POVERTY STATUS IN AFGHANISTAN

Poverty actually kills more Afghans than those who die as a direct result of the armed conflict either accidental, nor inevitable; it is both a cause and a consequence of a massive human rights deficit. The deficit includes widespread impunity and inadequate investment in, and attention to, human rights. Patronage, corruption, impunity and over-emphasis on short-term goals rather than targeted long-term development are exacerbating a situation of dire poverty that is the condition of an overwhelming majority of Afghans.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
based on an April 2010 report on a 14-province survey.¹⁹³

The 2007–2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) reported that the poverty rate for Afghanistan was 36%, which means that 9 million Afghans were not able to meet basic needs, the poor were only able to consume up to 78% of their basic needs, although 36% could not meet consumption needs, the probability of many more people becoming poor was high.¹⁹⁴ With regards to income, the report also showed that 36% of households rely on farming as their main source of income and more than half of those households report that farming is their main source of income are subsistence

¹⁹³ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010* (Washington DC: Center For Strategic and International Studies, 2010), http://csis.org/files/publication/100426_AfghanAg-Water.pdf, 2.(Accessed April 10, 2011).

¹⁹⁴ World Bank, “Poverty Status in Afghanistan National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08,” *The World Bank Economic Policy & Poverty Sector* (2010), 10.

farmers.¹⁹⁵ With regards to employment, more than 48% of employed individuals work less than thirty-five hours a week, while child labor is at 8 million Afghan children between the ages of six and fifteen who are engaged in some sort of economic activity.¹⁹⁶

Poverty not only affects employment, but makes it nearly impossible to ensure a healthy and survivable life for the population. Afghanistan holds the second highest maternal mortality rate, making it the single highest cause of death in the country, and the third worst in global ranking for child mortality.¹⁹⁷ Drinkable water only reaches out to 23% of Afghans while 24% of the population who are fifteen years and older can read and write.¹⁹⁸ Only 12.6% of women are literate, while there is only 20% literacy in rural areas; only 6% are literate in nomadic areas which are worse than with neighboring countries.¹⁹⁹ In 2009, maternal mortality in Afghanistan was 1,600 per 100,000 live births, which is five (Pakistan) to fifty times (Uzbekistan) higher than the situation in neighboring countries.²⁰⁰

With regards to food, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2010 reported that only 15–20% of the food donated reached the poorest areas.²⁰¹ One village (Badgah) received only forty sacks of wheat for six hundred families and another (Kasi) only received only ten sacks for three hundred families.²⁰² The consensus from both villages was that the food had been either embezzled or diverted elsewhere.²⁰³ Other stories of frustrated villages throughout Afghanistan share the same situations as the ones mentioned above. In Tirinkot, Uruzgan Province, policemen took a large share

¹⁹⁵World Bank, “Poverty Status in Afghanistan National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08,” *The World Bank Economic Policy & Poverty Sector* (2010), 11.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Human Rights Dimension of Poverty in Afghanistan* (Kabul, 2010), http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Poverty%20Report%2030%20March%202010_English.pdf, 2-3. (Accessed April 10, 2011).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 3.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010*, 4.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010*.

of the food aid when those distributing it refused to give a share to policemen out of sheer greed. In the Charsada district of Ghor Province, government officials were found to be involved in stealing food aid in 2009; no action was ever taken.²⁰⁴

Such examples of hoarding by the local police provide evidence that although much aid is being directed towards Afghanistan, it is not directed at the right places. Besides natural disasters, as well as the present conflict with the U.S., Afghans living in poverty are not getting what is necessary to survive. This is compounded by the absence of a system entrusted to ensure the social well being of its people and the government's inability to respond to the population's needs, especially in times of crisis.²⁰⁵

The World Food Program summed up the crises in Afghanistan with the following:²⁰⁶

1. Nearly a third of the population (7.4 million people) are unable to get enough food to live active, healthy lives. Another 8.5 million people, or 37%, are on the borderline of food insecurity.
2. Around 400,000 people each year are seriously affected by natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, earthquakes or extreme weather conditions.
3. While life expectancy has increased slightly to 44.5 years for men and 44 for women, many of the country's health indicators are alarming. Along with a high infant mortality rate, Afghanistan suffers from one of the highest levels of maternal mortality in the world (1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births).
4. More than half of children under the age of five are malnourished, and micronutrient deficiencies (particularly iodine and iron) are widespread (39% are underweight).

²⁰⁴ Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010*, 4.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 3–4.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 16.

5. In 2008, Afghanistan was hit by both drought and globally high food prices, which saw the price of wheat and wheat products increase dramatically across the country. Despite prices beginning to fall in 2009, they remain higher than normal.
6. Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Insurgent activity and military operations have affected food security in some regions, undermined reconstruction efforts and restricted humanitarian interventions.
7. Environmental degradation a severe problem. War, uncontrolled grazing, pastureland encroachment, illegal logging and the loss of forest and grass cover have worsened drought conditions and reduced agricultural productivity.

As long as areas of concern like proper food distribution, access to drinkable water, prevention of infant mortality rates, and security for the population that needs the food necessary to survive are being ignored, Afghanistan will continue to lose more of its population. Afghanistan needs more than an end to the Taliban and Al-Qaida; it needs to find a way to preserve the present population who is struggling to survive today. No school will prevent poverty, nor will it prevent corruption by those who are appointed to protect the population. Focusing on feeding and ensuring the physical well being of the population first will empower the population to educate and ensure its advancement and survival.

C. PRESENT CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN

Tactically, the U.S. has a foothold in areas that are deemed important to the mission in Afghanistan. These gains are also vital to the Afghan government who views these areas as necessary for the promotion of democracy and building a prosperous country. However, Figures 3 to 7 show that the conflict has only intensified with no signs of ending anytime soon. Figures 3 and 4 clearly show proof that there has been no break in the intensity of fighting in Afghanistan, showing a significant increase in 2009.²⁰⁷ Figure 5 shows that insurgents continue to have influence throughout the

²⁰⁷ Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010*, 25–26.

country and its indigenous population, which could aid them in their war against the U.S.²⁰⁸ Figures 6 and 7 illustrate poppy cultivation for opium has only increased, from which the Taliban is using to their advantage to fund their war against the United States, gain trust and gain influence and cooperation from the population.²⁰⁹




Figure 3. Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005–2009

²⁰⁸ Cordesman, *Afghanistan: Food and Conflict in 2010*, 27.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 29–30.





Figure 4. Rising Intensity of Fighting in 2009



Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.

UNCLASSIFIED 5

Figure 5. Insurgent Influence and Capability by District: 2009





Figure 6. Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at Province Level) (Source: Afghanistan Opium Surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC)

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)



Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2009, UNODC.

Figure 7. Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at Province Level)

Figures 3–7 illustrate that the U.S. and present Afghan government are making no real gains in areas that it pledged to free of the Taliban. Afghans in rural areas that don't have access to basic necessities to survive are being influenced by insurgents because the insurgents rely on the local population to assist in the illegal economy of opium operated to fund their war against the U.S. While these issues loom throughout the country, Afghans struggle to survive every day due to lack of access to the basic needs to sustain life. Unless the U.S. can answer to the needs of the population, the Taliban will gain its hold on the people that the U.S. promised to protect and modernize to a stable society.

D. TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

Figure 8 illustrates that terrorist incidents in Afghanistan have only increased since 2002. In 2002, casualties were at their lowest at seventy-nine.²¹⁰ However, every year after 2002 shows a steady increase to as high as 1,228 in 2008, while dropping slightly to 760 in 2009.²¹¹ Today, the U.S. is entering its tenth year of the war in Afghanistan. Casualties for both coalition forces and civilians are mounting while politicians in Washington D.C. are still searching for a solution as well as a timeline of U.S. withdrawal. The question that needs to be addressed is that if the U.S. defeats the Taliban and Al-Qaida forces, will its economic investment of reconstructing Afghanistan free it of extremism and terrorism?




Figure 8. Fatalities Resulting from Selected Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan
(Source: RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents)

²¹⁰ RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, "Fatalities Resulting from Selected Terrorist Incidents (Afghanistan) Incident Date between 2002-01-01 and 2010-12-31," <http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php> (accessed April 2, 2011).

²¹¹ Ibid.

E. CONCLUSION

Although the U.S. has invested billions of dollars in Afghanistan with the hopes of improving the lives of its people, poverty continues to plague the countryside. Lack of food and clean water that are not being distributed to areas that are in dire need of it, proper health care especially for newborns is not sufficient, lack of a study economy, and corruption from government officials makes any hope of progress bleak for the Afghan people. The war is entering its tenth year, with Al-Qaida and Taliban forces continuing to stifle U.S. hopes of ending the conflict with its control of the poppy production as well as support from rural villages. With regards to education, the U.S. has invested millions to improve the education system of Afghanistan by building more schools and expanding education opportunities to females. However, these efforts did not end the insurgency, corruption from government officials, and continued terrorist attacks.

Economic aid programs in the hopes of promoting peace do not guarantee a country free of terrorism. The U.S. has failed to realize that notion in Afghanistan. As the war continues, civilian deaths continue not by violence or by war, but by poverty due to the lack of basic needs for survival. Even if Al-Qaida and Taliban forces are defeated, the U.S. would have to ensure that the people who are responsible for providing for the Afghan people will ensure their survival. Providing millions in economic aid to Afghanistan in the hopes of assimilating it to the U.S. vision of modernization cannot guarantee it from falling back to an unstable and failed country, leaving the U.S. in another political and economic conundrum.

V. CONCLUSION

Any country that embarks on a mission of promoting modernization with education without providing a larger political economic change is likely to see increased discontent. Education is an important facet for improving a society; however, it cannot be the sole answer to prevent or reduce the likelihood of terrorism. Education in any country cannot be used as a measure of success if it cannot provide jobs, which in turn will strengthen a country's economy and self-reliance. As long as any country cannot provide basic necessities such as clean water, food, shelter and access to health care, there won't be enough children to occupy those schools. As mentioned in chapter IV, the U.S. has invested millions of dollars in education efforts. However, the country is still impoverished, government officials are still corrupt, opium is still the economy of choice, children are not getting the basic necessities, and the Taliban still exists. If the U.S. wants to have some sense of accomplishment in improving the conditions of Afghanistan, it must concentrate on the obvious problems that plague it today. This chapter will provide three insights that were reached in this thesis, and lastly; it also suggests some solutions to the problem of violence and terrorism in Afghanistan. These solutions are not meant to alleviate extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan; however, these solutions must be put in place in order to ensure that there is a move towards improvement of the country and its population.

A. INSIGHTS

1. An Educated Country Does Not Mean It Is the Most Civilized Country

Chapter I mentioned American scholars like Fukuyama, Huntington, and Olsen, who viewed education as vital to a productive and civilized society. However, they cannot answer how an educated country like the U.S. is riddled with crime and lawlessness. For the U.S. in 2009, the FBI reported that there was a murder every 34.5 minutes, a rape every six minutes, a robbery every 1.3 minutes, and an aggravated assault

every 39.1 seconds.²¹² Out of 13,687,241 arrests in the U.S. in 2009, 1,319,458, were for assault, 1,663,582 were for drug abuse violations, and 1,440,409 were for driving under the influence.²¹³ With hate crimes in 2009, there were 7,789 offenses with 8,336 victims throughout the U.S.²¹⁴ It's sobering how a global superpower like the U.S. that takes pride in educating itself cannot solve the growing crime rate in its own backyard. These statistics did not show causal factors as to why those individuals committed those crimes and whether that individual was from an educated family. However, these statistics prove that even a powerful country like the U.S. is not free from crime or terrorism from within.

2. Isolating a Minority Will Lead to Conflict and Dire Consequences

In this thesis, the author also illustrated a case where education policy became a point of contention between ethnic groups leading to the marginalization of the Tamil minority population and eventually a civil war. The war occurred between two groups: one that was seen as more educated, and the second who felt marginalized. The war, which lasted over two decades, could have been prevented if there had been more opportunities for the Sinhalese who felt that the Tamils got more than their share of the resources because of their education. Under the British, the Tamil population along with some Sinhalese elite was well educated and formed a dominant group. Feeling marginalized, the rural Sinhalese sought to cut off educational and job opportunities for the Tamils. The reduced upward mobility for the Tamils led to an educated Tamil class revolting against the Sinhalese that was marginalizing them. Although the LTTE was the violent result of that marginalization, it provides evidence that isolating a minority will only lead to dissention, anger, and then violence. The community's education level did not play a role in reducing terrorism in this case.

²¹² U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), "Crime Clock Statistics," U.S. Department of Justice, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/about/crime_clock.html (accessed April 22, 2011).

²¹³ U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), "Estimated Number of Arrests United States, 2009," U.S. Department of Justice, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (accessed April 22, 2011).

²¹⁴ U.S. Department of Justice (FBI), "Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2009," U.S. Department of Justice, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2009/data/table_01.html (accessed April 22, 2011).

3. Lack of Education Is Not the Lone Factor for Individuals Committing Terrorist Acts

Throughout this thesis, each chapter illustrated that a level of education will not prevent nor reduce the likelihood of terrorism. The eleven individuals illustrated in Chapter III are good examples of how individuals from different socioeconomic and educational backgrounds choose to be terrorists. Lack of education was not a casual factor in their rationale. This discredits the belief that education will produce a rational and law abiding citizen. What these individual cases prove is that a level of education does not prevent terrorism. Throughout history, there have been terrorist acts where perpetrators were not poor or uneducated, or solely raised with extremist ideology education from a madrasa as several of these policies not being implemented suggest.

B. WHAT REALLY NEEDS TO BE DONE IN AFGHANISTAN

As the war in Afghanistan is entering its tenth year, the Taliban has not been defeated, and in some regions has grown in popularity. Meanwhile, poverty and lawlessness continue to plague the countryside. Shortages of food, drinking water and access to health care continue to plague the Afghan population. Unemployment will not decrease unless there are programs in place to ensure the economic and social growth of Afghanistan. These programs should not be mistaken with the War on Terror. However, these programs are the easiest and most effective way of measuring success for the U.S. goals of improving Afghanistan. A newly built school means nothing if the children that are meant to occupy it are healthy and have access to basic necessities to sustain them to attend school. The U.S. needs to reevaluate how focusing on other programs outside of just education may be more cost effective in the long run. The following proposals must be put in place in order to give Afghanistan a chance while preventing its continual downward spiral. These proposals may not make Afghanistan's education rank above world standards, but these proposals will ensure the survivability of a population in need of preserving its future.

1. Make Basic Necessities for Survival *the* Priority, Not a Priority

Basic necessities that include food, water, shelter, and availability of medical care must be the focal point in Afghanistan. Success will not be measured by ensuring that the indigenous population will continue to have the basic necessities for survival, especially when the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan. USAID has given billions of dollars in economic aid to ensure the recovery and reconstruction efforts are underway as was shown in Chapter IV. However, prioritizing what will ensure survival for the indigenous population should be paramount.

With regards to food, The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) launched a groundbreaking food voucher project in eastern Afghanistan by distributing monthly food vouchers to about 1,500 families in the eastern city of Jalalabad in April 2011.²¹⁵ The program not only focuses on the poor, but also aims to boost the local economy in Afghan cities. However, this does not account for the over seven million people that are unable to have access to those programs. Although the WFP announced that there was a voucher program, it also identified a funding shortfall of \$257 million American dollars for food assistance on April 15, 2011.²¹⁶ With a lack of funds, a critical break in wheat (which is the primary food source in Afghanistan) is expected to occur in June, affecting millions of Afghans currently being assisted by WFP and partners.²¹⁷ Voucher programs for food in Jalalabad may be a great start; but only 1,500 families is nowhere near close enough to the seven million who need food now.

Access to clean water means prevention of diseases or outbreaks. It is a fact (by USAID findings) that diarrhea remains a serious health threat to Afghan children under five years of age. Most of the cases are caused by poor hygiene, sanitation, and lack of clean drinking water. USAID implemented a Community Led-Total Sanitation (CLTS)

²¹⁵ World Food Programme, “WFP Launches Food Voucher Project in Jalalabad,” <http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-launches-food-voucher-project-jalalabad> (accessed April 27, 2011).

²¹⁶ World Food Programme, “Funding Shortfall Threatens Food Assistance to Millions of Poor Afghans,” <http://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/funding-shortfall-threatens-food-assistance-millions-poor-afghans> (accessed April 27, 2011).

²¹⁷ Ibid.

approach in Chenar-e-Gunjishkan of Kalafgan District in Takhar Province, which educates the inhabitants to take preventative measures in ensuring that waterborne illnesses will not affect their district as well as access to clean water in March 2011.²¹⁸ This is a good start that not only improves sanitation and hygiene for that district, but increases the likelihood of children under five living through early infancy. Like any program for a population that lives in rural areas, improving the water system will take time, money, and most of the entire infrastructure necessary to implement and ensure its success.

In 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 4,369,086 moved to Afghanistan from Iran, Pakistan, and other countries.²¹⁹ All of the refugees believed that shelter was the most important need for integration because much of the infrastructure was destroyed, leaving many to move in with friends or family creating a crowded and adverse living condition. The UNHCR created about 180,000 shelters to accommodate refugees in need by 2009; however, those shelters only covered 25% of the over four million who have migrated to Afghanistan.²²⁰ It must be noted that these figures do not address the local population, who also don't have adequate shelter to accommodate their families. Access to shelter will continue to be a major concern for the local population as well as the thousands moving to Afghanistan from other countries.

The World Health Organization (WHO) gave the following summation regarding Afghanistan's health situation:

After 23 years of conflict and political instability, a collapsed economy, and three years of severe drought, Afghanistan's health system is among the very poorest in the world. Obtaining the most basic of necessities—food, shelter and clothing—is a constant struggle. Such exposure intensifies an already poor health situation, with acute respiratory illnesses, diarrheal diseases, and malnutrition killing and weakening the

²¹⁸ USAID, "Improved Hygiene and Sanitation Reduces Diarrheal Diseases through the SWSS Project, USAID is Implementing a Community Led-Total Sanitation Approach in Kalafgan District," http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/2156/Improved_Hygiene_and_Sanitation_Reduces_Diarrheal_Diseases (accessed April 27, 2011).

²¹⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Shelter," <http://www.unhcr.org/49ba2e9116.html> (accessed April 27, 2011), 1.

²²⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Shelter."

children of Afghanistan. There is a critical shortage of health care workers at every level. Healthcare facilities are in urgent need of restoration. There are inadequate supplies of medicines, vaccines, equipment, and fuel. An estimated 6 million people have no access or insufficient access to health care.²²¹

Besides being one of the lowest ranked in the world in life expectancy, the WHO identified that the lack of physical infrastructure (including proper housing, accessible rural roads, communication) impedes the improvement of health. It also noted that the low status of women, limited access to clean water, proper sanitation, extremely poor hygiene and environmental health shortcomings contribute to the high infant and child mortality rates.²²² With the growing refugee population, these issues will only get worse if these shortfalls are not addressed within the next five years. It is mystifying to think that the government of Afghanistan only allocated 5.2% of their GDP towards health when nearly 80% of their population lived in rural areas in 2008.²²³

The basic necessities mentioned above should be the primary focus. There have been programs set in place to address these issues; however, only limited progress has been made and the population of Afghanistan is increasing due to migration from other countries. The government of Afghanistan (with oversight by the U.S.) must first make all efforts necessary to ensure that basic necessities are met for the entire Afghan population. Second, Afghanistan must close its borders in order to care for its present population and if not, immediately increase its GDP allocation to facilitate a larger population that it must care for. Lastly, the U.S. must convene a congressional review as to where all its funding is being spent by the government of Afghanistan as well as a restructure of what programs that the U.S. is willing to continue to support. The U.S. and the government of Afghanistan must prioritize immediately to what is more important to the Afghan people: building more schools or ensuring their survivability.

²²¹ World Health Organization, "Health in Afghanistan Situation Analysis," www.who.int/disasters/epo/7543.doc (accessed April 27, 2011), 1.

²²² World Health Organization, "Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_afg_en.pdf (accessed April 27, 2011), 1.

²²³ World Health Organization, "Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance."

2. Increase Vocational Training While, Improving the Education System

The World Bank reported that 6.2 million students attend grades 1–12; the largest figure in the history of Afghanistan with 2.2 million students being girls, which has exceeded the pre-Taliban period.²²⁴ Areas of concern are improving critical areas of learning including literacy and numeric skills, problem solving, team building, critical thinking, and effective communication among the Afghan population.²²⁵ USAID boasts that it has printed more than 75.6 million textbooks, supported 43,800 students annually in remote community-based schools, trained nearly 10,500 teachers in an accelerated learning program and more than 2,600 university professors on modern teaching methods, and built or refurbished more than 680 schools in Afghanistan as of June 2010.²²⁶ These figures may show signs of progress; however, the real key is focusing on the future employment for students enrolled in those schools as well as adult programs that are in place throughout the rural and urban areas. With a majority of the population depending on farming as their livelihood, the focus should be on building a better connection between the rural and urban communities to enhance and improve the economy. The continued presence of opium trade continues to present a challenge which education does not solve.

For 2007–2008, Opium sales in Afghanistan produced \$10.2 billion U.S. dollars, which equated to 75% of its GDP. Opium fulfils two important roles in the Afghan economy: it produces the largest export profits and constitutes a major source of rural income.²²⁷ Although only 10% of Afghanistan's twenty-five million inhabitants live on poppy cultivation, it translates to 2.38 million farmers, including their family

²²⁴ World Bank, "Education in Afghanistan," <http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANE/XTN/0,,contentMDK:21682753~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:305985,00.html> (accessed April 29, 2011).

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ USAID, "Education Increasing Access to Quality Education and Suitable Learning Environments," <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/programs/education#Tab=Description> (accessed April 29, 2011).

²²⁷ Citha D. Maass, "Afghanistan's Drug Career — Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy," *German Institute for International and Security Affairs* (2011): 23–24.

members.²²⁸ There appears to be no slow down of the cultivation and distribution of opium throughout Afghanistan. With the high payout rates, rural farmers will continue to use this as their primary source of income, especially if their areas are lacking in basic necessities as well as access to other employment opportunities besides farming. For the average Afghan, dropping out of school to participate in the opium trade means providing food, shelter, and medical care for their families. Unless there are programs that can connect the rural with the urban centers for jobs and economic growth, the dependence on opium for income will continue to be the means of survival for the rural population. Education leading to no jobs does not solve the problem that the economy still relies on illicit trade to a large extent.

There appears to be some recognition of the disconnect between focusing on enrollment vis-a-vis the type of jobs available. The World Bank in Afghanistan is in the process of designing a project on vocational education and training (VET) driven by the following three present economic realities:

- Youth unemployment and underemployment pose both developmental and security problems;
- Workers from neighboring countries are largely meeting the country's demand for skilled labor, which reduces the employment prospects for Afghan citizens;
- The country's success in getting children back into school has produced a large number of students with few skills for integration into the labor market.²²⁹

These three realities show the importance of supporting programs like VET and not the present goal of just ensuring higher enrollment in schools. The U.S. needs to understand the long-term economic gains by investing in finding a healthy balance between literacy, school enrollment, and future economic growth by better skilled Afghans, not hired labor from other countries.

²²⁸ Maas, "Afghanistan's Drug Career," 23.

²²⁹ World Bank, "Afghanistan Skills Training," <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22023961~menuPK:2246552~pagePK:2865106~piPK:2865128~theSitePK:223547,00.html> (accessed May 1, 2011).

One can argue that USAID already has vocational programs like Learning for Community Empowerment Program (LCEP-2)²³⁰ and Skills Training for Afghan Youth (STAY)²³¹ underway since 2008 and 2010, respectively. However, both programs are only in place until 2013.²³² These programs must be a long-term investment, not a program that needs to be re-evaluated by 2013. The measure of success is determined on how much time, and yes, economic risk in ensuring that those involved in programs like LCEP-2 and STAY can be successful long after their training in those programs. There is no denying that programs like the ones mentioned above are already in place; however, there needs to be a concerted effort in supporting those programs that could bolster the workforce in Afghanistan, which will in turn bolster its economy.

Increasing vocational training to bolster the workforce and economic base in Afghanistan is a long-term and expensive investment. Some of the risks of continuing vocational training include: the opium trade will continue to be the source of income, those living in rural areas will only want to use agriculture as a means of income well as survival, and little interest to connect with the urban cities. The gains that it can give to the Afghan population are: bolstering the workforce throughout all of Afghanistan (rural and urban), increase trade and commerce with other countries, and looking to other forms of income outside the illicit growth and distribution of opium. Vocational programs like LCEP-2 and STAY target the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas and it will take years to assess any success. However, the reality is clear: unemployment is at its highest

²³⁰ LCEP-2 works in twenty provinces across Afghanistan and has already enrolled 167,000 community members (60% are female). A recent evaluation documented the difficulty of developing viable economic activities without strong local businesses, and the revised project will focus on literacy and livelihood training, while relying more upon networking and other entities for business and micro-enterprise development.

²³¹ The STAY project represents a collaboration of the USAID Education and Economic Growth teams; it addresses education and workforce development needs for youth ages 15 to 25. The project supports vocational training schools in two provinces, and provides small grants that target education and life skills training for highly vulnerable, out of school, illiterate youth. The vocational school for continues USAID's support to the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute, a coeducational vocational school that providing a two-year postsecondary program in fields needed to support Afghanistan's economic growth.

²³² USAID, *Education Increasing Access to Quality Education and Suitable Learning Environments*.

in Afghanistan, jobs are being taken by people from other countries and, even with a high enrollment of students in schools, many are not given the tools necessary to compete in the current Afghan job market.

3. Immediately Restructure Funding for Afghanistan

There is no doubt that after military kinetic operations conclude in Afghanistan the U.S. will continue to provide economic support for at least another ten years. Until now, there has been no sign of progress from Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, from 2002–2009, funding from just USAID alone to Afghanistan totaled more than \$9 billion.²³³ As of now, unemployment, poverty, illegal drug trade, lack of medical care, high infant mortality, and lack of a competent government to provide security and the basic needs to its people still continue to plague Afghanistan. The U.S. has overseen all the operations that the government and the people of Afghanistan have undertaken to make it a better country. However, there have been no significant changes or improvement to their present situation. The U.S. understands the political and military importance that Afghanistan holds in the region; however, it needs to draw the line on how taxpayer dollars are spent as well as American lives lost in this war. With the present administration in Washington, there will not be a push to stop all economic funding to Afghanistan; however, the following measures must be taken soon to ensure that U.S. aid is better utilized to make Afghanistan a better partner as well as a country that can be free of U.S. dependency in the near future.

First, priority must be focused on its people by ensuring that improving the infrastructure can provide the basic necessities for the average Afghan to survive. With a better infrastructure, clean water means a higher probability of healthier children who can go to school, elimination of non-communicable diseases, homes that are habitable, and centers that can provide better health care.

²³³ USAID, “Budget and Obligations,” <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget> (accessed May 1, 2011).

Second, feeding a country means having the right personnel that can distribute it to the people. If Afghanistan continues to allow corrupt government and law enforcement personnel have possession of food distribution, rural inhabitants will continue to be disgruntled, leaving them no choice but to depend on groups like the Taliban to support them while supporting terrorist operations. Forty-seven million dollars from 2008–2009 from USAID²³⁴ was not enough for the seven million who were without food, and more will continue to go hungry as more people from other countries continue to migrate to Afghanistan. This area of concern needs to be rectified sooner than later.

Third, the goal of the U.S. is to make Afghanistan self-reliant, not a country that is provided aid by the U.S. in its war against Al-Qaida. There needs to be a clear message given to Afghan government that the U.S. will provide the means necessary to ensure that the Afghan people will have the means and the training necessary to make itself a country that can connect the rural and urban areas for social and economic growth. Unless the Afghan government does not realize that aid can and will be limited, especially when the U.S. does not deem the country tactically and economically important, Afghanistan will continue to be dependent on U.S. aid and will continue its downward spiral as one of the poorest and unproductive countries in the world.

Many would argue that restructuring the budget to three priorities would be next to impossible to achieve. However, the U.S. has provided more than its share to Afghanistan and it is now time for Afghanistan to become self-reliant. The U.S. has done enough and the cost has been high, both with tax-payer money and the lives of its own military personnel. It is true that these priorities will be a long-term solution; however, it needs to start now, not after the next election. By restructuring the priority of funding to Afghanistan, the U.S. can focus on the real needs for Afghanistan, which will hopefully mean a successful conclusion to this present operation. The U.S. mission for Afghanistan must be focused on finding a solution for long term economic and social development.

²³⁴ USAID, “Budget and Obligations.”

Unless it finds a way to structure its economic and military support to Afghanistan, the U.S. will find itself in a long term commitment with a country that will drain U.S. aid as well as the lives of its own citizens.

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