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THESIS

**THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN EGYPT:
PURSUING MODERATION WITHIN AN
AUTHORITARIAN ENVIRONMENT**

by

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June 2011

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PURSUING MODERATION WITHIN AN AUTHORITARIAN ENVIRONMENT**

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ABSTRACT

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is one of the biggest Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa, and its role in the future of Egyptian politics deserves careful consideration in light of the recent overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's regime. Over the past decades, the MB has changed their relationship with successive Egyptian authoritarian regimes by continuously renouncing violence and abiding by a moderate path as a means to achieve their objectives. This study uses competing theoretical approaches to understand the reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to abide by a moderate strategy. The major finding of this study is that, over time, a combination of external and internal factors, such as regime repression and constraints and leadership, organizational and generational structures, as well as ideological influences, have shaped the organization's decision making. Furthermore, this study highlights the stagnation of this moderate development in the face of both regime constraints and internal leadership and generational issues, and demonstrates that the mode of recovery from this stagnation will be critical in the Muslim Brotherhood's future orientation as a movement.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Since its foundation by the young schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has become a powerful mass movement characterized by broad public support that enables it to present strong political opposition to different Egyptian regimes. Despite phases of cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling regimes headed by various presidents, for the most part, the relationship has been shaped by the state's comprehensive repression of the organization. The followers of the Muslim Brotherhood attributed the cultural, economic, and social grievances, as well as the stagnating democratization of the country, to bad governance by Egyptian political leaders, which widened the gap between both sides. However, a revolution or any other form of violent regime change was never considered an option for the Muslim Brotherhood in bringing about political change in Egypt. On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to pursue a nonviolent path, rejected violent and radical tendencies within the organization, and openly opposed radical Islamist movements that were using force and terror against the Egyptian state.¹ The aim of this thesis is to answer the major research question: Why did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood pursue its moderate path and reject a radical strategy against the different ruling regimes?

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state covers a relatively long period of time, marked by the presidencies of Gamal Adel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. This factor adds to the enormous and intricate complexity of the research question. Taking this factor into account, it will be further necessary to ask the following questions:

¹ In this context, *radicalization* and *moderation* are understood as processes of relative change. *Radicalization* presents the ideological and/or behavioral transformations of a movement leading to the rejection of democratic principles and the very likely use of violence as a means to achieve political objectives. *Moderation* describes the ideological and/or behavioral change of Islamist movements towards the acceptance of democracy (for example acceptance of democratic values or the participation in elections). Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 4–7.

1. What factors influenced the strategies and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood in its organizational development?
2. Did these factors change over time?
3. What was the causal weight of different factors on the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood?

B. IMPORTANCE

In recent years, many publications in newspapers, journals, or books have questioned the stability of Egypt, anticipating a press for political change or even considering the country at the brink of revolution, for various reasons.² These assumptions were eventually confirmed in 2011. After revolutionary public pressure based on mounting dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime's rule, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. Mubarak, who was considered an ally in the pursuit of Western regional policies, left the Armed Forces Supreme Council in charge of the country. Since then, the Egyptians face an uncertain future, which gives reason for concern with regard to relations between Egypt and the West. In particular, news of increasing Islamist influence is perceived as a huge threat to Western interests by prominent Western politicians, militaries, and Middle Eastern scholars. They fear that Islamist currents raise anti-Western, conservative, or even radical Islamic sentiments, which oppose further democratic development and Western political influence in Egypt and the Middle East. In this context, the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest Islamist organization, are judged.

Having lost regional influence due to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of Sadat's presidency and emerging powers like Iran and Turkey, Egypt still plays an important role with regard to the stability of the Middle East. This is of particular interest for American and Western policymakers. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood, which already formed strong opposition against the old regime and enjoys popularity in

² Aladdin Elaasar, "Is Egypt Stable?" *Middle East Quarterly* 16, no.3 (Summer 2009): 69–75. "After Mubarak," *The Economist* 396, iss. 8691 (July 17, 2010): SS15–SS16. Helmar Dumbs, "Ägypten-Experte: 'Kritische Masse will den Wandel'," *DiePresse.com*, February 22, 2010, accessed November 12, 2010, <http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/541610/aegyptenexperte-kritische-masse-will-den-wandel?from=suche.intern.portal>. Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet, *Egypt: The Moment of Change* (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2009). John R. Bradley, *Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008/2009).

Egyptian society, should not be underestimated and might crucially tip the scales in a potential turmoil or in unstable times characterized by uncertainty. Especially under these circumstances, the certainty that the Muslim Brotherhood did not tend to turn radical, but despite their repression for decades, eventually pursue a peaceful political transition may lay Western fears to rest.

Furthermore, the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers is the oldest and most important organization of political Islamism. Its rise as an Islamic reform movement had influence not only on political developments in Egypt, but also in other countries. The dissemination of its ideas, resources, or even personnel led to the foundation of many branches or subsidiaries in the Arab, and later the Western, world. Although these subsidiaries have mostly aligned their political emphasis with the influences of their national and political environments, there is still an active exchange of ideas and mutual support among the organizations.

Though Egypt has steadily lost cultural and political influence as a leading Arab state since the end of the Nasser era, national developments might still have a tremendous influence on the Arab world. For that reason, a behavior or policy change by a leading former opposition force with a vital network to its subsidiaries, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, might cause significant changes in politics of other states. Moreover, the role of a leading Islamist organization may be critical in these times, when many consider the recent public uprisings as a revolutionary domino effect that will spread further and further. Even Western societies whose demographics predict a rising Muslim population are perhaps affected.³

Once more, this link between Islamist organizations underlines another reason that the West has an interest in preserving stability in Egypt after the revolution. Beyond that, this also explains why a further analysis of the moderate development of the

³ Paul M. Lützeler, "Germany Today, or the Atlantic Dream," in *Kulturpolitik und Politik der Kultur/Cultural Politics and the Politics of Culture*, ed. Helen Fehervary and Bernd Fischer (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2007), 83–84. Adrian Michaels, "Muslim Europe: the demographic time bomb transforming the continent," *The Telegraph*, August 8, 2009, accessed November 12, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/muslim-europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html>.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its rejection of radicalism is so important. Based on the existing network, the denial of violence of the Egyptian moderate Islamists, despite repression by an authoritarian regime, may be an example for its branches in other countries with similar experiences or political conditions. The Egyptian organization might influence others to make positive changes in policies and induce a spirit of moderation.

Finally, most of the present literature explains how radical Islamist movements can be de-radicalized and deliver different solutions or tools based on experiences from involvement in national programs. Other authors focus on the different reasons for social and violent revolutions within states, and even Muslim rebellions against their states. But, having a compelling example like the Muslim Brotherhood at hand, it is necessary to analyze why an Islamist movement, through the different episodes in its past, repeatedly denies radicalization and abides by a moderate development to achieve its objective. This will provide valuable information to governments in dealing with similar organizations within their own countries in the future.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the course of this thesis, five theoretical approaches are considered to contribute to an explanation of the pursuit of moderation by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and will be applied to the case of the Islamist organization. The following literature review will briefly discuss these theories chosen to deliver a promising explanation for the moderate and nonviolent path of the Muslim Brothers.

The first theoretical approach is to answer the research question from a political perspective, based on the findings of Robert Michels, a German sociologist who studied the development of socialist and social-democratic parties in Europe. Michels's observations led to his political theory of the "iron law of oligarchy," which was published in his book *Political Parties*.⁴ According to this theory, the bigger a party

⁴ Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). While most of the book focuses on leadership, only part six deals in detail with the iron law of oligarchy and organizational elements of parties.

grows over time, the more necessary will be bureaucratic elements to lead and structure it. Bureaucracy provides a hierarchical structure that ensures efficiency and enables communication between members and decision-making within the party. In short, successful interaction and participation of these parties under their environmental influences makes the adoption of an institutional structure mandatory.

Once in place, bureaucracy develops from a means to an end. With regard to the parties analyzed by Michels, bureaucracy leads to a preoccupation with running the organization and further securing its success. Formerly revolutionary ideas are step by step undermined and give way to bureaucratic necessities. Additionally, it is an objective of the party's leaders to consolidate their interests as an elite within the party. Therefore, Michels concludes, the organization of a party ultimately leads to oligarchy or oligarchic tendencies.⁵

Oligarchy prevents a political party from taking risks that challenge its existence and bureaucracy preoccupies it and prevents it from following revolutionary tendencies. Thus Michels's theory presents a possible explanation for the moderate development of the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast with the following two theoretical approaches, Michels's findings are applicable to all organizations in general and do not necessarily imply political participation. However, if a group or movement seeks to enter political life, institutional and bureaucratic complexity increases according to the core requirements of its political activity.

The second and third theories that may explain the behavior of the Brotherhood focus on the relationship between political party and voter. First, there is the "median voter theory" first mentioned in an article by the Scottish economist Duncan Black and later popularized in a 1957 book by the economist Anthony Downs.⁶ Downs assumes in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* that an organization entering the political game primarily seeks power, income, and prestige—in short, success. In this context, he

⁵ Michels, *Political Parties*, 372–374, 400–401.

⁶ Duncan Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making," *The Journal of Political Economy* 56, no.1 (February 1948): 23–34. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1957), chs. 4, 7–8.

considers ideology and political ideas important to an organization; they are usually the expression of its purpose. However, Downs contends that in order to survive in the political arena *per se* and be successful, organizations must, if necessary, prioritize their pursuit of political survival and influence over their “...desire to implement ideological doctrines or serve particular social groups.”⁷

Consequently, it is of highest importance for parties to attract a majority of voters, even if this means an ideological shift, and according to the median voter theory, an organization’s ultimate key to success in elections is winning the middle of the voting spectrum. Therefore, a party does well to change its political programs and commit to the mainstream voters to ensure electoral success.

Applied to powerful Islamist parties or organizations, this means that these groups when entering political life probably move away from any extreme, revolutionary, or radical positions in order to maintain enough support to secure their position in the political game. In doing so, they are fully aware of the fact that they will lose their voters again if they return to their extremist political origin. In the long run, this leads to a more centrist course or political position with increasingly moderate views and further political openness.

However, the median voter theory only applies to single-peaked voting preferences, that is, if a single culmination of voters in the middle of the voting spectrum exists. In two- or multiple-peaked voting preferences, with more than one culmination, the political advantages of the median voters are inapplicable.

Electoral incentives are also an important element of another explanation for political behavior, the “pothole theory.” In her article “Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” Sheri Berman offers the pothole theory as an explanation for the pursuit of moderation.⁸ This approach assumes that an organization’s political environment and its participation in democratic institutions strongly influence its behavior. This leads to

⁷ Downs, *An Economic Theory*, 112.

⁸ Sheri Berman, “Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no.1 (January 2008): 5–6.

Berman's argument that an organization or a party that is entering the political game—no matter if it has revolutionary or extremist roots—must constantly convince its voters that it is capable of meeting constituent expectations.

There is a simple reason for this argument. In a party-voter relationship, dissatisfied voters are able to impose electoral sanctions on a party if it does not meet the wishes and demands of the constituency. Therefore, parties try to avoid these so-called audience costs and please their voters and potential constituents whenever possible. While the satisfaction of the voters becomes more and more a determinant factor in daily party life, the importance of a political party's objectives and behavior turn out to lose influence. Therefore, Berman concludes that organizations following this principle "...are busy filling potholes, fixing cracked sidewalks, and upgrading faulty sewage systems [and] tend to have little time left over for ideology, political rigidity, or radicalism."⁹

However, median-voter and pothole theory only apply to situations when political activity is possible for a party or organization. Especially in an authoritarian environment, the opportunities to participate in elections or public electoral processes are often restricted. This restriction ensures the unchallenged rule of the respective regime by excluding potential political opponents from the political game.

Referring to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, the idea of "Islamist auto-reform" also needs to be considered as an explanation regarding the behavior of Islamist organizations.¹⁰ Wickham defines Islamist auto-reform "...as the call for change in a movement's goals and strategies by members of the movement itself."¹¹ She argues that over time, political groups pass through a kind of learning process while playing the political game. These groups internalize the rules and norms of their political environment or framework, which eventually has a great impact on their ideology and behavior. In other words, participation in politics not only influences an organization's

⁹ Berman, "Taming Extremist Parties," 6.

¹⁰ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Causes and Dynamics of Islamist Auto-Reform," *ICIS International* 6, no.2 (Winter 2006): 6–7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

tactical moves in the political arena, but also a change of ideological or strategic principles of the whole organization by the means of internalization.

Consequently, argues Wickham, the Islamist movements manage to move away from their strict Islamist views, which are often not compatible with modern and democratic political concepts. In turn, this gives room for further openness to new political ideas and nonviolent development within these political groups. Therefore, Wickham's Islamist auto-reform presents another interesting theoretical approach that needs to be taken into account regarding the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, a downside of this theory is that Islamist auto-reform depends on a kind of cost-benefit ratio for the group, eventually influencing its will to be open to changes. This means for instance, that an organization's leadership has to be convinced that reform is beneficial to the group. Therefore, the mere fact of participation in a liberal political arena does not necessarily lead to moderation but does, at least, offer the opportunity.¹²

A last theoretical approach is founded on the assumption in "organizational theory" that organizations are significantly influenced by external or extrinsic factors and internal or intrinsic factors. In this context, external factors are understood as variables shaping the environment of an organization, such as political, legal, economic, cultural, or social factors. It is rather difficult for an organization to influence these heteronomous variables. Internal factors, such as leadership, motivation, learning receptivity, values (cultural or ideological), generational shifts, conflicts, or the formal structure also represent important characteristics that need to be analyzed in the course of this thesis.¹³

Some of the factors mentioned in the context of organizational theory will already be covered by the other theoretical approaches discussed above and, thus, will not reveal new or further explanations to the given case. However, the analysis of the behavior of

¹² Wickham, "Islamist Auto-Reform," 7. Besides leadership, influential cooperation with other groups or parties, a powerful political base or a general majoritarian openness and attraction might also be important.

¹³ Jerald Greenberg and Robert A. Baron, *Behavior in Organizations: Understanding and Managing the Human Side of Work* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000). Andrew J. Dubrin, *Foundations of Organizational Behavior: An Applied Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984). Steven L. McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, *Organizational Behavior: Essentials* (New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2007). Babette E. Bensoussan and Craig S. Fleisher, *Analysis without Paralysis: 10 tools to make better strategic decisions* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), Ch. 10–11.

the Muslim Brotherhood demands further focus on external factors like political, legal, and social influences, as well as on the impact of leadership, generational shifts, and conflicts on the internal side of the organizational spectrum.

For example, the consequences of state repression in its different forms may be an important aspect of external political and legal factors in any given case. Furthermore, an organization is probably influenced by its social environment, forces opposing it, and other parties, all of which eventually affect its behavior. All these examples represent important external factors for a political organization and need to be analyzed. External factors present themselves as opportunities or possible threats to an organization, both of which considerably channel its actions, policies and energies.

Analyzing internal factors, on the other hand, reveals strengths and weaknesses of an organization that affect its intrinsic motivation to adapt or deny a certain policy or path. Thus, by considering internal and external factors in the framework of organizational theory, further rationale for organizational behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood may be provided. At the same time, this theoretical approach will top off the four other theoretical foundations of the thesis. Nevertheless, due to the obviously comprehensive character of this approach, additional restrictions are inevitable and will be determined within the thesis.

The literature review focuses on these theories as the key to solving the research question. At this point, a detailed presentation of the manifold and extensive literature on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would go far beyond the scope of this literature review. Therefore, in the course of this thesis the above-mentioned literature will be used to access scholarly views on the Muslim Brotherhood.

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

The theoretical approaches chosen to find an answer to the research question produce the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The bigger and more organized an Islamist group grows, the more it is focused on managing the organization and the more averse it is to taking any risk that

threatens loss of its achievement. Consequently, it rejects extremist policies and becomes more moderate. If a group is smaller and less organizational effort is necessary to control and lead it, the rejection of further moderation is likely. Furthermore, if a group grows and organizational elements are not installed, control is nonexistent and even radicalization is possible.

Hypothesis 2: If an Islamist movement is able to secure its political position by concentrating its political efforts on the median voter within the political arena, it will have political success and adopt centrist political views. However, if the movement focuses on its original core constituency, as distinct from the peak of voters, it will have less success and abide by its extremist attitude, which opposes moderation.

Hypothesis 3: When Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood participate in an electoral process in accordance with the pothole theory and, therefore, focus on the wishes and demands of constituents, they turn towards or abide by a moderate political development. Otherwise, they will consistently strive for the achievement of their Islamist objectives, if necessary, by adopting radical or rigid traits.

Hypothesis 4: The longer an organization participates in the political game and follows the rules of the game, the higher the possibility that moderate traits succeed over ideological views. If a more radical or extremist organization attends the political arena for only a short period, its extreme ideological views dominate its political appearance.

Hypothesis 5: Based on organizational theory, development and decision making in any organization are significantly influenced by the external and internal factors to which it is exposed. Therefore, extrinsic or intrinsic impacts provoke behavior. In phases without these impacts, no development occurs at all. However, if they are present, internal and external factors can enforce moderate development of an Islamist group in addition to the other possibilities already mentioned above. If either external or internal factors deny this, moderation stalls and radical, or extreme, tendencies quite likely increase.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The research question seeks to determine why the Muslim Brotherhood continued to pursue a moderate path and rejected a radical strategy against different Egyptian regimes. The factors that influenced the decision making process are of vital interest for the solution of the puzzle. However, the question cannot be considered outside of context, namely, the influence of the respective ruling authoritarian regimes in Egypt on decision making. Without considering the circumstances, a true and comprehensive answer to the research question is not possible. Therefore, in order to answer the given research question, the single case-study method is considered best and will be used. Certain intervening variables will be analyzed thereby to link potential cause to observed effects or actions in certain periods of history and, thus, explain the decision making of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the given case study, it will be easier to split the interaction between the Islamist organization and the Egyptian state into different periods, according to the presidents of the respective ruling regimes. The reason for this approach is simple. After the Free Officers Movement of 1952, the political system in Egypt became a centralized regime headed by a president pooling all power in his person. Therefore, the external factors, which have affected the Muslim Brotherhood, are strongly dependent on the influence of the authoritarian rulers of Egypt—this means Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak.

The theoretical approach to the question is founded on the different theories discussed in the literature review of this introduction. The thesis will mainly rely on secondary literature or publicly accessible information, such as Internet sources, different sources of Egyptian public opinion, and statements of the Egyptian government and Muslim Brotherhood (MB).

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized into three main chapters and a concluding chapter.

Chapter II explores the relationship between the MB and the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime. The analysis will focus on the circumstances that led to a split in the Islamist

organization and eventually the breakaway of a radical grouping while the movement's mainstream finalized a decision to deny violence.

Chapter III examines the interaction between Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. The chapter provides insight into the further consolidation of the MB's moderate path, despite a revival of more radical trends in Egyptian society.

Chapter IV considers the development of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Mubarak era. This chapter illustrates how different influences facilitated a kind of jumpy rollercoaster ride, which led to a constant back and forth between a moderate and rather conservative alignment of the MB. Furthermore, it provides an explanation why the moderate progression of the MB eventually stagnated by the end of the last decade.

Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis and it presents the rationale behind the decision to pursue moderation and reject radicalization. Furthermore, it briefly considers how the findings may draw a deduction for the Muslim Brotherhood's potential behavior and political path after Hosni Mubarak's resignation in 2011.

II. SPLIT IN RADICALS AND MODERATES IN THE NASSER ERA

A. INTRODUCTION

In the 1920s, there emerged in Egypt a young Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the aim of its founder, Hasan al-Banna, to establish an Islamic state in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly gained strength during its first years. In the 1940s the Islamist movement became an influential and powerful political movement. However, in the following decade, increasing differences with the ruling Free Officers Movement led to an intense crackdown, which pushed the Muslim Brotherhood into probably its darkest period. On one side, state repression threatened the movement's very existence. On the other, this period saw the emergence of a deep-rooted, internal struggle that divided the movement into a moderate and a radical wing. The latter eventually broke away and formed a new generation of radicals outside the confines of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of today's radical Islamic organizations directly originate or connect with the strong ideological roots of this generation. This split marked the Muslim Brotherhood's decision to reject violence and pursue a non-violent and moderate path to achieve its objectives.

This historical event remains important for two reasons. First, it is an example of a decisive transition of an Islamist organization with occasionally radical tendencies into a non-violent, moderate organization. Analyzing this organizational split establishes a theoretical framework that is useful for considering the development of other radical Islamist movements. Second, with regard to recent political developments in Egypt, this history arouses great interest in the lively discussion among politicians about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's future, based on the perception that the Brotherhood presents a threat to democratic development. This chapter focuses on the Brotherhood's history and seeks an answer to the question: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood split into a moderate and a radical wing in the Nasser era?

Some scholars consider ideological change as the most influential factor leading to the breakaway of radicals; others regard the crackdown of the regime as a possible explanation. Yet, others take a comprehensive approach and assume the concurrence of different factors in their case studies. It is not the idea of this chapter to critically review the existing literature on the topic. Rather, this research seeks to explain the internal schism of the Muslim Brotherhood by means of a comprehensive approach based on organizational theory. This approach assumes that any Islamist organization, like other organizations, is significantly influenced by extrinsic and intrinsic factors.

In the course of this chapter, it will become clear that the split of the Muslim Brotherhood into two wings cannot be reduced to one factor. Furthermore, both extrinsic and intrinsic factors had a significant influence on the division. The elements considered had various weights and influences on each other. Therefore, a complex correlation of leadership weakness, external state repression, and ideological views will be examined and presented as the solution to the given research question.

The following section provides a rough overview of the major developments that led to an increasing internal chasm between the Brothers, split the Muslim Brotherhood into two camps, and eventually caused the radical members to break away. Next, external and internal factors will be analyzed. The section seeks to explain this outcome from a theoretical perspective by discussing a broad spectrum of influential factors, relying on secondary literature for examples and insight into the nexus.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

After the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna focused on consolidating the young organization's strength by establishing a strong social network and conducting missionary work. His objectives changed in the 1930s. By the end of this decade, the Islamists entered the political field, expanded, and followed a path of open, violent opposition to British influence and increased involvement in the Palestine-Jewish conflict. In 1948, the MB participated in the war in Palestine, fighting against secular parties and attacking government officials with the help of well-trained Brothers returning from the battlefield. Al-Banna no longer hesitated to openly express his anti-

Zionist, anti-imperial, and anti-secular sentiments. However, the assassination of the Egyptian prime minister forced government officials to react, and in 1949 al-Banna was assassinated in retaliation.¹⁴

The elimination of their charismatic leader and subsequent arrests of thousands of Brothers hit the organization hard and led the MB into a period of political factionalism. Led by al-Banna's successor, Supreme Guide¹⁵ Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi, who represented an uneasy compromise among factions, the MB reorganized and sought cooperation against the monarchy with the Free Officers Movement (FOM). This partnership, based on years of good relations¹⁶ between the military and Islamists, was the driving force behind the end of the Egyptian monarchy on July 23, 1952. The MB enabled the FOM's coup d'état by acting both as a security force preventing external intervention and as a protector ensuring the safe disappearance of the coup's leaders in case of a failure.¹⁷

However, the honeymoon between the two conspiring groups was short. The main problem was that there was no common understanding of the character of the future government. From their ideological perspective, the MB looked forward to the establishment of an Islamic state, or at least the strong influence of divine law in a future secular state. But the FOM was interested neither in a theocratic state nor strong MB influence in government matters and, consequently, rejected these ideas. Furthermore, al-Hudaybi's attitude and single-handed political undertakings were perceived as opposing Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's revolutionary FOM, and provoked reactions that drove the wedge even deeper between the former allies. The Brothers' disunity and al-Hudaybi's lack of skilled leadership eventually led to an attempt by MB members to

¹⁴ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (Westport: Hyperion Press Inc., 1981), 177–185. Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt – The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement* (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 2010), Ch. 8. Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 58–79.

¹⁵ Depending on the source General Guide or the Arab word *murshid* is used synonymously.

¹⁶ The relationship was mainly based on common participation in the recent war in Palestine against Israel, training of the MB by the military and several officers' membership in the Islamist movement. Pursuing their ideological objectives, the Islamists were also increasingly opposed to monarchy and imperialism and saw a chance in conspiring with the Free Officers to affect their goals.

¹⁷ Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 92–96, 101–104. Harris, *Nationalism*, 196.

assassinate Nasser. The failure of the assassination led to a massive crackdown on the Islamists. As a consequence, the MB leadership was imprisoned, many members were executed, and hundreds received prison sentences. This almost put an end to the movement's very existence.¹⁸

The experiences from Nasser's crackdown, which also led to massive abuse and torture of the Brothers in prison, and the secular, nationalistic, and authoritarian politics of the regime influenced Sayyid Qutb, the Society's foremost ideologue of the 1950s and 1960s. Initially, like many Brothers a supporter of Nasser, Qutb was sorely disappointed in Egypt's development under Nasser. Based on his experiences, he assumed a hostile attitude towards the regime and pursued a more radical and violent approach to achieving the vision of an Islamic state. His book *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (*Milestones*), published during his 1964 imprisonment, clearly outlined his thoughts and became the ideological guide for an emerging radical Islamist movement.¹⁹

Qutb's ideas kindled a discussion about the MB's future ideological development, which ultimately became a decision for or against a more radical path. Al-Hudaybi and his followers formed an opposition to Qutb. They pursued a less radical objective and published their thoughts in the work *Preachers, not Judges* in 1977. However, their broader objective was not to criticize Qutb's ideological heritage, but rather to focus on moderating imprisoned and radicalized members. Moreover, the book was a clear stance against "...the ideology of radical Islamist movements."²⁰ *Preachers, not Judges* offered a nonviolent alternative to the path of the Qutbists. Al-Hudaybi and his followers were to

¹⁸ Harris, *Nationalism*, 197–203. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, Ch. 5. Christian Wolff, *Die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft: Von der Utopie zur Realpolitik* (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag GmbH, 2008), 39–40.

¹⁹ Barbara Zollner, "Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood's Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel Nasser's Persecution, 1954 to 1971," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (2007): 413–414. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Affairs* 86 (March/April 2007): 109. Barbara Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 31–39.

²⁰ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 71.

a certain degree successful in convincing some members to return and abide by a moderate path. Nevertheless, some proponents of Qutb's radical ideas broke away from the MB.²¹

C. FACTORS FACILITATING THE SPLIT INTO TWO BRANCHES

As explained in the introduction, this analysis will focus on elements from organizational theory. Consequently, the variables that are considered important in answering the research question are divided into extrinsic and intrinsic factors, which are again divided into subcategories. This will not only allow a broad spectrum of possible influences on the division of the movement to be covered, but also a clear allocation of findings with regard to external and internal impacts. In short, this approach ensures a comprehensive consideration of the MB divide into the radical and the moderate camp in the 1960s and 1970s.

1. Extrinsic Factors

In this context, external factors are understood as variables shaping the environment of an organization politically, legally, culturally, and socially. The following paragraphs analyze the effects of state repression and other political, social, and cultural factors on the internal split of the MB. Extrinsic and intrinsic factors may also interact to a certain degree, and a close look at links between them is important for further analysis.

a. Repression

Mohammed Hafez's studies have shown that a repressive environment may cause a violent response from Islamist movements to protect the well-being of the organization.²² The crackdown on the MB and the following phases of repression—including imprisonment, torture, exile, and condemnation—should be considered from this point of view. The near eradication of the MB led to further radicalization of parts of the organization. As mentioned, Qutb—the driving ideological force of the organization

²¹ Ashour, *De-Radicalization*, 85. Zollner, "Prison Talk," 420, 424–425.

²² Mohammed M. Hafez, *Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), Ch. 3.

during these years—was strongly influenced by these experiences. He used his studies, teachings, and writings to spread his belief in more radical and even violent approaches to Islamist objectives. Due to a good support network provided by his family and the Muslim Sisterhood, Qutb managed not only to reach his fellow Islamist inmates in prisons, but also the remains of the MB leadership and fellow Brothers hiding in the underground network.²³

Qutb's ideas were very popular and influenced many members of the MB. Consequently, he was asked to become the spiritual leader of *Organization 1965*, a group of formerly imprisoned members of the MB who supported his views. His propagandistic writing became the foundation of the educational outreach of the new group, which was striving towards Islamist activism. They considered themselves the true believers and Islamic vanguard against misguided leaders and regimes, following the path of *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of divine guidance) that Qutb had addressed in *Milestones*. However, as Qutb had foreseen in *Milestones*, as soon as *Organization 1965* was detected by Nasser's regime, a new wave of repression overtook the MB. *Organization 1965* members were brought to court and "...accused of planning to overthrow the state system."²⁴ Qutb was among others sentenced to death and hanged in August 1966, thereby becoming, in the eyes of his followers, a prophet and also a martyr for jihad. The perception of his death as a martyrdom, along with the fresh phase of repression, strengthened the Qutbists and other radical and militant Islamist movements.²⁵

Nevertheless, scholars like Omar Ashour add a further key factor to Hafez's findings about how repression can decisively turn the course of events. Ashour believes that repression can also help de-radicalize Islamist movements that are utilizing violence to achieve their goals. He argues that short phases of repression cause radicalization, while intense and sustained repression may indeed provoke a moderately oriented rethinking of among Islamist leadership. This turn for the better is based on

²³ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 41–42.

²⁴ Zollner, "Prison Talks," 419.

²⁵ Ibid., 418. Leiken and Brooke, "Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," 110. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, accessed November 7, 2010, http://www.izharudeen.com/uploads/4/1/2/2/4122615/milestones_www.izharudeen.com.pdf, 7, 63.

consideration of the costs of protracted violence and the theological legitimacy of violence. Therefore, Ashour believes that leadership in such a repressive environment probably tips the scales decisively.²⁶

In the case of the MB, al-Hudaybi often showed his opposition to violence as a means of achieving the MB's objectives. Besides his stance against the Secret Apparatus and radical members in his early years as the Supreme Guide of the Brothers, he opposed violent engagement and preferred a moderate path during his leadership. Furthermore, although extent of al-Hudaybi's backing of the founding of *Organization 1965* remains unclear, it is believed that he agreed to it under the condition that its members would not use violent means. It was also al-Hudaybi who took a clear stand against the violent path of the Qutbists' ideas when he later distanced himself from *Organization 1965* and all its activities. Al-Hudaybi and his followers opted for a moderate path to establishing an Islamic state in accordance with al-Banna's ideology. For them, a change of society could only be accomplished by the education of the people and the missionary teaching of true Islam. Furthermore, "violence...would compromise the integrity of the Brotherhood's mission and jeopardize its future."²⁷ This rethinking presented a good solution to avoiding the costs of violence and rebuilding the organization. Salvaging the MB's reputation in the eyes of the state—in order to avoid further harm to his fellow Brothers and to save them from the cruel experiences of Egyptian prisons—turned out to be a further goal of his moderate attitude. Many supported this notion because after all their bitter, repressive experiences they wanted to get on with their lives.²⁸

Based on these findings, and not only on the Supreme Guide's recommendation, there was obviously sufficient willingness to initiate a moderate path. Al-Hudaybi also sensed that the sustained repression would harm the MB extremely and

²⁶ Ashour, *De-Radicalization*, 138–139.

²⁷ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 229.

²⁸ Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* (Saint Paul: Saqi Books, 2010), 31–36. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 229, 274–276. Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 45–46. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 87–88.

in case of further repression, the Islamists would pay a high price. However, the findings in this section have shown that the state's repression had two different effects on the MB and added to the internal division of the movement. Furthermore, in this case the repressive phases the MB experienced under Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s triggered Qutb's and al-Hudaybi's ideological orientation. Thus, state repression seems to have been a decisive factor with regard to the research question. Nevertheless, al-Hudaybi's leadership role needs to be intensively assessed when dealing with intrinsic factors. As established above, MB leadership was obviously not able to convince all its members to pursue moderate ideas and prevent the breakaway of radicals. This implies that leadership played an important and influential role during the repression of the MB and facilitated the movement's split.

b. External Political, Cultural, and Social Influences

During his presidency, Nasser gained enormous respect in Egypt and the Arab world. His policies pursued a secular, nationalistic, and authoritarian path and called for unity in open rejection of imperialist and Zionist influences. This found broad support throughout the region. Sympathizers admired Nasser's charismatic plea and action against the states embodying and supporting these ideologies. His idea of a unifying Arab nationalism developed into a success story, but massively marginalized the significance of Islam in daily life. However, Qutb and his followers completely opposed the Nasser regime and its policies. From their ideological point of view, he was an illegitimate leader. Even the Six-Day War in 1967 against an external, non-Muslim enemy, Israel, did not change their opinion. The radicals were unwilling to support a *jahili* leader under any circumstances.²⁹

The moderate camp had a different opinion. They did not deny that Nasser had done wrong in the past by betraying the Brothers' Islamist cause after the coup d'état. They resented that the state under Nasser distanced itself more and more from their ideal of an Islamic state under divine rule. Nonetheless, opposing the radicals' ideological beliefs, al-Hudaybi's moderate faction did not query Nasser's confessional status as a

²⁹ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 39, 45–46.

Muslim. Additionally, Nasser at least fought a common, non-Muslim enemy, which outweighed, in this case, their resentments. As a result, the moderate faction rallied in support of Nasser's war against Israel.³⁰

At first glance, the fatal outcome of the Six-Day War, which ended in an immense defeat for the Arabs, seemed to prove the Qutbists right in their perception of the consequences of *jahiliyyah* to a Muslim society. For them, the striking Jewish victory was the logical "consequence of the Muslims' disobedience towards God...[and if]...the Arab states [had] waged the war along Islamic lines, God would have assured their victory."³¹

It is undisputed that *al-Naska* (The Setback), as the war was called in the Arab world, caused deep scars to the Egyptian psyche, economy, and reputation in the Middle East. Furthermore, due to this Egyptian defeat, Nasser's idea of Arab nationalism eventually came to an abrupt end. Rachel Scott gets to the heart of the debacle's impact on Egypt's secular leadership when she writes that "it shattered the belief that the answer to Arab backwardness, dependence, and poverty lay in [Arab] unity."³² Furthermore, the frustration and stressful military experience of many returning soldiers promoted anger and violent tendencies within Egyptian society.³³

Experiencing dislocation and disconnection, many Egyptians found refuge in Islam; and while Arab nationalism slowly faded away, Islamic streams filled the ideological gap. Islamist groups, and especially the MB, preached al-Banna's ideas and solutions to escape a secular society's misery, and experienced a political revival. Nevertheless, it is difficult to concretely determine whether the radical or the moderate Islamist movement was more popular by putting a figure to it.³⁴

³⁰ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 39, 45–46.

³¹ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 268.

³² Rachel M. Scott, *The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 43.

³³ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 269. Tarek Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 89.

³⁴ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 278. Scott, *Political Islam*, 43–44.

It is safe to assume that both sides met the sympathies of new supporters and gained further strength. But just as external factors strengthened both sides, their different interpretations, based on differing ideological beliefs, increased the cleft between them. All this indicates that external political, social, and even cultural influences had at least a marginal impact on the MB's split. Furthermore, these external variables were decisively shaped by ideological convictions.

2. Intrinsic Factors

Internal factors, such as leadership, motivation, learning receptivity, values (cultural or ideological), generational shifts, conflicts, and formal structures also represent important characteristics that affect the intrinsic motivation to adapt or deny a certain policy or path. With regard to the topic of this chapter, they may present reasons for the breakaway of the radical Islamists. The following paragraphs will especially assess leadership, organizational structure, and ideological aspects. As mentioned, some of these are subject to the external influences described above.

a. Leadership and Organizational Structure

When al-Hudaybi was appointed as the Supreme Guide of the MB, he took over a difficult heritage. Al-Banna had been a charismatic leader who was able to cast a spell over his followers by promoting a sense of personal friendship. He convinced others with deep energetic commitment, exemplary behavior, inspiration, selflessness, humility, and administrative and organizational talent. The founder of the MB was a preacher for the Islamist cause and ideological objectives. Al-Banna was surrounded by an aura of trust and was able to appeal to all Egyptians, no matter their social and intellectual background.³⁵

Nevertheless, al-Banna expected that the Brothers accept his concept of leadership and discipline. His followers had to swear an oath of loyalty to his person. This meant confidence in his leadership and absolute obedience. Along with such disciplinary procedures and the strictly hierarchical structure of the movement, al-

³⁵ Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 295–299.

Banna's leadership showed almost authoritarian traits. He encouraged young and ambitious members by a system of promotion or other incentives and additionally, installed a bureaucratic structure within the hierarchical organization to ensure a system of continuous checks and balances that strengthened his position.³⁶

Al-Banna's assassination in 1949 was a heavy burden for the MB. The question of succession led to the formation of three different factions within the movement. First, there was the conservative group, headed by the late General Guide's brother. Then, there was a militant activist or extremist faction, led by one of the most militant of the Brothers, Salah al-Ashmawi. He was also editor and publisher of the magazine *al-Da'wa* and acted as an interim leader of the Brethren till the new General Guide was elected. The last group was represented by moderate and nationally recognized Muslim Brothers who favored a politically accepted and moderate Supreme Guide at the helm.³⁷

Al-Hudaybi's appointment as the General Guide two years after al-Banna's death was mainly based on a compromise between these three factions. He was a respected judge and a loyal friend and legal advisor of his predecessor. However, al-Hudaybi's leadership was not undisputed among the ranks. Already, at the beginning of his command, he struggled with factionalism and was not able to unite the different camps. Early on, he proved to be a weak leader who had, indeed, political talent but lacked al-Banna's charismatic personality and leadership. This weakness was just what his opponents within the MB, particularly the radical al-Ashmawi, were waiting for. In the following years, al-Hudaybi met strong resistance when he tried to secure his position by removing opponents belonging to the extremist camp, and Brothers often ignored his orders, a clear sign of disrespect.³⁸

³⁶ Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 300–303. Lia, *Muslim Brothers*, Ch. 3.

³⁷ Harris, *Nationalism*, 187.

³⁸ Ibid., 187–188. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 116–125, 149. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 176, 230.

The continuous internal schism within the Muslim Brotherhood was further fueled by al-Hudaybi's organizational changes. Some parts of the organization, such as the Guidance Office, were strengthened, and the Supreme Guide's influence declined. Furthermore, al-Hudaybi focused on abandoning the militant wing, which also caused internal struggle. These reforms explain why some Brothers perceived al-Hudaybi's leadership style as that of a political-party leader, in strong contrast with al-Banna, who was perceived as the head of a family.³⁹

Internal schism and al-Hudaybi's inability to unify the Brothers in a common cause continued until a couple of years before his death. At least in his stance against the emerging radical movement within the MB, he succeeded in winning other leading members to his moderate path. But even then, many criticized his leadership. These members remained neutral in the dispute between the other two groups. Their position was also a moderate one, following al-Banna's visions of an Islamic state and its establishment. However, they were simply unconvinced of the Supreme Guide's leadership and were unable to unreservedly support his stand. Furthermore, concerning the authorship of *Preachers, not Judges*, it should be noted that the creation and content of the work were influenced by several thinkers in al-Hudaybi's social environment. A good argument can be made that, even in the matter of his book, al-Hudaybi was not an influential and dominating figure who pulled the strings. Instead, his fellow Brothers probably pushed him in this direction, as some of them did when pursuing the revival of the MB in earlier years. Overall, al-Hudaybi left the impression of being passive.⁴⁰

Quite in contrast to al-Hudaybi, Qutb emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as the ideological leader of the MB and amply filled the gap that the new Supreme Guide had opened after taking the helm. Qutb's feelings of disappointment, bitterness, and hatred, as well as his experiences in prison, were shared by many Brothers. The ideas he developed during his imprisonment attracted many others who were willing to revive the MB and stand up against the enemy embodied by Nasser's regime. Like the founder of the MB, Qutb started to introduce his views of Islam and interpretations of the Qur'an to

³⁹ Harris, *Nationalism*, 188–194. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 303–306.

⁴⁰ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 46–47, 64–65. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 229.

his environment, his fellow Brothers in his prison. As his next step, he started to teach and preach his ideas and managed to spread them beyond the prison walls by using a support network. In this way, he further assimilated the identity of the late al-Banna and attracted even more supporters.⁴¹

Despite his rising popularity, Qutb abided by his loyalty to al-Hudaybi for a long time. It was al-Hudaybi who unilaterally recruited him in the 1950s for a coveted place on the Guidance Council. The Brothers disliked these dictatorial ways of decision making that introduced organizational outsiders into high positions. This was an internal measure used at their expense, circumventing the conventional rise through promotion according to merit. Though al-Hudaybi once more prompted internal criticism, on the other hand, he pushed one of his loyal supporters into a more leading position, which was quite beneficial for him. Qutb started working on the *Propagation of the Call Department* for the MB and proved his loyalty by supporting al-Hudaybi's cause in department publications.⁴²

During his missionary teaching in prison, some older members of the leadership accused Qutb of undercutting the Supreme Guide's authority and spreading questionable ideological views. To his critics, only al-Hudaybi was eligible to introduce ideological changes and provide spiritual advice and guidance. In their eyes, Qutb had crossed a line, and they questioned his loyalty. Still, Qutb was able to explain himself and his views and some of his critics accepted his explanations. A reason for this may be the fact that Qutb's activism helped restore the MB and presented a way out of their traumatic experiences and inability to act due to state repression. Nevertheless, others did not accept this and remained cautious, which in some way marks the beginning of the MB's division.⁴³

⁴¹ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 234.

⁴² Ibid., 187–188, 245.

⁴³ Ibid., 234–235. Zollner, "Prison Talk," 417.

Qutb remained sincere in his loyalty to al-Hudaybi and accepted his leadership as the Supreme Guide of the Brothers based on the MB's leadership structure. Even when the Guide's actions were limited due to the repression, he did not question al-Hudaybi's lead or support a change of leadership. However, this changed when Qutb became the spiritual leader of *Organization 1965*. According to John Calvert, "in [the] face of Hudaybi's relative political impotence, Qutb had no choice but to make important decisions regarding the secret organization on his own."⁴⁴ Thereby, not only did al-Hudaybi's influence in Qutb's doings decline, but when *Organization 1965* pursued a more violent and radical path to achieve its goals, Qutb also disobeyed the Supreme Guide. The latter had agreed on the group's foundation only under the condition that its members follow a moderate and non-violent path. This shows clearly that the loyal relationship between al-Hudaybi and Qutb was detrimentally affected.⁴⁵

Different conclusions can here be drawn. First, the MB's lack of acceptance of al-Hudaybi in the post of the Supreme Guide and his continuous inability to unify the movement weakened the organization against external influences, led to a lack of control over the Brothers and left room for further factionalism, which facilitated a probable breakaway of interest groups. Second, the Supreme Guide's bias for advocacy policy, his drab and dull appearance, and his relative political impotence and inactivity encouraged an atmosphere of departure and a desire for a new charismatic leader with fresh ideas. Finally Qutb, who was long a loyal supporter of al-Hudaybi, became the icon of this departure and, therefore, emerged as a competitor. Third, indecisiveness among the MB leadership and a lack of clear authority facilitated the emergence of a radical subgroup.

Fourth, organizational changes reduced the influence and power of the Supreme Guide tremendously, which unleashed opposing forces. However, due to Qutb's long-term loyalty, this argument can be eliminated as a cause for the internal divide. At best, one can assume that internal forces in the extremist camp of the organization were easily attracted to Qutb's ideas. Fifth, a generational shift as a driving factor for the split

⁴⁴ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 245

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 229–230, 245.

within the MB can be excluded for the most part. Certainly, young reactionary forces felt attracted by Qutb's ideas and supported him, but the radical, moderate, and conservative streams were always a part of the MB's identity and were not introduced or revived by a new generation of Brothers. Instead, the intensification of radical thought was rooted in Qutb's ideological framework and especially attracted other prisoners suffering the same tortures.

These findings show that the leadership played an important role in the split of the MB. However, this factor is closely connected to repressive and ideological influences. The latter will be considered in the following section. There, the two main ideological streams of the time, which were pursued by Qutb and al-Hudaybi and their respective followers, and their possible impact on the internal divide of the MB will be analyzed.

b. *Ideological Considerations*

Sayyid Qutb digested his experiences with the Nasser regime and its repressive actions in his book *Milestones*. The writing was based on his interpretation of the Qur'an and served as guidance for his idea of a vanguard to initiate Islamic revival in the Muslim world. He believed that every aspect of life is focused on following God's divine will by internalizing the Islamic principles of *tawhid* (there is no God but Allah) and *hakimiyyat Allah* (God is sovereign on earth). All Muslims must be convinced of these Islamic principles and apply them in their way of life. From Qutb's perspective, modern living had led Muslim societies to *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of the divine guidance) by obeying secular leaders or authorities instead of God. Therefore, Qutb and his followers called for *takfir* (excommunication) of Muslims following *jahili* influences. This meant declaring them a *kafir* (nonbeliever). The Qutbists perceived themselves as an Islamist vanguard movement of true believers. These radicals believed that the use of

violence was legitimate in order to fight all influences of a *jahili* society and establish an Islamic state. Even the concept of jihad was not excluded from achieving this goal.⁴⁶

Al-Hudaybi and the members of his Guidance Council predicted harmful consequences to the MB if the organization followed Qutb's views. In *Preachers, not Judges*, they offered alternative considerations of the three central concepts of radical Islamist interpretation. First, the concept *takfir* lost relevance if used to condemn an individual or a whole society, because the profession of faith (*shahada*) was considered the only valid principle in determining whether an individual is a Muslim or not. Once a person professes his faith, he must be accepted as a Muslim and part of the Muslim community unless he publicly renounces belief. Therefore, no human being is able to pass a judgment on another individual's belief or declare a Muslim a *kafir*. This judgment, as well as the absolution of sins, is up to God. As a result, participation in Islamist activism, of whatever kind, cannot determine whether a person is a believer or not.⁴⁷

Second, the book points out that Islamic scholars like Abul Ala Mawdudi were wrong in their assumption that human failure has led to misunderstanding of the Qur'an and Sunna. The reason is that the word of God, presented in the Qur'an, was never lost and always present to Muslims. Thereby, a century-long misunderstanding of the most important Islamic writings must be excluded as the reason for the present existence of a *jahili* society. The moderates concluded that Mawdudi's conclusion about the concept of *jahiliyyah* was incorrect, and thus took away another ideological basis of the radicals.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Qutb, *Milestones*, 6–7, 19, 26–27. Gudrun Krämer, *Gottes Staat als Republik: Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), 214–217. Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 73–74. The concept of *takfir* was never really mentioned directly in Qutb's works, however, his followers and critics interpreted his ideas this way.

⁴⁷ Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 75–76. Zollner, "Prison Talks," 422. Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 149–150.

⁴⁸ Zollner, "Prison Talks," 422.

Finally, the concept of God's absolute sovereignty on earth was reviewed. *Preachers, not Judges* assesses that Islamic law, *shari'a*, is not fixed but leaves room for flexibility and offers men a capacity of decision making in the regulation of social life (self-determination). As long as this self-determination does not violate religious obligations, it does not challenge divine governance or God's sovereignty. Additionally, applying God's rule to Muslims' daily lives is important and fundamental. Al-Hudaybi argued that it would be too far reaching to align secular laws in a rigid way according to the principle of God's sovereignty and *shari'a* without further excogitation.⁴⁹

Both writings symbolize the opposing sides of the unbridgeable ideological gap between the radical and moderate camps. There was no room for compromise or possibility of rapprochement. Unification was not an option. Consequently, according to Barbara Zollner, al-Hudaybi and his moderate entourage focused on Muslim Brothers who were still indecisive about whether to follow the moderate or the radical path. *Preachers, not Judges* aimed at persuading these members, often still imprisoned, to choose the nonviolent alternative to the radical and uncompromising path of the Qutbists. There were only a few radical hardliners that could be convinced to return to the moderate fold.⁵⁰

Ultimately, this ideological showdown forced all Brothers to make a decision for or against greater radicalism. It becomes clear that al-Hudaybi and Qutb pursued the same objective of an Islamic state by different means, based on their ideological stance—teaching versus violence. These ideological views were another important factor that eventually led to the split of the MB. However, they were triggered by the Brothers' experiences of a repressive Egyptian environment that eventually provoked either hatred and violence or a will to ensure survival by denying violence.

⁴⁹ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 150–151. Zollner, "Prison Talks," 423. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 75–76.

⁵⁰ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 75–76. Zollner, "Prison Talks," 420, 424–425. Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 65–66, 71.

D. CONCLUSION

As this analysis of extrinsic and intrinsic factors has shown, state repression and the leadership skills of the Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi played a major role in facilitating the split of the MB into two wings. External repression provoked two different effects: first, al-Hudaybi saw the need to steer the MB back into shallow waters to secure its survival. In his eyes, this meant treading a moderate path by avoiding further violent confrontation with the regime and focusing on teaching and education. Second, Qutb chose a violent and more radical path. For him, teaching and education were not enough to establish an Islamic state. *Jahiliyyah* had to be met with force.

However, the Supreme Guide's weak leadership was also an important factor. Al-Hudaybi failed to unite the MB and prevent factionalism, especially during the repression. Furthermore, he never initiated a revival by himself. The attempts to revive the MB in its deepest crisis were always initiated by motivated Brothers who merely requested his approval to legitimize their cause—the founding of *Organization 1965* is a good example. The repression and restriction on the Brothers' communications is not a sufficient explanation for this leadership failure. Even Qutb was able to use a good support network during his imprisonment to spread his ideas inside and outside the prison walls. Additionally, Qutb was a charismatic leader and suffered the same bitter experiences as many other Brothers, which attracted a lot of supporters. He was able to spark hopes for a strong revival of the MB, something that al-Hudaybi failed to do.

The ideological views that Qutb created out of his frustration, bitterness, and interpretation of the Qur'an left no room for compromises or possibility of rapprochement. His ideology sealed the fate of the MB and left a divided organization. *Preachers, not Judges* was only a drop in the bucket and a means to convince those Brothers who were still indecisive—not least because of their criticism of al-Hudaybi's leadership—about what path to take. If al-Hudaybi had introduced some ideological views providing a solution or a future objective for the MB much earlier during the crisis, a split might have been avoided.

The role of other external events had at best a marginal influence on the split. If anything, they increased the cleft between both camps, which was already promoted by differing ideological views. Apart from that, they played no major role.

This chapter has shown the importance of the effects of external repression and organizational leadership in the case of the MB split. If Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi had been stronger and provided a better ideological framework during times of crisis, the split might have been avoided. However, the failures and weakness of leadership tipped the scales and facilitated the emergence of a radical wing that produced many of the radical movements now threatening the security of societies all over the world.

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III. POLITICAL MODERATION IN THE SADAT ERA

A. INTRODUCTION

Gamal Abdel Nasser's death marked the end of the Muslim Brotherhood's darkest period since its founding, a period that almost ended its existence. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded this chief ideologist of Arab nationalism, turned away from his predecessor's policies. As president of Egypt, Sadat pursued a path of liberal politics domestically and a realigned foreign policy aimed at Egypt's financial betterment, based on economic openness towards the West and peace with Israel. The new regime's domestic politics were strongly influenced by a revival of Islamic sectarian sentiment throughout Egyptian society. Sadat utilized this atmosphere in his pursuit of legitimacy and regime consolidation. He opted for a pious self-portrayal and a more central role of Islam in politics and society.

This presented the perfect conditions for a revival of Islamic and Islamist movements that had lost ground during the decade-long dominance of secularism under Nasser. Sadat's reforms offered vital momentum and freedom that Islamists, especially, used to exert their influence in society and politics. Based on these circumstances also, radical trends managed to gain a foothold after Nasser's relentless repression. However, the Muslim Brotherhood did not back that horse. Despite some more radical groupings lurking within the movement and periodic tendencies historically towards the violent pursuit of objectives, the organization abided by its moderate path. Even increasing differences with the ruling regime did not present sufficient reason for the Brotherhood to resort to radical means. This chapter focuses on this phenomenon of the Brethren's history and seeks an answer to the question: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood consolidate its moderate path in the Sadat era?

Many scholars have described the relationship between the Sadat regime and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s, and they present valuable references to different aspects and factors that influenced the Brothers' orientation during the Sadat era. However, so far a comprehensive analysis of the motives of the movement has never

been performed. This chapter will close this gap by examining the writings of different authors. Furthermore, knowledge about the influence of extrinsic and intrinsic factors, which is based on organizational theory, will be used to explain the Brethren's decision. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham's idea of "Islamist auto-reform" will be considered. She argues that an organization's participation in politics influences its behavior and orientation. This chapter will show that the Muslim Brotherhood's intention to deny violence was caused by different factors that influenced each other significantly. After some paragraphs presenting a historical review of the Sadat era, the following sections will describe the impact of the new and old regimes' policies, generational and ideological influences, and the massive role of leadership, which consolidated the Muslim Brotherhood's moderate path.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

The Six-Day War in 1967 ended in an immense defeat for the Arabs. Egypt suffered the biggest loss on the Arab side. Its army was destroyed and two major sources of revenue were lost: the Suez Canal was under Israeli control for an indefinite time and the precious Sinai oil fields were seized by the Israeli Defense Forces. As a side effect of the military engagements, tourism decreased drastically, making the financial injury worse. Furthermore, the Arab world, especially Egypt, had to digest an awful humiliation. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the messianic leader of the pan-Arabic nationalism movement and president of the Arabs' strongest military power, lost face. Bearing the consequences of this military and economic disaster, he intended to resign. But the Egyptians, who were afraid to suffer further defeat and foreign domination, supported their charismatic leader and convinced Nasser to remain in office. During the following years of his presidency, Egypt never managed to recover from the fatal outcome of the Six-Day War. Although Soviet support ensured a rapid recovery of military strength, the country was financially ruined.⁵¹

⁵¹ Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 305–306, 310–312. Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 344, 347. Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs: A History* (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 340.

After his death in 1970, Nasser left his successor a difficult heritage. Anwar Sadat had to deal with a rather delicate mix of financial problems and strong public discontent with the consequences of Egypt's humiliation, and had to face some decisive challenges. The new president was considered a weak leader—Nasser's lapdog—and despite being a member of the Free Officers' Movement, had the backing of neither the military nor the Egyptians. Therefore, Sadat had to legitimize his presidency, secure his position against his opponents, win the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, and eventually improve Egypt's economic problems, which were mainly based on the ongoing and insoluble conflict with Israel, creating vast military costs.⁵²

To secure his political position, he had to remove his opponents. First were direct political opponents like former Egyptian Vice President Ali Sabri, a communist. Sabri followed the Nasserist thought that only war would solve Egypt's problems. In contrast to Sabri, Sadat was less optimistic about the chances of winning against Israel. He wanted to give diplomacy a chance. After Sadat's first peace initiative failed in 1971, due to Israel's unwillingness to enter into negotiations, Sabri and his supporters challenged the president. Sadat ordered the arrest of about ninety plotters who were sentenced to life imprisonment, and, thus managed to put his opponents away by what was called Sadat's "corrective revolution."⁵³

Second, there was the political left, like Socialists, Marxists and Nasserists, as well as the extreme right, represented by radical groups that Egypt's new president had to deal with. The Setback put an end to Nasser's idea of Arab nationalism and gave birth to a revival of religion in public life. Sadat used this sectarian development to legitimize his presidency. He was constantly seen in prayer, and the prayer's mark on his forehead

⁵² Thomas W. Lippman, *Egypt after Nasser: Sadat, Peace and the Mirage of Prosperity* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1989), 29–31. Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 388–398. William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 374–375.

⁵³ The Insight Team of the Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War* (New York: Ibooks, Inc., 2002), 46–51. Uri Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure," *Journal of Contemporary History* 41, no. 3 (2006): 545. Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004), 52–53.

represented a symbol of deep religiosity. Islam became a tool to project and promote his public self-image of the “believing” president embodying enormous religious piety.⁵⁴

Sadat followed a new political path, which allowed a more central role for Islam in politics. Religious themes entered political life, as well as decision making in Egypt and reached out to every sphere politics could influence. In 1971, for instance, he initiated changes to the constitution that made Islam and Islamic jurisprudence even more important. At the same time, Sadat took advantage of the Islamist movements in order to meet his political opposition. The Islamists were attracted by the sectarian politics and offered to be a good tool to secure the young president’s political base by building up a strong counterweight against leftist socialist elements and their grassroots on the university campuses. In all this, the MB was more than helpful. By granting the Islamist movement more and more political freedom, Sadat utilized the MB as an ideological opponent against the political left and even the extreme right. Sadat also encouraged the development of Islamic student organizations on campuses “to fight against the communists.”⁵⁵ As a result, he managed to neutralize the old and new generations of leftist elements in politics and the universities, which had developed during Nasser’s time and now opposed Sadat’s government. The different Islamist organizations eventually helped Sadat keep the opposition in check.⁵⁶

Although the Yom Kippur War in 1973 helped improve Sadat’s political standing by rekindling Arab pride and Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, the difficult patrimony of his predecessor demanded further developments, especially dealing with

⁵⁴ Mohammed Zahid, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis: The Politics of Liberalization and Reform in the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 81–82. Abdel Razim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in *Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, vol. 3 of *The Fundamentalism Project* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 167. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 229, 278. Scott, *Political Islam*, 43–44.

⁵⁵ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 134.

⁵⁶ Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 377–378. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 95–105. Ayoob, *Political Islam*, 77. Dennis J. Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), 73. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 134–135. Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 82. Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence,” 167.

Egypt's financial and economic problems. These problems were mainly based on the enormous costs of the ongoing conflict with Israel. Sadat sought to improve the situation by establishing a program called *al-Infatah*, an economic opening to attract Western investments. However, there were problems. First, *al-Infatah* was no real economic success story, because it did not benefit all Egyptians as planned and facilitated corruption. Second, it met strong Islamist opposition that feared dependency on and the influence of the West.⁵⁷

Besides the constitutional changes Sadat introduced in the early 1970s, he also stressed the supremacy of law in Egypt. He opposed the imprisonment of Egyptians based on political and religious beliefs. In the mid-1970s, he pursued further reorientation of the national political arena. He finally abandoned Nasser's one-party system based on the Arab Socialist Union and created a kind of restricted three-party pluralism covering left, center, and right orientations. By 1977, he created his own party, the National Democratic Party, and recognized the New Wafd Party as an additional party of this system. However, these changes were motivated by economic and political priorities to encourage foreign investment in Egypt and were not part of a broader democratization initiative.⁵⁸

In the late 1970s, as a consequence of still unsolved economic problems, Sadat pursued peace with Israel to eliminate Egypt's major cause for vast military expenditures. Although Sadat had been warned that peace with Israel would have serious consequences—the Egyptian people would not accept it and the Arab world would never forgive him—he flew to Jerusalem in 1977 and addressed the Israeli *Knesset*. In his speech he proposed a land for peace deal: full acceptance and recognition of the state of Israel by the Arab world and a solution of the Palestinian problem for a return of all territory occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Cleveland and Bunton, *Modern Middle East*, 374–382. Ana B. Soage and Jorge F. Franganillo, “The Muslim Brothers in Egypt,” in *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 43.

⁵⁸ Hesham Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 36. Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 52–53.

⁵⁹ Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, ed., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict* (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 207–215. Rogan, *The Arabs*, 389.

Only a couple of months later, Israel and Egypt started peace negotiations at Camp David. U.S. President Carter acted as a mediator between the two Middle Eastern states. The negotiations were tough as leather, and it took more than thirteen days and twenty-two drafts to achieve two separate agreements, the Camp David Accords. One was a fairly concrete bilateral peace between Israel and Egypt, and the other a rather ambiguous framework for Palestinian self-governance. Eventually, both parties signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. Egypt managed to achieve the return of the Sinai to Egyptian control, which meant some economic improvements. Additionally, the peace settlement ensured welcome U.S. military and economic aid to the Egyptians. But the treaty had an unwelcome side effect—Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League.⁶⁰

The consequences of the treaty—clefts among the Arabs and dependence on U.S. financial support—turned into a political disaster for Sadat. Its influence on Egyptian public opinion strengthened Sadat’s political opponents, including the MB, and also empowered radical Islamists within Egypt. Furthermore, 1979 became crucial with regards to developments in Iran. Islamic militants and students played an important role during the Iranian revolution. As a result, Sadat constrained the influence of student unions, which supported their Iranian fellows and denied government funding for Islamic organizations. Finally, the Egyptian president offered aid and political asylum to his friend, the ousted Shah of Iran, which caused further student unrest and opposition within Egypt. Sadat’s domestic policy turned more and more authoritarian until, in 1981, he ordered an indiscriminate campaign against all his opponents. These developments eventually ended in Sadat’s assassination by radical Islamists in 1981.⁶¹

According to Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred Wenner, the Egyptian president and the MB met in four “arenas of conflict.” First, although Sadat had

⁶⁰ Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat* (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 1983), 96–99. William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005), 177–204. William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 311–314, 335.

⁶¹ Rogan, *The Arabs*, 392. Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, 173–174, 216–224, 249–255. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 74. Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, “Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” *Middle East Journal* 36, no. 3 (Summer, 1982): 358. Soage and Franganillo, “Muslim Brothers,” 43.

introduced party-pluralism, constitutional changes, and Islam's central role in politics, he did not permit the MB's establishment of an Islamic party. Second, Sadat's policy of *al-infitah* and its flagitious side effects⁶² did not comply with the MB's idea of "a righteous and moral Islamic society."⁶³ Third, the new secular and liberal status of women and its underpinning laws was counter to the MB's Islamic interpretation of a woman's role in society. The fourth and last arena of conflict was Sadat's settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt's president tried to solve the long-lasting feud with his peace initiative, leading to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. However, the Brothers believed that it was not legitimate for Sadat to speak for Islam and offer concessions in any dispute regarding Palestine. But, despite these enormous differences near the end of Sadat's presidency, the MB abided by a nonviolent and moderate path, intensified its political efforts and influence, and resisted the trend towards radicalism that other Islamist movements were undergoing.⁶⁴

C. REASONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION

As explained in this chapter's introduction, this analysis will primarily focus on elements from organizational theory, which means that extrinsic and intrinsic factors and their subcategories will be analyzed. Besides the broad spectrum of possible influences on the Brothers' moderate path, Wickham's idea of Islamist auto-reform also needs to be considered for a detailed and comprehensive result.

1. Extrinsic Factors

Several external factors shaped the environment of the MB, such as the long-lasting effects of Nasser's repression of the MB and Sadat's religious and liberal politics. These factors influenced the decision making of the organization and the orientation of the Islamist movement, which again led to the Brothers' moderate development. Consequently, there are more or less strong links between extrinsic and the intrinsic factors, which will be analyzed later.

⁶² For example: night clubs, prostitution, corruption, gambling, alcoholic beverage consumption.

⁶³ Aly and Wenner, "Reform Movements," 355.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 355–356.

In the 1970s, the leadership of the MB pursued two related objectives. One, the official state recognition of the Brotherhood as a party, will be discussed later in this chapter. The other was the revival and rebuilding of the movement, which had almost ceased to exist during under Nasser. The latter objective must be analyzed a bit deeper because the environmental circumstances facilitating the MB's emergence during the Sadat era also decisively shaped the moderate orientation of the movement.⁶⁵

a. External Influences Based on Arab Nationalism and Secularization

The literature offers many explanations for the revival of the MB. Some of these explanations refer to events that lead to the demise of Arab nationalism in the 1960s. This caused a search for safe refuge in religious beliefs, which again pushed the popularity of Islamic and Islamist movements throughout Egypt. First, there was the Yemen War, also known as Nasser's Vietnam. After a military putsch, a group of army officers seized power in the country of Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula in the early 1960s. Soon they pronounced the establishment of a Yemini Republic, their dedication to Arab nationalism, and their support for Nasser's goal of Arab unity. However, the revolution presented a threat to the stability of Yemen's neighbor Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the Saudi king, Saud, conspired with the leaders of the overthrown regime to regain power. The coup's leaders again requested Nasser's support, and Egypt's president responded with a massive troop deployment to the Arabian Peninsula. This was the beginning of a protracted proxy war, which lasted five years before the Egyptian armed forces eventually, unsuccessfully, withdrew from Yemen in December 1967. The effects on Egyptian morale and the economy were enormous and cost the country dearly. Nasser's miscalculated military enterprise against the reactionary Yemini forces alienated many Egyptians from the idea of Arab nationalism, and disappointment in Egyptian politics increased.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 38.

⁶⁶ Adeed Dawisha, *Arab nationalism in the twentieth century: from triumph to despair* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 234–236. Aly and Wenner, "Reform Movements," 344.

However, a second event that took place in June of 1967 gave Nasser's ideology of Arab nationalism its quietus: the Six-Day War. This immense blow to the united Arab forces and the grievous loss of life, equipment, territory, and valuable state revenues presented a vast humiliation and economic disaster for Egypt's messianic leader and his people. The defeat eliminated any possibility of Nasser's pursuing his goal of Arab nationalism. Instead, his politics caused the realignment of Egyptian policy towards state nationalism and precipitated enormous domestic grievances. Economic problems, excessive national debt, migration from areas occupied by the Israelis, and wounded Egyptian pride caused tremendous problems and feelings of dislocation within Egypt. Like many Arabs, the people of Egypt had trusted his leadership and propaganda. They had believed in his success. Within six days, all their hopes were destroyed. Many of them found refuge in Islam. Others were influenced by the interpretation of Islamist movements. The defeat provided the Islamist opposition with ammunition. In the aftermath of the war, radical and moderate Islamist movements argued that the debacle was the consequence of the state's secular orientation, which violated the principles of Islam. No matter what eventually influenced the Egyptian people, many gave up their belief in Nasser's secular ideology and turned towards religious faith and Islamic as well as Islamist movements.⁶⁷

Some scholars present a third argument for the revival of the MB in Egypt, one unrelated to the demise of Arab nationalism. They consider the decade-long relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Islamist movement as a decisive factor in the emergence of the Brothers during the 1970s. On one hand, the MB considered the conservative social and political system embodied in the Saudi regime as a successful example of an Islamic state and, on the other hand, the Saudis provided shelter for members of the organization during its repression in Egypt. The Saudis opposed Nasser's ideology of Arab nationalism, an ideology which led to the proxy war in Yemen, and the Saudis approved of an Islamic influence in Egypt in order to keep secular forces in check.

⁶⁷ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism*, 252–255, 282. Rogan, *The Arabs*, 336, 340, 353–354. Aly and Wenner, “Reform Movements,” 344–345.

This presents a logical explanation for the Saudi support of the MB and also the interest in the financial backing of Sadat's political enterprises after he took over office until the peace treaty with Israel.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the external factors presented above were at best a sufficient condition for the revival and political orientation of the MB in the 1970s. Without doubt, the circumstances of Arab nationalism's demise facilitated the popularity of Islam and Islamist organizations, and Saudi support also guaranteed the survival of the MB. However, none of these external factors presents a satisfying explanation for the political development of the MB during the Sadat era. The key to this development lies in the political changes that occurred with the succession of the presidency from Nasser to Sadat.

b. Policy Shifts Under Sadat and the Repression Trauma

After Sadat took office, his pursuit of legitimacy as the new head of state greatly influenced his young presidency. Even after his death, the prestige and appeal of Nasser, Sadat's predecessor, outshone the young president. In military and government circles, but also in public opinion, Nasser's former vice-president was considered a weak leader. The fact that Nasser's reign had left deep marks in politics and society further facilitated this unfavorable perception. Nasserist and leftist influences were strong and well placed. These aspects challenged and threatened Sadat's political base. While he was eventually able to eliminate Nasser's old political guard, led by Sabri, by means of the corrective revolution, it was much more difficult to eradicate deep-rooted leftist movements.

Regarding the latter, Sadat decisively benefitted from the religious sentiment within society after the demise of Nasser's Arab nationalism. Combined with his religious and pious appearance, his further entrenchment of Islam in politics and public life, and his support of Islamic and Islamist movements, Sadat managed to move against the grassroots of his political opposition. The major beneficiaries of this

⁶⁸ Aly and Wenner, "Reform Movements," 345–346. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 20. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 212. Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism*, 291–292. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 238.

development were the MB and Islamist student movements at the universities. After the Brothers' leadership sent a clear signal of their moderate attitude in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the Egyptian public and ruler, Sadat used the movement and the students for his political objectives, systematically building up a countermovement against the political left (socialists, Marxists, and Nasserists) and extreme right and its radical groups. Thus, Egypt's new president managed to keep his opposition in check. For this reason, it was in Sadat's interest to grant further acknowledgement and freedom to the organization in the course of his presidency. Gradually, he released and rehabilitated the members of the MB who were imprisoned or exiled and allowed the movement some political undertakings.⁶⁹

Nasser's repression had left the MB weak and fragmented. The Islamist movement used the freedom and opportunities the new regime offered and re-emerged from the ashes to become powerful again. Although Sadat did not intend to legalize the technically still-illegal society, he tolerated its further lawful pursuit of political influence. Sadat's liberal politics presented the chance the Brothers had been waiting for to develop and spread their political ideas and influence in Egypt. In 1976, the president allowed the movement to resume publication of its newspaper, *al-Da'wa* (The Call), which had been banned under the old regime since 1954. Restrictions were lifted on other aspects of public life as well. With such an opportunity at hand, the MB managed to reestablish its political base and entrench itself within Egyptian society. The growing parallel Islamic sector, along with its manifold organizations, proved to be fertile terrain. The MB intensified their recruitment at Egyptian universities to win members of the student unions to their cause. These practices were condoned by Sadat. As a result, over the years the movement regained popularity and, eventually, members.⁷⁰

In spite of the opportunities offered by Sadat's new regime, the experiences of the decade-long repression under Nasser were a determining factor for the movement's moderate path. Like his predecessor al-Hudaybi, who died in 1973, the new

⁶⁹ El-Ghobashy, "Muslim Brothers," 377–378. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 134–135. Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence," 167. Ayoob, *Political Islam*, 77.

⁷⁰ El-Ghobashy, "Muslim Brothers," 377–378. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 96–105. Ayoob, *Political Islam*, 77. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 41–43.

General Guide of the organization, Umar al-Tilmisani, pursued a moderate path seeking to avoid any confrontation with the Egyptian state. The rethinking that is evident in the book *Preachers, Not Judges* was focused on avoiding the cost of violence—the cruel experience of repression—as well as salvaging the MB’s reputation in the eyes of the public and the state and rebuilding the organization. The persistent and savage prosecution of its members during Nasser’s presidency had stamped the Brothers and their leadership. Even if the new regime and its religious character seemed to be promising and in line with some of their ideas, they had learned to be cautious and observant with regards to any interaction with Egypt’s new ruler. Their moderate path was acknowledged by the regime and had opened a window of opportunity that they were no longer willing to risk losing. Instead, under al-Tilmisani, the MB intensified their efforts to achieve true legal recognition as a party and enter the political arena. Consequently, the achievement of goals by moderate political means became the central focus of the MB. In the long run, only this would guarantee its revival, its legal status as a party, and eventually its secure future in Egypt—which were its main objectives.⁷¹

The combination of liberal policies under Sadat and the ever-present vivid memories of repression under Nasser strongly influenced the MB and supported a consolidation of its moderate development. Therefore, these two extrinsic factors describe the necessary condition for the Brotherhood’s political orientation. The demise of Arab nationalism and Saudi support also contributed to this orientation, but not to such a high degree. Neither can the importance of leadership in the movement’s decision making process and orientation in the 1970s be discounted. Obviously, there is a link between the MB response to external influences and MB leadership, as represented by Umar al-Tilmisani. For this very reason, his role will be analyzed in depth when dealing with intrinsic factors in the following paragraphs.

⁷¹ Alison Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 31–36. Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 229, 274–276, 278. Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 45–46. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 87–88. Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 89–90.

2. Intrinsic Factors

With regard to the topic of this chapter, intrinsic motivation based on factors like leadership, ideological change, or generational shift may provide reasons for the development of the MB and its moderate consolidation during the Sadat era. The following paragraphs assess these aspects, which may also have been subject to the external influences described above.

a. *Leadership and Organizational Structure*

According to many scholars, the Brotherhood's third General Guide, Umar al-Timisani, decisively shaped the moderate and political orientation of the Brethren under his leadership. Some authors mention his enormous ability to impose himself on the movement—a characteristic quality that his predecessor Hasan Isma'il al-Hudaybi for the most part lacked. Due to this strength, combined with his enormous persuasiveness, he managed to mint the MB, convince potential followers, and fascinate his environment with his ideas. Thus, al-Tilmisani was regarded as the General Guide who brought the movement back to life after its darkest period during Nasser's presidency.⁷²

Based on these character traits, the third *murshid*—like the founder of the MB, Hasan al-Banna—managed to become a central and dominant figure within the organization. Important decisions, especially those dealing with the political participation of the movement, were a matter of the Brotherhood's leadership or al-Tilmisani himself. Even the political activity of single members of the movement was granted or denied by the General Guide.⁷³ In short, during the Sadat era the formerly repressed, weak, and fragmented Brethren reassumed their pyramidal organizational structure with a strict top-down approach combined with obedience to the new *murshid*'s guidance. This clear organizational structure did not leave much room for dissidents or compromises along the mainstream of the movement dictated by al-Tilmisani.

⁷² Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 43–44. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 38–41. Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 89–93. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 113. Bradley, *Inside Egypt*, 51. Ashour, *De-Radicalization*, 85.

⁷³ Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 38–41.

Al-Tilmisani was a member of the Guidance Council of the movement during al-Hudaybi's leadership and belonged to the close moderate entourage supporting the second General Guide in writing *Preachers, Not Judges*. After taking the helm, he abided by the moderate path treaded by his predecessor. Like al-Hudaybi, he pursued the objectives of ensuring the MB's continued existence and revival and the redemption of its reputation. In addition, al-Tilmisani intensified the efforts towards legal recognition as a political party. According to Mohammed Zahid and Hesham al-Awadi, the new General Guide envisioned a secure future for the MB that was based on a transition "from its traditional focus on spiritual piety to political activism."⁷⁴ Consequently, he redefined the movement's orientation towards more political engagement, in order to achieve legal recognition. Along with the Brotherhood's proven moderate path and their political engagement, al-Tilmisani also tried to fight for the MB's legal recognition in court. In 1977 he filed to overturn the dissolution of the Brothers' by the People's Court, which had happened under Nasser in December 1954, but he had to learn that despite the regime's liberal political changes under Sadat, the judicial system remained under the regime's influence and not achieved independence.⁷⁵

Another aspect of the importance of al-Tilmisani's leadership was his close dialogue with Sadat on different occasions. The General Guide was not only able to build the ruler's confidence in the movement's practices but also widen the MB's room to maneuver within society and increase its sphere of influence. In this context, a good example is the readmission and utilization of the Brothers' newspaper *al-Da'wa* in 1976, and the president's and Supreme Guide's discussion about its content.⁷⁶ Raymond W. Baker underlines al-Tilmisani's influence in this context, based on the fact that the *murshid* was also the editor of the journal and, therefore, had a direct influence on published articles. Baker gets to the heart of al-Tilmisani's role in the development of the organization and in dialogue with Sadat when he writes that the Supreme Guide

⁷⁴ Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 90.

⁷⁵ Zollner, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 68–69. Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 89–90. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 38–41. Harris, *Nationalism*, 224.

⁷⁶ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, Ch. 4. Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, 131–132. Raymond W. Baker, *Sadat and After – Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), Ch. 8.

“personified the Muslim Brotherhood”⁷⁷ and that for this reason his “strategic decisions...in the seventies for limited cooperation with the regime laid the intellectual and practical foundations for the legal expansions in the eighties into nearly all aspects of public life.”⁷⁸ Finally, al-Tilmisani was a courteous man, respected by Egyptian officials. He had never been part of any violent group within the movement, such as the Special Apparatus, and was able to convince the regime as if he were a partner in the president’s dialogue with the Brotherhood.⁷⁹ In other words, al-Tilmisani’s leadership was not only important in the Brotherhood’s interaction with the state during the Sadat era but in the policies and future of the whole organization.

All these findings strongly emphasize the influence of the General Guide’s leadership on the development of the MB in the 1970s. Al-Tilmisani revived the organizational structure based on his strong, central, single leadership, which the MB had last displayed under its charismatic founder, Hasan al-Banna, and lost under its second Supreme Guide Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi. As a result, the *murshid*’s guidance dominantly shaped the movement and its objectives. However, beyond his strong influence, Umar al-Tilmisani’s moderate and political course for the MB provoked different reactions among not only the Brothers but also potential followers. Because these reactions can be partially linked to generational differences, the side effects of al-Tilmisani’s leadership—which in turn influenced the MB—will be discussed separately in the following section.

b. Internal and Radical Trends Based on Generational Issues

Al-Tilmisani’s pursuit of moderation and political activism provoked a variety of opinions not only within the organization, but also with regard to Islamist trends outside the MB. Internally, the *murshid* and his followers formed a group that Gilles Kepel called the “neo-Muslim Brethren.” In accordance with al-Tilmisani’s ideas, they sought ties with the People’s Assembly during the Sadat era, cooperated with the

⁷⁷ Baker, *Sadat and After*, 243.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 246.

⁷⁹ Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 61.

regime, and used connections in business, religious, and political circles to increase their influence in furtherance of their political objectives. After it was republished in 1976, the magazine *al-Da'wa* was the reformists' mouthpiece and presented its position on all questions of life to the Egyptian public. Besides religious and political themes, it covered also social and economic contents.⁸⁰

Al-Tilmisani's and neo-Muslim Brethren's ideas about the MB's modern appearance in Egyptian society were opposed by an old guard of members who had been strongly influenced by Nasser's repression. This generation of the MB was represented by senior members like Muhammad Mahdi Akif, who suffered for decades in Nasser's prisons. These MB members were "generally more zealous, conservative, and committed primarily to long-term religious missionary work ... and to preserving the movement's unity."⁸¹ They shared al-Banna's point of view with regard to party politics and did not support the MB's opportunity to engage in the Egyptian political arena as a party. Corruption, conflict, rivalry, and national divisiveness were the negative characteristics the Brethren's first Supreme Guide had identified during his years at the helm. Al-Banna envisioned the MB in the role of a religious consultant in political matters to each regime. By this means, the movement remained outside the political cesspool, continuously reformed all parts of society in accordance with its ideals, and played the part of a moral custodian. Furthermore, the old guard's relationship to other political or social groups, or even former rivals, was characterized either by constant suspicion or by insurmountable differences due to past confrontation.⁸²

For the sake of an MB future that he envisioned in terms of further political engagement in party politics, al-Tilmisani was willing to meet the convictions of the old guard. Unconcerned about their apprehension of a decline in the MB's role in spiritual guidance, he pursued its transformation from traditional piety to political activism and challenged the conservative members. The *murshid* even welcomed the

⁸⁰ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 103, 106–107, 249.

⁸¹ Israel E. Altman, "Democracy, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," Vol. 3 of *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, ed. Hillel Fradkin et al. (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute Inc., 2006): 26.

⁸² Ibid., 26. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 218–220, Ch. X. David Commins, "Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949)," in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed. Ali Rahnama (New York: Zed Books, 2006), 136.

internal discussion during his ambitious striving for transition, and despite the differences in the basic ideological attitude of neo-Muslim Brethren and old guard, al-Tilmisani managed to keep the movement united.⁸³

However, as a consequence of Sadat's gradual grant of amnesty to the movement's members, some radical figures of the MB's military wing, the Special Apparatus (*nizam al-khass*), arrived again on the scene. This violent branch of the organization was still held in high esteem by members of the old guard, such as Akif, who considered it something glorious, to be proud of. Al-Hudaybi had met especially strong resistance and caused internal schism when he tried to secure his position by removing his opponents and the organization's military wing after he took office. In the following times, the Secret Apparatus started to perform independent actions against the government. After they planned and pursued the attempt to assassinate Nasser in 1954, its failure started the president's harsh crackdown on the MB. This weakened and fractionalized the Secret Apparatus and its followers lost their influence for decades, as did the whole remaining movement.⁸⁴

After the members of *nizam al-khass* were released from prison, they resumed work within the MB and managed to enter some posts in the Guidance Office with the objective of assuming control of the organization. This group of prison-experienced hardliners intended to rebuild the movement and, once again, challenge the state by recruiting like-minded members to lead the MB to new strength. Already during their final years in prison, Sadat's liberal policy and intention to use the Islamists against his political opposition had facilitated contacts with student movements on which these toughened and determined old members decided to build after they were rehabilitated.⁸⁵

Egypt's largest Islamist student organization, the *jama'at al-islamiyya*, was at the center of the *nizam al-khass*' attention. The students benefitted from Sadat's political objectives and had gained enormous power on university campuses. Over the

⁸³ Zahid, *Succession Crisis*, 91–92.

⁸⁴ Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 137–151, 160. Wolff, *Muslimbruderschaft*, 39–40. Harris, *Nationalism*, 187–188.

⁸⁵ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 36–39.

years, they managed to successfully increase their influence on campus by providing important services to their fellow students. Identifying ordinary problems and providing solutions was their biggest strength. For instance, these young Islamists organized cheap study materials, accommodation, and suitable transport for female students. Furthermore, they fought for improvements in the studying conditions on campuses, like the packed lecture halls and organized summer camps that became important social venues. They soon won followers and achieved a landmark success during the student elections against the grassroots of the regime's opposition in 1976.⁸⁶

Although these young Islamists were not affiliated with any particular political movement outside their universities, they were influenced by the ideas of Islamic scholars like Mohammed al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi and also by the more radical teachings of Sayyid Qutb. In general, many students felt a certain affinity to rigid and traditional Islamist approaches, as well as to a more militant stance. Most of the student leaders of *jama'at al-islamiyya* were honored and attracted by the recruiting advances of the MB hardliners, whom they saw as legends. Finally, the *nizam al-khass* convinced some of the most influential students to join the ranks of the MB. Nevertheless, both sides drew a veil of silence over this alliance. They had their reasons for this solution. The Brotherhood expected further recruitment under the students' banner to be more successful for their cause, while the students feared a loss of their supporters if the alliance should come to light. This precaution was based on the moderate path of the MB's General Guide, al-Tilmisani, who was rejected by radical elements of the student organization.⁸⁷

Despite the care taken, the merger leaked out in the late 1970s and the militant elements broke with the *jama'at al-islamiyya*. The radicals either joined forces in the students's fundamentalist successor organization, *jama'a al-islamiyya*, or in the militant *tanzim al-jihad*, in order to use violence against the Egyptian regime to pursue their objectives. However, students that had become members of the MB were subject to al-Tilmisani's influence and became convinced by his arguments of a moderate political

⁸⁶ Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 41–43. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, 135–138.

⁸⁷ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 38–41. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 42.

path. Additionally, in 1981 Sadat's assassination led to a major prosecution of radical Islamist elements throughout Egypt. The fact that some leading figures of the *nizam al-khass* were also affected by this clampdown turned out to be to the *murshid's* advantage. It gave him the unrestricted opportunity to pursue his political ideas for the MB.⁸⁸

Like the reactions of the more radical trends within the student movement of the 1970s, other radical Islamist groupings either avoided any contact with the MB or broke away and pursued violence to oppose the regime and achieve their objectives. Two of them shall be mentioned. The Society of Muslims (*jama'at al-muslimin*) was founded by the agricultural engineer Shukri Ahmad Mustafa, who was strongly influenced by his prison experiences and Qutb's ideas. The members of this radical organization were convinced that the Egyptian state and society were misguided and suffered from *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of divine guidance). In order to establish their vision of an Islamic society, they avoided negative *jahili* influences by living in isolation, gained strength by preaching its ideas, and eventually planned to return and fight the *jahili* state and society. Convinced by their ideological beliefs, the *jama'at al-muslimin* strongly opposed the moderate path of the MB introduced by al-Hudaybi. Their leader, Mustafa, had nothing but contempt for the reformist orientation of the neo-Muslim Brethren and considered it a weakness that would lead to their doom. Therefore, he distanced himself from the MB, which in his eyes was no true and legitimate Islamic movement. The Society of Muslims entered their violent phase in the second half of the 1970s.⁸⁹

Another radical grouping of the Sadat era was the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP, *hizb al-tahrir al-islami*), which was established by Salih Siriyya, a Palestinian. After Siriyya had moved to Cairo in the early 1970s, he frequented the MB and befriended Zaynab al-Ghazali, head of the Muslim Sisters and a leading Islamist feminist figure, and the MB Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi. The Palestinian was also influenced by Qutb's ideas but did not agree with Qutb's opinion of *jahili* society. Siriyya regarded the regime as the massive obstacle preventing the re-Islamization of the state. Furthermore, he was unable to align with the gradualist convictions of the MB to achieve an Islamic

⁸⁸ Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 82–83. Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 43–44.

⁸⁹ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism*, Ch. 3. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 77–78.

state. Therefore, he assembled a group of young people, primarily students, and formed the ILP in order to focus on an immediate transformation of the state. In 1974, the ILP became the first group to attack Sadat's liberal politics and staged a violent but unsuccessful coup d'état.⁹⁰

These examples show that the radicals, no matter whether initially close or more distanced from the moderate Brothers, decided to pursue their own objectives. This observation underlines the clear signal that the MB sent to the Egyptian Islamist movement. Additionally, the radical actions were condemned by the leadership of the MB at the time. For them, there was no moral justification for the radicals' use of violence. The Brothers' statements drove the wedge even deeper between the radical groupings and the MB.

To sum up this section, therefore, it can be said that different internal and more external, but still close, generational influences existed that opposed the reformist development of the MB. However, the ideological orientation of the Brothers that was introduced by al-Hudaybi and defended and developed by his strong successor al-Tilmisani prevailed against those influences. Furthermore, it was al-Tilmisani who played a key role. He was powerful and convincing and, thereby, capable to successfully meet or, with regards to the old guard, control dissidents. As a result, leadership had a strong impact on generational influences and needs to be linked to the defense of the Brothers' moderate path against internal or radical generational trends. Moreover, the ideological aspects, which will be presented in the following section, obviously presented a hurdle that prevented a rapprochement of radical elements.

c. *Ideological Considerations*

During the Sadat era the different Islamist movements had one thing in common, the objective of establishing an Islamic state. However, they strongly disagreed on how to achieve this common goal. This disagreement between the Islamist movements originated from two writings, al-Hudaybi's *Preachers, not Judges* and Qutb's *Milestones*. These books emerged as a result of an unbridgeable ideological gap between the radical

⁹⁰ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb*, 281–282. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 76.

and moderate camps within the MB and described two different means—teaching vs. violence—to the same end, an Islamic state. These different ideological perspectives not only were an important factor in the split of the MB, but also influenced the generations of Islamists that were still to come.

In the 1970s, the MB abided by its moderate path. The reformists had learned from the experiences of the past that moderation presented the only possibility to secure the organization's future by regaining strength and whitewashing its reputation while legally pursuing its objective. However, over the years, the MB's new *murshid* al-Tilmisani opted for further development of the movement's traditional engagement in society, which was solely based on teaching and preaching. He attached more importance to future political engagement of the Brethren and pushed for a transition from spiritual piety to political activism. As already described above, al-Tilmisani managed to prevail against the traditional views of the old guard, who shared al-Banna's opinion on the negative effects of party politics, and minted the organization according to his ideas. At the same time, the engagement in politics and eventually the acknowledgement as a political party would present further legitimacy, influence, and support for the movement's cause. Although al-Tilmisani's ideological advancements and lawsuits that abandoned some of al-Banna's traditional views never earned the MB recognition as a political party, he at least managed to stress the importance of moderate political activity and facilitated access to the political arena for following generations of Brethren.

Furthermore, this strict abidance to the MB's moderate path, which was defined by the denial of violence in achieving an Islamic state, kept radical elements from joining the MB and their influences at arm's length. This again allowed for a consolidation of the moderate orientation of the organization. But, as discussed, the ideological development was strongly linked to al-Tilmisani's leadership and was supported by the MB's organizational structure, which followed a strict top-down approach combined with obedience to the *murshid*.

3. Islamist Auto-Reform

As described earlier, for decades the MB tried to achieve their goals by openly confronting the Egyptian authoritarian regime under Nasser. Besides political engagement, planning and conducting violent actions like armed uprisings and assassinations were employed as conventional means towards their objectives. Especially after the assassination attempt on Nasser, the responses of the state can be characterized as acts of overwhelming repression against the MB whenever the movement stepped over one of the thin red lines of the regime. The interaction between both sides had a long lasting impact on the Islamists, which influenced its objectives under Sadat, as this chapter has revealed.

Carry Rosefsky Wickham identifies learning, or the process of learning, as one of the main components of her theoretical approach. In this context, the Brethren's interaction with the regime during the Nasser period should be considered a learning process that caused, first and foremost, a rethinking to abide violence. However, the long lasting impressions primarily took effect in the Sadat era by further influencing the MB's decision making and thereby shaping the organization. Based on the perception that decades of futile attempts to confront the regime had lead to no success but only worsened the conditions for the MB, the leadership eventually opted for cooperation with the regime under the new president. Furthermore, the MB under al-Tilmisani focused on political activism to preserve the movement from harm by increasing its legitimacy. Thus, in the first instance they learned that violence was a bad option in pursuing their objectives and they reoriented themselves on another less harmful path, political activism, to move on. Moreover, their rethinking was approved by the regime, which eventually was an acknowledgement to continue—in short a learning success.

Although, the MB's moderate path during the Sadat era was clearly dominated by al-Tilmisani's leadership, it becomes obvious that a learning experience also planted the seeds for the political activism of the MB. Thereby, for the most part, Wickham's thesis can be affirmed for this period. However, until Sadat's assassination, those seeds did not come up enough to spark the political engagement that again forms the premises for Wickham's idea of Islamist auto-reform. Therefore, Islamist auto-reform does not present

in its entirety an explanation as an influential factor for the consolidation of the Brothers' moderate path during the 1970s, though it does play a decisive part.

D. CONCLUSION

The findings of this chapter, which are based on the analysis of extrinsic and intrinsic factors, elucidate that during the Sadat era the development and orientation of the MB was strongly influenced by the Brothers' new Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmisani. The impact of his leadership was far reaching and was shaped by his vision of abiding by a moderate path while pursuing legitimacy and political activism to secure the organization's future. Al-Tilmisani left no room for the influences of other trends, opinions, or ideologies. He managed to revive the MB, hold the movement together by preventing factionalism, and push the Brothers in the direction he envisioned. Finally, al-Tilmisani remembered and benefitted from the organization's hierarchical, organizational structure, characterized by a clear, top-down approach, which enormously bolstered his influence.

However, the success of the Supreme Guide's realignment of the MB towards political activism was primarily facilitated by the presidential shift from Nasser to Sadat. This presented a fruitful ground for the MB and supported their aspiration for a new beginning. Other external factors had an impact on the new beginning of the Brethren, but played a secondary role. At the same time, the experiences of Nasser's harsh repression were still present. This also shaped the organization and convinced its leadership that violence was the wrong and unfruitful means to achieve the movement's main objective, an Islamic state. Furthermore, it taught them to be cautious about the state's leaders, despite the regime's liberal sectarian politics. As a consequence, the pursuit of legitimacy became an important intermediate goal. Recognition as a party, which was thought to protect the Brothers against state sanctions in the future, was especially vital for the new General Guide and fostered al-Tilmisani's decision to shift from the MB's path of traditional piety to political activism.

In part, Islamist auto-reform, as understood by Carry Rosefsky Wickham, should also be considered as an important factor in the MB's retention of its moderate orientation during Sadat's presidency. The findings of this chapter clearly show that the Brotherhood's environmental framework provoked a learning process, which led to the leadership's intensive strategic focus on political activism. Besides the merger of the students with the ranks of the Brethren, this planted the seeds for an influential and successful new generation of political activists within the organization, which had an important impact in the 1980s.

To sum up, this chapter has shown the importance of the effects of the organization's leadership in the consolidation of the MB's moderate path during the Sadat era. The Supreme Guide's influence and clear stance as well as past experiences with the ancient regime were major factors in abiding by the late al-Hudaybi's decision to deny violence in order to achieve the organization's objectives. However, policy shifts under Sadat granted the MB the freedom to pursue their objective with almost no restrictions and have to be considered an important facilitator.

IV. POLITICAL STAGNATION IN THE MUBARAK ERA

A. INTRODUCTION

When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat fell victim to assassination by Islamist radicals in 1981 his deputy, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded as Egyptian president. In February 2011, after being in office for almost thirty years, he bowed to the rising revolutionary public pressure, based on increasing dissatisfaction with his authoritarian politics, and resigned as the country's leader. Mubarak's resignation marked the end of a turbulent period for the Muslim Brotherhood. Under the lead of a strong Supreme Guide, Umar al-Tilmisani, and Mubarak's accommodating regime politics, the Brethren were able to follow a moderate path of continuous political activism as well as religious and social engagement. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to considerably increase their influence in all levels of the Egyptian political arena and society and developed into a strong political opposition force with deep grassroots in the networks of an emerging parallel Islamic sector.

During the 1990s, conditions changed, and over the following years different external environmental, but also internal organizational, factors pushed the moderate development of the Muslim Brotherhood into a choppy rollercoaster ride characterized by several drastic ups and downs. Finally, beginning by the end of the last decade, the moderation process seems to reach an impasse. Despite the movement's political success in the parliamentary elections of 2005, based on the progressing internalization of modern democratic political concepts and values, and the latter's merger with Islamic beliefs, the moderate path stagnated. Especially, changes to the political agenda and the apparent return of a conservative mindset in public support this opinion. Due to the pioneering role that Egypt plays in the Middle East with regard to political, ideological, and cultural influences, and the standing of the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the most influential Islamist organizations of the region, this development is alarming and may have negative consequences outside Egypt. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the MB's moderate development, its setbacks, and stagnation over the past thirty years of

Mubarak's presidency and seeks an answer to the question: Why—despite continued moderation and political successes—did the Muslim Brotherhood's development stagnate during the Mubarak era?

Many scholars and analysts of the Middle East and Egypt have written about this eventful period in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. They offer valuable information and data regarding the development of the organization. This chapter will build on these authors' studies and analyses and utilize their findings as references to provide a comprehensive and critical evaluation of the full range of factors that had an impact on the Brethren's political endeavors, their moderate path, and, finally, the obvious stagnation of this positive development. Furthermore, after analyzing the different influential extrinsic and intrinsic factors based on the approach, following organizational theory, the remaining theories presented in the introduction of this thesis will be applied. This chapter will show that the Muslim Brotherhood's continued moderate development and the stagnation of this process were caused by a bandwidth of interacting factors and cannot be reduced to a single explanation. Especially leadership, generational and organizational structure, and regime and U.S. policies, but also a continued learning process of the movement based on the political environment facilitated further moderation, while some of these factors also contributed to a stagnation of the political progress in this era.

After a historical review of the analyzed period, the following sections will describe the influence of external factors, followed by a detailed consideration of internal aspects like generational and organizational structure, leadership issues, and ideological influences. The application of these different theories will complete the analysis.

B. HISTORICAL REVIEW

After the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, had to face the consequences of Sadat's politics on the international and domestic stages. Especially, Sadat's major political achievement, the peace treaty with Israel, caused four major side effects Mubarak repeatedly had to deal with during his time in office. First, by

concluding the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Sadat had ignored the “Three No’s”⁹¹ based on an agreement of the Arab world during the Khartoum Summit Conference in 1967. His decision was regarded as a betrayal of common Arab objectives and opposition to Israel. This led to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League and the termination of existing political and economic relations between the members of the league and Egypt.⁹²

Second, the treaty and its direct consequences turned into a political disaster with regard to Egyptian public opinion and fueled the rise of radical revolutionary Islamist movements in the country, which eventually, led to Sadat’s assassination by radical Egyptian Islamists. Moreover, this facilitated the emergence of transnational jihadi organizations like al-Qaeda—a serious problem that Egypt, as a Western ally and close to the United States, repeatedly had to deal with in the following decades of Mubarak’s presidency.⁹³

Third, economic problems and the expulsion from the Arab League forced Egypt into an even deeper relationship with the West and affected the search for a new role within the Arab world. For ages the North African country had held the Arabs’ cultural and political leadership role and was considered an inspiring example, based on its rich history and identity. Now this proud nation had to seek a new place, which it found and consolidated by its sometimes-questionable and chameleonic position as a peace

⁹¹ Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 216–218, 228–229. “The Khartoum Resolution of 1967,” Palestine Facts, last modified September 13, 2010, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_khartoum.php. No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.

⁹² Oren, *Six Days of War*, 317–323. Laqueur and Rubin, *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 216–218, 228–229. Efraim Inbar, „Arab-Israeli Coexistence: The Causes, Achievements and Limitations,” in *From War to Peace?*, vol. II of *Israel: The First Hundred Years*, ed. Efraim Karsh (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 257.

⁹³ Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., “Egypt under Mubarak,” in *The Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Karl Yambert (Boulder: Westview Press, 2006), 212, 218. Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 55–68. Some of the Egyptians who were arrested for their part in the conspiracy of Sadat’s assassination turned towards al-Qaeda and became, like the Egyptian physician Dr. al-Zawahiri, its leaders in their bloody fight against Western nations. Four of the nineteen Arabs involved in the cruel terrorist events of 9/11 in New York and Washington D.C. were Egyptians.

negotiator or mediator between Israel, the West, and Arabs. The new president also tried to assume the position of a Palestinian patron for all questions regarding a solution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.⁹⁴

Last, after Egypt was banned by the other Arab states, it left a serious gap, a power vacuum, in the Arab world. No other Arab state had Egypt's military power or was capable of stepping into Egypt's place, although some—like Libya and Syria—tried to in the 1980s. However, in the 1990s, Iraq under Saddam Hussein successfully sought for power in the Middle East. Similar to those of Nasser, Hussein's policies managed to win the hearts of the Arab people by his offensive and radical stance against Israel and the West, which destabilized the region and drove a wedge between the Arab leaders and their people. This ended after the invasion of Iraq in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this cleared the way for another powerful state, Iran, to emerge in the region and oppose Western influence and U.S.-friendly Arab regimes in the beginning of the century.⁹⁵

In particular, the interaction of all these outcomes, based on Sadat's peace treaty with Israel, determined Mubarak's foreign and domestic politics during his presidency. In order to deal with the country's very weak economy, Mubarak continued the economic opening introduced by Sadat's *al-infitah* program, abided by peace with Israel and pro-Western, pro-U.S. politics. He ensured important Western financial support thereby, but also granted further Western political and cultural influence. However, Egypt's economic problems, Israel's actions in Palestine, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon, and U.S. involvement in the region led to a divide between regime politics and Egyptian popular opinion over the years. Despite the fact that he opted for a "cold peace" with Israel and

⁹⁴ Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948–2003* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 224.

⁹⁵ Veronica Nmoma, "Power and Force: Libya's Relations with the United States," *Journal of Third World Studies* XXVI, no. 2 (2009): 139–143. Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria's Role in the Region: Mediator, Peacemaker, or Aggressor?* (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), 8–10. Barry Rubin, "Iran: The Rise of a Regional Power," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 3 (September 2006): 142–144, 150–151. Ayellet Yehiav, "The Anti-Iranian Front: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (March 2007): 6–9.

achieved rapprochements with other Arab states during his time in office, this neither improved the domestic situation nor prevented the actions of radical Islamist movements opposing his politics.⁹⁶

After a period of indiscriminate repression against the Egyptian Islamist movements following Sadat's assassination, Mubarak decided to accommodate and cooperate with the moderate MB. By using the MB's broad societal access, combined with further democratic development and focused prosecution of radical tendencies, he intended to convince the population of the advantages of his policies and the radical Islamists of the need to deny violence. But alarmed by the MB's political success, the Islamist electoral success in Algeria, and growing and far reaching Islamist influence in Egypt, Mubarak shifted once more towards suppression of the moderate Islamists in the early 1990s.⁹⁷

During the 1990s and 2000s, the regime adopted more and more authoritarian characteristics in domestic politics and slowed down the political ambitions of the MB by repeated arrests and legislative amendments. Nevertheless, in the 1980s a young generation of the MB that had emerged from the student movement of the 1970s pursued a successful political path. Their policy was primarily characterized by the increasing importance of contemporary political experience, as well as by democratic values. However, in 1995 a failed assassination attempt against Mubarak resulted (among other reasons) in a drastic crackdown on all Islamist organizations, including the Muslim Brothers. As a result, the movement was pushed into a depression caused by internal generational quarreling, which lasted until the early 2000s.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Domestic Developments in Israel," in *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), 29–37. Michael Weir, „External Relations,” in *Egypt: Internal Challenges and Regional Stability*, ed. Lillian Craig Harris (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1988), 85. Rabinovich, *Waging Peace*, 223. The idea of the *cold peace* policy was to keep the principal peace commitments but reducing diplomatic, economic and cultural relations to a minimum.

⁹⁷ Mona El-Ghobashy, "Muslim Brothers," 384, 389–390. Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 43, 46–50.

⁹⁸ Israel E. Altman, "Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928–2007," *Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World Research Monographs on the Muslim World* 2, no. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute Inc, 2009), 14–15. Wolff, *Muslimbruderschaft*, 123–126. El-Ghobashy, Muslim Brothers, 389–390. Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 46–50.

Supported by a U.S. Middle Eastern policy that increased pressure on Mubarak to facilitate further democratization in Egypt, the MB achieved a tremendous success in the elections of 2005. However, Mubarak's response of constitutional changes was a setback and left little hope for a similar success in future elections under his presidency. Additionally, internal disagreement within the MB with regard to the movement's future ideological and political orientation resulted in a stagnation of the moderate path along modern and democratic values.⁹⁹

C. INFLUENCES ON THE BROTHERHOOD'S MODERATE DEVELOPMENT

This analysis will focus on important extrinsic and intrinsic factors derived from organizational theory. However, this chapter's screening of the organization's development for influences will also deliver solid evidence for theoretical approaches, such as Islamist auto-reform and pothole, median voter, and Michels's theory, as discussed in the introduction. It is possible to further support the argument of continued strong, moderate development of the movement during Mubarak's presidency and a further abandoning of radical ideas. Nevertheless, the analysis will also show that the MB's political path reached in some way a dead-end road by the end of the first decade of the century. This will complete the answer to the given research question of this chapter.

1. Organizational Theory

a. Extrinsic Factors

The review of external factors will once more focus on the MB's political environment in Egypt and the central role of the authoritarian state, as well as on President Mubarak. Other political influences, such as U.S. regional policies, also had an impact on the Brother's political path and need to be considered separately.

⁹⁹ Noha Antar, "Die Muslimbrüder in Ägypten: Zwiespältige Reformer," in *Moderate Islamisten als Reformakteure: Rahmenbedingungen und programmatischer Wandel*, ed. Muriel Asseburg (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007), 63, 69–70. Wolff, *Muslimbruderschaft*, 127–129. Bruce K. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 179.

(1) Regime Politics. Mubarak, Enabler and Oppressor. Despite the deadly setback Sadat had experienced with his economic openness and political liberalization, Hosni Mubarak continued to abide by his predecessor's policies when he took office. Furthermore, albeit in smaller steps, he sought to follow a path towards further democratization, enabling regular elections with multiple parties and an increase of press freedom. Nevertheless, Mubarak perceived political Islam in its different forms as a threat to his regime that could only be met by using the MB and their influence as a mass movement. Thereby, the Brotherhood was less a means to directly oppose the regime's enemies than to convince the grassroots of the benefits of the regime's socio-economic policies, as well as to convince potential radicals of the need to reject violence. For this very reason, Mubarak opted for confidence-building with the MB, whose moderate development was well recognized by the new president. As a result, similar to his predecessors, the new president utilized the MB as a tool to pursue his own domestic political objectives.¹⁰⁰

However, Mubarak had learned from the past and the mistakes of former presidents; he refused to end the state of emergency, which granted him a powerful position from which to meet political enemies. He pursued a two-sided strategy to deal with the Islamist movement in the country. While the radicals remained under the pressure of his security apparatus, he kept a close eye on the Muslim Brotherhood by setting limits to their political freedom. For instance, Mubarak denied the organization's wish to create a political party, although he allowed their electoral activity in professional unions, syndicates, and even parliament as independent candidates. He intended thereby to prevent the MB from emerging as a powerful opposition force to his own party, the National Democratic Party. The latter secured his legitimacy as Egypt's ruler by dominating the parliament. The formal political inclusion of an organization like

¹⁰⁰ Gehad Auda, "The 'Normalization' of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early 1990s," in *Accounting for Fundamentalism: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, vol. 4 of *The Fundamentalism Project* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 389–390. Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 43.

the MB, which was independent from his control and had strong social links and popular support from wide parts of Egypt's society, would have definitively threatened his presidency.¹⁰¹

With this new concept in mind, Mubarak began his term in office. He released detainees of different parties and political organizations and granted them freedom to return to their professions and political activities. Among the political inmates released was the leadership of the Muslim Brothers, which had been arrested in the state prosecution that followed Sadat's assassination. These Brethren pretty much resumed their political work where they had left off. In the 1980s, the political activism based on the leadership and vision of Umar al-Tilmisani, as well as a generational shift within the movement, had increased and the open opposition of the MB against radical Islamism continued. MB members had finally discovered politics as the new means to achieve their goals and penetrated different political levels within the state, for example, student unions, professional association and even political parties seeking for power and influence.¹⁰²

As a consequence, the MB became more powerful in the 1980s. The Brotherhood used its opportunities and avoided direct confrontation with the state. However, despite the tacit agreement of mutual accommodation between the regime and the MB, the organization crossed the boundaries dictated by the Egyptian ruler. In the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood criticized the state's electoral law, its Iraqi policy (when Egypt joined the multinational coalition against Hussein's attack of Kuwait), and finally brought shame to the regime by providing better care and support during the 1992 earthquake than the government.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Holger Albrecht and Eva Wegner, "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and containment in Egypt and Morocco," *The Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 2 (June 2006): 125, 129–130. Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 43.

¹⁰² Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence," 172–173.

¹⁰³ Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 45–46.

In fact, 1992 has to be considered the turning point in the relationship between the regime and the MB. Mubarak—who had initially opted for a more liberal way of interaction—perceived their political development as a risk to the power of his regime. Alarmed by the MB’s political moves and success, its growing support by the Egyptians, its very capable and excellent social and financial network,¹⁰⁴ the results of the Algerian elections in 1992,¹⁰⁵ and, finally, the ostensible meetings between U.S. representatives and the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak decided to shift towards repression. The situation got even worse after an assassination attempt against Mubarak in 1995 failed and the MB was accused of links to radical Islamist groups. This resulted in a drastic response by the regime, a crackdown on all Islamist organizations including the Muslim Brothers.¹⁰⁶

Over the following years, Mubarak and his regime adopted more and more authoritarianism in domestic politics, while democratic development stalled or even declined. With regard to this rather negative trend, the application of emergency law and its consequences for Egyptian society and the political environment was a decisive factor. After Sadat’s murder, Mubarak had declared a state of emergency to restore order in Egypt. Until the end of his presidency, Mubarak enforced the emergency law, which turned into an important means against his opponents and assured the persistence of his rule. He periodically asked parliament for an extension of the usually timely limited state of emergency, which was always granted due to the dominance of his party, to meet the threats from violence and terrorism. This was partly justified by the terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s. Later, the ground for emergency rule was less narrowly defined and aimed at the deterrence and guard of radical or criminal forces trying to incite unrest in Egypt. Thereby, the emergency law could be easily misused as a tool for political goals rather than for the establishment of security in the North African country.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ This was one of the decisive reasons why the Muslim Brothers were able to deliver faster support to the devastating earthquake in Cairo in October 1992 than the government itself.

¹⁰⁵ The fundamental success of the Islamist party *Islamique du Salut* against the ruling regime.

¹⁰⁶ El-Ghobashy, “Muslim Brothers,” 384. Soage and Franganillo, “Muslim Brothers,” 46–48.

¹⁰⁷ Kassem, *Egyptian Politics*, 38. Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, *Islam in Egypt*, 127.

When Mubarak started to consider the MB a political threat, he shifted his policy from some sort of cooperation and accommodation to repression and containment in the early 1990s. According to regime argumentation, this policy shift was justified for different reasons: first, the claim that the MB was involved in a large and violent conspiracy against the state; second, the regime had been misguided in its efforts to engage the moderate Islamists, due to the latter's confrontational course against the state; third, the MB only pretended to embrace a moderate path as a clever tactical maneuver to gain power; fourth, Islamists never change, and remain hostile as long as they are not controlled by the state; fifth and last, there are no shades of grey regarding Islamist movements, they are all the same. Due to these arguments and the changed grounds of the emergency law, all Islamist organizations took the centre stage of the state's extensive prosecution. At the same time, the MB itself became a major rationale for the continuity of the state of emergency. In this way, Mubarak's clever move pushed the MB into a vicious circle and yearlong suppression by the state's coercive security apparatus. As a result, the organization, for instance, had to endure the massive crackdown that was already mentioned above, repeated arrests of leading Brethren, especially just before elections, and massive intimidation of its members, voters, or sympathizers. The MB was still illegal, which enabled Mubarak to deal with its opposition at will. This again had serious effects on simmering internal organizational problems, which will be discussed later in this chapter.¹⁰⁸

Despite repression and the hard setback of the crackdown in 1995, which caused severe internal factionalism in view of the MB's political positions and engagement, the Brethren managed to overcome the obstacles and continued to focus on the pursuit of their ideas by political engagement. In order to meet this Islamist challenge on the political stage and restrict the MB, the regime additionally began to introduce legal and constitutional changes. The examples are manifold, such as the changes of the election laws for the professional syndicates—a stronghold of the Brotherhood's political work in the 1980s and 1990s—which reduced their overwhelming electoral success tremendously. Other restrictions focused on the basis of the MB. For instance, Mubarak

¹⁰⁸ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 86–88, 91–93.

spread a web of laws and regulations over the social and religious grassroots of the organization, which Wickham calls the parallel Islamic sector, and, thus both reduced the MB sphere of influence and increased the regime's. Finally, constitutional changes like those after the MB's electoral successes in the 2005s, which excluded independent candidates from elections and banned on religiously motivated parties and programs, strongly hampered future political engagement.¹⁰⁹

Besides the above-mentioned influences, Mubarak used the media for his objectives. Like many authoritarian rulers, he controlled the media. The regime owned or granted access to the market, or was able to assert strong influence over newspapers, radio, and TV. Accordingly, the authoritarian state determined press releases. At the same time, the independent media and journalists were under surveillance by the state, which used its huge security apparatus to ensure regime-friendly press. Besides structural limitations, legal constraints, censorship, and governmental influence through emergency law, editors and journalists suffered from repressive measures if they violated the rules. Threats, beatings, imprisonment, abduction, and even assassination were possible consequences of misbehavior. In this way, it was guaranteed that the media became an instrument of the authoritarian government, shaped public opinion in a regime-favorable way, and complied with the regime's political goals. As a result, efforts of the MB to establish their own newspaper and distribute or air positive and supportive press were very limited. Furthermore, the government's press releases helped to draw a negative and threatening picture in the minds of the Egyptian people about the Islamist movement and its political goals.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 93–94. Antar, “Zwiespältige Reformer,” 63, 69–70. Wolff, *Muslimbruderschaft*, 127–129. A detailed description of the new legal constraints is listed in International Crisis Group (ICG), *Egypt's Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?* 18 June 2008, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 76, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/485917412.html> [accessed 8 May 2011], 12–15.

¹¹⁰ Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 66, 96. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 94. Naomi Sakr, “Egyptian TV in the Grip of Government: Politics Before Profit in a Fluid Pan-Arab Market,” in *Television and Public Policy: Change and Continuity in an Era of Global Liberalization*, ed. David Ward (New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2008), 270–276. Naomi Sakr, *Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2002), 30–36. For instance, the influence on private radio- and tv-stations was based on national laws (distribution of licenses, intervention/censorship, and emergency law), state shares in ownership, financial dependency on government owned banks, and the mandatory use of state-provided information (most importantly news).

Although Mubarak tried to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood while limiting its freedom at the same time, his strategy was not successful. He underestimated the Brothers' influence and their development into a political party playing the political game, albeit illegally. Furthermore, he overestimated his government's capability of pulling the strings within the relationship. The revival of Islamic radicalism in the 1990s sent the Egyptian state into a phase of indiscriminate repression of Islamist groups. Although the MB itself did not turn violent, for Mubarak this was a perfect opportunity to repel the Brothers who had become strong opponents and had clearly crossed the boundaries of the framework set by the regime. Although the Brotherhood experienced repeated repression and restrictions by the authoritarian regime, it managed to recover and abide by its moderate political activism. However, the legal steps changing the Egyptian electoral system eventually posed a massive insurmountable obstacle for the Brothers' future political success and pursuit of change by means of the political game until the end of Mubarak's rule.

(2) External Political, Cultural and Social Influences. Besides the regime's influences on the MB's political path and development, there were other direct and indirect external factors that had an impact on the Islamist movement. Two important ones will be discussed in this section. First, the consequences of U.S. relationship with the Egyptian regime, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East, need to be considered before the relationship between Egyptian society and the MB is analyzed.

The relatively close relationship between Egypt and the U.S. dates back to Anwar Sadat. In the early 1970s, he intended to improve Egypt's economic and financial problems, which mainly were a result of the ongoing conflict with Israel and the loss of major sources of revenue during the war in 1967. Knowing the strong American influence on Israel's leadership, he pursued realignment of relations with the cold war parties and a shift from the Soviet Union towards the U.S. as the only solution to improving Egypt's situation. But as a defeated party of the Six-Day War, Egypt was in a weak position for negotiations. Even U.S. mediation early in 1973 could do nothing to iron out this crucial problem and improve Egypt's bargaining position. The Yom Kippur War led Egypt out of this gridlock to where it was accepted as an equal partner for peace

negotiations. In addition, Sadat secured financial aid to improve Egypt's economy from the U.S. who—due to the use of the oil weapon¹¹¹—was eventually forced to end the crisis and broker a deal between Israelis and Arabs. However, these political moves and the following introduction of *al-infitah* did not improve Egypt's economic situation and forced Sadat to another diplomatic step, a long-term peace with Israel in 1979. Besides the peace agreements known as the Camp David Accords, this peace settlement ensured U.S. military and economic aid and was the beginning of the two countries' long lasting relationship.¹¹²

During the years after Camp David, Egypt, under Mubarak's leadership, became one of the most valuable American allies in the region. Simply put, since the 1970s, Egypt's support was bought, and cost the U.S. dearly, with a total of some \$60 billion of economic and military aid. However, the money ensured Egyptian support and mediation in the region with regard to U.S. Middle Eastern policy and maintained at least a cold peace with Israel. Nevertheless, Egypt's leader often had problems remaining loyal to his American sponsor, based on Egypt's own regional interests and the U.S. special relationship with Israel. Israeli policies and economic endeavors had a repeated severe impact on the Egyptian domestic situation, causing public protest or simply presenting a disadvantage for Mubarak's own regional influence, though the annually paid \$2 billion presenting welcome and needed state revenue, was eventually convincing America's Arab lieutenant to stay in line. Malicious gossip had it

¹¹¹ The Arabs used their strongest weapon to force the U.S. to intervene, end the conflict, and act as a negotiator—"the power to use an embargo on the export of oil." This coined the term oil weapon. Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1991), 418.

¹¹² Quandt, *Camp David*, 311–314, 335. Cleveland and Bunton, *Modern Middle East*, 377–380. Raymond W. Baker, *Sadat and After*, 23–24. Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance," 549–556.

that Egypt was America's poodle. Some compared the Egyptian president with a payphone—pay money and get what you want in return.¹¹³

Besides the pursuit of financial and political interests that led to the alliance between the U.S. and Egypt, and the problems it caused, it had a far-reaching impact for Egypt's Islamists, and especially the MB. First, after the terrorist attacks in 2001, Egypt became one of the Americans' most willing enforcers of the U.S. strategic approaches to Global War on Terrorism objectives. The traumatic events intensified the intelligence cooperation between the two states, integrated Egypt's security apparatus into the CIA's Extraordinary Rendition Program, and eventually legitimized repression, torture, and assault on civil liberties against all kinds of Islamist movements. For this reason, the emergency law and the later passed anti-terrorism law equipped Mubarak with substantial freedom of action and legitimacy. Thus, the banner of fighting terrorism provided further rationale for the regime's domestic policies to meet the rising influence and political engagement of the moderate Islamist opposition embodied by the MB. Furthermore, this supported Mubarak's unimpeded actions in order to restrict civil liberties and political rights that eventually strengthened his own authoritarian rule in Egypt.¹¹⁴

Second, in the following years a shift in U.S. Middle Eastern policy pushed the MB and facilitated its tremendous success in the parliamentary elections of 2005. The policy shift was based on the increasing public resentment of American foreign policy throughout the region. After the invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, the Arab and Muslim world perceived

¹¹³ Bradley, *Inside Egypt*, 22. Rabinovich, *Waging Peace*, 224–228. Fawaz A. Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli relations turn sour," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (1995): 69–77. "America's Lieutenant," *The Economist*, July 17, 2010, accessed May 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/16564218?story_id=16564218. For example, Israel's regional military and economic policy and many of its individual agreements with some Arab neighbors openly circumvented Egypt and challenged the Egyptian legitimacy as a mediator raising strong distrust and fear in Cairo. However, Egypt's difficult relationship to Libya, Fatah, and Hamas also hampered its role as a negotiator. Whether it was the reaction's on Israel's policies or Egypt's own actions again and again the U.S. responded with square refusal and definite answer.

¹¹⁴ Anne Alexander, "Mubarak in the international arena," in *Egypt: The Moment of Change*, ed. Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2009), 146–148. Elaasar, „Is Egypt Stable?“ 71.

the military presence in the oil-rich countries as a form of imperialism and humiliation. As a consequence, public opposition in many regimes that had supported the different U.S. endeavors faced domestic unrest and strong criticism. This was met again by intensified repression and eventually dashed all hopes for reforms. For this reason, the U.S. sought to improve their image throughout the region by setting out for a political change towards further democratization and liberalization. In the context of this policy shift, the Americans also increased the pressure on Mubarak to allow further democratization along with free and fair elections as an important prerequisite for change. This granted freedom for the MB's political engagement, which was rewarded with 88 seats in parliament for the movement.¹¹⁵

Third, since the mid-1980s, Egypt's social problems and the decline of the Egyptian welfare state caused growing dissatisfaction among the Egyptian population. Besides the direct public resentment mentioned above, U.S. policy in the Middle East led to different military engagements that once more caused decreasing revenue and economic disadvantages. This again resulted in social problems and further Egyptian anti-Western sentiment. The stagnation of political reforms and the perception of increasing social imbalances and corruption added further fuel to the fire. The Egyptians were done with Mubarak. They finally had "enough" and longed for political change. The *Kifaya* (enough) movement of the regime's opposition emerged as a valve for the atmosphere and wish for change in Egypt. Furthermore, many were attracted by the political objectives of the MB, who had often supported the people when the regime had failed to fulfill its social contract. Along with a clear and liberal political program, which "dealt with religious, social, political, economic, and cultural reforms; the relationship with the Copts; and the situation of women"¹¹⁶ and promised change, the

¹¹⁵ Shibley Telhami, "The Role of the Persian Gulf Region," in *The Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Karl Yambert (Boulder: Westview Press, 2006), 181. Shibley Telhami, "The Contemporary Middle East – Some Questions, Some Answers," in *The Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Karl Yambert (Boulder: Westview Press, 2006), 263–264. Sherifa Zuhur, *Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 7–10. Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections," *CRS-Report for Congress*, January 15, 2006. 5.

¹¹⁶ Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 50.

MB's Islamist ideas managed to win the hearts and minds of many Egyptians. Thus, this public backing also ensured the MB's electoral triumph in 2005.¹¹⁷

However, the result of U.S. influence on the Egyptian elections and the strong public support as a consequence of the people's wish for change was not well perceived in Washington. For American decision makers, such an overwhelming success of the MB in Egypt and also for Hamas, the MB's offspring in Palestine, in the same year, was alarming to U.S. decision makers. Uncertain about how to deal with this development, to a certain degree unable to differentiate between different Islamist movements' political goals, and also too much impressed by dark visions of the future drawn by authoritarian rulers fearing to lose their leadership, the U.S. relativized its strong democratic rhetoric again. The Americans decided not to risk the alliance with Egypt and moreover probably U.S. interests in the Middle East. Rather than starting a journey into the unknown with a new unpredictable Islamist movement, the U.S. approved a stagnated democratic development after the elections in 2005 and even a democratic setback by Mubarak's constitutional changes in 2007.¹¹⁸

This section focused on the influences of the U.S.-Egyptian alliance that emerged in the 1970s. U.S. policy in the Middle East played a dominant role in this relationship. This led to different impacts on the Egyptian domestic level, which again had consequences for the development of the MB during the Mubarak era. For the most part, U.S. political influence or the absence of it, as in the end of the last decade, needs to be considered as an obstacle for the moderate political activism of the MB. The U.S. granted Mubarak freedom and legitimacy to prevent a political rise of the movement under the banner of the War on Terrorism and, if necessary, by the use of repressive means.

¹¹⁷ Mourad M. Wahba, „Social Aspects,“ in *Egypt: Internal Challenges and Regional Stability*, ed. Lillian Craig Harris (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1988), 18–25. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 15. Dan Eldar, „Egypt and Israel: A Reversible Peace,“ *Middle East Quarterly* (Fall 2003): 57–65. Referring to Eldar, especially “the drop in tourism, lower oil prices, reduced incomes from the Suez Canal and from remittances from Egyptian workers abroad, have persuaded many Egyptians that globalization is just another form of exploitation.” This resulted in anti-Western sentiment.

¹¹⁸ Alexander, “Mubarak,” 148, Zuhur, *Egypt*, 11. Bradley, *Inside Egypt*, 68–69. Elaasar, “Is Egypt Stable?” 71.

During the period of advocacy for democracy, U.S. policy presented an opportunity for the movement. U.S. influence, public support and dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, and the MB's clear moderate and liberal political objectives helped to push the movement and enabled success. However, the U.S. was unable to deal with the consequences of this result, and backtracked from its democratization campaign, preferring authoritarian rule over democratic development for the protection of its interests in the Middle East. Combined with the regime's constitutional changes, a successful political chapter in the MB's history was closed and brighter future conditions under Mubarak denied.

b. *Intrinsic Factors*

Internal factors can also have important effects. With regards to the topic of this chapter, therefore, the following paragraphs will especially assess leadership, the generational and organizational structure of the MB, and ideological aspects.

(1) Generational Aspects. In the early 1980s, the so-called "middle generation" reinforced the MB. Back in the 1970s, these members were the students who had formed student associations or unions and actively opposed leftist elements. Now that they had left university and entered professional life, they further affiliated with the MB and breathed new life into the organization. The members of the middle generation were young, skilled, and energetic Islamic activists who launched a new wave of political engagement of the Society of Muslim Brothers in the 1980s and early 1990s. They had the full backing of Umar al-Tilmisani, the Brothers' Supreme Guide, who even after the repression of the Islamists in connection with Sadat's assassination held to a moderate path.¹¹⁹

This new charismatic generation of MB members found broad support on the periphery of the Egyptian state within the Islamic networks that formed the parallel Islamic sector. In the following years, they managed to use their network-based financial and organizational capacities to increase their popularity and achieve their

¹¹⁹ Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 115. Albrecht and Wegner, „Autocrats,“ 134. Soage and Franganillo, „Muslim Brothers,“ 43–44. While Wickham (115) refers to the middle generation, Soage and Franganillo name this new generation the new guard (43–44).

political objectives within the narrow framework set by Mubarak. Striving for social and political power, the young generation first focused on Egypt's two-dozen professional associations and, step by step achieved a leading role within these unions. They were pushing further away from the political periphery and towards the center of politics, which meant representation as a party at the People's Assembly. However, legal establishment of the party was definitely denied by the ruling regime in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, growing influence in professional associations and the MB's popular base in the parallel Islamic sector paved a quite successful way for sedulous, electoral cooperation with registered political parties to access parliament.¹²⁰

Topics like political freedom, state repression, cultural and educational issues, corruption in politics, and economic concerns entered the political agenda of the MB. This revealed the growing importance within the MB of political views and participation as a political party. The reluctance to violence surfaced in anti-radical statements and open opposition against the state's means of repression. The Muslim Brothers adopted the behavior of a flexible, political party by competing, cooperating, and forming alliances with legal parties and playing the political game. They focused on the voter, campaigning and developing political programs embedded with their agenda and their Islamist ideals. At the same time, there was a further opening towards groups of other religious beliefs, like the Copts, by accepting them as full citizens.¹²¹ With regards to the development of the MB during the 1980s, Ramadan gets to the point: "...the Muslim Brotherhood transformed itself into a parliamentary political party with a unique place, existing and yet not existing on the political map."¹²²

Despite repression in the mid-1990s, the middle generation managed once more to use its opportunities to gain power after its most influential figures left prison a couple of years later. The MB abided by their political orientation and took a clear position on "...non-Muslims, the relationship between religion and politics,

¹²⁰ Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 115–118. Soage and Franganillo, "Muslim Brothers," 43–46. El-Ghobashy, "Muslim Brothers," 378.

¹²¹ El-Ghobashy, "Muslim Brothers," 379–382. Ashour, *De-Radicalization*, 85. Israel E. Altman, "Egypt," in *Guide to Islamist Movements*, ed. Barry Rubin, vol. 1 (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2010), 230–231. Zuhur, *Egypt*, 68–69.

¹²² Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence," 177.

violence and politics, and human rights.”¹²³ While Islamic values remained crucial, contemporary and political experience became more important to the Brothers. Overall, democratic values—like equality among Muslims and non-Muslims, free votes, freedom of speech, as well as a constitution specifying and regulating a balance of powers—substantially formed the political program of the organization.¹²⁴

However, the imprisonment of the Brothers’ open-minded generation left the MB in the hands of the old guard during important electoral periods. These older MB members caused a retrograde step in the ideological development pushed by the younger members. The elders caused harm to the MB’s public reputation by reviving and following the idea that the sole source of authority should be shari’a, and fell back on rather old-fashioned views concerning non-Muslims, party politics, and Islamic life in general, including the role of women. Therefore, the younger generation, which supported popular sovereignty, became increasingly frustrated. The separation of a group from the Muslim Brotherhood, the so-called Center Party (*Hizb al-Wasat*), was an inevitable consequence.¹²⁵

After the millennial, when the most influential personalities of the old guard had passed away, the MB revived its political activity and openness. Its new Supreme Guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, officially and publicly adopted the ideas of the younger generation and pushed the political goals of the organization.¹²⁶ In a press conference, Akif presented a manifesto, which “dealt with religious, social, political, economic, and cultural reforms; the relationship with the Copts; and the situation of women.”¹²⁷ Furthermore, he demanded a constitutional, parliamentary, and democratic

¹²³ El-Ghobashy, “Muslim Brothers,” 384.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 383–385. In 1994, statements on women’s rights and party pluralism followed. It was clearly a doctrinal reinterpretation of al-Banna’s thoughts on a woman’s role in Muslim life and his aversion to political parties, indicating an ideological shift within the Muslim Brotherhood. In another statement, they declared that the Copts had the same rights and duties as themselves, refused once more to countenance violence, emphasized the important role of the people with regards to the legitimacy of a government in a Muslim society, and underlined the importance of human rights to the Society and its members.

¹²⁵ Wolff, *Muslimbruderschaft*, 123–126. Soage and Franganillo, “Muslim Brothers,” 48–50.

¹²⁶ El-Ghobashy, “Muslim Brothers,” 389–390.

¹²⁷ Soage and Franganillo, “Muslim Brothers,” 50.

system, criticized the Egyptian regime, and opposed any foreign interference, especially addressing U.S. president Bush's Greater Middle East Initiative.¹²⁸

With this political agenda, and supported by the U.S. Democracy Reform Initiative, several of the MB's candidates achieved a bedrock electoral success in the parliamentary elections of 2005. The authoritarian regime responded with different constitutional changes. These legal hurdles ended the MB's opportunity to penetrate the political arena and made a similar result in future elections impossible. Based on this renewed setback and further state repression, traditional currents once more incrementally gained the upper hand within the movement until the end of the Mubarak era. The draft of a party platform in 2007, which put many democratic values of the 2005 political agenda into a different perspective, and the dominance of conservative figures within the leading level of the organization, support this argument.¹²⁹

But the old guard and the middle generation do not complete the generational structure of the MB. There is a third generation that joined the movement during the 1990s. The repressive experiences of these years raised a sentiment to withdraw from the public ground level and assured the survival of the MB by remaining underground. Being religiously and ideologically conservative, they filled rural midlevel leadership posts, ran the MB's administrative organs, and pursued the missionary outreach of the movement. Due to their religious and ideological views and their inward orientation of denying public politics in favor of ideological outreach, they are close supporters of the old guard and are often referred to as neo-traditionalist.¹³⁰

A last group represents the youth of the MB. This generation is considered far more open and curious than the old guard and the neo-traditionalists. The majority of young MB members aim at reaching more freedom, social justice, and a modern way of life based on an Islamic identity. They use new Internet-based technologies and social networks to express their opinion on all aspects of society and

¹²⁸ Altman, "Egypt," 232.

¹²⁹ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 53–60. Antar, "Zwiespältige Reformer," 69–70. Marc Lynch, "The Brotherhood's Dilemma," *Middle East Brief*, no. 25 (Waltham.: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, January 2008), 5–6.

¹³⁰ Khalil Al-Anani, "The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path," in Vol. 9 of *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, ed. Hillel Fradkin et al. (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2009), 99.

politics. Similar to the middle generation back in the 1970s and 1980s, these blogger-activists—as Marc Lynch calls them—have their roots in the urban university environment of Cairo and Alexandria and bring a fresh breeze into the MB. They have “not undergone the rigorous ideological indoctrination and organizational grooming that former generations of Brothers underwent,” which enables them to freely criticize the religious focus under the old guard’s influence and the strictly hierarchical, opaque organizational structure of the movement.¹³¹ Due to their ideas, open criticism, and hierarchical status, the conservative MB members put severe pressure on the young or pay scant attention to their views. In the past, the reformists were deeply involved in their struggle with the conservatives and now stand to lose the link to this new generation of political activists, who present a welcome support for their political objectives.¹³²

The struggle between the old guard and middle generation clearly dominated the past thirty years within the MB. By the end of the past decade, the older conservative generation prevailed and assumed power by pushing its candidate on the *murshid* post. This back and forth between the two currents consequently led to several setbacks of the moderate development of the MB whenever the old guard was in charge of the organization. Supported by neo-traditionalist reinforcement, they finally managed to consolidate their power and edge the reformists out of the leadership level.

Furthermore, members of the middle generation obviously missed the opportunity to integrate the young generation, who have, for the most part, a similar background and pursue recognition within the MB. Their fresh, open-minded influence and their interest in democratic values and objectives may once again boost internal reforms and revive political activism. Otherwise, the moderate reformist movement has reached a dead end.

(2) Leadership. Alison Pargeter describes Umar al-Tilmisani’s death in 1986 as a “watershed moment for the Ikhwan.”¹³³ Al-Tilmisani was the prime mover behind the reformist current of the middle generation. He was a vigorous leader

¹³¹ Al-Anani, “The Young Brotherhood,” 99.

¹³² Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 60. Marc Lynch “Young Brothers in Cyberspace,” *Middle East Report* 245 (Winter 2007): 27–29. Al-Anani, “The Young Brotherhood,” 99–102.

¹³³ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 46.

who was respected within the MB and supported young political activists in their pursuit of a more open approach to achieving their goals. The end of internal reform, but also the loss of an outstanding leadership figure, was considered a bitter consequence of his death by many of the new successful guard. The leading political activist who had set the Brothers' agenda for almost a decade and pushed the movement along a moderate path into the political arena was gone.¹³⁴

Al-Tilmisani's death presented an opportunity for conservatives to regain the leadership of the movement and mint the organization according to their ideas. The key members of the *nizam al-khass* current returned from exile and brought an era of new rigidity to the MB. However, when they resumed their work in the 1980s, they at first stayed on the sidelines and opted for indirect influence. Al-Tilmisani's successor at the General Guide's post, Hamid Abu al-Nasr, was unable to follow in his predecessor's footsteps. He lacked al-Tilmisani's leadership skills and suffered from serious health problems, which left the MB with a weak General Guide for a decisive period. For this reason, his appointment was supported by conservatives who used this weakness to increase their influence. The old guard increasingly restricted and opposed the political endeavors of the moderate movement, which provoked a growing internal schism.¹³⁵

The young were frustrated about these developments and hoped for changes with regards during the MB Guidance Office election of 1995. But when the election resulted in no change and, moreover, after the death of al-Nasr in 1996 the old guard dominating the office simply appointed one of their own as the new *murshid* (Mustafa Mashour), frustration grew. Finally, when the reformists were fed up with the rigid ideological backwardness and the authoritarian traits of the old guard's dominance, the internal schism between both sides reached its climax and resulted in the breakaway of young political activists. They formed the *Hizb al-Wasat* and found a way to abide by their moderate political ideas of popular sovereignty, party pluralism, and civil and

¹³⁴ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 89. Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 46–47.

¹³⁵ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 47–49. Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 89.

human rights for both genders and all religions. The *Wasat* members intended to be an overarching party for all Egyptians and did not differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims.¹³⁶

While parts of the middle generation broke away, other reformists were arrested over the course of the regime repression in mid-1990. Thus, until after the turn of the century, the MB remained under conservative leadership. After the death of the last guide assigned to the *nizam al-khass* group in 2004, a new Supreme Guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, publicly endorsed the ideas of the younger generation who returned from imprisonment and picked up the lost moderate path, despite belonging to the MB's elders. However, a strong influence of conservative currents remained within the organization. Along with the political suppression of the regime, the draft party platform of 2007 presented a step back to old Islamic attitudes with regards to women and non-Muslim minorities, a sign of strong conservative influence. Furthermore, the moderate voices like Muhammad Habib and reformist leader Abdel Moneim Abu al-Futouh were step by step pushed out of leadership positions. Akif proved to be unable to keep or bring reformist members to the leadership level of the MB. His last attempt to promote Essam Erian, who is associated with the MB's reformist wing, led to an éclat with the conservative camp and resulted in Akif's resignation as the General Guide in 2009.¹³⁷

The new conservative *murshid*, Muhammad Badie, elected after the dispute in 2010, is regarded as a leader lacking intellectual and political vision for political openness and the will and power to trigger internal reforms. In the beginning of

¹³⁶ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 49–50. Israel E. Altman, *Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, 1928–2007*, Research Monographs on the Muslim World, Series No 2, Paper No 2 (Hudson Institute, Washington DC, February 2009), 22. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation to Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (January 2004): 207.

¹³⁷ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 164. Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Muslim Brotherhood: new leadership, old politics," *The Guardian*, January 20, 2010, accessed May 11, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/20/muslim-brotherhood-egypt>. Amr Hamzawy and Nathan Brown, "The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment," *Carnegie Papers*, no. 19 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2010), 30–33. "Update on Reports of Division within the Muslim Brotherhood," *The Telegraph*, February 15, 2011, accessed May 11, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks-cables/8327131/update-on-reports-of-divisions-within-the-muslim-brotherhood.html>.

his term, he placed the emphasis on strengthening the organization, religious-oriented ideological outreach, and shifting away from political engagement and public life. This differs from the weakened, moderate-wing demands for a more active public role based on political activism.¹³⁸ But despite this conservative shift in the leading levels of the MB, an International Crisis Group interview with a leading Muslim Brotherhood member reveals that “this closed-minded [conservative] group is not dominant. It is in power.”¹³⁹ This comment once more underlines the importance of the Brotherhood’s organizational structure, which underlies a strict top-down approach. This means that whoever is in the lead is obviously setting the agenda of the movement.

It becomes clear that the MB entered a phase of leadership struggle after al-Tilmisani’s death. This internal dispute is mainly based on the disagreement between conservative and moderate views about the MB’s future engagement within the Egyptian society and politics. As a result of repeated setbacks caused by the state’s repression, and especially the strong constitutional boundaries after the 2005 elections, conservatism dominated the leadership by 2010. Moreover, being at the top of the MB’s hierarchical and pyramidal organization means not necessarily representing a dominant opinion of its members but deciding what direction the movement will take.

(3) Organizational Structure. The objective during the Sadat era of maintaining and expanding the organization was reassumed when Mubarak shifted to accommodation with the MB in the early 1980s. As a consequence, the MB began to expand its influence in Egyptian society. Like al-Banna, they started to build up a strong religious, social, economic, and political network—the parallel Islamic sector—within society. Besides providing, for instance, health, educational, or financial services, the parallel Islamic sector also included private mosques, which ensured a broad penetration of society. As in times of their founding father, the MB members were able to assure others that they were able to deliver social services and political change within the narrow borders set by the regime. They managed to tie their political ideas and promises directly to their actions, convinced others of the organization’s objectives, and rapidly

¹³⁸ Gerges, “The Muslim Brotherhood.” Hamzawy and Brown, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” 32–33.

¹³⁹ Cited in International Crisis Group (ICG), *Egypt's Muslim Brothers*, 18.

attracted new members. At the same time, the MB gained sympathies by providing services the regime was supposed to deliver, and emerged as a serious competitor. The capacity of the parallel Islamic sector was enormous and facilitated the MB's support during the earthquake in 1992. Finally, the deep entanglement within the Islamic network periphery of the Egyptian state made it very difficult for the regime to proceed against the well-placed Islamist opposition. The sector was characterized by its extremely decentralized and flexible structure, which made any regime influence, or even the attempt of control, very difficult. Mubarak and his state authorities, backed by the massive security apparatus, lacked the capacity to contain the MB's activities.¹⁴⁰

This endeavor was closely linked to the organizational structure of the MB. In order to meet the requirements of its new role in society and politics, based on the network and the different social backgrounds it had to deal with, the movement began to rebuild its various specialized departments and branches—one of them was the newly formed political section. The growing mass movement became more decentralized with regards to management and administration. The Brotherhood was able to improve their effectiveness while becoming less vulnerable to regime influences. However, despite granting more freedom to the regional and provincial levels, the elite of the MB retained its central and dominating role, deciding important issues and passing down major objectives and policies. Finally, the MB opted for election of the different leadership posts on all levels and abandoned its traditional way of appointing leaders based solely on seniority. This was an important development that introduced democracy to the internal organizational structure, ensured internal transparency and permeability for posts, hampered the old boys' network of internal authoritarianism, and later lent credence to the MB's democratic objectives.¹⁴¹

However, the remarks on leadership above present evidence that the changes in the organizational structure were not successful with regard to internal authoritarianism. The strictly hierarchical top-down approach with regard to the

¹⁴⁰ Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (Autumn, 2001): 501–502. Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 62. Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 97–106.

¹⁴¹ Al-Awadi, *Pursuit of Legitimacy*, 62–64. Marc Lynch, "The Brotherhood's Dilemma," 3.

orientation of the movements ensured that whoever gained power was able to set the agenda. This presents an explanation why the prominent public political voices of the Brethren's successful parliamentary bloc carried less weight in questions referring to internal decision making and tended to defer to MB leadership.¹⁴² Furthermore, as described above, it remained difficult to enter the highest leadership levels through elections, and the traditional appointment system prevailed in different situations. This implies a lack of organizational permeation.

A change of its organizational structure equipped the MB with the necessary means to become a mass movement. Furthermore, it facilitated the organization's broad access to society, which again provided a powerful backing for the MB's political objectives. Additionally, the new organizational structure, but also the Brothers' deep-rooted entanglement in the periphery of the Egyptian state made aimed actions against the Islamist movement difficult. Consequently, the combination of organizational changes and involvement in the parallel Islamic sector ensured support and protection for the objectives envisioned by MB leadership. Despite these successes and through changes in the organizational structure, the internal electoral processes did not prevail on every account. However, this factor is critical for change and equality within an organization. Combined with a form of strict organizational hierarchy and the consolidation of conservative beliefs in the highest levels of leadership, these developments must be considered as a setback for moderate ideas and its driving force, the reformist camp.

(4) Ideological Considerations. As the previous sections have shown, ideological views referring to al-Banna's thoughts of the role of Islam in Egyptian society were consolidated within the conservative camp of the movement. However, in the 1980s, the rise and influence of the middle generation within the movement introduced political activism. This new concept added to the emergence of a strong second moderate and open-minded grouping within the MB and, eventually, among other reasons, to the breakaway of some members in the 1990s. As Bruce Rutherford points out, the moderate political agenda of the young activists of the middle generation was

¹⁴² International Crisis Group (ICG), *Egypt's Muslim Brothers*, 19.

strongly influenced by the ideas of different Islamic theorists. Their research and writings on Islamic governance and constitutionalism were based on a modern and moderate interpretation of the Islamic values and principles represented in the Qur'an and shari'a law.¹⁴³

The moderate MB members seized many of the ideas of Islamic constitutionalism—like personal freedom, consultation and authority of the people, a ruler's accountability to the people, and a system based on a balance of powers—which were largely incorporated in the political campaign platform of 2005.¹⁴⁴ A strong second ideological position emerged within the movement and aspired increasingly for recognition, which eventually led to internal schism between conservatives and moderates. As a consequence, this moderate political path must be considered the ideological standpoint of the reformist who freed himself from the traditional ideology of the MB elders.

Contemporary Salafism was another ideological influence that regained increasing influence during the Mubarak era, due to a general regional radicalization and domestic repression in many countries. These impacts, and especially the ongoing frustration with the fruitless political engagement, a perception of leadership's unwillingness to confront the challenges of the day, and anger against the ongoing repression influenced many MB members of the third and fourth generation and caused further dissatisfaction.¹⁴⁵

As a matter of fact, the MB's drive for organizational expansion and security, combined with its structural change, led to an increasing penetration of rural populations. Here, Salafist ideas had a fruitful base among the people, which again caused its increasing encroachment into MB membership of more traditional and less tolerant ideological views. These developments led to further support of the conservative attitude of a more religious role. On the other hand, however, some authors predict an

¹⁴³ Rutherford, *Egypt after Mubarak*, 163–168.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 164.

¹⁴⁵ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 60. International Crisis Group (ICG), *Egypt's Muslim Brothers*, 19. Lynch, "The Brotherhood's Dilemma," 7. Ibrahim al-Houdaiby, "Egypt's Brotherhood Faces Leadership Challenge," *Arab Reform Bulletin*, November 10, 2009, accessed May 5, 2011, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=24118>.

increasing radical mindset based on the alarming military attitude of different Muslim Brotherhood youth groupings. This development gives reason for concern in the higher leadership levels of the MB. Leadership seems to be losing touch and control over some members of the younger generation. Although so far no violent actions have been committed, the higher ranks fear the consequences for the MB if these impatient and radical young are not brought to reason.¹⁴⁶

The findings presented above indicate that considerable ideological development and influence have affected the MB. Besides the ideological current reaching back to the MB's founding father, focusing on a missionary role, another grouping, the reformists, interpreted Islamic values and principles differently. This facilitated a rethinking towards political engagement and openness and a center role of the principles of Islamic constitutionalism. In contrast to the first ideological current, the politically oriented view made further political learning, and a change of some conservative core values and beliefs, possible. It thereby built a bridge between Islamic values and beliefs and a secular understanding of politics, and consequently opened the door for further moderate political development.

A final ideological view, contemporary Salafism, entered the arena by influencing many young and rural members of the movement. This influence leads either to a stagnation of the progresses made by the middle generation, by supporting the MB's elders or—an even more dangerous outcome—may present a revival of radical elements. A revival of radicalism would mean a serious blow to the MB as a whole.

c. Summary of Findings

These findings, based on a broad analysis rooted in the organizational theory based approach, offer valuable explanations to the moderate development of the MB. External influences like the accommodation policy of the regime and the U.S. regional democratization initiative facilitated opportunities for the MB to successfully engage within Egyptian society and politics. Furthermore, leadership decisions combined

¹⁴⁶ Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, 60. Marc Lynch, "The Brotherhood's Dilemma," 7.

with the character of the movement's organizational structure and the ideological openness of a whole generation of Brethren to political activism and modern and democratic views pushed and consolidated the moderate path.

However, the same factors also presented obstacles that led to several setbacks and a stagnation of moderation. The repressive actions of the increasingly authoritarian regime supported by U.S. policies ended the political endeavors of the MB by the end of last decade. This last smackdown for the reformist MB path facilitated the emergence of a renewed conservative sentiment, which also managed to regain leadership positions. Combined with the disadvantages of the Brethren's organizational structure, the internal pursuit of moderate objective seems to be a long shot. Finally, increasing Salafist influence adds to these disadvantages and, moreover, threatens to be a high risk for the MB in general.

Overall, as this deep analysis shows, using an approach based on organizational theory is an excellent tool to answer the research question this chapter focuses on. It allows detailed investigation that allows a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for organizational decision making.

2. Other Theoretical Explanations

a. Pothole Theory

According to this theoretical approach, a party changes its objectives and attitudes to gain support and please voters. Over time, it becomes more entangled in satisfying the concerns of the public and incrementally leaves its old—maybe radical—agenda to deliver solutions. In short, a group's ideological and political appearance in public transforms itself to avoid audience costs that weaken the party's base.

During the increasing political activity of the MB, beginning in the 1980s, the reformists' political work was to a certain degree focused on the voter and public sentiment in different matters. This supports the pothole theory argument at first glance. Moreover, the engagement of the MB within the parallel Islamic sector added to its successful political work. By providing many services that normally should be covered by the ruling regime, they impressed great parts of the Egyptian population and ensured

the support in the political arena. For these reasons—taking care of ordinary concerns and responding to wishes for democratic development and liberalization—the pothole theory seems to provide an answer for the moderate development of the MB.

However, these are the only reasons that support this theoretical approach. There are different arguments that weaken the pothole theory as an explanation for the MB moderation. First, political activity and its consequences can only be attributed to the reformist camp of the Brotherhood and were not generally supported within the MB. The period in question shows that there is strong disagreement about the political engagement of the organization, and that the MB's path was dictated by its leadership. This was supported by the hierarchical, top-down approach the organization followed. Consequently, while communication with the voter and satisfaction of his demands is a possible explanation for the reformists' moderation and denial of violence, it does not present an argument for the conservative camp's concentrating around the old guard. Furthermore, political activity is only one part of the MB's engagement. Most of the departments of the MB focus on religious, social, and financial engagement within Egyptian society, but especially within the parallel Islamic sector. The political section is only one of many. Thereby, political engagement has not necessarily been a priority within the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole.

Second, the Mubarak regime was authoritarian, and interested neither in democratic development nor in the emergence of a political opposition that would be a risk or threat to its own powerful position. Changing this environmental condition was not in the hands of the Brethren. However, only a more democratic framework allows unopposed and unhampered party work and communication with the voter. Furthermore, only in a democratic environment free, fair, and open elections are possible. Without these opportunities any communication between a party or political group and the voters is corrupted. As a result, an exchange of opinion or negative response in the form of good or bad electoral results is not possible. A pursuit of political work in order to achieve electoral success was never an option for the MB because the outcome was dependent on, or at least strongly influenced by, the authoritarian elite's repressive actions and constraints.

The last counterargument is also strengthened by the fact that the decision to follow a moderate path and, later, political engagement, was primarily a leadership position dating back to the 1970s. One reason was to ensure security for the MB within the authoritarian framework. Legitimacy by recognition as a political party became a major goal towards securing the organization against regime influence. Despite the fact that the regime allowed limited political engagement by the MB, it never recognized the organization as a political party. Consequently, the reformist camp, supported by a strong *murshid*, used the opportunities Mubarak offered to improve its domestic and international reputation and acceptance as a moderate political force within Egypt. This argument shows that legitimacy and acceptance were major objectives of the MB's political endeavors, more than the fixing of voter potholes.

Based on these arguments, the pothole theory, which is based on a party-voter relationship, does not present a comprehensive explanation for the development of the MB during the Mubarak era. Leadership and the authoritarian environment need also be considered. Certainly, the assessment would be a different one in a more democratic environment or at least within a state transitioning to democracy. This would allow the engagement of all forms of opinions in the political arena without an external threat that leads to a group's interest in survival. Such a competitive environment would also automatically push political activists to focus more on the voter as the key to influence and existence in politics.

b. Median Voter Theory

Anthony Downs is convinced that a party or group entering the political game is solely interested in success. As a result of clear priority, the party focuses primarily on meeting the expectations of the main group of voters, the median voters, even if this does not match its ideology or the opinion of its original social platform. As a consequence, over time these organizations move away from extreme or radical ideas.

The MB gained power, strength, and influence in the political arena by its religious, social, and financial work within the parallel Islamic sector, its influence in professional syndicates during the 1980s and 1990s, and its moderate political agenda in

the beginning of this century. Despite the authoritarian framework, which was a critical and limiting factor by determining the rules of any engagement, the MB abided by its moderate themes. They focused on liberalization and further democratic development in order to get the masses on their side. Similar to the argumentation presented above regarding the pothole theory, electoral success depended on authoritarian rule within the Egyptian state. Access to the Egyptian public was massively regulated by the different repressive means applied by the regime. This prevented the MB's unconditioned influence on the voters prior to and during elections and free communication with potential voters.

Both missionary and political work supported the goal of increasing power and influence in Egypt's society. However, considering the internal divide between moderate and conservative currents within the MB, this does not present a satisfying argument as to whether the organization has truly renounced extreme, revolutionary, or radical positions. Many scholars argue that the political announcements and endeavors were only tactical means to achieve power in Egypt or ensure survival against repression. In their eyes, the policies of avoiding direct confrontation with the regime during the 1980s and internal schism, which again and again led to changing announcements with regards to democratic values, are telling. Examples are the repeated setbacks of the moderate democratic developments in accordance with the influence of the old guard in the late 1990s or 2000s. Thus, the changes of direction, along with leadership or influence shifts between the conservative and reformist camp, are important and underline this point of view.

These findings show that despite the moderate development of the MB over the past thirty years, a satisfactory answer whether moderate views dominate within the MB cannot be given when applying the median voter theory. Other factors like authoritarian influence, leadership, and generational weight play an important role but are not included in the considerations of this theory.

c. Michels's Theory

Michels argues in his political theory that oligarchy prevents a political party from taking risks challenging its existence and that bureaucracy preoccupies and prevents it from following revolutionary tendencies. There is some solid evidence supporting this theoretical approach. Beginning in the 1970s, the objective of ensuring a secure platform for the MB by growth and expansion led to its increasing penetration of society and eventually a strong influence within a parallel Islamic sector during the following two decades. Furthermore, this development facilitated changes in the organizational structure and a considerable increase of bureaucratic elements.

Additionally, leadership persisted in its central role and abided by a strict top-down approach to ensure its influence. The leading elite opted for a new course of pursuing its objective of political activism and seeking influence by penetrating the political arena while avoiding direct confrontation with the state. Thereby, the leadership intended to protect the movement and, hence, its own being. The MB left its original sectarian ideological path and the ideas of their founder al-Banna with regards to political engagement and shifted towards a self-preserving path of political activism.

However, Michels's idea supposes an oligarchic element, which means that the elite must have a strong interest in consolidating its position, and uses respective means to ensure this. Unfortunately, the research on the topic provides neither the interest nor the means. The objective that was pursued by al-Tilmisani and his successors during their time as the movement's General Guides was focused on preserving and securing the MB and not on consolidating their leadership. Even effects of oligarchic actions cannot be identified.

On the contrary, despite the fact that the organization follows a strict top-down approach, internal elections on all levels intend to alert the MB to internal authoritarianism and leave opportunities for leadership change. Transparency prevents oligarchy. Furthermore, no matter whether a moderate or conservative leadership is at the helm, there is always considerable influence by the remainder, leading to the continuous internal schism described in this chapter. This shows that there is room for other

tendencies within the movement and that they are not completely neutralized by the elite. Moreover, this may cause internal discussion but also internal realignments and changes, which additionally contradict Michels's argument that revolutionary tendencies are undermined. Consequently, during the period of Mubarak's presidency, Michels's theory does not provide a satisfying explanation for the continued moderation of the MB.

d. *Islamist Auto-Reform*

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham argues that Islamist auto-reform leads as a result of an internal learning process to change in a movement's goals and strategies by members of the movement. Playing the political game and adopting the rules and norms of the political environment results in ideological and behavioral changes and provokes distancing from strict Islamist views opposing modern democratic concepts and political openness.

The detailed consideration of the middle and the young blogger generation in the course of this chapter offers strong evidence for Wickham's thesis. The middle generation was shaped by their work in the different student organizations in the 1970s. As young, skilled, and energetic Islamic activists they joined the MB in the 1980s and accepted the challenges of the political arena at the time. Supported by the strong backing of a *murshid* open to political activism, as well as the networks of the parallel Islamic sector, and strengthened by their electoral successes in the different professional unions, they started to penetrate Egyptian politics. Influenced by the constraints of the Egyptian political environment and public opinion, they adopted a flexible political behavior, cooperated and formed alliances with other parties, and focused on the voter by campaigning and developing political agendas addressing political standpoints, problems of public interest, and their solutions. Over the years of engagement in politics they were more and more open to the ideas of Islamic constitutionalism and democratic principles, which they integrated in the campaigning program. Furthermore, they presented clear modern positions to many critical aspects of conservative Islamist opinion, for example, women in society, non-Muslims, religion and politics, and human rights.

A young generation of MB members commenced their political work in the past ten years. They have a lot in common with the reformists of the middle generation. Experiencing the constraints of the authoritarian regime, the young demand further democratic development, pursue political freedom and social justice, support the recognition of human rights and civic equality, and are open to a modern way of life based on an Islamic identity. They express their political views openly in demonstrations or by using modern technological opportunities like the Internet.

Both generations pursue more openness and modern influence. They envision transforming the movement into a politically and religiously open and modern organization that also includes internal structural changes that allow more transparency and democratic appeal. However, they face severe problems regarding their ideas because the conservative camp is in power and unwilling to change. As a consequence, the middle generation is expelled from leadership posts and the bloggers are granted neither access nor hearing. This leaves the modern reformist movement in a dead end street.

The findings show that there are two disunited groups within the MB that strive for a change to modern democratic ideology and behavior. Although the conservative camp is in power, they are challenged by the reformists of two generations. This offers at least a promising opportunity of further moderate and democratic development for the MB in the future. Thereby, the analysis presented in this thesis chapter supports decisive aspects of Wickham's thesis of Islamist auto-reform as a promising explanation for moderation of the MB—even if the process is not completed yet.

Although Wickham includes the leadership aspect as a critical factor in moderate development, she does not directly address external factors like the influence of the regime or internal factors like organizational aspects in her theoretical approach. However, by assuming the leadership role as a key to change, which takes the momentous and final decision about internal changes and reactions to external influences by considering what is best for the organization, Wickham indirectly pays attention to these other factors. Therefore, Islamist auto-reform presents a good theoretical

explanation for the moderate and political development of the MB during the Mubarak era and points out why the moderation process is not completed or stagnant.

D. CONCLUSION

The organizational theory approach of analyzing extrinsic and intrinsic factors influencing MB decision making provided a comprehensive explanation for the its moderate progression but also the stagnation of this development. In summary it can be stated that leadership, generational and organizational structure, and external factors like regime and American policies facilitated further moderation.

The emergence of a generation of young and energetic MB members shaped by the Egyptian student unions of the 1970s and supported by the vision of the strong Supreme Guide al-Tilmisani proved to be a fruitful combination for continued moderation and political activism. Influenced by Islamic constitutionalism and democratic concepts, they started to conquer the political arena in spite of the authoritarian regime. Despite these external hurdles and without recognition as a party, the middle generation used any opportunity of political freedom and eventually became a challenging opposition to the Egyptian ruler. The parliamentary elections of 2005 turned out to be the peak of their successful work and continuous moderate progression characterized by the increasing internalizing of democratic values and modern views on Islamic values.

However, constitutional changes following this success presented a severe setback on two accounts. First, due to legal sanctions set by Mubarak, future engagement in the Egyptian political arena was impossible. And second, this impasse of the reformists' political work supported the increasing influence of a strong conservative camp. By the end of the last decade, the latter regained their leading positions within the MB and focused on introversive realignment with a traditional Islamic and missionary orientation. Consequently, the moderate development initiated and pursued by the middle generation eventually stagnated. Hence, regime repression as well as a generational dominance in the organizational leadership led to an obvious stagnation of any moderate progress.

When considering the other theoretical approaches applied in this chapter, these findings correspond in large part with the results based on Wickham's thesis of Islamist auto-reform. These results are thus affirmed through two different perspectives. However, the remaining theoretical approaches do not consider essential factors, and therefore provide no satisfying explanation of MB moderation during the analyzed period.

External influences, like the opportunities and restrictions presented to the MB by the authoritarian regime, and internal factors, like the role of leadership or the will of the middle generation, were decisive with regard to moderate progression or its stagnation.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. THESIS FINDINGS

This thesis offers a thorough analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's development over succeeding presidencies and sheds light on the manifold external and internal factors that have influenced the organization and its increasingly moderate path and continued denial of violence in the pursuit of its objectives. Close consideration of these different influences provides a comprehensive answer to the given research question. The following paragraphs will briefly summarize the findings.

In the case of external factors, the influence of authoritarian regimes and their policies played an important part by providing threats and opportunities to the Muslim Brotherhood. State policies of cooperation or accommodation towards the MB, which were intended to support the various presidents in achieving political goals and strengthening their bases, offered decisive liberties to the Brotherhood. The latter took maximal advantage of the often-limited latitude these policies provided in order to pursue their objectives.

Nevertheless, the constraints and repression applied by Egypt's authoritarian leaders created a wide range of obstacles for the Brethren. Nasser's brutal repression, for instance, almost put an end to the MB's very existence and caused grievances that led to a rethinking of non-violence. Under Sadat and Mubarak, repression and legal constraints against the MB handicapped, and eventually even stalled, political engagement and involvement. These Egyptian presidents felt threatened by the increasing power and influence of a rising political opposition and their policies provided an important motivation for MB leadership to continue to deny violence. Furthermore, by the rotative use of the give and take principle, the regimes provided the MB with opportunities to follow a moderate path while also setting its limits. The present findings underline the major role of regimes regarding the choice of a moderate political path within an Islamist movement.

Other external influences like U.S. regional policies or national grief based on Egypt's performance in different wars were also important and need to be mentioned. Nevertheless, analysis of these factors exposes two different perceptions. First, they were often tied to regime politics and had no direct impact on the MB. Second, they sometimes merely provided a good framework for MB endeavors. Therefore, they certainly had influence but played a minor role compared to the authoritarian regime.

While the respective regimes enabled or restricted moderation by imposing outside conditions or by influencing the environment, intrinsic factors provide an explanation for internally motivated changes, and leadership needs to be considered a key factor. In spite of al-Hudaybi's weak performance as the Brotherhood's *murshid*, he eventually managed to convince mainstream members to deny violence. This marked the emergence of a moderate current within the Muslim Brotherhood. Two of his successors, al-Tilmisani and Akif, were strong and moderate-oriented General Guides who abided by non-violence but also backed the political activism of the emerging middle generation. This enabled even further moderate progress by providing excellent conditions for the integration of modern political ideas and democratic values within the movement's old-fashioned Islamic ideology.

However, old-line leadership or influence on weak leaders caused severe setbacks for the moderate trend after the repeated imprisonment of some middle-generation figures from the mid-1990s to the end of the last decade. Weak leadership leaves room for diverse internal trends to emerge and gain influence, which again may cause further internal schism. Here, as described in chapters II and IV, General Guides al-Hudaybi and al-Nasr were good examples of this phenomenon. All these findings eventually imply that leadership plays an important key role in Muslim Brotherhood orientation and, therefore, in its pursuit of moderate ideas, but it also plays a key role for the different conservative-based setbacks.

The importance of leadership needs to be considered in the context of organizational and generational structure but also influential ideological aspects. First, the MB's organizational structure encouraged the deep-rooted social entanglement of the Brethren, which provided an excellent basis to support the political endeavors of the

middle generation. The MB is characterized by a strict top-down approach, which explains why whoever is in power sets the agenda. This has often proved to be a disadvantage when conservatives have been in charge of the organization; otherwise, this supported the reformist cause.

Second, moderation and political activism as introduced by al-Tilmisani was only possible due to the middle generation, who were shaped by their political work in the student unions and open to the strong *murshid's* ideas. These young activists were receptive to modern views on Islamic values and their political realization. The combination of the *murshid's* political openness and a reformist middle generation strengthened the cause of moderation.

Third, ideological aspects, or rather, ideological beliefs, also exerted influence on MB leadership and the different generational groupings. While al-Hudaybi's ideological views were in opposition to Qutb's radicalism, they convinced many members to pursue a non-violent path. Other examples are: the influence of Islamic constitutionalism on the middle generation; the old guard and conservative groupings that abide by al-Banna's traditional ideological views; and, finally, the younger generations who were affected by an increasing Salafist tendency in their environment. All these examples press the point that the influence of ideological beliefs should not be underestimated.

These findings reveal that a combination of factors enabled the MB to tread the moderate path; it is impossible to provide only one decisive factor or reason as an answer to the research question. Authoritarian regime politics and MB leadership—combined with ideological, organizational, and generational factors—must be considered key in the Brotherhood's moderate political progress over time. Moreover, some of these factors changed and had more or less causal weight during the different analyzed periods.

The validity of the theoretical approaches applied in this research has to be assessed critically. Organizational theory and Islamist auto-reform provide valuable explanations for the moderate development and denial of violence. However, while the first approach was universally applicable during all analyzed periods, Wickham's thesis of Islamist auto-reform was only fully practicable under the last Egyptian president. Both

theories are also helpful in explaining the reasons for the obvious stagnation of the MB political progress by the end of the last decade. The application of the other three approaches offered no satisfying answers to the given question because they do not include critical influential factors. Consequently, considering the hypotheses addressed in the introduction to this thesis, Hypotheses 1 through 3 do not pertain, but Hypotheses 4 and 5 apply.

B. CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

After the resignation of President Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt underwent drastic political changes. The country is dominated by a spirit of optimism about future democratic development after Mubarak's thirty years of authoritarian rule. After constitutional changes in March 2011 and under the supervision of the Armed Forces Supreme Council, the country is heading now for free, fair, and open parliamentary elections in September 2011 and presidential elections some months later. Many parties, political movements, and possible candidates have started preparing for the upcoming events, among them the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated independent candidates.¹⁴⁷

This development raises concern in the West, which does not know how to take the measure of the Islamists and their objectives. Recent comments by MB leadership on the killing of Osama bin Laden, the West, and Israel paint a threatening picture and question its true position on radicalism and violence. Furthermore, General Guide Badie's statements on the reconsideration of the peace treaty with Israel seem foreboding considering that the Islamists intend to contest up to half of the parliamentary seats and, so far, have presented themselves as the best-organized group in the upcoming elections.

¹⁴⁷ "Egypt referendum strongly backs constitutional changes," *BBC News Middle East*, March 20, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125>. Marwa Awad and Abdelrahman Youssef, "Egypt Brotherhood member says to seek presidency," *Reuters Africa*, May 12, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/topnews/idafjoe74b07620110512>.

Despite the military council's goal of preventing the emergence of an Iranian-style theocracy in Egypt, these developments present alarming signs for many observers.¹⁴⁸

However, other voices within the Muslim Brotherhood draw a different picture, like the moderate comments of Abdel Moneim Abu al-Futouh, who is running as an independent candidate and not as a member of the MB's newly established Freedom and Justice Party. He strongly opposes religious extremism and underlines the importance of cooperation among all political and religious views in Egypt. Furthermore, he calls for good international cooperation and civilian rule based on the results of the upcoming democratic elections. As an insider, al-Futouh pours oil on troubled waters and further differentiates between the MB's political wing, represented by the new party, and its social activities. For him, the MB will function as lobby group to the Freedom and Justice Party and he anticipates its success as perhaps similar to the 2005 elections, about 25 percent. This was confirmed by an opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in April 2011. The Pew analysts expect an even lower electoral gain of 17 percent.¹⁴⁹

The MB's youth response is similar. One activist, Khaled Hamza, stated recently that for them "moderate Islam means not using violence, denouncing terrorism, and not working with jihadists."¹⁵⁰ Most of these younger-generation activists played an active role during the revolutionary protests at Cairo's Tahrir Square and were involved in the leadership of the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution. Through their participation as

¹⁴⁸ Eric Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Sticks With Bin Laden," *The Atlantic*, May 3, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/egypts-muslim-brotherhood-sticks-with-bin-laden/238218/>. Mariam Fam, "Muslim Brotherhood Calls for Review of Camp David Accords," *Bloomberg*, May 5, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/muslim-brotherhood-calls-for-review-of-camp-david-accord-2-.html>. Awad and Youssef, "Egypt Brotherhood member says to seek presidency."

¹⁴⁹ Awad and Youssef, "Egypt Brotherhood member says to seek presidency." Amro Hassan, "EGYPT: Muslim Brotherhood announces new political party." *Los Angeles Times*, April 30, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2011/04/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-announces-formation-of-new-party.html>. "Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders, Religious Parties and Military, As Well - U.S. Wins No Friends, End of Treaty With Israel Sought," *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project*, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://pewglobal.org/2011/04/25/egyptians-embrace-revolt-leaders-religious-parties-and-military-as-well/4/>. Colleen Gillard and Georgia Wells, "Could the Muslim Brotherhood Win Egypt's Presidency?" *The Atlantic*, May 16, 2011, accessed May 17, 2022, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/could-the-muslim-brotherhood-win-egypts-presidency/238914/>.

¹⁵⁰ Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Sticks With Bin Laden."

part of the revolutionary movement and in cooperation with other young opposition camps, these young Brothers convinced many observers that they were willing to join forces for a common moderate political end and not seeking political gains for the MB's sake. Consequently, the younger generation reinforced the true motives of their cause by supporting the revolution. Many of the young had initially joined the Muslim Brotherhood because they thought it embraced moderate views on Islamic values. However, after the revolution they felt betrayed by MB leadership. The old-line members did not grant them access to politics and authority within the organization. Furthermore, the youth believed that the conservative wing within the organization opposed a moderate path, and showed their discontent by calling for organizational change, or even leaving the MB to form or join other parties.¹⁵¹

These recent post-revolutionary developments endorse the findings of this thesis. As described in Chapter IV, there is an increasing schism between the old-line conservative wing, represented by the remaining members of the old guard and the neo-traditionalists, and the reformist, political-activist group of the middle and youngest generation. Being in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood, the former dictates the development of the organization and obviously opposes moderate progression, which drives the wedge even deeper between both sides. A rapprochement between these two camps is less and less likely.

This leads to the assumption that, fostered by the waning of authoritarian influence, the reformist and moderate wing will sooner or later break away and pursue their own political objectives apart from the Muslim Brotherhood. The first stirrings of this increasingly probable development are the separate endeavors of independent candidates like al-Futouh and activists of the youngest generation, who seem to be unable

¹⁵¹ Trager, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Sticks With Bin Laden." Charles M. Sennott, "Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Part 1," *Globalpost Special Report*, February 21, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/egypt/110220/inside-the-muslim-brotherhood?page=full>. Hanan Solayman, "Muslim Brotherhood's young members dismayed at new leadership appointments," *Daily News Egypt*, May 4, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/muslim-brotherhoods-young-members-dismayed-at-new-leadership-appointments.html>. Deborah Amos, "In Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood's Youth Seek Voice," *npr*, April 5, 2011, accessed May 17, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/04/05/135128431/in-egypt-muslim-brotherhoods-youth-seek-voice?ft=3&f=135128431>.

to align with conservative views. Recalling the past and the breakaway of *Hizb al-Wasat*, such a split is not unusual for the Muslim Brotherhood in times of conservative leadership.

However, Egypt's democratic development is still in its infancy. There will be a long learning process, and recent developments are already part of this. In the beginning of 2011, the Egyptian people showed a willingness to change the future of their country. As a consequence, they have opened the doors to free political engagement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Now they alone will eventually determine whether the conservative or the reformist wing, or both, or neither, will participate in the politics of the country. No matter what wing they represent, if members of the MB are elected and gain political influence they will have to prove to the Egyptians that they are willing to lead the country in line with democratic values. It remains to be seen what kind of stuff they are truly made of.

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