Mission Incomplete: The U.S. Army's Unsuccessful Implementation of Stability Operations in Iraq
Abstract
The United States Army has struggled to implement the stability operations doctrine of its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. Despite the emphasis on stability operations in strategic guidance documents and written Army field manuals, they continue to evade the Army as a major priority. This thesis seeks to answer the following question: Why has the Army, as an organization, had such a difficult time implementing stability operations? The thesis also attempts to determine whether the Army made its best effort to implement stability operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2007. Chapter II reviews the Army's history and its struggle to acknowledge that irregular conflicts are as important as conventional warfare. Chapter III evaluates the implementation of stability operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 using a case study format. Chapter IV concludes with recommendations to the Army for implementing stability operations in the future.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA547854
Entities
People
- Daniel L. Kosters
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School