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Webber, Anthony L., Lieutenant Commander United States Navy

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**INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND EFFECTIVENESS: EMPLOYING THE
JIATF MODEL**

by

Anthony L. Webber

Lieutenant Commander, USN

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
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Lieutenant Commander, USN


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
25 April 2011

Thesis Adviser:

Signature: 

LTC Jeffrey Gardner, USA

Approved by:

Signature: 

COL Barrett Peavie, USA, Committee Member

Signature: 

Robert M. Antis, PhD, Committee Member

Signature: 

**Joanne M. Fish, CAPT, USN, Director,
Joint Advanced Warfighting School**

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ABSTRACT

The challenges facing interagency coordination and effectiveness is one that affects United States instruments of national power. The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) model and its proven success illustrates a framework for the strategic, operational and tactic levels to examine and adopt best practices to support the national security system. This thesis proposes a solution of establishing JIATFs collocated with every Geographic Combatant Command, an improved path for information sharing and understanding between the strategic and operational levels, and the importance of rotating agency leads within the JIATF. By examining Joint and Interagency operations, past and present, it outlines the challenges and success the interagency endures while continuously focusing on establishing coordination through cooperation to overcome current challenges. It focuses efforts on building personal relationships, professional development, and resource management in order to enable JIATF implementation. Finally, it addresses the latest congressional involvement to improve the cooperation of the interagency.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Since 2001, the United States foreign and domestic policy efficiency and strengths have undergone criticism with involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq and falling victim to multiple natural disasters.¹ As Former President George W. Bush states in the 2006 *National Security Strategy*, “The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They need to be transformed.”² In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates opening statement to the House Armed Services Committee comments on the status and outlook of interagency,

Over the last 15 years, the U.S. government has tried to meet post-Cold War challenges and pursue 21st century objectives with processes and organizations designed in the wake of the Second World War. Operating within this outdated bureaucratic superstructure, the U.S. government has sought to improve interagency planning and cooperation through a variety of means: new legislation, directives, offices, coordinators, “tsars,” authorities, and initiatives with varying degrees of success. Though recent efforts at modernizing the current system have faced obstacles when it comes to funding and implementation, some real progress has been made.³

In order to transform the ‘institutions of national security’ and overcome the obstacles facing interagency process, direction must come from the President and National Security Council (NSC) in the form of a Grand Strategy.⁴ Secretary of State

¹ On September 11, 2001, Al Qaida terrorist attacked the United States. This was the first attack on U.S. soil since the attacks of Pearl Harbor by Japanese warplanes during World War II. The shorthand for September 11, 2001 referred to as 9-11 for future reference. The attacks on that day spurred the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and years later Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In August 2005, the U.S. Gulf of Mexico region encountered one of the most deadly and costliest natural disasters in recent years, Hurricane Katrina.

² U.S. President. *The National Security Strategy*. March 2006.

³ Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on April 15, 2008, before the House Armed Services Committee, 110th Cong., 2nd sess.

⁴ For a complete discussion of a proposed Grand Strategy, see B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 322.

Hillary Clinton says, "The strategy calls for integrated government agency participation to ensure national security."⁵

Current conditions of worldwide economic hardships, contested diplomatic relationships and the United States Government (USG) approach to maintain the U.S. as a formidable superpower, the interagency or 'whole of government'⁶ approach requires more attention in the areas of management and implementation. This playbook for success and teamwork has some characteristics of the National Security Act of 1947⁷ and Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986.⁸ To date, legislation implemented has not met the significance of reform in comparison to the previous legislation. Subsequently, the 1947 and 1986 Acts were developed during a period of downsizing the military, promoting joint capability and operations and improving civilian-military relations.⁹ A Goldwater-Nichols like act for the interagency process may alleviate the dichotomy between DOD and interagency.

In a 1958 special message to Congress, Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower states, "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single

⁵ Jim Garamone, "New National Strategy Takes 'Whole-of-Government' Approach," DOD News Article, 27 May 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59377> (accessed September 15, 2010).

⁶ U.S. President. *National Security Strategy*. May 2010.

⁷ National Security Act of 1947 brought about changes to the re-organization of U.S. military forces, foreign policy, and intelligence. The Act most importantly established the National Security Council (NSC), a coordination group of the President's cabinet members.

⁸ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 brought change to the Defense Department. It empowered the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reconstituted civilian-military relations, and reorganized the chain of command and interaction among services to function jointly.

⁹ For more on Civil Military relations, see Samuel Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in *Civil Military Relations*, ed. Samuel Huntington and Andrew J. Goodpaster (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977).

concentrated effort.”¹⁰ As the threats to the U.S. evolve from nation-states to various actors within states in the 21st century, the U.S. remains conventional in its approach to the threat. The same principal of thought over fifty years ago proves effective within the military, but needs to be expanded to include the other agencies that support and lead instruments of national power¹¹ to defeat and counter current threats to national security.

Importance of Interagency (JIATF Model)

One area of concern over 20 years for USG has been the illicit trafficking entering the U.S. from the Caribbean, Central, and South America. In 1993, the President Clinton Administration provided a “policy framework for U.S. international drug control efforts as part of the Administration’s over-all counter drug policy.”¹² This directive led to the review of command and control and intelligence centers involved in narcotic operations. All agencies were claiming to lead efforts in counter narcotic trafficking, but no coordination and collaboration existed. This eventually led to the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South).¹³ The President’s directive stated,

...the scourge of illegal narcotics is severely damaging the social fabric of the United States and other countries...the operation of international criminal narcotics syndicate is national security threat requiring an extraordinary and coordinated response by civilian and military agencies, both unilaterally and by mobilizing international cooperation with other

¹⁰ National Archives and Records Administration, “The Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum,” Eisenhower Presidential Library, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/All_About_Ike/Quotes/Quotes.html (accessed January 14, 2011).

¹¹ The instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military and economic coined under the term ‘DIME’. Joint Publication 1-02 defines it the sum of all resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national objectives.

¹² Federation of American Scientists, “Presidential Decision Directives [PPD] 14 Clinton Administration 1993-2000,” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html> (accessed January 14, 2011).

¹³ U.S. Southern Command, “Interagency-U.S. Southern Command”, United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/interagency.php> (accessed August 25, 2010).

nations and international organizations such as the U.N., OAS, and international financial institutions.¹⁴

He later gave direction to Department of State to “manage the implementation of the international strategy”¹⁵ and report findings to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).

JIATF-South, as an operational subordinate to U.S. Southern Command, area of responsibility includes: “Latin America, the waters adjacent to Central and South America, the Caribbean Sea and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean.”¹⁶ This region totals 31 countries, 10 territories and equates to “one-sixth of the landmass of the world.”¹⁷

Central America is one of the world’s most dangerous regions where billions of dollars of contraband flow annually and nation sovereignty is rapidly failing in the face of heavily armed and organized cartels. The cartels, particular the Zetas¹⁸ and Sinaloa¹⁹ operate with relative impunity throughout the region. This situation is not new to Central and South America. For years, Colombia faced similar problems from drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)²⁰ until Plan Colombia²¹ initiated a multinational and interagency effort to reclaim Colombian sovereignty.

¹⁴ Federation of American Scientists, *Presidential Decision Directive 14*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ U.S. Southern Command, “Areas of Responsibility-U.S. Southern Command,” United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/aoi.php> (accessed August 25, 2010).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Zetas are a paramilitary force associated with the drug trade in Mexico and Central America. See George W. Grayson, “Los Zetas: the Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html> (accessed August 30, 2010).

¹⁹ Sinaloa are a rival drug cartel of the Zetas. See John Burnett, “Mexico Seems to Favor Sinaloa Cartel in Drug War,” NPR News Investigations, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126906809> (accessed August 30, 2010).

²⁰ FARC is a Latin American insurgent group created in the 1950s to protect Colombian Communist Part interest. FARC connected to a variety of illegal activity stemming from illegal drug trade. For more information, see Federation of American Scientists, “Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC),” Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/farc.htm> (accessed August 30, 2010).

²¹ Plan Colombia is a Colombian government effort to meet the challenges in Colombia ranging from government corruption and illicit trafficking. For more information that is detailed see U.S. State

The implementation of JIATF-South proves effectiveness and efficiency of an interagency task force at an operational level. A Joint Force Quarterly article recognizes the JIATF-South success,

Over the last 17 years, the Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF–S) has built an unparalleled network of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets to focus on detecting the movements and shipments of narcoterrorist organizations. With this evolving structure, JIATF–S serves as a model for bringing the most effective assets to bear on complex national policy issues, whether it be illegal drugs, weapons proliferation, or international terrorism.²²

The mission within the task force is understood among all agencies and multinational organizations. Individual agencies have their own set of complementary goals and collectively achieving their goals equates to success.²³ Under a directive from ONDCP in 1994, the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) established the task force. In signing the plan, all agencies collectively agreed to collaborate and join forces through interagency agreements and outlining specific responsibilities to countering illicit activity. The NICCP shall:

- (i) Set forth the Government’s strategy for drug interdiction
- (ii) State the specific roles and responsibilities of the relevant National Drug Control Program agencies for implementing that strategy; and
- (iii) Identify the specific resources required to enable the relevant national Drug Control Program agencies to implement that strategy.²⁴

All participants are responsible for specific tasks and obtaining mission objectives within the statutes of their individual organization. For example, the U.S. Navy is

Department Fact Sheet, “United States Support For Colombia”, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html (accessed September 2, 2010).

²² Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 42, 3rd quarter (July 2006): 26-27.

²³ USSOUTHCOM, “Interagency-U.S. Southern Command”

²⁴ Cornell Law School, “United States Code: Title 21 1710. Drug Interdiction Coordinator and Committee,” Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode21/uscode21_sec_21_00001710----000-.html (accessed January 3, 2011).

responsible for monitoring and detection over sea and U.S. Air Force through the air. The interdiction and arrest is retained with the United States Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies such as Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies.²⁵ The team organization requires full integration from all agency representatives. The intelligence community and international partners make up a large portion of the task force as well. Their participation is essential to attaining critical information and intelligence on illicit activity. Without the international partners providing 75% of the fielded forces in aircraft and patrol craft, it would be very difficult to complete the mission.²⁶

Through integration, a variety of agency personnel is capable of filling key positions. This method reinforces the trust amongst agencies and provides reach back capability for acquisition of assets and information sharing. Integration from the strategic level to the tactical level sets JIATF-South apart from other task forces. The ability to formulate a lasting cohesive unit enables the participants' to share a core and requisite knowledge of operations. Diversity in leadership across agencies,²⁷ and joint execution develops an appreciation for the mission. In doing this, expertise and information shared strengthens U.S. national security as well as serving the interests of our partners.

The role and relationship with the international partners facilitate access or represents a conduit to attain information and build positive and enduring relationships. Their support and assistance with providing maritime and air assets is a major contributor

²⁵ U.S. Southern Command, "Joint Interagency Task Force South," United States Southern Command, <http://www.jiatsf.southcom.mil/index.aspx> (accessed August 14, 2010).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

in extending the JIATF-S reach to monitor, detect, and communicate to area nations overcome by illicit trafficking. Measuring success is unique to JIATF-South. In accordance with the National Drug Control Strategy, all agencies must prevent contraband from entering the United States through collaborative effort.²⁸ Each agency has its own method for calculating success. For example,

...the primary metric for DOD is the amount of drugs seized, while the law enforcement community closely follows the number of arrests and prosecutions. These different but complementary objectives could raise disputes in a traditional joint organization, but JIATF-South has overcome this issue by recognizing and facilitating the success of all relevant metrics.²⁹

The establishment of JIATF-South proves that it takes time to build a successful reputation. An organization with a substantial amount of moving and interchangeable parts and cultural differences are critical in developing relationships across agencies. The joint operating area for USSOUTHCOM/JIATF-South is 42 million square miles which is 5 times the size of the U.S.³⁰ covering such a large area places a strain on asset allocation and interdiction, yet JIATF-South remains successful. However, studies may show how the drug trafficking has diminished over sea and air and moved over land via Central America into Mexico.³¹

This thesis argues that a change in interagency reform is necessary to achieve the success of Goldwater-Nichols for joint centric operations in the civilian led interagency environment. It makes an argument that the JIATF concept was so successful at the

²⁸ U.S. President. *National Drug Control Strategy*. 2010.

²⁹ Yeatman, *JIATF-South*, 26-27.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

³¹ Congressional Research Service, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs*, Congressional Research Service, January 2011 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1.

operational level, that a similar model should be employed at the National Security Council level.

CHAPTER 2: INTERAGENCY CHALLENGES

The U.S. interagency process continues to operate much as it has since the Cold War era. Various agencies of the United States Government grasped the concept of coordination and cooperation, while others remain parochial. This chapter will apply ends, ways and means to strategic, operational, and tactical levels of government.

At the strategic or policy level, agencies manage to reach an agreement on what they will do to support U.S. policy. The National Security Council (NSC) is the President's forum of advisors from various cabinet positions to handle matters pertaining to national security and foreign policy. History is a valuable asset when reviewing the interagency process. During the inter-war period of WWI and WWII, the Department of State was not an active participant in war planning. State believed it was necessary to neither interfere in military affairs nor allow the military to enter the civilian spectrum of government.¹ The lack of participation from Department of State and other vital concerns, eventually led to passing the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense, National Security Council and intelligence community.

In recent years, during the George W. Bush administration, the moderate Secretary of State Colin Powell resigned ending frequent cabinet battles with the more ideologically conservative Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.² On a few occasions, cabinet members disagreed with Secretary Powell's recommendations and promulgations for U.S. Foreign Policy. The most popular foreign policy disagreements surrounded the sanctions on Iraq and the U.S. presence in the Balkans. The despairing conflict in personalities at a senior level of the USG raised

¹ James Carafano, "Herding Cats: Understanding Why Government Agencies Don't Cooperate and How to Fix the Problem," *The Heritage Foundation*, July 26, 2006, 1-2.

² Mike Allen, "Powell Announces His Resignation," *Washington Post*, November 16, 2004.

concern for the American populace. Both department heads were constantly debating over policy issues that eventually made headline news. As a result, the inability to define a credible foreign policy early on in later years placed heavy emphasis on the U.S. military performing duties across all instruments of national power due to having respect and resources.³

The disagreements at the policymaking level trickles down to the operational level as well. Operational planning occurs at the Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) level. It is the U.S. joint military command assigned to a specific area of responsibility to provide command and control for military forces. At this level, effective change and translation of strategy and policy is established.

The operational level, where the U.S. government undertakes major operations and campaigns, and where agencies in Washington have to develop operational plans such as coordinating recovery operations after a major hurricane. This is where interagency cooperation is the weakest. This is a legacy of the Cold War. There was never a requirement for federal agencies to do that kind of integrated planning to contain the Soviet Union. Agencies generally agreed on the broad role each would play. There were few requirements under which they had to plan to work together in the field to accomplish a goal under unified direction. Washington has never had an enduring formal system to do that. Arguably, when efforts have been made to “operationalize” decision-making in Washington, principally by trying to coordinate ongoing interagency operations in the White House or at the NSC, they have proved unsatisfactory and Presidents have rightly backed off from the idea of trying to turn the Oval Office into an operations center. No administration has hit on a satisfactory long-term solution.⁴

The operational level or ‘ways’ are the heart of operational art and reside with the GCC.

The interagency process has not changed over time and may have gotten worse, as depicted in the Iraq and Afghanistan case studies. After the Cold War, foreign country

³ Ibid.

⁴ Carafano, “Herding Cats,” 2.

disaster relief became a responsibility of the interagency process.⁵ Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PPD56) gave the interagency process foreign humanitarian assistance guidance. Though the directive was a start in the right direction, it did not last long. The agencies lacked the experience of working together jointly, the education and training of combined operations, allocation of resources and a common mission or desired end state. After a few years of trying to mold an interagency process, it dissolved and after the 9-11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security emerged.⁶

The reconstruction activity in Iraq is an example of how the operational level of interagency has met a few obstacles. From 2003 to 2005, the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. Forces Iraq, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) all managed and supervised various projects that has the same purpose, yet were not shared among the agencies. In a war torn environment, the agencies did not have a common vision on what the outcome should be.⁷

The planning process was flawed and no integrated contracting or human capital management process established. As a result, on the job lessons learned were adapted but were unable to maintain the momentum of the operational environment. After spending billions of dollars on these organizations, very little return made on the investments. Although, introducing major organizations to an area of post-war stabilization or disaster relief on the 'home game' or 'away game', coordination is paramount before entering affected areas. The major difference from the operational planning at the organizational level and the offices in Washington is the opportunity to plan deliberately and develop

⁵ Carafano, "Herding Cats," 3.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

contingencies. This prevents strategic reach down and micro-management at the operational level, and allows the tactical means to make effective change.⁸

At the lowest level is the practice of cooperation among individuals on the ground. Here, there are many examples in which American officials and soldiers in uniform work well together, contemplate solutions, figure things out, and get the job done to the best of their abilities utilizing the resources available. The embassy country teams under the leadership of the Chief of Mission are an example. All U.S. personnel stationed at an embassy, from consular officers to agricultural attachés, Immigration and Custom Enforcement agents, and military foreign affairs officers, work under the unified direction of the Chief of Mission.⁹

At the tactical level, the ability to make the interagency process work is critical. The functional capability of JIATF's and military peacekeeping missions reflects the success at this level.

JIATFs that direct drug interdictions in the Caribbean and the Western coast of North America are a model of effective intelligence sharing and operational coordination, not just for U.S. military and law enforcement agencies, but also for foreign governments. It is not unusual for a French naval vessel to intercept drug runners headed for Europe based on information provided by the JIATF. The JIATFs are so effective that if they had twice as many planes and ships, they still would not be able to intercept all the suspicious shipments that they identify through intelligence gathers, fusion, and information sharing.¹⁰

The military, for example, conducts humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise across the globe. This affords military personnel and other agency officers the opportunity to work closely with one another, understand agency missions, and develop

⁸ Carafano, "Herding Cats," 3.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ James Carafano, "A Better Way to Fight Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed05705b.cfm> (accessed January 3, 2011).

coordination and collaborative skills. In the field, experience and the opportunity to train, forces the agencies to collaborate and complete the mission without clear top-level guidance. The guidance translated should ultimately articulate the intentions of a Grand Strategy.

Interagency Road Blocks

Albert Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. Some of the challenges within the interagency process have always existed, and the agencies continue to debate on how to fix it or wait until the last minute to get it right.¹¹ The constant cycle of the inability to plan, recognize a problem, and adapt will continue to erode our valuable resources. Correcting poor interagency cooperation starts with the diplomacy and military.

The failure to coordinate civilian and military efforts had tremendous consequences during the occupation of Iraq. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, USA, the senior military officer in theater, met often but never established procedures for anything more than ad hoc policy coordination.¹²

The delay in properly planning did not allow adequate CPA officials presence in Baghdad, therefore forcing military leaders into gaps, which should have been filled by civilians with appropriate expertise. These actions made it difficult for the State and Defense leadership in theater to promote and execute national policy. The confusion involved in planning post war reconstruction and stabilization phases led to chaos and a

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Nora Bensahel, "Repairing the Interagency Process," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 106.

haven for insurgency.¹³ The military then took the lead for efforts in Iraq by default.

Admiral Mullen in a visit to the Philippines stated,

The US government is not set up for the wars of the 21st century ...It doesn't reflect the expeditionary world we're living in. We haven't recruited, hired, promoted, trained, educated the people in our civilian agencies for the kind of expeditionary requirements and rotations that we are actually doing right now...The civilian departments need to grow; they need more people, and those people need to deploy at a moment's notice...Until we can do that, the military will pick up the slack, because we can.¹⁴

Since the military is prepared to fill the void in the interagency process, the lack of coordination may result in one element of the instruments of national power becoming too powerful. The opportunity for agencies to resolve the process issues and cooperate will take time, considering no governing or legal system is in place to define, manage, and coordinate issues at the operational level.

For example, the areas of responsibility differ between Department of Defense and State. The areas overlap and the approach to regional concerns do not align. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan (UCP), arguments are made that the DOD GCC grouping countries into regions and claiming a U.S. responsibility is unconstitutional and disregards the sanctity of the various nation states. Through increasing the amount of multiple permanent resident agency personnel with reach back capability to their parent organization to coordinate unity of effort may relieve the regional disconnects.

On the other hand, State department uses country teams led by the Chief of Mission (COM) or Ambassador to manage U.S. interest and policy within the nation

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Jim Garmone, "Defense.gov News Article: Mullen Views Interagency Success in Philippines." United States Department of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50069> (accessed September 15, 2010).

state. The country team is comprised of interagency personnel from agencies that have an impact or relevance within the nation state. This alone seems to portray an image of big military first, diplomacy second or last. According to one interagency study, “any effective integration of government effort requires that all government agencies conform to an agreed regional arrangement.”¹⁵ A good start would be reevaluating the use and arrangement of the GCCs of DOD and the six geographic bureaus of DOS. Combine the revised arrangement with a lighter, well equipped, and intellectual capable fighting force in the form of a JIATF. The JIATF would then be augmented by CONUS based conventional Carrier Strike Groups, Marine Expeditionary Units, and Brigade Combat Teams. The dilemma may then rest with who is in charge during peacetime and wartime, GCC Commander or COM. Essentially, a combination of unity of effort and unity of command depending on the situation would drive the conflict resolution.¹⁶

In today’s USG, the demand for a whole of government approach to tackling issues that affect national security is at its pinnacle and the skills required to handle the task are in high demand. Simply grouping agencies less than one department alone will not help overcome the obstacles as was tried with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Through an extensive selection process and professional development realm for the interagency, the ability to prepare for and defeat the enemy will benefit the U.S. in the future.

Culture and Education

Society has often spoken phrases such as “the children are our future.” This remains true in the infancy of the interagency. It remains in this state until it fully

¹⁵ Jeffrey V. Gardner, “Fight the ‘Away Game’ as a Team: Organizing for Regional Counterterror Campaigns” (master’s thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, 2005), 64.

¹⁶ Gardner, *Away Game*, 64-65.

addresses all challenges and forges a path to reform. Agencies face challenges such as traditions and cultures, which are the foundation of any organization or group. Those elements help define the character, mission and attitude of the organization. By maintaining continuity over time, it builds and hardens the impenetrable barriers. However, in an era of constrained resources, those barriers or stovepipes must be torn down and allow sharing of resources. Sharing knowledge of the history and specific operations improve integration. Incorporating the history, traditions, and cultural lessons in the indoctrination phases of training of personnel with a constant review through the lifetime of the organization are vehicles to improve agency effort.

Other challenges, such as the lack of a long-term educational program that fosters development through combined education, training, and cross-pollination tours prepare agencies for planning. The challenges are not new, but a mandate from the NSC or congressional mandate for reform has not passed. One researcher from the Army War College wrote,

Eventually we figure out that our forces that fought so well in battle are not well-equipped, trained, and organized to win the peace-that using the military that won the war to win the fight for peace creates as many problems as it solves. Needless to say, though, we always, or at least usually, ad hoc our way to victory.¹⁷

As discussed earlier, lessons learned from Goldwater-Nichols Act reformed the Department of Defense, established joint professional education to foster “jointness” among the services and improved civilian-military relations on Capitol Hill. A clear cut and concise strategy that is formulated by the President based on input from cabinet members and articulated to the general populace enables interagency collaboration and

¹⁷ James J. Carafano. “Learning from the Past and Leaning Forward: Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities,” *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 168.

direction for the nation. However, in today's strategic complex environment, identifying the multiple enemies, knowing the problem and possible crisis is difficult. The U.S. is no longer fighting a major conventional threat such as the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment and an economical stamina to outlast the adversary. Direction from "top down" and feedback from the "bottom up" is critical in these circumstances.

Legal Obstacles

In developing a strategy for interagency collaboration, the legal aspect provides roadblocks for implementation, therefore resting at the laurels of preventing collaboration. Article I of the Constitution and the Posse Comitatus Act are the most recognized. In an article by Carafano,

Congress is ill-suited to promote cooperation between federal agencies. It appropriates funds for operations of individual departments. The jurisdiction of committees that oversee the government dovetail with the departments they oversee.¹⁸

This means the departments must spend the money allocated on missions within its purview, unless given specific direction from Congress. This authority over funding does not allow departments to spend money on missions outside its department and restrict specific departments from operations OCONUS.

In recent years, the Posse Comitatus Act¹⁹ became an important factor of U.S. concern for security and defense issues during post 9/11 attacks and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. "Through a gradual erosion of the act's prohibitions over the past 20 years, Posse Comitatus today is more of a procedural formality than an actual

¹⁸ Carafano, *Herdin*, 3.

¹⁹ Posse Comitatus Act is U.S. Federal law limiting the federal government use the military for law enforcement activity. For a complete description, see U.S. Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 67, Section 1385.

impediment to the use of U.S. military forces in homeland defense.”²⁰ A routine example of exercising the Act is the Navy and Coast Guard responsibilities to monitoring and interdicting illicit activity within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility.

The Stafford Act²¹ and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 are both exceptions to the Posse Comitatus and provide direction to the military in carrying out missions within the United States. Former President Bush during an interview about Hurricane Katrina spoke about how informed professionals at state and local governments are aware of federal law and the impact crisis management,

But what many people don't know, he says, is that a state's governor—not the president—is in charge of emergency response. "The federal government's role is to help the governor," he says. Five days after strong winds and floodwaters turned lives upside down, President Bush met with then Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin. He says tension was high. 'Everybody's blaming everybody else so I said to the governor, 'Governor, give me the authority to send in federal troops,' President Bush says. 'By law, the president cannot send federal troops to conduct law enforcement without a declaration of insurrection and/or a request from the governor.' 'We all could have done a better job.’²²

In a 2008 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, discovered legal obstacles in specific statutory authority and restrictions on civilian and military activities related to stabilization and reconstruction operations and the allocation and the use of U.S. funds in the form of sanctions and earmarks. “Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act restricts the use of foreign assistance funds for the training of foreign police,” is among the most significant restrictions for stabilization and reconstruction

²⁰ Craig T. Trebilcock, “The Myth of Posse Comitatus,” *Homelandsecurity.org*, October 2000, <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Search.aspx?s=the+myth+of+posse> (November 28, 2010).

²¹ The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public law 93-288) Act authorize states to request federal assistance in disaster relief. For a complete description, see <http://www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtm>.

²² Former President George W. Bush, interview by Oprah Winfrey, *The Oprah Winfrey Show*, ABC, November 9, 2010.

operations. Although exemptions exist, these restrictions often delay program implementation.²³

For example, the attempt of the United States to form a Somali Police in the wake of the civil crisis as a withdrawal strategy failed due to delays in Congressional approval. By the time the funds were approved, forces withdrew, and lawlessness returned to the region. Similar situations require an aggressive response, adequate planning, and routine assessments of the issue from all entities. Reactive efforts to situations do not improve relationships, but continue to build roadblocks.²⁴

Departmental Budgets and Resources

The departmental budgets across the instruments of national power vary, but the defense department's budget is considerably larger and contains an abundance of resources compared to the other agencies and departments. This disparity in budget and resources contributes to the interagency challenges that do not allow all players to have a stake in the game.²⁵ Aside from the noticeable differences in budgeting, the expeditionary capability of the civilian departments are not well staffed and equipped to function in the field alongside the more capable and flexible Department of Defense. The recently released Department of State Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review aims to create a more robust civilian capacity for U.S. global engagement as a key pillar

²³ Derek Chollet, "A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States, A Report of the CSIS Post Conflict Reconstruction Project" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), 13.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

of foreign policy. Its end goals are “unified smart power, clear State and USAID roles and missions, and tangible organizational change leading to excellence in performance.”²⁶

After the mismanaged attempts to reconstruct and stabilize in Afghanistan and Iraq, the review recognizes lessons learned and opportunities to improve whole of government efforts. The Defense overshadows the diplomacy and development portion of the 3-D concept. The lack of manpower and resources renders USAID and State incapable of deploying in strength with the various military units in theater. This lack of participation requires the military personnel to step in and assume roles normally filled by respected civilian agency officials. Most federal agencies do not have the same capability to mobilize and deploy personnel and equipment, as does the military.

The gap in capacity is not only a concern for manpower, but for budgeting as well. According to one report, “if the State Department doesn’t get the money they’ve requested for Iraq, then we really are in the soup on this,”²⁷ says Secretary Gates to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The military is in the process of drawing down and military withdrawal from Iraq. A late approval of funds by Congress for State will cause delays in the withdrawal and turnover process between Defense and State. The United States has invested billions of dollars and sacrificed over 4,000 American lives in pursuit of a stable Iraq. Secretary Gates continues, if the State Department does not have “a

²⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID: Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,” United States Agency for International Development, <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/qddr/index.html> (accessed February 23, 2011).

²⁷ Charley Keyes, “Gates says funding cut could put gains in Iraq at risk,” CNN Politics, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-17/politics/gates.iraq.hearing_1_baghdad-embassy-iraqi-government-police-training?_s=PM:POLITICS (accessed February 23, 2011).

presence throughout Iraq, then much of what we've done to get Iraq where they are is at risk”²⁸

State vs. Defense

Differences in military and diplomatic cultures sometimes cause conflict in promoting U.S. national foreign policy. The authors of ‘Defense is From Mars, State is from Venus describes the relationship as

Two pillars of our national security strategy - Department of State (diplomacy), and the Department of Defense (military) - are increasingly thrust together in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian missions such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia to develop and implement agreements or programs for achieving foreign policy goals. Although these two agencies take their direction from the President, and are not the only agencies involved in foreign policy, they are critical members of the overall team. Both were unprepared for the dramatic shift in the domestic and international landscapes following the Cold War, particularly those that occurred so quickly, and both have scrambled to define their new roles.²⁹

This relationship between the two departments over time has given truth to the concept of effective teamwork and importance of meshing personalities. The organizations are the foundations of maintaining the U.S. national security and without its cohesion, differences, and issues to maintain stability begin to fester. Former Secretary of State George Schultz states,

I am a great believer that strength and diplomacy go together; it is never one or the other. Today foreign policy is a unified diplomatic, military, and intelligence effort that must be tightly integrated- a team approach. It is wrong to say we have gone as far as we can with diplomacy and it's now time for the military option. To do so is to fail.³⁰

²⁸ Lisa Daniel, “State Department Needs Iraq Funding, Gates Says.” United States Department of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62858> (accessed February 15, 2010).

²⁹ Rickey Rife, “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving and Promoting National Security” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 5, 2007), 1.

³⁰ Rife, “*Defense is from Mars*,” 2.

His comments are noted, but cultural differences remain. The chain of command structure is one particular example. The military has the perception of the civilian agencies not taking charge and leading personnel to a common goal. The direction given by the military is specific and attempts to alleviate any ambiguity. State on the other hand, avoids specifics to keep all options available. This creates a rift in the Security Council between State and Defense. "Defense officials view State and NSC as desiring to commit the troops without clear objectives and in areas not in the national interest". State views Defense using the lack of objectives as an excuse not to use its resources."³¹

Coordinating efforts between Defense and civil agencies creates a problem when not all entities are knowledgeable of each other's capabilities. This makes it difficult to resolve issues and coordinate. As simple as knowing the resources available can make a difference in the outcome of a national security issue.

One frequently quoted interagency study stated, "The root cause of the interagency dysfunction, in a word, is authority, or lack thereof."³² Knowing who is in charge of efforts is important to effective mission accomplishment. Along with authority, increasing the capacity of what agencies do well and improving on deficiencies may energize collaborative efforts.

Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti

Interagency effectiveness is not that easy to establish and maintain at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. This section will analyze case studies for implementing interagency processes for Operations in Afghanistan- Iraq and humanitarian aid and

³¹ Ted T. Uchida, "Reforming the Interagency Process," Research Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Air War College, May 2005), 60.

³² Gardner, "Away Game," 66.

disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts in Haiti. Both provide example where existing interagency frameworks were found lacking.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) best illustrate interagency challenges and collaboration. The majority of the obstacles preventing effective unity of effort were “mission clarity, chain of command, funding protocols and incentives for interagency personnel.”³³ PRTs were employed in the regions since 2002 to meet the development needs of the affected area. There are a few differences between PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The main difference is the command structure within the PRT. In Iraq, a Department of State (DOS) officer manages the PRT and in Afghanistan, a U.S. military officer leads the PRT. Even though there are the subtle differences, interagency collaboration remains an obstacle.

Each agency within the PRT has its own mission. The missions of the PRT can range from security, social, economic to development concerns. A lack of understanding each other’s mission when a particular agency mission best suits the overall mission and developing, understanding, and supporting the mission collectively is important when organizing a PRT. Not only should the mission be clear to the PRT, but also the mission stated at the theater and strategic level. This way metrics on effectiveness measured to help with the allocation of funds, progression of host nation government and time in theater for rotation.

Another obstacle for collaboration is the “convoluted funding schemes.”³⁴ To finance the operations conducted, each agency has its own line of funding. Each agency not receiving the proper amount of funds to execute the mission can lead to confusion

³³ Brandon Kaster. “Recipes for Failure and Keys to Success in Interagency Cooperation: Two Case Studies,” *Defense Concepts* 4, (December 2009): 22-23.

³⁴ Kaster, “Recipes for Failure,” 23.

and disjointed actions within the PRT. Mission accomplishment becomes challenging due to a lack of appropriate resources to execute the mission effectively. For example, DOD agencies receive funds from the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) for non-security related efforts, whereas USAID utilizes the Local Governance and Community Development Program Fund. Funds that are not supported by one or the same source causes delays in production and project planning.³⁵ The funding issue restrains PRTs from concentrating on projects based on priority, but convenience. A 2009 Government Accountability Office reported the following:

Funding is budgeted for and appropriated by agency, rather than by functional area (such as national security or foreign aid)...Because of this agency focus in budgeting and appropriations, there is no forum to debate which resources or combination of resources to apply to efforts...that involve multiple agencies.³⁶

The GAO recommended a culture of government where collaboration reduces the hardships of organizational differences amongst the disparate government agencies. It considers the funding channels base the needs and purposes on the PRT other than the specific missions within the PRT. Funding the PRTs as a whole will reduce the competition for funds among the organization, promote teamwork, and essentially result in mission accomplishment. These efforts will enable project-planning prioritization, which assessed to prove the need for more funds or discontinue efforts.

Along with not having a common mission and funding source, the lack of a chain of command or a hierarchy tree can constitute another area of concern for a PRT mission.

³⁵ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, April 2008* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 22.

³⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2009), 21.

On some occasions, military officers fill the role of DOS positions. For most notional military structures, this can be an uncomfortable position. The majority of the time the military positions filled by officers with experience and the rank are based on a “one up, one down” fill process.

There are other issue surrounding PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. The manpower available for DOD dwarfs the likes of DOS and USAID. The lack of personnel and expertise from DOS and USAID leaves positions vacant and requires DOD personnel to fill. The lack of consistency and experience lowers the effectiveness of the team, hinders interagency collaboration, and forces the DOD to execute majority of the other agencies responsibilities. The case study briefly examined the interagency challenges within PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan - clear mission guidance, a funding apparatus, command organization, and manpower constraints.³⁷ The need for interagency collaboration and coordination through a better multiagency framework remains an issue of concern in these affected regions.

USSOUTHCOM and JIATF-S are exemplary commands and organizations on how to manage and sustain interagency collaboration. Its ability to leverage support from the Department of Defense, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, while developing partnerships with surrounding nations and non-governmental organizations within the area of responsibility are instrumental in waging the ‘War On Drugs’. However, the 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster challenged the command’s ability to support a large humanitarian relief effort in the region. The organizational structure within USSOUTHCOM focused on facilitating collaboration, yet the disaster highlighted discrepancies. This case study on the 2010 Haiti earthquake will analyze command

³⁷ Kaster, “Recipes for Failure,” 22-25.

structure challenges, logistic functions, manpower augmentation and integration to provide relief for a contingency operation.

In October of 2006, the U.S. Southern Command combatant commander, Admiral Stavridis, changed the direction of the organization, based on recommendations from his predecessor. The intent to develop a more interagency-oriented organization vice a joint staff structure was his vision. In the American Forces Press Service, Admiral Stavridis stated,

We are working to create an organization that can best adapt itself to working with the interagency, with our international partners and even with the private-public sector. And we want to do it in a way that is completely supportive of all our partners. If I would put one word on it, it's partnership. That is our [SouthCom] motto -- Partnership for the Americas -- and our objective is to become the best possible international, interagency partner we can be.³⁸

However, in the wake of the earthquake in Haiti, the command reverted to J-codes to coordinate with military, international and interagency partners.

Admiral Mullen in a visit to U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) headquarters "called the new command's interagency makeup and the expansive capability it will bring a sign of things to come."³⁹ The threats to national security in the 20th century are different from those faced in the 21st century. A whole of government approach through interagency collaboration and structure fosters a level of expertise and teamwork to combat any adversary.

The new organization allowed U.S. government agencies through agreements to share information with each other and proactively collaborate with partner nations. It placed key USG agency personnel in directorate positions normally filled by military

³⁸United States Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Transformation Promotes New Approach to Regional Challenges", United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1323> (accessed August 25, 2010).

³⁹ Ibid.

officers in other combatant commands. The reorganization borrowed some positions from the Joint Staff structure, but to integrate fully the remaining interagency partners, positions that may have been able to manage or provide expertise to disaster management were not available. Pooling assets together and promoting positive international relations to a growing regional dilemma improves collective responses to challenges.⁴⁰

The initial response to the Haiti earthquake posed challenges for USSOUTHCOM under the new organizational structure. In accordance with Joint Publication-1, combatant commanders have the authority to organize their command structure to address properly the missions, duties, and responsibilities that pertain to national security. According to DOD's Unified Command Plan, USSOUTHCOM is responsible for planning and conducting missions and contingency operations, such as countering illicit activity and disaster relief. The structure in place did not focus on the unexpected or catastrophic natural disasters. Its structure was sound in preparing and managing the daily mission and promoting interagency collaboration. It may be that the command has placed a priority on the illicit trafficking aspect, not looking at the likelihood of an earthquake in the Caribbean. An earthquake within the region is not as common as one may think or in comparison to the West coast of the United States. Nonetheless, it happened and USSOUTHCOM was not prepared.

Operation Unified Response was the largest DOD led humanitarian relief effort conducted and first natural disaster crisis response for USSOUTHCOM. The disaster flexed the combatant command ability to maintain 24/7 assistance and support, where it is normally dedicating assets to a concentrated effort of collecting intelligence, detection,

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2010), 9.

monitoring, interception and interdiction of illicit traffickers. The disaster relief required more than 20,000 personnel to manage efforts.⁴¹

The command structure lacked a component for future operations, which according to USSOUTHCOM officials is necessary for cyclic planning and operations that extend past 30 days to a year. Core functions of a combatant command were not present to conduct long-term contingency operations. For example, the logistic function was now a portion of Enterprise Support and no longer a core function. Since it was not a core function, much of the logistic support was late and poorly planned causing delays in responding. Communication within the Joint Task Force was an issue of concern as well due to the organization setup based on mission area.⁴²

USSOUTHCOM did not develop an augmentation plan for military personnel to support Operation Unified Response. To support short duration missions and contingencies, a combatant command is responsible for identifying and validating the personnel augmentation required and submitting these requirements to its military service component commands to fill. USSOUTHCOM only operated to 85 percent of its authorized staff. The requirements for personnel necessary to augment for a contingency operation were not identified under the new directorate structure. The new structure was foreign to most military personnel and caused confusion for reporting responsibility.⁴³

To fill the gaps in the directorate structure, USNORTHCOM provided personnel to support USSOUTHCOMs efforts in Haiti. Within the first week of the disaster, USSOUTHCOM combatant commander reverted to a traditional Joint Staff structure. The new structure immediately showed signs of improvement in handling the command

⁴¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Management*, 25.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 5.

and control reporting, logistics and future operational planning responsibilities. However, during its directorate organization period, particular lessons learned were captured and retained to maintain the success of interagency collaboration. Some USSOUTHCOM officials believe the unfortunate occurrences of a disaster of this magnitude is not a frequent event and that the primary focus should be on what continuously affects the AOR. The command has maintained the traditional joint staff structure since the disaster and is working to revise its Organization and Functions manual to identify better staffing requirements for various contingency plans no matter the size.⁴⁴

USSOUTHCOM has been a beacon for other combatant commands to model themselves. The challenge in today's national security environment requires a unique command structure and collaboration among agencies to counter the effects of illicit activity and natural disasters. The directorate structure of USSOUTHCOM proved to be a success in the day-to-day mission, but failed in the long-term effects of an earthquake. The structure did not consider the second and third order effects resulting from disasters. Even though collaboration and partnership building have enhanced the effectiveness of USSOUTHCOMs law enforcement capability, the ability to conduct military operations is just as important. The attempt to improve interagency collaboration received approval from DOD, but no aspects and missions of the components ensured all components of an interagency have "skin in the game". For example, USSOUTHCOM did not properly staff the military components and provide the organization structure conducive to execute a military operation needed for the events that occurred in Haiti. USSOUTHCOM continues to develop and revise its command structure to meet the challenges of the 21st

⁴⁴ Ibid., 5-6.

century. All geographical combatant commands resort to the lessons learned from the Haiti Earthquake of 2010, to improve their own challenges with interagency collaboration and contingency planning.

CHAPTER 3: INTERAGENCY SUCCESS

90% of the cocaine and 47% of the heroin that reaches the U.S. emanates or passes through Colombia. Illicit drugs kill more than 21,000 American citizens each year and result in the loss of more than \$160 billion in revenue.¹

The Colombian government over the past forty years has seen a share of turmoil and corruption. The United State has been an advocate of ensuring Colombia remain a viable democracy. The majority of the USG efforts have been interest based to stop the flow of illicit trafficking into the United States and provide security and economical assistance to Colombia to help maintain stability within the Western hemisphere. The USG involvement dates back to the early 1970s. This was a period where Colombian military, police and law enforcement agencies fought continuously to overcome the competitive, volatile and network-centric drug production and illicit trafficking cartels.²

In the 1990s, conflict between the Colombia government and anti-government insurgent groups, primarily the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), backed by drug trade revenue escalated causing an influx of illegal trafficking and narcotic use in the United States. The FARC collected the majority of its revenue from the drug trade, and the remainder from ransoms of kidnapped government officials, and taxing cocoa farmers. The revenue from the FARC also used for weapon modernization to contest and nearly overthrow the Colombian government.³

In 1998, the start of Colombian President Andres Pastrana's administration marked a high point and the most lethal period for guerilla and paramilitary activity

¹ U.S. Southern Command, "Counter Drug/Counter Narcoterrorism," United States Southern Command, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/counterNarco.php> (accessed August 25, 2010).

² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance*, October 2008 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 8-9.

³ Ibid.

against the Colombian government. The following year, President Pastrana initiated a new strategy – “Plan Colombia”. The strategy focused on dissolving the ongoing conflicts in Colombia and an outreach request for international assistance. Plan Colombia was a six-year comprehensive program designed to: combat narco-terrorism, build economic recovery, strengthen democratic institutions and respect for human rights, and provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons. Plan Colombia’s counter-narcotics strategy concentrated on eradicating illicit cash crops and new development opportunities for farmers instead of poppy and cocoa fields. Its goal was to reclaim control of territory under FARC influence and other illegal armed groups through the instruments of national power. The plan formulated efforts to improving military and police security to engage the FARC and other illegal armed groups. Reform to improve professionalism and social economic efforts were also designed to support national security efforts.⁴

U.S. - Plan Colombia

In January 2007, the Colombian leaders presented a new strategy to consolidate gains under Plan Colombia, which eventually be known as the National Consolidation Plan (Plan Nacional de Consolidacion, or PNC). The new strategy, a civilian-led whole-of-government approach, builds upon successful Plan Colombia programs to establish government presence in traditionally ungoverned spaces. By improving access to social services--including justice, education, housing, and health--strengthening democracy, and supporting economic development through sustainable growth and trade, the Colombian Government seeks to permanently recover Colombia's historically marginalized rural areas from illegal armed groups and break the cycle of violence.

⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Plan Colombia*, 11.

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than \$6 billion in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. Under the general guidance and direction of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the Departments of State and Defense have overseen assistance provided to the Colombian military and National Police for Plan Colombia's counter narcotics and improved security objectives. State has provided most of this assistance, focusing on five major aviation programs for the Colombian Army, Air Force, and National Police. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice (Justice), and State have overseen nonmilitary assistance for programs that support alternative development, aid to internally displaced persons and the demobilization of illegal armed groups, and judicial reform efforts.⁵

Colombia represents USSOUTHCOM's interests during the drafting of the Department of State's Mission Strategic and Resource Plan for Colombia. According to both USSOUTHCOM and interagency partners, this coordination helped ensure that USSOUTHCOM and interagency partner strategic goals were mutually reinforcing and aligning activities and resources in achieving broad U.S. objectives. Specifically, USSOUTHCOM's goals to provide tactical, operational, and strategic support to Colombia's counter-narcotics efforts align with the Department of State's goals to provide counter narcotics training and technical assistance, therefore ensuring unity of effort.⁶

⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Plan Colombia*, 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-4.

Success in Philippines

Admiral Blair, former Commander U.S. Pacific Command, commented on breaking down interagency barriers in Southeast Asia,

I think September 11th has made a difference. I mean it was a shock to governments and people in Asia just as it was to us in the United States. And it's made us realize that we're going to have to work on this together, and the first part of working together knows what the real picture is. So I've seen barriers come down between us and other countries that were there before. I've also seen, by the way, some stove pipes within our own government that...That's military jargon that means separate organizations. But the sharing between the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence agencies like the CIA, has taken place on an unprecedented level because of this common campaign within our government against terrorism also.⁷

Before the 9/11 attacks, United States Pacific Command and sub unified Commander of Special Operations Command Pacific were able to identify Al Qaida (AQ) affiliated Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), primarily operating in the Southern Philippines. Upon the request of the Filipino government, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) conducted training and operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to deter and disrupt ASG insurgency efforts.⁸

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. declared a Global War on Terrorism and took a stronger stand on deterring and defeating the AQ threat in Southeast Asia. The 'unity of effort' formed through multiple agencies proved an effective method to bring justice and peace to an area ravaged with crime and insurgency. The interagency Joint Task Force consisted of the FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency

⁷ Jim Lehrer, Online NewsHour: Admiral Dennis Blair," PBS News Hour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec01/blair_12-19.html (accessed November 2, 2010).

⁸ Brian Petit, "OEF-Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID," CBS Interactive Business Network, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HZY/is_201001/ai_n52373655/pg_9/?tag=content:coll (accessed November 22, 2010).

(NSA), and USAID.⁹ Within the task force, the mission objectives and desired end states shared and understood among all the agencies led to success. The primary task or goal was to support the Philippine government and value long-term success over short-term gains. The task force recognition of the Philippines request for assistance helped define success through a synchronized interagency effort.

Admiral Blair used his policy advisors to help support the JTF and establish a counter terrorism cell. According to USPACOM, “the sharing between the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence agencies like the CIA, has taken place on an unprecedented level because of this common campaign within our government against terrorism.”¹⁰ Similar to Colombia in “Plan Colombia,” it requires the government of the affected or host nation to recognize the unfavorable conditions, take initiative to correct the problem and the request for outside assistance. The U.S. interest in combating terrorism and maintaining a positive relationship with the Philippines helped facilitate acceptance of the mission. The support from the region helped change the existing conditions that gave rise to terrorism and instability. Good governance, a professional military and economic developments are essential factors which support Philippine government efforts. A U.S. unilateral operation would not be an effective approach to resolution. A perception of U.S. offensive operations equates to a failure in U.S. strategy in the Philippines. By displaying Philippine leadership actively

⁹ David P. Fridovich, “USSOCOM Strategic Vision and the Enterprise Approach.” U.S. Special Operations Command. <http://www.crprogroup.com/eventnotebook/2010%20Winter%20Symposium/friday%20finished/LTG%20Fridovich.pdf> (accessed November 22, 2010).

¹⁰ Lehrer, *Online NewsHour*.

involved in operations, it builds trust with the host nation and the international community that the U.S. is operating in a support capacity.¹¹

The counterinsurgency and stability operations in the Philippines are an example of all agencies collectively working in the same region to shift responsibility back to the host nation. An indirect approach using the Philippine Armed Forces seemed to be the most prosperous way to defeating the insurgency. The strategy focuses on “building positive relationships among practitioners, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security forces, and sharing intelligence and information”.¹² This approach requires frequent collaboration on efforts to redefine the problem based on progress.¹³

Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff saw firsthand how the benefits of Department of Defense, State and USAID contribute to building security, rule of law, peace and improving quality of life. Civilian led government agencies share the responsibility and capability to bridge the gap between the military and non-government organizations (NGO). The combination of all agencies working effectively with each other in the fight to combat terrorism extinguishes long-term effects of terrorism in the Philippines and other like nations.

Admiral Mullen states, “What has become very evident to me as it should be to you here is security is a necessary condition, but security is not going to get you across home plate. You’ve got to be able to create an economic underpinning. You’ve got to have good governance. You’ve got to have the rule of law-all these things that start to

¹¹ Petit, “OEF-Philippines.”

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

sustain themselves.”¹⁴ The general mission of the military is to provide security to geographic region and a show of force – where the use of the military or war is an extension of politics through other means. The help of USAID in providing monetary relief to the impoverished Philippines for \$50-\$60 million surpasses the U.S. military aid efforts of approximately \$5 million. This is not to discount the military efforts, but shows how other areas of the government can influence change. The diplomatic and economic instruments of national power in comparison to the military carries more influence in the region. “We work closely with the joint task force here....we’re able to leverage our money to the best uses,” Jon Lindborg, USAID Philippine mission Director.¹⁵ The military is capable of managing and leading all areas of DIME. Other government agencies specialize in those particular areas and the military should merely support other agencies’ missions. In the Philippines, USAID and the joint task force work together in scheduling and conducting health and veterinarian care exercises for majority of the impoverished populace who fall victim to and influenced by terrorism.¹⁶

Budget and manpower cuts to civilian and military agencies since the fall of the Berlin Wall have greatly affected the potential footprint USG agencies can have in the field. The characteristics of current and future operations require the civilian government agencies have an increased number of educated and well trained individuals in rotation with their military counter parts. The agency engagement is supportive of areas where the military is not. The programs that the civilian organizations can provide build governance and security assistance, which in the long term builds military capability.

¹⁴ Jim Garamone, “Defense.gov News Article: Mullen Views Interagency Success in Philippines,” United States Defense Department, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50069> (accessed November 22, 2010).

¹⁵ Garamone, “Mullen Views.”

¹⁶ Ibid.

Since the civilian organizations lack the size and capability to exercise their missions in a full capacity, the military may fill the void left by other agencies. The DOD is not responsible to do the job of other agencies, but when staffing and funding are not available, there is no choice but to use what is available. Therefore, along with using what is available, more training and education of the military in the areas generally executed by other agencies must be conducted. This cyclic approach to whole of government increases spending and does not promote growth within the other agencies. "The days where a single service, a single department, a single anything can make things happen are behind us.....its got to be integrated, and its got to be all of us doing this together,"¹⁷ says Admiral Mullen.

Success in Nangarhar

During Operation Enduring Freedom, the 173rd Airborne Combat Team in Nangarhar provincial region of Afghanistan entered a partnership with U.S. governmental interagency to create the successful Nangarhar Incorporated. Agency collaboration and planning established regional developments plans to achieve foreign policy objectives and defeat insurgency.¹⁸ However, the success in Nangarhar is a small scale of the efforts to improve conditions in a region torn by a ten-year war.

In 2007 to 2008, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's National Development Strategy used district and provincial development plans to achieve strategic goals.¹⁹ The community development councils develop the plans derived from the project wish list. The plans from the councils primarily addressed poverty and

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ David K. Spencer, "Afghanistan's Nangarhar Incorporated: A Model for Interagency Success," CBS Interactive Business Network, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_4_89/ai_n56329579/pg_6/ (accessed November 22, 2010).

¹⁹ Ibid.

essential needs of communities. The plans turned over to Nangarhar district leads developed assemblies and prioritize concerns based on the top ten projects. The process did not provide a regional overview of developmental problems, but focused on the specific concerns of the communities. The development strategy embraced the following visions: political, socio-economic, and security.²⁰

Task Force Bayonet lines of effort were in keeping with the strategy, but essentially its primary objective was providing security. In the interim, it developed the capability and process to interject development and governance lines of effort to support the strategic mission. The focus of the task force efforts were directed towards economic growth to yield overall success within the region. Through extensive study and analysis, the task force discovered that fighting was the primary way to earn a living amongst the fighting age males. One method to lower the potential amount of fighters would be by paying them more than what the insurgents would offer. Therefore an economic strategy was developed. The Afghanistan leaders wanted to move past a sole reliance on international aid and “build a thriving, legal, private sector-led economy that reduces the poverty and enables all Afghans to live in dignity.”²¹ The reduction of poverty will occur overtime, but only through development of a steady economy.²²

The national development strategy continued focus on poverty only lessens the possibilities of provincial plans to take effect. Having the region vision and addressing solutions to the area provide economic stability and growth. Funds received from international donors address plan projects that support a specific community. Communities conducting their own individual projects without linkage may negatively

²⁰ Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc.”

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

affect regional economic growth. A top-down and bottom-up approach to the issue of provincial development plans is an appropriate solution. The task force reviewed the projects in search for linkages and opportunity for economic prosperity.²³

For example, “a comprehensive watershed management plan should lead to a dam with associated power production. Irrigation projects and agricultural development projects should increase the production of grain, leading to a grain elevator powered by the dam project while roads link all the projects together. These interconnected initiatives operating as a whole are far greater than the sum of the parts.”²⁴ The problem was clear to the task force and the challenge lies in how they attack this type of problem as a military unit.

The interagency partners whose expertises are in governance and development were not readily available within the task force to deal with this type of concern. The strategy would require a whole of government approach from the Department of State, USAID, Agriculture, and DOD. The staffing and manning of the interagency groups is very limited.

In accordance with Army Field Manual, FM 3-24, counterinsurgency (COIN) states that whenever possible, civilians should perform civilian tasks but “military forces must be able to conduct political, social, information and economic programs as necessary”²⁵ ...depending on the state of the insurgency; therefore soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute many non-military missions to support COIN efforts.

Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs

²³ Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc.”

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ U.S. Department of the Army. *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual No. 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006), 2-1.

personnel. Due to this, senior leaders of the task force and the embassy members met to discuss and form Nangarhar Inc. The goal was to use its formula as a model of success. The plan took nine days of preparation, 62 pages concentrated on three areas of impact: quick, near, and long. The input from all agencies exposed strengths and weaknesses, areas where agencies would complement the other, ability of the plan to maintain stability amongst agencies and host nation, and prioritization of projects.

To establish Nangarhar as an agricultural business base, the primary focus on developing transportation routes (airport, rail, and road) were influential to a developing economy. Along with commerce infrastructure, harvested produce required refrigeration capability for export of goods. The long-term projects cost more to maintain, but are critical to self-sufficiency and reduce reliance on donor support. The Department of State and USAID focused efforts on improving governance and rule of law while the PRTs and military concentrate on local government and lawless areas.²⁶

The lack of interagency participation other than military has increased the military ability to adapt and provide valued input in interagency planning processes. The efforts by the U.S. embassy to develop a robust strategic plan will benefit the commerce and economic stability within the region. However, the success of Nangarhar may not be the benchmark for the end of the war or maintaining interagency collaboration.

There are other factors crippling the support to Afghanistan. The foreign community investment capital donates funds for plans but does not organize efforts. “The efforts are disjointed and disconnected because they follow the fundamentally challenged provincial development plans and their own guidelines and mandates.”²⁷ U.S.

²⁶ Spencer, “Nangarhar Inc.”

²⁷ Ibid.

interagency has the opportunity to establish early stages of critical infrastructure' to attract investors. The interagency ability to coordinate cooperation is crucial in conflict areas. The missions and ethos of organizations vary. USAID is focusing on 'developing Afghanistan', where as in FM 3-24 explains,

Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit. Ideally, a single counterinsurgent leader has authority over all government agencies involved in COIN operations. The U.S. ambassador and country team, along with senior HN representatives, must be key players in higher level planning; similar connections are needed throughout the chain of command.²⁸

Unity of effort is essential between government agencies to ensure the objective of national development strategies execute appropriately.

The development and efforts to eradicate insurgency in Afghanistan are symptoms of the interagency disconnect dilemma. The responsibilities to coordinate the efforts of the warfighter and developer rest upon the Country Team Leader. Plans such as Nangarhar Inc., can continue to spread across Afghanistan with the assistance of funding and manpower. The funds and manpower must be appropriated to the areas that will turn around the largest dividend. There is no need to promote an area that has no chance to succeed. The development will start with areas with the potential for success and over time, the project will grow. "Coordinating development plans in the manner of the Nangarhar Inc., while weaving them into the fabric of the provincial development plans, will achieve the vision of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy."²⁹

²⁸ Field Manual No. 3-24, 1-22.

²⁹ Spencer, "Nangarhar Inc."

CHAPTER 4: COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

When writing on a topic as challenging as improving the interagency process, the successes and challenges of the process appears to maintain a balance. The efforts to improve the interagency process contradict the USG ability to maintain a “checks and balance” approach to decision making and planning. In JP1, the interagency process is often described as “more art than science.” Based on the examples shown earlier in the thesis, it is an equal amount of both. However, the interagency has all the pieces it needs to improve. It possesses the strength, speed, experience, knowledge and will to reform.

The National Security System is comprised of the President, cabinet, departments and agencies and Congress. Integrating across the system is a challenge due to issues that affect national interest and security “cut across a swath of agencies.”³⁰ Interpretations reveal the U.S. Constitution written purposely ambiguous to prevent one branch of government from becoming too powerful over another. It was not written necessarily for the agencies within the executive branch departments. This however does not require a reorganization or redistribution of responsibility. It is about taking what is available and focusing on one effort and planning for future issues in support of protecting U.S. National Security.

There is the assumption that the National Security Advisor manages or oversees the multiple departments and agencies. The President is essentially the one component that can bring it all together. With the daily routine and requirements of the President to handle existing issues, it is nearly impossible for him to focus efforts on interagency

³⁰ Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration*, Edited by Phillip C. Saunders (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, December 2010), 4.

process. The time has come to involve senior leaders with experience alongside the current leaders to develop an effective method to integrate.

The two main stakeholders in National Security, Defense and State, recognized the constraints on resources and funding in their latest quadrennial reports. With this as a major concern, the opportunity for collaboration is at its pinnacle. All efforts to improving the process start at the strategic level in defining the problem. The operational level is a viable conduit for transitioning the strategic policy into tactical gains. The national instruments of power, DIME, are the tools at the operational level to synchronize and transition efforts seamlessly.

Each instrument of national power is equally important. The key is identifying the problem and developing a plan of attack to counter the negative impact on national power. The plan may exploit the weakness of the opposition to gain the advantage in all four areas. This chapter will explain the importance of unity of effort and unity of command, professional development, operational concepts, and funding in pursuit of national objectives.

Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

The Secretaries of Defense and State have testified and stated that successful collaboration among civilian and military agencies requires confronting the disparity in resources, including providing greater capacity in the State Department and USAID to allow for effective civilian response and civilian-military partnership³¹...Additionally, the current Secretary of State noted in testimonies before two congressional committees that the State Department is working with DOD and will be taking back the resources to do the work that the agency should be leading, but did not elaborate on which activities this included.³²

³¹ GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, 25.

³² Ibid.

Interagency integration requires knowing when to implement unity of command and unity of effort. Since the end of WWII, the threats to U.S. National Security have changed. This change requires multiagency involvement and coordination to ensure synchronization of DIME. The National Security System requires flexible coordination and cooperation to achieve unity of command and effort. A handover method between the two or ability to transition can better prepare the U.S. for the various threats that effectively target the U.S. instruments of power. For example, the terrorist organization Al Qaida targeted the U.S. for years before they attacked on 9/11 and created a long war that negatively affects the U.S. economy and military. Reform efforts were made to integrate command and unity among departments, but nothing that completely decentralizes stovepipes.

The unity of command provides leadership in mission planning. The concern here is how unity of command “comes at the expense of the unity of effort because departments refuse to work together for fear of losing their powers, prerogatives, and budgets.”³³ The unity of command is strong within agencies, but the unity of effort is weak across departments to resolve issues. Establishing a balance between departments and agencies starts with a directive from above to the specific leads to analyze gaps and overlap between agencies. Some missions within the organizations may need reevaluation to ensure they meet the goals of national security. All departments’ missions should essentially share the same end states, for they are all in support of national security.

After taking notice from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of State recently released its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).

³³ Lamb and Marks, *Chief of Mission*, 4.

The review evaluates the practices of the department and focuses on areas to improve and integrate with other departments. If all departments adopt a collective quadrennial review process, then reducing the lack of cooperation may improve. The reviews serve as a tool to share information, missions and objectives that may affect another department.

In JP1, unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.³⁴ In order to sustain effort, creating structure and control processes are necessary. The GCC attempts to integrate through a JIACG have been marginal. The GCC remains under the DOD and reach back for agencies to parent organizations is not that strong. Reducing the influence of GCCs, increasing the number of JIATFs, and merging country teams into the process increases the probability of positive unity of effort. The JIATF structure focuses on the national security concerns and through agreements with parent organizations and promotes unity of effort. A higher authority does not mandate the JIATF agencies, but agency participation is based on the concentration of the threat. A highly concentrated threat region poses a need for particular agencies to counter the threat and form alliances among each other and with the international community. As long as an individual agency has a purpose in countering a threat, then it remains viable in the fight.

The placement of JIATFs should be from the direction of the NSC instead of the Pentagon. An expansion of JIATFs takes into consideration the needs of each particular AOR. If a strong military presence is needed in an area, then it should remain, but if

³⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02. Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Washington DC: November 8, 2010), 387.

diplomatic or economic advantage is needed, then other agencies should lead the JIATF. The linkage with DOD is through resources, capability and global coverage. Through lessons learned from Plan Colombia and Haiti Earthquake of 2010, JIATFs prove that diversity and flexibility are required to handle various missions.³⁵

Professional Development

The issue with professional development is the lack of development systems for the interagency and the influence placed on attracting personnel to the agencies. The military for example uses programs such as the military academies and officer candidate schools to assess young professionals. The military War Colleges also promote professional development for military and other agency professionals. The problem agencies face with professional development is the limited amount of personnel available to share the experience with the military students. This is symbolic of why the military is capable to fill in the gaps of positions left vacant by other agency personnel.

Unlike the armed forces, advertisement and recruiting is not as profound for many agencies. For the most part, funding is not available to improve recruitment within that realm. Other methods not discussed in this paper may seem productive, but professional training may start at the university level for individuals who are committed to professional programs. This method may increase enrollment into programs and create a positive and competitive environment among agencies. Once the person has graduated and affiliated with the respective agency, more training to prepare them for a collaborative joint environment will be addressed. Early collaborative education methods coupled with agency specific training, results in a more well rounded professional to execute the goals of national security objectives.

³⁵ Lamb and Marks, *Chief of Mission*, 15-22.

Operational Concepts

A key aspect of the professional development will be producing a concept of how interagency operates and educating personnel on unity of command and effort and when applied. Establishing who is in charge early or who has what authority outlines the rules of the game. Further, these professionals should be trained in interagency flexibility, and how to transition from one lead agency to another.

For example, European Recovery Plan or Marshal Plan focused on economic and infrastructure recovery efforts for European countries devastated by conflict during WWII. The transition from defense to state did not dismiss the military from supporting state efforts. The missions focused on defense, diplomacy, and development.³⁶ Whether a post conflict environment like Iraq and Afghanistan, or interdicting the flow of drugs into America from Central and South America, priority must be distinguished early and assessed regularly. At some point when security is established, the priority of the missions may shift.

In a non-combat crisis response situation, the military should resort to a support and resource role. The possibility of any civilian agency obtaining a budget as large as DOD is unrealistic. The civilian agencies primary resources are its personnel. The focus for them should be on increasing manpower, training and building relationships. The key to operations is how well the civilians are educated on the capabilities of the military and effective planning and vice versa. The military must also recognize some objectives are not necessarily clear and the position of leadership will not always reside with the military.

³⁶ Carafano, "Herding Cats," 5.

Funding

The 3-D agencies, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, along with other smaller and critical agencies, support their U.S. national security by spending billions of dollars through diplomatic, development and defense means. With this increased amount of spending, it is important, during a resource constrained period, that all agencies use its funding wisely for continued support to national security. The agencies reaching a desired end state will require coordination from all government and essential non-government agencies.

Between the executive and legislative branch, budget recommendations and approvals, along with reviewing processes are key to shaping a collaborative environment.³⁷ The budget process involves the administration and Congress. The President submits a budget to Congress, which is then reviewed and passes legislation to appropriate funds to various departments and agencies. Departments and agencies operate to a large degree on the size of their budget. The size of the budget can outline the functionality and capability of a given entity. Within the budget, funding appropriated to the individual organizations and not by a functional area such as national security or foreign aid.³⁸ Changing the method of appropriating funds can be discussed in further research.

The DOS budget is roughly 12% of the DOD budget. This is a clear depiction of the focus centering on specific agencies and not on a functional area. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will require a continued collaborative and integrated perspective of government. The funding proposal may complicate matters for current and future

³⁷ GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, 4, 21.

³⁸ Carafano, "Herding Cats," 5.

operations. However, DOD provided DOS the training of the Afghanistan National Police and other activities. The transfer of funds is a productive initiative towards attaining collaboration but DOS officials lacked proper training, capability and manpower to meet DOD requirements to counter insurgency.³⁹

Information Sharing

The 9/11 attacks transformed the nation. The 19 Arab Islamic extremists under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden conducted one of the largest attacks in the U.S. since the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Over 2,600 people perished in the World Trade Center and 125 at the Pentagon.⁴⁰ Since the attacks, the U.S. and coalition partners remain at war in Afghanistan and around the world fighting the war against terrorism.

As noted in the 9/11 Commission Report on organizing the government for the future, “the U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for processing and using what it has.”⁴¹ The inability for federal agencies to share information precedes and during the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks remains a concern for future situations. According to reports from the Government Accountability Office, “agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners.”⁴² Failure to share information is not only at the federal level, but at the lower tiers of government as well. As a key element of DIME, information is “a crucial tool in

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *DOD Obligations and Expenditures of Funds Provided to the Department of State for the Training and Mentoring of the Afghan National Police* (Arlington, Va: Department of Defense inspector General, February 2010), <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA514570> (accessed March 3, 2011).

⁴⁰ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 314.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 417.

⁴² GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, What GAO Found.

addressing national security issues and its timely dissemination is absolutely critical for maintaining national security.”⁴³

Relevant information shared among agencies on all levels of government may have prevented the attacks by al Qaeda leading up to 9/11. Although since 9/11, vast improvements have been made to strengthen efforts. Every agency and organization has its weaknesses that rather not expose. Agencies and departments follow different procedures for handling and sharing information. When developing plans, these differences can have major impact on effective plan development and agency participation.

Agencies unfamiliarity with one another contributes to the “lack of clear guidelines, policies, or agreements for coordinating with other agencies.”⁴⁴ This means that knowing the cultures, capabilities, vulnerabilities gaps and overlaps among agencies will provide the U.S. the advantage in identifying, tracking and defeating the adversary. In contrast, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) lacks the emphasis of cooperative advantage by failing to address the importance of information as a means to an end. Agencies must recognize the linkages within departments and formulate guidance and agreements bottom-up and top down.

Security clearance has an impact on efficiency of information sharing as well. Along with the cultural differences and unclear policy, the lack of a baseline or security standard does not appear to be uniform throughout the agencies. A level of security may vary from agency to agency depending on pay-grade, level of experience, importance, access level and department. In a recent GAO report, non-DOD personnel could not

⁴³ GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, What GAO Found.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

access some DOD planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they may not have had the proper security clearances. In order to plan with a whole of government approach, all agencies should be consistent with its planning. Their non-access issues negatively affect the overall planning development plan.⁴⁵

When the information is shared properly, sometimes source management may influence and overload the decision process and determining relevancy. Sorting through enormous amounts of data being shared requires time and manpower. A lack of roles, responsibilities and data comparability management can confuse the threat picture in ‘connecting the dots’ for various agency integrations.⁴⁶ In July 2008, the GAO testified the following,

The President had adopted “controlled unclassified information” to be the single categorical designation for sensitive but unclassified information throughout the executive branch and outlined a framework for identifying, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating this information. As we testified,” controlled but unclassified information” may help reduce difficulties in sharing information; however, monitoring agencies’ compliance will help ensure that the policy is employed consistently across the federal government.⁴⁷

Monitoring the agencies can reduce the redundancies of sharing and integrating information. Multiple agencies collect and submit similar or the same information which becomes time consuming and creates redundancy. Some redundancy is good because it provides amplifying data, serves as a backup, and solidifies the truth. However, at an increased level it can make it difficult to discern what is relevant. Overwhelming the end user with information can slow the progress of reach a desired end state. During Hurricane Katrina reconstruction efforts, state and federal agencies attempted to share

⁴⁵ GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, What GAO Found.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

project information, but were impacted by constantly resubmitting because of the incompatibility of database exchange. The duplication of documents created a delay in reconstruction efforts.⁴⁸ Unclear roles and responsibilities require monitoring of agencies. The information sharing process must be clearly understood on all level of the organization. A misunderstanding or lack of information shared can delay efforts for all agencies involved.

Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and Interagency Process

In Joint Publication 5-00.1, states, “guidance from civilian and military policy makers is a prerequisite for developing a military campaign plan. Military campaigns are not conducted in isolation of other government efforts to achieve national strategic objectives.”⁴⁹ The concept of a JIACG intends to ensure all government efforts inform unified command planning efforts and operations. As an advisory element for the combatant commander, it bridges the gap between civilian and military planning efforts and alleviates some agency stovepipes.

The advisory aspect limits the impact of a JIACG mainly to the larger DOD combatant commander in the execution of campaign planning and security cooperation. It presents a misconception of the military not being an agency within the interagency. The JIACG is a portion of the combatant command normally led by a senior civilian. This propagates the perception that the military, with its detail planning capability, is responsible for all elements of national power in campaign planning. Although the planning at the operational and tactical levels integrates agencies well, the majority of the strategic level planning is focused by the military at combatant commands. The strategic

⁴⁸ GAO, *Interagency Collaboration*, 50.

⁴⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, Joint Publication 5-00.1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 25, 2002), VII.

policy should filter down to the combatant commands to execute. Instead of a JIACG at the combatant command level, a JIACG for the NSC would set the interagency conditions earlier and more effectively.

Civilian-military relations have seen highs and lows over the course of U.S. history. In the changing operational environment, which requires agency unity of effort, “if the United States fails to coordinate civilian and military efforts, it will experience failures that discredit more ambitious peace operations and erode both domestic support and respect for U.S. leadership abroad.”⁵⁰ According to studies of JIACGs in 2004, civilian members of JIACG felt that the military had a plan and they were responsible to make sure their agency followed the plan.⁵¹ Military objectives alone do not achieve national strategic end states. Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom are prime examples. The heavy military objectives were met at Phase III operations, but non-DOD agencies were not ready to accept the handoff although remained in charge. Due to the lack of collaboration at a strategic level early in the planning phases, the U.S. struggles to achieve our objectives in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

⁵⁰ Bruce Pirnie, *Civilians and Soldiers, Achieving Better Coordination* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 2.

⁵¹ Marcy Stahl, “Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results,” briefing, outsourced to ThoughtLink, Inc., sponsored by National Defense University and Joint Forces Command, January 15, 2004, 16-17.

CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS

Interagency coordination is comparatively similar to the interagency issues faced in the military that resulted in passing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The need for interagency collaboration is much like the lack of joint mindedness that was missing from the Armed Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has proven effective in bringing unified action to the Department of Defense. A few years after the legislation passed, the U.S. entered the first Gulf War where joint operations significantly improved over previous wars.

Although titled the DOD Reorganization Act, it gave the armed forces a level playing field to exercise all capabilities of expertise together so the military can fight as a team. Some would debate that the only benefit gained from synchronization of efforts among branches of service. Through education and training, combatant commands overcame boundaries. The coordination tenets that lacked in wars since World War II for the military exist in recent operations for the interagency process. Goldwater-Nichols legislation for the interagency will take time because there are many agencies and departments, along with varying resources and budgets.

This thesis analyzed the problems and symptoms related to US interagency process reform. The JIATF-South framework, with its primary mission focusing on countering narco-terrorism, offers a unity of effort and organizing strategy that the USG can apply to reform the interagency process and utilize throughout USSOUTHCOM and neighboring combatant commands for all national security issues. In addition to employing the JIATF model, the additional recommendations are: 1) Geographical Combatant Commanders and JIATFs collocated, 2) ensure NSC policy is implemented at

the operational level, and 3) JIATF leadership should rotate among agency leads to establish continuity of effort.

The elements of interagency process reform are in place, but the structure and organization to achieve a 'whole of government approach' to 21st century threats needs attention. Unlike the JIATF-South model, the proposed JIATF organization must not be one dimensional in mission and design. The difference is a JIATF that manages and execute task related to the functions pertaining to the primary missions of the agencies it incorporates. By incorporating a multi-purpose JIATF with every combatant command, it provides global geographical coverage with a small but capable joint interagency team. All agencies will retain their statutory authorities and responsibilities, but will now have a framework for cohesive unified action.

The GCCs ability to exercise diplomacy to establish positive relations with international militaries and use service components as force providers is important when all instruments of power have exhausted. A balanced JIATF staffed by all agencies necessary to mitigate the threats to U.S. national security and interest within a region is a first step toward more comprehensive reform such as Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).¹ While, the GCCs are large in regards to manpower and resources, replacing military positions with diverse innovative agency personnel can bridge the gap on foreign policy and international concerns that the military is not properly trained, equipped and experienced to handle.

In a resource-constrained environment, the capabilities of all agencies without the DOD-GCC size budgets are not able to exercise all their responsibilities. With the

¹ PNSR is an interest organization, which places effort on revitalizing the American government by transforming the national security system. For more information, see <http://www.pnsr.org/>.

facilitation conducted by a GCC through a JIATF, this may relieve the stress on smaller and less capable agencies and enable a synergistic approach to deliberate planning and execution. The JIATF-South model explained earlier in the study exemplifies how all players have a stake in the game to meet the U.S. national strategic objective to prevent various types of illicit trafficking from entering U.S. borders. The USSOUTHCOM/JIATF-South command relationship displays how the operational and tactical relationship to prevent narco-terrorism is just a fraction of achievement for the national objectives. Since the aim is to advance U.S. interests globally, the JIATF-South model presents the best framework for organizations to integrate, fuse, and “truly synchronize operations” across all elements of national power.

Secondly, to achieve understanding of NSC policy guidance, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (DASS) in the JIATF who works for DOS Regional Bureau Assistant Secretary or a Foreign Policy Advisor for the combatant command region, and other lead departmental and agency officials must develop to transform strategic policy into operational means. In addition to DOD representation by the GCC and DOS by DASS, all other agencies should also have senior representation in the JIATF. This task should not reside with the GCC or Chief of Mission alone, but by a collective interagency effort similar to a board of directors.

Strategic Level Coordination

At the strategic level, President Eisenhower, shortly after taking office, met with key cabinet members to address the existing national strategy of containment. The containment strategy was the whole of government approach established to deter Soviet communism expansion and nuclear weapon proliferation post World War II. While

President Eisenhower was in favor of the strategy, his administration suggested a military strategy to defeat the Soviets. Eisenhower replied with, "It's the minds and hearts of men that must be won."²

He envisioned that a long term policy needs to be developed. By winning the aspiration of the people, it would counter the Soviet race to stockpile nuclear weapons. With this in mind, Eisenhower gathered his cabinet to form a "specific strategic policy put forward for all to follow".³ Even though he had his own idea of a strategic policy, "he believed the best way to formulate national policy as a democracy was to gather the best qualified people with opposing views and carefully listen to them debate each other on the issue." The Cold War expanded over 40 years and no nuclear weapons or military combat operations against the Soviet transpired. Employing all instruments of national power prevented the possibility of a nuclear war. President Eisenhower predicted, "It would be take a long time, be very expensive, and would sometimes entail frightful risks".⁴

Applying the JIATF Model

JIATF-South senior representatives can routinely meet to revise mission sets, review strategy and asset availability. The focus of the JIATF should help translate these national policies for the agencies to execute collectively. This process to include all agencies improves information sharing, unity of effort, and helps manage limited resources and reduce competing priorities.

² Eisenhower Memorial Commission, "Project Solarium," Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission, <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/stories/Project-Solarium.htm> (accessed March 6, 2011).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Gardner, "Away Game," 57.

The policy implementation through the JIATF will require interagency doctrine similar to the Joint Military Doctrine used by the armed forces. Discussion between the policy makers and the JIATF with experience on issues may increase flexibility and will to change. The policy must then be in writing for the JIATF to follow and often reviewed based on the changing environment. This will improve the execution of interagency operations by stating the roles of agencies and the benefits each will share in the success of mission accomplishment. All agencies must see the benefit of working together and experience the results unity of effort presents.

Third, the JIATF leadership organization must provide a cyclic leadership opportunity for the senior personnel from all agencies. JIATF non-military personnel should serve in positions of authority and decision-making. Additionally, other interagency personnel should also serve as planners alongside their military counterparts in the JIATF. This concept improves the balancing of the playing field and providing expertise that is more comprehensive across elements of national power. The establishment of agency informational networks and cross training offers the opportunity to improve many other efforts as well.

Fourth, a JIATF must operate as a functional enforcement arm of the GCC. The organization will reside with the combatant command, but its functionality and agency consistency makes it a valued asset for the NSC and all member agencies. The GCC would consist of the JIATF and the current full military function of the GCC to counter potential conventional military actors as well as all disaster relief, transnational crime, and other challenges. The JIACG role for each region will remain in place, but the National Security Council Interagency Policy Committee (NSC/IPC) shall retain

responsibility to ensure national policy is recognized, understood, and acted upon by all agencies through the JIATF for that region. The NSC/IPC should assist in maintaining the balance of responsibility and focus area for the GCC and JIATF. There should be representation from each agency that will be the staff for the rotating chairman, who will advise the JIATF, GCC and NSC. The NSC/IPC will promote jointness, develop doctrine within the interagency, and mandate the balance of agencies within the JIATF. This requires assessments conducted by the NSC/IPC to act as a 'checks and balances' for JIATF effectiveness.

Although, opposition still exists in developing interagency process legislation. The armed forces all have something in common in regards to structure and process after Goldwater-Nichols. Some critics believe the interagency and its vast amount of agencies cannot achieve the symmetry acquired by DOD and the military. LTC David Tucker states in a U.S. Army War College Quarterly,

It is suggested, for example, that just as jointness has replaced service rivalries, so can interagency coordination replace interagency squabbling. The problem with this analogy is the military officers from different services have much more in common than do representatives for different agencies. Compared to the differences between, say, a CIA case officer and a State Department Foreign Service Officer, the differences between Army officer and a Marine Corps officer are negligible with respect to 'culture, bias, misperceptions, unique perspectives,' and respect for hierarchy. This means that whatever interagency coordination may be, if it is achieved, will be unlike what the military has experienced in jointness.⁵

An initiative perhaps not on the scale of Goldwater-Nichols, but of the same significance can greatly improve interagency operations. The Act perhaps

⁵ David Tucker, "The RMA and the Interagency: Knowledge and Speed vs. Ignorance and Sloth?" *Parameters*, US Army War College Quarterly, (Autumn 2000), 6-7.

propelled military jointness to what it has become today, “joint centric mindset” and “joint intuition” inspired by collaboration.⁶

Education and Training

Improving the operational level of the interagency process begins with professional education and training. This method may raise the incentive to develop future political leaders. Within the military, teaching young officers early and often prepares them on the processes of the military decision-making and future positions as senior leaders. Although, the other agencies do not have the resource and budgeting, DOD advocating for other agencies can increase other agencies capabilities and leveling the playing field across all agencies in a JIATF. The interagency must make itself just as effective as DOD to the nation by effectively pursuing US national interest in a cohesive manner. The gap or transition between politics and military must be filled by interagency, not DOD alone.

Former House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton and Congressman Geoff Davis took steps in the right direction towards reform for the interagency. In September 2010, they announced new legislation in the form of law “that would begin to overhaul interagency national security coordination in the most noteworthy reform since the 2004 reorganization of the intelligence community.”⁷ The Skelton-Davis Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development (INSPEAD) System Act, centered on lessons learned from the Goldwater-

⁶ Scott Zippwald, *Interagency Role Model: Adopting the Military’s Salient Characteristics*, Research Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2006), 18.

⁷ Small Wars Journal Editors. “Skelton, Davis Introduce Groundbreaking Interagency Reform Legislation,” Small Wars Journal, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/10/skelton-davis-introduce-ground/> (accessed November 3, 2010)

Nichols Act, intends to concentrate on interagency collaboration, culture and building national security professionals.⁸ Congressman Davis quoted in an interview,

The greatest impediment to effective national security interagency operations is the many agencies lack personnel who have the skills and experience necessary to execute mission priorities as a multi-agency team in a crisis situation...improving our interagency capabilities will significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our government when responding to national security threats and natural disasters.⁹

While the future of this legislation is uncertain, all of the above methods to attain interagency collaboration are critical to success. The JIATF-South model has proven successful but its focus is from a law enforcement point of view and only on counter narco-trafficking. A multipurpose JIATF in every combatant command can level the playing field and establish balance among all agencies to have synergistic interagency implementation. Just as the military follows the Unified Command Plan, so should the executive level mandate interagency do the same or establish an organizational playbook to create a uniform landscape of the global regions. While civilian agencies will not reach the budget capacity and manpower of the military, multiagency representation does increase cooperation and coordination and can result in more effective attainment of national security objectives. Increasing the number and broadening the role of JIATFs will improve collaboration and effectiveness of the interagency. This idea provides full representation of USG agencies for all situations, and does it without changing current statutes or laws and with minimal additional resources.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

In the past ten years, the United States has encountered a spectrum of natural disasters and conflicts that challenge all instruments of national power. The end of the Cold War and the United States rise to a prominent superpower status raises question of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The change of the millennium requires the U.S. to address this complex situation differently. The 1990s was a decade of complacency. While the U.S. sat comfortably on its laurels, other countries took note of the U.S. accomplishments and aspired to be better and competitive in the global market.

The attacks of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, along with Hurricane Katrina, and an economy in recession tested the nations will to re-evaluate its Grand Strategy and focus on interagency collaboration. The future for our strategy rides on the backbone of studying American history and analyzing global changes. The interagency process is essential to cohesively employing the instruments of national power. In its current state, the military carries majority of the resources of the DIME. How long can that last? The military is large, capable, intellectually sound, yet expensive. In the global market, flexing military muscle should not always be the first resort when attempting to achieve end states.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act transformed the military to meet the threats of the late 20th century. Since then, the threat has evolved in a short period and the U.S. is playing catch up. The cultural and organizational reform needs to be a part of the interagency process as well. This reform will help our nation counter the challenges of current and future threats.

The JIATF model highlights how the interagency has been successful for roughly twenty years within USSOUTHCOM. The JIATF models expanded to other areas of the world for various issue such as counter terrorism, strategic communication, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the study we learned that the collaboration requires input, 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' to ultimately be successful.

The Skelton-Davis INSPEAD Act is a step in the right direction for interagency collaboration and organization reform. If passed perhaps the problem may be reduced to military and interagency both conducting joint like operations separately and later merging the two when desired. Blending the success and best practices of JIATF-South with that of country team will improve the interagency process. It provides balance and ownership for specific phases of operations. All players need to master their own area of responsibility, understand the responsibility of others, and be able shift roles and gears to support one another. Culture and education as well will be essential to interagency process reform.

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VITA

Anthony L. Webber
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

LCDR Webber is a 1999 graduate of Prairie View A & M University and commission through the NROTC program in Prairie View, Texas. He is a Surface Warfare Officer and has completed 7 years of sea duty on two combatants and one amphibious ship. Prior to arriving and attending Joint Advanced Warfighting School, he was assigned to the USS MAHAN (DDG-72) as the Weapons and Combat Systems Officer, homeport in Norfolk, Virginia.

After graduating college, he attended the Surface Warfare Officer Division Officer School and Damage Control Assistant Officer School before arriving to the USS KEARSARGE (LHD-3), a large deck amphibious ship. He successfully completed one two year tour as the Repair/Damage Control Division Officer before transferring to the USS STETHEM (DDG 63) in San Diego, California. While assigned to the USS STETHEM, he served as the Fire Control Officer, responsible for the division sailors and maintenance and upkeep of the Aegis Weapon System.

LCDR Webber's joint, interagency and multinational experience includes one deployment to the USSOUTHCOM/ JIATF-South AOR conducting counterdrug operations and coalition operations in the Baltic Sea with other NATO countries. In 2008, he deployed on the USS MAHAN to the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa to conduct anti-piracy operations as well.

