Russia's Conventional Military Weakness and Substrategic Nuclear Policy
Abstract
The transformation of the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of Russia's conventional armed forces and its modernization program to 2020 signal a clear break from past reliance on mass mobilization. They mark a coming to terms with the strategic traumas to the military following the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, reorienting Russia's force structure to the types of conflict it may face in the future. Combined with the "reset" in relations between Washington and Moscow and a gradual improvement in NATO-Russia relations since the Alliance froze ties for 6 months following the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, hopes that a new era in nuclear disarmament may be approaching followed the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) in early 2011. Pressure towards further deepening disarmament regimes is growing, with calls in Washington and Europe to foster a new dialogue with Moscow. This paper examines Russian nuclear policy in the context of its continued high premium on nuclear deterrence, and the nexus between Moscow's stance on further reductions and the condition of its conventional armed forces. It presents a range of Russian security perspectives, including the limits of determining nuclear policy with certainty through its doctrinal statements, and argues that the deep spasms experienced in defense reform, and the immense challenges facing its modernization plans, will naturally induce reluctance to radically revise nuclear policy. Western policymakers face reconciling ambitious nuclear arms reduction aspirations to an uncomfortable Russian reality that acknowledges problems stemming from the weakness of Russia's conventional armed forces, and to emerging non-Western-centric patterns in the strategic environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA549120
Entities
People
- Roger N. Mcdermott