

PRISM

VOL. 2, NO. 4 ♦ 09/2011



CENTER FOR
COMPLEX OPERATIONS

DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT

A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS

CCO

PRISM

VOL. 2, NO. 4 ♦ 09/2011

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE SEP 2011		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Prism, Vol 2, Number 4				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University Press, 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605), Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 167	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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PRISM

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PRISM



Afghan and U.S. commandos reinforce Afghan government presence in remote villages along Afghanistan-Pakistan border

Transforming the Conflict in Afghanistan

BY JOSEPH A. L'ETOILE

Many have characterized the war in Afghanistan as a violent political argument between the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (with its coalition partners) and the Taliban, with the population watching and waiting to decide whom to join, and when. The main value of this analogy is not in its characterization of the war but in its explanation of why the Afghan government and the coalition are finding it so difficult to gain traction against a largely unpopular insurgency. By framing the options as a simple binary choice between the government with its hierarchical, remote, and centralized governing structure and the Taliban with its violently repressive but locally present shadow government, the war is represented—or *misrepresented*—as a matter of unattractive choices that impel the population to remain on the sidelines waiting to see who will win.

Unfortunately, the political clock is running out in Afghanistan. It is imperative for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to capitalize on the progress in security made in the fall and winter of 2010 and continue to show progress during the fall of 2011. This is necessary in order to buy the time and the coalition resources required for an orderly and responsible transition to Afghan-led security by the end of 2014.

Joseph A. L'Etoile is the Director of the Irregular Warfare Group at Orbis Operations LLC.

The immediacy and severity of the security challenges in Afghanistan are driving political and military reconsideration of restrictions previously imposed on some population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies heretofore deemed too “risky.” Fears of warlordism and traditional Afghan factionalism are being subordinated to fears of Taliban success propelled by a shadow government that has operated with more presence and immediacy within the Afghan population. Consequently, bottom-up population mobilization has become a major line of operation for the coalition, embracing community-based constructive governance that stimulates and enables resistance to the Taliban’s malicious policies and practices.

The coalition and Afghan government have neither the time nor resources to secure the most relevant and threatened segments of

operations, returning to the very roots of the U.S. Special Forces ethos. Trained to work by, with, and through local populations to achieve desired ends, SOF have been assigned the mission to mobilize select Afghan populations to achieve campaign-level effects. Through the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC–A) Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs, the Afghan government and coalition are beginning to treat the population more as a resource and a potential solution and less as a burden or security chore. However, time is short and the security transition challenges are profound.

This article briefly examines coalition experiences with local defense and population-mobilization initiatives in Afghanistan to emphasize the political and sociological challenges involved. From that perspective, recent VSO/ALP initiatives are placed in context. That context in turn highlights significant challenges, both materiel and nonmateriel, that require immediate attention to enable and reinforce population mobilization efforts. Next, broad solutions to those challenges are suggested, with an emphasis on those that offer the greatest potential for near-term success as well as sustainability through 2014 and beyond.

the international community and the Afghans it backed concluded that local governance and security should be handed over to local elites and their militias

the population by using only their respective resources. This has led to a shifting in the ISAF campaign plan from operations almost exclusively designed to *protect the population* to operations designed to *enable the population to protect itself*. These most recent efforts toward population mobilization represent a revisiting of previous practices that kept the population out of the conflict,¹ but at this point in the campaign, it is both logical and moral to mobilize the local Afghan populations and to make them a party to the conflict that will determine their future.

This approach has placed U.S. special operations forces (SOF) at the center of coalition

Background

Although VSO is sometimes interpreted as the first sustained effort at bottom-up COIN since the fall of the Taliban, the operations actually represent the second swing of the pendulum toward bottom-up solutions, following a swing to top-down solutions that lasted from 2005 to the middle of 2010. After the Taliban’s defeat at the end of 2001, the international community and the Afghans it backed concluded that local governance and security

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should be handed over to local elites and their militias. This arrangement represented continuity with most of Afghanistan's past; since the unification of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century, the central government in Kabul has been most successful in controlling the country through provincial elites of various sorts who organized local men into militias.

For the first few years, this approach seemed to work, as there was little insurgency to be found in most of the country. In 2005, however, things began to fall apart. One reason was that the international community had begun forcing the disbandment of numerous militias and had created a national police force to replace them. Some of the militiamen were moved into the national police, but others were left jobless, and many of them proved willing to join the insurgents in return for pay. Although some militia commanders became police chiefs, others were removed from power because they had preyed on the population enough to drive it into the insurgency's arms. But the new police chiefs were often just as predatory and less competent. The U.S. penchant for lavishing development funds and insisting on intrusive power-sharing mechanisms, such as imposing term limits and leadership rotations among local elites, also contributed to instability and violence. When the insurgents ramped up their offensive activities in 2005, they fully exploited those weaknesses.

The government of Hamid Karzai and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies responded to the deterioration in security by increasing the size of Alliance forces and attempting to strengthen the top-down Afghan security organizations: the Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA), and National Directorate of Security (NDS). The pendulum had swung all the way to the

top-down side. The NDS made progress most quickly because it received robust advice and support from the Central Intelligence Agency and was a smaller organization with a smaller scope of mission. But its small size prevented it from exerting a decisive impact on the war. The ANA made slower but significant progress; however, like the NDS, it was too small for the task, and it shied away from the long-term population security operations required in COIN, preferring to concentrate on offensive operations. The ANP grew in size, but its abbreviated training and poor leadership resulted in such widespread predation and incompetence that its presence was often beneficial to the insurgents. Many ANP members served outside their home areas, a decided disadvantage given the provincialism of rural Afghans, the need for counterinsurgents to know the human terrain, and the value of having friends and relatives as intelligence sources. Not until 2008 did the international community really begin addressing the problems in the ANP, and it is still in need of much improvement. Although increased partnering with ISAF and purges of malign actors have cut down on predation, the ANP remains deficient in the intelligence and operations capabilities required to combat the insurgents. More importantly, the ANP is not connected to an effective judicial system. This is especially problematic since the most significant governance void the insurgency fills is the need for judicial and dispute-resolution procedures.

From 2001 to 2005, the international security forces in Afghanistan concentrated on counterterrorism missions. Operating from bases that were often distant from the population, they sought to capture or kill high-value targets. With the growth of the insurgency in 2005 and the consequent expansion of the foreign troop presence, emphasis shifted to "population-centric" COIN operations. Because of

population-centric doctrine and prohibitions against recruiting local militias, ISAF commanders focused on “protecting the population” rather than “mobilizing the population”—a distinction built on a profound underlying difference: there were often too few troops to protect much of the population, and when protection existed, it did not guarantee the cooperation of the villagers. Obtaining intelligence on the enemy, in particular, proved very difficult.

The security forces and civil servants the national government sent to the provinces were hobbled by unforeseen difficulties in the employment of individuals outside their home

the inability of the top-down security organizations to stem the insurgency after 2005 reignited interest in bottom-up solutions

districts. Afghans regularly deserted or disappeared for weeks at a time to be with their families. In addition, Afghan villagers by nature tend to be hostile to outsiders and unwilling to cooperate even with Afghans from other parts of the country who show up in their villages. ISAF leaders were often surprised that the nationally recruited ANSF elements assigned to rural areas were often perceived as just as “foreign” as NATO personnel.

The inability of the top-down security organizations to stem the insurgency after 2005 reignited interest in bottom-up solutions. Some ISAF commanders sought permission to recruit local men into militias, but their requests were denied by the Karzai government, civilian NATO authorities, and the U.S. Department of State on the grounds that militias had been socially disruptive in the past and were to blame for much of the support for the insurgency. But,

as occurred in Iraq, the continued decline in the security situation began to weaken the resistance of higher authorities to local security programs. Additionally, the successes that flowed from population mobilization efforts in Iraq suggested that under certain circumstances, similar efforts might enjoy success in Afghanistan.

At the end of 2006, President Karzai authorized creation of the 10,000-man Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), which was supposed to be a local security force, albeit under national authority. But many recruits did not end up serving in their home districts, and the program eventually collapsed because of poor oversight and weak leadership. Following the ANAP program was a series of bottom-up defense initiatives: the Afghan Public Protection Program, Afghan Public Protection Force, and the direct predecessors of VSO: the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) and the Local Defense Initiative (LDI). Many of these programs attempted to harness the “indirect approach” preferred by U.S. SOF and other COIN advocates—that of using local partner nation forces to protect the population. However, the effort stalled from a lack of political support from both the Afghan and U.S. governments.

ANSF growth rates, quality, and usefulness in the provincial outlands of Afghanistan began to indicate that the security forces available to support security transition requirements were insufficient. In recognition of these circumstances, CFSOCC-A began pushing against the restraints placed on the CDI and LDI programs to establish local examples of what was possible in these bottom-up approaches. Confronted with those early CFSOCC-A population mobilization successes, paired with intensive lobbying by the U.S. Government, President Karzai agreed in August 2010 to the creation of

a 10,000-man local security program, titled the Afghan Local Police, with the proviso that its units would be subordinate to the district police chief and, ultimately, the Ministry of Interior. Armed forces organized under the CDI/LDI Initiative were merged into VSO/ALP, and CFSOCC-A became the lead U.S. organization for VSO/ALP. For the first time, strategic buy-in from the Afghan government and ISAF set the stage for coherent and widely effective population mobilization from the bottom up.

Population Mobilization and VSO/ALP

The overriding U.S. objective in Afghanistan is preventing the use of Afghan territory for terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland and American interests abroad. The United States seeks to build the capabilities of the Afghan government so it can carry more of the security burden and enable the United States to reduce the costs and scope of its involvement. America and its NATO Allies have devoted considerable intelligence and military resources toward counterterror strikes against extremists within Afghanistan, but those strikes alone have not been sufficient to rid Afghanistan of the terrorist threat or enable the country to take responsibility for its own security. Complicating the security challenge is the fact that the sanctuaries in Pakistan are the source of the majority of the ideologically driven individuals who lead the insurgent groups in Afghanistan. Geopolitical realities prevent the coalition from undertaking operations in Pakistan of sufficient magnitude to stop this flow of insurgents. Nor is it possible to stop these insurgents at the transit zone, the 2,430-kilometer Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The only practical solution for success at this point in the campaign is to turn Afghanistan itself into a hostile arrival zone for insurgents.

The preceding argument is not an attempt to apply Manichean absolutes to complex problems. Clearly, a layered security approach that addresses the challenges within Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan itself, is required to meet strategic objectives. Likewise, the Afghan government and ANSF must have the defining role in security and must obtain legitimacy within its own constituency. However, given the strategic timelines playing out and the magnitude of the challenges, population-mobilization strategies that augment and do not compete with ANSF are not only legitimate, but imperative. By failing to mobilize the population, we have elevated the importance of the Pakistan sanctuaries and the border regions—two areas where we are least capable of affecting outcomes.

The fundamental resource for transforming Afghanistan into an environment hostile to the insurgency is its population. Without this resource, ANSF and the Afghan government stand little chance of succeeding, especially in the face of transition demands. However, the population is not a homogeneous entity that conforms well to cookie-cutter solutions and top-down approaches. Perhaps the most universal and most powerful characteristic of Afghan society is its proud and independent character. At the most fundamental level, Afghan tribal society (especially those tribes that aid and abet

it is shameful for a man to be denied a role in protecting his own family, clan, or tribe

the Taliban) is governed by a shame- and honor-based value system (Pashtunwali). In such a society, it is shameful for a man to be denied a role in protecting his own family, clan, or tribe. All

of the good works of governance and development will come to naught if population-centric COIN strategies do not take this simple fact into account. General Sir Frank Kitson's thoughts on this idea are instructive:

I was gradually arriving at the conclusion that I have found to hold good in various different places. Briefly it is that three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man shift his allegiance. First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in something unpleasant happening to him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to his friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action. Some people consider that the carrot and the stick is all that is necessary, but I am sure that many people will refuse the one and face the other if by doing otherwise they lose their self-respect.

Providing security feeds an honor narrative and taps into the deep cultural DNA of Afghans. More fundamentally, VSO/ALP feeds a strategic narrative of Afghans helping Afghans. Concerns over the factionalism of Afghan tribal society are legitimate, but denying tribal members a role in securing their own families and villages, especially when qualitative and quantitative ANSF deficiencies leave them vulnerable to predation and mobilization by the Taliban, is tantamount to declaring them a greater threat to themselves than is the Taliban. It also reenforces a foreign occupation narrative.

The added benefit of an effective population-mobilization strategy directly bolsters the success of U.S. forces as well. As COIN lessons in Iraq

and elsewhere have demonstrated, beneficial second- and third-order effects emerge once local populations have embraced the view that U.S. forces do not represent an "occupation," but rather exist to facilitate good governance, development, and social stability, and to protect against Taliban oppression. These benefits include increased information on malign actors, increased security, and real sustainable progress on developmental projects with community buy-in. Sustained progress within these programs at local levels is essential to achieve stated objectives that cross Afghan, inter-agency, and coalition lines of effort, thus realizing common goals that allow legitimacy and governance to grow and function at district, provincial, and national levels.

How VSO/ALP Works

Previously, the analogy of an argument was used to describe the conflict between the Afghan government/coalition and the Taliban, with the population waiting to pick a side. VSO/ALP turns this dynamic on its head by engaging in a dialectic with the population instead of perpetuating a violent argument with the Taliban. VSO/ALP blends formal and informal forms of governance into a cohesive, trust-building, dynamic approach. Because population mobilization requires a coalescing element, VSO places renewed emphasis on identifying the root causes of *stability* instead of the root causes of *instability*. Every village is ordered by some coalescing element. In some villages, it is a key personality, elder, mullah, merchant, or strongman. In other villages, it is a collaborative body such as a shura. The point is that no village exists in utter entropy with no leadership structure, however informal—and where there is order of any kind there is opportunity. Instead of asking "What isn't working here?" VSO asks "What is working here?" and seeks to amplify and support it. Using skill

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sets honed via specialized training and adapted for Afghanistan, U.S. SOF stimulate, amplify, and support these sources of stability. Eventually, living in the village day and night, these VSO special forces create, nurture, and assist successful conditions along three lines of operations: security, governance, and development.

VSO progresses in four stages—shape, hold, build, and transition. During the shaping phase, the SOF team gathers information on the human terrain, opens dialogue with local leaders, and conducts kinetic operations against insurgent forces. In this phase, the crucial situational awareness of inter- and intra-tribal dynamics is developed, and those structures and individuals that contribute to stability—the things that are working—are identified for reinforcement and maturation into the sustainable foundations of security. In the hold phase, the SOF team is granted access to the village structure or invited to live within it. In this phase, the team organizes an ALP unit while continuing to conduct population security operations and begins governance and development activities. It is during the build phase that the governance and development activities of VSO come to the fore, with the overarching objective of connecting villages to the district government and, just as importantly, the district government to the villages. In a sense, the government auditions for the village, and the village auditions for the government. After these phases have been completed in a village, the SOF team transitions its responsibilities to the ALP and moves on to a neighboring village, which by this time may be eager to participate. After a period of between 2 and 5 years, the ALP element will either be merged into the Afghan National Police or disbanded, or its “contract” may be renewed as conditions dictate.

CFSOCC–A has incorporated ALP into what it terms the Village Stability Platform (VSP), which consists of the ALP and its SOF partners

and engages in VSOs, which are COIN operations to provide security, governance, and development. Most, but not all, VSO sites have ALP units. As of July 22, 2011, there were 43 validated ALP sites, with a total of 6,849 ALP members. Communities

in the hold phase, the SOF team is granted access to the village structure or invited to live within it

petition the government to participate in the program, and the government selects those that it believes have the will and capability to make the program succeed. Local shuras nominate commanders and ALP members, who are vetted by NDS, SOF, and village elders and trained and equipped by the Ministry of Interior.

Each VSO site has a small SOF detachment from the U.S. Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations Command, or Navy SEALs. The ISAF commander has attached two conventional U.S. Army battalions to CFSOCC–A to provide additional manpower for the program. These Soldiers augment the SOF teams, allowing the latter to be split into multiple parts that can cover different sites.

Transition and VSO/ALP

The campaign in Afghanistan is entering a process of transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan government. The 2011 to 2014 timeframe, while subject to varying definitions, sets clear goals for transferring lead security responsibilities. The ability of the government and ANSF to control transitioned districts and provinces will be infinitely easier with a mobilized population instead of a populace still sitting on the fence watching to see who will win. While the Awakening in Iraq is not a perfect analogy, there

are some undeniable similarities. The Iraqi population mobilized (often at the local level), identified its enemy, became a party to the conflict, collaborated with the coalition and the Iraqi government, and set the conditions for an orderly transition of security responsibilities. These measures or actions are similar to the objectives of the Afghan security transition process.

However, one of the primary lessons from security transition efforts in Iraq to date is that the first casualty of coalition forces engaging in transition is often situational awareness. As

initially, SOICs will more likely be consumers of VSCC information and intelligence than providers

coalition forces scaled back local operations in Iraq, contact with the population was drastically reduced and a concomitant reduction in situational awareness resulted. As the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal (Transition) Board considers provinces and districts for transition, it will be reliant on district stability reporting. Accurate district stability reporting is in turn reliant on timely and reliable local information. Quantitative assessment processes that depend on objective criteria expressed in measures of effectiveness and measures of progress will have an important role in the transition. However, more subjective or qualitative reporting, the type based on a first-hand understanding of an operating area (the kind that can only be obtained by living with the population) will be more valuable in most cases. If transition requires situational awareness, and situational awareness requires intimate local knowledge, then the value of VSO/ALP is heightened, not reduced, by sound and effective transition plans and activities.

Fortunately, there are considerable opportunities to integrate VSO/ALP activities and reporting into overall stabilization and development planning. Village or local level information can and should be passed via the Village Stability Coordination Centers (VSCCs) to the regional Stability Operations Information Centers (SOICs) to create a mutually reinforcing information architecture that, with appropriate manning and focus, can establish situational awareness networks and enterprises that can thrive in and through the transition. By combining the nontraditional information sources, which SOICs should be focused on, with the bottom-up tactile information that VSO/ALP can provide, the challenges of maintaining situational awareness during security transitions can be largely overcome. The key is to undertake the planning steps and resource investments now so when the traditional “INTs” of military intelligence (such as human intelligence—HUMINT—and signals intelligence—SIGINT) begin to thin as a result of security transition activities, nontraditional and local informational/intelligence capabilities can more than make up for the reductions.

SOICs and VSO/ALP

As Major General Michael Flynn, USAF, and others suggest in *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*,² information about nontraditional intelligence subjects such as local environments, key influencers, grievances, demographics, loyalties, and so forth are as important to VSO, or COIN, as geospatial intelligence is to kinetic targeting. Yet the organizational framework and architectures for this support are still immature. Commensurate training, guidance, and lessons learned are still insufficient, and until adequately trained and experienced personnel are providing effective support and reporting key details affecting local populations, intelligence

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Resident of Now Bahar District voices concerns during Afghan Local Police validation shura

DOD (Brian Ferguson)



support to VSO will not be optimal. In fact, initially, SOICs will more likely be consumers of VSCC information and intelligence than providers. This highlights the imperative to tie the VSCCs into a broader information/intelligence architecture. Eventually and appropriately, the lines will blur regarding who is the supported or supporting entity—the SOIC or VSCC. Serious consideration should be given to those information-sharing mechanisms, especially the exchange of liaison officers who can expeditiously and effectively push and pull relevant population-centric information across the VSO/ALP enterprise. Lastly, by properly nesting VSCCs and SOICs, VSCCs will have broad access to interagency personnel, and interagency personnel will have access to detailed local knowledge.

Challenges

The defining characteristic of VSO/ALP operations is their distributed nature. Operating from austere locations beyond the mutual support of adjacent units and reliant on hyper-extended lines of communication and support, VSO inserts American SOF into new environments with unfamiliar geographical and human terrain, against insurgents who are intimately familiar with both. The force protection and mission accomplishment challenges of VSO/ALP operations are therefore considerable; they span the domains both of warfighting functions and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations. The solution to existing problems clearly is *not* to add more SOF personnel to each VSO site. First, there are not enough SOF personnel available. Second, the majority of the challenges to VSO/ALP require a mixture of qualitative, not just quantitative, materiel and nonmateriel solutions. The key is to significantly enable

VSO and eventually ALP members so they have access to and represent much more powerful networks, accelerate learning, aid in rapid informed decisionmaking, and ensure that the geographic isolation of VSO sites does not translate into unacceptable mission and force protection risks.

The number of Americans assigned to a VSO site usually ranges from 10 to 20, and initially the team has no one to rely on for help except itself. The insurgents may have several times that number in the area, and they usually have established networks of supporters among the civilian population who provide them with food, shelter, and information. It is therefore imperative that the SOF team rapidly develops its rapport with the population and obtains the cooperation of some of its members. This requires intelligent and informed interaction with the local population. Team members must meet regularly with elites to gain influence with them. These Key Leader Engagements are essential to population mobilization efforts at all levels. They must organize development projects to gain the community's support. They must communicate with the population to identify its needs, collect information, and relay messages. Under these circumstances, the sine qua non of successful VSO/ALP is situational awareness.

Identifying the right villagers, groups, and individuals for inclusion in ALP is important and difficult. Afghanistan is divided into numerous competing factions, so the creation of ALP with one group is liable to engender enough resentment in a neighboring group to drive it into the insurgency. One focus of VSO personnel is working with the local shura, which is the body of villagers that selects ALP members. But often the shura system is broken or dominated by one faction. To create viable Afghan Local Police, VSO personnel must be able to identify the major local players and rivalries and untangle any

interpersonal intrigues. They may need to bring elders back from the cities, or assist in negotiations between factions. Additionally, while VSO strives to link village populations to district-level administration, in many cases that administration may be utterly ineffective or corrupt, calling into question the utility of creating the linkages. VSO personnel need to know how to handle bad actors within the government. When they cannot achieve the removal or marginalization of such individuals, they need to look for ways for villages to run their affairs without extensive involvement from the districts.

Unfortunately, U.S. SOF by themselves do not have sufficient personnel to conduct VSO on a scale that is likely to influence the overall campaign decisively. Splitting the teams up further is unlikely to be productive because the teams are already small and have few people with certain key specializations, particularly intelligence; and the VSCCs will require additional capacity. Therefore, forces outside of SOF are being incorporated into VSO to meet the ISAF commander's growth targets. Some General Purpose Forces (GPF) have been assigned to the SOF teams at VSO sites and placed under the control of the detachment commander. In some instances, GPF are being used to hold a site after SOF have formed the ALP and removed most of the insurgents. Adequate preparation and command and control of the U.S. forces assigned to VSO demands great attention and care. As VSO matures, there may develop a scalable menu of options from the current exclusively SOF teams and SOF-GPF hybrids, to GPF-led/SOF-enabled teams and exclusively GPF teams. Selection of the preferred model may depend on the complexity of the operating environment (including threat and tribal dynamics), the maturity of the operating environment

(especially previous and current experience with coalition and ANSF forces), and the risk tolerance of the Afghan government and ISAF as 2014 transition goals approach. Regardless of the model, most of the challenges are likely to remain the same or similar.

Additionally, through involvement in governance and development, VSO is intervening in matters that previously have been in the domain of the U.S. State Department, the Afghan government, and other coalition organizations, mainly because of security conditions and in some cases a lack of civilian personnel. However, the shortage of civilian personnel in the districts, and the ability for SOF to achieve access to local villages, creates an unavoidable necessity for military involvement in governance and development. SOF have Civil Affairs specialists who possess expertise in governance and development, but there are too few to provide support at all VSO sites. Traditionally, Civil Affairs has been a minor supporting element of any U.S. military approach, with a consequent dearth of funding. As the now “supported element,” the development and Civil Affairs funding sources need to be brought into line with operational priorities. Similarly, governance and development issues are not a core competency of most U.S. personnel who will participate in the VSO mission. Developing effective education, training, and tools that empower small teams to acquire and improve competence in these areas prior to, as well as during, deployment are critical factors in achieving the desired paradigm change and subsequent stabilization effects.

Solutions

Clearly the challenges to conducting distributed VSO/ALP operations are significant, but they are by no means insurmountable. A DOTMLPF framework illustrates some of the solutions and can be used to inform the way ahead.

Doctrine. Unconventional warfare and Foreign Internal Defense doctrine was clearly in the minds of the Special Forces personnel who conceptualized the current VSO program. Additionally, a vast body of contemporary experience in Afghanistan informed those

VSO is intervening in matters that previously have been in the domain of the U.S. State Department, the Afghan government, and other coalition organizations

early efforts. However, for VSO/ALP to grow at the pace that the ISAF commander desires, the unique factors influencing population mobilization efforts in Afghanistan in general and in the myriad of idiosyncratic factors at the local level that influence current and potential VSO sites must be systematically captured and analyzed with the results disseminated and incorporated into training. While doctrine, as an enduring body of work, appropriately moves in deliberate fashion, it should not remain uninformed by contemporary events. Deliberate efforts should be undertaken to ensure that written, oral, and video histories, best practices, and operational lessons learned from VSO/ALP operations are made available not only to current but also to future doctrine writers. The richer the story from which it is derived, the more precise, flexible, and useable future doctrine will be.

Organizations. The organizational structure of the supported and supporting VSO/ALP organizations must be tailor-made for the operational environments in which they operate and provide support. Not only should specific local challenges such as corruption, narcotics, border issues, or displaced persons be recognized in the organic organization and/or reach back assets of the VSO/

ALP units, but the operational phase (shape, hold, build, or transition) should also influence organizational design. No two VSO/ALP teams will be identical. Mission analysis and the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations should drive team composition. As U.S. Special Operations Command is already stretched

years of kinetic operations and other nonpopulation-centric tasks have left SOF with uneven population mobilization skills

to the limit, contract subject matter expert support will prove invaluable in the near term.

Because VSO/ALP teams are only as capable as the networks that support them, considerable attention should be devoted to the processes, organization, and capability of the Village Stability Coordination Center that supports and synchronizes VSO/ALP efforts. Best practices from Company Level Intelligence Cells, Civil Affairs teams, Economic and Political Intelligence Cells, SOICs, and other niche organizations should be harvested to inform VSCC training and other preparatory efforts.

Technology should be aggressively leveraged to flatten and network VSO/ALP organizations. Real time experiences from geographically separated teams and centers can, and should, be disseminated freely, especially in the early stages of setting up VSO sites, before there is a large body of experience. Experiences shared through technological means will help to rapidly mature and refine VSO operations. Video capture and 3G capabilities will be central to organizational maturity and vicarious learning and critical to the rate of partner force (ALP) growth and development.

Training. Years of kinetic operations and other nonpopulation-centric tasks have left SOF with uneven population mobilization skills. Initial training, doctrine, and oral traditions of SOF will not be enough to transform the force. Concerted and focused training in population mobilization techniques must be undertaken. As discussed, situational awareness is both the fundamental and foundational skill set that must be developed. Advanced situational awareness training in the form of Human Behavior Pattern Recognition and Analysis is the most important VSO/ALP skill in which SOF personnel have not previously received extensive training. VSO/ALP also demands increased emphasis on human intelligence techniques, tactical questioning, site exploitation, and language and negotiation skills. If the past is prologue and the integration of GPF into VSO/ALP operations continues, SOF-GPF integration will increase dramatically both at the VSO site level and in terms of larger battlespace management issues. There should be a VSO/ALP-specific predeployment training program for GPF forces slated to participate in VSO/ALP.

Materiel. The distributed nature of VSO/ALP operations demands technologies that empower small organizations across warfighting functions. Accordingly, as mentioned previously, it is critical to apply technology solutions to the VSO mission that make qualitative differences, especially in communications and networking. The approach to technology should be considered in a phased or tiered approach. The following discussion is not a thorough examination of the materiel challenges attendant to VSO, but rather an illustration of how technologies available today can be fielded in short order and have a significant impact on VSO/ALP operations.

The distributed and disconnected nature of the VSO/ALP mission is ideal for the insertion

of mobile devices to enable information-sharing, automated dissemination, and virtualized training. Tailored applications will be critical to harness the power of mobile devices in support of VSP unique needs, and they should be customized for both Afghan and American use. For the typical Afghan user, an approach can be applied with a mostly graphical and video-based application framework, whereas the typical U.S. user's applications can be largely text and information-based.

With the geographic and disconnected nature of the VSO mission, a tiered approach can be applied to connecting the VSCC, VSO team, ALP, and the local population. There is likely no one communications solution that can address all needs at every VSO site. An infrastructure of 3G cellular, satellite communications (SATCOM), and even Wi-Fi can provide the swarm of Internet Protocol (IP)-based connectivity to enable an environment for mobile computing. The assumption is that the initial network deployments will be focused on an unclassified environment with no direct connections to secure networks. Communication technology deployment to the VSO should be considered in the context of severity of the need, technology readiness level, deployment timeline, and vulnerability assessment. Every device on the network should be alerted, located, managed, and controlled to a level that provides options for force protection, situational awareness, remote device control (that is, perimeter security cameras), and communication.

With the deployment of an IP-based communications infrastructure, mobile devices, and IP-enabled hardware comes the challenge of power. At the device level, relatively inexpensive solar solutions should be considered. The consideration for each site may be different based on the geographic location and power resupply options. For example, one site may be able to sustain a full 3G architecture, while another may

only be able to blanket the area with solar power Wi-Fi solutions tied to a SATCOM for sporadic backhaul connectivity. These kinds of factors should be assessed when determining the best technology support to each VSO location.

Leadership and Education. VSO/ALP operations are too complex to rely on discovery learning. Leaders across the force should be engaged on the salient issues now. Career, intermediate-, and top-level schools across the Department of Defense should be focused on VSO/ALP as the imperative that it is. Additionally, the numerous centers of excellence and irregular warfare/COIN/stability organizations that have proliferated in recent years must be harnessed and focused. To that end, a VSO/ALP proponent/executive agent should be expeditiously identified at an appropriate level within the Defense Department and empowered to leverage those leadership and educational entities.

Personnel. VSO/ALP organizations will require expertise in numbers that traditional military personnel systems cannot support. Accordingly, creativity must be applied to assign personnel with the right skills at the right place at the right time. Appropriate Military Operation Specialties from across Services, interagency personnel, and contract personnel should all be used. In many cases, SOF leadership will be an absolute necessity, but the demands of the current operational environment may make it necessary to go without the full complement of SOF personnel in order to set up the required number of VSO/ALP elements.

VSO/ALP are also in need of full-time Female Engagement Team (FET) personnel who can obtain information from female Afghans and assist SOF and ALP with searches. In Afghanistan, the female half of the population is prohibited by custom from speaking with American males, so FETs are the only means

by which our forces can interact with that half. Because some Afghan men have proven more comfortable speaking with American females than with American males, FETs have also served as intermediaries between community leaders and coalition forces.

The development of FET training is in its infancy, and FET-specific doctrine is nonexistent. A robust training regimen must be created if the FETs are to realize their full potential. Courses in tactical questioning, human terrain analysis, cultural understanding, and advanced situational awareness are essential. Much of the existing U.S. COIN doctrine applies to FETs, but separate doctrine must be created that builds on the strengths, and recognizes the limitations, of FETs. Establishment of a permanent FET organization will also give U.S. SOF a capability that can be deployed to other areas of the world.

Facilities. SOF, GPF, and other interagency or contracted personnel need a joint training and education center based in the United States where SOF, supported by contract subject matter experts, can help prepare non-SOF personnel for the VSO/ALP mission. Additional predeployment training and education can be provided virtually through videos and distance learning tools. However, prior to deployment, all VSO personnel slated to work together—SOF, GPF, interagency, and contracted—should participate in a multiday exercise at a simulated Afghan village, preferably at a U.S.-based VSO training facility. If robust scenarios are created and Afghan role players are properly prepared, these exercises will give VSO/ALP trainees the best possible preparation for the environment they are about to enter.

Conclusion

Time is running out in Afghanistan. We no longer have the luxury of keeping the population on the sidelines of this conflict. Population mobilization can no longer be tactics, techniques, and procedures episodically applied in Afghanistan. It has become a campaign imperative. Unlike previous bottom-up COIN efforts, Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police currently enjoy the political support of both the Afghan government and ISAF. But that support is tenuous, and near-term results will almost certainly determine future support. We cannot squander this opportunity: We must expeditiously resource and support VSO/ALP with a concerted effort across the DOTMLPF domains. This effort should include both materiel solutions tailored for utility to individual teams in unique environments and nonmateriel solutions that allow effective grassroots success in achieving security, development, and governance. Parsimonious or disjointed implementation of VSO/ALP programs may threaten the prospects for any further bottom-up approaches. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Previous efforts at population mobilization in Afghanistan notwithstanding, Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police is the first large-scale population mobilization effort attempted with the support of both the Afghan government and the coalition. These programs are also unique as they are being executed within a security transition framework.

² Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), available at <www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf>.

State-building

Job Creation, Investment Promotion, and the Provision of Basic Services

BY PAUL COLLIER

Rigorous research on state-building is still in its infancy. In this article, I take three issues that are important and distinctive to state-building situations and discuss what research can potentially contribute. The issues are by no means exhaustive; they are merely a sample of what needs to be a more comprehensive engagement between scholars and practitioners. There is unfortunately a wide gap between what practitioners need to know and what research can currently show with reasonable confidence. There is a further wide gap between what is known and what is likely to be feasible for researchers in the next few years. At least practitioners should be aware of where they must make decisions unsupported by solid evidence; more ambitiously, they can encourage research into those issues that are both feasible and significant.

Low per capita income is now avoidable if governments adopt policies that are conducive to private economic activity and employment generation. While superficially all governments want growth, some do not translate this into day-to-day practical decisions. Thus, a minority of low-income developing countries lack functional economic policies and state capacity to facilitate economic growth, stability, and peace. The populations of these countries are among the neediest on Earth, and meeting their needs requires approaches that work swiftly. Given the current limitations of state performance, the solutions need to focus on host government reform policies and alternatives for delivering basic services, rather than depending on building state capacity that can only work in the long term. The three important and distinctive issues for building state capacity and encouraging policy priorities that are beneficial for economic growth and stability are establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment

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that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government.

Governments are not homogenous entities; it is the reformers in low-income developing countries who are most likely to advocate for practical policies to promote economic growth. What donor actions and incentives would make it more likely for local reformers to win their struggles for economic growth?

historically, the most common motivation for governments to adopt growth-conducive policies was the need for tax revenue

Policy decisions that are conducive to private economic investment activity and employment generation are most likely to raise postconflict and other low-income countries out of poverty. The emphasis here is upon those policies that are distinctive to postconflict conditions and the early stages of recovery from prolonged poverty and stagnation. I focus on policies that might speed the recovery of private investment; on which sectors are likely to have the best opportunities for early growth and the impediments that could be eased by policy reform; and by the benefits and strategies for employment generation. In each case, the question is, given what we know (at varying degrees of confidence), what important policy choices might be informed by feasible further research?

Government capacity enables the delivery of basic social services by the host government, and likewise such delivery of goods and services enhances the perception of government capacity. In what follows, I discuss how the delivery of basic social services could be improved in the

conditions typical of these difficult postconflict and economically stagnant environments.

Incentives to Promote Private Economy

While practitioners tend to emphasize the need to build capacity, economists focus more on the need to align incentives. A persistent lack of capacity is seen as evidence that the incentives to acquire the capacity are too weak. Along these lines, one likely explanation for the persistence of low income is that the government lacks the incentive to promote growth. Historically, the most common motivation for governments to adopt growth-conducive policies was the need for tax revenue. Other motivations may also be important and applicable in the fragile state context.

Promoting Revenue-motivated Growth.

Growth generates government revenue conditional upon an effective tax system. Hence, an important current hypothesis in political economy is that government investment in the machinery of effective taxation is a precondition for development, not so much because of what tax revenues buy as because they induce the government to provide a legal system.¹ Some governments have chosen not to build an effective tax system, and hence, on the above hypothesis, they lack the incentive to provide the rule of law, which in turn promotes economic growth. If the government is not capturing any of this growth, it has no interest in promoting it. Presumably the reluctance to build effective tax systems originates from either the costs of building these systems being atypically high, or the benefits being atypically low.

Revenue-motivated growth could indirectly be promoted by donors if they were able to address these impediments. Costs might be atypically high in some states because of the lack of

skilled personnel or because norms of corruption have become so entrenched that taxation merely generates income for tax collectors rather than the state. Clearly, the costs of tax collection vary among states. The degree to which the economy is monetized, the degree to which transactions involve third parties or generate written records, and the proportion of transactions flowing through chokepoints such as ports are all observable. Furthermore, in something approaching a natural experiment, in some countries the International Monetary Fund encouraged governments to take revenue-raising away from the civil service and give it to Independent Revenue Authorities (IRAs), which selectively rehired staff and paid higher wages in return for monitored performance. There may be scope for research on whether variations in the costs of tax revenue, both among countries and over time (including quasi-exogenous institutional innovations such as the IRAs), explain the emergence of the rule of law and subsequent economic development. Such research might provide some guide as to the importance of the ability to raise taxes for state development.

The benefits of building a tax system might be atypically low for several reasons. Building state capacity is an investment, and so one possible explanation for a lack of investment would be if some governments had atypically short time horizons. However, despite the prevalence of coups and rebellions, the incumbents of many dysfunctional states have enjoyed long tenure, so this explanation seems unlikely, at least superficially. It is potentially testable because our knowledge of the risks faced by incumbents has now advanced to the point at which expected tenure could be modeled.

A second possible explanation as to why the benefits of a tax system might be atypically low is if there are alternative sources of revenue. The most prominent alternative sources are aid

and resource rents. Since both are important in dysfunctional states, this explanation has some plausibility. It is clearly a testable proposition: states vary considerably in aid receipts and the approach of José Tavares is a reasonable way of tackling endogeneity.² Similarly, their natural resource revenues vary considerably over time, and the component due to world prices can reasonably be treated as exogenous.

If this model of state development and its impediments is right, then the implications for policy are potentially radical. Aid, especially in the form of budget support, and revenues from resource extraction, should both be curtailed in these environments. Aid could be confined to modalities that kept it out of government control, avoiding fungibility by being tied to expenditures that the government would not itself wish to provide (that is, the opposite of “country ownership”). Revenues from natural resource extraction could be curtailed either by the Chinese model of selling extraction rights directly for infrastructure rather than for revenue, or by the radical option of discouraging resource extraction itself (for example, by imposing international conditions on companies that made these environments unviable).

A third possible explanation for atypically low benefits from investing in tax capacity is that the economy is currently so small and

economies have to grow to a certain size and formality before government investment in a tax system is a paying proposition

informal that the investment would not pay off until the distant future. In other words, economies have to grow to a certain size and formality



before government investment in a tax system is a paying proposition. For example, the much slower rate of state formation in post-Roman Britain than in post-Roman continental Europe is sometimes attributed to the exceptional and total collapse of the post-Roman economy in Britain so that there was no basis for revenue.³

The policy implications of this explanation are radically different. Leading with tax effort might even be detrimental. If the formal economy is only a small proportion of the overall economy, even a modest ratio of tax/gross domestic product may have significant disincentive effects. Furthermore, if reported profits cannot be trusted, de facto tax collection may depend on observable signs of profitability of which the most obvious is investment. In contrast, aid and revenues from resource extraction may be benign, financing the initial development of the economy to the critical level at which the government chooses to invest in tax capacity.

A fourth explanation for atypically low benefits from tax revenue is if the governing elite would not benefit significantly from public spending. If, for example, the core interest of the elite is for private goods rather than public goods, public policy might be most effective if it generates direct opportunities for elite rents, rather than raising revenues that are then appropriated by the elite. Historically, the counter to this argument has been that elites benefit from public spending on property rights and defense since this maintains their own power. However, leaders may gain patronage from the insecurity of property rights, and if the main threat to the regime is from coups and rebellions rather than from international invasion, then high military spending may have ambiguous effects on elite security. Famously, Mobutu Sese Seko chose not to spend on his army. Other than security, the elite may indeed

perceive little benefit from public goods: poorly motivated public employees may be unable to provide services at a quality that satisfies elite tastes, and donors may insist on a composition of public spending that favors low income groups.

If this explanation is correct, the policy implication may be that the international community either should decisively override elite interests or acquiesce to them. Power-sharing structures, such as the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program in Liberia and the Interim Commission in Haiti, by limiting the ability of elites to frustrate development, may enable the economy to develop to the level at which interests change. But the other extreme, in which donors give governments the freedom to serve elite interests unashamedly, might also work by aligning elite interests with growth. The conventional donor conditionality discouraging defense spending and encouraging expenditures on primary education and primary health care could therefore inadvertently be detrimental. It leaves elites in control of taxation but prevents them from benefiting from revenues.

Nonrevenue Motivations for Growth.

Although the desire for revenue is one obvious reason why governments might want to promote private economic activity, there are others. One alternative to revenue motivation is if governments become accountable to well-informed citizens. Faced by such accountability, governments that wish to survive have no choice but to focus on developing the economy. A potential advantage of accountability as a way of motivating government is that it provides a more generalized influence on the composition of public spending than just efficacy for growth. Thus, a revenue-motivated government would indeed choose to invest in the rule of law. By contrast, an

accountability-disciplined government would also spend on public goods that enhance general well-being but are not cost-effective investments from the perspective of elite interests, such as health care and education.

Historically, accountability to citizens followed, rather than preceded, economic development. However, now that the accountability of government to citizens is normative, it may be possible to use international pressure to reverse the historical sequence. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been just such an attempt targeted on the governments of low-income countries. Although to date, this attempt has largely been unsuccessful, it may have failed because of the particular strategies adopted by the international donor community (such as the priority given to elections over institutions). In this case, the appropriate international policy would be to revise and reenergize efforts for accountability, perhaps by harnessing new technologies to inform citizens.

Another way to motivate government is nationalism. Arguably, the governing Chinese elite are concerned neither to maximize state revenues nor to serve the preferences of ordinary citizens, but rather to build a country that is strong and respected. Not only does nationalism provide an inducement to effective government by motivating ordinary public sector employees—both tax collectors and service providers—but it also lowers the costs and raises the benefits of taxation. On this account of state capacity, the key policy is building a shared sense of identity. Historically, identity has usually grown out of international conflict, making the testing of revenue-driven motivation versus identity-driven motivation difficult. However, Edward Miguel argues that identity can be built by less costly policies.⁴

Implications for a Research Agenda. The state has a critical role in promoting private economic activity through providing the rule of law, such as establishing a legal system that protects contracts and property rights. Hence, to explain failures in the rule of law and the provision of other public goods, a reasonable starting point is that the government lacks sufficient interest in economic growth to provide these public goods. I have sketched several possible reasons why a government might lack such an

the state has a critical role in promoting private economic activity through providing the rule of law

interest. Unfortunately, the policy implications of these different explanations are radically different, yet we do not currently know which is correct, whether generally or conditional upon context. The historical evidence from the development of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development states points to the stimulus as being the need for revenue to counter international security threats. However, this fact is perhaps of only limited relevance because of the major changes in the international environment and the distinct modern circumstances of low-income developing states.

One approach to adjudicating among the various explanations would be to take as the pertinent population all the states that at time X were low income and lacked the rule of law. Time X should be well after independence so domestic political forces have had time to reshape their colonial inheritance, but sufficiently distant from the present that several of these societies have subsequently built the rule of law (and related public goods). Research could then investigate

the sequences best suited to building the rule of law in contemporary conditions.

How to Promote the Economy

I now turn from the issue of motivation of government to the economic policies—beyond building the rule of law—that a government might take to promote an economy starting from poverty and stagnation. Such economic conditions are commonly the legacy of internal conflict. These economies are distinctive in being capital-scarce, in the structure of opportunities, and in great need of employment generation.

Investment. Poverty, stagnation, and conflict leave a distinctive economic legacy. Investment in both physical and human capital will have been below replacement rates. The counterparts of underinvestment are accumulated unexploited opportunities for investment, and accumulated offshore assets in the form of flight capital and a diaspora. Private investment faces atypically severe impediments of risk, infrastructure, and regulation. Applied research can quantify these impediments and the practical scope for addressing them.

Risk. As to risks, Jakob Svensson shows that the decision to exploit opportunities for investment in a low-income postconflict society depends upon the “bad news principle”: the critical impediments to investment are the severe downside risks. These risks are largely concerned with fears of government actions. Both donors and governments can do something about them. The most obvious donor policy would be political risk insurance that covered worst case scenarios. Governments can potentially address investor fears either by adopting commitment technologies or by other actions that reveal the economy to be investor-friendly. There is scope for both policy experiments and

analytic and empirical research. Analytically, governments often do not understand the bad news principle, the rationale for commitment technologies, or that an effective signal is an action too costly to be imitated by a government that is not genuinely investor-friendly. Empirically, there is good data both on foreign direct investment and on perceived investor risks. Hence, it should be possible to quantify how sensitive private investment is to specific risk-reducing actions.

Infrastructure. There has been little quantitative work on the returns to infrastructure in the poorest societies. However, it is now becoming researchable. For example, a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) database⁵ provides time series estimates of the public capital stock for many countries up to 2003, and the World Bank is in the process of generating further data. The IMF study also estimates the return on public capital. These are the necessary building blocks for estimating the legacy of underinvestment. While such estimates could not be definitive, they would be a considerable improvement on the wish lists drawn up for the typical postconflict donor-pledging conference.

Regulation. On regulatory policies for investors, the World Bank's *Doing Business* surveys now provide an objective and comparable measure. Potentially, such data sources could be used to compare the payoff to risk reduction, infrastructure, and regulatory reform as means of attracting private investment.

Capital Repatriation. Foreign investors typically start from considerable ignorance about low-income postconflict societies because there has been little point in acquiring information. The best informed, and therefore the earliest investors, are likely to be among the diaspora and the owners of flight capital. They constitute major opportunities for the poorest societies as

often most of their capital and skills are abroad. The scope for reversing flight has been little studied, but it appears to be a function of the standard variables of expected returns and perceived risks.⁶ Data on capital flight remain poor, but can be inferred indirectly through several standard approaches.

Diaspora Return. The scope for the return of the diaspora is both ripe for policy experiments and a researchable process. Stocks of emigrants return at different rates to different low-income (and postconflict) societies from the same country of emigration. This is now readily observable from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development census data.

Sector-specific Issues. In a low-income economy with a legacy of poor infrastructure and regulation and high perceived risk, the tradable sector is likely to be uncompetitive.

the most important private investment that postconflict countries are likely to attract is for resource extraction

The sole exception will be where there are location-specific rents as with resource extraction. Other than in resource extraction, most business opportunities therefore are likely to be in the internationally nontraded sector. Within the nontraded sector, the key subsector is likely to be construction because it supplies the nontradable capital goods—the structures—that complement investment in equipment.

Natural Resources. By far the most important private investment that postconflict countries are likely to attract is for resource extraction. Resource extraction does not usually generate many jobs, but it does generate rents

that can be appropriated by government. The potential sums involved are enormous relative to all other aspects of the economy. Afghanistan is now estimated to have \$1 trillion in unexploited subsoil assets. More generally, in low-income countries, discovered subsoil assets are only around one-fifth per square mile that of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Resource extraction is the last frontier for discovery.

Managing the discovery and extraction process faces particular problems of agency, asymmetric information, and time inconsistency. Failure to address these problems can lead both to under-exploitation (hence the low incidence of discovery to date) and to low rates of revenue-capture for government. These issues have not been adequately investigated using analytic and quantitative techniques in

the construction sector is at the heart of postconflict recovery

the context of the poorest countries. One of the few such studies illustrates why common sense is unlikely to be sufficient.⁷ Massimo Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara analyze the impact of peace in Angola on the valuation of foreign private investment in diamond extraction. Contrary to expectation, they find that peace *reduced* the value of these investments.⁸ A possible explanation is that peace improved the bargaining power of the Angolan government and so reduced the commercial value of extraction rights. Many resource extraction companies are publicly quoted and have market valuations and are required to release information about their activities. There are also new databases on contracts and revenue payments being generated through transparency initiatives, notably the

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, so it should be possible to estimate the payoff to enhanced transparency.

The astounding payoff to research on auction theory that netted the British government £20 billion from selling 3G mobile phone rights illustrates the potential profitability of managing resource extraction. At one end of the spectrum, the government of Iraq recently auctioned management contracts for the extraction of oil from existing wells, getting a highly advantageous deal in which the government retains all the oil and pays reputable oil companies a modest service fee per barrel extracted. At the other end of the spectrum, many postconflict governments sell the rights to resource extraction through opaquely negotiated deals with obscure companies that acquire option rights to resources that they need not exploit for many years. There is considerable observable international variation in the rate of rent capture and in investment rates. Some of this variation occurs because differences in objective conditions, such as geology, affect optimal choices. However, much of the variation occurs probably because some governments make major mistakes or cannot overcome their internal problems of agency.

The Natural Resource Charter sets out guidelines on international standards for the management of resource-driven development, and also links the standards to an international process of research so new knowledge feeds back into improved policy advice. It is a useful model for more comprehensive research-informed policies for fragile states.

Construction. The construction sector is at the heart of postconflict recovery. It supplies the nontraded capital goods, mostly purchased by the public sector—such as roads, power plants, and ports—that are fundamental to modern

economic activity. The inherited stock is likely to be grossly inadequate.

Because investment typically will have been low for many years, the construction sector will have withered away so that a quantum increase in demand, such as is typical of postconflict and policy reform situations, collides with limited supply. The elasticity of supply in the construction sector thus determines whether the sector becomes a bottleneck. Potentially, public policy can flatten the supply curve at several points in the production cycle of a structure: the availability of land can be impeded by unclear legal rights; the availability of key inputs such as cement can be impeded by trade restrictions or transport bottlenecks; the market structure of the construction sector can be insufficiently competitive because of government procurement practices that exclude new entrants; and key construction skills can be scarce because of market failure in training.

There is seemingly no quantitative study of the construction sector in postconflict and recovery situations, or any special attention paid to it in policy discussions. No international data set exists, so data would need to be gathered through field work.

Employment. Should employment generation be an objective in postconflict societies, and if so, how should it be achieved? While economists know plenty about employment generation in general, there is as yet no serious work on the distinctive issues raised by employment generation in postconflict situations. If employment of young men reduces conflict risk, employers confer an externality on society. Analytically, the shadow wage is below the actual wage and may even be negative. An old tradition in development economics urged the use of shadow wages in development planning. The key critique of that tradition was that

rather than offset market distortions (wages being set above market levels), it was preferable to break rigidities in the labor market. However, postconflict wage distortion is not due to rigidities in the labor market, but rather a potentially very large externality.

Does It Affect the Risk of Conflict? There is now reasonable statistical evidence that both the level of income and its growth rate reduce the risk of civil war.⁹ The application to the specific context of the postconflict environment poses more acute statistical problems, but

the market structure of the construction sector can be insufficiently competitive because of government procurement practices that exclude new entrants

such analysis as has been feasible finds the same associations.¹⁰ Given the inherent plausibility of the hypothesis, and the robust evidence for it in the more general context of proneness to civil war, it seems reasonable to assume that the same relationships hold in the postconflict context, where risks of conflict are likely to be higher.

Turning from overall economic activity to employment, and in particular youth employment, there is less macrostatistical evidence of a direct link to the risk of conflict. Some studies find associations with the demographic structure of the population, with risk increased by the age group 15 to 24. While there are many other explanations for such an association, this is clearly the age group for rebel recruitment. Thus, it is a plausible supposition that societies are at risk primarily from their young males, analogous to the distinctive age and gender propensities to violent criminality apparent in virtually all societies. There is not, to my knowledge, any

macrostatistical evidence linking conflict risk to the employment opportunities for young males. There is, however, arresting new evidence from a survey of the motivations for recruitment to rebel groups undertaken for the *World Development Report*.¹¹ The report finds that a lack of employment opportunities is by far the most cited motivation for recruitment, and is much more important than any political grievances. The hypothesis is inherently plausible from the microtheoretical perspective of choices between activities: the choice among employment opportunities is

during the massive Russian civil war of 1919–1921, recruitment fell and desertion peaked during harvest time

more likely to be motivated by payments (in cash and kind) than by political objectives, the payoff of which is a highly uncertain public good in the distant future.

The Holy Grail of quantitative research would be to compare the efficacy of public resources spent on employment creation for young males against other strategies such as targeted policing. Ideally, this would come with an estimate of the rate at which the returns to each strategy diminish so they can be equated at the margin. Such precision is likely to be beyond the horizon of feasible research: decisionmakers will judge based on their best guess as to the likely magnitudes. A less demanding objective, which might just be feasible, is to show that resources spent on employment creation are cost-effective in the lesser sense of having a substantial payoff. Since the costs of conflict are known to be enormous, it follows that almost any effect of employment on conflict risk that

is statistically significant is likely to be economically significant. Furthermore, since the resources during the transition from conflict come predominantly from the international community and are probably highly endogenous to evidence of effectiveness, this lesser goal may be more pertinent than the notional ideal.

How might the efficacy of employment creation for the reduction of the risk of conflict reversion be estimated? Both explanatory and dependent variables are difficult to observe. As to the explanatory variable, although the labor force data for postconflict societies is pitiful, it should in principle be possible to generate crude estimates of youth employment from the pre-conflict employment structure of the economy and data on how the overall structure of the economy has changed as a result of conflict. Since large differences in employment opportunities among postconflict societies are likely, even crude estimates may be revealing.

The readily observable dependent variable is the reversion to conflict. But given that any causal connection from employment opportunities to conflict is likely to run through recruitment to rebel forces, a superior dependent variable would be changes in rebel recruitment in one or more postconflict (or even conflict) countries. It should sometimes be possible to infer changes in recruitment either from studies of the composition of a rebel army (for example, at the point at which it is disbanded), or from military estimates of its size made at different times. These changes in size may be statistically relatable to observed or inferred changes in employment. A variant on the above may be to relate observed or inferred changes in recruitment to observed changes in the opportunity cost of labor. For example, it is known that during the massive Russian civil war of 1919–1921, recruitment fell and desertion peaked during harvest time.



Likewise, in many conflict-prone societies such seasonal patterns and variations of weather and the causal connection with the opportunity cost of male labor of different age groups are clear enough.¹² On balance, the quantitative study of rebel recruitment offers more promising opportunities of convincing results than the macroapproach of observing employment and the reversion to civil war. However, such quantitative study depends upon opportune fieldwork, such as during rebel demobilizations.

Generating Jobs. One hypothesis on employment generation in postconflict settings that is potentially testable is “forgetting by not doing”: that the necessary skills for employment are limited because skills atrophy during conflict, necessitating targeted employment generation policies. This could be tested by using in-country variations in the intensity of conflict to study differences in firm-level employment generation. Researchers have analyzed other factors to explain analogous fluctuations and their connection to variations in conflict intensity. Timothy Besley and Hannes Mueller used in-country variation in conflict intensity to explain variations in house prices in Northern Ireland.¹³ Edward Miguel and John Bellows researched variations in conflict intensity in Sierra Leone to explain variations in political participation.¹⁴ Marguerite Duponchel and I have attempted to relate data on conflict variation to firm-level employment data.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the only employment data, from a survey conducted by Duponchel, contains limited pertinent information. Controlling for other characteristics, firms in conflict areas shed employment more rapidly during conflict and in the postconflict period have a higher demand for training. This suggests that conflict has destroyed skills. There is scope for a purpose-designed, firm-based employment survey in a postconflict society to use variations in conflict intensity to develop such ideas more thoroughly.

If skill shortage is a major constraint for firms, the policy implications are reasonably clear. At low levels of per capita income, investment in generic skills is well understood as problematic: firms are reluctant to finance it because the returns accrue to employees, while employees are unable to finance skill acquisition themselves because they face financing constraints. One option for targeted post-conflict employment generation policies is to encourage the return of emigrants who have maintained and acquired skills while abroad. Another approach is to subsidize in-firm training. A third is to establish government-financed technical schools.

if public servants have not internalized the goals of the organization, there are few other means of providing incentives to perform

Government Capacity and the Provision of Basic Services

The constraint on enhanced delivery of basic services in low-income fragile states is not necessarily financial, but rather is a challenge of capacity and incentives. As the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys of the World Bank have shown, often only a small fraction of the public money allocated for services such as education and health care actually is spent for this purpose.

The provision of basic services raises difficult issues concerning the performance of employees and how costs are financed. If public servants have not internalized the goals of the organization, there are few other means of providing incentives to perform. During the 1990s, the approach favored by donors to

address the problem of a dysfunctional public sector was to introduce standard market discipline through cost-recovery—that is, users would purchase services. This approach has generally been found to be a mistake. The poorest households are not in a position to purchase services at levels appropriate to actual costs. Furthermore, providing free services potentially maximizes usage, thereby enhancing public perception of government capacity. However, policy has not yet shifted to the corollary of how, if services are not to be sold through the market, service-providing organizations are to be disciplined into being cost-effective. There are various ways of providing such a discipline.

One is conventional civil service reform, introducing performance targets and rewards. In nearly all of the societies that currently lack adequate state capacity, this approach has been encouraged by donors for the past four decades. It has proved to be difficult for three primary reasons. First, poor performance may well be a locally stable equilibrium. Second, the target-reward system is easy to game because individual performance is difficult to monitor. Third, incentives may further undermine intrinsic motivation. It is time to think of alternative approaches for providing incentives for building such capacity.

The radical approach often favored by economists is a voucher-type system for schooling and insurance for health care. There has been some research on this model, although not, I think, in the most difficult environments. An advantage of this approach is that it would enable the provision of services to be private while finance would be public. However, while it may be the best solution in some contexts, it faces both political and administrative obstacles that make it infeasible in most countries.

An intermediate approach involves Public Service Agencies (PSAs) contracting and monitoring.¹⁶ The PSA channels public money from donors and the host government to organizations that provide the services, including nongovernmental organizations, churches, local governments, and firms, while monitoring their performance. Hence, the assessment of organization performance is undertaken centrally rather than by users. Since the PSA is allocating resources, it can also set criteria such as standards, geographic coverage, and unit costs. Hence, the PSA provides the government with more direct control than a voucher/insurance system, and yet, as with the voucher/insurance system, it does not necessitate the public sector directly providing the services.

There is a lot of research testing specific interventions that might improve the performance of public sector employees in specific contexts of developing countries, but little that evaluates alternative systems. The work of George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton on employee motivation has not been substantially applied in the context of the breakdown of public sector performance.¹⁷ What is needed is not simply smart individual rational choice theorists, but a larger research program in collaboration with a government that is interested in experimenting with not only minor innovations but also greater reform involving alternative systems.

Such opportunities can only come about at times of structural change, such as early postconflict years, new governments, or natural catastrophes, when governments face up to the wide gulf between their aspirations and what reasonably can be achieved.

Conclusion

Since stability and economic security in postconflict settings are high international priorities, and given the link with income level and growth rate, donor funding is likely to be found for whatever approach can be shown to work to raise the income level and growth rate at a reasonable cost. Building domestic state capacity is the long-term goal, yet low-income societies emerging from conflict do not have the luxury to wait for such a capability to emerge. Certain economic policies can be put in place even with low government capacity to stimulate employment creation and other public goods for rapid positive effect. Establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government contribute to security and stability as they also build state capacity. **PRISM**

Notes

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Operationalizing Anticipatory Governance

BY LEON FUERTH

The United States is confronted by a new class of complex, fast-moving challenges that are outstripping its capacity to respond and “win the future.” These challenges are crosscutting: they simultaneously engage social, economic, and political systems. They require measures that extend the horizon of awareness deeper into the future, improve capacity to orchestrate both planning and action in ways that mobilize the full capacities of government, and speed up the process of detecting error and propagating success. The result is anticipatory governance.¹

Anticipatory governance offers a set of concepts about how to deal with the twin phenomena of acceleration and complexity, which together threaten the coherence of American governance. Various Cabinet-level agencies—most notably the Department of Defense—have internal planning systems that approximate anticipatory governance. No such system is available at the national level. As a result, government is increasingly confined to dealing with full-blown crises and is losing its capacity to design policies that enable America to shape the future. There is no mechanism at the national level for bringing foresight and policy into an effective relationship. The absence of such a system impairs the ability of the government to think and act strategically. The cost of this impairment to the Nation now rises to a level that threatens national security as conventionally defined, and even more so when it is thought of in expansive terms that go to national strength, as opposed to the more limited requirements of national defense.

Faith in U.S. ability to shape the future has been a constant factor in the development of the Nation. As events continue to outpace us, the evident loss of that faith will have serious implications for our ability to continue to find common cause among ourselves. This has a potentially

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devastating impact on not only our domestic existence as a state, but also our behavior within the international system. There will be substitutes for American leadership, but none is likely to be premised on the existence of a win-win approach for all competitors. Any other approach, based on zero-sum thinking, will prevent rational action to preserve the future of our species. The stakes are high.

Realistic Change

This is a problem that has deep political roots. It is, however, also a problem that reflects poorly designed systems for planning and execution.

the elements of anticipatory governance can be put into place efficiently, quickly, and by means specifically suited to Presidential authority

The political dimension of this problem is hard to deal with, given that every policy issue is automatically translated into partisan terms. Deep reform of the Federal system is therefore unlikely because it cannot occur without enabling legislation. Given the political climate, it is hard to imagine Congress passing a well-designed, bipartisan omnibus bill providing for major alterations in the way government operates, even though it is sorely needed. The best chance is to make limited improvements in the operation of executive branch systems, hoping to leverage these as ways to improve the performance of government as a whole. Fortunately, we do not need enabling legislation to get started, or to destroy the existing system to develop anticipatory governance. Much of the needed new capacity exists in latent form in the executive branch.

The elements of anticipatory governance can be put into place efficiently, quickly, and by means specifically suited to Presidential authority. Presidents already have substantial legal and customary authority to arrange the workings of their own offices—comprising the whole of the White House—as they see fit. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) is thus the necessary locus for innovative rethinking of the systems by which it is served. Presidents have at their disposal the means to create a core mechanism by using existing elements of the Executive Office to operate as an overall steering body. The Chief of Staff, National Security Council (NSC) staff, deputies committees, National Economic Council (NEC), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), individual agency policy planning staffs, and the layer of now famous czars can be used collectively as a means to ensure overall coherence. To some extent, they are already used for this purpose, but mostly on an ad hoc basis rather than systematically. It is possible that these existing authorities can be fashioned into a faster, nimbler whole-of-government process that can be used to correct our strategic myopia and secure America's global place in the 21st century.

Acceleration and Complexity

Our era is destined to be marked by accelerating deep change. Major social change is accelerating at a rate fast enough to challenge the adaptive capacity of whole societies, including our own. Our national expectations of the future were set a generation ago by the baby boomers' exaggerated sense of entitlement. The future, however, will not be an extension of the past. A new normal awaits us, and it is likely to have rough edges. It is increasingly dangerous to make policy only in the short term or to arbitrarily diminish the universe of possibilities by ideologically limiting policy choices.

The White House (Pete Souza)



President Barack Obama talks with advisors in Oval Office before phone call with President Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon to discuss situation in Côte d'Ivoire

To deal with acceleration, we must begin installing new approaches to organization that feature much greater sensitivity to faint signals about alternative futures, and which enable us to respond to these with increased flexibility and speed. Bureaucracies are procrustean in responding to new problems by chopping them to fit old concepts. We need a form of management that could be called protean that is able to change its shape rapidly to match evolving challenges. If we do not find it, we risk being swamped by events and succumbing to systems failure.

Acceleration is accompanied by increasing complexity, which inevitably has the effect of eroding the customary boundaries that differentiate bureaucratic concepts and the missions that are based on them. Modern policy issues are complex phenomena, not linear. Linear problems can be broken down into components, and then sequentially administered and resolved. Complex problems are the result of concurrent interactions among multiple systems of events. They do not lend themselves to permanent solutions, but instead tend to morph into new problems, even as the result of our interventions to deal with them. They do not automatically move toward stable outcomes, but instead can exhibit highly disproportionate consequences in response to relatively small changes of condition. Complex challenges cannot be permanently resolved because they continuously mutate. Instead, they must be constantly monitored and managed.

We assume that for every problem in politics there is a unique solution. Under linear theory, change in input will give a proportionate change in output; there are no interruptions or collapses to a curve. Complexity more accurately describes the way human affairs transpire. Everything is interacting with everything else. However, it is difficult for us to analyze in terms that do not

reduce the reality. If we pretend the problem is not complex, we fail to understand what is really happening. What is needed is a robust effort to keep track of how things alter, and particularly knowing when to fold the cards on an obsolete policy. We tend to follow what we have implemented to the bitter end; we do not change course until the costs become impossible to ignore. Complexity has become a bumper sticker, but it has real and profound meaning.

Complex priorities are combinations of complex challenges that are urgent, thematically related, interactive, and resistant to treatment

the fundamental characteristic of national security is that it is complex—not linear—and that systems of governance based on linearity must be redesigned

in isolation.² Complex priorities form systems that must be managed concurrently. Short-range goals must be examined against long-term objectives. Complex priorities cannot be dealt with by means of linear approaches based on individual elements of government. No single agency possesses the authority or the expertise needed to manage them. The traditional interagency system provides only intermittent coordination of effort among executive branch agencies, and therefore is unlikely to handle complex priorities successfully.

Complex priorities require an integrated approach to the formulation and execution of policy. In the end, responsibilities have to be broken down and assigned to individual agencies. But at some point, the efforts of all these agencies have to be coordinated with reference to an evolving central concept. The array of agencies engaged

should depend on the nature of the priority. Certain kinds of issues transcend the capacities of individual agencies, and require such a broad spectrum of collaborators as to become whole-of-governance challenges. This does not mean that every agency is simultaneously engaged, or that all are engaged at the same level of intensity. It does mean that no part of the government is considered an island unto itself; that as circumstances demand, conscious arrangements of agencies and missions will be deployed.

Broad Scope Definition of National Security

If we are overtaken by the accelerating rate of change and increasing complexity, our national security will be jeopardized. We must therefore also broaden our concept of national security and upgrade systems for making and monitoring national security policy. The concept of *national security* is often conflated with that of *national defense*, but it is actually a much broader term, requiring a far deeper integration of domestic and international policy than has been practiced in American governance. The fundamental characteristic of national security is that it is complex—not linear—and that systems of governance based on the assumption of linearity must be redesigned.

National security absolutely begins with the ability to defend the Nation against its enemies, both foreign and domestic. But more is needed. We are in the presence of new forces, rapidly accelerating in speed and growing in power. To deal with these forces, we need to overhaul the concept of national security and the apparatus used to sustain it. The concept of national security has expanded from time to time in response to new threats, including terrorism after the September 11 attacks, and only recently to include economic security after the 2008–2009

financial crisis. It remains, however, mainly focused on the elimination of physical danger in the immediate present. It pushes away longer range concerns having to do with the foundations of our national power. These “discounted” challenges are pressing for acceptance as officially recognized major components of national security. Included among them are maintenance of technological leadership, maintenance of economic leadership, and maintenance of global moral leadership (that is, soft power).

An appropriately expanded definition of *national security* would:

- ❖ protect the Nation from violent assault, whether from within or without, by means of a national capacity to anticipate threat, deter threat, respond to attack by destroying enemies, recover from the effects of attack, and sustain the costs of preparedness
- ❖ secure against massive societal disruption as a result of natural forces (specifically including the national and international effects of environmental collapse at the systems level, including climate change)
- ❖ secure against the failure of major man-made systems by means of the capacity to plan for contingencies, organize systems capable of containing the damage, and organize systems capable of expeditiously repairing the damage
- ❖ secure against societal collapse and demoralization as a consequence of massive economic failure
- ❖ maintain the foundations of national power by means of sound fiscal policy over time combined with long-term investment in the elements of

competitive strength, including physical infrastructure, public health, public education, and especially the nurturing over time of broad areas of deep excellence in the sciences and in engineering

- ❖ maintain the capacity to perform such guarantees as extended to formal allies and associates
- ❖ preserve the ability to do all of the above within the framework of the Constitution in a free society, governed by law faithfully and transparently administered.

While many people respond favorably, at least in principle, to the idea that the scope of national security should be broadened, others oppose the idea on grounds that it is not actionable. Typically, they say that national security is inherently limited to the core mission of protecting the United States against violent attack and subversion and that widening the scope of the term will destroy its meaning and create something impossible to administer. They argue that it is impossible to predict the longer range future, or even to make good long-range forecasts, so there is no point in attempting to couple policy to systematically researched foresight. The political system in any event discounts the future in favor of current priorities. Even if we could reform the executive branch, such changes would be pointless unless the Congress reforms itself, which it will not. The bureaucracy will resist and ultimately wait out any serious redesign of its functions.

National security, however, is manifestly a broader concept than national defense, encompassing the foundational sources of America’s material and moral power. We ignore this reality at our peril. When we have to do something vital

for the national security, we do not get it done by describing as impossible an urgent departure from obsolete practices. We underutilize the forecasting tools at our disposal. In any event, no one is talking about predicting the future: the issue is how to think rigorously about alternative long-term possibilities and their implications for policy in the near term. If the political system is not challenged to excel, it will not. That is what leadership is for. As Chief Executive, the President is not the curator of legacy systems, but he is the most important modernizer and innovator in government. The bureaucracy responds to positive leadership. Its willingness to serve can be used to offset its natural inertia.

anticipatory governance would register and track events that are barely visible at the horizon

Anticipatory Governance

Anticipatory governance is a system of institutions, rules, and norms that provides a way to use foresight, networks, and feedback for the purpose of reducing risk and increasing capacity to respond to events at earlier rather than later stages of development. It would register and track events that are barely visible at the horizon; it would self-organize to deal with the unexpected and the discontinuous; and it would adjust rapidly to the interactions between our policies and our problems. In anticipatory governance, systems would be designed to handle multiple streams of information and events whose interactions are complex rather than linear. As a complex system of systems, anticipatory governance is not only the sum of its components, but also its own environment with its own set of characteristics. These characteristics

would represent the interplay of subsystems for foresight, networking, and feedback systems. Anticipatory governance would be a scalable process, with similar relationships displayed at every level of governance, from the bureaucratic base to the political apex. A fully operational form of anticipatory governance would be a system of systems, incorporating a foresight system for visualization, a networked system for integrating foresight and the policy process, and a feedback system to gauge performance and to manage “institutional” knowledge.

Systems for Foresight and Visualization.

Foresight is about the disciplined analysis of alternative futures. It can be organized as the product of a process to monitor prospective events, provide timely warning of oncoming major events, and alert policymakers to potential consequences. There is always something new and consequential brewing; if potentially transformative or destabilizing developments are detected early, we can take action in the present while they are still nascent enough to be shaped for preferred future outcomes. Systematic, organized foresight is the instrument by which we can imagine alternative futures, allowing us to simulate actions that would otherwise have to be tested against reality, where the consequences of error are irrevocable.

In government, foresight methodologies can be used to create and test alternative constructs about the future. Foresight can be cultivated as the product of a network of organizations, both public and private, employed to bring together forecasting, scenario development, and modeling. This system would be designed to identify and track “weak signals” of potentially major long-range trends and events. The system would hand off these weak signals for tracking and evaluation and use them as drivers in the development of alternative

scenarios, including the testing by analysis and simulation of alternative policy responses and their first- and second-order consequences. Scenarios are case studies of the future—looking forward to possible events, rather than backward to known events. They provide a means to test in the mind, or in a virtual setting, what we might otherwise have to try in reality. Other nations and bodies are already well on their way in developing and deploying these capabilities, most notably Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission.

Foresight is a discrete form of information with distinct characteristics. Foresight is not a synonym for *vision* or *prediction*. Visionaries are exclusive in their views about what should happen and are blind to alternative outcomes. Visionaries seek to knock out the competition. Prediction is a point statement of what will happen in the future. Life does not behave that way. Foresight, on the other hand, means openness to multiple futures; it is about ranges of possibilities, not point predictions. Additionally, foresight is not exclusively future oriented. It is concerned with what *will* happen, but is used to inflect what *is done* in the present. Otherwise, we blunder forward with no visibility. Foresight is about conceptualizing what may be happening and what needs to be done in alternative models to protect our interests. It is not a single statement, a single J-curve, an ideology, or a doctrine; it is the capacity to rapidly formulate alternative constructs and examine the consequences of different forms of response in theory and practice.

Anticipation has a dual nature: it is possible to anticipate consequences by visualizing alternative ways in which events play out in response to exogenous events; it is also possible to initiate the events ourselves, in which case, the decision to do so must be enveloped in a concept of what

the consequences might be, including both the desirable and undesirable. Either way, foresight entails mindfulness of consequences, especially including those that may not be obvious, and which could be drastic and discontinuous.

Networks for Whole-of-Government Operations. Our legacy systems represent 19th- and 20th-century concepts of organization, constructed on the basis of an 18th-century constitution. Oddly enough, it is the Constitution that continues to be the source of creative change in American government, while our organizational concepts—based on industrial principles—are outmoded. This vertical mode of organization (stovepiping) is based on an understanding of events as linear rather than interactive and complex. This form of organization significantly impedes the ability of government to deal with complex challenges. Authority to act in the present system requires detailed supervision from the top, mediated by large bureaucracies. Information about real-world conditions does not travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels. It flows even less readily between the executive agencies. These shortcomings expose the government to system failure, which takes the form of sudden collapse of function in the presence of unanticipated shocks to the system.

the interagency system is especially ill-suited for managing complex priorities that involve strong interactions among formerly isolated policy domains

We have left a period when our most serious security problems were by nature stove-piped, when information about these problems was linear, and hierarchical management was

sufficient. We have entered a period when the problems we face are themselves networked: information about them is marked by complex interaction, and organization for dealing with them must become flattened and integrated.

The interagency system is especially ill-suited for managing complex priorities that involve strong interactions among formerly isolated policy domains (for example, climate policy in its relationships with energy policy, trade policy, fiscal policy, and defense policy). A more subtle and continuous form of integration between policy and management is needed—what is now being referred to as a whole-of-government

the function of feedback is to monitor actual events to help alert policymakers to the known consequences of actions already taken

approach. Network theory offers an alternative way to organize governance. Networking expands the mandate of lower echelons to act, eliminates bottlenecks latent in middle layers of management, and radically improves the flow of information throughout the new system.

The fundamental idea is that large organizations will—if organized in the form of networks that feed information to the “periphery” and that enable that “periphery” to act toward broadly but clearly stated goals—display a capacity for rapid, internally generated responses that will consistently outmaneuver conventionally organized hierarchical systems. The basis for networking civilian governance can already be found in the uniformed armed Services, where it has been developing for more than two decades as the theory and practice of network-centric warfare. Net-centric warfare

is an approach to military operations based on complexity theory, network theory, and advances in command, control, and communications. We need similar networked processes for collection and assessment of intelligence and for policy analysis and implementation. As has been the case in the military, networked civilian operations will require encouragement of a culture of governance adapted to the requirements of action within the framework of complexity.

Gauging Performance. Feedback is employed in engineering as a way to confine the performance of a system within specific bounds, by detecting indicators of error and applying corrections sufficient to redirect the system. In organizations, feedback would depend on sampling mechanisms and on arrangements for converting the outputs of these into corrective actions. The White House does not systematically use sampling and feedback systems to measure the performance of policies. As a result, the United States often does not detect early signs of policy failure until it has become patent and costly. To counter this, we need to design systems to provide feedback connections between estimates and results. These feedback systems should be coupled into the policymaking process to support a constant reassessment and recalibration of policies. Constant feedback is also needed from the policymaker to generators of foresight in order to keep pace with what information is useful and what overloads the circuits.

There are two forms of feedback. What is needed is negative feedback, which serves as a stabilizer to filter out unwanted distortions and to emphasize the signal. All negative feedback systems permit a certain amount of error to pass through as output. This feature of feedback design, when applied to human organization, accommodates the reality of underaction and overaction. It can be used to permit a network

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to incorporate greater latitude for experimentation and rapid, local response to stimuli, but at the same time it is insurance against rogue or runaway behavior. This link between networking for flexibility and feedback for fidelity is important.

The function of feedback is to monitor actual events to help alert policymakers to the known consequences of actions already taken. In this matter, a feedback system should be regarded as consisting of sensors up front. These sensors provide the earliest evidence that events are following one particular course out of an infinite number of possibilities. One is critically dependent here on the sensitivity of the sensor system and on the way in which information is passed through from this detection mechanism for evaluation by other systems.

Proposals for Operationalization

There are multiple ways to establish these systems, but the system as a whole should be designed to meet criteria for actionability. The pulse of government cannot be stopped while the system is redesigned, and Congress is unlikely to produce an omnibus bill to upgrade government systems. Therefore, to comport with reality, the design of anticipatory governance as a whole, and of its constituent systems, should be:

- ❖ light on resources
- ❖ executable on the basis of existing Presidential authority, without requiring new legislation
- ❖ compatible with existing executive branch systems and processes
- ❖ ultimately compatible with deeper, more profound reform involving the executive branch as a whole, if and when that becomes possible
- ❖ integrated with advanced methodological approaches, including methods potentially important to foresight generation and to systems operations.

The following proposals share a common feature in that all of them aim to pass this test for feasibility. The proposals are categorized as follows: creating a high-level incentive for foresight; establishing a foresight-policy bridge; linking foresight methodology to the budgeting process; designing networked arrangements to share information and work across jurisdictional boundaries; and implementing feedback protocols to gauge performance of policy, speed up the learning process, and encourage midcourse correction.

Create High-level Incentives for Foresight

- ❖ *Establish a staffing function for foresight:* Assign individual staff members to maintain a flow of foresight-related information as part of the data flow to principal officials.³ There could also be a staff function to make sure foresight issues were identified and inserted into the agendas for deputies and principals meetings. An important part of this function would be to connect foresight to the here-and-now and decide which day-to-day decisions require integrating longer range consideration into the calculus.

- ❖ *Add precepts for foresight to terms of reference for policy analysis:* Mandate that major intelligence assessments and new policy recommendations include foresight-based analysis sections to explore alternative consequences. This would require analysts to go beyond purely evidence-based analysis and include disciplined assessments of plausible hypotheticals that could have major consequences. New precepts could incentivize a stream of foresight-based reporting tied to policy and budget, which is presently lacking. Insights about the future should be tied to actions that can be taken to seize an opportunity or avoid a threat. These requirements could be written into standards via supporting directives at the department or agency level. Measures would have to be taken to prevent these requirements from being mechanically applied to so many documents as to destroy their value, as well as to ensure that hypothetical analysis from the intelligence community does not become policy advocacy.
- ❖ *Revise career incentives to encourage long-range analysis:* Foresight analysis needs to become integrated and valued. Foresight should be asked for in the Presidential Daily Briefing. Rewards and promotion could be issued for good foresight analysis, specifically for analysis that leads to seizing opportunities (in addition to averting risks). New incentives could be designed for civil servants who self-organize across bureaucratic boundaries to share information on a mission-by-mission basis.
- ❖ *Educate/train in foresight:* Create opportunities for Federal officials to acquire formal education in foresight generation and application—using existing government educational institutions or outside consortia. We do not train civil servants to think across categories, and this kind of training is necessary to give the next generation of civil service the capacity to operate under 21st-century complex conditions. Short-course training in foresight methodology (analysis of alternative futures) should be part of the experience of senior civil service (including senior executive service and national security professionals) as well as military officials. Exposure to joint planning and joint operations should be an expected element of professional development. There should also be a revised approach to training at the academic level, stressing interdisciplinary study and exploring the relationship between theory and practice.

Establish a Foresight-Policy Bridge

- ❖ *Use small teams to broker between foresight producers and policymakers:* There are multiple concepts for organizing foresight into a specific stream of information available to policymakers. The central problem is that no mechanism exists for bringing foresight and policy into an effective relationship. A brokering function could improve communication between producers and potential users of foresight. Small, ad hoc translation teams could be organized and composed of foresight and policy specialists tailored for specific issues, but with broad experience in both domains (foresight and policy). Their job would be to serve as translators: translating to policy what is available from foresight sources, and translating for foresight producers what is needed by policymakers. It would also be helpful to include experts who can help policymakers and computer

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modelers find a way to communicate. Over time, brokers could help policymakers practice foresight methods. Such a function would bridge the cultural gap between policymakers and foresight producers who do not think in the same terms and who do not understand each other's approach.

- ❖ *Set up a dedicated office for foresight as a component of the EOP:* Establishing an office dedicated to the production of foresight within the Executive Office of the President would provide a service similar to that of Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning process. Functions of the office would be scanning for weak signals of impending major events, linking long-range assessments to ongoing policy formation, and possibly running games and scenarios to study potential consequences. This office would supplement the short- and medium-term emphasis of the National Security Council by focusing exclusively on the long term. Many questions would have to be answered: Would it be possible to do this effectively with a small staff? Would the office take the initiative to create its own agenda? Would it instead be responsive to instruction from somewhere else in the system? If the latter, would it retain independence of thought? How would it relate to intelligence input, especially longer range input? Where would it connect in the larger system? How would its output be related to policy formation (a Presidential order establishing that this be part of the dimensionality of all policy products coming out of the White House staff)? What is the handoff between long-range and current issues (at what point is an issue no longer prospective in the long term and active in the here and now)?
- ❖ *Nest and synchronize the national strategy documents:* Congress has mandated an array of reports on national strategy (the Quadrennial Defense Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review, National Security Strategy, and so forth, plus the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review initiated by the Secretary of State). These reports are asynchronous, syncopated, and disjointed from one another. Instead, these strategy documents should have a cumulative impact toward a common goal, understood in common terms. They should have direct relevance to each other and be treated as if "nested" one within the other. They should have a clear progression from broad strategy down to programmatic detail. Their due dates should be aligned to promote a strategic progression. The planning process should allow time for planning and reflection. Time is needed to do workmanship and to synchronize strategies. It is an iterative process where the parts take time to gel. Each one of these documents should be readily convertible into budgetary implications. It would make sense to insert parallel requirements for long-range analysis in each of these reports to establish the link between the national strategy and longer range foresight.

Link Strategy to the Budget. Policy can be linked to resources by creating a venue for OMB–NSC–NEC exchanges at the level of complex priorities.

- ❖ *Use alternative budgets to reflect scenarios for alternative futures:* There are many possible futures—so why do we have one budget? We have had a succession of single-image views of



The White House (Chuck Kennedy)

First Lady Michelle Obama joins students for "Let's Move!" Salad Bars to Schools launch event at Riverside Elementary School in Miami, Florida

budget cuts and taxes that have not been adaptive enough to withstand a range of contingencies. It would be helpful to have a set of scenarios that show where we are supposed to end up after these transactions so we can buy into or buy out of alternative visions of where we want to be. Developing alternative budgets based on alternative national strategies would provide for better informed decisions as to how to pursue and resource our national strategies.

- ❖ *Use the budget process to develop strategic priorities:* OMB already requires alternative budget proposals, but the emphasis is on alternative decrements without considering alternative priorities or how alternative priorities can shape the country over the longer term. Alternative budgets should be used to model the effects of different decisions about strategic national priorities. If we have budgets that really do address the fiscal crisis, alternative approaches are going to mean alternative futures for how we live in the United States and how the Nation relates to the international system.
- ❖ *Establish an OMB–NSS interface:* OMB could serve as an active party to strategic planning and coordinating resources. Regular meetings between OMB and the National Security Staff (NSS) to translate strategies into budget implications would be a form of brokering function. The purpose would be to clarify strategic priorities by translating them into budgetary terms. (This could be done by regularly having representatives from OMB present at NSS meetings to shed light on the budgetary implications of strategy, and representatives of NSS present to shed light on the strategic implications of budget decisions.)

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- ❖ *Translate long-range priorities into language compatible with the congressional appropriation cycle:* The United States will periodically spend several billion dollars on long-term projects meant to shape the future, and then cancel them with nothing to show. Instead, proposals for large projects could be broken down into manageable chunks that are independently valuable but collectively aligned toward a larger goal. These chunks would be turned into policy recommendations and then translated into legislative language and timelines. Each component is valuable in its own right and can stand on its own so that benefits are achieved regardless of whether the final goal is achieved. Success depends on describing a desired long-term endstate and developing a series of short-term steps to achieve it. This Component-level Implementation Process (CLIP) is a way to analyze the programmatic implications with terms that are in sync with congressional politics by breaking down the long-term goals into progressive short-term legislative steps that offer substantial stand-alone benefits. CLIP mitigates the political risk inherent in introducing legislation when the final results may not be seen for decades.

Networks for Whole of Governance

- ❖ *Organize virtually for foresight:* Create a virtual foresight system by existing organizations in government that have foresight or policy planning functionality. A system of portals could be designed into the system, where nongovernmental foresight producers could deliver their products to a government system able to assimilate and direct the contents (that is, a “wisdom of the crowds” approach to integrating foresight). This would not be a brick and mortar organization; it would use existing personnel. Currently, foresight and policy planning are done in stovepipes from a subject-matter perspective. A virtual organization could bring together all department and agency foresight and policy planning processes into a structured, methodical approach in the direction we as a nation should be moving. It would be beneficial to center this process at the White House to help enrich flow of foresight materials to the policy system. This virtual organization could be created using interprocess communication (IPC)—for example, the Federal Advisory Council on the Future, a sub-IPC focused on determining priorities and objectives over the next decade or longer.
- ❖ *Create a committee of deputies for managing complex priorities:* This committee could serve as a nucleus for long-term foresight and warning and cross-disciplinary policy formulation as response. Its function would be to consider the intersection of multiple issues and match potential consequences to policy priorities. This would be a lightweight way to add formal consideration of the foresight dimension to the White House policy process. It would also enable the exploitation resources from a variety of bureaucracies while coordinating cross-bureaucracy policies. Efforts would have to be made to limit the additional burden on deputies and to integrate this committee into the policy formulation process in order to avoid competition for buy-in.
- ❖ *Create mission-based teams of czars:* Organize the now-infamous executive branch czars⁴ into strategic groupings (for example, heads of interagency task forces). It is possible that

czars—who should be viewed more as *integrators* than *autocrats*—collectively possess the totality of the information about where the government is and where it is headed. Some report directly to the President and others to Cabinet officers, and some have hybrid responsibilities with lines of responsibility running more than one way. Integrators—individually and corporately—can perform a crucial knowledge management function in the executive branch by connecting top-of-system awareness to political authority. They are in a unique position to provide the visioning, networking, and feedback functions necessary for anticipatory governance. Such functions would not threaten the oversight authority of Congress providing it is clearly established that responsibility for the execution of policy remains in the hands of Senate-confirmed officials. They can generate situational awareness across the whole of government, during both the formation and execution of policy and track progress of policy implementation and needs for midcourse adjustment. The proposal is, therefore, to create a venue that brings these integrators together for systematic consultation and cross-fertilization. This creates a network of existing officials, with a collective responsibility focused on national priorities. It would *not* substitute for the NSC or the deputies and principals committees, nor would it displace Senate-confirmed Cabinet officers from their authorities and responsibilities. It would simply augment the existing process by adding a critical missing element: the ability to visualize policy formation and execution in relation to *mission*, as opposed to *bureaucratic jurisdiction*. This arrangement would require an authority responsible for coordinating the groupings and rearranging them as the problem or priority on which they are focused inevitably morphs.

- ❖ *Use the Cabinet strategically:* Use key White House officials and members of the Cabinet to manage the mission by establishing ad hoc task forces for complex priorities. Currently, the Cabinet has little corporate existence, but it is possible to organize groupings according to strategic requirements. Agencies could get involved in subgroups to ensure their organizations are aligned from the top down. This is similar to commander's intent in the Defense Department. These groupings can help make sure they mesh when they encounter each other. Congressional oversight would need to be taken into account here since Congress does not hold Cabinet secretaries accountable for how well they have interacted and interlinked with others (even if that is what is required to strategically maneuver the government under the pressures of complexity).

Systems for Feedback and Learning

Every policy sent to the President (or any senior decisionmaker) for approval should be part of a package including the following explicit terms:

- ❖ statement of key assumptions on the basis of which the recommendation has been made
- ❖ definition of *success*, including overall definition of success as well as specific key objectives
- ❖ information streams to be monitored on an ongoing basis

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- ❖ performance indicators that would automatically trigger a review of the policy
- ❖ points of responsibility and accountability in the system for collecting and applying such information
- ❖ periodic audits of performance by teams that will independently report their conclusions to higher levels of consideration
- ❖ provisional date for an audit of the policy and its performance to occur even in the absence of a trigger date built into the White House calendar.

A feedback system could be embedded into the policy process using these mechanisms. It can serve as a basis for ongoing evaluation, reassessment, and recalibration of policies. This is vital for preventing breakdowns and system failures that routinely go undetected until it is too late. It will also speed up system learning from experience to improve the conduct of ongoing policies and to improve the design of policy in the future.

Political Leadership

Reconfiguring the government to handle complex priorities—to be anticipatory rather than reactionary—will ultimately require deep changes within the executive branch involving legislation and a lengthy period of organizational adjustment to new processes. However, as we know from experience with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, once a new legal foundation is laid, it will be the work of a generation to integrate it completely into the processes and culture of government. Meanwhile, the Nation is immersed in multiple ongoing crises, with more coming. Something needs to be done now to

capitalize on existing law and precedent. This process can be initiated from the top of the executive branch, using existing Presidential authorities and for the most part by redeploying personnel and using them in new ways rather than by tremendously expanding the staff.

This article's proposals for establishing anticipatory governance are focused on actions which can, to the extent possible, be carried out by the President under existing authorities and precedents. However, even if this approach were to succeed within the White House and/or at the tops of agencies, the larger task of reforming the executive branch bureaucracy would remain, and that job is so big as to eventually

Congress has the flexibility under its own rulemaking powers to adjust to the urgent need for long sighted approaches

require congressional buy-in. In a politically charged atmosphere, this may seem impossible. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to make premature concessions to pessimism. Congress has the flexibility under its own rulemaking powers to adjust to the urgent need for long sighted approaches sustained over considerable periods of time. Doing this is not a constitutional question; it is a question of political leadership.

Conclusion

The national security of the United States is a complex megasystem of systems and needs to be managed as such. The endstate should not be visualized as a vast unitary process, but as many systems harmonized by common strategic direction, conveyed through a networked administrative system. To this point, however, the U.S. Government is without an integrated foresight

system, a networked approach to the management of complex priorities, and a formal feedback system to help it learn from experience. The consequences are visible in terms of an increasing number of collisions with “unforeseeable events,” and in terms of economic opportunities lost to rivals who are consistently pursuing winning strategies. This pattern is feeding an increasing conviction at home and abroad that the United States is in irreversible decline. Such a conviction feeds on itself and becomes a negative force in and of itself.

The truth is hard to face. For decades, we have acted as if American primacy was the natural order of things rather than a legacy built on the vision and the sacrifices of our predecessors. We have been encouraged to think of ourselves as fortune’s favored children, and the sad consequences of that are all too apparent. We must now learn to govern ourselves more intelligently. The first step is to accept that, in a complex universe, the only true constants are surprise and change. Success goes to those who anticipate. **PRISM**

The author acknowledges the work of Evan Faber, whose substantive expertise, critical comments, and organizational skill were of great value in the preparation of this article.

Notes

¹ The term *anticipatory governance* first came to the author’s attention when it was used in an email written by former student Neil Padukone. The term also appears to have been used in relation to nanotechnology and is somewhat similar to the term *anticipatory democracy* as used by Alvin Toffler and Clem Bezold.

² The fall 2007 Graduate Seminar on Forward Engagement created the concept and defined *complex priorities* as:

the consideration of multiple intersecting issues across time which may have unintended or unexpected effects, and involve factors beyond those normally considered relevant to the issue. Complex Priorities specifically cater to the practice of policy-making, where the importance assigned to various issues is constrained by resources, but nonetheless must consider interactivity, short-term gains, and long-term interests. Complex prioritization involves a more in-depth, comprehensive view to ensure that decisions made are not simply surface-level political band-aids, but rather, provide broad-range, profound solutions to policy issues.

³ The Chief Operating Officer as mandated by the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (2011) could be a model or used as a functional equivalent.

⁴ The term *czar* is a misleading concept, weighed down by a great deal of historical baggage. It unavoidably suggests vertical organization, rigid hierarchy, and an imperious style of decisionmaking. Nothing could be further from what is required: laterally networked organization characterized by decentralized authority, operating with flexibility and transparency. The present random assortment of czars may somewhat improve coordination within and among various agencies but cannot do that for the system as a whole. In their present configuration, the czars cannot help the President achieve overall system coherence. They cannot provide an overall awareness of the operations of government, the interactions of policies with each other, and the impact of these forces on complex challenges.

Colombia Updating the Mission?

BY CARLOS ALBERTO OSPINA OVALLE

With the emergence of the so-called new threats, the world's perspective on the use of force has changed, and new challenges have developed. Alternative roles for the military have been proposed, and even new philosophies have been developed with concepts such as population-centric warfare and network-centric warfare. All of these revolve around the idea of developing better relations with the people and seeking a better understanding of the environment.

However, in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular, these issues have been part of daily life for many years, and the role of the military has long had a much broader scope than the more narrow conceptions articulated in Western civil-military relations theory. The reality is that the more expansive role has been part of the lives of the Latin countries due to their different historical circumstances.

Contrary to what might be happening in other countries, the internal struggle has been the most important issue in Colombia during the last few decades, and consequently the military has been involved in irregular war in all its facets. These have included the participation of the Colombian armed forces as main actors in our counterinsurgency and nation-building strategies, as well as first responders to major natural emergencies and disasters.

Irrespective of the present declining strength of insurgency in Colombia and the regaining of governmental authority in all the national territory, it is unlikely that in the short- or medium-term a change of role will emerge for the Colombian armed forces. More likely is that they will continue to be engaged for years to come in the effort directed against internal violence and in emergency efforts.

The Latin American Environment

Though no major international wars have affected Latin America for a long period of time,¹ the region is far from being a tranquil neighborhood. It has been plagued with internal violence, caused sometimes by political issues, sometimes by organized crime as a consequence of the drug trafficking

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Colombian army special forces at Tolemaida Air Base during technical demonstration

issue, and sometimes by social contradictions as in the case of the gangs affecting much of Central America and Mexico. The levels of violence these nongovernmental actors produce are extremely high, becoming in many cases the main concern of governments and international organizations such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations. These latter often demand more and better action against the threat to public order.

The armed forces in the majority of the Latin countries have been central actors in national life, and in some countries still maintain substantial societal power. During the Cold War era, for example, military officers became dictators and de facto rulers. The “Southern Cone” was under



military rule for many years as were neighboring countries. The armed forces became important players in national development and executed important infrastructure projects that impact to the present. Still, with time and the end of the Cold War, such arrangements became dated and were replaced by democracies willing to strengthen civilian control and development of civil society. In the Southern Cone, the previous situation was reversed, and the armed forces were banned from internal action except in extreme cases, such as natural disasters.

In Central America, following the insurgencies that affected the region for more than 15 years in the 1970s and 1980s, ending with the defeat of the insurgents, something similar happened. The

military was not only reduced in its effectiveness (and effectiveness) but also banned from intervening in internal affairs. This did not remain the case for long because the growing levels of crime changed the minds of the politicians. The result was that again in countries such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the armed forces were recalled to internal duties, but this time to assist the police in the struggle against violence and to chase armed bands and gangs. Still, they had lost much capacity.

historically, Colombia has been a weak state unable to control its own territory and provide good services to its citizens

Mexico, a traditional paradise for tourists, suddenly became a battleground where the number of casualties mounted day after day due to the actions of drug cartels trying to smuggle cocaine, as well as marijuana and heroin (which were produced within Mexico's borders), into the United States, and to prevail over rivals in competing gangs. Ultimately, the Mexican armed forces, especially the navy through its marines, were directed to join the fight and quickly became main actors and an important element in the overall strategy of the government to deter and stop the drug cartels.

Much farther south in Chile in 2010, after the terrible earthquake that shook that country, the armed forces, which had been confined to their barracks for more than 15 years, were recalled. They not only assisted the victims but also controlled the security situation and brought back order to the affected zones.

As these examples illustrate, the role of the armed forces in Latin America has been a staple

of the internal environment and continues to be so today. This is unlikely to change as various missions are assigned from the general category sometimes simply termed "new roles." In reality, these roles are much as they have long been.

Where there is an important difference is in the revived sphere of politics in the nations of Latin America, where, for a time, the military held sway. As a consequence, political control over military activities has tightened. Today, the armed forces are under the close supervision of the political authorities. In some countries, the difference between defense and security is strictly understood to mean "no participation" of the armed forces in internal affairs. This results in primacy only in traditional military affairs with small windows of opportunity opened for internal participation in cases of emergency. The result is an often artificial preparation for defense through regular war that is unlikely to occur.

The Colombian Environment

Ironically, Colombia is perhaps the premier example of a state where the military must be prepared for both external defense and internal involvement through counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

For many years, the main characteristic of the Colombian environment was weakness of the state. Historically, in fact, Colombia has been a weak state unable to control its own territory and to provide good services to its citizens. As a consequence, all manner of criminality flourished, especially in the areas without government presence.

Perhaps even more debilitating, the idea of using violence for the achievement of political gains became embedded over many years in the minds of local and national politicians of both major political persuasions, liberal and

conservative, beginning with several civil wars during the 19th century. Those wars ravaged the countryside, destroying the national infrastructure that had been built after independence and killing tens if not hundreds of thousands of Colombians at times. Particularly costly was the so-called Thousand Days War of 1899–1902. The consequences were devastating and brutal.

Yet clashes between liberals and conservatives did not stop there. In the 20th century, liberals and conservatives looked upon each other as enemies and invariably excluded the other whenever a change of power occurred. Instead of ameliorating rivalry, the passage of time saw its consolidation. The peak came in 1948, when the Liberal Party's brightest star was assassinated in Bogota. The reaction blamed the conservatives. The result was Colombia's costliest civil war, termed simply The Violence, or *La Violencia*. Bogota was nearly destroyed, and the bloodshed spilled into the countryside where it reached its greatest intensity. The machete, the traditional working tool of the peasants, or *campesinos*, became a deadly weapon. Soon, casualties mounted to unimaginable numbers, at least several hundred thousand. The situation was out of control.

Within such a catastrophic context, the armed forces, particularly the army, were summoned to take action. Their mission was to neutralize the armed gangs and restore peace. This was difficult because many of the groups were embedded within the population. In other cases, their support came from political party elements. Nevertheless, military success slowly brought about a change in the situation, with order all but restored as the 1960s began. At this point, though, new threats emerged from the more thinly populated areas of the country.

In the mid-1960s, new armed groups appeared in Colombia. This time, they

were inspired by the Cuban Revolution and Colombian Communist Party. These groups began a different type of politically oriented violence that aimed not just to fight the government, as had their predecessors, but to seize political power and change the nature of the state to a Marxist regime. This was to be accomplished through a prolonged process of People's War that followed a strategic plan. That strategic plan was designed in phases to unfold according to a schedule that combined the time and space gained through popular mobilization with increasing territorial control.

Amid this challenge emerged another, that of drug trafficking, first in the form of marijuana, later heroin, and eventually cocaine. The lethal combination threatened the security of all citizens. Again, the military was called to restore the situation. In fact, throughout the events outlined, some units had participated in internal control even as others were deployed to different areas of the country to assist the authorities in the consolidation process. In some cases, these units used their own resources to improve the situation of the inhabitants with whom they became involved. Still, as violence increased, so did the military's role and its commitment to its assigned mission.

Army Mission During *La Violencia* (1948–1962)

Of course, it is the army that we are particularly discussing since it has always been the dominant service. When violence broke out in Colombia in 1948, the structure of the army was conventional and deployed in independent brigades. Each brigade was an independent force comprised of three infantry battalions (equipped mainly with small arms) supported by an artillery battalion, a cavalry group, and an engineer battalion. This structure had been developed by

a Swiss advisory mission some years before. In the 1930s, this organization had faced a limited war (1932–1943) against the Peruvian army in the jungles of the Amazon due to territorial claims by that country.² After a difficult period of offensive actions in a difficult environment, the army was able to achieve its military objectives. The conflict ended with a national strategic victory that featured few casualties and lessons learned.

Yet the army's structure was not suitable for dealing with irregular groups. It proved too heavy and inflexible. Hence, reforms were made. In particular, the centralized command and control structure was modified, with companies given the latitude for independent action needed to counter elusive irregular groups.

Clearly, even at this moment, the mission of the army, as it was understood during the conflict with Peru, was evolving to one that focused primarily upon stability operations rather than preparing to defend the borders. In a sense, the Colombian military was undergoing the transformation that would be required of (in particular) the U.S. Army as a consequence of its post-9/11 involvement in counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jaime Garcia Covarrubias explains that such a shift occurs "since the design of the military apparatus depends on the selected strategic modality and that, in turn, depends on the challenges and threats facing the State."³ So it could be said that the strategic modality of the Colombian government evolved as internal stability assumed primacy. In such a case, the state will utilize all of its available tools to gain control of its internal situation. This widens the scope of the missions that the army in particular and the armed forces in general must carry out.

The main focus of these missions is action in support of the police forces but not replacing

them. In the case at hand, the Colombian army had to adapt its tactics and equipment to this new mission, which included discarding artillery and armor⁴ and increasing the use of trucks and light vehicles, as well as helicopters and boats (this last item to control the rivers of the Amazon jungle basin). Such a posture was possible because the Colombian constitution allowed the armed forces to protect the "institutions" of the country. Military action hence became authorized when "democratic institutions" of the country were in jeopardy.

Simultaneously, the government was willing to develop new national infrastructure, especially roads and bridges, and at least partially turned to the army for completion of the effort. In this way, the army was committed almost fully to internal missions, and its obligation to prepare to defend the country's sovereignty was reduced to a minimum. At the same time, the army began to interact with the Colombian National Police (CNP) by assisting in certain procedures when they had to be conducted in rural areas, such as protecting small police stations and patrols in dangerous areas. Military outposts were deployed to those places where the security situation had deteriorated to try to protect villages and municipalities from the armed gangs who roamed the countryside.

Ironically, even as the military became accustomed to such a role, the army was again tasked at least in part with a traditional mission: support for the United Nations in the Korean War. In 1950, Bogota sent an infantry battalion to Korea, along with a navy frigate. Though involvement was intense,⁵ this was only the second time in the 20th century that the army had participated in a traditional mission using regular doctrine and means. After little more than 3 years, the troops returned home bringing with them a variety of experiences and knowledge

Cocaine drug packs with scorpion logo confiscated by Drug Enforcement Agency



DEA

about traditional wars. Within a short period, though, they returned to their previous nontraditional role in irregular, internal conflict.

Strategic Adaptation to Changing Context

At the end of the 1970s, the internal situation in Colombia became more complicated still. Coca cultivation, which had previously been centered in Peru and Bolivia, responded to the pressure of counternarcotics efforts in those two countries by transplanting itself to Colombia. It set down roots primarily in just those spaces that were characterized by a lack of state presence. The consequence was the empowerment of those who previously had been relatively minor criminals. Growth of coca was accompanied by the production of the drug itself and its movement into the channels that supplied it to the American and eventually European markets. Typical of the resulting narcotrafficking cartel was that of Medellín under Pablo Escobar, who used all manner of brutality and criminal activity to secure his market-share. Such was the level of violence that the military had to be engaged by the state. Ultimately, successful action by the military and police destroyed the large, powerful cartels.

Unfortunately, this action occurred even as the leading insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), developed a strategic plan funded primarily by money coming from involvement in the drug trade (initially, protection; later, direct involvement). Hence, the state was distracted at the time FARC garnered greatly enhanced funding generated by narcotics

but supplemented by efforts in a variety of other criminal enterprises, notably kidnapping and extortion. The result was that in a relatively short period of time after the formal 1982 leap into the drug matrix, FARC had acquired enough strength to challenge the army with “columns” (*columnas*) capable of overrunning exposed or isolated reinforced companies. This “war of movement,” in the doctrinal terms of People’s War, which was adopted as the warfighting approach by FARC, led in the late 1990s and early 2000s to half a dozen large, intense actions atop the much more numerous terror and guerrilla activities. The toll inflicted on the army and police was high (exceptionally high in the case of the latter).

The result was what some called “civil war” due to its intensity but what in reality was simply “war.” That is, the insurgents did not have the support of anything even remotely close to the half the population that is the critical metric in labeling a conflict civil war. Indeed, the two key tasks of the

the twin challenges of the narcotraffickers and the would-be insurgents again were such that commitment of the armed forces was necessary

security forces were, first, protecting citizens, and second, eliminating the structures and funding of FARC (and, to a lesser extent, of a distant second group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN). In terms of mission, then, it can be seen that the shift to preservation of order and ensuring security for the country’s citizens had completely overtaken any realistic preparation for interstate war as dictated by the traditional need to defend the national territory from foreign aggression.

The participation of the Colombian armed forces to internal security missions was a political decision driven by the necessity to lower the insecurity index. Insecurity in the urban areas was created primarily by drug trafficking gangs, in the rural areas by FARC (and, to a lesser extent, by ELN). Though the National Police assumed primacy in the struggle against the drug cartels and the armed forces in the fight against FARC, the armed forces frequently were deployed in urban areas to execute area domination operations and to secure specific sectors of different cities.

As previously mentioned, the Colombian constitution, since it was first promulgated in 1886 and amended in 2001, authorizes the use of the armed forces in this type of mission: “The Armed Forces will have as their primary purpose the defense of the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the national territory and of the constitutional order.”⁶ The twin challenges of the narcotraffickers and the would-be insurgents (mainly FARC) again were such that commitment of the armed forces was necessary. More than force was involved. Assets such as engineers engaged in local development, with financing done in most cases by local authorities. Whatever the precise nature of the assets deployed, most of the Colombian forces were involved in internal missions. Only small contingents were dispatched to the country’s international borders. A single understrength battalion was deployed in the Sinai as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission there. The internal orientation was solidified by tasking that included response to natural disasters, such as the terrible Armero incident.⁷

Listing the missions carried out by the Colombian armed forces between 1948 and 2002, therefore, produces:

- ❖ internal security
- ❖ nation-building
- ❖ international wars
- ❖ disaster relief.

This variety of missions gives an idea how the armed forces and especially the army adapted to all types of situations, often on short notice. Ultimately, they served as an instrument of national power that was used frequently and for long periods for purposes beyond those deemed traditional.

Democratic Security Policy

In spite of the intense participation of the armed forces in internal security missions, the situation in the 1990s went from bad to worse. In response to the disintegration of public order they saw engulfing them, Colombians in 2002 elected as president the only candidate who offered to turn the tide, Alvaro Uribe. Once in office, Uribe promulgated his “Democratic Security Policy,” which aimed to end violence in Colombia and neutralize the main threats to the population—FARC and the drug traffickers.

As had been the case in the past, the main tools to achieve the proposed goals were the armed forces, especially the army. Uribe’s first intention was to strengthen the forces’ ability to deal with the internal threats, so he asked for a special tax to finance security programs. It passed easily. The foundation of democratic security was securing the countryside, especially small and remote villages traditionally at the mercy of the drug traffickers and FARC. To do this, he developed a particular form of neighborhood watch system by giving a slice of the national draft levy the option of serving in “home guard” units trained as regular soldiers.

These units gave local authorities their own defensive capability.

Uribe also agreed with the plans of the armed forces to attack FARC’s “strategic rear-guard” located in the former demilitarized zone granted by former President Andrés Pastrana Arango. This was done using counterguerilla units with support from the navy and the air force. Designed to disrupt the operational coherence and logistics bases of FARC, the operation had no time limit,⁸ and the military units deployed remained indefinitely through use of block leave and other techniques. Simultaneously, in the remainder of the country, local operations continued.

A dedicated special operations effort targeted FARC leadership to try to decapitate the organization. Special forces were organized,

development was undertaken, especially construction of infrastructure that would incorporate areas into larger economic, social, and political networks

trained, and equipped to augment existing capabilities. Relatively quickly, they scored spectacular and public successes, but these were accompanied by much more mundane but regular, important neutralization of midlevel targets.

While this was happening, the CNP was dealing with the drug traffickers and their self-defense groups in the urban and rural areas. This was challenging, since numerous small cartels had emerged after the elimination of the Medellín and the Cali cartels. To accomplish this type of mission, CNP was equipped with some military arms such as machineguns and small mortars, as well as grenade launchers, and had the support of helicopters.⁹

As areas were reclaimed, it was necessary to hold and develop them. For this purpose, special interagency programs were directed to improving the living conditions of inhabitants at two levels. At the first level, traditional civil-military action addressed immediate necessities and laid the foundation for a handoff to democratic authority. At the second level, development was undertaken, especially construction of infrastructure that would incorporate areas into larger economic, social, and political networks. Everything from bridge construction to school development was included. Because many remote areas were located in insecure areas, resources came from a variety of governmental levels with security always an integral component of the whole.

Such a melding of the instruments of national power produced a visible improvement in both development and security. Standard livelihood metrics such as *road counts* (that is, traffic) and *business* were augmented by efforts to judge security (for example, whether a mayor slept in his town) and military initiative (for example, who was launching attacks and on what type of targets). At the heart of the Uribe strategy was fostering security of the individual within the national context. There followed the predictable (and hoped for) blossoming of national life. Gross domestic product growth, which at one point had fallen to less than 1 percent, together with fears for the economic situation in general, improved markedly and went even to 7 percent in some years. The poverty rate came down by more than 10 points, though it remained high by most measures.

In this way, President Uribe emphasized anew the premier role of internal security in the mission profile of the armed forces. Indeed, it could be argued that the tremendous success

enjoyed by Uribe during his two terms as president was due precisely to the participation of the armed forces as the main component in restoring security to the polity. To do this, though, many traditional facets of the military institution required reform and enhancement. Improved mobility and combat staying power were among the greatest improvements, with significant advances made not only in use of rotary wing assets but also in military medicine and treatment of casualties.

Even something seemingly as simple as enhancing mobility required extensive enhancement of Colombia's support infrastructure; training of pilots, technicians, and maintenance personnel; and acquisition of techniques such as night flying and movement of weapons in combat. With American support, a new aviation brigade was organized and soon was fully operational and ready to support the armed forces. Least of our concerns was acquiring new helicopters. More importantly, a new and modern culture was developed around the aviation brigade. This allowed the achievement of much that had been difficult or even impossible.

Hence, the military was able to offer protection to the people in ways that went beyond anything seen previously. For example, fishermen were able to return to the rivers and streams and even to fish during the night, something that was prohibited by FARC. Vendors along the roads could return to business, offering their products, normally fruits and other agricultural elements to returning tourists. Travel became an ordinary past-time again, whether on roads or rivers. Special capabilities ensured these ordinary functions. Using the Colombian marines and a great number of small *piranha* boats, the rivers could be kept safe. Likewise, a national plan, *Meteor*, with its

own assets, secured the road network and ended FARC use of roadblocks as the sites for kidnapping and other crimes.

Capabilities, then, improved dramatically, but in all this effort, little was dedicated to the improvement of the more conventional equipment or techniques that might be required by regular military engagement. Certain types of aircraft, ships, submarines, and even armor and heavy artillery were not sought, sending with this a clear message that the mission of the Colombian armed forces would continue to be internally oriented.

New Environment in Colombia

The Democratic Security Policy changed life in Colombia in dramatic ways. Though serious security problems remained, in general the country returned from the brink of failing. The threat to the very existence of the state had been pushed to the margins of society, physically and certainly mentally, and the ability of even criminal actors to impact significantly upon national rhythms had been contained.

FARC, as the principal security challenge to the state, found its armed structure checked, and the number of militants and armed guerrillas diminished substantially.¹⁰ Control of human and physical terrain long held was lost, and the resident guerrilla units in populated areas were forced into the deep jungle to avoid the superior firepower of the armed forces. More telling, FARC lost those links to the populace that had served as its original foundation and the basis for its Marxist ideology of liberation. The insurgents, already in a tenuous relationship with the masses due to the former's reliance upon drugs and criminality for resource generation—as opposed to drawing what was needed from the people—found themselves completely isolated. This led to a lashing out against the people, who became not the sea that

fish swam in, but perceived threats. Consequently, the population in general was targeted, completing the transition of the movement from FARC's status as insurgents in the mid-1960s to that of terrorists by the mid-2000s.

This transformation occasioned a new military situation. No more battles against government forces were fought, and the number of firefights dropped significantly. It was evident that the FARC had lost its military capacity. Instead, explosives against different targets were placed in cities and even in the countryside in places such as rural elementary schools, roads, bridges, and trails. The use of mines and improvised explosive devices became commonplace, despite their being internationally banned. It was easy to see that a transformation had taken place not only in FARC fundamentals but also in the nature of its violence and the purpose it served.

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Without doubt, President Uribe's government achieved a big success in driving FARC into its transformation as a terrorist organization with limited power and little future. Yet there remains a threat to local security in certain regions and in particular to the security of citizens where FARC remains determined to launch terrorist attacks, using mainly explosives, and to engage in kidnapping.

Similarly, drug traffickers in many cases have merged with criminal gangs spawned by splinters produced when the larger phenomenon

known as the paramilitaries demobilized in a process accomplished with international involvement.¹¹ The not totally unexpected refusal of some of those demobilized to retreat to their previous life circumstances saw the paramilitaries move laterally into organized crime. In particular, some of the paramilitary second-level leaders quickly became heads of lethal new

by spreading fear in targeted communities, FARC seeks to camouflage its strategic failure, creating at the local level the image that it is yet powerful

groups. One of the main characteristics of this type of organization was close ties to the drug trafficking cartels. Growing involvement in all facets of the drug production and early trafficking cycle led to their receiving the simple name “criminal bands” or, in Spanish, *bandas criminales*, which became BACRIM in everyday usage.¹² Eventually, they became effectively the armed wing of the cartels. Though having much in common with the first generation of paramilitaries, this new generation of BACRIM is more aggressive and more experienced than the previous one and more thoroughly integrated into the narcotics industry. In this they have much in common with the Mexican groups that have dealt such a blow to their country.

As a consequence, despite all that the government has achieved in the security field, the threats of cartels and BACRIM continue to disrupt normal life for many inhabitants of rural areas and even those of some small cities. In this sense, traditional threats to Colombian security have evolved into more sophisticated ones even as certain elements have remained constant. Drug trafficking activity and its immense profits remain central to the challenge. Still, much has changed.

In the first place, FARC has deteriorated from an insurgent organization to a terrorist one. Its main concern has become its own survival. The only way to achieve this is by avoiding direct confrontation with the armed forces. Pursuing such a course of action though creates secondary consequences. If there is no military activity, much is lost, such as internal cohesion, the organization’s credibility in the eyes of its followers, the control over its own nets, and even its relationship with other organizations (such as the narcotraffickers). With this loss goes the possibility of continuing the struggle against the government. The only possible solution is the smart use of force through small actions directed against weak targets, thus to achieve subjectively the appearance of strength even while objectively weak.

Terrorism is an ideal choice in this case. In fact, the abduction of both government officials and civilians is one of FARC’s favored actions. Numerous past victims, representing the armed forces, government, and civil society, remain hostages, some held as long as a decade. The attempt to use important hostages to effect strategic change in the correlation of forces has been revealed through interrogations of prisoners and exploitation of captured FARC documents. Though this gambit has thus far failed, FARC leadership recently issued new orders instructing columns to again seize as many hostages as possible, especially military and even retirees. The plan is to use them as bargaining tools with the government to force it to accept political terms and impositions.

Use of explosives has also become, in a variety of ways, a central part of FARC activity. By spreading fear in targeted communities, FARC seeks to camouflage its strategic failure, creating at the local level the image that it is yet powerful. Though this cannot lead to

strategic advance, it does keep FARC on the stage, ever hopeful to capitalize upon an unseen change of global or regional circumstances that might generate national opportunity.

The criminal bands are using even more drastic methods against the inhabitants of the regions where they are active. Their first goal remains maintaining the drug production process. The protection of coca leaf cultivation is fundamental, and to do this, the BACRIM must control local populations in the affected areas. A second goal is the protection of the primary and advanced laboratories necessary to process the raw material. Both of these lead to the third goal: achieving supremacy in the permanent struggle against possible rivals and competitors. Especially in the southern part of the country close to the border with Ecuador, BACRIM compete not only for control of the coca producing process but also the routes and contacts in other countries.

The best way to gain this control is through extreme measures, assassinations, and expulsions of potentially dangerous populations (for instance, commercial farmers, peasants, and uncooperative residents in general) from areas. In limited areas, BACRIM have domination. This has not been in the manner of insurgents, through total control and exclusion of the government, but through coercion or bribery even as the state remains. A return of such negative realities to areas that during the Uribe administration had begun to experience normal life has led to a loss of state legitimacy among some groups.

In summary, then, it can be judged that the security situation in Colombia is under control. It is quite unlike that which prevailed a decade ago. FARC, in particular, has seen its dreams of seizing power destroyed. The drug traffickers continue in business, but cultivated area and

production capacity have been reduced, as have the number of metric tons shipped to overseas markets. Still, the discussion above should make clear that the armed forces continue to be central to the progress made by the state—a situation that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. This negates Western-centric concepts of “defense reform” that seek an artificial division between roles and missions.

The Way Forward

Local security in Colombia will continue to be an issue for many years. The fundamental concern will be the intensity and quality of that local security.

Intensity denotes the scope, frequency, and type of the issue. Thus far, the scope of the local security has been broad. For this purpose, the army has approximately 25,000 troops distributed in 598 municipalities.¹³ These troops create a protective shield for the police officers in each of the municipalities. Normally, each police station has an average of 20 to 30 officers. In their daily routine, they are distributed in four shifts, which translates into easily less than a dozen on duty at any given moment. The local platoon of 40 men remains on call 24 hours a day within reach of reinforcement by its parent battalion or nearby units. The army does not involve itself in police matters and has no authority to do so. The police implement local law and order. The role of the security platoon is external security of the urban area including patrolling the surroundings and running maneuvers such as ambushes and similar operations. In this way, irregular groups are deterred from approaching the urban areas or interfering with life. The resulting improvement in local security has been dramatic.

Frequency has also been intense. On a permanent basis, platoons have been deployed

in all these villages every day throughout the 9 years that have passed since the Democratic Security Policy was implemented. Small towns and villages have become accustomed to the presence of the soldiers in their villages and believe that the troops “belong” to them. They are part of their daily lives. Besides that, they have become a part of the local economy.

in some of the regions of northern Colombia in the Caribbean region the majority of the security platoons and military units have been withdrawn, with the police assuming full responsibility

The type of security has been “coordinated.” Though army troops do not interfere with police duties, their presence is a factor in reinforcing the sense of security and tranquility. Both forces thus work in coordinated fashion to achieve the same end, even as they maintain their distinct roles and chains of command.

Quality describes the results that, as indicated, have been gratifying, even as *not all* security problems have been solved. Challenges must not obscure the dramatic drop in crime and violence during the past decade. The solutions applied to the problem have been qualitatively superior and have met their objectives.

With this discussion in mind, several questions arise. Is there the possibility in the near future these successful programs that have done so much for local security could be halted? Might the roles of the armed forces, in particular that of the army, be modified substantially? Could a shift of focus release the troops from their internal security roles?

According with the current situation in Colombia, all three questions appear to produce negative responses. To respond otherwise would be to divorce the armed forces and their employment from contextual reality. The security of remote towns and regions would be jeopardized and a relapse to an era of insecurity could occur. What is more likely, then, is modifications in intensity through changes in the scope and frequency as required by local circumstances but adherence strategically to realistic address of Colombia’s situation.

This is already what is happening in some of the regions of northern Colombia in the Caribbean region. There, the quality of security obtained by coordinated action has been high and tranquility has returned. As a consequence, the majority of the security platoons and military units have been withdrawn in a systematic manner, with the police assuming full responsibility for the areas without support from the armed forces. This has not yet proved possible in other regions of the country, especially in the southern part, where the actions of FARC remnants and BACRIM remain a focus of effort by the security forces. In those places, the situation is far from normal, and the coordinated action of both services is a real priority.

In other areas, attention to the situation dictates that frequency be altered. There are areas, for instance, where the armed forces are present on only a temporary basis. This has facilitated a denser concentration of troops in those places with yet some type of problem and permitted the police to normalize daily life in the cleared areas.

This is where matters stand. During the last four decades, Colombia has been affected by what are now called by many “new threats.” Though perhaps not as new as some would claim, these threats have definitely been

impacted by globalization. It has enhanced their scope. In response, the Colombian government, especially during the administration of President Uribe, has developed an effective strategy that has dealt effectively with these new threats and returned most of the country to normal life.

To achieve those results, the armed forces have been tasked with internal security missions that have included local security, counterterrorism, nation-building, and disaster relief. These have been happening now for many years. Particularly important has been the restoration of domestic order, which has been possible only by focusing the armed forces upon internal security as their primary mission. That the complexity of the situation seems to guarantee that irregular challenges will remain into the indefinite future, so will the role of the military be nontraditional, but only in terms of the artificial categories of Western military sociology.

In reality, service to the state is driven by the contextual dynamic. This demands that in the short- and medium-terms, the Colombian armed forces will not change in a dramatic way and will continue to perform the internal security missions with which they have been tasked. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ Argentina fought a short war against the United Kingdom in 1882, and Peru and Ecuador engaged in frontier clashes in the 1970s and 1980s.

² Military actions took place deep in the Amazon Basin, and this factor limited the scope of operations. The major engagement took place in a remote location, Guepi, and it involved but three Colombian battalions supported by an artillery battery, two gunboats, and six planes deployed against a Peruvian reinforced company supported by two battalions that were unable to get to the battlefield in time after being stopped close to their rendezvous point.

³ Jamie Garcia Covarrubias, "New Threats and Defense Transformation: The Case of Latin America," *Low Intensity Conflict and Low Enforcement* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), 114–155.

⁴ Since this time, the Colombian army normally has been weak in tanks and heavy artillery.

⁵ See Bradley Lynn Coleman, "The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950–1954," *The Journal of Military History* 69, no. 4 (October 2005), 1137–1177.

⁶ Colombian Constitution, Title VII: The Executive Branch, Chapter 7, Public Force, Article 218.

⁷ Armero was a small city in the middle of Colombia that was wiped out by an avalanche in November 1986 with a toll of approximately 30,000 casualties.

⁸ Efforts were made to try to speed up the operation and to achieve results in a shorter period of time. In fact, President Uribe often urged his military commanders to quicker and better action.

⁹ The Colombian National Police has benefited from a long relationship with the appropriate U.S. authorities, which provided a great part of the equipment and training needed for mission expansion beyond the realm of traditional policing.

¹⁰ According to official figures, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) effectively have been reduced from between 18,000 to 20,000 in 2002 to 8,000 in 2010. Of the more than 100 armed columns previously in existence, only 30 are currently operational. Reduction of FARC combat power, therefore, has been significant, and changes of recovery in the short- to medium-term are low.

¹¹ Paramilitaries were armed militia of various origins that contested for local and resource control with the insurgents (now terrorists). Though they had a variety of origins, these groups were in their majority spawned

by the actions of FARC. Necessarily, they involved themselves in criminality for funding and ultimately proved every bit as vicious as FARC in their behavior among the populace. Though often portrayed by activists as government auxiliaries, there were no formal links between the state and these criminal elements.

¹² Recently during a press conference in Bogota, Colombia's defense minister pointed out that *bandas criminales* are currently the most dangerous threat to local security in many places of the country and thus the most urgent security threat.

¹³ Information provided by the Colombian Defense Ministry (June 26, 2006) stated that 598 platoons of this type had been deployed with a total of 21,598 effectives in a four-phase program, Plan Coraza (Shield), which covered the most threatened populated areas of Colombia.



Kuchi Village local speaks with Human Terrain Team members in Kandahar Province

Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years

BY MONTGOMERY MCFATE AND STEVE FONDACARO

The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program that recruits, trains, and deploys mixed military and civilian Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), which embed with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams conduct social science research about the local population to provide situational awareness to the military and “enable culturally astute decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge.”¹ The teams rely on the HTS Research Reachback Center to provide secondary source research and

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the Mapping the Human Terrain Toolkit (MAP-HT) to support analysis, storage, and retrieval of sociocultural information.

During the first 4 years of its existence, HTS was surprisingly successful in addressing the requirements of Army and Marine units downrange. In the words of the brigade commander of 56th Stryker who worked with a team in Iraq in 2008, “If someone told me they were taking my HTT, I’d have a platoon of infantry to stop them. . . . The HTT has absolutely contributed to our operational mission. Some things we’ve looked at—solving problems in a lethal manner—we’ve changed to nonlethal options on the basis of the HTT information.”²

the decision to invade Iraq was not supported by adequate research or understanding of the economic, political, historical, or social context

Despite the positive reception by the deployed military units, HTS was controversial with certain elements of the defense intelligence community and with some academics.³ For example, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association found that HTS was “an unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.”⁴ The controversy that surrounded HTS generated substantial media coverage and prompted a vigorous discussion about the application of social science to national security issues.

Until a story appeared about HTS on the cover of the *New York Times* in 2007, almost nobody had heard of the program.⁵ HTS started quietly with a set of PowerPoint slides and no budget. Within 4 years, we:

- ❖ transitioned HTS from a “good idea” to an institutionalized Army program
- ❖ expanded HTS from a 5-team proof of concept to a 30-team program
- ❖ developed HTS from an unresourced concept to a program with a \$150 million a year budget
- ❖ expanded HTS from a small group of colleagues to an organization with over 530 personnel
- ❖ developed the MAP-HT Toolkit from a nonfunctioning prototype to a fully accredited system in use in Afghanistan and Iraq
- ❖ designed, developed, and implemented a training program to prepare HTTs for deployment.

All this was done simultaneously rather than sequentially with a skeleton staff.⁶

During the first 4 years of the program, Montgomery McFate was the Senior Social Scientist and Steve Fondacaro was the Program Manager. Both of us left HTS in 2010. At the end of the first 4 years of the program, we have a rare moment to reflect on our experiences. This article places HTS in historical context as an example of the military’s adaptation to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and then explores the relationship between social science and military intelligence, utility of social science for military operations, importance of sociocultural knowledge in Phase Zero, and unintended consequences of current Army rotation policy.

Identifying the Problem

HTS came into existence at a moment when the Department of Defense (DOD) was adapting to the challenges posed by the wars

in Afghanistan and Iraq. These wars showed that the whole-of-government approach remained more of an ideal than a reality. The decision to invade Iraq was not supported by adequate research or understanding of the economic, political, historical, or social context, though senior leaders such as General Eric Shinseki pointed out shortfalls.⁷ When major combat operations ended in Iraq in May 2003, the consequences of limited planning and ad hoc implementation of post-war stability and reconstruction operations quickly became apparent. Because neither the Department of State nor other agencies of the U.S. Government were able to effectively engage in nation-building due to the security environment and regulatory hindrances, these tasks fell by default to the military. As General David Petraeus once noted, “We looked around for someone to pass the ball to when major combat operations were finished, and there was no one there.”⁸ In effect, the military assumed many of the functions of the Department of State and began performing many activities that were neither their official duties nor within their domain of expertise, such as setting up a local banking system, deworming sheep, and mediating water rights disputes between tribes, to name a few.

In addition to the new governance tasks the military inherited, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations posed unique challenges for U.S. forces. To fight an insurgency effectively, the military must conduct combat operations, reduce support for the insurgents within the population, and increase support for the legitimate host-nation government. Since Field Marshal Gerald Templer coined the phrase during the Malayan Emergency, *hearts and minds* has been used to describe a central task of COIN: engaging the local population

in order to win their trust and negate their support for insurgent organizations. A critical first step in civilian engagement is determining the legitimate power holders in the community, and through them addressing the interests and grievances of the population they represent. The problem in Iraq (and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan) is, as Lieutenant Colonel Richard Welch observed:

Several thousand Iraqis claimed to be real tribal leaders when the actual number is just a few hundred and the number of key top tribal leaders is less than a dozen. The problem with this is that, if the Coalition supports an illegitimate tribal leader that doesn't have a real tribal lineage, then it dishonors the real tribal leaders and alienates them from the Coalition, creating potential enemies or non-support.⁹

The U.S. military, seeking to simplify a situation that it perceived as social disorder and political chaos, redefined the problem as opposing “blue and red” forces and reverted to its traditional comfort zone—kinetic action. This lack of cultural understanding led in some cases to escalation of force or unnecessary violence. For example, in the Western European tradition, a white flag means surrender. Many Marines (rather logically) early in the Iraq war assumed a black flag was the opposite of surrender—“a big sign that said, shoot here!” as one Marine officer pointed out.¹⁰ As a result, many Shia who traditionally fly black flags from their houses as a religious symbol were wrongly considered as the enemy. Conversely, understanding the local culture could often lead to a deescalation of violence and restraint on the use of force. In the words of one Special Forces officer:

Had we understood the cultural role of celebratory gunfire, more than one wedding party would have been spared from fires conducted in self-defense against a perceived threat. While downrange, I tried to impress upon my crew the importance of cultural [intelligence] in the tactical environment. . . . That knowledge enabled us to “retract the fangs” on several occasions, allowing us to identify the behavior of potential threat groups to our ground party as benign.”¹¹

military personnel did not have sufficient baseline knowledge to validate the information and derive the conclusions needed to develop courses of action within the staff decision cycle

These issues—the negative consequences of a lack of cultural knowledge, complexities of engagement in tribal societies, a tendency to resolve issues through kinetic force, and challenges of governance—concerned the small group of us who created HTS. Our hope was that sociocultural knowledge would enable the military to take local perspectives and interests into account in their planning and execution of missions. Perhaps naively, we believed that sociocultural understanding restrains violence rather than enables it.

“An Expensive Footrest”

HTS was born out of a predecessor project called Cultural Preparation of the Environment (CPE). In December 2004, Hriar Cabayan at the Joint Chiefs of Staff J3 (Operations) asked Montgomery to assist with a short-term pilot project, under the sponsorship of the Joint Improvised

Explosive Device (IED) Task Force, to collect and organize cultural information in support of Army brigades in Iraq. Software developers, military personnel with recent experience in Iraq, and a variety of social scientists contributed to the CPE. The CPE used Diyala Province for the proof of concept, in part because prior research had been done there for the Iraq Training Program, a computer-based predeployment training program created for the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations the previous year. The objective of the CPE was to “provide commanders on the ground with a tool that will allow them to understand operationally relevant aspects of local culture; the ethno-religious, tribal and other divisions within Iraqi society; and the interests and leaders of these groups. . . . Ultimately, the CPE may assist commanders in making decisions about applying the appropriate level of force.”¹²

In fall 2005, the CPE prototype was field-tested in Iraq. Since the Joint IED Task Force had sponsored the project, it made sense to field-test the prototype with the task force’s element in Iraq. Colonel Steve Fondacaro, as officer in charge, was responsible for evaluating a variety of counter-IED capabilities. After testing the prototype, he identified three main problems. First, brigade staffs were already overloaded with gadgets that they had no time to learn, manage, or employ. Thus, the CPE in its current form was likely to become an expensive footrest. Second, military personnel did not have sufficient baseline knowledge to enable them to validate the information and derive the conclusions needed to develop courses of action within the staff decision cycle. Third, military units needed embedded social scientists on their staffs who could do research, derive lessons learned from the unit’s experience, and apply them to the development of effective nonlethal courses of action that would make sense to the population.¹³ As a result

of the field test in Iraq, the Joint IED Task Force returned the CPE to its headquarters.

Despite this setback, we began looking for a permanent home for the project in the summer of 2005. Because the Joint IED Task Force (which later became the Joint IED Defeat Organization) could not run programs like CPE on a permanent basis, Dr. Cabayan encouraged the team to reach out to other U.S. Government entities that could develop the CPE as an enduring capability. Thus, we met with the State Department Humanitarian Information Unit in March 2005, Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command in June 2005, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity in July 2005, and so forth. Resulting from the weekly video teleconferences held at the Pentagon, a variety of organizations expressed interest. Because the Army Foreign Military Studies Office's institutional mission aligned with the CPE objectives, we reached out to their parent organization, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DSCINT) to verify its interest. Thus, in March 2006, Montgomery and two colleagues began discussions with Maxie McFarland, the TRADOC DSCINT. McFarland had just completed a year-long tour as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Senior Executive Service Principal for Intelligence and was supportive. In July 2006, TRADOC DCSINT created a steering committee for the Cultural Operations Research–Human Terrain System, as it was then called, which became the foundation for the HTS program staff.

“Catastrophic Success”

In late 2005, the 10th Mountain Division submitted to the Department of the Army an Operational Needs Statement (ONS), which is a Service component document that articulates

the “urgent need for a nonstandard and or unprogrammed capability to correct a deficiency or improve a capability that enhances mission accomplishment.”¹⁴ Generally, units submit an ONS for equipment or technology they lack, but rarely if ever is an ONS used to request a human capability.

U.S. forces continue to operate in Iraq without real-time knowledge of the drivers of the behavior within the host population

Subsequently, Multi-National Corps–Iraq signed a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in April 2007. Combined Joint Task Force 82 signed a JUONS later that month, creating a requirement for Afghanistan. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) consolidated the Afghanistan and Iraq JUONS in May 2007. These documents created HTS and established the requirement for teams at brigade and division level in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Afghanistan JUONS and USCENTCOM JUONS are classified and cannot be quoted from here. However, the unclassified Iraq JUONS offers a unique insight into the issues that senior military personnel in Iraq thought were critical in the 2005–2006 timeframe. Noting that “human terrain knowledge deficiencies” exist at all command echelons, the Iraq JUONS observed that “detailed knowledge of host populations is critical in areas where U.S. forces are being increased to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq. U.S. forces continue to operate in Iraq without real-time knowledge of the drivers of the behavior within the host population. This greatly limits commanders’ situational awareness and creates greater risks for forces.”

Accordingly, the Iraq JUONS established the objectives of the HTS experiment to “improve operational decisions and chances for mission success” through “increased understanding of Iraqi citizens’ physical and economic security needs at local/district resolution”; “increased understanding of local ideological, religious, and tribal allegiances”; and “avoidance of unintended second order effects resulting from a lack of understanding of the local human terrain.” The Iraq JUONS also noted that it was hoped HTS could help “decrease both coalition force and local national casualties” and “avoid needless loss of life that has occurred due to lack of a systematic process and systems to enable transfer of human terrain knowledge during unit Relief in Place/Transition of Authority.”

While the JUONS brought HTS into existence as an organization, it provided no funding. In the private sector, an entrepreneur would approach venture capital firms to raise the money. In DOD, there is no single office and no single process for fundraising. To meet the JUONS requirements, we had to cobble funds together from a variety of sources. Our joke at this time was that we would brief anyone—including the PTA.

In summer 2006, we used the Army ONS as the basis for a proposal to JIEDDO for a \$20 million, 5-team proof of concept.¹⁵ Although we had neither permanent office space nor training facilities, we began training the first HTT with those JIEDDO funds. Operating on the assumption that HTS was going to be a 2-year experiment, we hired staff, coordinated logistics, purchased equipment, recruited team members, wrote a concept of operations, designed the curriculum, and performed the other tasks necessary for startup. A few months after the first team deployed to Afghanistan, however, the newly signed USCENTCOM JUONS increased the requirement for teams

from 5 to 26, divided between two theaters. USCENTCOM had decided to put HTS teams at every Army brigade, Marine regiment, and U.S. division in Iraq and Afghanistan and wanted their request expedited to meet the Baghdad surge.¹⁶ This type of requirement is known inside the Pentagon as “fill or kill,” meaning that if a JUONS is validated as an “immediate warfighter need,” DOD must address the requirements within a fiscal year. In HTS, we referred to this 420 percent increase in the number of teams as a “catastrophic success”: while the boost from DOD was gratifying, fulfilling the mandate would stretch a brand-new organization to the limit.

From an organizational perspective, a slower expansion would have allowed us to build a management structure, hire necessary staff, develop procedures, and perform a host of other activities necessary for a new organization. However, since HTS was standing up 4 years into an active conflict (and thus was already late in some regards), was validated as an immediate warfighter need, and had the potential to save lives in Iraq and Afghanistan, the normally sequential developmental tasks had to be done in parallel and completed as fast as possible. Unlike the world of private industry, there was no way to refuse this mandate or slow it down.

Thus, we initiated planning for submission of the HTS concept plan and table of distribution and authorization in November 2007, conducting regular coordination with Army staff throughout the 2-year approval process. We initiated, developed, and approved the HTS mission statement, mission essential task list, collective tasks, and individual tasks. We began redesigning the training curriculum, which had grown organically over the years, to introduce a case study approach and systematize the research and analysis methods portion of

the course based on team experiences in theater. We built a Program Development Team to identify best practices, collect lessons learned, and solicit recommendations for program improvements (many of which were implemented, including in-theater management). We developed a contracted social science research and analysis capability in both Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct empirical qualitative and quantitative research to augment that of the teams. In 2010, after a 2-year wait, the HTS table of distribution and authorization was finally approved by the Army, and we received authorization for an Army Program Objective Memorandum base for \$18 million, making HTS a permanent Army program.

Reflections

From concept to capability, development of HTS took only a few years. Like any startup venture, HTS experienced a variety of challenges, including obtaining funding, managing personnel, answering to our oversight executive, and responding to the press. Some of these experiences were painful, such as the death of our colleagues Michael Bhatia, Nicole Suveges, and Paula Loyd. Some of these experiences were hilarious, such as karaoke night at the High Noon Saloon in Leavenworth, Kansas. All of these experiences provide fodder for discussion; however, in the interest of brevity, we focus on the relationship between social science and military intelligence, utility of social science for military operations, importance of sociocultural knowledge in Phase Zero, and unintended consequences of current Army force structure.

The Relationship of Social Science and Intelligence

The first Human Terrain Team deployed in February 2007 to support the 4th Brigade

Combat Team of the 82^d Airborne Division at Forward Operating Base Salerno in Khost, Afghanistan. Because HTS was experimental, we wanted the commander to determine where on his staff the HTT should be located, given the unique configuration of his brigade. According to brigade commander Colonel Marty Schweitzer, “The idea to put them in the [intelligence office] turned out to be dead wrong.”¹⁷ Having the HTT in the intelligence office (commonly called the S2) resulted in overclassification of research,¹⁸ reduced the ability to interact with the rest of the staff, and threatened to draw the HTT into kinetic targeting, an activity that was outside the scope of its mission.

The first deployed HTT was initially collocated with the intelligence office as a result of the natural tendency in military organizations to lump functions together by analogy: HTTs deal in information, and information is like intelligence, so they should be part of the intelligence office. COIN and stability operations, however, require new types of organization. Staff structures

having the HTT in the intelligence office threatened to draw the HTT into kinetic targeting, an activity that was outside the scope of its mission

inherited from the Prussian army do not easily accommodate the complexities of 4th-generation warfare. Recently, military staffs have adapted by creating the Effects Cell, generally known as the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell but also as the Fusion Cell (but distinct from an Intelligence Fusion Center). An Effects Cell pulls together all nonlethal resources on a brigade staff, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S. Agency for International Development representatives,

Civil Affairs, and so forth, to evaluate and plan nonlethal operations such as infrastructure repair, governance activities, and agricultural projects.

To execute the nonlethal elements of a brigade's mission, the Effects Cell requires knowledge of the local environment, such as the population's perceptions of the fairness of electoral procedures and the consequences to local communities of reintegration of internally displaced people. Since the HTT mission was to provide sociocultural situational awareness to "enable culturally astute decisionmaking," the HTT was a natural fit within the Effects Cell. It also filled a gap: as one team member in Iraq in 2006 noted, "The S2 doesn't support [Effects Cell] efforts, nobody else supports their intel needs for non-kinetic."¹⁹ HTTs, in sum, provided the information about the local community that the Effects Cell could not get from military intelligence. In the words of one brigade civil-military operations officer in Iraq, "The HTT is the non-lethal S2."²⁰

At the time HTS was created, military intelligence primarily collected and analyzed information to produce targets for kinetic resolution. According to joint doctrine, the primary focus of military intelligence is lethal targeting of the adversary, not understanding social context: "the most important role of intelligence in military operations is to assist commanders and their staffs in . . . determining adversary capabilities and will, identifying adversary critical links, key nodes, [high value targets], and [centers of gravity], and discerning adversary probable intentions and likely [courses of action]."²¹

The disarticulation between military intelligence's historic focus on the adversary and the new requirements for broad sociocultural contextual information necessitated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has caused the military intelligence community to do

some soul-searching. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor note that the military intelligence community has been focused on the enemy rather than the population: "The tendency is to overemphasize detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic, and cultural environment that supports it."²² Contextual information about the population is almost entirely absent: "battalion S-2 shops rarely gather, process, and write up quality assessments on countless items, such as: census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams; polling data and atmospheric reports from psychological operations."²³ The authors attribute this failure to focus on the population to a tendency of "intelligence shops to react to enemy tactics at the expense of finding ways to strike at the very heart of the insurgency," a "lack of sufficient numbers of analysts," and an organizational predilection for "killing insurgents which usually serves to multiply enemies rather than subtract them."²⁴

The heart of the matter is that the training and role of intelligence analysts in most military units is to attend to the "red layer," specifically the identification of targets. Most intelligence offices have their hands full with that particular task and are not trained, manned, or organized to undertake investigation of the local sociocultural context.

Because sociocultural information was outside of the domain of military intelligence when we started HTS, we avoided defining the program as an intelligence activity. Defining HTS as an intelligence program would have been simpler (reducing the need for constant explanation inside and outside of the Pentagon) and easier (making fundraising much more streamlined). As one social scientist in Afghanistan noted in 2009:

*Publicly I don't know why HTS puts such a strong public emphasis on "social science research," which again just invites unnecessary criticism. . . . I have published peer-reviewed academic articles and have a Ph.D. and so believe I have a pretty good understanding of what real social science research that is academically rigorous qualifies as. I have also been over here and been out enough times where I have been consistently shot at to know that what we are doing is substantively different. . . . We are doing fairly generic data collection and analysis on local socio-political dynamics and applying it for non-kinetic ends.*²⁵

Unfortunately, the Pentagon has no snappy phrase for "generic data collection and analysis on local socio-political dynamics." At the time we were building HTS, one could either call it intelligence or social science.

There were also various reasons for framing HTS as a social science program. First, given the vast collection and reporting effort that supports lethal targeting, using HTS to fulfill this function would be redundant and duplicative. Second, the JUONS that brought HTS into existence did not articulate intelligence activities as part of the HTS mission set. Third, the intelligence production process differs significantly from the social science knowledge production process. While the intelligence model separates collection and analysis, HTS follows an academic model whereby the same people collect and analyze information. Social scientists and military intelligence professionals also collect information differently. Human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors search for specific answers to specific questions. As one HTS team member explained, "the challenge for former HUMINTers who have joined HTS is that [they] have to learn to

be satisfied with vague answers to vague questions."²⁶ Whereas HUMINT requires highly specific information about individuals in order to capture or kill, social science, as practiced in HTS, seeks broad contextual information for nonlethal purposes. In the words of one social scientist who served on an HTT in Afghanistan:

*The [intelligence] process involves identifying gaps in threat-oriented knowledge, tasking collection assets who use specialized techniques to gather information (applying those techniques toward gather[ing] information makes the information "intelligence information" because the act of acquisition affects the very data itself, primarily through its extraction from its context—something the social science purposefully rejects), analyzing patterns in the information (without consultation from its sources—another practice that social science rejects) to determine "best fit," selecting information that falls with "best fit" categories set into pre-conceived structural models (widely rejected by critical theorists out of hand since the 60s, let alone other schools) and then reassessing gaps. Intel is about eliminating danger, not building cooperation.*²⁷

while the intelligence model separates collection and analysis, HTS follows an academic model whereby the same people collect and analyze information

Despite our conviction that social science was different from intelligence, critics noted a variety of "evidence" to support their view that HTS was an intelligence program. First, the program was housed within an intelligence subelement of a training and doctrine asset.²⁸

TRADOC intelligence, however, is not supported by Intelligence Community funds and under the DOD Shared Production Program has no charter to produce intelligence products. Second, the oversight executive for HTS was the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. However, when HTS was formed, there were few senior officials in the Pentagon who had any interest in the subject. Finding an Under Secretary willing to accept oversight

we conjectured either DOD would embrace social science as a permanent, institutionalized capability separate from intelligence, or intelligence would expand its aperture to include social science

responsibility for HTS was mostly the result of preexisting relationships with staff members who were able to advocate for us up the bureaucratic chain. Third, the “significant likelihood that HTS data will in some way be used as part of military intelligence, advertently or inadvertently” was problematic.²⁹ All research products in the public domain (including ethnographies produced by academic anthropologists) are accessible by intelligence units. The question is whether a report on property law in Afghanistan or the tribal structure of Mosul would be valuable for lethal targeting. The answer is generally no. As Dr. Kathleen Reedy, a social scientist who served on teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan, noted, “HTTs retain control of their data until it is distributed, not collected. They have the same degree of control that any researcher does until that point. As a social scientist, I could ensure that no one received any information that I did not intend them to, and so could be certain that my informants were kept protected.”³⁰

Downrange, the relationship between the intelligence office and HTT was sometimes antagonistic and sometimes cooperative depending on the culture of the brigade, its mission, individual personalities, and the local environment. In 2008 in Iraq, we visited one HTT that was having trouble integrating with their brigade as a result of that unit’s lethal targeting focus. The brigade S2 viewed the HTT as a threat to his “turf,” a misunderstanding that was cleared up after a brief conversation. Another S2 in Iraq who worked with a team in 2009 had a different view: “Typically the brigade relies on intel to provide what the HTT now provides to us. We don’t have the knowledge—we haven’t been there for a long time. We have no time, and no manpower resources to focus on population and environment. It really helps us out because I don’t have the time to dedicate to it. We’re so focused on the bad guy.”³¹

When we were building HTS, most of the Intelligence Community was disinterested in sociocultural information. Some elements of the Intelligence Community have now integrated it into their missions.³² For example, the Defense Intelligence Agency established the Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group. U.S. Central Command established an Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence, which contains a Human Terrain Analysis branch. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence made a large investment in sociocultural analysis at the theater-strategic level and established the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council. However, a number of barriers remain. First, political pressure to resolve the war in Afghanistan has apparently caused Major General Flynn’s successor, Major General Steve Fogarty, to reject “the need for social, civil and tribal intelligence” and shift the emphasis back to

“targeting the enemy.”³³ Second, the focus on short-term effects within DOD and the Intelligence Community has sustained the preference for airborne technical collection systems.³⁴ Third, the terms *sociocultural dynamics* and *human terrain* have no shared meaning. The military intelligence community tends to think of these terms as quantitative information about population demographics represented through geographic overlays. DOD tends to think of sociocultural dynamics as modeling and simulation (“methods, models and tools”),³⁵ rather than the type of empirical on-the-ground research required to support military units in combat.

In 2005, we conjectured about the possible bureaucratic outcomes of interjecting social science into a military context: either DOD would embrace social science as a permanent, institutionalized capability separate from intelligence, or intelligence would expand its aperture to include social science as part of its mission, doctrine, and training. This would create a permanent cadre of dedicated professional researchers and analysts and a permanent funding stream for acquiring and archiving this information, which might lead to better preparation for future U.S. military operations overseas. It would mean that someone in the Pentagon would be the oversight executive for this abandoned child called social science, with the authority to evaluate programs and ensure funding.

On the other hand, keeping social science outside of the Intelligence Community would preserve its unique perspective. As one social scientist in HTS noted:

An antagonistic relationship between HTS and intelligence operations fortifies the relevance of both, strengthens their interest in doing methodologically (each

*to his own) solid work, and increases the military’s access to distinctly multiple reporting. . . . One of the best things HTS can do is to approach an issue from completely different and distinct directions, and contradict the perspective of intelligence. That contributes to the [military decisionmaking process] more than hand holding, group thinkers.*³⁶

The view that social science perspectives offer a unique, independent perspective has also been echoed by members of military units who have worked with HTTs. In the words of the executive officer for Marine Regimental Combat Team 8, “When you go into a planning process, it’s not good to have a consensus view when you’re forming a [course of action]. You need to hear new perspectives, and you need people who bring something new to the table. If [the HTT] are too close to intel, you get too much consensus.”³⁷

A variety of bureaucratic actors, each with their own agendas, will make a final determination about the fate of social science over the next few years. Our hope is that the potential contributions of social science to the national security decisionmaking process are not overlooked.

Utility of Social Science for the Warfighter

During the development process for the CPE in 2005, our team sent out a data call to the 15 intelligence agencies of the U.S. Government. Our goal was to see whether the ontology we developed worked with real data, assess what information was being collected, and whether what we were proposing was duplicative. In response to our request for information about the tribal structure in Diyala, we received wildly incongruent answers. Some agencies stated there were seven tribes in



U.S. Army (Canaan Radcliffe)

Psychologist and DOD civilian Richard R. Boone interviews Afghans about daily life in Logar Province

Diyala, others said there were hundreds. After conducting preliminary survey research in Diyala, we tentatively identified 15 tribal confederations and 87 major tribal groups in the province.

The paucity of consistent data in the intelligence stream resulted in an epiphany: intelligence agencies were collecting sociocultural data mainly as an afterthought. Collection, when it did take place, was through HUMINT or open source intelligence. Those who collected it were not trained social scientists, and thus the data were subject to a variety of issues, such as validity, reliability, and bias. In effect, U.S. and coalition forces were interacting every day with a population about which they knew little, and we believed some empirical research might help.

Indeed, supported military units frequently commented on the benefits of having social scientists on their staffs. The first common theme was the increased accuracy of data. In the words of a deputy operations staff officer for the 172^d Stryker Brigade Combat Team who spent a tour in Iraq in 2008 working with an HTT, “This is my third rotation, but we’ve always done a horseshit job at it. We don’t have enough patience. Everything we do is focused on security. But they can get after a problem set and be more academic about it. . . . We have a tendency to bullshit and say ‘this is how people feel’ but having a dedicated academic supported by operators, they can achieve a lot more accurate data.”³⁸

The second theme we heard from military units concerned the benefits of analysis. Often, the military used unanalyzed, impressionistic data generated by haphazard research as the basis for decisionmaking. In the words of the assistant chief of staff for operations for II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), Multi-National Force–West:

*When you all weren't here, we relied upon ourselves to do the requisite research—What is a tribe? How many are there? An economy, [what] makes it sustainable? We were just trying to touch everything—build schools, make hospitals work, train governments through the [Provincial Reconstruction Teams], and at the same time fighting the IED fight. . . . The HTT brought folks who were immediately able to look at the problem, identify the causal effects, how this trickles down, and how it [a]ffects population from a security point of view. . . . Now we have a team to do this instead of just a bunch of guys who can shoot well trying to do it.*³⁹

The third theme that we heard frequently from military units concerned the benefit of having someone with expert knowledge on their staff. Regional expertise seemed to be less relevant than domain knowledge. For example, the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, was supported by an HTT with a political scientist as a team member. According to the civil-military operations officer:

*You can take an engineer from the States and they'll compare their pencil protectors—engineering is engineering—but when you get into the political play and how the ballot was designed for the election, you probably ought to have a political scientist on the team. . . . We had no violence [on election] day because we covered it well. It could have very easily tipped the other way, but it didn't because we had the information provided by the HTT that helped the brigade commander make the decisions that made the day successful, and there was no violence because of it.*⁴⁰

The fourth common theme was simply that soldiers should perform the military tasks for which they are trained and qualified. Soldiers should be soldiers, not social scientists. According to the French Civil-Military Co-operation/Civil-Military Operations Officer for Task Force Corrigan, “It’s very difficult to train soldiers to be scientists. You can train them to do interviews but they won’t have the capacity to make analysis, and that’s the most difficult part. . . . It’s easier now to take scientists and put them with military. Soldiers when they arrive here are here to fight, not to engage people in discussion about family, religion, and way of life.”⁴¹

analysts are not so much in the wrong places as they are starved for the right information

The Intelligence Community has recognized the benefits of having granular socio-cultural information. Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor assert that military intelligence analysts should focus on the political, economic, and social aspects of the local population at a granular level. However, they note that “these analysts—the core of them bright, enthusiastic, and hungry—are starved for information from the field, so starved, in fact, that many say their jobs feel more like fortune telling than serious detective work.”⁴² As a mitigating measure, the authors propose relocating analysts to battalion level and below. However, analysts are not so much in the wrong places as they are starved for the right information. Relocating analysts to the lowest level cannot improve the quantity, quality, or availability of population-based information. As Thomas Marks, a professor at National Defense University, noted: “You can’t

correctly assess a situation about which you have only second-hand knowledge. . . . Who knew better how the Arab revolt was going, Lawrence or the bureaucrats in Cairo?”⁴³

Despite the benefits to the military of having social scientists conducting research in-theater, some commentators believe that “social scientists should not be directly embedded with military units in theater” and should assist the military at a distance by providing predeployment training.⁴⁴ The main reason for keeping social scientists out of theater is that their involvement would “only further alienate most social science academics from the military”⁴⁵ and “provide antimilitary elements within their own community any substantial ammunition with which to undermine the military-academic relationship.”⁴⁶ Denying the opportunity for civilian service to academics who are willing to contribute directly to national security only hurts military efforts downrange. Civilian members of HTTs (or Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Teams, or any other entity that uses scholarly labor in a military context) contribute something valuable to the commander and staff of deployed units—namely, a unique *nonmilitary* perspective derived from years of education and research. Civilian social scientists who work *for* the military but are not *in* the military bring a level of objectivity and an out-of-the-box perspective that promotes increased understanding of the civilian population and helps identify more effective courses of action. Because civilian members of an HTT are not beholden to the performance pressures created by the need to obtain a favorable Officer Evaluation Report rating, they can articulate views not necessarily in conjunction with the dominant perspective. Keeping civilian social scientists out of theater will not alleviate the antipathy between academia and the military

and will reduce the number of civilian social scientists with relevant experience and knowledge. Everyone would lose if ivory towers became inaccessible fortresses.

Phase Zero

When discussing the performance of the teams with supported units downrange, we frequently heard the question, “Where were you 5 years ago?” As the assistant chief of staff for operations, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), Multi-National Force–West, observed, “We would have gotten where we are now sooner if we’d had knowledge of infrastructure—what does paramount sheikh really mean? When they say they’re unemployed, what does that mean? If we’d had that back then, we could have done the COIN fight not better, but quicker.”⁴⁷ From platoon leaders to corps commanders, the general consensus was that sociocultural information would have been helpful *before* the war began. This observation caused us to wonder whether the war in Iraq would have been less lethal, better executed, or even unnecessary if this information had been available to and utilized by decisionmakers during Phase Zero.

In planning a campaign, the military divides the time sequence into six phases: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.⁴⁸ Phase Zero, the shaping phase of the campaign, involves activities “to assure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”⁴⁹

In simple terms, Phase Zero refers to the prevention of conflict. According to General Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S.

European Command, “Phase Zero encompasses . . . everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place.” The “ultimate goal” is to build capacity in partner nations that enables them to “prevent or limit conflicts.”⁵⁰ This focus on “prevention rather than reaction,” in the words of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, is central to the mission of U.S. Africa Command.⁵¹

In the standard military campaign model, the Y-axis represents a time sequence, while the X-axis represent the level of military effort. The X-axis also represents a cost curve, whether that cost is financial, national resources, or lives lost. Avoiding the cost curve is desirable from both a moral and financial standpoint. In the words of then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates:

*How do you identify a problem early and put in the resources—whether it’s train and equip or other partnership initiatives—so that American men and women in uniform don’t have to go fight, so that we build indigenous capabilities that provide for stability operations rather than having to go in and do it ourselves in ungoverned spaces in countries that are under stress?*⁵²

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For example, the intervention in Liberia in 2003 cost “over \$680 million, mostly for [United Nations] peacekeeping and emergency assistance. Prior to that, the United States had committed a mere \$67 million to programs to promote stability in the troubled nation. Doubling or even tripling spending on our preventive programs would still have been far cheaper than the cost of reacting to the crisis and the violence that eventually unfolded.”⁵³

If sociocultural knowledge benefits commanders and their staffs during tactical operations, it might also benefit the combatant commands conducting Phase Zero activities, such as building partnership capacity, influencing neutrals and potential adversaries, and alleviating underlying causes of conflict. As noted in Joint Publication 3–0, *Joint Operations*:

*The social, economic, and political environments in which security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly [host nation] require a firm understanding of [that nation’s] cultural and political realities. History has shown that cultural awareness cannot be sufficiently developed after a crisis emerges, and must be a continuous, proactive element of theater intelligence and engagement strategies.*⁵⁴

if sociocultural knowledge benefits commanders during tactical operations, it might also benefit the combatant commands conducting Phase Zero activities

In 2004, the Defense Science Board (DSB) asked combatant commands to evaluate their preparedness for stability operations. According to the DSB, “almost across the board, combatant commanders felt they needed more knowledge for every country in their area of responsibility in order to be most effective in peacetime and during stabilization and reconstruction.”⁵⁵ Suspecting that there was probably still a gap in this domain, we reached out to U.S. Pacific Command, Special Operations Command–Pacific, and Combined

Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in 2008. Although senior staff confirmed the need for more sociocultural knowledge in their respective organizations, the bureaucracies were so byzantine that the timescale for working solutions was geological. Money that was programmed by the Pentagon years earlier to improve the combatant commands' sociocultural knowledge eventually went toward hiring more analysts rather than conducting systematic, empirical social science research. It is worth repeating an observation from Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor: “analysts . . . are starved for information from the field, so starved, in fact, that many say their jobs feel more like fortune telling than serious detective work.”⁵⁶ Creating more analysts but failing to provide actual information from the field is unlikely to produce different results even if a crystal ball were included.

recognizing the effects of unit rotation policies, we deployed HTS teams in such a way that they were permanently geographically located

Mitigating Army Unit Rotation Policy

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army employs a policy of unit rotation, which means deploying an entire unit (brigade, division, corps) to a theater, keeping it in place (generally for 12 months), rotating the unit home, and simultaneously replacing it with another unit. Individual rotation, on the other hand, “maintains the same unit in theater over time but moves individual soldiers into and out of the unit.”⁵⁷

The current unit rotation policy limits the Army's ability to conduct COIN and stability operations. As one Special Forces Soldier noted, “‘rotational warfare,’ as it is often called, is one of the single greatest obstacles to the

long-term success of [COIN] in our respective theaters.”⁵⁸ First, the unit rotation policy creates a narrow window when units can focus on their mission. A unit requires 3 months at the beginning of a tour to get organized and emplaced, and 3 months at the end of the tour to prepare to redeploy. This leaves the unit 6 to 8 months to focus on its mission. Second, the short duration of the tour prevents units from developing expertise about local population. As one unit leaves, a new unit must start from the beginning. The “left seat/right seat ride” (in which a unit passes information and personal contacts with the population to another unit) is often hindered by time and manpower constraints. As Brian Jenkins has noted, “America's unit rotation policy impedes the accumulation of local knowledge and breaks the personal relationships that are essential to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.”⁵⁹ Third, disrupting the interpersonal relationships between soldiers and community members established during a year-long deployment has a significant deleterious effect on trust, credibility, and even such mundane matters as contracting.

Recognizing the effects of unit rotation policies (and our inability to change Army policy), we organized and deployed HTS teams in such a way that they were permanently geographically located. After a new team deployed, it was filled as needed with individual replacements, staggered over time, as the old team members rotated out. In theory, this enabled the team to become the knowledge base for the unit and to provide continuity with the local population. New units that rotated into theater found an HTT already in place, prepared with information about the local economy, political system, and key leaders. As the S3 chief of plans for 56th Stryker Brigade noted in 2008: “The HTT provided continuity that we wouldn't have had otherwise. . . . Having an HTT,

you can walk across the street and talk to an experienced team who knows what was going on with sheik so-and-so 6 or 7 months ago.”⁶⁰

In mitigating some of the unintended consequences of the Army unit rotation policy, we assumed the difficulties of an individual replacement system. These difficulties included integrating individuals into teams already on the ground, separation of individuals who worked well together in training and wanted to stay together downrange, difficulty integrating existing teams with newly arrived units, and a variety of similar issues. We considered options to mitigate the effects of individual rotation of team members, including pairing social scientists and team leaders or changing the duration of tours. However, managing the HTS team replacement system, which involved creating new teams from scratch (through a process of training, evaluation and assignment with associated attrition) and backfilling existing teams, was complex and did not lend itself to any easy solution. Ironically, the problem we sought to address on a microlevel within HTS was recapitulated with no obvious solution.

Conclusions

While looking for a motto for the program in 2006, one of us (Montgomery) proposed and the other (Steve) rejected “Changing the Army, One Brigade at a Time.” In retrospect, the motto was not inaccurate; our goal was to improve a small but critical part of how military units conduct their mission. We wanted to provide military units with operationally relevant sociocultural information so decisions and actions would be better informed, more compassionate, and less kinetic. Based on feedback from the units HTS supported—as impressionistic and subjective as that may be—the teams downrange were beneficial to the Army and Marine Corps.

Whether HTS or any program with similar goals could be effective on a strategic level remains to be seen. Even if the requisite socio-cultural knowledge were readily available, easily retrieved, and presented in a user-friendly format, would combatant commanders or policymakers actually use it to craft strategy and execute plans? Would detailed, empirical knowledge of the tribal structure in Iraq or the political objectives of Ho Chi Minh during the Vietnam War have enabled us to better shape the environment or deter conflict? Critics of the Bush administration believe that the Iraq War was the product of a neoconservative political agenda that rejected nuanced approaches in favor of military unilateralism. In that type of policy environment, a tree falling in a forest does not make any sound.

Whether the military itself can change and institutionalize the thinking that brought HTS into being remains to be seen. On April 14, 2008, Secretary Gates gave a speech in which he observed that the “Human Terrain program . . . is leading to alternative thinking—coming up with job-training programs for widows, or inviting local power-brokers to bless a mosque restored with coalition funds. These kinds of actions are the key to long-term success, but they are not always intuitive in a military establishment that has long put a premium on firepower and technology.”⁶¹ Despite the recent experience with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the military establishment continues to operate on the assumption that firepower and technology are the sine qua non of the military machine. Programs such as HTS are unusual and experimental, but this also makes them vulnerable to the plate tectonics of the Pentagon.

Only time will tell whether HTS endures, whether the U.S. military adapts, and whether it is judged as a success or failure. We enjoyed doing our part. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ The Human Terrain System (HTS) mission statement is available at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Default.aspx>>. It was developed through a series of workshops and approved by the Program Manager in 2008. It follows guidance from Field Manual 5–0, *Army Planning and Orders Production* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, January 2005), and uses a variety of materials to include the HTS concept of operations, HTS concept plan, Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement, and HTS annual report 2007–2008.

² Interview, 2008; notes in possession of authors.

³ Ben Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket,” *Military Review* (March–April 2009).

⁴ American Anthropological Association (AAA) Executive Board, *Statement on the Human Terrain System Project*, October 31, 2007, available at <www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/Human-Terrain-System-Statement.cfm>.

⁵ David Rohde, “Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones,” *The New York Times*, October 5, 2007, available at <www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html>.

⁶ When the authors use the term *we* in this article, it refers to the team of people who built HTS or to the HTS staff in general.

⁷ When General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2003 that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz dismissed his views and asserted that many fewer troops would be needed, given that there was no ethnic strife in Iraq as there was in Bosnia or Kosovo. See Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size,” *The New York Times*, February 28, 2003.

⁸ Interview with General David Petraeus, 2006; notes in possession of authors.

⁹ Richard D. Welch, *Building Cultural Bridges: A Year in Iraq with the First Cavalry Division* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006).

¹⁰ Interview, 2006.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Joint IED Task Force, Cultural Preparation of the Environment Pilot Information Sheet, July 19, 2005.

¹³ Some of us working on the CPE were concerned that a database system would not fully address the gaps being expressed by the military in Iraq. Thus, in March 2005, Montgomery and one of her colleagues produced a paper outlining a concept for an organization that would deploy teams, conduct social science research, provide reachback, run the CPE database, provide training, and so forth. *Military Review* eventually published the paper. See Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, “An Organizational Solution to DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs,” *Military Review* (July–August 2005), 18–21.

¹⁴ Army Regulation 71–9, December 28, 2009, 6-1(a), 25, available at <http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/R71_9.PDF>.

¹⁵ Resourcing was approved in 50 percent increments but contingent on individual unit requests, which came quickly from 82^d Airborne Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force, and III Army Corps.

¹⁶ Following a presentation to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell in late April 2007, \$66 million was approved for fiscal year 2007 and \$122 million for fiscal year 2008.

¹⁷ Interview with Colonel Marty Schweitzer, 2007; notes in possession of authors.

¹⁸ Because it handles secure compartmentalized information relating to potential targets, military intelligence is sequestered from the rest of the staff. The intelligence generated concerns the location, identity,

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capabilities, and intent of people, places, and things, which can be targeted using lethal force. As a result, almost everything produced by intelligence offices is classified and not available to most staff members.

¹⁹ Interview, 2006.

²⁰ During the 4 years that we were involved with HTS, no HTT was assigned to the intelligence office. As noted above, the vast majority of teams were located with the Effects Cell. However, when the HTT team leader has a rank above O5, the HTT tends to acquire the status of special staff (such as the Judge Advocate General or the chaplain) with a direct line of communication to the brigade commander. In Iraq in 2009, 40 percent of the teams were assigned as special staff working directly for the commander, or through the deputy commander or executive officer. This arrangement enhances team ability to influence and contribute to brigade planning and operations. It may also, however, limit the ability of the team to integrate fully with the rest of the brigade staff.

²¹ Joint Publication 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2006), I-26.

²² Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2010), 3, available at <www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf>.

²³ Ibid., 7.

²⁴ Ibid., 8.

²⁵ Interview, 2009; notes in possession of authors.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Interview, 2010; notes in possession of authors.

²⁸ AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities, *Final Report on the Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program*, submitted to the AAA Executive Board, October 14, 2009, 18.

²⁹ Ibid., 3.

³⁰ Interview, 2009.

³¹ Interview, 2008.

³² Broadening the aperture of the Intelligence Community, and the HTS project in particular, was championed by Lieutenant General John F. Kimmons, who was the Army G2 at the time and became Director of the Intelligence Staff for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on February 28, 2009.

³³ Kimberly Dozier, "Intelligence Shift Shows Change in Afghan War Aims," Associated Press, June 27, 2011.

³⁴ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Intelligence: Counterinsurgency Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*, Washington, DC, February 2011, 61.

³⁵ The majority of DOD sociocultural programs fall within the Human Social Culture Behavior Modeling Program (HSCB), executed by the Office of Naval Research. See HSCB Newsletter, Spring 2011, 9.

³⁶ Interview, 2010.

³⁷ Interview, 2008; notes in possession of authors.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Interview, 2009.

⁴² Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 9.

⁴³ Thomas A. Marks, "Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 11, no. 3 (Winter 2000), 21–46.

⁴⁴ Scott Atran, "Pathways to and from Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-Based Field Research," Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2010.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Connable.

⁴⁷ Interview, 2008.

⁴⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 3–0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 17, 2006, incorporating Change 1, February 13, 2008), IV-27–IV-30.

⁴⁹ Ibid., IV-27–IV-28.

⁵⁰ Charles F. Wald, "New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign," *Joint Force Quarterly* 43 (4th Quarter, 2006), 72–75.

⁵¹ Theresa Whelan, "Why AFRICOM? An American Perspective," Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, August 17, 2007, available at <www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ord538=grp1&ots591=eb06339b-2726-928e-0216-1b3f15392dd8&lng=en&id=99985>.

⁵² John J. Kruzell, "Stability Operations Require More U.S. Focus, Gates Says," American Forces Press Service, April 14, 2009.

⁵³ Wald, 73.

⁵⁴ JP 3–0, VII-10.

⁵⁵ Defense Science Board (DSB), *Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington, DC: DSB, December 2004), 114.

⁵⁶ Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, 9.

⁵⁷ Douglas Holtz-Eakin, "The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq," Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, November 5, 2003, 10. The Army's unit rotation policy resulted from the experience of individual rotation during the Vietnam War. As Charlie Moskos once noted, "The rapid turnover of personnel hindered the development of primary-group ties . . . [and] reinforced an individualistic perspective." See Charles C Moskos, Jr., "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," *Journal of Social Issues* 31, no. 4 (1975), 31.

⁵⁸ William S. Sobat, "Relief in Place: Managing the Transition of Authority," *Special Warfare* (January–February 2009), 29.

⁵⁹ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Safer, But Not Safe," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, September 10, 2006, available at <www.rand.org/commentary/2006/09/10/SDUT.html>.

⁶⁰ Interview, 2008.

⁶¹ Robert M. Gates, Speech to the Association of American Universities, April 14, 2008, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228>.

Patronage versus Professionalism in New Security Institutions

BY KIMBERLY MARTEN

Where do effective military and police institutions come from in a society that is not already based on the rule of law? In particular, can informal militias based on patron/client relations be successfully reformed or integrated into professional and effective state security institutions? We do not have good answers to these questions. Yet the United States and its allies are wrestling with them daily in many locations around the globe. My goal in this article is to examine what we do know about historical and recent situations that to some degree mirror these current challenges, and to draw out some unexpected practical suggestions about what might work on the ground.

These questions originally grew out of my research on warlords. *Warlords* are individuals who control small pieces of territory through a combination of force and patronage, acting in defiance of genuine state sovereignty but with the collusion of weak states and their leaders.¹ The relationship of warlords and their informal militias to state actors is bargained and based on personal ties. Warlord militias are not implacably hostile to the state or resentful of *de jure* state sovereignty over the territory where they operate. In most cases, state leaders have actually informally granted them *de facto* control over particular territories. This situation creates obvious challenges for internationally supported security sector reform efforts in places such as Afghanistan.² But these questions have relevance beyond cases of warlordism, too. Rebel or paramilitary forces opposed to the current state

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can also be based on patronage ties, reflecting a commander's ability to take care of followers by sharing the spoils with them rather than on professional discipline and adherence to a mission or ideology.³

Such questions raise a conundrum for the United States and its allies in many postconflict areas where key interests are at stake. As a crucial component of peace accords in many parts of the world, militias that are based as much on personal ties and the political economy of a spoils system as on common ideological goals have been integrated into new state security forces, with the United States and its allies providing training and support. The prime consideration for policymakers has usually been to stop the bloodshed and achieve some measure of stability in new or reconstituted states. The successes of these stabilizing efforts should not be underestimated. There has been little focus, however, on the long-term security implications for the United States when it chooses to support patronage-based security institutions under a new guise.

patronage is a factor the United States should consider when designing its foreign military assistance policies

For example, in Afghanistan the Local Police Initiative relies in part on former mujahideen commanders (at least some of whom fit the definition of warlords) for recruitment through personal connections.⁴ In Iraq, many of the Awakening and Sons of Iraq units that were slated for integration into state police and army forces were tribal or neighborhood groups, connected through family or other personal ties, who were known to have engaged in organized criminal activity in the past. In Kosovo,

family and clan relationships underpinned many Kosovo Liberation Army units, which have now been quietly integrated into the new state security forces after what amounted to a temporary decade of official disarmament. In Somalia, the United States and its Ethiopian allies have often cooperated with former warlords and their chosen armed contingents.

A vivid illustration of this conundrum is found in the Egyptian military in 2011, which has taken a leading role in the post-Mubarak political transition following popular revolt against the authoritarian regime. Long trained and supported by the United States, Egyptian forces have been lauded for their combat skills, respect for civilian control, and efforts at civilian casualty avoidance. Egyptian protestors were eager to maintain good relations with the military, seeing the institution as friendly and a potential bulwark against the brutal Interior Ministry police. Yet the Egyptian military is known to practice patronage. Analyst Lisa Anderson notes that the military leadership is “deeply interwoven into the domestic economy” and “largely hostile to economic liberalization and private-sector growth.”⁵ It remains unclear what this military patronage system bodes for the future of Egyptian development and for Egyptian popular perceptions about what has been a critical U.S. alliance in the volatile Middle East. This example suggests patronage is a factor the United States should consider when designing its foreign military assistance policies.

Definitions and Implications

In patron/client systems, both security and economic advancement are determined by how well one is personally connected to those who control the exercise of force. People in the inner social circle surrounding powerbrokers are well protected, and they and their friends have



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easy access to political and economic resources. Patronage ties may lead to hiring and promotion as well as opportunities for graft and corruption that are denied to those outside the network. Those who are not favored by family or other social connections must simply live as best they can, on the good graces of those who control the territory. For example, if they try to start a business that is not supported by the powerbrokers, they may have a hard time protecting it from thieves or arson.

In these systems, trust of other people depends on personal relationships, not on faith in abstract institutions such as the law. This means that strangers are by definition threatening since they belong to different and potentially competing patronage networks. Thus, laws and other institutions of the state are rather meaningless; they are shells controlled by in-groups. Corruption of state resources—not rule of law—is the socially accepted norm.

As long as commanders in patron/client systems retain the loyalty of their forces, patronage-based militias (and what Samuel P. Huntington famously called “praetorian” state security institutions⁶) can win battles and keep and expand territory. Francis Fukuyama points out that China, for example, has wrestled for centuries over whether familial patron/client ties or professional bureaucratic institutions would be the basis for state-building.⁷ The Chinese state endured through all of these struggles, which he believes remain unresolved to this day.

Fukuyama argues nonetheless that the Chinese state was weakened whenever familial rule won out. An examination of patronage systems in theory and practice explains why. Distrust of outsiders is endemic, making large-scale coordination difficult and violent infighting between competing in-groups likely. Fukuyama notes that familial rule often led authority to devolve to the local level in Chinese history. Corruption makes security institutions expensive to maintain, and implies that

their equipment, logistics, and even purported personnel numbers will be unreliable, given the incentives to fudge the data for personal gain. As we see in Egypt, by their nature these institutions set favored in-groups apart from disfavored out-groups, potentially creating long-term resentments (and hence instability) both within the forces and the surrounding population. Such characteristics cannot form a solid basis for reliable security institutions and state-building over the long term.

institutionalization of economic law contributes to the future bargaining power of states on both the domestic and international level

Unanswered Questions

The lack of attention to this problem by U.S. policymakers is not surprising, since these questions also fall into a gap in the literature on state-building. There is a large academic literature from sociology and economics that describes why rule-based (as opposed to personal patronage-based) *economic* institutions should evolve over time. The institutionalization of abstract rules that apply to everybody should serve the interests of elite actors. Elites enmeshed in traditional patron/client exchange relationships should find that their interests are better served by being more inclusive in their trading and investment decisions since this expands the scope and scale of useful exchanges. The inclusion of strangers in economic relationships demands a high level of confidence in legal institutions that can enforce bargains and contracts.⁸ Buyers and sellers should value the reduction in uncertainty

that legal institutions provide for their commercial interactions. Third-party enforcement of legal bargains allows them to decrease the costs of business transactions, especially when dealing with potentially unscrupulous strangers.⁹ State leaders should come to see it being in their interests to enact property rights, rather than ruling by capricious or arbitrary fiat, since the confidence this gives property holders in the future value of their investments will lead to revenue maximization (useful both for paying off internal rivals and fighting foreign wars).¹⁰ In turn, when wide-ranging, inclusive bargains can be enforced through institutional legitimacy and general respect for law, rather than the use of actual force, it frees state resources for wealth generation. Institutionalization of economic law thereby contributes in a virtuous circle to the future bargaining power of states and state leaders on both the domestic and international level.¹¹ The literature agrees that this helped lead to the triumph of the Western European model of statehood since reliable legal institutions allowed such states to achieve military and economic dominance.

Yet there is a gap between the economic institutionalization literature and the notion of the institutionalization of *security* provision. We know full well that many states in the world continue to operate by patronage in spite of these supposed incentives for change. Who does the enforcing of these new inclusive bargains and depersonalized laws in a system that is not already based on abstract legality? How are security forces found who are willing *not* to be bought off by the old patron/client networks?

All human interaction originally began at the level of families, clans, and tribes.¹² Security and defense of the group from predators was provided by those whom one knew personally. In a stateless social environment, it is natural

for security institutions to practice patron/client favoritism and out-group predation since both trust and profit are based on direct knowledge of another person's history and reputation. Many organized crime groups in areas suffering from state weakness continue to operate through such patron/client relationships today.¹³

Yet at some point effective military and police forces, including those located in liberal democracies, stopped practicing patronage or at least severely limited its practice (one can imagine, for example, that nepotism in police hiring might still be common, but with forces for the most part practicing rule-based, rather than family-based, enforcement of law). How can security forces that are undergoing the process of state-building or state reconstruction come to be made up of individual members who follow abstract, institutionalized rules instead of remaining loyal to patron/client cleavages? How, while undergoing that process, can they maintain their ability to defend themselves and their populations against those whose self-interest is harmed by the end of patronage? In other words, how can rules be made stronger than personal social ties in situations where legalism is not already the norm and security is tenuous?

Our comparative historical knowledge about these endeavors is weak. In the rest of this article, I review some of the existing literature relating to these questions, identifying crucial issues for policymakers to consider, even though most of the literature does not address these questions directly.

Literature on Demobilization

There is a large recent literature on the demobilization of fighting forces after civil wars.¹⁴ By definition, the concept of demobilization implies that rebels are disarmed—nonstate militias are broken down and disbanded. There

is no effort in these cases to integrate informal militias into the new security forces, which are instead formed from scratch. For example, in postwar Liberia, officers of Charles Taylor's army and police forces, as well as anyone known to have committed any crimes or human rights abuses, were explicitly excluded from the new security agencies.¹⁵ In postwar El Salvador, a national police force was created *de novo*, state military forces were reduced and reformed, and rebel forces were disarmed and became a successful civilian political party.¹⁶ Getting rid of the old security forces might seem a straightforward way to eliminate their patronage behavior.

Indeed, forced or negotiated demobilization of nonstate militias has been a regular occurrence throughout history. In Europe, it dates at least from the rise of European nationalism and mass armies under Napoleon.¹⁷ In Japan, it occurred at the dawn of the Meiji era in the late 19th century when samurai lords were stripped of their military functions to fashion a new state that could compete with the West.¹⁸ In China, it happened in the 1930s and 1940s, with the triumph of Mao Zedong's Red Army out of the ashes of Republican-era warlordism and the eventual defeat of Japanese efforts at domination.¹⁹ The newer literature on the concept never cites or explores this historical analysis, and that is unfortunate; the problem of how to successfully demobilize a militia is not a new one.

The findings of this older literature lead to two potentially useful policy conclusions. First, historically leaders were able to replace patron/client security systems with effective professional armies when states faced a strong external threat. In Europe, China, and Japan, demobilization of old militias happened when the state needed an effective army to ward off foreign invasion. (Fukuyama notes that militaries

Afghan Uniform Police knock down
poppy plants in Zabul Province





often have no means to survive in combat unless they become meritocracies; he believes that this causes military organizations to lead civilian bureaucracies in the speed and depth of their professionalization.²⁰) This may mean, though, that such a transition might have trouble succeeding today. Most states simply do not face a threat to their existence. Scholars have

an ideology of individual human rights fundamentally challenges the collectivism and familialism of patron/client societies

long noted that the absence of external threats has enabled the survival of weak states in post-colonial Africa.²¹ It also may mean that there is little external pressure forcing patron/client-based security systems to transform themselves.

But perhaps external conflict is just an enabling factor, and not a necessary condition, for change. A second factor present in each of these historical cases was an ideological transformation of broader society that accompanied the response to the external threat. State (or proto-state) efforts to establish a professional army were bolstered by popular acceptance of (and even fervor on behalf of) new nationalist belief systems that united people in identifying with a greater geographic space. In China, this was enhanced when Mao's vision of communist equality won over the peasantry. Today, nationalism per se is not a new ideology. Yet an ideology of individual human rights, growing out of the western Enlightenment, fundamentally challenges the collectivism and familialism of patron/client societies. This seems to be playing a role in the current revolutionary fervor suffusing the Middle East. It remains unclear whether such a liberal ideology can motivate

revolutionary change on the scale that nationalism or communism did. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that the promotion of literacy, education, and communications and transportation infrastructure (to enable the transmission of new ideas) may be important mechanisms for replacing patron/client-based systems today.

Perhaps the major reason the modern literature on demobilization does not refer to these historical cases is that today's preferred demobilization method does not center simply on destroying and disarming the old militias. Instead, with the support of the United Nations (UN) and other members of the international community, the process is just one component of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR). Militia members are given new skills, new jobs, psychological and career counseling, and community support in hopes that this will discourage them from taking up arms again.

It is on these (usually negotiated) DDR processes that the current literature focuses, cautioning that demobilization is tricky and prone to failure. Those who are used to the prestige and power that comes from wielding guns may be loathe to give them up and may fear for their own safety if they lose the ability to defend themselves against rivals or retribution attacks. Militias may become spoilers of peace processes,²² or they may turn from warfighting to organized crime and gangster activity.

Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem warn that the possibility of failure is magnified when nonstate militias are cantoned together in groups for reeducation and processing during the demobilization period. Cantonment isolates the militias from the rest of society and can potentially reinforce existing command structures.²³ Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein similarly find that separating combatants from

their former militia comrades was the most important part of the successful DDR process in Sierra Leone. Such “delinking” of former militia members, especially when it came to economic opportunity, was a much more important indicator of true reintegration than participation in official UN DDR programs.²⁴ In the same vein, Sarah Zukerman Daly shows that densely networked former combatants in Colombia who hail from (and return to) the same locality can easily reconstitute themselves into paramilitary organizations when power balances shift.²⁵ When groups retain their predemobilization social structures, the influence of old commanders and operational mindsets remains stronger.

While these findings are usually presented in relation to the question of whether civil war may break out again, they can also be applied to the question of what leads to the successful creation of professional state security forces out of a patronage-based past. They imply that when old militias are kept together as units rather than dispersed, they are less likely to be successfully integrated into well institutionalized state security forces and more apt to maintain previous patron/client ties. This conclusion might seem obvious, but it is striking how often it has been ignored by policymakers. Attempts to integrate by unit, under existing command, are frequent. For example, in Republican-era China in the 1920s and 1930s, Nationalist Army leader Chiang Kai-shek tried to integrate warlord units into his forces. He learned to his chagrin that it resulted in corruption, theft of resources, and fragmented command in battles against Mao’s superior Red Army.²⁶ More recently in post-Dayton Bosnia, army brigades (later switched to battalions of 1,200 soldiers each inside brigades made up of different ethnic battalions) have been drawn from former ethnic militias. These battalions seldom have

much substantive contact or cooperation across ethnicities, instead reinforcing old networks. A similar arrangement has been reached for separate ethnic entity policing in Bosnia.²⁷ Even more recently, in Al Anbar Province in Iraq, preexisting Sunni tribal militias were recognized as state-sponsored local police forces under the state-supported Awakening program. They refused an alternative proposal from Baghdad that would have dispersed their members throughout Iraq, arguing that dispersion would

an emerging literature asks how rebel groups with clear territorial aims should be treated after civil wars to ensure that war does not break out again

subject them to sectarian Shia attack and that they wished to protect their own neighborhoods instead.²⁸ The evidence from the demobilization literature suggests that in these cases, patron/client ties will continue to dominate security force relations and prevent the true professionalization of forces. Short-term stability may undercut long-term state-building and state security.

Literature on Rebel Integration after Civil War

There is an emerging literature that focuses on the integration of militias into state military forces after civil war rather than DDR.²⁹ It asks how rebel groups with clear territorial aims should be treated after civil wars to ensure that war does not break out again. Its authors concentrate on issues of power-sharing and trust-building between former enemies rather than examining the question of patronage versus professionalism within the new forces. The argument behind much of this literature,

for example in work by Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, is that power-sharing is a postwar confidence-building measure.³⁰

This literature concentrates on what it claims are some notable successes of rebel integration into state security forces. Yet these claims are problematic for two reasons. First, the literature does not examine variation in the long-term results of integration efforts. Its goal instead is to assert that integration can work, and to give examples where that has been the case in the immediate term. Unlike some other authors, Stephen Burgess does look at cases of integration failure rather than merely concentrating on the success stories. However, he defines *failure* as the collapse of the peace agreements that support the integration process.³¹ He does not examine in any depth variation in what happens to state security institutions after the integration process has occurred. Like Hartzell and Hoddie, his focus is fundamentally on what makes power-sharing arrangements succeed at a political level.

The second and related problem is that *success* in this literature is defined in such a way that it does not reveal anything about the reorientation of security forces from patronage toward professionalism. While the success or failure of power-sharing agreements can establish whether civil war ends, such agreements alone cannot determine whether a newly integrated military or police force will be characterized by rule-abiding integrity or instead by in-group favoritism and corruption.

Indeed for some of these authors, integration success merely implies that the process of hiring militia members into state security forces proceeds smoothly. In this view, success is achieved when a significant number of militia members are offered jobs and accept them, and civil war between the rebel group and the

state does not break out again, no matter how ineffective the new security forces are.³² For example, Florence Gaub argues that the primary benefit of integration in both Lebanon and Bosnia was “symbolic,” serving as an indicator of “the return of the rule of law and the state in all its functions” after civil war (even when that rule of law and state functioning are essentially toothless and old militia ties remain strong).³³ The Mindanao experience in the Philippines is categorized as a success by some authors. Yet a case study that lauds success in Mindanao also hints that security force integration resulted in command and control difficulties and financial mismanagement.³⁴ Burgess calls the Zimbabwe integration experience a success, even though “fighting between former . . . factions marred the integration process” and “in spite of corruption and decay.”³⁵ Uganda’s integration experience is similarly termed a success by Monica Duffy Toft.³⁶ In Uganda’s case, even some members of the notorious child-snatching Lord’s Resistance Army, which was blamed for thousands of war crimes, have recently been turned toward cooperating with the state.³⁷ Yet a recent news report laments that the Ugandan army is “bolstered by corrupt spoils,” and cites a statement by British scholar Phil Clark that the Ugandan leadership rules through “the fear of violent military crackdowns.”³⁸ This finding is especially disheartening since Jeremy Weinstein had earlier described the formation of the National Liberation Army (the rebel group whose victory in warfare led them to become the new Ugandan state) as operating under a population-centric ideology based on strict discipline and respect for civilians.³⁹

Burgess defines success in more detail than many other authors in this literature. In his view, success is measured by the survival of the new regime in a high-threat environment,

indicating that the security forces are able to protect the state, and sometimes by the ability of the newly integrated forces to engage in foreign intervention or peace enforcement processes without being routed.⁴⁰ This fits the general definition of military effectiveness put forward by Stephen Biddle as well, who in a recent literature review noted that the “ultimate dependent variable of interest for effectiveness is the outcome of combat.”⁴¹

Yet the world is replete with examples of military and police organizations that have managed effective security states (at least temporarily) or survived opposing forces by cowing the public while remaining corrupt and undisciplined. If this is how success is defined, then one might argue that Ramzan Kadyrov of the Russian republic of Chechnya has succeeded in integrating rebel forces into his autonomous militia (now recognized by the state as the local branch of Interior Ministry forces) through a campaign of well targeted and selective terror.⁴² Indeed, Russian authorities do hold Kadyrov up as a success story since outright civil war in Chechnya is over. Yet Kadyrov’s successes are fundamentally centered on a brutal form of personal patronage—and few objective analysts believe that the deep security problems of Chechnya and its relations with the Russian state have been permanently solved.

The definition of success in the existing literature is further complicated by the fact that many nonstate militias have links to foreign actors, including states, multinational companies, and nongovernmental organizations.⁴³ Warlords are particularly susceptible to the lure of middle-man status, taking on patron/client roles between states and foreign actors.⁴⁴ Links with foreign benefactors who evade state control—whether they provide weapons, investment, training, or simply political advice and

friendship—need to be broken to ensure the long-term reliability of successful integration into professional home-state security forces. The existing integration literature remains largely silent on that topic.

For these reasons, it is not clear that the literature on the integration of militias into state security forces offers any useful conclusions for the questions presented here, even though integration of informal militias into state security institutions is a fundamental subject of this study. Integration, in many recent cases, does not seem to be associated with professional transformation.

the world is replete with military and police organizations that have managed effective security states or survived opposing forces by cowing the public while remaining corrupt

Literature on the Motives of Rebel Forces

There is a well established literature examining the motives of rebel forces.⁴⁵ It offers a range of competing explanations for why rebels fight. These explanations range from the authority of family and community norms to the importance of personal values and emotions, and include a focus on the power of economic and political incentives that range from the individual to the collective and from the structural to the strategic.

The variation in explanations offered by this literature makes it hard to draw any definitive conclusions from it. But part of this literature deals with the fact of indiscipline and corruption within certain rebel movements but not others, and two useful conclusions can serve as the basis

for further policy advice. First, Weinstein argues that rebel organizations blessed with access to economic endowments (oil, diamonds, or external financing, to name a few) will by nature end up attracting recruits based on the possibility of looting and other immediate access to wealth. He believes that rebel organizations not blessed with this access have to rely on what he calls “social endowments” for their recruiting power instead. He argues that they will develop norms of group solidarity, focused on the achievement of a far-off political or ideological goal. He also believes that these resource-deprived rebel groups are more likely to treat civilians well since they need local support and trust in the absence of alternative sources of financing. In other words, rebel groups based on social endowments are more likely to follow the rule-based patterns of professional armies. Rebels attracted by economic resources will be more prone to fragmentation and more apt to engage in indiscriminate violence against civilians, both markers of indiscipline.⁴⁶

sending newly formed or reformed militaries on difficult peace enforcement operations abroad may help them become stronger institutions

This can lead to a related conclusion, that militias whose members are denied access to private economic endowments after integration (for example, lootable minerals or narcotics) will be more successfully integrated into well institutionalized military forces than will those who gain or retain access to those endowments. Those who retain access to lootable resources will be more likely to maintain their patronage behavior. To speak plainly, this might mean that success in building professional security

institutions in Afghanistan depends on eliminating the illegal poppy trade. Otherwise, local militias that are now being integrated into state security forces have a strong incentive to continue illegal patron/client relations on the side, thereby preventing the institutionalization of professionalism. Current U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization policy that avoids poppy eradication in Afghanistan may be wrongheaded, as it sacrifices long-term success in building reliable state security institutions for the short-term benefit of hearts and minds operations with local poppy farmers.

Paul Kenny’s work on rebels and lootable resources takes a less structural and deterministic approach than Weinstein. While Kenny agrees that resource extraction is tied to force cohesion, he focuses on rebel leadership strategies in dealing with those resources, not on the question of whether fixed background conditions influence cohesion and disintegration. When leaders of rebel groups are “forced to be self-financing” or choose to be “dedicated primarily to resource extraction,” in Kenny’s view, cohesion will fall. In that sense, he agrees with Weinstein. But he goes on to argue that experiences of “shared sacrifice” on behalf of a common goal (for example, rebels serving prison terms together on behalf of their cause, or accepting tattoos that permanently mark their rebel status and thereby prevent them from denying it if they are captured) will foster socialization into the organization and lead to cohesion.⁴⁷

If this argument holds true postintegration, it means that nonstate militias whose members undergo shared sacrifices alongside other state security forces will be better professionally integrated than those who do not share that experience. This provides an alternative explanation for the success of both the Zimbabwean and postgenocide Rwandan integrations that are

described by Burgess. He argues that a mark of the success of the professional integration process in Zimbabwe was that the new forces fought well in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the 1980s and early 1990s.⁴⁸ In postgenocide Rwanda, he argues that a similar mark of success was that former Hutu militia members were effective at fighting Hutu extremists in the DRC in the mid to late 1990s and 2000s.⁴⁹ Kenny's argument suggests, however, that the causal pathway may be reversed: shared sacrifices that these forces underwent during combat in the DRC might have helped both countries achieve the successful integration of former enemies. In other words, sending newly formed or reformed militaries on difficult peace enforcement operations abroad may help them become more effective and stronger institutions.

Conclusion

Some analysts throw up their hands and declare the problem of security sector professionalization insoluble in patron/client systems. Dipali Mukhopadhyay, for example, in her brilliant study of how warlordism has continued in Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai, argues that while warlords continue to exact “undeniable costs” on the citizenry, the patronage bargains they have reached with the Afghan state “may represent the best dividend to be expected” in the absence of “credible, pre-existing domestic security institutions.” She believes that security sector reform in Afghanistan “reflects an assumption of formal institutional capacity on the part of the state that simply does not exist.”⁵⁰ Citing Charles Tilly's work, she reminds us that state-building in Europe was messy, violent, and based on informal bargains, too. Maybe the continuation of patronage systems, for the sake of immediate stability, is the best we can do.

Certainly the problem of overcoming patronage systems is a difficult and long-term endeavor for those seeking to build or assist the creation of new security institutions. This article nonetheless suggests that the history of and literature on state-building and security sector integration can be mined for advice. There may be creative ways of thinking about the design and policy environment of new security forces in areas of the world where patron/client relations have been the norm, resulting in small steps forward on what is undoubtedly a long path to eventual professionalization. **PRISM**

Notes

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Regional Engagement in Africa

Closing the Gap Between Strategic Ends and Ways

BY LAURA R. VARHOLA AND CHRISTOPHER H. VARHOLA

The East African Standby Force (EASF) is East Africa's contribution to the African Union's African Standby Force, which is an international and continental military force with both a civilian and police component to be deployed in Africa during times of crisis. Although the EASF is still under development and in need of capacity-building assistance, the United States does not have the authorities to provide direct assistance to this regional force. Instead, Washington must rely on bilateral assistance mechanisms that are cumbersome and less efficient than dealing directly with the EASF.

Sometimes this causes difficulties in conducting combined activities. In 2009, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States participated in Natural Fire, a U.S.-sponsored exercise designed to improve collective responses to complex humanitarian crises in East Africa. Since the United States could not work directly with the EASF, it concentrated its support bilaterally on the five member countries of the East African Community (EAC), all of which were also members of the EASF. During the planning phase, U.S. timelines for the exercise conflicted with both an EAC and EASF military exercise. However, due to a lack of U.S. authorities to work directly with these regional organizations, Natural

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Fire could not support either and was conducted as an additional stand-alone exercise. Although all three exercises occurred, it created a duplication of effort and competition for limited EAC and EASF financial, logistical, and personnel resources. More importantly, it caused confusion as to what nations or organizations would take the lead in the event of an actual East Africa crisis.

Recent U.S. national security reviews have highlighted an emerging trend of thought affecting U.S. vital interests: the importance of the African continent to America's security. In response to this growing strategic realization, both President George W. Bush's 2007 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 50, which articulates U.S. strategy for sub-Sahara Africa, and President Barack Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) promote economic development and stability in Africa. While well established multilateral alliances and partnerships exist in other theaters such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

multilateral approaches to U.S. security assistance in Africa should be balanced with bilateral approaches as a means of empowering African states

(NATO), this is lacking in Africa. Without similar arrangements or authorities, the U.S. military is limited to aggregating bilateral efforts in pursuit of similar effects.

Multilateral approaches to U.S. security assistance in Africa should be balanced with bilateral approaches as a means of empowering African states to take responsibility for their own regional security. To achieve that, both NSPD-50 and NSS stress investing in regional capabilities and organizations. They direct

policymakers to strengthen Africa's regional organizations, with a specific focus on the African Union (AU).¹ Multilateral approaches would also make U.S. security assistance plans and programs more efficient, as described in Department of Defense (DOD) 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*. This article identifies this disjuncture between policy objectives and the manner in which the United States currently executes security assistance—namely a highly promoted but hollow focus on regional organizations.

Why Regional Approaches Are Important

While case studies are drawn from Africa, the challenges of developing regionally appropriate strategies, plans, and programs have relevance throughout the U.S. military. Globally, there has been tremendous growth in regional organizations interested in peace and security: NATO, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Union (EU), Organization of American States, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Organization of the Islamic Conference are but a few examples. Not all of these organizations have formalized civilian oversight of military structures to the same extent as NATO, which complicates the manner in which authorities to work with the regional organization can be granted. This is the case in Africa, where some of its regional economic communities do not exercise full civilian control over the emerging multilateral African Standby Force brigades, and it is possible some never will.

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) engagement reflects the challenges the United States faces in working regionally. Presidential determinations (PDs) are currently authorized in Africa for the AU, Economic Community

of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This allows these organizations to receive defense articles and services under section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and sections 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended. However, PDs do not exist for the North or East Africa regions. Even in those regions with PDs, U.S. security assistance programs do not exist to directly support these regional organizations.

The question becomes whether we can accept the risk inherent from forgoing direct interface with those regional organizations. In light of the transnational threats facing the world, the answer is clearly no. In the case of Africa, support to regional organizations is of particular U.S. national security interest but is impacted by U.S. reluctance to place “boots on the ground” there in response to crises and lack of capacity in many countries to respond unilaterally. Although the United Nations (UN) is still the preferred response mechanism for crises, it often lacks the capacity, consensus, and resources to intervene. As a result, there is recognition in Africa of the need for collective responses to peace and security challenges. Recent examples include the African Union Mission in Sudan, 2004–2007; African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 2007–present; the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic, 2008–present; and ECOWAS discussions on intervention in Côte d’Ivoire.

The relational dynamics of security demonstrate that “no nation’s security is self-contained.”² Dysfunctional, failing, and collapsed states can produce spillover effects on neighboring countries, threatening regional peace and

security. These problems transcend national borders and represent what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates refers to as “the main security challenge of our time.”³ Terrorism, for

the Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963 but was steeped in Westphalian notions of sovereignty

example, cannot be addressed bilaterally if a neighboring nation allows the harboring of terrorists, or if ungoverned spaces traverse national boundaries. Regional approaches address these issues more efficiently. In Africa, security threats, balkanization, and marginalization have led to calls for unity and collective solidarity as the *deus ex machina* for the maintenance of continental peace, security, and development.⁴ However, Africa’s regional organizations lack funding and capacity to effectively address these issues. This is further undermined by U.S. challenges in providing security assistance to regional organizations, given the way this assistance is organized and administered.

Africa is not new to the concept of regional efforts. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963 but was steeped in Westphalian notions of sovereignty, where Africa’s heads of state pledged noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. The result was an organization that maintained the status quo and tolerated dictators to include Uganda’s Idi Amin, who was the head of the OAU in 1975, and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who headed it in 1997. The problems and ineffectiveness of the OAU eventually led to its restructuring. In its place, the African Union was established in 2002. The AU, comprised of 49 member nations,⁵ is focused on economic development, peace, and security, and promotes



U.S. Navy (Ian Carver)

U.S. Navy instructors conduct self-defense training with members of Congolese military during boarding team operations course aboard High Speed Vessel Swift

democratic institutions, good governance, and human rights. However, the AU's Constitutive Act now defines sovereignty in the conditional terms of a state's capacity and willingness to protect its citizens. This shift from regime security to human security goes even so far as to recognize the AU's right to militarily intervene in its member states' affairs.⁶

Along these lines, the AU is developing a comprehensive African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that aims to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and support peace-building. Central to APSA is the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the central AU decisionmaking body. The PSC oversees the resolution and management of conflict, and its powers include the ability to authorize peace support missions, impose sanctions, and militarily intervene in a member state as a last resort. The PSC is a decisionmaking body in its own right, and its decisions are binding on member states. Additional conflict resolution organs in

the AU include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise, and an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is comprised of five brigade-size elements,⁷ one for each of Africa's five regions, and also includes police and civilian components. Once fully operational, the ASF will serve as a permanent African peacekeeping force.

Another distinguishing feature between the AU and OAU is the intensive cooperation the AU has with Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The AU sees regional trading blocs not as competitors, but as essential building blocks and implementation agencies for its programs. Although Africa has multiple regional blocs, the AU recognizes eight, of which five are key elements of the AU's CEWS and contribute troops to the ASF.⁸ By basing its security architecture on these "regional pillars" and incorporating existing initiatives into its continental policy, the AU profits from the regions' comparative

advantage where countries have a vested interest in regional stability, greater understanding of the local environment, and increased legitimacy. Under this approach, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the RECs, while the AU serves as a legitimizing clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives. This is important because of the confusing web of institutional overlaps in Africa, which may take some time to change since countries often benefit politically from multiple memberships, which increase their regional influence and donor attractiveness.

The EU and NATO have recognized the AU desire to develop regional security capabilities and are providing support to AU capacity-building initiatives and peacekeeping missions. This affects not only how the United States coordinates security assistance with its African partners, but also how to best synchronize and deconflict assistance provided by other countries and organizations. Coordinating security assistance through a regional organization provides the benefit of addressing transnational security concerns, while leveraging relative capacities within an African framework and reducing donor redundancy and overlap.

U.S. Challenges

The United States is challenged in supporting regional organizations in multiple ways. Restrictive authorities, conflicting policies, misaligned or improper distribution, execution of funding, and disparate timelines all affect U.S. ability to support regional organizations effectively.

Although bilateral funding will remain the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy throughout the world, U.S. bilateral-centric security assistance structures are less efficient at developing sustained, integrated,

and synchronized security cooperation programs that build effective capacity and capability to address regional issues. This Cold War structure was created when U.S. bilateral relations were a zero-sum game against a perceived Soviet threat, and states often defined themselves internationally by affiliation with the United States or Soviet Union. Today, the Department of State still grants Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and coordinates Foreign Military Sales and peacekeeping funds bilaterally. Yet the proliferation of regional organizations necessitates the availability of more flexible tools to engage directly with them. This has manifested itself in several ways.

proliferation of regional organizations necessitates the availability of more flexible tools to engage directly with them

Unnecessarily Complex Funding Plans for Multilateral-oriented Programs. Although State and DOD security assistance specialists have been creative in building patchwork programs to address regional security concerns, this is not sufficient, especially since ad hoc programs and funding are hard to sustain and lack flexibility in the event of real world crises. The Africa Partnership Station (APS), for example, is a much acclaimed international initiative that was developed by the U.S. Navy in 2007 to assist African militaries, coast guards, and mariners in improving their abilities to address maritime safety and security concerns. However, the execution of APS during its first 3 years required the cobbling together of more than a dozen Title 10 and Title 22 funding sources and authorities. While this is time consuming and complex for

Americans, the consequences for Africa are more serious if these programs cannot be sustained. Similarly, the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is an inter-agency plan to combat terrorism in trans-Sahara Africa. The military component of TSCTP is Operation *Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara*. The goal of TSCTP is to counter terrorist influences in North Africa and the Sahel in order to help governments better control their territories and prevent huge tracts of largely deserted African territory from becoming safe havens for terrorist groups. Although this program seeks to promote interstate cooperation, it is constrained by ad hoc and short term bilateral funding and works outside of the ASF construct.

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) is another popular program that “enhances the capacities and capabilities of African partner countries and regional institutions to assist African planning, training and deployment efforts to sustain sufficient quantities of professionally competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal non-African assistance.”⁹ It also has collaborative relationships with the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. However, like TSCTP, ACOTA engages bilaterally. ACOTA’s strength is in its ability to conduct tactical-level peace support operations training for countries participating in regional or international peacekeeping missions. ACOTA is not structured to provide support directly to regional organizations. But there is a need for multinational staff training at the regional level—a critical precondition to effective command and control in complex peacekeeping and stability operations scenarios.

A key legal challenge is the issue of end-use monitoring of defense articles and services and related technical data subject to licensing

under Section 38 of the AECA concerning the compliance of U.S. export regulations. End-use monitoring entails prelicense or postshipment checks on any party or other aspect of a defense trade transaction to verify its bona fides and to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient is complying with U.S. Government requirements with respect to use, transfers, and security of defense articles and services, and that such articles are being used for the purpose for which they are provided. In Africa, RECs do not always have the ability to store and inventory items or staffs dedicated to accountability and proper use of these items. As a case in point, night-vision goggles are valuable and easy to pilfer. Although mechanisms exist to oversee end-use monitoring in individual countries, managed by respective U.S. Offices of Security Cooperation, these have yet to be developed for regional organizations.

Inability to Engage Hybrid Defense/Nondefense Security Organizations. Another challenge the United States has in supporting regional organizations is the inability to train ASF integrated staffs, which include both police and civilian components. This is significant since international peacekeeping forces now most often include these elements. Thus, the capacity for the United States to meaningfully contribute to African peacekeeping efforts is limited. Whereas America strongly advocates an interagency approach to synchronize its own elements of national power, it does not have the mechanisms to support international organizations taking the same approach.

Overly Restrictive Ability to Share Information. From an information-sharing perspective, regional interactions with nonmilitary organizations are also problematic. Although the United States has agreements with NATO, this is a military organization with standing

agreements in place. To disclose information to regional organizations, even with sovereign governments, Foreign Disclosure Officers must likewise cobble authorities together based on Cold War bilateral information-sharing agreements. This is cumbersome and time-consuming. USAFRICOM is especially challenged because it does not yet have mature sharing relationships across the continent.

As a result, there is a significant lag in the amount of time it takes to obtain Exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy (ENDP). The U.S. information-sharing policy is “owned” by the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), comprised of members from 18 different U.S. agencies. However, before an ENDP is granted by the NDPC, it requires unanimous approval by all voting members, whether the issue is sharing training, techniques, and procedures, technology, or operational information. This process is bureaucratic and slow, making quick and flexible responses difficult unless they are specifically directed by the National Security Council. This is particularly salient given the importance of satellite images in rapidly changing peacekeeping scenarios, and further complicated by the membership of countries in regional organizations where U.S. diplomatic relations are strained. Here the United States must evaluate the costs of sharing information with states deemed inimical to U.S. interests versus the benefit of contributing to Africa’s overall stability.

African Challenges to Regional Integration

Challenges and obstacles remain that impact the effectiveness of the AU and its associated RECs. Interinstitutional rivalry and competing aims, for example, play a major role among these organizations. This is not restricted

to Africa. The EU has long had to deal with contending regional agendas. Europe’s multiplicity of regional and institutional rivalries, though, are contained within a stable democratic framework with developed conflict resolution mechanisms.¹⁰ Africa still lacks such a framework, and the degrees of differences are greater. In the case of the EASF, for instance, the membership of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea result in a largely dysfunctional organization, contested international recognition, and internal political and military conflict.

the United States must evaluate the costs of sharing information with states deemed inimical to U.S. interests versus the benefit of contributing to Africa’s overall stability

Another factor hampering regional integration is when national identities and priorities, or personal power politics, hold sway over regional decisionmaking bodies, especially if a leader or economically powerful country believes it has more to lose than gain from regional priorities.

The internal capability of the AU and its affiliated RECs also varies considerably. All organizations suffer from resource and capacity constraints—even ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC, which are considered the most developed RECs within the AU. Another challenge is that many of these staffs do not have the human resource capacity to absorb security assistance programs. They quickly become oversaturated.

Common approaches help prioritize efforts and mitigate competition among regions for preeminence in promoting African peace and security. They also make individual state leaders more accountable to international norms and

expectations. In that regard, the creation of the AU has helped inspire a new generation of politically responsible African leaders who are one by one replacing the autocrats and so-called big men of the continent. However, to ensure it is feasible and appropriate for the United States to engage directly with regional organizations, certain preconditions must be established. First, an organization must be willing to partner with the United States, and, in the case of Africa, the regional organization should be affiliated with the AU. Second, the organization must

complementing the assistance other international organizations are providing would help reinforce favorable conditions and further U.S. goals

have a charter or constitution that articulates agreed rules, responsibilities, and procedures for its effective management. Third, it must have the ability to parcel out benefits equitably and appropriately to its members, to include mechanisms to oversee and control funding, training, and/or equipment provided by donor nations. Four organizations in Africa have met such conditions. PDs can therefore solidify an organization's legitimacy among its neighbors by demonstrating its credibility in the international community.

An additional condition should be considered if a regional organization has a pariah state where U.S. sanctions or restrictions have been levied to ensure security assistance contributes to the overall security goals of the organization but does not directly contribute to the individual state. This allows the United States to support regional staffs comprised of member nations that do not qualify for bilateral assistance. Leahy vetting would also still

need to be conducted to ensure individuals with human rights violations on their record are not selected.¹¹ While some would view this as a disadvantage since it could indirectly empower states that America does not support, the true advantage is that it transcends state politics and focuses on regional stability, allowing all state members to be part of a regional solution. It also encourages regional organizations to engage with their pariah states and gives incentives for reform. Although possibly contrary to some American mindsets, this gives actual meaning to the phrase "African solutions to African problems." It also encourages the principle of mutual accountability, where if the AU demonstrates progress in the development of the ASF, or in its ability to conduct sound end-use monitoring practices, the United States would commit to increasing support and collaboration on the basis of demonstrated results. Consequently, there is a shaping effect because states that benefit from a regional approach encourage other states to comply. For example, in 2008, SADC questioned the legitimacy of President Mugabe as the head of state for Zimbabwe. That paved the way for greater recognition and integration of the opposition party. This not only empowers the region, but also builds trust among members and lessens perceptions of U.S. favoritism and self-interest.

Effective support cannot be furnished by the United States alone. It requires international cooperation. Complementing the assistance other international organizations are providing would help reinforce favorable conditions and further U.S. goals. The EU is the AU's most important partner when it comes to peace and security. In 2004, based on an AU request, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF). Through the APF, the EU has



U.S. Air Force (Nic Raven)

been at the forefront of international support to the African Peace and Security agenda, providing, in parallel to EU political backing, substantial and predictable funding to African peace support operations and relevant capacity-building at the regional and continental level. To date, the EU has channeled over €740 million through this instrument.¹² EU–AU cooperation on peace and security has become a driving force for the development of a fully fledged African–EU strategic partnership, culminating in a comprehensive Joint Africa–EU Strategy adopted in December 2007.¹³ Another example of EU support includes the European Union Training Mission–Somalia, which currently provides specialized training for approximately 2,000 Somali soldiers in support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government.

While EU support to the AU focuses on strategic level issues, such as the enhancement of African peacekeeping training centers, a

U.S. strength is providing tactical training via the ACOTA program. Although ACOTA priorities for 2010 included support to AMISOM, the UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur, other multinational peacekeeping operations in Africa, and the ASF,¹⁴ ACOTA needs the ability to train regionally integrated staffs, not just bilateral partners. This would harmonize efforts with the EU and NATO, as well as Brazil, China, India, and Japan, who are also keen to cooperate more closely with Africans on peace and security.

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a State Department Title 22 program intended to address major gaps in international capacity to conduct peace support operations. Africa receives approximately 60 percent of this funding—the largest block of Title 22 funding injected into USAFRICOM’s area of responsibility—out of an approximate \$100 million annual budget via State’s peacekeeping

operations account. (This is almost double what Africa receives annually in FMF.) Prior to USAFRICOM's inception, all GPOI programs in Africa were executed by the U.S. State Department–Africa Bureau with the bulk of the funding in support of ACOTA. To better synchronize U.S. peacekeeping capacity-building efforts with the AU, USAFRICOM should be included in State's GPOI funding prioritization process to ensure a more unified U.S. approach.

conditions might need to be levied to ensure that certain countries only use the equipment under certain circumstances, such as peacekeeping or disaster relief

Another more efficient approach to regional capacity-building is through the empowerment of regional training centers. Peacekeeping training centers exist in many African countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Currently, the AU is conducting a study to determine an "approved" list of regional training centers. Once approved, leveraging these AU Centers of Excellence to address specific training needs in a multilateral forum can help prioritize security assistance efforts and reduce redundancies often produced through isolated bilateral training. They could also serve as repositories for military material to be used in contingency scenarios. Although this requires preexisting authorities for immediate distribution, it could support ASF development of regional logistics depots, or "prepo" capability, for regions to draw upon during crises or as directed by the AU. This was the

original logic for Kenya's International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC), which has classroom facilities and barracks space for a brigade-size element and is adjacent to a military airfield. IPSTC facilities conduct steady-state training but have the ability to stage and project forces to react to contingencies throughout East Africa. However, conditions might need to be levied to ensure that certain countries only use the equipment under certain circumstances, such as peacekeeping or disaster relief.

One encouraging legal development toward the ability to provide security assistance to regional organizations is the new DOD African Partner Cooperation Authority (10 U.S.C. § 1050a) enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011. This authority allows for the payment of travel, subsistence, and special compensation of officers and students of African countries and other expenses the Secretary considers necessary for African cooperation.¹⁵ This authority is identical to the authority that exists for Latin American cooperation, 10 U.S.C. § 1050. However, given the "authority gaps" for Africa, this new law has potential for more expansive and strategic application. One way to use this new authority could include allowing civilians working at regional organizations, such as members of the AU's Peace and Security Operations Directorate, to participate in U.S. security assistance activities and events or to engage with regional Centers of Excellence.

Further, such authorities are needed to help bridge the gap and extend services to regional organizations. Enhanced versions of FMF, International Military Education and Training, and peace operations funding are also needed that allow those programs to engage with regional organizations as clients just like

individual states are now. This should also be expanded to include assistance to civilian and police capacity-building activities. Although rules and conditions may be different when working with regional organizations, these challenges need to be overcome.

Poverty, disease, environmental degradation, unsustainable population growth, and weak governance continue to undermine the future of Africa and much of the developing world. African states have taken steps to collectively face these challenges to stability and development. Whereas this article harbors no illusions about the obstacles facing regional institutions, or that PDs are a panacea to regional engagement, it nonetheless advocates giving the U.S. Department of Defense greater flexibility to directly assist these multilateral organizations in achieving common peace and security goals. This does not preclude the importance of bilateral relations, but suggests broadening the scope of current authorities and mechanisms to empower states within their own regional frameworks. If targeted, coordinated, and applied correctly, this provides a strong and legitimate foundation for pursuing sustained security engagement in Africa and throughout the world. **PRISM**

For their contributions to this article, the authors thank Jo Sherman Roberts, Ryan K. Stoffer, and Michael A. Casciaro.

Notes

¹ *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 46; Theresa Whelan, “Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes U.S. Objectives for Africa Command,” remarks given to the Royal United Services Institute, London, February 18, 2008, available at <www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1663>.

² Barry Buzan and Ole Woever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43.

³ Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs* (May–June 2010).

⁴ David J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems* (Williston, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 4.

⁵ Countries currently suspended from African Union (AU) membership include Eritrea, Madagascar, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire. Morocco has never been a member.

⁶ Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (May 26, 2001) states that the AU will intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, or when internal issues are of “continental concern” where protection of human rights is at stake.

⁷ All five African Standby Force brigades are at different levels of development, and many have not yet achieved full brigade-size strength. West Africa has the most developed standby force, while North Africa's standby force is the least developed.

⁸ The five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that contribute to the Continental Early Warning System and African Standby Force are the Arab Maghreb Union, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Southern Africa Development Community, and Economic Community of Central African States. The other three RECs include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Community of Sahel-Saharan States, and East African Community.

⁹ The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance mission statement is available at <www.state.gov/p/af/rt/acota/index.htm>.

¹⁰ Benedikt F. Franke, "Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture," *African Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (Spring 2007), 5.

¹¹ The Leahy Law or Leahy provision is a human rights stipulation in U.S. congressional foreign assistance legislation. It prohibits U.S. military assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights with impunity. It is named after its principal sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).

¹² The Africa Peace Facility is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm>.

¹³ *The Africa Peace Facility 2009 Annual Report* (Luxembourg: European Union, 2010), 4.

¹⁴ Department of State, briefing, "African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program," November 2010.

¹⁵ Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, §1204, H.R. 6523, Pub. L. 111-383, 124 Stat. 4137 (January 7, 2011).

NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat

BY MICHAEL AARONSON, SVERRE DIESSEN, YVES DE KERMABON,
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most successful collective security arrangement among states in the 20th century. Having deterred and outlasted its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the challenge of redefining its roles and purposes in the 21st century. Like all pluralist organizations, the Alliance must reflect the common interests of its 28 members, and defining common interests that motivate all members to sacrifice for the good of the whole has been difficult. In the absence of a direct common military threat, disparate interests, commitments, and visions of the transatlantic future have fragmented Alliance coherence.

The Strategic Concept adopted by heads of state and government in Lisbon in November 2010 reconfirms the NATO commitment to “deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”¹ It offers itself as the strategic map for NATO in the 21st century and touches on extremism, terrorism, and such transnational illegal activities as trafficking in arms, narcotics, and people, as well as cyber attacks and other technological and environmental threats. The Strategic Concept, however, does not refer to hybrid threats or provide insight into the magnitude, likelihood, nature, or nuances of the “emerging security challenges.” Moreover, it does not address the possibility of having to face some or many of these challenges simultaneously, or the threat posed by the convergence of these many separate elements, which when braided together constitute a threat of a different nature.

The new threat confronting the diverse nations of the Alliance is insidious and not easily defined or identified. It flourishes in the seams *between* states, and in the soft areas of bad or weak governance. The new threat consists of distinct but tangled elements—hence the rubric *hybrid*

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threat. Hybrid threats are much more than the amalgamation of existing security challenges. This is due in part to the interrelatedness of their constituent elements, the complicated and interdependent nature of the activities required to counter them, the multiplicity of key stakeholders with vested interests, and the dynamic international security environment in which traditional military solutions may not be best (or even a key component) but may nevertheless be necessary. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has recently stated, “The paradox . . . is that the global order enjoys more stakeholders than ever before, and yet it has very few guarantors.”²

The task of articulating, elaborating, and developing these concepts has been assigned to NATO Allied Command Transformation

the new threat confronting the Alliance flourishes in the seams between states, and in the soft areas of bad or weak governance

(ACT). In the words of one NATO/ACT official, the task is to “paint the face on the faceless enemy”³ and to develop the hybrid threat concept, as well as examine viable and effective strategies to meet hybrid threats. A recent experiment raised important issues concerning how NATO does business. One of the issues raised was how NATO reaches out to important civilian players who it may have to rely on or even support in its current and future endeavors. Another topic was how the Alliance engages with industry, particularly with the cyber and energy sectors as two key areas identified in the Strategic Concept. Yet another issue is how NATO deals with non-military threats that are nevertheless security

dangers to the Alliance but do not lend themselves easily to the traditional Article 5 analysis. Lastly, the experiment asked whether NATO bureaucracy and its processes have kept pace with a rapidly changing world; or whether the Alliance is positioned to respond effectively to the frightening pace of emerging security threats.

NATO in the 21st Century

As NATO positions itself to meet the diverse and complex security challenges of the 21st century, it must carefully take stock of the needs of all its members. In examining emerging threats, the following points are salient:

- ❖ We need to be as secure against emerging threats as we were against the conventional threats of the past.
- ❖ NATO was appropriate for security against past (that is, conventional) threats.
- ❖ Its effectiveness against emerging threats should not be taken for granted and must be demonstrated.
- ❖ We must understand the nature of the new threats.
- ❖ We must discover how these threats can be effectively countered.
- ❖ We must determine what role, if any, NATO can play in countering these threats.

NATO operates by consensus; it has only been the presence of an existential clearly identifiable threat (the Soviet Union) that allowed the Alliance to operate effectively over the years. Because hybrid threats are not clearly identifiable and their existential nature is not the subject of consensus, there is never an

imperative to address the challenge they pose. One way of framing the issue, therefore, is to say that we must demonstrate the existential nature of the current threat or threats to provoke a discussion and decision about how NATO wishes to respond. Without this, the discussion will continue to fall prey to conflicting visions for NATO within the Alliance.

NATO nations are all members of the United Nations (UN), and most belong to the European Union (EU). So for any NATO member, the starting point in the discussion will not necessarily be who NATO needs to work with to counter emerging or hybrid threats, but rather to what extent states want to work through NATO as opposed to individually, or through the UN, the EU, or other alliances. NATO action is complicated by the blurred distinction between legality and legitimacy in an Alliance intervention where there is no clear and unambiguous Article 5 justification.

The 1999 Kosovo intervention, for example, was widely perceived as morally justified and therefore legitimate when compared to nonintervention. Legality, on the other hand, will by definition depend on a Security Council resolution sanctioning military intervention by the international community. Despite the possibility of the Security Council acting in what may be the political interest of its member nations without being strictly moral by universal standards, it is generally accepted that Security Council-sanctioned action is legitimate by definition. In other words, all legal actions are legitimate, whereas the opposite is not necessarily true. Or, to put it another way, legality is a subset of legitimacy, and legitimacy is not for NATO alone to determine. Allied leadership acknowledges this: “The UN Security Council must remain the overall source of legitimacy for international peace and stability.”⁴

Since it is widely held that UN sanction is a prerequisite for any kind of legitimate civil-military intervention, NATO’s level of ambition will be effectively limited by what the least willing member country can agree to. This, in turn, is decided by the degree of necessity from the point of view of the country least threatened, or by the member for whom intervention policies are most difficult for domestic political

since UN sanction is a prerequisite for legitimate civil-military intervention, NATO’s level of ambition will be effectively limited by what the least willing member can agree to

reasons. This dynamic has been clearly brought out by the current NATO intervention in the Libyan conflict. This may raise doubt about the ability of NATO to deal with hybrid threats, other than as a forum for the creation of coalitions of the (most) willing—provided there is also the necessary legitimacy.

This leads inevitably to NATO’s role, if any, in non–Article 5 situations in which the Alliance or a member is threatened in nontraditional ways. Emerging threats in the technology or cyber realm offer interesting examples. At what point does a cyber attack become a threat to the Alliance or its members? Certain scenarios are relatively straightforward. For example, if NATO or one of its facilities was assaulted by cyber attackers, the Alliance could not only defend itself, but also engage in offensive-defense actions to identify, mitigate, contain, and retaliate against such an attack. Similarly, if a member state were under cyber attack and requested Alliance assistance, this would be an appropriate use of its power and resources.



Other plausible scenarios are less clear, however. What if a member nation's cyber security posture was so poor that it represented a threat to the Alliance due to its interconnectivity with vital Alliance facilities or activities? Who would be responsible for improving that state's capacity, deterring attack, responding to an attack, or repairing the damage done by an attack? How might a member under internal attack invoke NATO action in the case of a cyber or other technology-driven assault, particularly one deemed to fall short of Article 5 parameters? Who would be responsible for identifying the attacker? Does it matter that a hybrid threat might originate either in capabilities only residing in nation-states, or would NATO also pursue private citizens, cyber hackers, or criminal enterprises that threatened Alliance or member cyber security? Does the Alliance have the tools, expertise, and mandate to do so? Do changes need to be made to the Alliance's core processes and procedures to respond to emerging and fast-paced threats? Is there a need to identify possible instances when the "consensus" model should give way, allowing a more flexible "coalition of the willing" response to security needs?

The Hybrid Threat

Threats are the combination of our weakness and the enemy's intent and strength. It is important that we keep the language right. The last thing we want is a "War on Hybrid Threats." There is an urgent need to carefully analyze the range of threats confronting our world to better prepare our defenses. What is the difference between a real threat and mere fear or concern? This is the first question NATO must examine. Is there such a thing as a hybrid threat, or is this merely a new

way of looking at threats that have existed for a long time? While many of these threats are not new, they have now become more frequent and are manifested in novel ways. Does their combination, simultaneity, or perpetration by a single adversary or group of adversaries constitute a new and present danger? One must then determine when these threats become seriously dangerous and when they might require a reaction from the international community. What actions should trigger a concrete reaction?

Admittedly, *hybrid threat* is an umbrella term encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict, and so forth. What is new, however, is the possibility of NATO facing *the adaptive and systematic use of such means singularly and in combination by adversaries in pursuit of long-term political objectives*, as opposed to their more random occurrence, driven by coincidental factors. It is this possibility that merits a fresh and more conceptual approach from NATO's side as to how they can be countered. It is particularly important to note that hybrid threats are not exclusively a tool of asymmetric or non-state actors, but can be applied by state and nonstate actors alike. The principal attraction of hybrid threats from the point of view of a state actor is that they can be largely nonattributable, and therefore applied in situations where more overt action is ruled out for any number of reasons.

According to the most recent iteration of the NATO Capstone Concept, "Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives."⁵ By not specifying state adversaries, this definition acknowledges both the ambiguity of the enemy and

the simultaneous and combined conventional and unconventional nature of the threat itself. Clearly, the traditional boundaries defining the conflicts that served as the basis for the Alliance's historic shared interests do not apply today. It is no longer true that only the most powerful states have the means and intention of posing a dire security threat to the Alliance or its members. The means of destruction have proliferated from the few to the many, with the barriers to entry for some technologies and methods capable of wrecking havoc relatively low or nearly nonexistent. As noted, adversaries capable of threatening NATO and its members need not be government actors; nonstate and anonymous actors can and do pose a substantial threat. Security threats are no longer bound by geography and can have impact on a substate or worldwide basis. They are not even bound by terrestrial limits and may manifest themselves in space or cyberspace against Alliance interests or against NATO itself. Deadly and devastating attacks against Alliance members can be perpetrated and initiated in an instant from remote locations, leaving no trail to determine their origin.

NATO/ACT is far from alone in trying to identify and articulate this new generation of threat and to develop effective strategies to mitigate hybrid threats. Significantly, NATO efforts track U.S. attempts to paint a face on the faceless enemy, develop conceptual clarity on the nature of the threat, and develop capabilities to counter the threat. The 2008 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, "Irregular Warfare," defines its subject as a "violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. . . . It may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary's power."⁶ The *National Strategy*

to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, subtitled *Addressing Converging Threats to National Security*, states that its subject, transnational organized crime:

threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in

it would be detrimental to NATO long-term interests to fall too far behind its dominant member in understanding the nature of hybrid threats

world strategic markets; using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists; and expanding narco-trafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. Transnational organized crime also threatens the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout the global economy and across our borders.

While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human

*smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.*⁷

These U.S. efforts reflect a growing awareness of the wide range of threat elements that over the past two decades have begun to converge and expand via globalization and new technologies in information access, communication, and transportation. The organizations, both state and nonstate, that operate in the nether networks of illicit commerce, terrorism, and insurgency have proven adaptable, innovative, and entrepreneurial as they have apparently begun to blend and diversify. They are “highly adaptive and show a great ability to learn and adjust their behaviors based on lessons learned and changes in the operational environment.”⁸ For a range of reasons, it would be detrimental to NATO long-term interests to fall too far behind its dominant member in understanding the nature of hybrid threats, anticipating their emergence, and developing countering strategies.

The Comprehensive Approach

The organizations, individuals, and networks that animate the hybrid threat “employ a complex blend of means that includes the orchestration of diplomacy, political interaction, humanitarian aid, social pressures, economic development, savvy use of the media and military force.”⁹ In short, they avail themselves of a comprehensive range of methods and weapons to accomplish their objectives—a comprehensive approach to goal attainment.

What changes in structure, process, and procedure might NATO adopt to account for the recent evolution of the international security environment and enable the Alliance to respond effectively to the comprehensive range of methods and weapons employed by hybrid

threat adversaries? Put simply by a NATO/ACT officer, “There are areas where we are not joined up and this can be exploited by others with harmful intent.”¹⁰ NATO Assistant Secretary General Jamie Shea elaborated that threats develop in response to vulnerability; we therefore need to understand ourselves better as well as understanding our adversaries if we are to respond effectively. This dual focus—looking inward at ourselves as well as outward at potential enemies—is an essential part of countering hybrid threats.

Countering hybrid threats is about new understanding of such threats and the innovative use of existing capabilities to meet these new challenges, rather than about new hardware. Indeed, the relevant countermeasures are largely included in the existing Comprehensive Approach to strategy, a concept NATO has embraced. This may be seen to imply that NATO has developed the solution to the problem before having defined the problem. However, the current understanding of the Comprehensive Approach is heavily influenced by the conflict that brought it about, as is often the case with innovation in the field of strategy. NATO therefore needs a more generic and conceptual grip on the kind of hybrid threat/comprehensive response cycle of which Afghanistan is but one example.

The recently adopted Strategic Concept states that:

The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage

*collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.*¹¹

The Comprehensive Approach thus begins to address the challenge, but how should we define this concept? Which agent or combination of agents provides the best response depending on the timing, nature, and place of the threat? How should the actions of various players be coordinated?

it is currently impossible to identify an international institution capable of coordinating all the efforts required to meet hybrid threats

One thing is clear: the Alliance cannot provide a credible answer on its own and currently offers only part of the solution to the problem. As a military alliance, NATO recognizes that it cannot implement a comprehensive approach and is limited to a supporting role. But who or what will it be supporting? A recent study of member perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach concept found three consistent themes:

- ❖ coherent application of national instruments of power
- ❖ comprehensive interaction with other actors
- ❖ comprehensive action in all domains and elements of crises.¹²

While these consistent themes emerge, the concept remains relatively undeveloped. It is currently impossible to identify an international



ISAF

As part of Afghan-led 2-day course at Kabul Military Training Center, trainees take target practice with M-16 rifles

institution capable of coordinating all the efforts required to meet the challenges of a comprehensive approach to hybrid threats. Though this is a difficult and sensitive issue, it would nevertheless be useful to bring a variety of capabilities from different contributors to a single organization. But what would be its mandate and legal framework, and how would one ensure that it was recognized by all as the overall coordinator? It seems that much time and patience will be required (as they were for the creation of the United Nations) before a solution is identified. In the meantime, several intermediate solutions are possible, such as what we call coalitions of the willing.

Beyond such intermediate steps, it is equally unclear what entities are best positioned to undertake the next steps toward policy development and implementation of the soft power tools contemplated by NATO's new Strategic Concept under the rubric of the Comprehensive Approach. The tools for economic development, such as rule of law, governance- and institution-building, and other "comprehensive activities," traditionally reside in nonmilitary governmental agencies, intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector. These capabilities are not found either in member nations' militaries or in the NATO bureaucracy itself. Moreover, the civilian organizations or actors best equipped to provide them are frequently wary of the military. Most are unaccustomed to working with the military, at best. At worst, there are hostile feelings.

To overcome many civilians' lack of familiarity with working with NATO, one of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Kosovo is that where the military and civilian sectors must work together, the military must often take the initiative to establish trust and communication

with civilian counterparts. The two communities work best when they work collaboratively and cooperatively. Collaboration and cooperation should begin with a shared analysis. All participants in a comprehensive approach must understand the challenge not only from their own vantage points, but from those of the other major participants. Many perceived threats (terrorism, transnational crime, violent extremism) are symptoms or consequences of underlying root causes (poverty, ethnic strife) that are not within the technical competence of most military organizations.

Whereas treating the symptoms is about *preventing actions in the shorter term*, addressing the root causes of instability is about *changing conditions in the longer term*, which is the fundamental goal of development. Removing the root causes of conflict is always more difficult and time-consuming than dealing with the symptoms. Long-term solutions aimed at solving the fundamental problems are also harder in terms of achieving the necessary political consensus at the national as well as the international or coalition level. This is a challenge of political agreement and thus of diplomacy. This means that in the absence of a political agreement, NATO may have to accept that treating the symptoms, despite its limitations, is the best buy under the circumstances. Even in such cases, the participation of nonmilitary organizations will enrich the military's understanding of the challenges they face.

As for planning, while the military may be best equipped to plan and facilitate the cooperation through planning and outreach, the civilian sector should be included in the earliest aspects of the planning for best results. Outreach should be done early and often to permit the civilians the necessary time for budgetary and other preparation. It should not be

left to commanders on the ground to begin the search and engagement for the nonmilitary capabilities and partners they may need.

Once initiated, an effective comprehensive approach requires unity of effort, which in its turn requires at least some unity of command. This raises the question of who owns the problem, or more specifically what or where the organization, body, or entity is that can coordinate all the necessary means of persuasion as well as coercion to achieve the strategic objectives of the international community. We believe that if we do not all own it, we are in trouble. However, this is not the same as saying we need unity of command. The challenge is *how* to achieve unity of effort in the *absence* of unity of command.

the absence of unity of command does not exclude any possibility of success, but it means that achieving it will require more time, treasure, and potentially lives

Is it possible on a case-by-case basis to create a “supreme commander” who, assisted by a “comprehensive headquarters,” can develop and execute campaign plans that encompass all necessary lines of operation, military and civilian? This seems highly unlikely. Many NGOs reject any kind of inclusion in coordinated strategies, particularly when they involve the military since that violates their principle of strict neutrality in any conflict. Other factors are bureaucratic rivalry between the different governmental agencies and departments which must necessarily contribute to a comprehensive effort, lack of trust between public sector agencies and private sector participants, and national sensitivities at the coalition level. One

practical implication of this is a lack of willingness to share intelligence, which may impede a coordinated effort in a theater of operations.

The overall effect of the absence of unity of command is a considerable dissipation of energy and effect for a comprehensive approach strategy. This does not exclude any possibility of success, but it certainly means that achieving it will require more time, treasure, and potentially lives. However, it seems a firm conclusion that unity of command cannot be achieved, at least not unless and until the group of nations forming the coalition faces an immediate existential threat. A comprehensive approach to hybrid threats is, in other words,

NATO needs institutions capable of making precise appreciations of the nonmaterialistic dimension of the root causes of hybrid threats

as much an institutional as a conceptual problem. There will never be a single overarching goal to which all actors can be expected to subscribe. It is better to acknowledge that different actors in the same situation have different perspectives and seek the common ground that can form a basis for collaboration.

There is much discussion of whether NATO needs new capabilities to counter terrorism, cyber attack, transnational organized crime, insurgency, and so forth. Countering hybrid threats is first of all about new understanding of such threats and the innovative use of existing capabilities to meet these new challenges, rather than about new hardware. New equipment and weapon systems are not in this case the key to success. The challenge is to get better collaboration around existing capabilities.

A relatively unexamined component of the Comprehensive Approach is the question of strategic communications—at least when we consider its huge importance for the success of any such campaign. The execution of a diversified hybrid threat by an adaptive and intelligent adversary is first of all an acknowledgment of NATO's conventional military supremacy. Reverting to a hybrid (or comprehensive) approach on the part of the aggressor thus has two essential purposes:

- ❖ blurring the strategic picture by replacing a clearly visible friend-foe, good-bad perspective with a hazy multitude of actors and causes, thereby clouding the perception of what is at stake and who is behind it
- ❖ avoiding a situation where the issue is decided quickly through decisive use of NATO's overwhelming military capability by changing it into a protracted test of patience and determination as the campaign drags on with a steady toll of treasure and human lives and apparently no end in sight.

Both purposes make strategic communication and information to the public a matter of the utmost importance, if a comprehensive approach is to succeed. Real situation awareness must be created by presenting a credible picture of who the adversary is and what his long-term objectives are in order to justify intervention. Furthermore, the public must be given a clear and unambiguous understanding of the time scale of any comprehensive campaign aimed at defeating the threat. As has been proved by the Afghanistan War, the prevailing perception within the general public about the duration of armed conflict is still shaped

by the conventional war experiences of the major conflicts of the 20th century. This means on average that after 4 to 5 years, the “bring the boys home” campaigns and the “negotiate now” advocates will gain support as frustration and impatience start spreading. However, stabilization or counterinsurgency campaigns may take two or three times what a conventional war might. The public must therefore never be left in doubt as to what it is in for. If political leaders allow themselves to create false hopes by underestimating either the duration or the cost, the effect will reinforce the downturn in public support.

What Role for the Private Sector?

Arguably the single most important factor in successful stabilization of failed or failing states is economic development. That, in turn, depends on financial incentives to investors, improvement of infrastructure (digital as well as physical), access to energy, and a skilled workforce. This makes institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank key players and potential partners with NATO. This assessment, however, requires some qualification. Although economic development is obviously of the utmost importance in many scenarios, we should bear in mind that the Western materialistic definition of development is not a universally accepted standard of welfare or happiness. Notably, religion and adherence to religious customs are on the rise as the most important metric of human progress, particularly in the Muslim world. In other words, not all root causes of hybrid threats can be eliminated simply by improving the material living standards of the people in question. The rage felt by many Muslims toward the West—irrational as it may or may not be and sustained as it is by conditions stemming

from the incompetence and corruption of their own governments—is nevertheless real. NATO therefore needs to partner with, or else have in-house institutions capable of making precise appreciations of the nonmaterialistic dimension of the root causes of hybrid threats. It is also interesting that many people living in poverty and squalor around the world rank competent and honest government as more important in the short term than a larger income, presumably because they realize that good governance is a prerequisite for any degree of sustained economic growth.

The Afghanistan experience has brought out an interesting dilemma when it comes to how we should prioritize resources for the achievement of economic development. Should the resources required to stimulate economic growth be applied where security as well as other conditions favor it, or should they be used in the most marginal areas, where presumably the need is greater and even modest progress can help turn the population away from an insurgent or destabilizing influence? In other words, should we apply military logic and reinforce success or try to stem the tide of destabilization by aiding those who, because they are most in need, may also be those most ready to reject insurgent influence? There is no hard and fast answer, but again it is an important aspect of designing a comprehensive strategy to defeat a hybrid threat. With these caveats, there is little doubt that economic development and progress is a powerful weapon in the NATO inventory, particularly in addressing root causes.

NGOs and industry have been dealing with some of the issues and many of the geographies of interest to NATO for much longer than the Alliance. Indeed, the private sector’s individual companies feel the harm done by hybrid threat elements most directly. Counterfeiting networks

steal the intellectual property and potential revenues from legitimate companies. Cyber attackers can disable information and communication companies resulting in lost business. Financial institutions are compromised by money laundering and other illicit transactions. Their more intimate familiarity with the illicit networks and other discrete elements of the hybrid threat that leech their operations provides them with a far more granular appreciation of the identity, methods, and extent of the hybrid threat. Indeed, the business community has been countering discrete elements of the hybrid threat for some time. Innovative techniques have been developed to counter specific threats and risks, but they are not widely shared. Private sector experience is extremely valuable to NATO in this regard.

experimenting and gaming may provide an atmosphere where issues related to conducting NATO engagement with soft power providers can be explored collaboratively

Assuming NATO decides that engaging the private sector is worthwhile, it must examine ways to ensure that industry is incentivized to respond to the Alliance's outreach attempts favorably. Ideally, industry should be encouraged to reach out to NATO on its own initiative if it believes it is necessary or desirable. To incentivize industry, the Alliance should consider ways to make both outreach and responses to industry engagement transparent and easy. Regular engagement will go a long way toward that end. NATO must also appear to be listening and legitimately seeking input and collaboration. Finally, the Alliance should consider what, if

anything, it might provide to industry. On this latter point, recent U.S. experience might be illustrative. Senior command and Department of Defense (DOD) officials regularly engage defense, technology, space, and industry members by providing insights into DOD activities and goals, speeches on leadership, and lessons learned that might be applicable to industry. In exchange, they receive unprecedented access to high-level management and expertise, and even task various private organizations for assistance.

Conclusions

A hybrid threat is more than just the sum total of its constituent parts. Combating such threats does not require new capabilities as much as new partners, new processes, and, above all, new thinking. Experimentation and gaming offer benign, nonhostile forums in which to conduct outreach and to engage civilians where they do not feel threatened. Through the give and take of such activities, both military and civilians may be encouraged to overcome predispositions concerning each other and reach mutual understanding. Civilian participants might make progress toward questioning their prejudices, if any, concerning cooperating with the Alliance.

NATO Allied Command Transformation conducted such an experiment in May 2011 named "Countering Hybrid Threats," during which many of the themes discussed above emerged saliently. The week-long experiment benefited from the participation of nearly 100 private sector professionals, each of whom invested a full working week to the experiment. The number and level of participants and the time they spent suggest that NATO is considered relevant by the business community and that ACT retains an important place in its intellectual leadership. This perception may

pose significant opportunities and a few challenges. It should be noted that a bottom-up approach was used in this experiment, which remains the exception. Taking into account the opinions of experts on the ground can be particularly useful, not only because of their expertise and experience but also because it might prevent us from repeating past mistakes.

Experimenting and gaming may provide an atmosphere where issues related to conducting NATO engagement with soft power providers can be explored collaboratively. While each NATO member may be best suited to engage its own governmental institutions and individuals to find needed capabilities, it is less clear who should approach the private sector. NATO should reach out to large multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and Gulf Cooperation Council to provide the capabilities for the “hold and build” in its most recent deployments. But is institution-to-institution the only desirable engagement? What about engagement of civilians in the preventative or predeployment stage in which NATO might be interested in the knowledge and experience of others in order to shape the environment? What about interactions with nongovernmental and smaller multilateral institutions, including those of the host country or region? At what level should NATO reach out to them and begin to plan cooperatively with a needed civilian workforce? When should it happen? Does it make sense to establish regular relationships with institutions in anticipation of likely problems that NATO may be called on to address in order to shape the environment early? Where should that engagement happen? Is it a function reserved for Brussels and other headquarters elements, or for local commanders as they see fit? Should NATO develop an overarching policy that guides these types of engagements, and what input, if any, should the non-NATO, civilian government, and private players have in developing such a policy?

Synergies among NATO's bodies must be enhanced. That should allow experimentation to impact the ongoing work on the Deterrence and Defence Posture, the Comprehensive Approach, Strategic Planning, and in time, NATO reform. One can hope that this would provide food for thought to the North Atlantic Council in the course of its work during the next few months. It might even allow NATO, with the agreement of member states, to remain ahead of developments and become more proactive rather than remaining reactive. The United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, African Union, and others should be engaged, as well as more experts from the diplomatic field.

While NATO member states must lead the way in anticipating the skills, practices, and capabilities needed to confront emerging hybrid threats, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and ACT have a vital role in soft power engagement and in initiating a necessary dialogue with those non-NATO actors best positioned to assist in this endeavor. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ NATO 2020: *Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement* (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, May 2010), available at <www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>.

² Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO After Libya,” *Foreign Affairs* (July–August 2011).

³ Brigadier General Roy Hunstock, Final Plenary, “Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats [MCCHT] Experiment,” Tallinn, Estonia, May 13, 2011. This article is based on this experiment, which

was held May 8–13. Further information is available at <<https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/20102011CH/Experiment>>.

⁴ Fogh Rasmussen.

⁵ IMSM-0292-2010, Hybrid threats description and context, May 31, 2010.

⁶ Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare,” December 1, 2008, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf>.

⁷ *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security* (Washington, DC: The White House, July 2011).

⁸ Joint Irregular Warfare Center, “Irregular Adversaries and Hybrid Threats,” 2011.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Richard Hills, Opening Plenary, MCCHT Experiment, May 8, 2011.

¹¹ NATO 2020.

¹² Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, “Study on Nations’ Approaches to Comprehensive Approach,” available at <https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/20102011CH/Experiment/References/StudyonNat/file/_WFS/Study%20on%20Nations%27%20Approaches%20to%20Comprehensive%20Approach%5B1%5D.pdf>.

COIN in Peace-building

Case Study of the 2009 Malakand Operation

BY NADEEM AHMED

Since 2007, Islamic militants and law enforcement agencies have remained locked in a sporadic tussle for control in the Malakand Division of Pakistan.¹ The division is located in the northern part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province and borders the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It consists of the districts of Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Swat, Shangla, and Buner. An increased influx of radical elements from across the border and from other parts of the country resulted in the strengthening of informal miscreants' networks and fundamentalist actors, ultimately resulting in the creation of a parallel state structure. Rapprochement and efforts of reconciliation between these groups and Pakistan government authorities continued for nearly 2 years, resulting in the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation of 2009,² which conceded to the demand for the implementation of Sharia law in the entire division. However, within the space of 1 month, a failure on the part of the Islamist groups to maintain their end of the bargain, and their growing expansionary tendencies, resulted in the government deciding to intervene, using the army to conduct a rapid law enforcement operation with the goal of reestablishing the writ of formal state institutions.

This article looks at the genesis of the crisis and the successful enforcement operation carried out by the Pakistan government, specifically with a view to understanding how a complex emergency was handled through well-coordinated application of the military instrument while simultaneously catering for emerging humanitarian needs of the affected population. The larger theoretical theme is how counterinsurgency (COIN) operations contribute to long-term peace-building. After an initial discussion of the various aspects of the 3-month Operation *Rah-i-Rast* ("The Righteous Way"), this

Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed, Pakistan Army (Ret.), was Head of the Special Support Group and was responsible for managing coordination of all stakeholders in the 2009 Malakand Operation preconflict, conflict, and postconflict phases.

article outlines the strategic vision offered by the government of Pakistan, focusing on recommendations to reinstitute peace and rule of law in the volatile regions of the country.

Genesis of the Crisis

The crisis, which required a coordinated, precise, and speedy intervention on the part of the armed forces, emerged against the backdrop of several factors. To understand the context of the law enforcement operation, it is important to delineate the factors that led to a deterioration of law and order in the Malakand Division and its adjoining areas.

a toxic political situation and the exhaustion of other mitigating measures left the government with little option but a rapid law enforcement operation

An ever-increasing population vis-à-vis growing resource scarcity, degradation of basic social service delivery, and poor governance by the state were some of the primary reasons for the discontent within the masses that led to an influx of nonstate actors and the creation of parallel informal structures. With growing political expediency on the part of the provincial as well as federal government toward addressing the urgent socio-legal-economic needs of the Malakand Division, the social inequities increased rapidly over the last decade or so. The demographic youth bulge in the concerned districts, when juxtaposed with rampant unemployment in the younger population, helped convince fundamental, far-right elements to expand their ideological and political agendas.

Beyond demographic and socioeconomic factors, a history of elite-backed repressive

behavior on the part of the local law apparatus (the courts and police) further alienated the people. With the courts and the legal system in general unable to dispense cases and resolve disputes in a timely, efficient, and just manner, the institutional space became increasingly fertile for actors peddling largely falsified agendas of quick and religiously compliant justice.

Finally, the international context cannot be ignored in the situational specificity of this particular case study. Given the area's proximity to Afghanistan, and a history of cross-border engagement between nonstate actors on both sides, U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervention, with the support of the government of Pakistan, led to an increase in anti-American and antistate sentiment. Painted in increasingly zero-sum terms, the issue of jihad against the allied forces and those who assisted them was disseminated through multiple media.

The genesis of this particular crisis was the gradual conjoining of these factors and contingencies. The creation of a toxic political situation and the exhaustion of other mitigating measures and solutions left the government with little option but to intervene through a rapid law enforcement operation.

Preoperation Situation

With the writ of the government, and specifically the social service capacity, ultimately ceasing to exist, Swat and neighboring areas became a safe haven for 8,000–10,000 militants. These militants had trickled over the border the last few years and were given shelter and an enabling environment by fundamentalists already based in the region. During the course of this period, with the implementation and ultimate failure of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (based on Islamic laws), government functionaries and local law enforcement

Destroyed house is backdrop for 8-year-old Amreen washing dishes in rainwater, evidence of severe flooding that affected northwest Pakistan



UN Photo/UNICEF/ZAK

officials started to leave the districts, ceding further space to the militants. Exploiting local media, militants began to expand their reach both within Swat District and neighboring areas. Once they established strongholds, they conducted public beheadings and other such tactics to instill fear and force compliance from the populace. Swat thus emerged as the miscreants' center of gravity.³

Shaping the Environment

Once the decision was made by the Pakistan government to use the military to establish the writ of the state, the biggest challenge was to generate a supportive environment with the public at large, and to institutionalize political ownership of the operation. One step that swayed the popular sentiment in favor of use of the military was that the government had given "peace a chance" by acceding to the "introduction of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation," which did not stop the miscreants from furthering their agenda and flouting the agreement. Media support was garnered through both extensive public relation exercises and large-scale dissemination of information about the repressive activities of the terrorists. A successful media and public relations campaign allowed the currying of public support in a relatively short time and political ownership was instituted by the democratic government, which took all major political parties in the country on board.⁴

The strategic preparations for the operation required intensive training of the army to conduct counterinsurgency operations in hilly terrain. In tandem with training, intelligence-gathering was also stepped up during March and April to provide the latest target information, along with a discreet build-up of troops to their respective launch pads.

Most relevant to our perspective on the issue, the government with support from key stakeholders set out to expand existing humanitarian response capacities, specifically in those areas that would house displaced populations. The government simultaneously initiated work on developing postconflict sustainable crisis recovery strategies.

The desired goal of the intervention was "to re-establish writ of the State and ensure security through application of military instruments, thereby creating conditions conducive for political and administrative machinery to bring sustained peace and stability to Swat and neighboring areas."

Military Aspects

At a basic level, military strategy revolved around the elimination of operational command and control structures to disrupt the militants' operations and ensure their isolation from the public at large. Displacement of the population in those areas where the operation was under way was facilitated with a view to providing sufficient liberty of action to the military to conduct operations without fear of causing collateral damage. At the peak of its intensity, the size of the displaced population was around 3 million. Many were accommodated in nearby districts, but others went as far south as Karachi to stay with relatives.

Through a combination of air support, tanks, and indirect-firing weapons, the operation was conducted on a sustained day and night basis. Where possible, encirclement (including vertical) of militant hideouts and strongholds was carried out, while extra effort was made to reduce dependence on roads and pathways to avoid improvised explosive devices and booby traps.

Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the strategy was the concept of expanding influence

zones, while applying clear and hold tactics in areas where operations were conducted. As opposed to cases where militaries clear areas and then move the offensive forward to leave a vacuum, the Pakistan army decided to maintain a permanent presence in all cleared parts to keep logistics routes clear, enhance public support, and improve intelligence-gathering.

The 2009 Malakand Operation⁵ remains the largest counterinsurgency undertaking in the country's history, using approximately three army divisions to cover four districts. Operating on three axes, converging inward, compressing spaces (thereby denying liberty for the miscreants to operate freely), and blocking all possible ingress/egress routes to contain the miscreants, the army was able to defeat them in detail within 3½ months. The operation was also the largest aviation-borne intervention in South Asian history; an entire brigade of special forces was lifted by helicopters onto Piochar (the headquarters of miscreants) and maintained by helicopters till the miscreants were eliminated from the area. At the end of the operation, collateral damage was minimal, having been limited to 1.11 percent to property and 0.11 percent to life.⁶

The operation was successful in reestablishing the writ of the state in Malakand Division. The relatively short time-span, and the deftness with which the armed forces managed to deal with the militants, provided a major psychological boost to the entire country in the larger struggle against terrorism and militancy. Over the last year and a half, the security situation has been stable, public confidence has been restored, and community-based village defense committees have been strengthened and mobilized to ensure that extremist elements do not stage a comeback. With displaced populations returned to their areas of origin, the continuing

challenge is to certify that the confidence of the citizenry remains restored. For this particular purpose, specifically in the aftermath of the operation, the humanitarian community has firmly established itself in the Malakand region and is now complementing the state's ability to deliver basic social services. In terms of economic recovery, Swat has seen a slow but solid revival of tourism as well, which is crucial for the region. Some of the long-term reforms have been introduced, but a great deal more needs to be done. The march toward full normalcy was

the army decided to maintain a permanent presence in all cleared parts to keep logistics routes clear, enhance public support, and improve intelligence-gathering

somewhat interrupted due to the massive floods of 2010, which destroyed extensive infrastructure and livelihoods.

Humanitarian Aspects

In a complex emergency such as the one under discussion, the desired end results could only have been obtained if there was a multifaceted response. In such cases, the military component of the operation alone cannot deliver the requisite objectives, and it has to complement the larger humanitarian intervention required for the well-being of the affected population. In this particular case study, the most immediate humanitarian requirement was to cater to more than 3 million displaced persons. These large-scale displacements were facilitated by institutional systems specifically put in place to handle the movement of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to relief

providing zones (RPZs) that were set up in carefully chosen locations.

The major criterion in establishing the RPZs was close proximity to the operation area. Hence, the neighboring districts of Mardan, Charsadda, Nowshera, Swabi

reluctance in the humanitarian community to work with the military was resolved by adhering to internationally accepted principles of humanitarian response

Peshawar, and districts farther south such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan were selected, and adequate management structures were set up to deal with the IDPs. A significant challenge, apart from the facilitation and assistance to people in the RPZs, was to sustain and assist people who remained in the operation area. Psychosocial impacts of armed intervention such as sustained trauma, along with a modicum of collateral damage, produced a potentially volatile situation. The government saw that as a major challenge. It was therefore thought prudent that the same military conducting the law enforcement operations must also be actively involved in the humanitarian aspects, and more so in the conflict zone where the humanitarian community had no presence.

Secondly, the problem of unstructured reverse migration was challenging primarily because the armed forces required some amount of time before an area could be declared completely safe and ready for return. People, in a bid to restart their lives and recover their livelihoods, would often migrate back from the RPZs well before these areas had been recovered, exposing themselves to the dangers of the

operation. Finally, the geographical expansion of the operation to adjoining areas progressively increased the caseload for humanitarian response. Initially planned with a figure of around 2.4 million, the final affected population count was more than 3 million.

At a secondary level, maintaining security in the RPZs was a significant challenge. To ensure that militants did not infiltrate relief camps, the provision of security, intelligence, and relief apparatus had to be coordinated in all designated areas. On several occasions, specifically in Mardan and Charsadda, there were reports of terrorist movements from operational areas into the RPZs, but thankfully, timely interventions and close monitoring ensured that no untoward incidents took place. At a humanitarian response level, the large amounts of philanthropic support coming in from citizens in Pakistan as well as abroad needed to be channeled and demarcated according to the requirements of each RPZ and operation area. To ensure judicious and equitable distribution of relief items, an efficient and transparent registration mechanism was established for the IDPs, and a complementary grievance redressal system was put into place. Also, there was reluctance in the humanitarian community to work with the military in a complex emergency. That was resolved by adhering to internationally accepted principles of humanitarian response.

Institutional Arrangement

The complex nature of the emergency required the presence of a coordinating body that could, on one hand, deal with the humanitarian community working in the response effort, and on the other, with the armed forces carrying out the intervention. In the absence of any such preordained institution, and owing to the lack of capacity of any existing disaster

response unit, the government of Pakistan established the Special Support Group (SSG), a federal-level body responsible for coordination among multiple stakeholders. The SSG was constituted by the prime minister of Pakistan in consultation with the army chief through an official notification, which was read by the prime minister in the parliament before issuing.

Summarily speaking, the SSG was to liaise with the following actors:

- ❖ federal government ministries and agencies, such as Prime Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs Division, Ministry of Interior, Civil Aviation Authority, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
- ❖ provincial government departments and agencies (Health, Housing, Communication and Works, Civil Defense, Revenue, and so forth)
- ❖ army
- ❖ humanitarian community (the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations)⁷
- ❖ donors
- ❖ displaced communities and local communities in RPZs.

To give it the requisite authority and stature to interact with the various stakeholders, a three-star corps commander was put in charge of the SSG and had all the assets of the corps to include health, transport, food, water, security, logistics, and facilitation at his command. Cumulatively, a brigade-plus size body of troops from various services was deployed to manage the complete spectrum of management and return of the IDPs.

Salient Features of Response

The existence of multiple complexities and the relatively short time span in a response effort of this nature results in the activity spectrum being slightly different from what is normally seen in a disaster response. The management of the displaced population, as step one of the effort, was closely followed by the facilitation and management of returns, all within a 3-month period. People were moved back to their places of origin in tandem with early recovery activities in the affected areas and included the simultaneous rehabilitation and provision of basic services to the returnees. Closely following the recovery phase, small-scale reconstruction and rehabilitation, mostly community driven, was initiated. So, broadly speaking, the various aspects of the activity spectrum were concurrent and overlapping, depending upon the stability of the security situation in a particular area.

The successful coordination and response mechanisms established during the emergency were able to provide a host of services to meet the needs of the affected population. First and foremost, the registration requirement for the IDPs was met through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and Provincial Social Welfare Department, which was later verified through the National Database Registration Authority (NADRA). This was essential to avoid duplication and waste. NADRA also issued national identification cards to the people who had lost them or never got them in the first place. Shelter and nonfood items were handed out on a household basis. Relief camps were set up in various locations within the designated RPZs. Additionally, a great number of IDPs chose to stay with host families. Food, health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene arrangements were made for both categories.

A cash grant of 25,000 Pakistani rupees (U.S. \$325) was also distributed to each of more than 400,000 households through Visa debit cards (introduced for the first time to provide financial assistance to those affected).

In the second phase, transportation for returning and commuting purposes and education facilities for children in RPZs were also provided. Alternate banking arrangements for receiving funds from relatives and the authorities were also initiated. To deal with the psychosocial impact of the emergency, trauma

return was totally voluntary; if someone did not want to go, his or her relief assistance was continued

management centers were established in all RPZs. Finally, a returns package and vocational training facilities for those people who were economically vulnerable were also delivered.

The return policy was premised on four basic principles: informed, voluntary, safe, and assisted. All potential returnees were provided with full information about the security situation and availability of basic services in the area of return to enable an informed choice whether they wanted to return sooner or later. Second, it was totally voluntary; if someone did not want to go, his or her relief assistance was continued, and there was no forced return. Third, the SSG in coordination with the army and civil law enforcement agencies ensured that the route and area of return were cleared of the miscreants and unexploded munitions. Fourth and finally, their return was assisted, which implied free transportation, food and non-food items, medicines, and hard cash.

The basic conditions set out by the SSG for an area to be deemed fit for return

of populations included, first, the clearance of mines, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, and unexploded bombs by the military. Second, roads and pathways had to be cleared of debris. Third, some basic infrastructure—such as government services, water, sanitation facilities, and community infrastructure—had to be restored. Fourth, civil law enforcement had been reinstated and made functional. Market routes and inter- as well as intradistrict communication were restored. Finally, public representatives, including legislators, local councilors, and other notables, were asked to come back in order to incentivize and facilitate the returning population. The army had already been asked to maintain a continuous presence in the area until complete return of stability.

The return assistance package included provisions for free medical examinations and medicines, 1 month of food rations, nonfood items, free transportation, reconstruction tools for property rebuilding, and a one-time cash grant of \$325.

The reasons for the success of the operation and response effort were numerous and included unprecedented public and media support, political ownership, government resolve, sufficiency of military resources, adequate and timely training, coherent planning, organized structure of management, return of displaced people, community mobilization for local defense, extensive intelligence and monitoring activities, and the strong participation of the humanitarian community in the relief, early recovery, and reconstruction work.

Rebuilding Peace

The most vital component of the response strategy was a clear understanding that despite successful efforts and sacrifices, the military

by itself was not the ultimate solution to the problem. Under this premise, a larger vision was crafted, along with four strategic objectives catering to nine specific sectors.

A fundamental characteristic of the vision was to rectify the structural problems that led to the emergence of a crisis in the first place. Under this vision, the long-term plan is to establish peace in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA region with greater responsiveness and accountability on the part of the state, well functioning legal institutions, and adequate law enforcement mechanisms. This would go hand in hand with better provision of social services such as health care, education, water and sanitation, and economic opportunities.

The process through which a holistic framework of response was formulated started through community-level consultations in the target areas to obtain a sense of ground realities, especially in terms of spatial characteristics. This was followed by wider civil society consultations and close interaction with the federal and provincial bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies as well as public representatives. Finally, a thorough literature review of previous peace-rebuilding exercises was conducted. This process resulted in the development of a crisis analysis framework. Its three components were:

- ❖ crisis manifestations: delineating reasons for the development of the situation, specific focus on administrative and systemic inefficiencies, social inequities, and unresponsive state structures
- ❖ crisis drivers: weaponization, informal legal institutions, increased militancy, and terrorist activities
- ❖ effects sought: political and judicial reform.

The framework, especially the effects-sought segment, was closely tied to the vision mentioned earlier and rested on the execution of four strategic objectives:

- ❖ build state responsiveness and effectiveness to restore citizen trust
- ❖ stimulate employment and livelihood opportunities
- ❖ ensure provision of basic services
- ❖ foster reconciliation, deradicalization, and counterextremism.

there was an urgent priority for the government to communicate plans for a new social contract with the citizens

The nine priority sectors demarcated in the response strategy were:

- ❖ good governance
- ❖ rule of law
- ❖ agriculture and natural resources
- ❖ nonfarm economic development
- ❖ education
- ❖ infrastructure
- ❖ health
- ❖ social protection
- ❖ strategic communication.

Objective 1: Restoring Citizen Trust in the State

Drivers. The articulation of this first strategic objective was driven by pervasively low levels of trust in the state at the community level. This was largely a product of poor



U.S. Army (Wayne Gray)

Pakistani jingle truck driver watches soldiers unload food bound for Swat Valley in support of U.S. flood relief efforts

accountability mechanisms and nonexistent transparency in state practices. The vacuum left by nonfunctioning legal institutions, prevalence of an informal economic structure, and continued degradation and corruption of the local jirga system provided further impetus toward seeking reform and change. Finally, insufficient civic participation and political exclusion were also important drivers, especially in the tribal areas.

Findings. Upon examination of the various drivers that informed the strategizing process, it was concluded that there was an urgent priority for the government to communicate plans for a new social contract with the citizens. The first priority would be to undertake extensive legal and political reform, especially in the tribal areas. Second, improved security and access to justice were needed, as well as transparent and effective delivery of other basic services. Third, increased responsiveness of the state at the local level by encouraging community participation and civil society dialogue was required.

Recommendations. To deal with the issue of political and legal reform, it has been recommended that full citizen rights be given to the people of FATA, which would allow for a program of stronger integration into the state of Pakistan. The use of a postconflict needs assessment will be vital in drawing up a roadmap for transition, including consensus-building among the people for preferred alternatives.⁸ Second, improving security arrangements, both existing and planned, should be done with a view to increasing community-level accountability. Third, strengthening access to justice can be made possible through training systems and regimes in the judicial sector, reviewing the substance of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation and its compliance with the constitution,

introducing audits of state institutions in the tribal areas, extending the jurisdiction of the federal ombudsman's office to include FATA, and providing investigation and prosecution support to jirga deliberations. Last, there is a need to strengthen the relationship among the state, civil society, and communities through instituting political participation, participatory planning, and monitoring of public affairs. The adoption of efficient grievance redress mechanisms is also a crucial recommendation.

Objective 2: Stimulating Employment and Livelihood Opportunities

Drivers. The demographic contingency of having a large youth population contributes to high levels of unemployment in a resource-scarce environment. Relevant to our particular case study, the economic incentives offered by militant groups outweighed the existing formal opportunities available, exacerbating the problem. In the absence of viable monitoring and regulatory institutions, the prevalence of an informal economy, driven largely by drug- and arms-trafficking, has become entrenched in the province, and the relatively unsecure nature of remittance flows coming in from other parts of the country and abroad made the local economy relatively easy for the militants to capture.

Findings. In the postoperation scenario, the highest priority was to initiate a quick revival of the agriculture and livestock sector through assistance and replacement of lost assets. An important finding was that there is a need for diversification in the local economy from subsistence agriculture to more commercialized ventures. Similarly, there was a significant skills gap in the labor pool, and existing skills being imparted were detached from market demand. The overall theme was that employment and livelihood stimulation is

required to ensure that militants can no longer use economic vulnerability to their advantage.

Recommendations. The recommendations made under this particular strategic objective cater to both agriculture- and nonagriculture-based economic activity. For the former, the most immediate recommendation was to replenish livestock, restore lost animals, provide feed and fodder, and assist in the repair of livestock sheds and poultry/dairy farms. Second, expand community-based planning, implement rural livelihoods interventions, and provide matching grants for community development schemes such as forestry. Third, use government procurement and public works to maximize local employment generation. This was specifically relevant to areas where infrastructure damage to public works had taken place. Fourth, arrange for the provision of social safety nets and the initiation of micro-credit programs, including special provisions for access by the most vulnerable segments of the population. Fifth, introduce specialized forces to prevent funding flows to militants and enable the regulation of the informal economy. This can only be done in close coordination with other provincial governments as well as the government of Afghanistan. Finally, create effective employment opportunities, with an emphasis on skilled and unskilled youth. This is a priority that can only be achieved through investment in building a private sector, upgrading productive assets, supporting entrepreneurial initiatives, and engendering sensitive business development services. Along with economic incentives, there is a need to review and restructure technical and vocational education training to align market demand with training curriculum. Also important is to provide support packages, training, and financial assistance to demobilized fighters and militants.

Objective 3: Ensuring Provision of Basic Services

Drivers. A significant part of the problem lies in the inability of the state to ensure access to basic services. This has resulted in widespread deficits between the demands of the citizenry and what they ultimately receive. Deficits in education have resulted in a shortage of qualified human resources. In the same vein, deficits in the provision of safe water and sanitation systems have resulted in deteriorating health conditions due to a dilapidated basic healthcare system. The lack of proper road networks as well as energy availability directly harms economic activity. This presence of a nonconductive environment retards economic investment and ultimately prosperity.

Findings. As a result of these drivers, it has been found that the prevalent perception is that the state does not care for the citizenry. This perception, coupled with increasing poverty, serves to exacerbate socio-political tensions and is one of the fundamental reasons why militant groups are able to present themselves as a viable alternative to existing state structures.

high levels of illiteracy and poor access to alternative sources of information facilitated the militant agenda of spreading a radical narrative

Recommendations. In the postcrisis scenario, and as a first step, the excluded and vulnerable groups in society must be assisted in accessing basic services. Beyond the immediate response, the long-term strategy is based around several key points such

as provision of social safety nets, cash transfers, in-kind support, and school feeding programs. Second, provide increased access to water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure for nearly 2.8 million people. Third, retrain state employees in relevant sectors to enable efficient delivery of basic services, specifically in the postcrisis areas. Fourth, prepare quality benchmarks and standards for service delivery in each sector. This can be done by encouraging the involvement of community-based organizations, which can in turn also take on a monitoring role. Fifth, the enhancement of capacity for law enforcement agencies is an urgent necessity for the affected areas. Adequate capacity enhancing steps can be further complemented with public awareness campaigns and civic education.

Objective 4: Countering Radicalization and Fostering Reconciliation

Drivers. Religious extremism and militancy are driven by a number of factors, all of which have a close relationship with the political and social characteristics of the region. The primary driver identified was the real and perceived exclusion of the citizenry that resulted in discrimination, cultural elitism, and the denial of access to basic services and a better life in general. This was further accentuated by the absence of enabling conditions for trust-building and dialogue, including security and safety. Furthermore, high levels of illiteracy and poor access to alternative sources of information and opinions facilitated the militant agenda of spreading a radical narrative. This narrative also used imagery and perspectives on discrimination against Muslims across the world, specifically at the hands of Western countries and their allies.

Findings. A major indicator that showed the nuanced approach of the government was recognition of the fact that the crisis could not be reduced to being premised purely on material grievances. An important finding from this particular indicator was that a durable reconciliation process requires state support to an enabling political, legal, social, and economic environment, as well as continued evidence of the government's commitment to addressing accusations of corruption, mismanagement, elite bias, and discrimination. Attitudinal and behavioral change can only be made possible after exposure to systemic alternative information and open public dialogue between the state and society.

Recommendations. Points submitted to address this objective were divided into three broad categories. The first dealt with the establishment of an alternative discourse to counter extremist religious and ideological messages. This can be done through rehabilitation of detainees by exposing them to peaceful Islamic teachings and an alternate cultural paradigm within local Pakhtun value systems. Vulnerability of the wider population can be countered by providing exposure to alternative cultural and religious viewpoints. Second, promotion of a diverse, open, and tolerant society can be achieved through plurality of information, fostering the harmonious coexistence of diverse groups, establishing a mechanism to encourage diversity in short-term public works employment and in public representation and oversight, and promoting institutions that support state enforcement of appropriate legislation to enable pluralism. Third, fostering social cohesion among and within communities can be accomplished by state support to counter exclusion, sectarianism, and other inter- and intracommunity strife.

Conclusion

The Malakand operation remains an example of a successful counterinsurgency contributing to long-term peace-building. While only a couple of years have elapsed since the target areas were cleared of militants, a long-term strategy, as articulated in the last few sections, has been put into place to deal with issues of extremism, state failure, and violence across vulnerable parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. With a well thought out, inclusive, and coherent strategic vision in place, the effects of a successful military intervention in the fight against terrorism can be fully actualized. What is important to remember, however, is that the process of peace-rebuilding and the creation of a better socio-political and legal environment can only be done in close coordination with the humanitarian community, local communities, and all other relevant stakeholders, including international actors.

As life gradually approaches normalcy in the intervention areas, the contribution of all stakeholders previously mentioned must be given due credit, and their efforts should be recognized. At the same time, the magnitude of the task should not be forgotten, and the long-term vision for the province and the region as a whole must always remain as the driving factor for humanitarian interventions. **PRISM**

The author thanks Umair Javed for his valuable research and editing assistance with this article.

Notes

¹ Malakand is a division consisting of several districts: Swat, Buner, Upper Dir, Lower Dir, and Shangla. All of them saw some military action, with Swat being the center of gravity. The divisional system ceased to exist following the 2001 local government ordinance, but it is still referred to as a geographical convenience.

² The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation (literally, *Order of Justice*) was first planned out in February 2009 but was formally enacted April 13, 2009. The shaky truce wasn't in place a month when Pakistani forces launched an offensive on militant activity after their expansion into Buner.

³ Swat has a population of 1.75 million and an area of 5,337 square kilometers. The length of the valley is 160 km and its width is 35 km. The elevation ranges between 1,200 to 5,718 meters.

⁴ Television programs and teleplays highlighting the need for the operation were broadcast on public and private channels and radio stations.

⁵ Colloquially referred to as the Swat Operation after the main area of operations.

⁶ A 1.11 percent collateral damage to the property means roughly 1 house in every 100 was either damaged or destroyed. A 0.11 percent to life means 1 person per every 1,000 was either injured or killed. At the end of the operation, collateral damage to life and property was minimal.

⁷ The United Nations launched the Consolidated Appeal in the shape of the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan. To date, it has received nearly \$330 million out of a total requirement of \$660 million.

⁸ The Post Crisis Need Assessment for this operation was conducted by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank in July 2009.



782nd Alpha Company avoids blast holes from recent improvised explosive devices in southern Afghanistan that killed one Soldier and injured others

The Premature Debate on CERP Effectiveness

BY MICHAEL FISCHERKELLER

What does the Department of Defense (DOD) community know about the effectiveness of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), how to use it to greatest effect, and cost versus its value to operations? DOD has been employing this "weapons system" for over a decade, and so much has been written on the topic that one would think quite a lot should be known. In fact, the surface of understanding has barely been scratched.

Claims regarding CERP effectiveness are wide ranging and include arguments that it is ineffective and increases instability or that it is effective only for short-term stabilization.¹ Proponents

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of these perspectives base their conclusions on anecdotes, surveys, case studies, and/or statistical analyses of large datasets. The argument presented in this article is that CERP has yet to be studied in a manner that permits confidence in any conclusions presented to date.

Analyzing a capability's effectiveness in a complex, dynamic environment is challenging. Compounding that challenge with ill-defined and a priori measures, or incomplete and in some cases inconsistent data or data access constraints, dramatically increases the burden on analysts. Today's environment demands a research approach and strong research designs structured to minimize the constraints and maximize the opportunities presented. The measures and data challenges require a significant effort on several fronts: understanding desired effects, what data are appropriate, where those data reside, obtaining access to those data, and "cleaning" the data to support analysis. Is such a significant effort warranted to better inform the debate? Absolutely.

Importance of the Debate

CERP has been in the commander's toolkit for years. It has been employed for many types of projects large and small in both rural and urban environments. Since its inception in 2003, DOD has requested, and the Congress obligated, \$6 billion for the program in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States and its coalition partners will continue reducing both forces and funds for kinetic and nonkinetic operations in Afghanistan, thereby making a better understanding of the effectiveness of CERP all the more critical. Moreover, over the next several years, in a future security environment that includes operations in which population engagement is an important component, commanders will likely expect CERP to be available to support their campaign plans and operations.²

The history of CERP is reason enough to warrant an effort. When combined with considerations of near-term and future operations, there is little room to argue against a sustained commitment to rigorous analyses.

Lessons Learned

With its first appropriation in 2003, CERP could have been characterized as a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC), which by its nature is often fielded in ongoing operations without predeployment training or training materials and without doctrinal guidance on its most effective employment.³ Such materials do tend to emerge from lessons learned in operations; however, those lessons—and the materials that follow—are often based on anecdotal evidence.⁴ In some cases, this is understandable, as applying the rigorous test and evaluation regime used for cost-equivalent major defense acquisition programs is not feasible given the nonpermissive operational environment in which QRCs tend to be employed. Rigorously evaluating such capabilities in a counterinsurgency environment requires another approach.

Over the past year, we have been laying the foundation for, and begun executing, studies on CERP and other nonkinetic programs and activities. Through these efforts, a number of serious issues have been identified that should be taken into account before the defense community can state with confidence that it understands the effectiveness of CERP. Such understanding is necessary to develop training materials, implement CERP to the greatest effect in current operations, and value it against other capabilities in current and forecasted operations in order to inform doctrine, concept development, and programmatic decisions.

Tales of caution and optimism are offered in the sections that follow. Caution is expressed

most often in reference to having too much confidence in the findings of studies that have been done to date. Optimism is offered because the serious issues can be addressed—several studies are presented as examples—thereby increasing the confidence that DOD and others can have in decisions regarding the employment and funding of CERP.

Understanding the Independent Variable

What is the size of the population of projects? For CERP projects in Afghanistan, the focus of the analytical efforts discussed in this article, data are entered into three separate databases—initially as an Afghanistan Development Report record, again with additional data and supporting media files in Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE),⁵ and finally as a CERP Checkbook entry.⁶ Working with data from 2008 to 2010, it became clear that all three databases required thorough review in order to build an accurate and comprehensive account of each project's vital statistics, including but not limited to subprojects, start/end dates, locations, cost, type, and desired effects. Consider, for example, the fact that the number of CERP records in the CIDNE database does not equal the number of CERP projects. Many records (for example, those in the category of Bulk Funds) often represent several projects that are visible only upon review of attached media files, the details of which are not accounted for when exporting unclassified CERP data from CIDNE. This brings to the fore the first cautionary note: studies that have been done to date based on unclassified data have in all probability drawn conclusions from an incomplete dataset.

The critical need to use classified data in CERP analyses will be a theme throughout this article. In spite of the best efforts of some

talented analysts, no comprehensive study of CERP in which DOD could have confidence is possible using only unclassified data.

What is the substance of the population of projects? As several analysts have described, CERP projects are varied by category (20), location, date, duration (days to years), and cost. Within “category,” there is potential for further differentiation by “type.” For example, the category of “Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities” includes such disparate types as mosque construction and telecommunication, radio, and support services. Projects are also varied in specified desired effects, a point to be discussed in depth later. This degree of variance in combination with the significant number of CERP projects leads to the second cautionary note: findings

no comprehensive study of CERP in which DOD could have confidence is possible using only unclassified data

regarding CERP effectiveness drawn from anecdotes or case studies alone should be viewed as a weak basis from which to draw *general* conclusions. In addition, studies that have looked at thousands of cases but treated CERP projects indiscriminately—by aggregating all projects by cost, number, province, or country—may not serve the community well since they also fail to account for the variance described above.

Accounting for the Context

CERP is being employed in a complex and dynamic environment. Measuring effectiveness in such an environment, given the multitude of extraneous factors that may influence the achievement of a desired effect, is challenging but not impossible. This is where a strong

research approach and rigorous research designs come into play.

CERP is not used in a laboratory setting in a way that one could, as in a true experiment design, control for the potential influence of specific extraneous factors by physically excluding them from the environment. It is instead used in an environment where other factors such as high-tempo operations may or may not be taking place, coalition forces may or may not be present, ethnic or tribal boundaries may or may not be crossed, projects may or may not have been consistent with community leaders' priorities, good governance may be present in one locale but not another,

there are as many perspectives on the desired effect of CERP employment as there are conclusions regarding CERP effectiveness

and so on. Many of these data are classified, serving as yet another example of the important role classification plays in CERP analyses. Comprehensive analyses of CERP effectiveness must take the potential influences of these other factors into account. This can be done systematically in several ways, two of which are described below.

In one type of *comparative* method, the research design controls for extraneous factors by comparing cases that share the same or similar values for the factors (Most Similar Systems Design) but differ on the value of the dependent variable (was the effect achieved or not?) on the assumption that doing so increases confidence that changes in the dependent variable are associated with changes in the independent variable. For example, were one to identify two cases—one in which CERP was employed and

one where it was not—where the extraneous factors in both were similar in many respects and the desired effect was achieved in the case where CERP was employed and not achieved in the other case, one could have some confidence that the effect was a consequence of the CERP project and not other extraneous factors.

While this research design would increase confidence that CERP effectiveness was actually being measured, it has limitations. The two-case focus decreases confidence that the measured effectiveness can be generalized to the larger project population. A different research design, one that could account for context and increase confidence in the generalization of results, is the statistical method.

In the *statistical* method, extraneous factors are not controlled for; rather, they are measured and their influence is accounted for through statistical analysis. If a well-designed statistical model looking at thousands of cases concluded that CERP had been associated with changes in the desired effect in a statistically significant manner, confidence that an effect can be generalized would be warranted.

Given that different research designs have different strengths and weaknesses, a research approach to studying the effectiveness of CERP should be multimethod in character. Robust findings across multiple methods would increase confidence in conclusions regarding effectiveness. In addition, as often occurs in research, findings from one method will tend to suggest important questions that require additional analyses using a variant of the same method or another method altogether.

Understanding the Desired Effect

That Which Has Been Claimed. There are as many perspectives on the desired effect of CERP employment as there are conclusions

regarding CERP effectiveness. Analysts have claimed it is intended to improve security through the purchase of loyalty or information, improve governance, protect forces, build capacity, or improve the relationship between the Afghan population and government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.⁷ U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A) guidance on CERP as a weapons system instructs commanders to employ it in order to build capacity, promote peace and hope for future generations, and build trust and lasting support for the Afghan government.⁸ Other Regional Command–East guidance uses similar phraseology and adds that CERP projects enhance economic opportunities as a viable alternative to the insurgency.⁹

These desired effects run the gamut from the tactical to the strategic level of war. CERP certainly could be characterized as a tactical weapons system capable of generating tactical, operational, and strategic effects. From an analytical perspective, this is an important issue, as the focus of and research design for measuring effectiveness at the three levels would be different. The lack of clarity on the level of analysis in the CERP debate has made a large contribution to its inconclusive nature.

Given the wide range of CERP project categories, it is conceivable that each of the desired effects listed is valid in conjunction with one or more of those categories or combinations thereof. Indeed, an example of this from our own research is offered later. However, and to repeat, there is no guidance specifying such relationships and no research that, as yet, provides empirical support for them. Without an understanding of *the* desired effect (were CERP to be treated in the aggregate) or of certain effects associated only with certain categories of expenditures, little progress can be made toward evaluating CERP effectiveness.¹⁰

This plethora of perspectives is important to consider from another angle: training. Without a clearly specified mechanism of action and desired effect, commanders cannot be trained to understand well and plan against the effectiveness of this weapons system at any level of analysis. The absence of a comprehensive training program puts warfighters at a disadvantage and at risk.

That Which Has Been Analyzed. Ideally, assessing effectiveness should be done after a desired effect and a concomitant direct measure of effectiveness have been identified. Absent a direct measure, indirect and surrogate measures can be pursued. Agreement on a desired effect is far from an apt description of the current state of affairs. Nonetheless, in analyses of CERP (treated in the aggregate), the *direct* measure of effectiveness most often used has been *changes in levels of violence*. The hypothesis is that if CERP were effective, it would manifest as reductions in violence. This hypothesis likely follows from several analysts' claims that *the* desired effect is improved security. The availability of unclassified data may also have played a role in this choice—improvised explosive device (IED) events, for example, can be downloaded from CIDNE in an unclassified format.

Does the measure *changes in levels of violence* serve well as a valid direct measure of effectiveness? It is insightful to tally how often it is listed as a desired effect by CERP practitioners. In a review of over 2,000 CIDNE CERP records from Afghanistan, less than 10 percent specified a primary or secondary intended benefit that could reasonably be equated with changes in levels of violence, with the intended change being a reduction.¹¹ This should give one pause, and it highlights the third cautionary note with regard to recent studies: the conclusions being drawn about

effectiveness may not be valid as they may not speak directly to the effects specified by the initiators of the projects under analysis.

It may be that this clear disconnect lies in the levels of analysis issue raised previously. Perhaps the approximately 10 percent specified by the practitioners are desired tactical effects and the recent studies were more strategically focused. A strategic-level study of the effectiveness of CERP using changes in levels of violence as the direct measure of improved security should take into account other factors that may be associated with such changes, the most significant of which is the presence of U.S. and coalition forces. No such rigorous accounting has been seen in recent studies. So again, one should give pause when considering the conclusions.

just as care should be taken when considering analyzing CERP in the aggregate, so too should care accompany approaches to treating violence in the aggregate

Does the changes in levels of violence measure serve well as a valid indirect measure of effectiveness? Indirect measures are useful when gauging a direct effect poses a significant challenge, and they are valid if they correlate with direct measures. Since there is no agreement on the valid direct measure, analysts can only speculate as to whether *it* may correlate with changes in levels of violence. But why bother doing that when several of the direct measures specified by practitioners are measurable? For example, the effectiveness of projects intended to increase activity at a market or bazaar could be measured by analyzing Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) data on access roads

to those locales in periods before and after project completion. As one might expect, those data are classified.

Are changes in levels of violence a reasonable surrogate measure? Surrogate measures are useful when issues such as time-sensitivity or cost prohibit waiting until a desired effect is measurable. They are often referred to as path-dependent measures whose values correlate with those of the desired effects. Similar to what was stated above, as there is no agreed-upon perspective regarding the mechanism of action of CERP, there is no way at this time of determining if changes in levels of violence is a valid surrogate measure of CERP effectiveness.

Finally, just as care should be taken when considering analyzing CERP in the aggregate, so too should care accompany approaches to treating violence in the aggregate. The difference between Afghan-on-Afghan violence vis-à-vis other types can be an important discriminator in understanding the effectiveness of CERP projects.

That Which Requires Greater Consideration. Our experiences suggest that several additional nuances should be brought to bear in analyses of CERP's effectiveness. The first is found in a careful reading of USFOR-A guidance on CERP employment; CERP is intended for projects that can be sustained by the local population or government, and commanders need to evaluate how projects can add value to the local community.¹² This emphasis on local suggests that the measurement of a desired effect should be focused in an area proximate to that in which the CERP project was completed. For projects where the desired effect may be to create or restore goodwill or suppress ill-will (for example, from a battle damage payment), this notion also suggests an interesting sensitivity analysis that could explore degrees of

THE PREMATURE DEBATE ON CERP EFFECTIVENESS

decay in effectiveness as a function of proximity to the project.

A second nuance is the importance of the temporal domain. Many of the positive effects that may be generated by CERP projects likely fade over time—but over what time period, and to what degree? At what point in time after project completion is an effect most pronounced, and at what point does it begin to diminish? Sensitivity analyses focusing on decay over time could answer these questions and could inform a commander's decisions regarding the sequencing of activities. Of course, one could also perform sensitivity analyses on combinations of time, proximity, and project type.

A third nuance, tightly coupled to the first, is the recognition that not all violence is local. If reduction in violence is the desired effect of a project that was in an area proximate to a main supply route, including any IEDs or other violent events along the route in the analysis may be inappropriate.

The more one studies CERP, the more one comes to understand the nuances that should be taken into account when drawing conclusions regarding its effectiveness.

Reasons for Optimism

Over the past year, we have steadily and patiently built the foundation for executing studies of CERP that satisfy the demanding criteria put forth in this article. The base of that foundation is data.¹³ It has been a significant undertaking getting access to, gathering, reviewing, and cleaning all of the data required to execute analyses that satisfy the minimal criteria specified above. We are grateful to the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program for sponsoring that work and to the warfighters who have taken the time to share data. Creating the data foundation is not as simple as downloading

information from CIDNE. It requires a review of brigade battlefield/commander update assessments, patrol reports, Human Terrain Team reports, U.S. (and other coalition) force tracking data, GMTI data, and Afghanistan National Security Force development reports. It also calls for interviews with brigade, battalion, and company commanders. Finally, it requires cleaning and translating all these data into a format suitable for analysis. We have reciprocated that cooperation by communicating findings back to commanders who have, in turn, requested additional analyses in order to better inform their resourcing decisions. One such study and additional findings are presented below, albeit in a way that takes account of classification issues.

we identified a positive association between culvert-denial systems and a subsequent reduction in IED events

Study: Culvert-denial Systems

A deployed unit requested an analysis of the effectiveness of culvert-denial systems. Many roads in Afghanistan are undercut by culverts that present opportunities to insurgents seeking to intimidate or disrupt freedom of movement of the Afghan population. Culverts are ideal for the emplacement of high net explosive weight (HNEW) IEDs as they are ubiquitous, ample (allowing for significantly sized IEDs), and accessible (allowing for repeated visits over which to build an IED). When a vehicle encounters a culvert-emplaced HNEW IED, the immediate outcome often includes a destroyed vehicle, casualties, and road debris. The effects of such an event could include reduced freedom of movement of the

Afghan population, which could, in turn, impact commerce and a host of other issues.

Research Design, Context, Desired Effect, and Findings. Culvert-denial system projects are a subtype that appears in several different CERP categories. After a thorough review of the three CERP databases described previously, several hundred such projects were identified. This large number and the desire to test for findings that can be generalized suggested the statistical method. The comparative method was also brought to bear on the question.

Culvert-denial systems have been employed in many different locations throughout Afghanistan, crossing district, provincial, ethnic, and tribal boundaries; in areas that are densely and sparsely populated; and in areas where the coalition's operations tempo has been both high and low. A statistical model was designed to identify the influence that such factors may have on whether installing a culvert-denial system produces the desired effect.

What is the desired effect? Since these systems are employed to deny insurgents the ability to hastily emplace IEDs in culverts that can injure or kill the Afghan population, the direct measure of effectiveness is *changes in levels of IED events on or immediately proximate to culverts*. This was measured using IED data exported from CIDNE for a defined period preceding and following the installation of culvert-denial systems.

In reviewing the data on culvert-denial systems, an opportunity for additional analysis was identified for which the comparative method served well. There was a period during which a commander had units of similar capability dispersed over similar terrain (both in terms of terrain features and population density) that included an 80-kilometer (km) stretch of road. The first 40 km of this road had culvert denial systems installed and the second half did not,

as the commander was waiting to receive funding for it.

Using the statistical method, we identified a statistically significant positive association between the introduction of culvert-denial systems and a subsequent reduction in IED events on or near the culverts. In the comparative case study, no IED explosions were reported for the 40 km of road on which culvert-denial systems were installed versus five IED explosions for the 40 km of road where they were not installed. Upon completion of these studies, the findings were swiftly communicated back to the field.

This analysis could be characterized as a tactical analysis of effectiveness. Emplacing these systems can also have operational and strategic effects. Follow-on operational and strategic-level analyses will focus on measuring changes in freedom of movement on these roads (using GMTI data) in addition to other measures.

Cost versus Value. USFOR-A guidance regarding CERP instructs that CERP will not be used for "direct or indirect benefit to U.S., Coalition, or other supporting military personnel."¹⁴ However, that does not prevent the analytic community from assisting DOD in considering direct or indirect benefits to U.S. forces for purposes of calculating value. The culvert-denial system analyses can be used to illustrate what is possible.

U.S. forces, mounted and dismounted, cross culverts with frequency equal to, if not greater than, the Afghans. Insurgents are aware of this, and are also aware that a culvert provides one of few opportunities to emplace a HNEW IED that is capable of disabling or destroying a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. A number of different systems are used to deny insurgents access to culverts, but for purposes of illustration, the cost of a cage constructed of reinforcing bar (rebar) is approximately \$5,000



U.S. Army (Richard Daniels, Jr.)

per unit. There are many variants of MRAPs whose unit cost can range from \$500,000 to over a million dollars. A simple material-based, cost-versus-value calculation suggests that, in reference to MRAP survival, one rebar system has a value ranging between 100 and 200 times its cost.

Additional Findings

The culvert-denial system analyses demonstrate a value of analyzing CERP in a far more discriminate manner than has generally been done. The findings were of immediate use to warfighters in Afghanistan and offer a concrete example to policymakers of how CERP can significantly impact operations. We have continued to receive requests for analyses from the field and in the course of research have identified a number of intriguing findings that speak to the salience of nuance raised in this article.

Terrain Features. Aspects of the operational environment are proving to be important factors to consider in CERP analyses. It was suggested previously that effects should be measured proximate to a project. Based on analyses of completed CERP projects in both urban and rural environments, we encourage analysts to consider terrain features when setting the distance about a project in which to measure for the desired effect. We have discovered that urban terrain features appear to limit the geographic reach of a desired effect. If we cast the net too far from an urban project, evidence of an effect can be overwhelmed by unrelated activity at the periphery of the area of analyses. This finding is quite consistent with the observations offered in joint doctrine on military operations in urban terrain.¹⁵

Types of Projects and Types of Violence.

In one province under analysis, a relationship was identified between economic development projects and increased proximate levels of violence. This was not the desired effect of these projects, of course, so the finding was troubling. Once identified, it would have been of no use to warfighters to share this finding and then simply walk away, leaving them with the impression that economic development projects invited violence. Identifying the types of projects and type of violence proved insightful in revealing an underlying dynamic—a particular set of projects was fueling a turf

greater access is a call for the development and execution of a comprehensive data-gathering strategy so a better understanding of nonkinetic capabilities can be developed

war among local powerbrokers resulting in Afghan-on-Afghan violence. This level of detail is of value to commanders as it suggests the motivations of the powerbrokers; in turn, that may offer a means through which to manage their participation in the counterinsurgency more effectively.

Operational and Strategic-level Analyses Interaction Effects. The culvert-denial system comparative case study controlled for the presence of U.S. forces by selecting a period when units in both cases were of comparable capability and patrolled a space of comparable geographic scope both before and after the installation of culvert-denial systems. That is, U.S. presence was essentially constant. Our most important findings from a strategic and operational perspective are emerging from analyses of projects

in which U.S. presence proximate to a project actually changed after project completion.

This research line of effort focused on testing for a strategic- or operational-level effect and assumed the desired effect was improved security. The effect was operationalized as changes in level of violence. CERP projects were not treated in toto since our other research identified significant differences in effectiveness across categories. Instead, projects from several “like” categories were bundled and those bundles were used as the units of analysis.

As mentioned, any analysis of CERP projects in which changes in level of violence is the desired effect must take into account other factors that could have an impact on violence. The most significant of those factors is the presence of U.S. forces proximate to a project. Changes in presence were measured by analyzing Blue Force Tracking data.

Analyses have led us to conclude that there is an important interaction effect associated with changes in levels of violence in the proximate area where a project is completed and changes in the density of Blue Forces. Increases or decreases in presence nearby a project are systematically and significantly associated with the changes in levels of violence and the degree of the changes. This interaction effect is significant in analyses of several bundles of CERP projects, during different phases of operations, and across different locales in Afghanistan. It is not an understatement to describe the interaction effect as substantial for certain bundles of CERP expenditures when compared to cases in which changes in U.S. presence occurred in areas where projects may or may not have been completed. (A random sample of locations was analyzed to establish a baseline against which to compare the interaction effect.)

Should this relationship be robust in the face of updated data sets (both longitudinally

and in richness), it could advance the conceptual development of combined arms (or, more appropriately, combined capabilities) warfare for counterinsurgency operations. Its more immediate value, however, from both an operational and strategic perspective could be as an input into the calculus behind decisions regarding how best to surge in an area—by sequencing or synchronizing kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities—or whether and how best to “thin out” for purposes of transitioning to a host nation government.

Conclusion

The debate regarding the effectiveness of CERP has been fueled by studies that may reasonably be characterized as incomplete since they do not address satisfactorily the several issues identified in this article. This discourse, as does any that is not well-supported by evidence, carries risk—in this case to the warfighter employing the capability and the policymaker determining whether to fund it. Such risks can be reduced by a sustained effort to better understand and then gather the data required to support rigorous analyses of CERP and other nonkinetic activities. That said, further increasing the burden on unit commanders to record even more data is not a course of action advocated here.

For capabilities already fielded, there is plenty of data out there: it takes only one trip from a company headquarters to its battalion headquarters to its brigade headquarters to its regional command headquarters to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) joint command headquarters and to ISAF headquarters to be made patently aware of that fact. That mass of data, of course, is not “clean,” is in many formats, and tends not to be consistent across units. As noted at the outset of this article, it is a challenging environment for analysts,

and the analytical community has quite a bit more work ahead in that regard. With greater access to these data and strong research approaches and designs, improved analyses in which DOD and others can have increased confidence are possible. Greater access is not a call for prematurely declassifying much of the data required for thorough analyses. It is a call for the development and execution of a comprehensive data-gathering strategy so a better understanding of these nonkinetic capabilities can be developed.

The findings presented here demonstrate that committing resources to this analytical task can have substantial returns in answering questions regarding CERP effectiveness. A final note of caution is in order, however. Such questions should be thoughtfully crafted and informed by the issues and nuances identified in this article. A response to a simple query regarding CERP effectiveness will provide little if any insight to the one asking the question. Well-structured queries that take into account the nuances discussed previously will result in far more informative responses.

The analytical challenges presented here come from having to analyze CERP effectiveness in a nonpermissive environment long after its employment. In the future, to better understand such capabilities *before* they are employed and to establish an evaluation regime, the first task is to step *back* and consider what effects are desired, what mechanisms of action exist for their success or failure, and then and only then what data should be captured to determine operational effectiveness. This typical preemployment operational test and evaluation approach for kinetic capabilities should be made typical for nonkinetic capabilities as well, so they can be employed in the most operationally- and cost-effective manners. **PRISM**

Notes

¹ See, for example, Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson, “The Commander as Investor: Changing CERP Practices,” *PRISM* 2, no. 1 (March 2011); Mark Moyer, “Development in Afghanistan’s Counterinsurgency: A New Guide,” *Orbis* (March 2011); Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper #14606, March 2009; Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN Operations,” July 22, 2010; Andy Brosnan, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Identifying Problems and Interagency Solutions,” Harvard Kennedy School of Government, April 1, 2008; and Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 37 (2^d Quarter, 2005), 46–52.

² Most of the arguments presented here apply equally well to other capabilities rapidly fielded in Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* (for example, biometrics and forensics, U.S. Agency for International Development funds, counterthreat finance cells, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the Human Terrain System).

³ There is no formal definition of *Quick Reaction Capability*. It has entered Defense Department discourse as a means of describing a capability fielded in response to an urgent operational needs statement.

⁴ Administrative guidance for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds is found in “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Publication 1–06, *Commanders Emergency Response Program SOP*, updated February 2011, 2. This document does not offer guidance on how to use CERP to greatest effect.

⁵ Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) is the designated Significant Activity reporting tool of record in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

⁶ Each entry supports specific reporting requirements.

⁷ See, for example, Patterson and Robinson; Berman, Shapiro, and Felter; Moyer.

⁸ “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 2.

⁹ Memorandum for Record Addressing Fiscal Year 2011 CERP Guidance from Commander, Regional Command–East.

¹⁰ Several U.S. Government Accountability Office reports make similar arguments. See, for example, “Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq,” GAO-08-736R, 5–6.

¹¹ There is a field in the CIDNE CERP database in which practitioners can identify primary and secondary effects.


¹² “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 2.

¹³ Our foundational data-gathering effort has initially focused on the Regional Command–South and Regional Command–Southwest areas of operation.

¹⁴ “Money as a Weapons System Afghanistan,” 3.

¹⁵ Joint Publication 3–06, *Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 16, 2002).

An Interview with Richard B. Myers



NDU Foundation

In 2003, did you believe that Iraq posed a clear and present national security threat to the United States?

General Myers: The fact that everybody thought Iraq had WMD [weapons of mass destruction] made [it] a threat because of the nexus between WMD and violent extremists.

If you had known that Saddam Hussein did not have WMD at that time,

would you have advised the President against invading Iraq?

General Myers: I think so, but the President's and everybody's rationale was that the nexus between WMD and violent extremists constituted a clear and present threat. There were fringes that had other theories that have taken over the political debate and made it vitriolic; for example, people say, "You went in there for the oil." No, we went in there because he had WMD, and we didn't think it would be a good thing if [these weapons] fell into the hands of others at a time Iraq was supporting violent extremism. You can't deny that support when Iraq was giving \$25,000 to families of terrorists who martyred themselves in Israel, so that was the rationale.

According to the Powell Doctrine, among the questions you should ask before committing troops are "Is there a vital national security threat? Is there a clear and obtainable objective?" And "Is there broad international support?" Do you feel that you had a clear objective?

General Myers: It's interesting that someone, especially someone who was in the military when he did that, thinks that you can establish

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a “doctrine” for the President to follow. The President makes these decisions. You can have it in the back of your mind that “Okay, we better have a pretty clear mission here before,” but the President in the end will decide, and the President may decide that’s not important. I think those are good principles—great principles actually. And I think we did have a pretty good way forward, but you have to remember in all this we can have the best way forward in the world, but we are just one part of the equation. There are other parts of the equation that you don’t have any control over, and you can think about it and so forth, but in the end, the other variables play a part, too. We had a plan with an end in sight, and it turned out to be more complex. Here we are 10 years later. We are where I thought we’d be earlier, but still a place where they have a constitution; they’ve elected a government. It’s not the government we would necessarily pick, but they’ve started the process we wished them to start.

There was a State Department effort prior to the invasion, the Future of Iraq Project. Why was that plan not brought in or not used as a template for building a plan or used as a stepping stone?

General Myers: That’s a good question. I don’t know. What we often find in the U.S. Government—at least in this particular case—is that there were a lot of bodies, not at the Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell levels, but below that, where there was an attitude of “anything coming out of Defense, we don’t want to hear about,” or “anything coming out of State, we don’t want to hear about.” Not with the military; this is civilian to civilian, bureaucracy to bureaucracy, below the level of the principals, but it goes on and that’s not helpful. That’s one

of the issues I think we have in our government. We don’t have a good mechanism to focus all of our instruments of national power on a problem. You can argue, as I did as Chairman, that in Iraq the military instrument would be predominant in the early stages of major combat and perhaps early stages of stability and reconstruction, but then these other instruments of national power—the diplomacy, economic, informational—have to play their roles as well. It’s really frustrating that we couldn’t harness these in a way to focus more effectively in Iraq.

And do you believe that was because of institutional rivalries?

General Myers: It’s a combination. There are clearly some in our government who did not buy into what was going on in Iraq, and there were also departments and agencies that were not well-resourced. Let’s think about this for a minute: the Department of Justice was picked to “go stand up a new judiciary inside Iraq.” They don’t have people sitting around the Justice Department with their bags packed ready to go to a worldwide contingency. That’s not what they do. Their focus is on the United States. So we were asking Justice to take people out of their domestic responsibilities for a foreign mission. No doubt that important domestic positions would go unmanned to support that.

When they stood up the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], it was supposed to be manned with civilians. I know it wasn’t fully manned well into its existence, but even a year after [L. Paul] Bremer pulled out, I don’t think it ever got fully manned. It was the military that had to fill in the gaps—partially because the agencies were not making it happen and partially because of resource constraints in

the civilian agencies. If it takes all the instruments of national power to succeed, the civilian agencies have to be resourced in a way that will allow them to do that.

In these uncertain economic times, do you believe the civilian agencies will be able to get the resources they require to play the role that you describe?

General Myers: I think traditionally they have not for many reasons. I was on a State Department group that Secretary [of State Condoleezza] Rice organized to look at what she called transformational diplomacy. What you find out quickly is that they need more resources, but their relations with Congress are not as robust as, for instance, the Department of Defense's relations with Congress. So there isn't the continuing dialogue to articulate the need. Since I've left office, I think State Department has been plussed up with a considerable amount of personnel and probably budgets as well. My guess is that it is still not sufficient, though, for what they ought to be doing in the world. That's going to be hard, especially in difficult fiscal circumstances.

In November 2005, after you had left the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05, which stated that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and shall be given "priority comparable to combat operations." It then went further to say that whatever requirements the civilian agencies could not meet, the Department of Defense would develop internally—everything from the city planner to the training of the judiciary. Do you think such roles are appropriate for the U.S. military?

General Myers: If you are going to be effective at those types of tasks, you have to be educated and trained. It's hard to believe that we have military members with a lot of extra time to learn another skill set who would be better at it than someone who has developed and worked with these skills in the private sector. The military can do that—we've filled in a lot of places. We had artillerymen and privates developing town councils based on what they learned in high school civics—I've talked to them. It's a great thing, but not a perfect thing. It's a great thing that they were so enthusiastic. It's a great thing the Iraqis were enthusiastic about their guidance as well. And as one said to me up at Walter Reed [Hospital], "Well, in any case, I knew a lot more about it [civics] than they did." Which is true. Apparently, he paid attention to it in high school. But that's not the way it ought to be done. If that's the way we are doing it, I'm not going to criticize it, but I think whoever does it should be educated and trained in the task. Otherwise, we are not going to be effective.

Do you think it likely the United States will be involved in major stabilization and reconstruction operations involving substantial troop deployments in the near future?

General Myers: That's impossible to know. We are, as the facts bear out, terrible at being able to see what's around the corner. If you are talking about military capabilities and you are the President of the United States, from whatever party, you require a spectrum of response capability from all-out conflict to helping nations in appropriate ways, and you need people trained and ready. But when we look at the issues that are confronting some of these countries, there are a couple

of characteristics that they have in common. For one, they have a huge youth population and usually poor economic situation. I don't know if there is a role for the military, but there certainly is a role for the developed world to help these nations develop in a way that makes them viable international players without fomenting extremism along the way. Economic issues and huge unemployment can certainly spawn extremists and that will have to be part of any grand strategy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States stated that America is threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones. Do you believe that that's still true today?

General Myers: That's a good question. I think the greatest threat to America today is from nonstate actors. This doesn't mean nation-states are no longer a threat, but in terms of the ones that are the most immediate. It took 19 people to attack us on 9/11, and that has dictated our actions for 10 years. More than 19 in terms of planning of course, but 19 terrorists carried it off. We still must pay attention to those nation-states that are trying to steal our secrets and deny us access to certain parts of the world. That's all important. With all the unrest, you can have state-on-state conflict; that's clear. But I think the more immediate threats are the nonstate actors.

Other than al Qaeda, are there others that come to mind?

General Myers: Hezbollah, for sure. They are sponsored by Iran and, as somebody said early on in all this, al Qaeda is a real threat, but

Hezbollah is the real A-Team of terrorist organizations. They've killed Americans and other Westerners before; they are well-organized, and I think a potential threat that needs to be thought about.

And now they are a part of the Lebanese government.

General Myers: Yes. So how does that bode for the security of Israel when Hezbollah has the backing of Iran which is a terrorist-supporting state? It's not a good sign.

Given what we know of Iran's possession of WMD, do you think there is a rational argument to be made for a military strike against Iran?

General Myers: I thought initially probably not. Certainly any concept of U.S. boots on the ground in Iran is not appealing. But I don't think we take a military response totally off the table when we are considering all the ways we can deal with the current problem. If the United States and the international community were to decide that a nuclear-armed Iran was a threat to our vital national interests, then certainly military action should be on the table. But it's an evolution of discussion and thought to come to that point.

Then we would have to ask the military, "What can you do, what impact would it have, and what would be the consequences? Can you assure us that through strikes you can delay [Iran's nuclear] program by 1 year, 2 years, 3 years or just 1 week?" Then our decision might be different depending on the answers and anticipated ramifications. What is the potential for Iran to make it difficult to get oil out of the Persian Gulf—which would bring the

world economy to its knees? All this would have to be considered. I don't think military action is something we can just dismiss. I think it's something we have to discuss around the National Security Council table to decide if our vital national interests would be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran and where that nuclear potential might wind up.

I'd like to go back to the point you made about the tension between agencies as we were going into Iraq. Another of the goals of the 2002 National Security Strategy was to transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Fast forward to today—10 years and a couple of trillion dollars later—do you think that we've done that?

General Myers: My personal opinion is that the national security apparatus that we have today is an outgrowth of the National Security Act of 1947. Though it has been modified five or six times, it is still an act that was born out of our experiences of World War II. So, I say flippantly, that we are perfectly organized for World War II, but we are not particularly well organized for the 21st century. We see that in the way that we've dealt with the current conflicts. I used to ask people who they thought was in charge of our efforts in Iraq or in Afghanistan. When I talked to civilian audiences, they'd often say, "Oh, well, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld or Secretary Gates." I would say, "Oh, so he's in charge, he's responsible? What authority does he have over the State Department, National Security Council, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security? What is his authority there?" The answer is that he has no

such authority. So how can you put someone in charge if we're talking about all the instruments of national power focusing to solve a problem when this person "in charge" doesn't have complete authority? We don't have a system that provides a belly-button, or even two belly-buttons, to allow you to say, "They're the ones responsible and they have the authority." You just can't say that about our government in the current conflicts.

If you were to advise on how to evolve our system, in order to be a more rational responder to the challenges of the 21st century, what would your guidance be?

General Myers: There has been some great work done by Jim Locher and others who have looked at this. I did not participate in that work [the Project on National Security Reform], but I know some of the folks who did. They have given serious thought to this question. In my book, *Eyes on the Horizon*, I offered a solution that might be tenable that is not new bureaucracy-building. You can't say the President is in charge because the President has a lot of things to be in charge of. Right now he's worried about our budget, he's worried about our economy, he's worried about jobs, he's worried about health care; there are a lot of issues on his plate in addition to national security. He can't be the one who is responsible and has the authority. Somehow that has to be delegated. I think the threat from violent extremism is sufficient that we should have somebody in charge who has the responsibility and authority to work with the other departments and agencies. Not the tactical control. I'm not saying, "You need a platoon of tanks at 12th and Maine in Baghdad." But in developing the strategy and ensuring the resources

are flowing to fulfill that strategy as well as the clout to make it happen. We don't have a system like that.

Would you then propose something like a “Super-Secretary”? Someone with authority over multiple cabinet agencies?

General Myers: We could do it that way—somebody who doesn't have a whole lot of staff. In the past, it has been fashionable to create a “czar” in the National Security Council. I have a real problem with staff being in charge of anything. We need somebody who is, I'll use “in command” in the military parlance, somebody who is in charge and knows he's in charge and has the authority to make things happen so he can be held accountable. When it doesn't go right, we can say, “Hey!” the President says to the new person in charge, “I thought we were going to do this.” “We were, but Defense didn't kick up their resources,” or maybe State. Somebody can start working those sorts of issues and then be responsible. I think the threat is sufficiently serious. I'm not just talking about Iraq and Afghanistan, but I think the threat is beyond those two places; they are merely the current tactical manifestation. There is a larger issue at stake here.

Returning to the subject of Iraq, in retrospect what is your assessment of the decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority to dismantle the Iraqi Armed Forces?

General Myers: I think at the time it seemed reasonable, although that particular decision did not get a good hearing inside the Beltway. There was not a good discussion by the policy folks on that particular decision. My understanding was that it was a decision the

CPA sort of preformed and just did it. You can argue it a couple ways: It was always the plan to keep the young conscripts around to do real work. On the other hand, there were a lot of generals in that army that could never be a part of what was to follow in Iraq because they had too much blood on their hands, most of them Sunni. That was never going to sit well with the Shi'a or Kurds. The CPA thought otherwise. I wish we'd had more of a policy debate of some kind, but CPA just did it.

It left us with a situation where we had to rebuild the Iraqi Armed Forces.

General Myers: We were probably going to have to do that anyway because the leadership was not going to be acceptable. A lot of the acceptable soldiers did come back. I don't think the notion that we had a ready-made armed force was realistic if you are talking about conscripts; their hearts weren't in it. We were going to have to invest in a lot of training anyway, and equipping, because they didn't have much. When it was all said and done, we took care of a lot of it.

In Afghanistan, we are rebuilding the Afghan National Security Forces. The military side seems to be going fairly well. The law enforcement side doesn't seem to be going quite as well. Any insights as to why it seems more difficult for us to train law enforcement forces than a military force?

General Myers: We're not used to training law enforcement. That's traditionally a State Department task. Right as I was leaving office, the President decided that the Department of Defense would have that mission in Iraq because we were already doing the training,

and we were the ones who were frustrated that it wasn't going as fast as it should be going. It's a skill set normally brought in from the international community and usually from those countries that have national police forces. Part of the problem is that police are local. Your army and air force are probably not. Once police are trained, they go back to a local setting where the corruption and local pressures, even though they are newly trained and enthusiastic, remain the same. They are pressured to do things that perhaps aren't the right things. I think it has a lot to do with geography. It ought to be the national police forces providing local security in both countries, not the army, which should be focused outward. Unfortunately, we seem a long way from that.

Some people have argued that we've lost a lot of time in Afghanistan. Do you think that our preoccupation with Iraq from 2003 to 2008 set us back in Afghanistan?

General Myers: I'm not sure if I agree with that. Certainly we were concerned about Iraq and gave it a lot of attention. On the other hand, look what was happening in Afghanistan, at least up to about 2008; a constitution was adopted, elections—secure enough to be fairly peaceful elections. President [Hamid] Karzai was a pretty good president, and the Taliban were not a threat to the central government. The question was, to me at least, whether we would be in a big hurry in Afghanistan and spending a lot of U.S. resources. We were training at a pretty rapid rate anyway, but should we double that? I think the allocation of resources between Iraq and Afghanistan was about right. I don't know when the intelligence kicked in, but our intelligence never told us that the Taliban were

regrouping and that they were going to be a threat to the central government pretty soon. All of a sudden they were, and we had to take different action.

You have to have some knowledge of what's happening. If we didn't have enough intelligence folks on the ground in Afghanistan finding out what was going on because they were all being utilized in Iraq, that's a factor to consider. I don't know. There was always this notion that I held that you want to help these countries, but you can't do it all for them. It's the old dilemma: How long and how many resources do I bring to their aid and when do I start withdrawing so they can stand on their own two feet? You have to consider the taxpayer in this, local capabilities and all that. When people say we just weren't paying attention, maybe the intelligence wasn't paying attention, but actually things in Afghanistan were moving pretty well by Afghanistan standards until the Taliban became a threat. I remember when I first heard the Taliban were in resurgence, several years after I retired, I began thinking somebody's not reporting this right because it just wasn't anything I had even worried about. But apparently the Taliban regrouped and became a factor to the point where we are experiencing large-unit conflict. More force-on-force than we'd had before which is kind of a new development this time around.

More force-on-force than in Iraq?

General Myers: I think so. Al Qaeda in Iraq would do things like they always do—it wasn't force-on-force, squad-on-squad. In Afghanistan, you didn't see this stuff early on. This time around, they're better trained, they actually exhibit pretty good tactical prowess.

MYERS

Their [tactics, techniques, and procedures] are pretty good.

How do you see the end of the Afghanistan War?

General Myers: For me it ends when the Taliban are no longer a threat to the stability and security of the central government. There are always going to be Taliban around. The end is when the central government can deliver goods and services to the provinces without threat. A lot of that is up to Afghanistan; they have to shoulder the load. Right now there are lots of questions. Some say President Karzai can still do the job. Others have already dismissed him and that's too bad. This kind of debate shouldn't be taking place in public. If we are critical of the Afghan government, we ought to do it in private and be supportive to get them ready for their tasks. If we are successful in thwarting the Taliban to the point where the Afghan government doesn't have to worry about its legitimacy and its ability to provide goods and services, that's success. I think it will take a long time and we will be training Afghan security forces for perhaps a long time. I don't necessarily believe its going to require the massive forces that we have there today. Having said that, one of the questions in all this is Pakistan. I don't believe we are going to have a secure Afghanistan, one where we can steadily reduce our forces, as long as Pakistan is a safe haven for the Taliban. It's just not possible in my view.

Everything you read about counterinsurgency suggests that it is a long-term process and that it cannot be done in one night. Yet here in the United States we have a short attention span. Do you think we

can ever be a successful counterinsurgency practitioner as a country?

General Myers: History tells us that most counterinsurgencies run 8 to 10 years or something like that. If we look at Vietnam, if we look at the last 10 years, if the importance of being involved can be described by our senior leadership to the American people in a way that makes sense to them, almost anything is possible, but it has to be seen in our vital national interest. President Bush and President Obama both said clearly that it is in our national interest to have a secure and stable Afghanistan; otherwise, we are going to see more of what we saw on 9/11. It's up to the President to convince the American people that this is in our national interest and dedicate the resources to it. There is always a tension and there ought to be.

In situations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, do you think there is a blurring of the lines between combatants and noncombatants—as in “farmer by day, Taliban by night”?

General Myers: In any insurgency, we have that issue. That's what makes fighting an insurgency so tough. It's important for the United States, given our values and the way the world looks to us to uphold those values, but we have to be cautious when we go into combat in those kinds of situations—cautious in the sense that we need to avoid as much collateral damage and civilian deaths or injuries as we can. It is after all conflict, so it's not always going to be possible, but it's a special burden. All-out war is one thing, but this is a special burden when the enemy could be a child or a woman with bombs strapped to them. We have to make

these judgments to show that we have this high set of moral values and at the same time carry out our duties.

Do you think that the laws of war themselves are in need of an update to be able to account for such nuances?

General Myers: Personally, no. I think they are adequate for the task. They put a huge burden on international coalitions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and particularly on the U.S. military. Some countries are out front fighting, and some countries are keeping the fires at the forward operating bases burning. For those who are out front, it puts a huge burden on the young and middle-aged men and women; I don't deny that. I think the law of armed conflict is appropriate. I don't know how we'd change it. You wouldn't make it easier to kill civilians, I don't think. I think we can train and educate our people, and they've responded pretty well. So, no, I don't think it will change.

What do you think is the future for complex operations?

General Myers: In the past, we had military operations followed by other things. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there were phases where there were more military, but quickly within a matter of weeks, we needed to bring to bear all the instruments of national power. That's why this whole idea of "Are we organized properly to develop that?" came from. I don't think we're going to see the sequential application of our national and international instruments of power. I see the trend going into the future of more simultaneous application of all instruments of national power, which means the planning capabilities between our various departments and agencies in this government and with our friends and allies need to be a lot more robust than they are today. **PRISM**

Book Review

The Future of Power

By Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

PublicAffairs, 2011

300 pp., \$27.99

ISBN: 978-1-58648-891-8

REVIEWED BY JOHN W. COFFEY

In his latest book, Joseph Nye presents a comprehensive examination of the multifaceted dimensions of power and advances a framework for what he calls “liberal realism.” Nye writes for the “intelligent reader” rather than an academic audience and offers a set of recommendations for a smart power strategy in the 21st century.¹ *Smart power*, he explains, is “the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction.”

According to Nye, the problem confronting all states in the new century is the increasing number of threats (for example, international financial instability and terrorism) outside their control resulting from a diffusion of power from states to nonstate actors. Military power has not become obsolete, but will continue to underpin international order and shape the agenda and political calculations of leaders. Economic resources will remain a tool of smart power as well, although nonstate actors and market vicissitudes will constrain its exercise. The use of soft

power (for example, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchanges, assistance/training programs) to attract and persuade foreign publics will be critical in a global information age. The cyber age diffuses power, placing more dangers outside the control of even powerful states. States will still play the dominant role on the world stage, but that stage will become more crowded and unruly. In coming decades, the rising power of other state and nonstate actors will challenge a still preponderant America. The United States, therefore, will need “power *with* others as much as power *over* others. America’s capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will be an important dimension of the nation’s hard and soft power.”

In what he calls liberal realism, Nye proposes an American “smart power strategy” centered on multilateralism and partnering in the context of a global information age. Based on a synthesis of interests and values, this strategy gives priority to national interests, but considers values “an intangible national interest.” Tradeoffs and compromises are inevitable, Nye concedes. While according an unexceptionable primacy to securing national survival, his grand strategy recommends all manner of multinational good works.

Nye notes that his concept of smart power has influenced the Obama administration’s policy. And so it has. In two speeches before the Council on Foreign Relations,² Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined the smart power strategy “central to our thinking and our decision-making.” The “heart of America’s mission in the world today,” she stated, is to exercise “American leadership to solve problems

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in concert with others.” Taking a multilateral approach, the administration will mobilize all available resources in a “blend of principle and pragmatism” to revitalize international institutions, reach beyond governments to nonstate actors and people, and join others to solve shared problems. Setting forth an ambitious global agenda in a “new American Moment,” Secretary Clinton seemed heedless of limits and the need to set priorities. America must do it all. “What do we give up on? What do we put on the backburner?” she asked. Council President Richard Haass raised the awkward question of money. With U.S. debt nearing the size of gross domestic product and deficits running at \$1.5 trillion a year, Haass objected, how can America conduct foreign policy as if it had unlimited resources. The Secretary answered that making the right decisions will be “very tough.”

Neither the Secretary’s agenda nor Nye’s book takes sufficient account of the Nation’s fiscal peril and its consequences for America’s role in the world. Nye claims that the country can solve its debt problem with consumption taxes and expenditure cuts to pay for entitlement programs once the economy recovers. He overlooks the daunting political task of reducing entitlement programs themselves, the main driver of the country’s unsustainable debt. Richard Haass and Roger Altman have issued a dire fiscal forecast entailing huge spending cuts and substantial tax hikes, and Michael Mandelbaum has written a bracing book explaining how economic constraints will inevitably curtail America’s post–World War II activist foreign policy with baleful effects for the stability and prosperity of the world.³

Nor does Nye, beyond a nod to recognizing limits, come to grips with setting priorities among national interests in order to match limited means to ends. As Mandelbaum argues,

given current fiscal straits, we must distinguish between those missions and initiatives vital to national safety and prosperity and those that are merely desirable and, therefore, expendable. Our oldest commitments belong to the first category: U.S. security guarantees and military presence in the Middle East, East Asia, and Europe. Our newer commitments of the last 20 years—nation-building in such places as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan—are expendable.⁴ Similarly, John Mearsheimer urges a return to America’s traditional “grand strategy of offshore balancing” aimed at preventing a hostile hegemon from dominating the same three vital areas.⁵

Professor Nye’s book has won wide acclaim, yet how new is smart power? Apart from a novel diffusion of power in the cyber age, if smart power means the adroit marshaling of hard and soft resources in a multilateral approach to common problems, what, if not smart power, was the post–World War II American statecraft that created the international security and politico-economic architecture that underlay seven decades of security and prosperity benefiting much of the world?

Nye counsels restraint in democracy promotion, but he elevates our values to an “intangible national interest,” and his liberal realism invites an ambitious foreign policy. The Obama administration’s smart power strategy joins interests and values. Secretary Clinton declares that “democratic values are a cornerstone of our foreign policy” and rejects what she calls a false choice “between our security and our values.”⁶ This expansive view of foreign policy recalls the hubris of “democratic transformation,” what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice termed a “uniquely American realism,” according to which our national interests require an international order reflecting our values.⁷

During the 2008 Presidential campaign, Senator Barack Obama often distinguished between the bad war of choice (Iraq) and the good war of necessity (Afghanistan). On March 19, a U.S.-led coalition initiated a humanitarian war against Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, launching Operation *Odyssey Dawn* to create a no-fly zone to neutralize Qadhafi's air force and enforce an arms embargo in order to protect civilians from his suppression of rebel forces. In a March 28 speech to the Nation, President Obama justified this optional war in a third Muslim country, asserting America's responsibility to mankind and "who we are. . . . Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action."⁸

As he spoke, the President proclaimed mission accomplished for our limited objective and transferred leadership to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. However, the shape of Obama's "coalition of the willing" and of the mission itself are unclear. The war has divided NATO and demonstrated the irrelevance of the European Union, from its inception the creature of French foreign policy. The Arab League, after endorsing the no-fly zone, expressed shock at civilian casualties. Mission creep has expanded the scope of action from protecting civilians to attacking Qadhafi's ground forces and supplies to force regime change. As of this writing, the conflict has ground to a stalemate, while Qadhafi has parried the effects of Allied economic sanctions more successfully than the rebels in the east, and France and Britain, the instigators of the Libyan venture, are running out of ammo. Belatedly, President Obama dispatched Central Intelligence Agency teams and special envoy

Chris Stevens to ascertain just who the rebels are and what additional support they might need. From the start, the administration failed to match the means of limited force to its maximalist goal of regime change, defying a fact of life that in a less risk-averse age, every boy learned on the schoolyard playground: Don't start a fight you can't finish.

Some countries may draw a less benevolent lesson from America's moralistic intervention, as Russia did from President Bill Clinton's Balkan humanitarian intervention.⁹ The bald fact is that Libya is weak and, unlike Saudi Arabia or Bahrain where we have bigger fish to fry,¹⁰ of marginal strategic interest. The United States is strong enough to get away with it. Nor will the United States punish a far more monstrous regime than Qadhafi's—North Korea. Kim Jong-il knows the reason. That is why he is not going to give up his nuclear weapons. The ancient Athenians, who also boasted of who they were and their values, taught the Melians a harsh geopolitical lesson. Practical people understand, Athenian envoys informed the Melians, "the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."¹¹

Professor Nye hails President Obama's Libyan war as smart power in action.¹² If he is correct, the future of American power is bleak. Smart power offers a guide to the implementation of foreign policy, but smart power will be to no avail if policy goals are dumb. Armed humanitarian intervention, particularly if irresolute, and opportunistic regime change are profoundly ill-conceived goals for U.S. foreign policy. History will forever remain replete with cruel tyrants and their atrocities. No end exists to humanitarian warmaking for a nation that would assume the moral custodianship of

mankind. As Henry Kissinger and James Baker write, “our idealistic goals cannot be the sole motivation for the use of force in U.S. foreign policy. We cannot be the world’s policeman. We cannot use military force to meet every humanitarian challenge that may arise. Where would we stop?”¹³

The United States will not have a credible foreign policy until it adopts a more modest conception of its national interests and ceases to meddle in other states’ domestic affairs in the vain attempt to reform them according to supposed “universal values.” This need for self-restraint becomes more exigent particularly in Muslim lands, where no Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel waits in the wings to lead. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned, “We have to be very realistic about our capacity to shape the world and to shape other countries that have their own history and their own culture and their own traditions—and particularly, to shape them in our image.”¹⁴ Secretary of State John Quincy Adams classically stated this policy of American self-restraint in a speech to the House of Representatives on July 4, 1821: “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”¹⁵ **PRISM**

Notes

¹ See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs* (November–December 2010), 2–12.

² Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,”

Washington, DC, July 15, 2009; and “Remarks on United States Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, September 8, 2010.

³ Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Haass, “American Profligacy and American Power: The Consequences of Fiscal Irresponsibility,” *Foreign Affairs* (November–December 2010), 25–34; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010); also “Foreign Policy in an Age of Austerity: A Conversation with Brent Scowcroft,” *The American Interest* (January–February 2010), 30–39.

⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, “In an Era of Tightening Budgets, Can America Remain a Superpower on the Cheap?” *The Washington Post*, February 17, 2011.

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial By Design,” *The National Interest* (January–February 2011), 16–34.

⁶ Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Civil Society: Supporting Democracy in the 21st Century,” Krakow, Poland, July 3, 2010; “Remarks on United States Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, September 8, 2010.

⁷ Condoleezza Rice, “American Realism for a New World,” *Foreign Affairs* (July–August 2008), 3–5. Another architect of the Bush Doctrine sees its progeny in the Obama Doctrine: Michael Gerson, “In Search of the Obama Doctrine,” *The Washington Post*, March 31, 2011. A key Bush advisor on Iraq warns of parallels in Libya: Meghan O’Sullivan, “Will Libya Become Obama’s Iraq?” *The Washington Post*, April 3, 2011.

⁸ Barack Obama, “Address to the Nation on Libya,” National Defense University, Washington, DC, March 28, 2011.

⁹ See Michael Mandelbaum, “Modest Expectations: Facing Up to Our Russia Options,” *The American Interest* (May–June 2009), 52.

¹⁰ See Joby Warrick and Michael Birnbaum, “As Bahrain Stifles Protest Movement, U.S.’s Muted Objections Draw Criticism,” *The Washington Post*, April 15, 2011.

¹¹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), Book V, 360.

¹² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "From Lone Ranger to Smart Arranger," *Politico*, April 7, 2011.

¹³ Henry A. Kissinger and James A. Baker III, "Grounds for U.S. Military Intervention," *The Washington Post*, April 10, 2011.

¹⁴ Quoted in Michael Gerson, "The Paradox of Bob Gates," *The Washington Post*, March 14, 2011.

¹⁵ Quoted in Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 35.

