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Remarks of the Honorable Michael B. Donley Secretary of the Air Force

Class 2011 Graduation—School of Advanced
Air and Space Studies
Maxwell AFB, 15 June 2011

DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, family, friends, faculty and staff, alumni and graduates: It is a pleasure to join you to celebrate the graduation of Class 2011 from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS).

This is a great day for the Air Force and for our nation. Today, we recognize the achievements of the 58 airpower strategists in this year's class, each of whom has completed a rigorous course to earn a master's degree in airpower art and science. Congratulations to you all.

We actually have a double celebration today. As we honor the achievements of the Class of 2011, we are also recognizing another significant milestone—the 20th anniversary of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

Over the last 20 years, hundreds of students have graduated from SAASS. SAASS graduates, strategic thinkers who developed and refined their skills here at Maxwell Air Force Base, have applied this education to advise and serve the US Air Force, the US armed forces, and, particularly through our international graduates, advise and serve militaries around the world. The SAASS reputation was further advanced last week when the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity voted unanimously to recommend to the secretary of education approval of the AU PhD program.

My special congratulations and thanks go to the SAASS faculty, staff, and alumni who played a part in reaching this 20-year anniversary. We wish this distinguished institution many more anniversaries in the years and decades to come.

Class 2011

It was almost one year ago when Class 2011 met as a group for the first time. Over the last year, you tackled a very challenging course load, with assignments that included more than 42,000 pages of reading, covering

everything from military theory, to airpower history, to strategy and campaign planning. Fortunately, all of your reading was complemented by in-depth seminars, lively discussions, and serious writing projects, including a master's thesis.

But you didn't spend all of your time at the AU Library. Your education in military strategy also included a seven-day staff ride in France. By visiting Verdun and sites in Normandy—where thousands of soldiers fought, and thousands still lie in final repose, between the crosses, row on row—I know you learned lessons you will never forget. Not the least of these lessons is keeping in mind the seriousness of the military art as a profession and developing an even deeper understanding that a leader's decisions, wise or unwise, have far-reaching consequences—for citizens, for militaries, and for nations.

But beyond your work in class, my sincerest hope is that the personal and professional relationships you have developed with your fellow students will be an enduring benefit of your year together. You have forged bonds with colleagues across the Air Force, but also across the services, and beyond our national borders. I suspect that as your careers progress, you will have cause to call upon one another from time to time. These relationships, and the mutual understanding you have gained, are likely to pay dividends for years to come.

Importance of Professional Military Education

Now it's fair to ask, why does the Air Force think it's worthwhile to take a second year away from your standard career path in order to pursue professional military education?

My answer is simple. I believe that educating strategic thinkers is just as critical as maintaining our technological edge. Cultivating our best thinkers is part of our investment in people, and the success of our Air Force and our national security is directly related to the quality of our people.

In the Air Force, we sometimes have a tendency to focus on the awesome technology that surrounds us everywhere you look—the aircraft and the satellites, the state-of-the-art communications and computer systems, and the missiles and other weapons systems. But no matter how advanced our systems and technology, we still depend on the education, training, commitment—and ultimately, the quality of our Airmen who operate

and maintain these systems and put them to work in support of our nation's defense.

It's impossible to precisely measure the value of sending people to school, providing them the luxury of time to think and learn. But we do know that while military training, tactics, and weapons may change, the critical thinking skills you've sharpened during your education here will always be mission essential. Your ability to think strategically will help you help our Air Force deal with evolving conditions and emerging threats as they develop. And it's virtually guaranteed, you will be dealing with change.

It's astounding to think about the pace and magnitude of technological change since the first SAASS graduates earned their diplomas 20 years ago. In 1992, the Internet revolution had not yet taken hold; cell phone communication was just taking off, if you didn't mind carrying a phone the size of a large brick; GPS was the gee-whiz technology of the Gulf War; nobody had a computer tablet; tweeting was something only birds do. Communication was slower, and, depending on your perspective, sharing information was more difficult.

These observations don't even take into account the fluctuating geopolitical dynamics prompted by the end of the Cold War, or the rise of asymmetric threats around the world. Considering all of the changes we've experienced, who can say what the next 20 years will bring?

As the Air Force and the other services fulfill today's mission requirements, we also have a responsibility to plan for the future. But it is a simple fact that no matter how much planning we do, the future is defined by uncertainty. In trying to determine what's coming around the corner and how to shape our forces accordingly, we must frequently use partial information, intermingled with limited experience, combined with inherently flawed judgment.

In fact, Secretary Gates often says that since Vietnam, we have an absolutely perfect record in forecasting where we will use military force next. We have never once gotten it right! This doesn't say much for our ability as prognosticators, but it should give us all the more reason to find value in professional military education. We need professional military strategists who have analytical skills and experience; who have already thought through the implications of alternative futures; and who have a depth of understanding and historical perspective that bring strong foundations to contingency planning in response to dynamic changes in the security environment.

As an airpower strategist, you will be in a position to help shape your Air Force of the future. Sooner than you may think, you will be having an impact on the difficult decisions facing defense policymakers.

The need for strategic thinkers is not a new requirement. Thousands of years of military history describe the pioneering work of your predecessors, scholars, and practitioners of the art of war. But as we face today's strategic environment and budget challenges, it's clear we need our strategic thinkers more than ever.

Air Force Challenges

So let's talk through a few of the strategic issues that Air Force leaders are grappling with today, issues which will continue to play out and which will certainly affect you in the days ahead.

While this is undoubtedly an exciting time to be part of the Air Force and the defense community, it is also a time of transition. DoD civilian and military leadership changes are on the way. By next month, we expect to have a new secretary of defense. Later this fall, we will have a new chairman and vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time, our nation continues to face both a complex global strategic environment and an ongoing budget crisis.

Our Air Force continues to provide the nation's unmatched *global vigilance, reach, and power* across the full spectrum of operations. From the humanitarian relief operations supporting our Japanese friends in need; to the ongoing stability and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; to the no-fly-zone enforcement and protection of the civilian population in Libya; and to the continuous air sovereignty, space, cyber and nuclear-deterrence missions—the speed, precision, and versatility of the US Air Force is being tested and proven daily.

But many difficult choices loom on the horizon. We cannot ignore the serious long-term financial challenges confronting our nation, the Department of Defense, and the Air Force. In fact, last year, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, identified the national debt as the single biggest threat to our national security. The Air Force and our sister services have already made a long-term commitment to finding budget efficiencies, including \$33 billion identified by the Air Force, but we know that efficiencies alone will not be enough.

The president's recent speech on fiscal policy made it very clear that defense expenditures will not be exempt from further efforts to reduce spending at the federal level. Of note, the timeline for the president's goal of finding \$400 billion in defense savings extends to 2023, confirming the long-term commitment that will be required to get our nation's fiscal house in order.

As defense professionals, we are in the business of managing risk, and this process involves setting priorities and making trade-offs. We have to make smart choices that enable us to meet a range of potential contingencies that we cannot accurately predict, and to identify and hedge against those areas where our nation may be willing to accept more risk. We need strategic thinkers like you to help us consider our options in full and help us make the right choices for our future.

In the Air Force, we have determined that balance is the key feature of our resourcing strategy to accommodate the uncertain and fiscally challenging future. Balance among core functions; balance among force structure, readiness and modernization; and balance among our active duty, reserve, and Air National Guard components.

Uncertainty in the international environment calls for us to build a balanced force with the flexibility and versatility that enables our forces to operate effectively across the potential spectrum of operations. This includes the enabling capabilities on which the entire joint force depends at any level of conflict—capabilities like C4, mobility and air refueling, personnel recovery, and ISR, to name a few.

It also reflects the need for a broad range of capabilities. For example, while we are currently reinforcing our counterinsurgency capabilities, we're also building the joint strike fighter. While working on command and control for missile defense, we're building the light-attack armed reconnaissance and light-mobility aircraft to more effectively train nascent air forces. While recapitalizing the tanker fleet, we're strengthening space situational awareness and cyber defense. And, while building up language and cultural competency, we continue research on directed-energy weapons.

Of course, building a balanced force also has a temporal dimension. We must balance our operational focus on winning today's fight with the necessary investments for tomorrow's fight, and preserve the personnel, training, acquisition, and other institutional foundations upon which our capabilities are built.

Anticipating the challenges and decisions ahead, Air Force leaders have also begun a discussion on how best to balance resource allocation across our force structure, our readiness, and our plans for modernization at whatever level of resources we are provided.

Force structure is shorthand for the overall size and composition of our forces. It includes active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel strengths; all of our core functions; and the organizational- and unit-level framework in which our capabilities are embedded—the commands, numbered air forces, wings, and squadrons. If our force structure is too large given the resources available, then we risk not being able to sustain the costs of ownership, such as providing for pay and benefits, training, and materiel readiness. If it is too small, we could unintentionally drive some mission areas and career fields to unsustainably low levels, lose the flexibility to accommodate new or evolving missions, or risk our ability to sustain expeditionary operations.

Readiness refers to the near-term preparedness to generate military capabilities. Readiness measures whether we have the right number of personnel, proficient in the right skill sets, sufficiently educated and trained, and available, and mission-capable equipment, which is well maintained and supported by a healthy supply chain, with adequate stocks of munitions and spare parts. If we allow readiness to slip, we risk not being prepared for the rapidly developing contingencies that characterize the current security environment. And shortages in flying hours, other training, and spare parts would demoralize our Airmen and threaten our ability to retain a quality force. But if we focus too much on near-term readiness and on preparedness exclusively for today's fights, we risk undermining the longer-term investment and modernization necessary to sustain our technological edge and to build the Air Force we will need to meet future challenges.

Modernization refers to the technological improvements needed to maintain military advantage and prevent obsolescence of equipment, weapon systems, and forces. If we fail to modernize our forces at an adequate rate, the near-term costs of maintaining and upgrading our legacy fleets will grow, crowding out longer-term investment; our war-fighting advantages in technology could shrink, and the costs of new equipment would likely increase further and be stretched out even more. But if we put too many resources into modernization as budgets decline, we could risk driving the size of the Air Force to unacceptably low levels and perhaps not sufficiently sized or ready for the unforeseen contingencies immediately ahead.

Finally, we are committed to finding balance in the Total Force. I don't need to tell you that the Air Force depends on the Air Force Reserve components, and that we will remain committed to the Total Force enterprise—the powerful combination of the active duty and reserve components that together make up the United States Air Force. We do, however, have an obligation to consider whether we have the right balance and mix of missions across the components, as well as how we can best organize that mix to maximize the capability and efficiency of our Total Force.

As you know, bringing balance to the force is an iterative process. It will require us to keep a critical eye on the changing strategic, technological, and resource environments over the long haul, as details are adjusted and calibrated along the way. The task ahead will be far from easy, but to be successful, it will require all of our best efforts, starting with the help of our best thinkers.

Charge to the Graduates—Make it Count

Over the years, there has been a growing understanding throughout the Air Force that it's good to have a trained airpower strategist on staff. When it comes to determining future assignments, there are usually about three times as many requests for SAASS graduates than can be met, so it's clear your skills are considered a precious commodity.

Here's one testimonial. Many of you may know or remember retired lieutenant general Donald Lamontagne, who became the commander of Air University in the summer of 2001. I'm told that when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11, calls started coming in to General Lamontagne's office. Commanders and members of the Air Staff wanted to know, "Where are the SAASS grads? We need them now!"

It's commonly accepted that SAASS graduates go where the hard thinking about war and security is done. So I am about to issue a challenge to you. You wouldn't be here if we didn't consider you to be a heavy hitter. Now we want you to make this count.

I call upon you to demonstrate what this year-long opportunity to think and learn has delivered. You will have the opportunity to apply what you've learned and put it into practice. You are in a position to help your Air Force and our armed forces make the right choices as we reshape ourselves for the future.

We need your innovative thinking, and we need you to keep learning. We need you to help us make the right strategic choices for our country. We need you to help us out-think those who are devising ways to prey upon our vulnerabilities. We need you to continue building professional relationships and to continue engaging with one another and members of the defense community. And as every line in the federal budget falls under scrutiny, we need you to show that our investment in your professional military education was money well spent—our future ability to invest in the intellectual component of the Air Force depends on it.

Conclusion

Our Air Force is a world-class institution. As its stewards, we are committed to ensuring that the United States continues to have the world's finest air force for generations to come.

I say to the graduates of Class 2011, make this experience at SAASS count. Take this education, this preparation, this experience, and do something great for our Air Force and for our country. SAASS graduates, we need you now, and we will need you for many years to come.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am proud and humbled to be associated with today's graduates and with all of the dedicated men and women, and their families, who serve this great institution. Graduates, it is an honor to serve with you in the world's finest Air Force.

Honorable Michael B. Donley
Secretary of the Air Force

Preparing to Lead with a Compelling Narrative

If You Don't Frame the Narrative, Someone Else Will

The narrative determines how we perceive the credibility and authenticity of leaders and organizations. The concept of the narrative may be familiar, but there lacks an understanding of how this can be leveraged to achieve an organization's vision and aspirations. The proliferation of information sources, the speed of transmitting the narrative, and the number of visible competing narratives presents a limited time for leaders to frame their narrative. Compressed news cycles feed on quick responses. To dominate the narrative, a nation-state, company, or emerging political movement requires flexibility to adjust its narrative without losing sight of its aspirations and goals. Narratives reflect the values of movements, and successful leaders become part of the storyline in a narrative. The narrative is a collection of compelling stories that represent the cultures, history, and purpose of individuals, organizations, and nations. A narrative continuously flows, like a current in a stream, determined by the actions and inactions of the the parties involved. The narrative is an emergent property from within the cacophony of different ideas, opinions, facts, and information sources.

Given the historical events in the Middle East in early 2011, we first address the complexities facing leaders who want to communicate a compelling narrative. Next, we provide illustrative narratives to reinforce what has worked and what has failed. Finally, we build on the points these narrative examples reinforce to list core factors required to frame a successful narrative.

The Middle East Revolutions and Competing US Narratives

The US narrative is represented by some powerful personal stories. At the founding of America, John and Abigail Adams symbolized part of the revolutionary American narrative. Joseph J. Ellis writes in his newest release, *The First Family*, "Recovering their experience as a couple quite literally forces a focus on the fusion of intimate psychological and emotional experience with the larger political narrative" (p. x). Narratives are personal

and national at the same time. At its roots the American narrative embraces freedom to choose. Aligning the American narrative of freedom and choice with the national security stability objective has become cumbersome for American policymakers.

In early 2011, US officials reflected this awkwardness in their public statements. The wave of protests, accelerated by social media, that began sweeping across the Middle East in December 2010 and continued into 2011 raises a serious narrative dilemma for the US government. The United States is keen to be seen as championing democracy and freedom. But Washington faced the challenge of how it could maintain this narrative against the national security desires to see pro-Western governments remain in Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, and other parts of the Middle East. How can the United States reinforce the narrative of freedom and democracy while implicitly conveying support for authoritarian rule? Each ruler (Egypt's President Mubarak, King Hamad of Bahrain, and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia) has proven to be an ally and asset in supporting US national security goals. Bahrain's hosting the US Fifth Fleet provides Washington with a critical naval presence in the region, for example. Since President Mubarak was forced to resign, will other Middle East leaders meet the same fate? From Syria's President Assad to Libya's President Gaddafi, Middle East leaders will be looking at Egypt and Tunisia, asking themselves how they can manage to strike narratives that resonate with their populace. Similarly, the United States is questioning how this wave of democracy will take shape and how US past and current actions may influence the prospect of the next crop of leaders and their supporters becoming pro-Western and supportive of US strategic goals.

Even the Iranians felt compelled to link the fall of Mubarak on 11 February 2011 with their historical narrative. That date marked the 32nd anniversary of the toppling of the Shah of Iran. However, from Tehran's perspective, Egypt's revolution echoed the people's challenge to their rule following the disputed presidential elections in 2009 and the threat this posed to their grip on power. Regardless of the outcome, the events which began in early 2011 will have profound effects on the Middle East region and will frame the US narrative for years to come. For the United States to reinforce its narrative during these uncertain times, it is important for Washington to fully engage and support the fledgling democracies—countries that lack experience in developing and managing stable and open multiparty politics. Emerging democracies face

several common problems, including developing a system that maintains political engagement with its populace beyond elections, choosing leaders and legislators who are not perceived as corrupt and self-serving, and establishing robust institutions that serve as checks and balances. Aspiring politicians require advice on how to run campaigns and, once elected, on how to maintain links with their constituencies not to become out of touch.

The events of early 2011 created the prospect of democracy and freedom in every regime across the Middle East. The United States and its allies face a unique opportunity to assist nascent democracies by sharing best practices without dictating policy. Given the founding principles of the United States and its role as a successful model of democracy, it is imperative that it reinforce this narrative through thought, word, and deed. Possible options may include funding nongovernmental organizations, like the Carter Center that has offered to assist running Egypt's elections, or involve collaborative partners like the UN, African Union, or European Union to assist in creating democratic governance programs. The narrative surrounding how the elections will be organized (in short, the guidance supplied by democratic nations) may influence how Egypt's next government views the United States and its allies.

The narrative plays an integral role in the viability of public and private organizations. It is imperative that leaders of domestic and international organizations understand the narratives operating within their decision-making frame. All too often individuals and organizations are operating in competing narratives and struggle to define a compelling narrative that dominates the attention of those they lead and serve. For example, Mubarak's use of F-16 aircraft flying low over protestors in Tahrir Square to intimidate a rally was symbolic of the narrative going off-message—American-made equipment used to intimidate peaceful protests focused on obtaining democracy. Some protestors clearly showed their displeasure with Mubarak's close ties with the United States by spray painting on American fast-food chain KFC, "Mubarak collaborates with America." Meanwhile, the Egyptian military sought to maintain its narrative of modernity and heroism since the overthrow of King Farouk's rule in 1952 in a military coup led by Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite its support in training and equipment from the US military, the Egyptian military was not seen as "collaborating."

The Importance of Defining a Narrative and Values

Failure to define a compelling narrative can lead to considerable difficulties when leading, particularly in the face of crisis. How an organization or a government handles a crisis can very much determine how it is defined by its stakeholders—for better or for worse. Understanding the narrative's ripple effects is vital. For a narrative to be effective, an organization must first identify what its values and aspirations are. Having defined these, the narratives can then support, define, and enable the achievements. The narrative becomes an essential tool for an organization to be consistent with its deeply held values and aspirations.

The narrative goes beyond public relations and communicating risk; if managed correctly, it should reflect and serve as a tool for achieving the aspirations and vision of an organization. Individuals and organizations cannot choose to opt out of a narrative—we are all in narratives just as we breathe air. Communications teams are only one of many groups who assist leaders in framing the narrative. Narratives are like a river—they flow, and people get swept up in the stories. How narratives flow can be influenced by leaders. And like a torrent of water rushing through a river, how leaders and their organizations prepare their environment will determine how that torrent will flow in a crisis.

If leaders ignore dominating the narrative, then others will frame the narrative for them. Leaders then run the risk of being in a continuous reactionary mode. Reacting to someone else's narrative rather than framing and communicating their own narratives poses two risks for leaders: undermining support for their organizations' objectives to create the future they aspire for their company, community, or nation; and being perceived as opposing their own narratives and being framed as “against” rather than “for” what their organizations represent.

The narrative cannot be controlled. But leaders can dominate the narrative by continually filling the frame with their own narratives, making it difficult for others to erode what they are attempting to convey. Below are some narratives that worked, followed by narratives that are currently faltering.

Where the Narrative Worked

Nelson Mandela. The Anti Apartheid Movement (AAM) in South Africa represented one of the most powerful narratives, with Nelson Mandela emerging as the symbol for freedom and justice. Even though Mandela was imprisoned for 30 years, when he was released from prison, he championed

reconciliation. No one could question that he had suffered and was justified in wanting revenge. He became the symbol for reconciliation and healing. The narrative he promoted was best represented by the story of the man who suffered under the apartheid regime. Yet Mandela knew that to build a powerful future for South Africa required reconciliation and forgiveness for the past to move into the future successfully.

Solidarity and Lech Walesa. The Polish trade union movement Solidarity, founded at Gdansk in the 1980s and led by Lech Walesa, represented a compelling narrative for the Poles to bring democracy to Poland. Walesa represented a powerful narrative—support for worker concerns. Educated as an electrician, he became active in a trade union at a Gdansk shipyard. He suffered because of his beliefs. The communist regime arrested him, and eventually he was fired as a result of his activism. He persisted and negotiated a landmark agreement between striking workers and the communist government. Walesa rose to be elected as prime minister of Poland with the narrative that workers deserved a say and that democracy could unleash the path to prosperity and opportunity in Poland.

Faltering Narratives

If actions are not consistent with the stated narrative, the competing or alternative narratives can undermine trust and confidence in your leadership and strategy. Below are examples where the narrative has faltered, and how in some cases, it can undermine public health and well-being.

MMR Vaccine Scare. Fifteen years ago Andrew Wakefield published the now discredited paper in the *Lancet* medical journal that sought to establish a connection between children receiving the mumps, measles, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and the onset of autism. Public health authorities missed the need to develop a narrative that was easily understood by the public. They found themselves battling with this belief (supported by the *Lancet* article) to win the narrative with parents of newborns. Unfortunately, because the medical community cannot explain a likely cause for the rise in autism in children, unfounded claims like Wakefield's feed the narrative that it could be the vaccine (even though the established medical community discredits such a connection). Public health officials want parents to believe that the MMR vaccine is safe and integral to the health of children. Despite numerous studies and communications from public health officials in the United Kingdom and United States, the MMR vaccine lacks comprehensive trust among parents. Consequently,

the herd immunity rate—the ratio of those vaccinated versus those not vaccinated to prevent the outbreak of MMR—has dropped below the threshold of 80 percent receiving the vaccine necessary to keep these diseases at bay. Children are now contracting what were once rare illnesses, causing long-term physical damage and, in some cases, death.

Afghanistan and President Karzai. Afghanistan provides a great example of how a personal story can undermine the narrative. While the United States and its allies have sought to establish an effective governance and rule of law, Hamid Karzai's government, since first winning office, has been besieged with accusations of corruption. While Karzai has faced the unenviable task of tackling corruption within his government, he has not been seen as the symbol for good governance. The anticorruption narrative framed by the United States is undermined by Karzai's own brother who, prior to his assassination, was accused of embezzling millions, possibly billions, of dollars in property deals in Dubai financed with money from Kabul Bank. One consequence was Kabul Bank losing the confidence of its customers in the latter part of 2010, with depositors withdrawing their money thereby threatening the downfall of Afghanistan's banking system.

Current Narratives

The narrative theater is by no means limited to national and local governments. The private sector, too, faces narrative challenges. In January 2011, British Petroleum (BP) agreed with the Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft to sell 5 percent of its shares in return for access to drilling and exploration rights in Antarctica. Following the 2010 Gulf oil spill, BP was looking for prime investment opportunities after unexpected expenses forced a sell-off of several billion dollars' worth of assets to pay for the clean-up operation. BP realized the opportunity for greater exploration in American waters was limited. While the deal with Rosneft makes business sense, how might this deal affect BP's narrative? How will this move be perceived, particularly by those who harbor concerns of what a partially Russian-controlled energy firm may mean for US national security?

The deal with Rosneft was consummated on the heels of the Gulf oil spill—thus, a prickly narrative was already operating between the United States and BP *before* the deal with the Russian state-owned oil firm was announced. BP's uneasy relationship with the United States is compounded by how the firm's senior leadership communicated its response during the Gulf oil spill, contributing to the company's lasting reputational damage.

How CEO Tony Hayward's actions and attitude were perceived by the American public came to define BP's narrative and the US response to the oil spill. BP corrected this path, recognizing they needed an American from the region, and appointed Bob Dudley CEO. Dudley's knowledge of the region and his accent embodied the narrative BP wanted to communicate. However, his attempts at reframing the narrative were still constrained by how the company's values and aspirations were defined and perceived—a company driven not by engineering excellence, but by revenue generation at the expense of safety and effective contingency planning. No matter how successful an organization might be in framing the narrative, if it is out of sync with its values, creating and sustaining a narrative will be ineffective.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama communicated hope for a better tomorrow in his speeches and through his personal story. He was a living example of opportunity through education in America and was a symbol for “yes we can.” However, the low approval ratings, defeats in the 2010 midterm elections, and increased unemployment illustrate how Obama has struggled to define a working narrative in of ce that can transcend partisan lines to advance and to sustain what was a compelling narrative during the election campaign.

Another example of misalignment concerns to what degree actions can reinforce or unravel an organization's narrative. Google and Yahoo—built on American ingenuity and freedom of thought—constricted access and free speech to cement deals with China. After succumbing to a customized and sanitized search, Google eventually decided to move its servers to Hong Kong, allowing users unfettered access to its content. Yahoo released the e-mail addresses and details of prodemocracy supporters to the Chinese authorities. This undermined their trust with users and brought into question the company's role in supporting the whims of the government. Following this major stray from its narrative, Yahoo had a difficult time rebuilding that trust.

Factors to Consider when Framing the Narrative

There are six essential considerations when framing the narrative.

Why Is the Narrative Important?

Public perception of risk influences the narrative and serves as one of the indicators in the narrative's “taking hold.” Outlining why the narrative is important links to the higher purpose of a movement—its clearly

defined values and aspirations. Why are we forging this path and what do we stand for and want to achieve? Why does this story need to be voiced? Why this story? Why now?

A universal narrative is the umbrella for competing narratives. A narrative broad enough to encompass competing narratives but narrow enough to communicate a tangible path has a good chance of winning the day. The key is striking the balance between broad and narrow. If the narrative is too broad it sounds like a platitude and will not be compelling. If it is too narrow it will not resonate with enough people to gain momentum. Thus, balance is the key.

What Is the Narrative? Do People Resonate with the Story?

At the personal level, people need to identify with the story, understand the story, and be able to “link” their personal narrative to the broader narrative. Successful narratives have a “face” and are simple and elegant.

How Do You Tell the Narrative? How Do You Reinforce the Narrative?

Discipline within organizations is essential to staying on message. All too often organizations become distracted by events. It is important to focus on the entities’ priorities and not be lured away by quick news-cycle distractions. Leaders and staffs need to remain true to their core message and look at daily events within the context of a long-term view.

Crises are framed within the narrative; crises do not define the narrative. Organizations too frequently allow the crisis of the day to define their narrative. It is important to focus on how the crisis fits within the narrative and not allow the crisis to trump the narrative.

Sustaining the narrative requires reinforcing and reinventing the story as events change. Over time the narrative will need refreshing. The purpose remains, but the stories that communicate that purpose should be renewed to continually engage and reengage the public. It is the leader's role to link ongoing actions to outcomes. The leader provides context and direction as perceptions shift. Through the narrative the leader is able to engage the public and make it meaningful for their lives.

Who Communicates the Narrative?

For the messenger to be seen as authoritative and credible, those communicating the narrative need to understand the personal stories. A compelling narrative is powerful if the person communicating the story is seen

as a symbol that reflects and represents a microcosm of the story and if that person is authentic. Genuineness and authenticity play a role in communicating a compelling narrative. If the communicator's personal narrative is not aligned with the overarching narrative, it will be weakened. Or the personal story may be so counter to the narrative that by this person outlining this direction, the narrative gains momentum. For example, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's commitment to Israel was unquestioned. He fought in 1948 to protect the newly formed Jewish state. When he signed the Oslo Peace Accords it was a powerful statement—a powerful narrative—that it was time to live in peace. Rabin had experienced war, and he could not be called a “dove.” His personal story assisted him in persuading the Israeli people to embrace the peace narrative.

What Backdrop Supports the Narrative?

The place where the message is delivered needs to support the narrative, whether virtual (e.g., Internet) or real world. Location helps to define the message; a symbolic backdrop reinforces the message. President Reagan's speech at the Berlin Wall demanding, “tear down this wall”; Martin Luther King's “I Have a Dream” speech with the Lincoln Memorial in the background; Boris Yeltsin defying the August 1991 coup on top of a tank outside the Russian parliament, condemning coup leaders as the “junta.” These powerful images broadcast around the world greatly defined their moment and strengthened the reputation of these leaders. But it can also be the ordinary citizens of the country that capture the narrative. For example, the image of the man standing in front of a line of tanks during the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising defined the struggle for freedom among China's people in the face of an entrenched one-party system. And in Tahrir (Liberation) Square in early 2011 the Egyptian people demonstrated tenacity and commitment to freedom with weeks of continued demonstrations in opposition to the now fallen 30-year regime.

When Is the Narrative Communicated?

In addition to knowing where to plant seeds, it is important to know when to plant. Innovative ideas are accepted if the timing is right. Innovative ideas need to be relevant given the current events of the day. Openness to change depends on multiple factors. The chaos of the sixties in the United States allowed multiple movements to anchor their narratives and to proceed to make progress in the seventies. It is important to find fertile

“idea soil” where the seeds of change will be nourished and protected to allow the seedling idea to gain strength.

To be on par with, or on top of, the narrative flow requires framing and mapping the boundaries. You need to frame the debate and the narrative before everyone else. Allowing others to define your narrative is like riding a runaway train—you are never quite sure of the destination, and it could derail. If you do not take control of your narrative, another narrative will fill the void. We find ourselves in a sea of narratives every day. The compelling narratives appeal to the individual, are timed appropriately, and are delivered by a credible messenger.

Early warning indicators that the narrative is out of sync or “off rhythm” include:

- Lack of trust surrounding the competency of the individual(s) or organization(s) in carrying out the intended strategies. A compelling narrative can be lost by losing the trust of one’s stakeholders. Trust is difficult to win but easy to lose.
- Uncertainty concerning the risk or issue being communicated. For example, the lack of definitive scientific data or ambiguity of an organization’s intent.
- Emergence of competing and compelling narratives, such as changing public attitudes or other organizations becoming successful in crafting and communicating their competing narratives.
- Preexisting counternarratives that flow against the preferred narratives. For example, new political leaders taking office in a highly charged partisan or low-trust environment seeking to enact their own policies. Or competing narratives emerging in one’s own organization.
- Narratives that are not “crisis proof.” A narrative must be robust and enduring enough to serve as a reference point during a crisis for all responders to frame their responses, given the umbrella narrative. For example, a company’s response to a high-profile industrial accident or safety scare requires a response couched in an enduring narrative on how the organization wants to be viewed.

If not appropriately addressed, a leader’s narrative can be challenged, distorted, and undermined, thus complicating an organization’s ability to enact its strategic goals and gain the support required.

Common causes of losing the narrative include not developing a compelling narrative and failing to respond to early warning indicators that the narrative is “out of sync.” Much like risk communication, developing and maintaining a compelling narrative is an ongoing process that first requires understanding how the target audience perceives one’s narrative to frame a narrative that appeals to that audience.

Leading is *not* following public opinion polls and taking a risk-averse approach but understanding what your core narrative is and making decisions that support your core principles. Chilean president Sebastián Piñera, for example, was willing to take on the reputational risk of becoming personally involved in the October 2010 miner rescue. He could have distanced himself and allowed the mining company to take the blame if something went wrong. Some of his advisors warned against broadcasting the rescue live and greeting each rescued miner personally, should there be a hostile or unpredictable response when a miner surfaced. In addition to engaging fully, he asked the world for help. Piñera wanted the best minds in the world to apply creative problem-solving techniques to this crisis. He was willing to ask for outside assistance and in doing so demonstrated leadership, not weakness. He recognized it was important to get out in front and to lead the country in support of the trapped miners.

To sustain the narrative, it is important to understand the changing pace and frame of the times. These are the current questions that organizations must address to sustain their narrative. Developing and maintaining a compelling narrative provides a rigorous foundation to encompass an organization’s short- and long-term strategic goals, communication policy, and position vis-à-vis its stakeholders. The narrative is not about “spinning” an issue or getting the communication right. But rather, it is the public symbol of the heart and soul of the organization.

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Transitions in the Arab World

Spring or Fall?

David S. Sorenson

Beginning in early 2011, mass public protests swept much of the Arab world, bringing a mix of hope, sadness, and foreboding for the future. While the demonstrations sent several long-serving presidents out of their countries, other rulers mobilized their security forces and inflicted high civilian casualties to retain their grip on central power. This article considers some of the reasons for the revolts that have occurred in numerous Arab countries and assesses some potential outcomes and implications, both for the Arab world and for the United States. Recent events raise a number of questions.

- Will the proverbial hundred flowers of democracy spring forward in Arab countries that have either exiled their leader or are in the process of challenging established autocracies?
- Will democracy building become sustainable through the building of democratic institutions and popular support, or will incomplete democratic construction ultimately lead to disappointment and a possible democratic rejection?
- Will corrections to the economic conditions that contributed to the waves of populism in the Arab world follow democratization and secular capitalism?
- Will religious forces, initially marginalized in the popular revolutions, reassert themselves through democracy, and should that happen, will democracy survive possible religious radicalization?

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- Might Arab-world democratization make the Middle East less war prone?
- How will the United States recraft its Middle East policies in the wake of the so-called Arab spring?

The “Arab Spring” Begins

In January 2011, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi of Bouzid, Tunisia—unable to get a job despite a degree in computer science—was being harassed by authorities for selling vegetables from a cart without a license. The police badgered him and stole his wares. When he complained to a magistrate, she allegedly slapped him. His frustration and humiliation drove him to drench himself with paint thinner and light it, perishing from his burns two weeks later. Videos of Bouazizi swathed in bandages quickly spread throughout Tunisia, and angry crowds gathered to demand the resignation of Pres. Zine Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled the country autocratically since 1988.

After several weeks of escalating violence between security forces and demonstrators, leaders of the Tunisian army demanded that Ben Ali depart the country. Surprisingly, he complied and boarded a plane for Saudi Arabia, thus becoming the first Arab autocrat in many decades to wither in the face of public unrest. More significantly, his departure triggered a wave of popular actions in a number of Arab countries, ushering in what the media came to refer to as the Arab spring, fueled by the lowest levels of full democratization in the world.

In Egypt, cries of “Tunisia is the solution” replaced “Islam is the solution,” as the movement spread to Cairo. Discontent over the Hosni Mubarak regime, which had occasionally exploded into angry demonstrations over the years, rekindled as Egyptian citizens watched Tunisians rising up against Ben Ali. Increasingly larger crowds gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and elsewhere. Their discontent reflected some of the same issues that motivated protests in Tunisia: poor national economic performance, high levels of corruption, and a loss of faith in the electoral system, which many Egyptians believed was particularly manipulated in favor of regime supporters in the 2005 national elections. The crowds grew in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Egypt, and after numerous confusing signals from the regime and spasms of violence wrought by state security forces, senior Egyptian army officers joined the protestors in support. With an important support base

gone, President Mubarak boarded an aircraft for Sharm al-Sheik, leaving considerable disarray behind, as many in the square realized that the task of reconstruction lay ahead in a long and uncharted journey.

Decades of political stagnation and top-down control across a wide swath of Arab countries fueled the anger of activists, who took to the streets and to social media, determined to oust the occupants of the presidential palaces. From Tunisia and Egypt, revolutionary zeal spread to Oman, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Libya. However, these movements and their targeted regimes took different trajectories. In Oman, protests occurred largely in the port city of Sohar, though they spread briefly to Muscat but waned after Sultan Qaboos ibn Sa'id promised reforms. Jordanian monarch King Abdullah II fired key cabinet members (a tactic used by his father, King Hussein, to quell protests or coup efforts), while dissenters in Syria and Yemen continued the conflict with their rulers and regime supporters. Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad used his military and internal security forces to quell large demonstrations in most large Syrian cities, as did Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh. In June 2011, Saleh was wounded in a palace attack and departed to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Yemen slipped farther into chaos as armed Islamist gangs roamed the periphery of the key port city of Aden, while the army and state security forces melted away without leadership or direction. Demonstrators flooded Pearl Square in Manama, Bahrain, and were first repelled by Bahraini security forces. As the protests grew, Saudi Arabian and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces crossed into Bahrain to quell the demonstrations. This move, the only coalition effort to dampen antigovernment activism during the 2011 Arab revolts, came with the explanation that the mostly Shia Bahraini movement would only benefit Iran if it had succeeded. In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi fought the opposition with most of his armed forces, leading the UN Security Council to declare a no-fly zone that morphed into a "prevent civilian casualties" policy, including targeting military vehicles along with aircraft. In response, warplanes from several NATO countries, joined by Qatar, attacked Libyan security forces, and Libya appeared to literally fall apart. Qaddafi clung to power as rebels captured half the country and set up a "capital" in the eastern city of Benghazi.

With Ben Ali's departure, demonstrators in other countries began to believe that in at least some Arab countries, the man behind the curtain was just that, ruling with illusory powers and standing on a fragile powerbase. Yet Ben Ali proved to be the exception. The military in socially liberal

Tunisia, small but professional, refused to dispatch troops against their fellow Tunisians, lining up instead to protect the protestors against the security police. And the head of the armed forces, Gen Rachid Ammar, told Ben Ali that the army would not obey his orders to shoot demonstrators and that the president should depart. It may also be the case that Tunisia's economic elite were not sufficiently bought off through patronage to make them willing to put up much of a fight in Ben Ali's defense because, as one author argues, most of the corruption in Tunisia existed within the president's own family.¹

In other Arab countries few, if any, demonstrations broke out; thus, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, and most of the Gulf Arab states remained relatively calm. Bahrain was the notable exception, but harsh prison terms for Bahraini protest leaders and the GCC intervention seemed to dampen any more interest in taking to the streets. Scattered demonstrations broke out in Jordan and Morocco, but quickly dissipated. Thus, at this writing, parts of the Arab world are in transition, leaving important questions about the future.

The Arab storms surprised many observers, yet they should not have been surprising. With the growth of global media, popular pressures grew over the years against other unaccountable governments in most parts of the world. The refrain was the same: we want democracy, and, along with it, economic progress. Given its conditions in 2011, the Arab region seemed more vulnerable than anywhere else in the world to mass public outcries.

While democracy may be on the march in other parts of the globe, 2011 Freedom House rankings showed no Arab countries rated as "free" (Israel was the only Middle Eastern country so ranked), three considered "partly free," and 14 ranked "not free."² Moreover, the march to democracy in the Arab world was moving backwards, as the 2009 Freedom House ratings carried seven Arab countries as partly free, but Bahrain, the Palestinian Territories, Yemen, and Jordan moved from partly free to not free in the 2010 report.³ Limited freedoms in some Arab countries vanished as regimes increasingly feared the rising tides of discontent fed by stagnant economies, growing corruption, regime misbehavior (lavish spousal gifts and nepotism got special attention), and the rise of Islamist movements that increasingly wanted to enter the political system through popular elections. Unaccountable Arab regimes dreaded that street protests enabled by a growing adoption of social communications media would quickly spread

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to their own countries. Paradoxically, some Arab governments reflexively rolled their limited democracy back, censoring or suspending news media, banning Islamists from parliament, and jailing those whose political activism went beyond regime redlines, thus setting the stage for the very revolts that pushed for the ousting of those same regimes.

Will Democracy Build and Spread in the Arab World?

The push toward global democratization accelerated in several parts of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. East Asia saw South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan transition to democratic rule. Latin America witnessed numerous military juntas fall to political change. Sub-Saharan Africa gradually began to democratize, and political change also came in Eastern and Central Europe as most post-communist countries adopted Western European-style democracies. In these cases the old order rarely used violence to stay in power. They either acceded to elections in the false hope they would prevail; departed the country, as did former Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos; or were executed, as was the fate of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu in 1989. While some autocratic regimes displayed dogged resistance to protestor demands—as have Burma’s military rulers and the Chinese Communist Party at Tiananmen Square in 1989—they were increasingly the exceptions.

Might the Arab world follow these regional “waves” of democratization? And how might democracy arrive, embed, and survive in Middle Eastern Arab states? Conversely, might the passions for accountable governance founder as regime supporters mobilize and raise the price of protest to the point where hope is replaced by the realization that further dissent will only result in jail or death, as it did in Iran in 2009? The initial answers involve the identification of fundamental requisites for democracy, elements that may both empower democracy and impede it.

Some Democratic Requisites

One essential requirement for establishing democracy is a favorable attitude by the recipient public. Numerous public opinion surveys in Arab countries reveal broad majority support for the concept: to wit, a spring 2010 Pew Charitable Trust survey found 60 percent of Egyptians, 69 percent of Jordanians, and 83 percent of Lebanese agreed with the statement,

“Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.”⁴ These results mirror other findings of widespread support for accountable governance in the Arab region, as Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler find: “Despite—or perhaps because of—the persistence of authoritarianism across the Arab world, popular support for democracy there is widespread. The evidence for this may be gleaned from twenty different surveys carried out in nine different Arab countries between 2000 and 2006.”⁵ Implicitly these sentiments not only support the establishment of accountable participatory political systems, but they also discredit the old clientelist governments that characterize so many Arab states.

Democracy also grows best when incubated through institutional mechanisms: the acceptance of rule of law; state-building, to include impartial administrative bodies and their managers; an open news media; and a viable education system, allowing citizens to make informed choices. Some would additionally argue that democratization also requires outside pressure (often read, “from the United States”). US policy has sometimes been hesitant to support democracy or reluctant to back away from autocrats, even as they were slipping from power, as in Indonesia.⁶ The United States opposed election results it did not like in the Hamas victory in Palestine in 2006 and ignored the thwarting of democracy after the military clampdown in Algeria following the 1991 elections, which favored the Islamist FIS party.⁷

Democracy also requires patience, because few countries make dramatic leaps from autocracies to full-fledged democracies. Only Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro jumped from not free immediately to free on the Freedom House scale after their 2000 elections, while most others either became lodged at partly free (Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, and Moldova) or tumbled back toward autocracy (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia).⁸ Because the elites who benefitted under autocracy will most likely resist democratic efforts to normalize wealth distribution, democracy will remain incomplete. As author Charles Tilly observes, “On average, people who experience equitable treatment from their governments and/or have direct say in governmental operations gain more satisfaction from politics and display greater willingness to bear burdens for the common good.”⁹

Barriers to Democratization

The primary barriers to democratization are the resistance of regimes and their entrenched economic, political, and military elites. Administration

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supporters who draw considerable benefits from autocratic rulers may resist political transition unless they can shape it.¹⁰ These elites contribute to state constructions that are designed more to facilitate central rule than to provide essential public services, including a large state security network, expensive housing compounds, private schools and tutors for the wealthy, and hospitals run by soldiers that cater to wealthy foreign medical tourists. They also include hefty militaries and military budgets, which not only provide national security but also military support for the regime that signs the checks. Thus, even if elections were to occur in the Arab world, the “deep state” structures would remain as impediments to democratic growth.

The Persistence of Arab Autocracy

Persistent rule became a hallmark of many Arab regimes: the al-Saud family has governed Saudi Arabia since 1932, Sultan Qaboos ruled Oman since 1971, the Alouite family reigned in Morocco since 1956, the Assad family controlled Syria since 1970, Muammar Qaddafi ruled Libya since 1969, and Ali Abdullah Saleh first served as president of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1978 and then became president of unified Yemen in 1990, to name just a few Arab longevity cases. In other cases the polity has been dominated by the “big men,” as it has been in Lebanon,¹¹ and in Palestine under Yasser Arafat.¹² These and other long-serving Arab leaders could claim to have brought political stability and security to their countries as they not only quashed leftist and Islamist movements but also negotiated to keep the military from launching periodic coups by buying off soldiers with powerful positions in the government and the economy. They did the same for powerful tribal and family leaders, as patronage kept many Arab leaders afloat.¹³

In these cases strong Arab rulers prolonged their stay in power by capturing existing institutions or creating new ones to serve the interests of themselves and their parties, usually to distribute patronage to regime supporters. However, when the “strong man” leaves, an institution often withers away, not independent enough to stand on its own. Without viable political structures, a country is thus often vulnerable to yet another strong man who can rule in the absence of independent organizations. He steps in to fill a vacuum because the mechanisms tying him to public consent are lacking. He can demand such consent after arrival and then continue to “ask” for it through periodic staged “elections.” Partly

because of these patronage and Potemkin village–like electoral structures, the kinds of political institutions upon which democracy must be constructed are lacking, such as independent judiciaries, civil societies that are independent from the old regimes, and electoral mechanisms designed to facilitate elections instead of stealing them.¹⁴

Religion and Autocracy

Sometimes political elites construct their resistance to democracy on religious grounds. Saudi Arabia is particularly important in efforts to block further democratic transitions in the monarchical Arab world, fearing a sweeping away of such regimes if one falls to popular rule. The al-Saud family justifies its right to rule largely through its adherence to the “Wahhabi” understanding of Sunni Islam, which has fairly extensive quarrels with the practice of Shia Islam.¹⁵ Thus, Saudi Arabia is trying to gain admission of Jordan and Morocco to the Gulf Cooperation Council, joining the “king’s club” of Gulf Arab countries, in an effort to emphasize the stability of Arab monarchies as a bulwark against potential Iranian influence in the area.¹⁶ Saudi Arabia is also working to head off Egyptian support for Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, since that group professes to follow a different understanding of Islamic law than that which is dominant in Saudi Arabia, and which would challenge the Saudi Arabian understanding that justifies absolute monarchy. Said one Saudi Arabian lawyer, “If another model of Shariah says that you have to resist, this will create a deep difficulty.”¹⁷ And, most significantly, Saudi Arabia joined other select GCC countries in sending in security forces to quell antiregime demonstrations in neighboring Bahrain, sending a strong signal that the most powerful Gulf Arab country would not tolerate threats to either itself or to other Gulf kingdoms. In doing so, Saudi Arabia inserted itself as a defender of the Sunni-dominated Gulf countries against demonstrations that were mostly (though not exclusively) by Bahraini Shia. The message reflected the concern that the Shia populations, not only in Bahrain but in the other Gulf Arab countries as well, would challenge the Sunni domination and, in doing so, would facilitate Iranian Shia influence.

Other barriers to democratization include mechanisms for “rent distribution.” This was likely the case in countries such as Venezuela and Russia, which wandered from a path to democracy. States sell their raw material resources to foreign consumers, and the accrued rents go directly back to the state, which distributes the proceeds through an enlarged state

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capacity system to buy off the opposition rather than having to face it in electoral competition. These so-called rentier states do not levy personal income taxes on their populations, thus removing a key measure of political accountability.¹⁸ However, as Charles Tilly posits, state capacity may either impede or facilitate democratization, particularly when it is lubricated by petroleum sales. “International sales of such resources as oil often promoted de-democratization.”¹⁹ Additionally, because rentier states depend on raw material prices to sustain their rulers, sharp fluctuations in such prices can lead to popular discontent because the flow of rewards plunges during price downturns. Oil prices alone have gyrated dramatically since 1973, enriching on the upswing and stoking hopes of good fortune, yet plunging downward several years later and angering those who had dreamed of better economic futures.

Arab Military Politics

In most Arab states the military has been and still remains a powerful player, portraying itself as the backbone of independence, either constructing the state after leading the independence movement (e.g., Algeria) or ousting a post-imperial lackey, as did the armed forces in Egypt in 1951 and in Libya in 1969. Arab militaries often became Praetorian guards that deposed monarchs and sultans on a regular basis and replaced them with those of their liking.²⁰ Thus, soldiers emerged in the post-independence periods as a major part of state capacity, often participating in and controlling, to some extent, the distribution and redistribution of national resources. Their reward is often a significant part of the national budget; many Arab-world defense burdens—the percent of the GDP taken by defense—are among the highest in the world. Oman tops the list at over 11 percent of GDP; Saudi Arabia and Qatar spend 10 percent, while Iraq is 4th in the world, Jordan 5th, and Yemen is in 7th place.²¹

In some cases Arab militaries, often joined by state security services, fought to crush popular protests (e.g., Syria, Libya, and Yemen), and GCC troops joined to dampen Bahraini demonstrations, as noted above. Some soldiers appeared to truly believe their duty was to defend the regime. Others most likely feared they would sink along with the state leader and be executed or imprisoned for corruption or human rights violations, along with a loss of military privilege. They could calculate that military largesse would not survive democracy, as it had not in other democratic transformations. As James Lebovic notes regarding Latin America, “The

effect of democratization was to increase civilian relative to military shares of countries within the region.”²²

When the military adopts the mantra of state defender, it may decide its ideal of a nation is harmed by the continuing rule of an unpopular autocrat, as they did in Tunisia and Egypt. But this does not mean that the army will move the next step to democracy promotion. The Tunisian army returned to its bases after Ben Ali left, but the Egyptian military remained in power, ruling via a rump military council and engaging in activities that raised questions about its motives. Said one observer in Cairo, “I think they are incapable of understanding the extent to which the revolution wants to change things in the country. To them, removing the president was enough.”²³ The military began to censor publications critical of it and threatened some journalists for crossing over what it seemed to believe were media redlines.²⁴ This is probably reflective of the Egyptian military belief that one of the greatest threats to Egypt was from Islamist activism and that democratization would serve to empower the very groups that the armed forces had campaigned against since the founding of the Egyptian Republic. Egypt’s armed forces may be willing to negotiate a “pacted transition” to the next leader, stipulating certain demands in exchange for their move back to their bases. They apparently preserved some of their privilege when they kept the ministry of military production under military control and may have even negotiated with the Muslim Brotherhood to finally clear Cairo’s streets of protestors. Noted one analyst, “There is evidence the Brotherhood struck some kind of a deal with the military early on. It makes sense if you are the military—you want stability and people off the street. The Brotherhood is one address where you can go to get 100,000 people off the street.”²⁵

How Arab-World Democratization Might Start

Partly because of these democracy obstacles, the test cases for democratization will be in the countries that have initially sent their autocrats packing, Tunisia and Egypt. Democratization is most likely to happen in Tunisia, which though ruled authoritatively since its founding, still features a relatively liberal social order reflecting the values of founding president Habib Bourguiba, who emphasized a secular vision for his country that continued after his 1988 replacement by Ben Ali. Bourguiba also politically marginalized the Tunisian military, professionalizing it while

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restricting its political space.²⁶ And he countered the elite power seen in other Arab countries through his sometimes troubled support of Tunisia's labor movement, the *Union Générale Tunnisienne du Travail*, or UGTT. After Ben Ali's exit from Tunisia, the country's temporary leadership re-scheduled the July elections for September to give democracy more time to ferment and grow, though, as Dr. Larbi Sadiki told Al Jazeera News,

And now, all of a sudden, it is as if there is too much democracy—unimaginable a few months ago. A once-starved fortress of political thought and deliberation besieged by Ben Ali now has mastered the art of deliberation in a variety of registers. Professional elite politics, endless political new media freelancing and cafe politics—where the bulk of protesters take breathers—tests the pulse of the national mood, caricatures the octogenarian leadership, and laughs at the expense of all parties and leaders.²⁷

Yet Tunisia is different even from its North African neighbors, and different also from the rest of the Arab world, as noted above. Few Arab countries have Tunisia's relatively progressive political culture or a military that has been as politically neutral as have been the Tunisian armed forces. Most draw on some form of legitimacy to bolster their claims to authoritarian rule that go far beyond those used by Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Thus, while full democracy may bear fruit in Tunisia, its prospects are dim in most of the rest of the Arab world where it does not already exist, even in partial form.

Some other Arab states may become at least partly free, joining Lebanon, Kuwait, and Morocco; these three countries will most likely remain in this status. Egypt could transition, though the military committee that now manages political affairs in the post-Mubarak regime will probably be quite reluctant to grant more than partial suffrage, most likely excluding many Islamist or leftist parties from participation. It is also unlikely that the conservative military and its allies in what remains of the Mubarak state will want to permit a fully independent judiciary or a fully free press. Jordan's King Abdullah II has promised more parliamentary oversight of the government (though not of the monarchy), allowing for parliamentary control of some of the budget and the appointment of ministers (and removal for cause).²⁸ Yet other Arab countries now in the throes of revolt may only witness more bloodshed and turmoil as largely discredited regimes try to hang on to power, as in Libya and Syria. Bahrain remains a monarchy with few reforms and no movement to democracy after Bahraini and GCC forces moved to protect the Crown. And Yemen without President

Saleh remains a question mark. On the one hand, its deep divisions are highly unlikely to be bridged by even a furtive effort at democracy. Yet, as one writer notes, even under Saleh, Yemen has developed more liberal structures and openness than have most other Arab autocracies, permitting open criticism of the regime and the president, and has held several elections deemed free and fair by outside observers.²⁹

If It Arrives, Will Arab Democracy Last?

Finally, even if more Arab leaders join presidents Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Saleh in the old autocrat's home, democracy takes time to grow. Notes Jack Goldstone, "Even after a peaceful revolution, it generally takes half a decade for any type of stable regime to consolidate. If a civil war or counter-revolution arises (as appears to be happening in Libya), the reconstruction of the state takes still longer."³⁰ In the few months since the regime exits in Egypt and Tunisia, frustration is beginning to build again, and if democracy requires public patience, that tolerance may not last long enough for even partial democracy to develop.

Democracy carries a high price, as it demands compromise, delay, stalemate, and, frequently, indecision or compromised decisions at best. Over time, enthusiasm for democratic rule may wane, as it did in places like Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine. After years of turbulent democratic governance, those preferring democracy to a strong leader fell from 51 to 29 percent in Russia, 79 to 42 percent in Lithuania, and 57 to 20 percent in Ukraine.³¹ To be sure, not all populations in former autocratic countries felt betrayed by democracy, but the danger of disappointment is clear. Transitions to democracy often build popular hopes that can be easily disappointed should democracy not produce the expected results. After the Soviet Union's collapse, many Russians welcomed the establishment of an elected parliament and a presidential system, and new political parties quickly emerged to challenge the Communist Party. But constructing a market economy on the foundations of a Marxist-inspired economic system riddled with corruption and favoritism proved difficult, and as the economy foundered, discontent with democracy grew. Some Russians seemed to welcome the transition from partial democracy to autocracy under Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitri Medvedev. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez came to power in an election but has gradually pushed the

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country back to its authoritarian past. Although there have been mass protests, they have not stemmed the slide away from democracy.

Sustainable democracy also requires the establishment and defense of independent political institutions that dispense justice independent of regime leadership, which referee political disputes in a manner widely accepted, and which provide outlets for diverse political views without censorship. However, such institutional construction can take years and encounter stiff opposition from those who have benefitted from the old order. The military often is wary of limits on its authority, and religious groups may fear that strong democratic institutions may limit religious expression or religious power. Religion, after all, derives its influence more from faith than by democratic choice. Because Islamic organizations in particular gain influence by having their religion designated as the official state religion, as in most Arab countries, they may fear in particular a political loss to secular institutions.

Arab Transformations and Economic Progress

While the transition forces' narrative in many Arab countries was the call for political change, poor economic conditions underpinned much of the protestors' anger. High population growth, persistence of rentier state economies, doggedness of the state-managed economy, endemic corruption (the highest in the world, according to Transparency International),³² and a host of other factors combined to restrict economic progress. The *2002 Arab Human Development Report* argued that

Most countries in the region formerly adopted, and some long adhered to, now discredited statist, inward looking development models. These models may have been appropriate in early post-independence years, but they now serve neither governments (which need rapid economic growth in order to achieve policy objectives, including human-development objectives with respect to, e.g., health care, education and provision of social safety nets) nor people (who seek more good jobs with decent wages and working conditions).³³

In some Arab countries, guided economic development came from "Arab socialism" empowering the state to manage economies, though the result was often a confusing welter of conflicting ideas drawn from Arab historical experience, Marxism, or "scientific socialism," all supported by sometimes tortuous logic. Fouad Marsi wrote in a 1966 Egyptian publication, "Necessity in society is the same as inevitability in society. It is a

historical inevitability, like the inevitability of the triumph of socialism in our country. . . . For society is governed by necessity . . . but necessity in society is, in the final analysis, economic necessity.”³⁴ The result was often a large bureaucracy that operated much of the economy through state planning and desires to not only reduce unemployment but to also engage in import substitution industrialization to reduce dependency on the industrial West.

In some cases the regime supported existing economic elites, as did early independence leaders in Syria. Both rural landowners and urban merchants contending for influence were desirous of independence from the French Mandate but fearful of revolution or democracy. They feared it would bring left-wing movements into power.³⁵ Jordanian economic leaders largely came from “East Banker” Bedouin families, whom the monarchy rewarded with industrial aid to allow them to catch and surpass the Palestinian merchant class in levels of industrialization.³⁶ In Morocco, critical fingers point at the small group of elite business owners “who live on unearned income from official favors such as transportation permits and quarry and fishing licenses.”³⁷

In other cases state socialism closed opportunities for private sector investments, and so, as the failures of socialism became apparent, some regimes initiated a privatization process. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat initiated *infitah* (“openness”) after the 1973 war which, according to some critics, opened doors for a new business elite that would show its appreciation through regime support, particularly when privatization helped to create monopoly power and political favoritism.³⁸ For example, as Tarek Osman notes, the allocation of contracts for property, tourism, and development often went to business tycoons with close ties to the ruling regime.³⁹

The persistence of the state in the economy is generally not conducive to economic progress; in Morocco and Tunisia the state lagged behind the industrialists and business associations in promoting and upgrading the apparel economic sector, for example.⁴⁰ Authors Robert Springborg and Clement Henry attribute this lag to “crony capitalists [being] provided local oligopolies and monopolies that they exploit, leaving the more competitive and risky business of producing for export to those unable or unwilling to strike deals with the political leadership.”⁴¹ Partly for such reasons, Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than they were in the 1970s, four decades earlier.⁴² According to Paul Rivlin, “The balance of

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political forces that prevails in the beginning of the twenty-first century does not encourage economic development. The forces for economic change are weak, while those favoring the status quo are strong.”⁴³ Thus, prospects for economic progress are limited.

If political transformation leads to at least the foundations for democracy, will economic change follow? The answer is probably a qualified “no,” or at least not rapidly, and not at a pace that would satisfy most of the protestors who are demanding more jobs, more accessible and better education, better economic infrastructure, and the other economic factors that make up a healthy economy. Moreover, there are already indications that the Egyptian public believes economic conditions are worse after Mubarak’s exit. According to a Gallup survey conducted between 25 March and 2 April 2010, 28 percent of Egyptians ranked the economy as “getting better” in March 2010; this dropped to 20 percent in March 2011, a month after Mubarak left.⁴⁴ While some may view economic chaos as the price for change, others may come to the position that things were at least economically better under the old order.

One possible remedy for anemic Arab economic performance is to continue the process of privatization of state firms begun in the 1980s in some countries but never completed. However, such a move would probably produce more problems initially than it might solve. One strident complaint that fueled Arab discontent was high unemployment levels, but privatization is designed in part to reduce the bloated job levels in inefficient state enterprises. Thus, viable privatization might only swell the current Arab unemployment ranks. Second, privatization often benefits the oligarchs and their families; witness in particular the anger directed at the Mubarak family and their cohorts who benefitted from the transfer of state enterprises. If such a pattern repeats after political transformation, supporters of the new political order might get the rewards the old oligarchic families received, thus fueling a new round of political discontent.

Finally, one persistent complaint by the street demonstrators was the deeply embedded corruption, yet efforts to root it out may only worsen economic conditions. As one observer in Egypt stated, “The main sources of capital in this country have either been arrested, escaped, or are too afraid to engage in any business,” and many construction projects funded with corrupt money have been stopped. Banks have ceased lending money as anticorruption investigations probe illegal activities of the Mubarak elite.⁴⁵

Might Arab Transitions Change the Politics of Religion?

Islam is the prevailing religion in the Arab world, mixed with pockets of other faiths, and its role in Arab politics has varied. Before the arrival of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, Islam provided governance, if not democracy, in many parts of the Arab world. Timur Kuran explains:

Until the establishment of colonial regimes in the late 19th century, Arab societies were ruled under Shariah law, which essentially precludes autonomous and self-governing private organizations. Thus, while Western Europe was making its tortuous transition from arbitrary rule by monarchs to democratic rule of law, the Middle East retained authoritarian political structures. Such a political environment prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately facilitated the rise of modern Arab dictatorships.⁴⁶

The dominant political movement in many Arab countries that had experienced colonial rule was Arab nationalism, which brought a new class of autocrats to power in newly independent states, calling not for religious governance, but rather political modernity.⁴⁷ These demands came from multiple sources: European contacts; the Arab renaissance, or *Nahda*, of Egypt's Muhammad Ali Pasha; the narratives of modernizing Islamist thinkers like Rashid Rida and Jamal al-Afghani; and nationalist figures like Mustafa Kamil and Lutfi al-Sayyid, along with Christian Arabs from the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁸ Yet Islam and its legacies were always in the political and cultural background, and when Arab nationalism began to fail expectations, political Islam emerged. Consequently, some Arab regimes have suppressed political Islam, its leaders, and parties, either fearing it will compete successfully for their national narratives or believing it will lead to interfaith conflict and repression should it prevail in political spaces. Others faced a violent threat from radical Islamists, as occurred in Syria in the early 1980s when the Muslim Brotherhood literally declared war on the ruling Ba'ath regime. Algerian forces and violent Islamist movements clashed in the 1990s in a bloody civil war that claimed over 100,000 lives, initiated partly when the Algerian armed forces suppressed elections in 1992 that would probably have resulted in a majority Islamist parliament. Other regimes banned or severely limited Islamist participation absent a real challenge to their regimes, so Tunisian presidents banned the al-Nahda party, and Jordan restricted considerably the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt restricted or banned outright the Muslim Brotherhood and either assassinated or executed some of its key leaders, like Hassan al-Banna

and Sayyid Qutb. Other polities have tried to embrace political Islam, authorizing their own spiritual leadership, as in Saudi Arabia, or capturing the voices of Islamic institutions, as have successive Egyptian regimes that have pushed the venerable Al-Azar University to speak in their support. Yet both the most popular and the most violent Islamist groups were at least kept at arm's length if not banned outright by autocratic regimes. Should such regimes depart and even limited forms of democracy emerge in the Arab world, will the results empower Islamist groups?

There is considerable public support for Islam playing a greater role in politics, as noted in a 2010 Pew poll. In a question asked only of Muslim citizens, fully 95 percent of Egyptians, 53 percent of Jordanians, and 72 percent of Lebanese said that it was "a good thing" that Islam played a large role in politics.⁴⁹ This of course begs the question, What kind of Islam? The common answer usually divides across "radical" versus "moderate" Islam, but such categories do more to confuse than to clarify. As Jillian Schwedler deftly notes, the context matters. While most Muslim Brotherhood branches, some Salafi groups, and conservative clerics all explicitly reject violence, their goals range from limited reforms to a complete makeover of the government and economy, so are they radical or moderate? Other Islamists choose violence against the military but not against civilians, while even the most moderate Islamist faction might turn to violence if subject to severe repression or total exclusion from political spheres.⁵⁰ In short, Islamists are less likely to adopt violence as a tactic if they are at least partly included in post-transformation dialogs and policies and allowed to participate in elections. At the same time, some Islamist groups that have experienced repression at the hands of autocratic governments may not be trusting that the new order will include them, or if there is no new order but just continuing disorder, may continue violent struggles. Thus, it is quite possible that Islamist groups like the al-Houthi in Yemen, a branch of the minority Shia Zaydi sect, may continue to use violence against a likely Sunni-dominated political order in the post-Saleh era.⁵¹ An increase in Islamist militancy is reported in some parts of Yemen after Saleh, particularly in less-governed parts of the country.⁵² Yet Hezbollah in Lebanon, widely considered a radical violent Shia group, has lessened violence against other Lebanese (though clearly not against Israel) and contested successfully for Lebanese parliamentary seats. In June 2011, Hezbollah and its Christian and Druze allies expanded their parliamentary seats from

11 to 18, allowing them even more influence, albeit through the electoral process.

This last trend reflects a wider practice in the Arab world and beyond of Islamist groups contesting for influence under a democratic umbrella and raising concerns in some quarters that Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible. Bassam Tibi writes that “the Islamists propagate the formula *al-hall huwa al-Islam* (Islam is the solution). For them, this solution is the Islamic *shari’a* state. This state is based on the principle of *hakimiyyat Allah* (God’s rule), which is clearly not in line with democracy.”⁵³ Yet while there are certainly extreme Islamists who argue that sovereignty must be found in God and not in popular participation, Asef Bayat describes a more significant trend. “Since the late 1990s, against a backdrop of intensifying religious sentiment in the Muslim world, a nascent post-Islamist trend has begun to accommodate aspects of democratization, pluralism, women’s rights, youth concerns, and social development with adherence to religion.”⁵⁴

The other question is whether elements of what is described as “radical Islam” will moderate under Arab transformations. One answer is that it will have to if it is to survive public preferences. The call for an “Islamic state” has been a consistent demand of many more radical Islamist groups, yet the appeal of such a polity is small for most Muslims. David Cook observes, “Radical Muslims offered Afghanistan under the Taliban (1996–2001) as an example (of a *Shari’a* state), and it was not persuasive to the vast community of Muslims.”⁵⁵ Very few Muslim Arabs would find either the strict application of sharia law or membership in an Islamic caliphate desirable. While Islamic law informs much of personal jurisprudence in the Arab world (facilitating such matters as divorce, alimony, and other such issues), civil codes are prevalent in most of the region, and the complaint is not that Islamic law should replace civil structures, but that such structures have become arms of the state. The idea of a caliphate is more popular outside of the Arab region, partly because it offers few solutions to immediate problems facing Arabs, and because Arabs, at only 20 percent of the world’s Muslim population, would be a distinct minority in an Islamic empire.

Apostasy is another aspect of Islam that has spawned debate within Islamist circles, though the very term causes confusion because of the variety of understandings. The most radical jihadists may claim the right to declare certain Muslims as apostates (*tahwid*) and then either call for

their death (as did the late Ayatollah Khomeini in the Salman Rushdie case) or kill them directly, but, as Olivier Roy notes, even eminent Islamists have not called for death of those accused of apostasy but rather their legal separation from the Muslim community.⁵⁶ Moreover, the “Amman Message,” initiated by King Abdullah II of Jordan and adopted at an Islamic conference in Saudi Arabia in 2005, with the endorsement of over 500 Muslim scholars, specifically forbids the declaration of any Muslim as an apostate,⁵⁷ giving some religious sanction to the forbidding of this practice (known as *takfir*) by certain radical Islamists that had little support anyway among the wider Islamic community.⁵⁸ Everyday Arab Muslims risked death by Islamist fanatics who decided on the basis of some illegitimate fatwa that those not fighting violently in support of radical ideals were apostates, and thus it is very unlikely that a democratic Arab political entity could endorse death for those considered apostates.

Other potential fissures cross religious boundaries, including relations between Muslims and minority Christians. Authoritarian regimes generally managed potential tensions between faiths, though there were tense moments. Egyptian Coptic Christians relied on tacit bargains struck between Coptic leaders and the Mubarak government to protect Egyptian Copts, estimated to be around 10 percent of Egypt’s population. However, in the political vacuum that resulted from Mubarak’s ouster, religious pressure escalated, with several church burnings and dozens dead in the wake of rioting sparked by rumors of Christian abductions of women trying to convert to Islam to circumvent Coptic divorce laws.⁵⁹ Egyptian Islamists, marginalized by decades of National Democratic Party rule, may now gain more power, raising fears among Egyptian Copts that the rights and protections negotiated under Mubarak may disappear or at least weaken.⁶⁰ It is also quite possible that the progressive groups of Muslim scholars and journalists that Raymond Baker called “the new Islamists” will exercise more influence with their beliefs that the Egyptian stage has been shared by both Muslims and Christians and that ultimately both must cooperate in solving Egyptian problems.⁶¹ Bruce Rutherford also notes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, perhaps reflecting the views of younger members, has emphasized religious pluralism and described the Copts as “partners and brothers in our long struggle to build the nation.”⁶²

While democracy will most likely result in a moderation of the more dramatic interpretations of Islam, the religion will most likely remain in the public sphere. The kind of secularism represented by the Kemalist

Turkish image is doubtful. Arab Muslim publics are unlikely to accept such Turkish practices as state control of the mosques or state-appointed religious mufti to articulate the state's position on religious matters, since the autocratic Arab state widely engaged in such practices. Even in Turkey itself, the public restrictions on Islamic expression are gradually withering under the rule of the modestly Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, or AKP), which continues to win majorities in the Turkish parliament.

Will Democracy Make Middle Eastern Wars Less Likely?

The traditional Kantian assumption that democracies are less likely to wage war against other democracies has been a part of American national security strategy since the Clinton administration,⁶³ but recent scholarship challenges this assumption. Authors Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue that emerging democracies that fail to develop democratic institutions to check the potential power of a war-prone leader might actually be more likely to engage in war. They note that earlier waves of democracy generally involved middle-income countries, but subsequent democracy waves are more likely to involve low-income countries with lower citizen skills and immature institutions, thus, "Botched democratizations in such settings could give rise to grave threats to international peace and security."⁶⁴

Wars have been selective events in the Arab world. Some Arab countries have been involved in numerous conflicts, including Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, which fought Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973; Syria was also briefly involved in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Yet other Arab countries have rarely if ever fought a significant interstate war. Morocco and Algeria fought the brief "War of the Dunes" in 1963 but not since. While some Gulf Arab countries sent troops to the 1990–91 effort against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, their conflict was brief. While not one of these states was democratic in its time of war, it is not obvious that a democratic political order would have made much difference. These were small engagements, and when national leadership calculated the cost of continuing the conflict, they demurred and the troops came home.

Yet Mansfield and Snyder's arguments are important, because viable political institution building may not accompany democratization should it occur in the Arab world. And given the powerful emotional pull that the Palestinian issue has on Arab publics, it is possible to imagine situations

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where faltering economies under incomplete democratization may push some elected leaders to pick a fight with Israel to deflect criticism from their own domestic problems.

While interstate wars may become less likely, for reasons other than democratization, civil wars may grow in number and intensity. While Yemen's President Saleh was increasingly unpopular in his own country, he at least controlled the forces of dissolution that loomed large since the country's unification in 1999 but did not explode into civil war. With Saleh's departure or demise, the anger in south Yemen about alleged northern favoritism could easily rekindle civil war, as could the resentment in the areas dominated by Saleh's rival tribes. Syria, long under the political domination of the minority Alawite, could also see civil war as its majority Sunni Muslim population fights to reclaim what it believes is its right to dominate the state.

Arab Transformations and Relations with the United States

The United States entered the Arab transformation period in a disadvantaged position, which was largely of its own making. The George W. Bush administration had few friends in the region outside of the ruling circles in select Arab countries, and what little capital it enjoyed evaporated in the 2003 Iraq operation that received almost universal Arab condemnation. One observer wrote that democracy promotion under the second Bush administration was "part of a wider set of US interests and policies with which it is frequently in contradiction, and US credibility is so low in the Arab Middle East that the US message of democracy is often rejected together with the messenger."⁶⁵ The Obama administration fared somewhat better at its outset, but squandered capital as well when it failed to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts and continued to support the same autocrats that a considerable majority of the Arab populace wanted to remove. It did not help that, even as the wave of protests gathered steam in Cairo, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the Mubarak regime to be "stable." Moreover, the United States was highly inconsistent, with President Obama calling for the removal of Muammar Qaddafi and sending US warplanes to support rebel efforts against him, while at the same time saying very little about harsh regime policies in Bahrain, a US security partner and military base host. Critics of US Arab-world policy

also noted the United States was much more involved in transformations to democracy in places like Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia, actively using USAID funds to support antiregime broadcasts in these countries, while remaining silent in the Arab transformation period.⁶⁶

Should democracy spread even marginally to the Arab world, the resulting governments will have to respond to the opinions of their publics. And if surveys are partial indicators of attitudes toward the United States, accountable Arab regimes will find their freedom to cooperate with the United States constrained. According to a 2008 Brookings Institution poll, 64 percent of respondents in the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia hold “a very negative attitude towards the United States,” and a similar number believe that Iran has a right to acquire nuclear weapons.⁶⁷ Most importantly, deep suspicions of American motives remain, as revealed by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, a widely respected Egyptian journalist, in an interview with Al-Jazeera Television: “Although the Arab world has great expectations, it is still facing serious dangers simply because the multinational forces [code for United States and its allies] have interests in the region and are working to protect them through sectarian lines, economic and psychological pressure, or military action.”⁶⁸ Thus, relative to American policy, the real concern is whether or not US Middle East interests are advanced through Arab democracy. In this case “probably not,” but, more importantly, we do not yet know what kind of democracy will occur, if any, or where, or how stable it might be.

For the United States, this should be a period of watchful waiting and recognition that the old policies of supporting unelected Arab leaders in the name of regional stability may not produce the same results as it did for many decades. While such support sometimes produced useful shared intelligence, cooperation in arresting suspected terrorists, combined military exercises, and basing rights, the reality is that such support now may only weaken Arab absolute rulers. Thus, choices must be made with much more care about which Arab leader(s) to embrace. More importantly, the range of possible outcomes in countries like Egypt is too wide to craft definitive US policy, because Egypt might become a semi or full democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood might win enough seats to block Egyptian cooperation with the United States, or the Egyptian army may decide to retain the reins of power, hoping to preserve privileged positions and keep de-

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mocracy limited at best. American rash choices without a long-term view of the changes in the Arab world will only produce policy disappointments.

Conclusions

The year 2011 started auspiciously in the Arab world, as two long-standing autocratic regimes collapsed after a decades-long period of rule. Initially, hopes sprung in the region, and beyond, that democracy might finally bloom—a genuine “Arab spring.” Yet the belief that transition would be relatively quick and painless disappeared, as some Arab absolute rulers learned from the experiences of their former colleagues and tightened their rule, banding together in some cases and raising substantially the price of opposition. Revolts that emerged in Oman, Bahrain, and Jordan faded as a combination of security-force violence and partial reform measures quelled them. In other cases the street protests continued, but dictators in Syria, Yemen, and Libya used their elite armed forces, sometimes supplemented with foreign mercenaries, to violently suppress popular movements. Life returned to the status quo in the few Arab countries that had not been wracked by violence, disorder grew in Egypt and Yemen after their leaders left, partly because their departure created too large a political vacuum for anyone to fill except the armed forces, or, in the case of Yemen, rival factions fought over the remains. The United States and other outside countries were left wondering how to craft revisions to their Middle East policies with so much uncertainty left in the area.

At the same time, a force has been unleashed in the Arab world that will be very difficult to curb completely, though in countries where the regime response has been particularly violent and repressive, the movement may all but die, as happened in Iran after 2009. Certainly the hopes of those expecting a fairly rapid and wide Arab democratic transition have been dashed. Yet, if even slow democratization comes to Tunisia and perhaps to Egypt, and Jordan and Morocco continue to open a fairly closed political system, Arab hopes for political transformation will continue, and democracy may spread slowly. That may be a more favorable long-term outcome for Arab democracy advocates, because, as noted here, sometimes the too-rapid diffusion of democratic governance may carry the seeds of its own destruction. 

Notes

1. Christopher Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb* (London: Routledge, 2010), 64–65.

2. Freedom House issues an annual map of freedom, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIW2011_MENA_Map_1st%20draft.pdf. The organization considers Western Sahara a separate country ranked as not free, while Morocco, which claims Western Sahara, is ranked as partly free. Of the total population of the Middle East and North Africa, 78 percent live in countries rated as not free compared to 35 percent of sub-Saharan Africa.

3. Iliya Harik notes that relatively undemocratic Kuwait and relatively democratic Turkey hold the same score (partly free), and that some sub-Saharan African nations with severe democratic challenges rank higher than do most Arab countries. He says, “The argument here is not that Arab countries have a stellar record of democratization, as indeed they do not. It is a matter of whether FH’s quantitative measurement of democratization across the board is reliable at all.” Harik, “Democracy, ‘Arab Exceptionalism,’ and Social Science,” *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 664–84.

4. James Bell, “Will Enthusiasm for Democracy Endure in Egypt and Elsewhere?” Pew Charitable Trust, 8 March 2011, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1918/enthusiasm-for-democracy-in-egypt-tunisia-fragile-eastern-europe-experience-shows>.

5. Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler, “Attitudes in the Arab World,” *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (January 2008): 97. Like all surveys, these results must be taken with appropriate caution. Not all who respond to the survey have a similar understanding of “democracy,” and sometimes support for democracy is higher in nondemocratic countries than in their counterparts. Yu-Han Chu and Min-Hua Wang find that uncritical support for democracy is lower in Taiwan and South Korea, two successful Asian cases of democratic transformation, than it is in Vietnam and China, where one-party rule still prevails. See Chu and Wang, “Solving an Asian Puzzle,” *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 10 (October 2010): 114–22.

6. Thomas Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (January 2007): 21.

7. Ian O. Lesser, “Policy towards Algeria after a Decade of Isolationism,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 8–21. Daniel Brumberg chillingly predicted that “if the Algerian experiment immediately founders, or succeeds temporarily only to give rise to a new authoritarianism, the prospects for a new democratic bargain in the Arab world will be dealt a severe blow.” Brumberg, “Islam, Reform, and Elections in Algeria,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 71.

8. Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 4 (October 2006): 6.

9. Charles Tilly, “Inequality, Democratization, and De-Democratization,” *Sociological Theory* 21, no. 1 (March 2003): 41. Michael Bernhard makes a similar argument to explain the failure of Weimar Germany to sustain democracy: “This marriage of iron and rye (agriculture in the east and industry in the west) perpetuated the social pattern of unequal development. It preserved the quasi-feudal character of German agriculture in the east, while Germany in the west increasingly evolved into a modern society. . . . Because of this alliance, Germany is seen as the classic European example of the antidemocratic potential of the bourgeoisie.” Bernhard, “Democracy in Germany: A Reappraisal,” *Comparative Politics* 33, no. 4 (July 2001): 382.

10. Some members of these elites did line up with the protestors against the established regime, but that was largely because they either thought they could maintain their power under democratic rule or they had fallen from favor in the presidential palace.

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11. David S. Sorenson, *Global Security Watch: Lebanon* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 79–80.

12. Amaney A. Jamal, *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 24.

13. For examples, see Toby Craig Jones, *Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Steffen Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Christopher M. Davidson, *Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); and Marc Valeri, *Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

14. This is not to imply that Middle East civil societies are all or mostly tools of the state, because many have been performing essential work that fills voids left by governmental neglect. Yet Arab autocrats have viewed most civil society groups as threats and have clamped down on those that rulers believe are conduits of internal opposition and/or outside influence. Laith Kubba correctly notes, however, that Arab civil society groups are effective agents to demonstrate the lack of performance by too many Arab governments. Kubba, “The Awakening of Civil Society,” in *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 28–34.

15. See Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 86–90.

16. “Saudi Arabia Scrambles to Limit Region’s Upheaval,” *New York Times*, 27 May 2011.

17. Ibid.

18. Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (April 2001): 325–61. Rentier states derive wealth from raw material rents, which often prop up authoritarian regimes because proceeds from them are used to buy off potential opposition and because income flows mitigate the need for personal income taxes, one primary means of accountability between the citizenry and government. See Gwenn Okruhlik, “Rentier Wealth, Unruly Law, and the Rise of Opposition: The Political Economy of Oil States,” *Comparative Politics* 31, no. 3 (April 1999): 296–97; Donald L. Losman, “The Rentier State and National Oil Companies: An Economic and Political Perspective,” *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 427–45; Steffen Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries,” *Comparative Studies in Society & History* 52, no. 2 (April 2010): 282–318; and Jay Ulfelder, “Natural Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy,” *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 8 (August 2007): 995–1018.

19. Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 200. Studies vary on exactly how much of a barrier rentier states pose for democracy, though. Michael Herb argues that while rent-seeking states do have an impact on democratization, other factors like income distribution and the percent of the population that is Muslim also impact on levels of democracy. Herb, “No Representation without Taxation: Rents, Development, and Democracy,” *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 3 (April 2005): 297–316.

20. Majid Khadduri, “The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 47, no. 2 (June 1953): 516; Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 56–57; James T. Quinn-Jivlin, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practices and Consequences in the Middle East,” *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 131–65; S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); Victoria Clarke, *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 63; and Larbi Sadiki, *Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 120.

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To Deter or Not to Deter

Applying Historical Lessons to the Iranian Nuclear Challenge

Cheryl M. Graham

Since the dawn of mankind, humans have sought to enhance their chances of survival through the development of various types of weaponry. And the most effective weapons consistently have been copied by others who felt threatened or intimidated by their existence. Pres. John F. Kennedy considered this tendency in making his March 1963 prediction regarding nuclear weapons proliferation. At that time only the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France were armed with nuclear weapons, but Kennedy forecast that another 15 to 20 countries would join this club by the mid-1970s. He also warned that such a development should be regarded as “the greatest possible danger and hazard.”¹

Although Kennedy’s fears were not realized, the issue of horizontal nuclear proliferation has once again assumed a prominent spot on the international strategic agenda. Like Kennedy, recent US leaders have referred to the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities as the greatest possible danger to international security. In a September 1993 address before the UN General Assembly, Pres. Bill Clinton argued that “one of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD], whether they are nuclear, chemical or biological.”² More recently, Pres. Barack Obama warned that “nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states” represents the greatest threat to US and global security.³

Concerns about the impact of nuclear proliferation are accentuated by rising uncertainty regarding the reliability of deterrence strategies, causing some analysts to caution that new nuclear enemies “may be madder than

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‘MAD’.”⁴ This article examines the Iranian nuclear program to determine whether these concerns are justified, assess whether preventive war is an appropriate or viable method of eliminating the Iranian nuclear “threat,” and determine whether such a strategy is preferable to one of deterrence. To facilitate this assessment, parallels are drawn between the contemporary Iranian nuclear issue and proliferation challenges originating in China during the 1960s.

The Chinese Proliferation Challenge Lessons from the Past

In the early 1960s many Kennedy administration officials, including the president, viewed potential Chinese nuclear capabilities as a serious threat to Western national security. A June 1961 Joint Chiefs of Staff report concluded that China’s “attainment of a nuclear capability will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World, particularly in Asia.”⁵ Kennedy’s attention was increasingly drawn to the Chinese nuclear issue in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, and in January 1963 he directed the CIA to assign the highest possible priority to uncovering information about Beijing’s nuclear efforts. Kennedy’s apprehension was further heightened by his belief that the Chinese attached a lower value to human life and would therefore be less susceptible to deterrence threats. Between 15 and 30 million Chinese are estimated to have died as a result of Mao Zedong’s misrule and the Great Leap Forward program of rapid industrialization. Compounding these concerns was the fact that when Mao launched the program in 1958, he was known to have declared openly that “half of China may well have to die.”⁶

The context in which China’s nuclear developments took place was also very important in shaping the Kennedy administration’s threat perceptions. China in the 1960s had already fought the United States in Korea, attacked India, and threatened Indochina, Indonesia, and Taiwan. Chairman Mao had publicly stated that nuclear war with the United States was a scenario not to be feared. He is quoted by the Chinese as saying, “If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.”⁷ This, coupled with Chinese support for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese insurgencies, meant that China in the early 1960s possessed all of the characteristics of what is now referred

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to as a “rogue state.” Many analysts were also concerned that the strategy of deterrence, which had prevented a nuclear war with the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Cold War, could not be applied to the Chinese.

US officials were keen to develop measures to address this problem, and a number of high-level debates took place within the White House over whether to use military force to curb China’s embryonic nuclear program. During a visit to Moscow in July 1963, Amb. Averell Harriman was instructed to play on the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and draw out Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s opinion regarding potential US action aimed at limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear developments. The matter was also discussed during a visit to Washington that year by Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Gen Chiang Ching-kuo. He suggested that the United States provide covert support for paramilitary operations against Beijing’s nuclear installations and emphasized that his exiled government “would assume full political responsibility” for any action.⁸

In parallel to deliberations about the need for preventive military action against China’s nuclear program, the State Department’s Policy Planning Committee was reevaluating the notion that a Chinese nuclear capability would have an intolerable impact on Western security. This committee, headed by China expert Robert Johnson, submitted its first report in October 1963, downplaying the military threat posed by Chinese nuclear endeavors. The committee argued that preventive action was unnecessary because the vast gulf between Chinese and US nuclear capabilities made it exceedingly unlikely that China would use nuclear weapons unless its territory were directly under attack. They viewed Chinese nuclear ambitions as a vehicle for gaining prestige and respect rather than as a means of enabling an aggressive military posture. Johnson submitted a subsequent report in April 1964, which concluded that “the significance of [a Chinese nuclear] capability is not such as to justify the undertaking of actions which would involve great political costs or military risks.”⁹ In the final section of this report, Johnson expressed doubts over whether preventive action would have the desired long-term effect of halting Beijing’s nuclear enterprises, stating further that

It is doubtful whether, even with completion of initial photographic coverage of the mainland, we will have anything like complete assurance that we will have identified all significant nuclear installations. Thus, even “successful” action may not necessarily prevent the ChiComs from detonating a nuclear device in the next few years. If an attack should be made, some installations are missed and

Communist China subsequently demonstrates that it is continuing to produce nuclear weapons, what is likely to be the reaction to the half-finished U.S. effort:¹⁰

Iran—the Contemporary Proliferation Challenge

The themes circulating in the current debate over the Iranian nuclear impasse are similar to those regarding Beijing in the early 1960s. As in the proliferation challenge posed by China, one proposed method of countering the Iranian threat is to engage in a preventive war against Tehran's nuclear infrastructure. In discussions of how to deal with Iran's nuclear defiance, Bush administration officials frequently warned that all options were "being kept on the table."¹¹ Although President Obama has approached the Iranian nuclear issue in a more conciliatory manner than his Republican predecessor, the White House continues to warn Tehran that the use of force has not been ruled out. In January 2009, when asked whether military options were still under consideration, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs replied, "The President hasn't changed his viewpoint that he should preserve all his options."¹²

Arguments in favor of preventive military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran are common in the academic community. Norman Podhoretz has argued that "if Iran is to be prevented from developing a nuclear arsenal, there is no alternative to the actual use of military force."¹³ He compares Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's public expressions of the desire to "wipe Israel off the map" with the objectives outlined by Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf* and argues that failing to utilize military force to stop Ahmadinejad now is as irresponsible as not stopping Hitler at Munich when "he could have been defeated at an infinitely lower cost."¹⁴

Bernard Lewis makes the case that the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) will not function when applied to Iran. For him, there is no comparison between the Islamic Republic and other governments with nuclear weapons as a result of "what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran's present rulers."¹⁵ Lewis concedes that a direct nuclear attack by Iran against the West is unlikely in the near future but maintains that Israel has good reason to be concerned by such a prospect. Although an Iranian nuclear attack against Israel would incur an unavoidable number of Palestinian Muslim casualties, Lewis argues that Iran will not be deterred by this prospect. For him the regime will even use the phrase, "Allah will know his own," to convince themselves that they

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are actually doing collateral Muslim casualties a favor by “giving them a quick pass to heaven . . . without the struggles of martyrdom.” Lewis cites al-Qaeda’s acceptance of large numbers of Muslim casualties in the 1998 attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as evidence of this phenomenon. He also maintains that the Iranian Shia complex of martyrdom and apocalyptic visions renders any concerns about possible Israeli retaliation obsolete. Mainstream Shia religious doctrine maintains that after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, leadership of the Muslim community was transferred to a succession of 12 imams, beginning with Imam Ali through to the 12th imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi (born 868 AD). The Mahdi did not die, but in 873 or 874 entered what is known as a period of Lesser Occulation. It is said that he reemerged briefly in 940 before entering the Greater Occulation and will not return until the Day of Judgement to usher in a worldwide incorrupt and just Islamic government.¹⁶ While there is no precise theological prediction for when this day of judgement will occur, it is commonly believed that it will happen at a time when the world has descended into chaos. He concludes that for people with this mind-set, “MAD is not a constraint; it is an inducement.”¹⁷

Clearly, there are similarities between today’s concerns regarding Iranian nuclear intentions and those circulating about the prospect of a nuclear-armed China in the 1960s. Problems associated with preventive military action to curb Tehran’s nuclear endeavors also closely resemble those identified vis-à-vis China. First, such efforts are extremely unlikely to *permanently* remove the nuclear threat. The general consensus is that while preventive attacks are likely to set back the Iranian program, they would not prevent its recovery. In December 2008, *The Atlantic* magazine collaborated with retired Air Force colonel Sam Gardiner in a series of war games focused on Iran. After close consideration of the location and physical features of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and a range of possible military options, Gardiner concluded that there was no *permanent* military solution for the issues of Iran.¹⁸ It is also highly likely that preventive action would serve as a catalyst for increased Persian nationalism and provide impetus for the regime to resume nuclear efforts with increased vigor. From this perspective, military action would enforce the perception of a perpetually hostile West and the belief that a nuclear weapons capability is essential to deter Western aggression.¹⁹

It is important to remember that preventive action would qualify as an act of war, and it is reasonable to assume that the Islamic Republic would

retaliate. One possible scenario relates to Tehran's ability to manipulate its political and military influence in Iraq to undermine the war effort and the overall stability of the region. Despite the belief that virtually all of Tehran's intelligence and covert action organizations secured sources of influence in post-Saddam Iraq,²⁰ it is clear that the Iranians have been restrained in their activity there more recently. The US State Department's 2008 *Country Reports of Terrorism* recognized that while terrorism "committed by illegal armed groups receiving weapons and training from Iran continued to endanger the security and stability of Iraq . . . incidents of such violence were markedly lower than in the previous year."²¹ Although Iran has scaled down its support for Iraqi militia, this support could intensify noticeably in the wake of a preventive strike.

The Case for Deterrence

In light of the predicted costs and questionable benefits of preventive military options, it must be said that the only persuasive justification for starting another war in the Middle East would be if there were good reason to believe that the leadership in Tehran is fundamentally undeterrable. Fortunately, pessimistic predictions that the ayatollahs will be inclined to initiate a nuclear Armageddon are unlikely to manifest themselves. Although Ahmadinejad's statements about wiping Israel off the map are inexcusable, they do not indicate a proclivity toward nuclear suicide. Claims to the contrary ignore the fact that such provocations have been part of Iranian political rhetoric since the 1979 revolution and are not symptomatic of any broader nuclear ambitions.²² Ahmadinejad's confrontational discourse also reaps political benefits in the sense that it undermines his reformist opposition who he can accuse of seeking rapprochement with a hostile and threatening West.²³ It is also interesting to note that such rhetoric is not unique to Iran. During the Cold War, Nikita Khrushchev once infamously promised to "bury America," whereas Ronald Reagan declared that the Soviet Union would end up on the "ash heap of history."

Future Iranian nuclear attacks against Israel are not strategically *impossible*, but there are a number of reasons to be confident that Iran will be deterred from taking such action. Bernard Lewis maintains that the Iranian regime will not be deterred by the fact that a nuclear attack against Israel would also kill a staggeringly high number of Palestinians and Muslim citizens in neighboring states. However, what Lewis fails to recognize is

that the portrayal of itself as the foremost defender of Palestinians is an image that Iran has pursued with vigor since the 1979 revolution. The acceptance by any Iranian leadership of a large number of Muslim deaths is simply not consistent with this long-standing expression of concern for the Palestinians.²⁴ The relevance of his comparison between a potential Iranian nuclear attack against Israel and the 1998 al-Qaeda African embassy bombings is also questionable. Al-Qaeda ideology has exploited Islamic concepts such as *takfir* and *jihad* to justify the killing of other Muslims. The Iranian leadership does not ascribe to this militant extremist vision and is therefore unlikely to view collateral Muslim casualties as acceptable on the grounds that they have been granted “a quick pass to heaven.” The prospect of damage to the holy city of Jerusalem (the third holiest location in Islam) is also likely to deter Iran from initiating a nuclear conflict with Israel.

Even if the Iranians were sufficiently confident in their ability to initiate nuclear attacks against Israel without damaging Jerusalem or harming disproportionate numbers of Muslim civilians, there is still reason to be optimistic about the prospects of deterrence. A November 2007 study for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated the Israeli nuclear arsenal at more than 200 boosted and fusion weapons, most with a yield of between 20 and 100 kilotons and some reaching one megaton.²⁵ In a hypothetical nuclear exchange, these high-yield weapons, combined with accurate delivery systems, would give the Israelis the option of striking all major Iranian cities while maintaining a reserve strike capability to ensure that no other Arab states could capitalize on the military distraction caused by an Iranian nuclear strike.²⁶ Israel's fleet of at least three *Dolphin*-class submarines armed with nuclear missiles also provides the Jewish state with a second-strike capability that nullifies any effort on the part of Tehran to conduct a decapitation strike and remove Israel's capacity for retaliation. Finally, aside from the credibility of Israeli deterrent capabilities, the Iranians must also consider the implications of US security guarantees to Israel. In her 2008 presidential campaign, then senator and now secretary of state Hillary Clinton warned that if Iran were to “consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”²⁷ Although the credibility of such a threat is questionable, US defense commitments to Israel are nevertheless a factor the Iranian leadership will have to take seriously.

Although the Iranian regime theoretically should be deterred by credible deterrent threats supported by sufficient second-strike capabilities, Lewis

has warned that Iran's mainstream Shia religious ideology will encourage the leadership to welcome punitive retaliation and destruction as a means of hastening the return of the hidden Mahdi. While such arguments have a certain headline-grabbing quality, they do not reflect the true character of Iran's international conduct. Regardless of the frequent examples of ideologically inspired rhetorical bombast, the Iranian regime has behaved in a strategically calculating and rational manner since the 1979 revolution. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the Islamic regime issued a series of bloodcurdling promises to embrace martyrdom and, if necessary, fight to the last man. However, when various strands of the war came together to indicate that Iran stood no chance of emerging victorious, Ayatollah Khomeini ended the conflict. In a public address on 20 July 1988, Khomeini stated that while he would have found it "more bearable to accept death and martyrdom," his decision was "based only on the interests of the Islamic Republic."²⁸ This statement ended Iran's eight-year war with Iraq and provides reassurance about the likely future of Iranian decision making. The fact that Khomeini, who has been described as the most extreme of them all, bowed to reality and pragmatic national interest rather than embrace martyrdom indicates that the Iranian leadership is capable of making rational and strategic calculations.

Iran's approach to the US-led coalition effort to remove the Taliban in Afghanistan provides yet another example of the regime's willingness to yield to realist principles as opposed to ideological inclinations. The Iranian government and the Taliban shared an antagonistic relationship long before the events of 11 September 2001 precipitated Operation Enduring Freedom. Animosity toward the Afghan regime stemmed from the movement's radical Sunni origins and close associations with Pakistan's military and intelligence services. Influenced by their unique Persian pride and stature as an Islamic state, Iran also viewed the Taliban as "reactionary peasants" tainting the image of Islam. Hostility was further exacerbated by the persecution of Afghanistan's Shia Muslim minority and the spillover of drugs and instability across Iran's borders.²⁹ This history of enmity led to a remarkable congruence of post-September 11 interests between the United States and Iran. Despite long-standing hostility toward the United States, the Iranian government, in true "an enemy of my enemy is my friend" fashion, was extremely helpful with the US-led military effort in Afghanistan. It played an active and constructive role in the Bonn process, which created the new central government in Kabul and was one of the

first countries to officially recognize the postconflict leadership of Pres. Hamid Karzai.³⁰

Overall, regardless of how Iran is often portrayed, the historical record of pragmatic behavior discussed above indicates that the regime is willing to prioritize realist considerations of national interest rather than revolutionary and religious ideology. This strongly suggests that it is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed Iran will attack Israel without consideration of the consequences or that the mullahs will deliberately initiate a nuclear Armageddon to hasten the return of the Mahdi. Although it is impossible to prove with absolute certainty how Iran will act in the future, previous behavior does undermine Lewis' arguments against the compatibility of deterrence and Islamic ideology.

Given its track record of terrorist sponsorship, it is understandable that some analysts have drawn attention to the possibility that Iran may pass nuclear weapons, materials, or knowledge to nonstate actors. One of the biggest post-September 11 concerns is that terrorism could escalate to the nuclear level, and a transfer from a nuclear-weapons state to a terrorist proxy is one way that this nightmare scenario could occur. As the 2005 *Country Reports on Terrorism* emphasized, "State sponsors of terrorism pose a grave WMD terrorism threat. . . . Iran presents a particular concern, given its active sponsorship of terrorism and its continued development of a nuclear program. . . . Like other state sponsors of terrorism with WMD programs, Iran could support terrorist organizations seeking to acquire WMD."³¹

Although it is possible that Iran could transfer nuclear weapons to one of its many terrorist proxies, this is exceedingly unlikely for a number of reasons. First of all, it is *incredibly* unlikely that *any* state, regardless of its ideological inclinations, would knowingly allow nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of actors it did not directly control, simply out of fear that the weapons might then be used against it. It is also worth noting that Iran is known to be affiliated with a mixture of Islamist factions and radical secular groups.³² Although these ties are inexcusable, links with groups of varying ideological and political inclinations indicate that Iranian involvement is motivated by secular and national interests rather than radical preferences. The 2008 *Country Reports on Terrorism* also identifies Iran's use of terrorist proxies as a means of advancing "its key *national security* and *foreign policy* interests" and makes no mention of religious or ideological loyalties (emphasis added).³³

Other nuclear terrorism scaremongers highlight the concern that Iran may be tempted to use one of its many terrorist proxies to carry out an anonymous nuclear attack against one of its enemies.³⁴ Proponents of this argument, however, neglect the fact that almost all of the nuclear material left behind after an explosion is suitable for forensic investigation to attribute nuclear weapons to their origin. Since weapons-grade materials do not occur naturally, material analyzed in the aftermath of an explosion will contain certain physical, chemical, elemental, and isotopic signatures which in turn provide clues about the origin of the weapon, making anonymity impossible.³⁵ Attribution capabilities have been complemented by well-articulated deterrence threats from Western governments. In October 2006, following North Korea's nuclear test, President Bush declared that the "transfer of nuclear weapons or material" to terrorists "would be considered a grave threat" and that North Korea would be held "fully accountable" for such action.³⁶ In a February 2008 speech at Stanford University, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley expanded this threat to a universal scope, stating that "the United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts."³⁷ Even though President Obama has yet to make any similar reference to Iran, in May 2007 then senator Joseph Biden, wrote, "We must make clear in advance that we will hold accountable any country that contributes to a terrorist nuclear attack, whether by directly aiding would-be nuclear terrorists or wilfully neglecting its responsibility to secure the nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material within its borders."³⁸ Barring a complete reversal of strategic thinking, it is likely the United States will continue with this posture of expanded deterrence, regardless of Obama's gestures of reconciliation towards Iran.

When discussing the implications of nuclear proliferation, it is important to consider what factors encourage states to cross the nuclear threshold. Do states acquire nuclear weapons to facilitate aggression, or are there more peaceful, defense-orientated incentives driving horizontal proliferation? In answering this question it is possible to identify further parallels between the current Iranian nuclear issue and the Chinese challenge of the 1960s. The Chinese flirted with nuclear research in the late 1940s, but it was only after the outbreak of the Korean War that the importance of nuclear weapons in balancing the United States received full attention. The war on

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the Korean Peninsula was a central issue in the 1952 presidential campaign of Dwight Eisenhower, wherein he pledged his commitment to resolving the conflict. He warned the Chinese that if armistice negotiations proved unsuccessful, he would be willing to escalate the war and publicly hinted at the possible use of nuclear weapons against Beijing.³⁹ This perception of US “nuclear blackmail” was enhanced further during the 1955 Taiwan Straits crisis when Secretary of State Dulles warned that the United States was willing to use force to prevent the communist conquest of Taiwan and that Washington intended to establish defense commitments with the island.⁴⁰

Like China in the 1960s, it is likely that the Iranian regime also views the military muscle of the United States with acute trepidation. The United States currently has military forces stationed in Iraq, Afghanistan, a large number of Gulf States, South Asia, and Turkey. Although the ousting of Saddam Hussein improved Iran’s *actual* security situation, it also confirmed mounting Iranian fears of strategic encirclement. Officials in Tehran became concerned that not only might Iran be sandwiched between two US client states, but also that regime change in Iraq might encourage similar American ambitions for Iran. The Iranian leadership is also likely to have drawn important lessons from the way the United States dealt with the respective proliferation challenges from North Korea and Iraq. Their view is likely to be that the United States is averse to challenging states militarily once they have a nuclear capability but is more aggressive and favors regime change in states that have demonstrated nuclear intent. Viewed from this perspective, the notion that nuclear weapons are strategically necessary to ensure regime survival and territorial integrity is understandable.⁴¹

As noted, the Policy Planning Committee report submitted in October 1963 identified Chinese nuclear weapons as a vehicle for gaining prestige rather than a means of facilitating aggression. Indeed, Mao is known to have viewed China’s independent ability to mobilize and commit its armies in an equal if not greater manner than other states as an inherent part of Chinese sovereign independence. In 1958 he reportedly informed senior colleagues that without nuclear capabilities, “others don’t think what we say carries weight.”⁴² There is evidence that the desire for prestige and international respect is also driving Iranian nuclear endeavors. The general consensus among Iran’s clerical leaders is that the Islamic Republic is the representative of revolutionary Islam and the guardian of oppressed

Muslims everywhere. They therefore believe that the fate of the world-wide Islamic community depends on the ability of Iran to develop the military capabilities to protect and advance that community's interests. In an April 2006 speech before the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, its secretary Hassan Rohani emphasized this point. "This is good for our international reputation and shows that we have made good technological progress and have been successful in the area of technology," he stated. "It is going to be a very effective and important statement."⁴³ His speech also indicated that the Iranians may view nuclear weapons acquisition as a means of forcing dialogue from other states. Rohani pointed out that: "The world did not want Pakistan to have an atomic bomb or Brazil to have the fuel cycle, but Pakistan built its bomb and Brazil had its fuel cycle, and the world started to work with them. Our problem is that we have not achieved either one, but we are standing at the threshold."⁴⁴

Prospects—Applying the Proliferation Lessons of the Past

The 1963 Policy Planning Committee report argued that a Chinese nuclear capability would not fundamentally alter the balance of military power in Asia. It stated that the great asymmetry in US and Chinese nuclear capabilities made Chinese first use of nuclear weapons "highly unlikely except in the event of an attack upon the mainland which threatened the existence of the regime." It also argued that nuclear capabilities would not alter "Chinese prudence in the use of military force" and, if anything, "could increase Chicom caution." Finally, the report stressed the need for the United States to maintain an appropriate balance between credible nuclear retaliatory threats and an "evident visible ability to deal with communist aggression" in dealing with a nuclear-armed China. This was considered essential to reassure Asian allies that the United States would be willing to respond to all levels of Chinese aggression in the region.⁴⁵

On 16 October 1964, one year after the report, Beijing announced the detonation of its first atomic device. The Chinese government also stated that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities was driven entirely by defense motivations and breaking the nuclear monopoly of the two superpowers. It also stressed the importance of the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ In effect, this statement confirmed the State Department's prediction that Beijing would act as a responsible nuclear power. Although it is not possible

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to say with certainty how Iran will behave if it crosses the nuclear threshold, the issues discussed in this article indicate that it too will behave in a pragmatic fashion. The fact that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has recently referred to nuclear weapons as “a symbol of destruction whose use if forbidden”⁴⁷ is also reassuring.

In response to the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson swiftly issued the following statement:

This explosion comes as no surprise to the United States Government. It has been fully taken into account in planning our own defense program and our own nuclear capability. Its military significance should not be overestimated. . . . Still more basic is the fact that if and when the Chinese Communists develop nuclear weapons systems, the free world nuclear strength will continue, of course, to be enormously greater. . . . The United States reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the United States to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression.⁴⁸

The United States should not disregard the relevance of the Chinese proliferation experience in the 1960s in dealing with the contemporary challenge posed by Iran. China's nuclear capabilities did not translate into the intolerable military problems foreseen by President Kennedy but may actually have facilitated rapprochement between the two countries.⁴⁹ Mao Zedong was also a much more ruthless and revolutionary figure than Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mao actively supported anti-Western insurgencies all over the world, allowed millions of his own countrymen to perish in his mismanaged attempts at reform, and even spoke openly about his willingness to destroy half of the world for communism to triumph. Despite this track record, the desire for self-preservation and national survival has seen China armed with nuclear weapons successfully deterred from using them for more than 40 years.

As with China in the 1960s, if Iran does cross the nuclear threshold, there will be a massive asymmetry between Tehran's nuclear capabilities and those of Washington. Both the United States and Israel have the capability to inflict what can only be described as unacceptable damage against Iran in retaliation for its first use of nuclear weapons. However, when a new state enters the nuclear club, it is *essential* that deterrent relationships are quickly established. In 1964 President Johnson *communicated* to the Chinese a *credible* threat that the United States had an “enormously greater” nuclear *capability* and that he was willing, if necessary, to use

force to respond to Chinese aggression. This threat set the parameters for a deterrent relationship that has now been successful for more than four decades and ought to provide valuable guidance for the current US government. President Obama is clearly attempting to establish a relationship with the Iranians and dissuade them from pursuing their nuclear weapons ambitions. If these measures to halt the nuclear program fail, then at least they will have laid the framework through which deterrent threats can be communicated. President Obama would be wise to draw on some of the more assertive rhetoric of his predecessor, George W. Bush. He should make clear that the United States is committed to responding to Iranian aggression, be it direct or indirect, and ensure the United States maintains the capabilities to make deterrent threats credible. In the long term, a nuclear-armed Iran may even encourage a more cautious foreign policy from Tehran and pave the way for a more balanced and constructive engagement with the West. **SSQ**

Notes

1. News Conference 52, Pres. John F. Kennedy, State Department Auditorium, Washington, DC, 21 March 1963, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Press+Conferences/003POFO5Pressconference52_03211963.htm.
2. Cited in "Remarks by Les Aspin, Counterproliferation Initiative, Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 18, December 1993," <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm>.
3. Anthony Capaccio and Nicholas Johnston, "Obama Nuclear Policy Focuses on Terrorism Threat," *Bloomberg News Bulletin*, 7 April 2010, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid=apXunD6dMZJE>.
4. Expression used by Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS) in debating the FY-96 National Defense Authorization Act, 6 September 1995, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1995/s950906a.htm>.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, memorandum, 26 June 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. 22, *China; Korea; Japan*, doc. 36, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d36>.
6. Nicholas D. Kristof, "'Mao': The Real Mao," *New York Times*, 23 October 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/books/review/23cover.html?pagewanted=print>.
7. Cited in Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 175.
8. William E. Colby to McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the president, memorandum, 19 September 1963, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB38/document9.pdf>.
9. "An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities," paper prepared in the Policy Planning Council, Washington, DC, 14 April 1964, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/other/frus_30_025.htm.
10. Ibid.

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11. "Bush Warns Iran of 'all options'," *BBC News*, 11 June 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7447428.stm>. Considerations of preventive war have also been made public by Israeli officials. During a symposium in Herzliya in February 2009, Defense Minister Ehud Barak stated that "Israel's policy is clear: we do not take any option off the table with regards to Iran's nuclear program." Ofri Ilani, "Barak: Time Needed to Deal with Iran Slipping through Our Fingers," *Haaretz*, 25 February 2009, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/1066855.html>.

12. Tom Baldwin, "US Pours Cold Water over Hopes of Iran Deal," *Times* (London), 30 January 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article5614805.ece.

13. Norman Podhoretz, "The Case for Bombing Iran," *Commentary*, June 2007, 21, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-case-for-bombing-iran-10882>.

14. *Ibid.*, 20. Podhoretz is not alone in his comparison of these two leaders. In April 2009 Knesset speaker Reuven Rivlin drew the same analogy stating that "the hate expressed by the President of Iran is a warning to all humanity [that] the world [had] witnessed the return of Adolf Hitler." He then went on to say that although "this time he has a beard and speaks Persian . . . [his] words are the same words and the aspirations are the same aspirations and the determination to find the weapons to achieve those aspirations is the same menacing determination." "The New Hitler Speaks Persian," *Haaretz*, April 21, 2009, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1079945.html>.

15. Bernard Lewis, "At War: Does Iran Have Something in Store?" *Wall Street Journal*, 22 August 2006, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008768>.

16. Ali Alfoneh, "Ahmadinejad versus the Clergy," American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, August 2008, 1, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080820_No523414MEOg.pdf. In one hadith the fifth Shiite Imam predicted that when the Mahdi returns, "like Muhammad, the God messenger, he will destroy everything that was before and resume Islam from the beginning." In other hadiths it is claimed that the Mahdi will kill two-thirds of the global population in order to "clean the earth from non-believers and deniers." Cited in Mehdi Khalaji, *Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy*, Policy Focus no. 79 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2008), 3–4, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus79Final.pdf>.

17. *Ibid.*

18. James Fallows, "Will Iran Be Next?" *Atlantic*, December 2004, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200412/fallows>.

19. Investigations by the IAEA have traced Iran's clandestine nuclear activities to 1985. According to Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt this suggests that "Iran has been engaged in less of a nuclear race than a nuclear saunter." They share the concern that preventive military action may reverse this trend and cause the Iranian leadership to assign a higher priority to the program than it has previously enjoyed. Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, *The Last Resort: Consequences of Preventive Military Action against Iran*, Policy Focus no. 84 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2008), 6, <http://www.theisraelproject.org/atf/cf/%7B84DC5887-741E-4056-8D91-A389164BC94E%7D/POLICYFOCUS84.PDF>. Clawson and Eisenstadt also point out that when Iraq attacked Iran in the 1980 air raids on Tehran, other major cities did in fact cause the population to rally behind the regime and even the former Shah's son volunteered to fight (although his offer was refused). *Ibid.*, 8.

20. Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Threat from Iran," Prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 29 September 2005, 6, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/pollack/20050929.pdf>.

21. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* (Washington: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2009), 116, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf>.

22. According to Mehdi Khalaji, anti-Israeli rhetoric appeared in Iran for the first time in the 1940s from the Fadayeen-e Islam, an Islamic fundamentalist group committed to the elimination of the “enemies of God.” Khalaji, *Apocalyptic Politics*, 24, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus79Final.pdf>.

23. Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger, and Shmuel Bachar, “Iranian Nuclear Decision Making under Ahmadinejad,” Paper prepared for the Eighth Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel’s National Security, 20–23 January 2008, (draft), 16, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/Uploads/2814ShmuelBarIranianAhmadinejad.pdf>.

24. Andrew Terrill, “Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff,” *Parameters*, Spring 2009, 85–86.

25. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Iran, Israel and Nuclear War,” PowerPoint presentation to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007, slide 6, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071119_iran.is&nuclearwar.pdf.

26. Ibid.

27. Jake Tapper, “Pennsylvania’s Six Week Primary Ends Tonight,” *ABC News*, 22 April 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Vote2008/story?id=4698059>.

28. Cited in John Simpson and Tira Schubert, *Lifting the Veil: Life in Revolutionary Iran* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), 305.

29. *Iran: Time for a New Approach*, report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations co-chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Gates (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), 27, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iran_TF.pdf.

30. Ibid., 27–28.

31. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington: Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), 173, http://www.npr.org/documents/2006/apr/state_dept_terrorism_report.pdf.

32. Islamist groups include Hezbollah, HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Islamic militants in Afghanistan. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Kurdish Workers Party, and Iraqi militias are among the secular radicals supported by Iran. Anti-Israeli groups such as Hezbollah and HAMAS also provide the Iranian regime a conduit for fueling the Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of diverting attention from itself.

33. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008*, 10.

34. Scott Sagan drew attention to this possibility during a Herzliya Conference in Israel in February 2009, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22412/Sagan_talk_Herzeliya_Conference_020409.pdf.

35. M. J. Kristo et al., *Model Action Plan for Nuclear Forensics and Nuclear Attribution*, UCRL-TR-202675 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, 2004). <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/305453.pdf>.

36. Cited in David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “US Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism,” *New York Times*, 8 May 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/washington/08nuke.html?ref=world>.

37. “Remarks by the National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, to the Center for International Security and Cooperation,” Stanford University, 8 February 2008, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080211-6.html>. In October the same year Defense secretary Robert Gates, who continued to fill this role within the current Obama administration, also stated before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that “the United States will hold any state,

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terrorist group or other non-state actor or individual fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction—whether by facilitating, financing or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.” Cited in Thom Shanker, “Gates Gives Rationale for Expanded Deterrence,” *New York Times*, 29 October 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/washington/29gates.html>.

38. Cited in Michael Levi, *Detering State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism*, Council on Foreign Relations Special Report no. 39 (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, September 2008), 8, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Nuclear_Deterrence_CSR39.pdf.

39. John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, (1988), 13–14. He later stated that his intention was “to let the Communist authorities understand that, in the absence of satisfactory progress, we intended to move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons, and would no longer be responsible for confining hostilities to the Korean Peninsula.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (London: Heinemann Press, 1963), 181.

40. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 25.

41. Henry Sokolski, *Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2006), 30. Sokolski also points out that as well as deterring a preemptive invasion, Pyongyang’s presumed nuclear capabilities actually led to offers of economic and security benefits. Statements from Iranian officials indicate that Iran has aspirations to emulate such a diplomatic situation. For example Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi has stated that “we are ready for discussions and negotiations, but we need to know what benefits the Islamic Republic would get from them.” Cited in *ibid.*, 57.

42. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, 36.

43. Cited in Chen Kane, “Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse,” Middle East Brief no. 5, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, May 2006, 3, <http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB5.pdf>.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Robert H. Johnson, *A Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation and Nuclear Capability: Major Conclusions and Key Issues*, report prepared by the State Department Policy Planning Council, 15 October 1963, declassified 28 November 1997, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB38/document10.pdf>.

46. Chi Wang, “China’s Nuclear Programs and Policies,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1983, 18.

47. “Khamenei: Nuclear Bombs Illegal and Harem,” [*sic*] *Islam Times*, 20 February 2010, <http://www.islamtimes.org/vdcgt39x.ak9zw4j5ra.html>.

48. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device,” 16 October 1964, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26615>.

49. In 1969 the United States and China initiated a dialogue that had developed into an unspoken “anti-Soviet alliance” by 1972.

Hegemonic Disruption

The Asymmetric Challenge to US Leadership

William W. Newmann

In the absence of a “peer competitor,” and before second-tier powers begin any serious “hard balancing,” asymmetric challenges from nonstate actors may be the greatest threat the United States faces in the short and medium term. From a systemic or great-power perspective, the absence of serious rivalries indicates that the “unipolar moment” has stretched into a unipolar era whose foundation rests on US ideas, military superiority, and economic strength.¹ Stable is not synonymous with static, however, as recent events in the Middle East prove. This article presents a “hegemonic disruption model” that supplements traditional realist theories of great-power rivalry and hegemonic competition with an alternative scenario in which the United States faces a transnational network of nonstate actors that derive much of their power and policy from political/religious radical Islamic sources. Though the impact of al-Qaeda and its associated movements (AQAM) is well documented, it is also generally ignored by international relations theory and, in particular, realist theory.² The fact that it is not a unified movement or single entity, not backed by a nation-state champion, and only semi-allied with nationalist but radical Islamic movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah does not lessen its potential significance. The hegemonic disruption model places the complex “global war on terror” or “long war” into a larger strategic and theoretical perspective.

This article argues that nonstate actors and ideology are strategically significant elements of the international system in the twenty-first century and that AQAM should be seen as strategic actors. Their strategic significance lies in the potential of transnational forces to create instability on

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a national or regional basis in key areas. Such instability can undermine US hegemonic goals in these areas, essentially pulling them out of the hegemonic orbit. In short, US unipolarity or hegemony can be seriously threatened by nonstate actors, not only peer competitors.

The hegemonic disruption model flows out of existing realist theory—power is still the coin of the realm, but new actors know how to wield it. This does not undermine realism. It adapts theories such as balance of power and power transition to a globalized world in which nonstate actors and ideological conflict have a role to play in the evolution of power relationships in the international system. Traditionally, these theories focus on the way in which great powers vie for leadership, with balance-of-power theories predicting that second-tier powers will balance against a unipolar power and power transition theories describing how challengers to a hegemon will develop. Realist insistence on nation-states as the only unit of analysis and the exclusion of ideology as an element of power hampers the ability of the paradigm to explain current developments in the international system. AQAM wields both hard- and soft-power assets in ways that affect the strategic calculations of powerful nation-states. Understanding the impact of nonstate actors and ideology is crucial for a nation such as the United States that has hegemonic aspirations based on a desire to maintain its power and spread its ideology.³

The model has three elements. First, nonstate actors and ideology need to be incorporated into realist thinking on hegemony and rivalry. Theories that reject the relevancy of nonstate actors in the international system suggest that the United States should wait until AQAM has control of a state and then add it to the threat matrix. The ideological challenge of these nonstate actors should not be separated from notions of power competition. Just as in the Cold War, this ideological movement is competing for power against the US hegemonic ideology.

Second, the model of hegemonic disruption examines the ways in which AQAM's strategy and impact has an influence on the international system. AQAM can be seen as a twenty-first-century version of the Cold War-era communist wars of national liberation backed by powers such as the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China. It has been described as a loosely organized "global insurgency,"⁴ a rejectionist bloc of organizations who rebel against the prevailing political dynamics nationally, regionally, and internationally. However, it is unique in that it does not require a state sponsor to maintain a significant attack tempo or to propa-

gate its ideology. The sponsorship of a nation-state champion that supplies weapons, funds, sanctuary, and a message has been replaced by the realities of globalization—the diffusion of technology and the ease of travel, financing, and communication. Fundamentally, the nation-state has lost its monopoly on coercive diplomacy.

Third, the transnational threat is explored through two radical Islamic groups, AQAM's power-projection capability and strategy as well as the rise of radical Islam in Somalia where a failed-state crisis eventually gave birth to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and eventually al-Shabab, an AQAM-affiliated movement. The cumulative impact of nonstate actors who reject US hegemony, both ideologically and in terms of US power, can become a significant strategic challenge as these actors square off with local or regional US allies in destabilizing terrorist campaigns, insurgencies, or civil war. The nature of these asymmetric threats is based on neoclassical realist assumptions—transnational and nationalist movements are power seekers. In this sense, nonstate actors are balancing against or challenging the hegemon through proselytizing and/or violence, a type of asymmetric balancing.⁵

Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of the model—a new strategic landscape in which US hegemony is challenged not just by potential peer competitors and regional powers but also by radical movements that sow instability as they defy US attempts to build national and regional orders based on its hegemonic ideals. To maintain its role in the international system, the United States must respond to a range of threats: instability in a major state, instability in a minor state, hostile governments that emerge peacefully, and seizures of powers by radical movements. Though Iraq and Afghanistan are obvious cases, AQAM and al-Shabab are more representative examples of the asymmetric problems the United States may encounter, especially after the revolutions in the Middle East. Perhaps most critically, recent uprisings in the Middle East, though in the name of democracy, may lead to an era where ideologies and movements compete for power on a regional and national basis. A post-authoritarian era in the Middle East may be similar to the postcolonial era in Asia and Africa when the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) jockeyed for influence. In this case, however, the United States and its allies may face off against the AQAM network and its desire to penetrate and influence the direction of change in the region. While we hope that political change in the region remains as peaceful as Tahrir Square, the current conflicts in

Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, as well as terrorist campaigns in Somalia and Pakistan, are potentially visions of the future. From a policy perspective, the United States may be realizing the implications of its ambitions to deter all rivals and remake the world. Just as China's rise is fueled by its acceptance of the US hegemonic norms of free-trade capitalism, US-sponsored globalization empowers nonstate actors. In an ironic twist, success in spreading its hegemonic ideology creates threats to US power.

Expanding Realist Thought: Nonstate Actors and Ideology

Traditional neorealist and power transition theories are systemic or structural realist theories, theories that focus on the relationships between the powerful states within the system. The nation-state is the relevant actor. Ideology is either ignored or discounted as a factor in great-power struggles. The question of how unipolar or hegemonic powers might be challenged is a question answered by an assessment of the response of other powerful states, who are acting based upon their need for power or their fear for their own survival. The addition of nonstate actors and ideology into the model is almost a necessity for adapting these models to the current threat environment.

Traditional Analysis: Great-Power Rivalry

As the Cold War ended, scholars and policymakers alike turned their attention to the meaning of a unipolar world led by the United States. Unipolarity was almost a given, but in most cases it was viewed as a temporary phenomenon.⁶ The great mystery centered on what state might become the peer competitor for the United States and when it might be ready to reshape the balance of power or confront US hegemony.⁷ Neorealist theory predicts that states will balance against a unipolar power. In an anarchic structure, the unmatched power of the United States will be seen as a threat to second-tier powers, who will act to balance against it to protect themselves and maximize their power in the international system.⁸ As states failed to balance against the United States in the predicted manner, proponents and critics of neorealist theories adapted the basic theory to the post-Cold War reality. Offensive realists argued that balancing behavior would eventually begin; in an anarchic world, nations balance against concentrations of power. The end of the Cold War did

not bring a change in the basic structure and processes of international affairs.⁹ However, balancing behavior may not be immediate, particularly when the unipolar power has such an advantage in relative power. Several scholars developed a model of “soft balancing,” a sort of neo-neorealism in which states essentially hedge against hegemonic power by increasing their ability to act independently of the hegemon while carefully avoiding the direct challenges—hard balancing—that balance-of-power theory predicts.¹⁰ From the perspective of soft balancing, states are already balancing against US hegemony in a cautious but identifiable way. A further spin on balancing was a valuable case study–driven model suggesting that nations generally “under balance” by failing to recognize and respond to growing threats.¹¹ Defensive realists argued that balancing against the United States depended on US policies; if nations perceived US unipolar or hegemonic power as a threat to their interests, they would balance against that threat.¹²

In contrast, scholars who favor power transition theories or hegemonic realism consider unipolarity to be both stable and durable in the medium term. Preponderance of power within a hegemon deters second-tier states from engaging in the types of great-power rivalry that might lead to war. A state may also benefit from the policies of the hegemon, concluding that balancing is not in the national interest.¹³ Changes within states, such as demographic shifts, rapid industrial growth, or political developments leading to more efficient mobilization of state resources allow second-tier states to catch up to the hegemon, and that may take decades. A rough balance of power between hegemon and challenger or the perception that parity is on the horizon may lead to great-power war.¹⁴ Initial models of the theory consider powerful but dissatisfied challengers as those who begin wars; however, other scholars argue that empirically it is the hegemon who is more likely to initiate preventive war in an effort to crush a challenger before it reaches full strength.¹⁵ The failure of states to balance against the United States in the decade and a half since the fall of the USSR is not a challenge to the theory. States have simply not caught up to the United States yet, and it does not yet see the second-tier powers as true threats.

Analysis from either perspective begins with a similar post–Cold War consensus on unipolarity—the United States is the only power in its class. Neorealist, neoclassical realist, and power transition theories may disagree on when and how unipolarity may come to an end; however, they all agree

that the challenger will be a peer competitor nation-state or coalition of powerful states.

The Relevance of Nonstate Actors

In traditional realist theories, the nation-state is not the only actor that exists, but it is the actor whose power capabilities define the international system and its stability; therefore, it is the only actor that truly matters.¹⁶ That assumption has become a point of contention, particularly after the swift end of the Cold War; confounding neorealist analysis, stable bipolarity had collapsed into unipolarity without a shot being fired.¹⁷ Neoclassical realist ideas emerged in response to this theoretical dilemma. Scholars combined the systems view of Waltz with the state- and individual-level variables of Morgenthau.¹⁸ In contrast to neorealism that focused on the ways in which states responded to similar threats or external constraints in nearly identical ways, neoclassical realism attempts to explain the variations in state foreign policy when faced with similar external constraints or threats.¹⁹ The answers are rooted in the interaction of domestic-level and system-level variables, the ways in which ideas and nonstate actors influence foreign policy decisions of nation-states who face systemic threats or opportunities.

Even in neoclassical realism, however, the importance of nonstate actors is in the ways they influence the foreign policy decisions of nation-states. The hegemonic disruption model takes this one step further by examining how nonstate actors act autonomously of nation-states, in effect pursuing their own foreign policy goals and political strategies in the interests of their movement. The theory is still realist, however. As described below, these nonstate actors do pursue power and make strategic calculations based on an assessment of global and regional power relationships. Relaxing the assumptions that nation-states are the only relevant unit of analysis allows realist models a theoretical flexibility necessary to explain a world in which asymmetric challenges are alarming and great-power challenges muted.

Already nonstate actors and ideology have been given a prominent place in numerous research agendas. They are generally seen as relevant to international affairs in several ways. First, nonstate actors are sometimes seen as the defining variables in the formation and implementation of state foreign policy. The classic studies of bureaucratic politics and organizational processes considered foreign policy to be the result of rivalries between

individuals and organizations rather than rational calculations of national interest.²⁰ Recent studies add another layer to this by focusing on the growth of “outsourcing” to private contractors in US foreign and defense policy in areas such as aid projects and overseas security, which can divorce implantation from policy intent in unintended ways.²¹ Second, collective action by nongovernmental organizations (NGO) composed of private individuals who work collectively across nation-state boundaries is an important area of study. Epistemic communities, networks of “knowledge-based experts,” contribute to state behavior through the ways they conceptualize specific issue areas, such as trade or climate. They may also have an impact on the issue itself as international epistemic communities develop common approaches to key issues, common approaches that seep into the decision-making processes of many states through the advisory process.²² On an even greater scale, scholars have examined the ability of NGOs to redirect and redefine IGO (intergovernmental organization) agendas. These studies see the rise of NGO power as a phenomenon that ultimately can redefine the characteristics of state sovereignty. Ethnic diasporas have been studied for their influence on their states of origin and the foreign policies of their adoptive states.²³ Third, a large range of nonstate transnational actors play prominent roles in the international system. Classic studies of the 1970s examined the power of multinational corporations, leading to a broad range of research on how financial markets, corporate cartels, and even transnational organized crime have been able to exert significant impact on states’ foreign policies.²⁴

Fourth, and most importantly, a growing literature on social movements, civic activists, and networks details how the combined power of citizens can significantly affect state domestic and foreign policies. More recent focus has centered on the power of what are sometimes called “transnational advocacy networks” to alter the way IGOs and states deal with issues such as the environment,²⁵ human rights,²⁶ security issues such as missile deployments,²⁷ and the use of antipersonnel land mines.²⁸ Scholars argue that the network form may be the next stage of societal organization, as globalization and information technology transform the fundamental ways humans interact.²⁹ Fifth, and related to all of the above, is the changing nature of communications. From “hacktivism,” to social media that spurred movements in Iran and Egypt, to cyber terrorism, the information and communications revolution empowers nonstate actors.

The extent of this empowerment and how well governments can keep up is the subject of growing debate.³⁰

In these models nonstate actors, however influential, are still essentially noteworthy only for their ability to influence the decisions of states. They may be independent actors who change state and IGO policies, but they are still subordinate actors in the larger systemic issues of power competition. The hegemonic disruption model goes one step further by examining the ways in which nonstate actors can independently challenge nation-states.

The Relevance of Ideology

Ideology is typically discounted as a variable in traditional realist theories. The interests of states in neorealism are defined as the pursuit of power (offensive realism) or security (defensive realism). Ideological goals are secondary, if they matter at all.³¹ Power transition theorists view national interest as influenced by system- and state-level factors such as state power capabilities, wealth, cultural welfare goals, and the search for peace. These are generally defined by ruling elites and individual leaders, but ideology or ideas are not key factors in defining interests. A nation's level of economic and, consequently, political development is the critical factor in the definition of its interests.³² For the purposes of this article, ideology is defined as the principles used to order societies in terms of the relationships between government and the governed, and between the nation-state and the international system. This is a broad definition based on the theories surveyed below and includes judgments on the social, political, and economic norms of society and the international system.

In contrast to the treatment of nonstate actors, nonrealist theories have often incorporated ideology into theories of power competition. Descriptions of the Cold War as a titanic struggle between the forces of liberal-democracy and communism dominated the public debate on both sides of the East-West divide, even as the scholarly community gravitated toward realist theories that transformed the United States and the USSR into power- or security-seeking mirror images.³³ Variants of the "English School" focus on the role of ideas; rather than anarchy defining the international system, hierarchy based on "common values," a "common set of rules," or the "working of a common set of institutions" defines international society.³⁴ In this sense, the balance of power is influenced by the differences in the ideologies of powerful states.³⁵ Constructivists have developed theories that explain the national interests of states as based

on states' national identities,³⁶ or the way international society socializes states,³⁷ or the ways in which the preferred social orders of powerful states may clash.³⁸

Ideology again emerged as a crucial variable in post–Cold War debates on the shape of the next international system. Variants of democratic peace theory are based on the notion that ideology matters: liberal-democracies are less likely to fight each other, and liberal democratic ideologies are judged to be inherently less threatening than other ideologies, engendering fewer reasons to balance against a liberal hegemon among liberal-democratic and non-liberal-democratic states.³⁹ Others speculated that future great-power rivalries will be based on ideological conflict. Liberal-democracy faced challenges from religious nationalism,⁴⁰ or soft authoritarianism,⁴¹ or a wholesale rejection of Western values, ideologies, and an international system based on those traditions.⁴² The two most notorious debates on the international system and future great-power conflict after the Cold War were both based on the notion that ideology matters. The debate over the “end of history” argued that ideological conflict among the great powers had ended.⁴³ The potential for a “clash of civilizations” reflected the possibility that new divisions in the world would be based on culture and civilization, key components in political ideologies. These civilizations would begin to clash at the micro level over control of nation-states and at the macro level as national champions for each civilization form alliances and square off.⁴⁴

These models describe the ways ideas influence the foreign policies of states or the clashes of states or the clashes within states. The hegemonic disruption model builds on these notions by making nonstate actors more autonomous. When nonstate actors reject the ideas of the hegemon, they have the ability to challenge the hegemon in strategically meaningful ways.

The Model of Hegemonic Disruption

The model of hegemonic disruption is based on three elements: the importance of nonstate actors, the relevance of ideology in the international system, and the strategic nature of the asymmetric threat from nonstate actors today. These ideas flow from a basic observation of hegemony in theory and reality. US unipolarity is the basic strategic reality of the early post–Cold War decades. Whether this represents empire, hegemony, or something else entirely and what the United States could or should do

with such power is a subject of debate. A key distinction in sorting out these terms is to consider power in terms of material resources and power in terms of influence. A preponderance of resources qualifies as unipolarity, but hegemony requires a preponderance of global influence.⁴⁵ There is a serious debate between those who argue that global hegemony is a myth and that only regional hegemony is possible,⁴⁶ and those who contend that the United States has sought global or “extra-regional” hegemony since at least the end of World War II.⁴⁷ This is less of an argument than it first seems. Whether global hegemony is possible and whether states seek it are two different issues. Realism suggests that global hegemony, even if possible, is fleeting; states will balance against the aspiring hegemon, or a single challenger will emerge. Unipolarity, even hegemony, is an interregnum before India, China, or the European Union catch up and defy the United States individually or collectively.

Great powers either seek to change or maintain the structure of the international system. Classical realists,⁴⁸ most scholars of neorealism,⁴⁹ and power transition theorists⁵⁰ contend that great powers are typically status quo oriented, seeking to maintain established power relationships that favor their state. Offensive realists may argue the opposite: great powers are power seekers, rather than security or stability seekers, acting to increase their power over other states.⁵¹ The United States is somewhat exceptional, a revisionist hegemon, often behaving as if it were a revolutionary power bent on changing the status quo. From Wilson’s Fourteen Points through the Bush Doctrine and into the Obama presidency, an implicit and sometimes even explicit element of US policy has been the notion that a rule-based world order, the spread of democracy, and the expansion of free trade are the long-term solutions to US national security threats. The United States is not only protecting its own national security, it is also engaging in the hegemonic task of world-order building.⁵² Since the end of World War II, US foreign policy has rested, in part, on the assumption that a lack of US leadership in the interwar period was one of the causes of the depression and the war; only US economic, political, and military leadership could restabilize the world system.⁵³ In this sense, the Cold War was not just a realist struggle between two great powers, but also an ideological struggle between two domestic systems.⁵⁴

The hegemonic disruption model adapts traditional realism’s observations about hegemony to recognize that nonstate actors who oppose the power and ideology of the hegemon are willing to use violence to back up

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their opposition to US hegemonic goals and that they have the power projection capabilities to use that violence in a coherently coercive manner. As the nation-state loses its monopoly on global influence and coercive diplomacy, transnational movements such as AQAM and its regional allies like al-Shabab become relevant to the evolution of hegemony in the international system.⁵⁵

Table 1 compares power transition, balance of power, and hegemonic disruption. An era of unipolarity or an era during which a nation makes a bid for global hegemony is the starting point. Revisionist global-order-building policies dominate the hegemon's agenda; however, on a regional basis it faces ideological and military challenges from groups that reject its power and its ideology. These asymmetric rivals could successfully prevent the hegemon from achieving its revisionist goals. The result is not great-power war or major rebalancing of relationships between the great powers, as in the other models, but a clear waning of hegemonic influence in at-risk regions as the costs of hegemony increase and the ability of the hegemon to enforce its rules decreases.

Table 1. Models of power competition

Model:		Phases:			
Power Transition	hegemonic war	➔	winner becomes hegemon	➔	hegemonic decline; challenger rises
				➔	hegemonic war
Balance of Power	stable balance of power	➔	aggression or imbalance of power	➔	balancing by great powers
				➔	rebalancing or war
Hegemonic Disruption	unipolarity or bid for global hegemony	➔	revisionist hegemony (order building)	➔	nonstate actors present ideological challenge to hegemon and its regional allies
				➔	asymmetric disruption of hegemony

Transnational Radical Islamist Groups

The threat of transnational radical Islamic groups is illustrated here through two aspects. First, AQAM's ability to spread its ideology, build a network, and use each of these strengths to create the capability for global power projection is one of its unique features. Second, AQAM's ties to local groups, such as al-Shabab in Somalia, may be its greatest power.

AQAM on its own is not strong enough to impose revolutions from outside a nation. Its failure in Iraq is evidence of this.⁵⁶ However, its ability to form alliances with local radical Islamic movements, merging national and regional goals with transnational ambitions, gives it staying power and perhaps the ability to gain a foothold in nations and regions.

AQAM's Power Projection

Radical Islam has been viewed in many ways: as part of a classically defined "social movement" that spreads from nation to nation,⁵⁷ as a theocratic response to Western-imposed secularism,⁵⁸ or as a general "anti-imperial" response to Westernization and Western power.⁵⁹ It has also been viewed as another in a series of "revolutionary waves" through which an idea is ignited by a central revolution and then catches fire in other nations as the revolutionary idea is exported.⁶⁰ Radical Islam is at times all of these, depending on what level of analysis guides the research strategy.⁶¹

Radical Islam can be categorized by its ideological nature (Sunni or Shiite) and its goals (transnational or nationalist). This study focuses on the Sunni transnational variant, though a larger research design could add the Shiite variant as an additional case study. However, it is slightly different in nature because it is still primarily state sponsored (Iran). The difference between transnational and nationalist movements is important and addressed below.

The linkages between radical Sunni movements are based in an often shaky consensus on a shared ideology that seeks to end the separation of church and state in Muslim societies, to return to "true" or "original" Islam, to impose a near-medieval version of Islamic law, to overthrow ruling elites who do not share their ideology, and to remove Western influence from society and Western power from their regions. The Sunni variant, based in Salafi or Wahhabi thought, traces its roots along several interlinked paths and includes followers of the beliefs of Ahmed ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328, Damascus), Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92, Arabia), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935, Ottoman-controlled Syria), Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–79, founder of the Jama'at-i-Islami party in Pakistan), Hasan al-Banna (1906–49) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), founder and onetime leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.⁶²

The transnational and nationalist division is equally important and relates to two issues. First, AQAM's goal is to rebuild the old Islamic caliphate, an empire under al-Qaeda's control that would stretch across Africa

and Asia. In this sense, its goal of eliminating the nation-state system in the Islamic world runs headlong into the goals of groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, who seek to gain control in a nation-state. It is unlikely that after having fought to achieve power in Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, respectively, these movements would happily turn control over to the Saudis and Egyptians who lead al-Qaeda. Second, al-Qaeda sees democracy as un-Islamic, giving leadership, power, and secular decision authority to man that belongs rightly to God. Hezbollah and Hamas have both participated in elections, and that fact has created some tension between AQAM and Hamas.⁶³ Analysts should not assume that different radical Islamic movements have the same strategic goals (power in a nation-state vs. power in a region) because they use the same style of tactical operations (terrorist attacks). Viewing radical Islam as monolithic or entirely linked to al-Qaeda is a mistake similar to the one made in the early years of the Cold War when Western analysts perceived a monolithic communist threat in which Russia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba, among others, were inseparable allies, working in coordination to achieve a single goal. As in that case, radical Islam contains a diverse set of movements that already have experienced tensions over goals and the strategies to achieve those goals. Importantly, this suggests that the level of threat from each of these movements is different and the way to combat each will also be different.

AQAM is unique because it has achieved something no other terrorist organization has: global power projection. Its ability to exert that power even in the face of the US-led “war on terrorism” and the threat from its affiliates to seize power in at-risk nations makes AQAM a geopolitical factor rather than simply a critical global law enforcement problem. How AQAM can help regional allies make a bid at seizing power is illustrated by the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and al-Shabab in Somalia.

In the context of neorealist theory, the form of terrorist asymmetric warfare used by al-Qaeda is a strategy based on its weak position in the international system. It cannot directly challenge the United States because it does not have the resources; it uses what methods it has—terrorist forms of coercion—to balance against US power. In the context of power transition models, AQAM is a rising asymmetric power that has taken advantage of technological change and rising capability to present a challenge to the hegemon. For movements that use terrorism, power is both a means and an end. As seen below, they all seek a share of power, either nationally or regionally. Analysis of their strategies suggests that they have concluded

that their political goals are unachievable unless they can demonstrate a clear capability to exert power in a significant and sustainable way—through the ability to conduct terrorist strikes. Having once proven that power capability, coercion becomes a tool to force their targets into concession or surrender.⁶⁴

AQAM is also a part of a trend of the information age and globalization. It is a network-style organization rather than a hierarchical organization. Its structure is not based on command and control from a central headquarters. It is a virtual organization in many ways—decentralized, with autonomous and entrepreneurial units, who may or may not have even loose connections to the central hub of the organization. Linkages to AQAM are temporary; ideology may even be the only commonality; finance and training may be the only functional relationships. AQAM has been seen as an international credit union for terrorism, while its regional affiliates have been seen as franchises (carrying the international brand, but locally owned and operated); its leaders may “lead” only in terms of inspiration and example. It has built an organization with global power projection by taking advantage of the information revolution in communications (for organizational structure and publicity), the ease of travel in a globalized age, and the availability of technologies for weaponry. In both senses ideology is a force multiplier: it recruits, unifies, and sustains disparate organizations and individuals into a decentralized hydra. Al-Qaeda’s ideology serves as an alternative ideology to the one that underpins US hegemony. It combines a medieval Islam with anticolonialism, Pan-Islamism and Americanism, and antisecularism.⁶⁵ Even if the actions of its many heads are uncoordinated, they have the same cumulative effect: weakening the United States and its allies.

The hegemonic disruption model considers scenarios short of radical Islam taking root in a peer competitor or AQAM creating a successor to the Islamic caliphate. A great power or large empire steeped in radical Islamic thought would likely behave in ways explained by traditional models of great-power rivalry. Hegemonic disruption examines the damage that can be done to US hegemony by an asymmetric threat.

AQAM’s asymmetric challenge to US hegemony is defined here as a threat of disruption. Disruption has several potential elements: propagation of an ideology that rejects the hegemonic ideology spread by the United States; terrorist campaigns against governments, organizations, and individuals that are US political or ideological allies; inspiration of

more traditional insurgencies on a national or regional basis; and the attempted seizure of power in nation-states.

Al-Qaeda's ultimate goal is to rebuild the old Islamic caliphate across Africa and Asia.⁶⁶ At its core the strategy seeks the removal of the regimes in the heart of the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Three elements of the strategy are important to the hegemonic disruption model: AQAM's global power projection, including its decision to attack the United States; terrorism as insurgency; and soft power.

AQAM's global power projection is based on strategic calculation. The one key obstacle to al-Qaeda's success in the Middle East and Asia is US support for the targeted regimes. The innovative nature of the strategy rests in hitting the global enemy first and then moving on the local targets. In al-Qaeda's terms this means war with the "far enemy" before the "near enemy." The decision to do so has been and still remains controversial within AQAM.⁶⁷

A brief look at AQAM's activities illustrates its global power projection. According to US officials, AQAM has cells in over 70 nations. It has dedicated affiliates in several regions, including Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, al-Shabab in East Africa, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the Middle East, and even the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus operating out of Chechnya. Its allies in South Asia, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, are perhaps the most lethal organizations in the radical Islamic community.⁶⁸ Since 2004, well into the global efforts to defeat AQAM, to mid-2010, it has been able to launch 17,030 attacks spanning four continents with a total of 94,674 killed or wounded. Table 2 illustrates AQAM's sustainability. From 2005 through 2010, it has shown the ability to launch at least five attacks in two or more years in 11 nations, with several nations seeing attacks increase from under 10 to the hundreds (Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia). This data excludes attacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel perpetrated by nationalist-oriented groups such as Hamas. Even subtracting obviously escalating attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq, the number of attacks by AQAM affiliates has increased by a factor of 13 during that time span.⁶⁹ AQAM and its allies have been able to sustain a stream of attempted attacks on US targets, some that have succeeded in killing Americans (Abdulahakim Mujahid Muhammad's June 2009 attack in Little Rock and Nidal Hassan's November 2009 attack at Fort Hood, both linked to AQAP), while other potentially

more lethal attacks were foiled (Najibullah Zazi's September 2009 plan for attacking the New York subway system, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab's bombing attempt on 25 December 2009, AQAP's attempt to ship package bombs to the United States in October 2010, and Mohamed Osman Mohamud's attempt to bomb a Christmas-tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR, in November of 2010).⁷⁰

Table 2. Sunni radical attacks, 2005–June 2010
(excluding Israel, Gaza Strip, and West Bank)

Nations with 5 or more attacks in 2 or more years	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Afghanistan	264	525	657	1220	2107	3292
Algeria	30	49	43	50	75	34
Bangladesh	15	1	5	0	2	1
India	86	126	50	64	63	61
Iraq	284	334	513	466	528	891
Nigeria	0	0	1	0	8	31
Pakistan	9	22	117	1214	1319	818
Philippines	15	27	8	32	37	26
Russia	5	6	19	406	406	373
Somalia	1	4	75	425	438	562
Yemen	0	0	3	12	6	49
Other nations with fewer than 5 attacks	9 nations ¹ 20 attacks	7 nations ² 11 attacks	4 nations ³ 18 attacks	7 nations ⁴ 18 attacks	13 nations ⁵ 35 attacks	17 nations ⁶ 30 attacks
TOTAL	729 19 nations	1,105 17 nations	1,508 14 nations	3,907 17 nations	5,016 23 nations	6,155 41 nations
TOTAL excluding Afghanistan and Iraq	181	246	338	2,221	2,381	19,872

Data compiled from National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS), Office of the Director of National Intelligence, www.nctc.gov/wits/witsnextgen.html.

¹ Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Kingdom

² Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mali, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey

³ Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mauritania

⁴ China, Jordan, Lebanon, Niger, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey

⁵ Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, United States, Uzbekistan

⁶ Bangladesh, Denmark, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, Turkey

The importance of sustainability relates to a second key issue. While it is difficult to clearly identify a single strategy that belongs to a decentralized network such as AQAM, there is an identifiable theme that runs through much of AQAM's debates on strategy: AQAM's terrorism strategy seems to be based in the logic of insurgency. Even if only as a metaphor, considering AQAM's strategy in that context brings coherence to an under-

standing of its methods. At a geopolitical level, this strategy is a modified and updated version of classic Maoist guerrilla warfare.⁷¹ Classic insurgent warfare occurs in three phases. The first phase consists of political mobilization and organizational development. In phase two the insurgent cells attack enemy targets, while avoiding direct head-to-head military confrontation with the forces of the enemy. It is the guerrilla's ability to prove that the government cannot defeat it that ultimately leads the targeted government to fall, negotiate, or withdraw if it is intervening in another nation. The classic aphorism "a guerrilla wins by not losing" has proven itself in cases such as China, Algeria, and Vietnam. If support of the population is the ultimate prize, the people can be seen as a floating constituency that insurgents hope to detach from government alignment and swing toward the insurgent side.⁷² Conventional military operations mark phase three. Once the government has been politically weakened and its military effort has suffered commensurately, the insurgents can reorganize to capture the key cities, win the war, and establish the new order.

Captured AQAM documents and important writings of key strategists, when combined with the record of AQAM attacks, reveal a similar insurgent-style asymmetric concept of political-military victory. The parallels are striking and not coincidental. Radical Islamic literature contains discussions of Mao's guerrilla strategy, Western analyses of guerrilla warfare, and case studies of previous guerrilla insurgencies, such as in Algeria and Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s. Al-Qaeda's Internet magazines discuss the uses of "fourth generation" and "asymmetric" warfare.⁷³ Bin Laden's own 1996 fatwa emphasizes the success of small attacks in forcing the United States to withdraw from Beirut in 1983, Somalia in 1993, and Yemen in 2000.⁷⁴ Many writers discuss the weakness of the United States and the importance of revealing that weakness to the world.⁷⁵

Abu Bakr Naji's *Management of Savagery*, written in 2006, often reads like a primer on guerrilla warfare aimed at describing how terrorist attacks against the United States will eventually lead it to withdraw from activity in Islamic regions. Naji develops a theory on tactical and strategic operations that mirrors the events of Afghanistan and Somalia. The strategy consists of three stages.⁷⁶ Stage one uses the "power of vexation and exhaustion." This phase consists of political recruitment, cell building, and "vexation operations"—terrorist attacks. The goals of this phase include "exhausting the forces of the enemy," "draining" its capabilities, forcing it to "pay the price," and "making the enemy withdraw its forces," either by trapping it

in a “limited war” when it intervenes (as in Afghanistan) or by punishing it enough that it abandons its support for the targeted local regimes. The ultimate goal of this phase is to plunge a nation into chaos, undermining the government’s ability to maintain stability and the population’s faith in the government. Having achieved this goal, stage two, the “administration” or “management of savagery,” begins. During this stage, the radical Islamic organization essentially tries to bring order to the chaos it has created, an order based on its ideology. Along with social welfare, food and medicine, internal security, and continued vexation operations against remaining enemy forces, the radical organization will establish sharia law as the foundation of a new regime and religious indoctrination as a primary method for maintaining that order. Eventually stage three, “establishing the state,” begins when the new radical Islamic order is stable.

These writings also connect the notion of repeatedly striking the United States and its enemies to the notion of weakening US hegemony. Abu Musab al-Suri’s *Call to Global Islamic Resistance*, which has been compared to Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* or Lenin’s *What Is to Be Done?*, specifically describes the conflict as one between America’s desire for hegemony and jihadi organizations’ opposition to the international order and US domination of the third world.⁷⁷ Zawahiri also describes how the United States “monopolized its military superiority” following the fall of the USSR to impose its will on the rest of the world. However, he argues that the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan was a “training course” for taking on the United States and its “sole dominance over the globe.”⁷⁸ Naji also analyzes US and Soviet goals of world domination but quotes Paul Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* to warn that if the United States believes it can achieve world domination, it will overextend itself and collapse.⁷⁹ In short, as both Zawahiri and al-Suri emphasize, the battle is global and the United States is the main target.⁸⁰

Soft power is a key element of AQAM’s strategy. The importance of the Internet for popularizing the AQAM message, the care which AQAM takes to issue videos and media statements, and the fact al-Qaeda’s core structure consists of a media committee⁸¹ that reports to the Shura decision-making body make it clear that AQAM does understand that it is in a “war of ideas.” As in the case of insurgency, AQAM is acutely aware that ultimately the ability to gain support of the population will determine whether AQAM succeeds or fails. AQAM worries about alienating supporters if it becomes too brutal; Zawahiri himself explains it plainly: “more

than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media,” and “we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”⁸² Naji’s “stage of administration” is essentially an effort to use soft power to reestablish order and security for the population, an effort aimed directly at achieving legitimacy and popularity within society. In this sense, both AQAM and those who intend to fight it believe that terrorism in the twenty-first century is perhaps first and foremost information warfare.⁸³

Al-Shabab: A Model for AQAM?

The rise of radical Islam in Somalia is an example of the nature of the ideological threat to regional stability and of how AQAM found an opportunity to expand its influence. It is the tale of how radical Islamic organizations evolved out of the chaos into the Union of Islamic Courts and finally into al-Shabab, an organization that is seen as an integral part of the AQAM network.⁸⁴ Cases of direct US intervention, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, are unusual and less likely to be repeated. The Somalia case is featured here because it is the more likely scenario: the AQAM ally seems incapable of consolidating power, the US-backed government and regional alliances cannot seem to defeat the radical movement, and the United States chooses not to intervene. Instead the conflict seems an intractable threat to regional stability, a continuing humanitarian crisis, a source of spreading radicalism, and an obstacle to US regional and global goals.

Radical Islam became a factor in Somalia in the 1970s as its entry into the Arab League expanded ties with more conservative Arab states. Pres. Mohammed Siad Barre’s response to political Islam was to arrest and execute Islamic leaders.⁸⁵ The key development in the growth of radical Islam was the formation of the al-Itahaad al-Islaami (AIAI) during 1982–84 through the merger of two smaller groups. The anarchy that followed the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991—a multisided, clan-based civil war causing famine and political chaos—allowed radical Islam to flourish.⁸⁶ The AIAI transformed itself from a proselytizing organization into a militia-backed political force with the help of some returning Somali veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviets and the key defection of Somalia army colonel Hassan Dahir Aweys.⁸⁷ As lawlessness, clan violence, and famine took a toll, Islamic courts based in local mosques or subclan leadership began to spring up to restore order by mediating local disputes. The courts based their rulings on either local customary law (*xeer*) or Islamic law (sharia), both radical and moderate.

The civil war in Somalia was seen by Iran, Sudan, and AQAM as an opportunity for expanding the reach of their ideas and activities. The military regime in Sudan led by Gen Omar al-Bashir—steeped in Hassan al-Turabi's radical Islam by the early 1990s and already playing host to al-Qaeda—became the locus for these activities. A joint Sudanese-Iranian committee channeled funds to the Somali Islamic Union Party, while Iran created a radical militia, the Somali Revolutionary Guard. The ill-fated 1992 US/UN humanitarian intervention was a shot of adrenalin to AQAM. Islamists of all stripes saw the intervention as a Western attempt at re-colonization; its failure—and AQAM's alleged involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu—led to expanded AQAM ties to the AIAI and Gen Mohammed Farah Aidid's militia.⁸⁸

The AIAI had hopes to use Islam as the unifying force that would unify clans and end the Somali civil war, but this effort failed.⁸⁹ Ethiopian retaliation for AIAI terrorist attacks across the border led to its defeat as a fighting force in 1996. In 1998 Aweys created a southern Mogadishu court, Ifka Halane, based in radical Islam and described by some as less a court than a military base. However, further defeats by Ethiopia and Aidid's forces in 1998 and 1999 forced the AIAI to shift strategy toward local proselytizing and cooperation with the government, particularly the judiciary, through the Islamic courts movement.⁹⁰ When an internationally backed coalition government, the Transitional National Government (TNG), was formed in 2000, Aweys accepted a governmental role as head of a sharia implementation council. When the TNG collapsed in 2003, its successor, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), tried to crush the courts' movement and stabilize the nation, but failed.⁹¹

In response to the TFG's hostility toward Awey's courts, the Union of Islamic Courts was formed as a coalition between radical Islamic courts. A US-led attempt to build an anti-UIC movement based in secular militias and funded by local businesses pushed the conflict to a head. The US-backed Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism formed in February 2006 and almost immediately went into battle with UIC forces. The UIC defeated these militias, captured most of Mogadishu, and declared itself the new government of Somalia in June 2006.⁹²

The victory for radical Islamists was temporary; Ethiopian troops, backed by the United States, overthrew the UIC in December 2006, returning the TFG to power. After a period of disorganization, the UIC splintered into two key armed factions: Al-Shabab, the new AQAM-

linked terrorist organization, based in the youth wing of the UIC; and Hizbul Islam, Aweys' newest vehicle for his ambitions.⁹³ Following Ethiopia's withdrawal in January 2009, the TFG was led by moderate Islamist sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a former member of the UIC. Radical Islamists control most of southern Somalia, save the capital Mogadishu, where peacekeepers of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) keep the TFG afloat.

Not surprisingly, the number of terrorist attacks in Somalia attributed to radical Sunni Islamists has increased from one in 2005 to 438 in 2009, with resulting casualties increasing from nine to 4,385; in just the first six months of 2010, 248 attacks resulted in 1,941 casualties.⁹⁴ More threatening in the long run is the message sent by twin al-Shabab-linked bombings in Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010 that killed 70 and wounded 74. Studies of al-Shabab have highlighted AQAM's role in training members of the group, AQAM's use of al-Shabab-controlled territory as a sanctuary for travel to and from Africa and the growing convergence of their messages.⁹⁵ In a unique twist, indictments in 2009 and 2010 were issued against Somalis for recruiting American Somalis in Minnesota to fight for al-Shabab and for raising money for the group. Reportedly, at least two dozen Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Somalia to fight for al-Shabab; several of them are now in custody.⁹⁶

In the context of the hegemonic disruption model, Somalia is in play. Transnational radical Islamists have been able to spread their ideology and organization to gain a foothold in East Africa. Al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam remain critical threats, even as their escalating violence alienates the population and divisions in their ranks increase.⁹⁷ Though the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya revealed AQAM capability in the region, al-Shabab's strength establishes a sanctuary and training ground for AQAM through which it can expand its activities in the region. It is unlikely that the United States, Ethiopia, or Uganda will allow Somalia to fall permanently into the hands of al-Shabab. Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni would like to expand the AMISOM force and give it a more aggressive mandate for fighting al-Shabab, a move backed by the United States diplomatically and financially.⁹⁸ However, denying it a victory will take years. AQAM has taken advantage of the local chaos of Somalia's civil war to create a larger regional threat that disrupts the stabilizing efforts of the United States and its African allies.

A New Strategic Landscape

The hegemonic disruption model suggests that the US hegemonic task is complicated by the rise of nonstate actors. It is a strategic landscape in which the United States must worry about a peer competitor (such as China), a regional challenger (such as Iran), and the impact of nonstate actors with hostile ideologies and ambitions. The first threat conjures up visions of world war, while the second suggests isolation or containment or Iraq-style intervention. The third, however, places the United States in a position of expending a broad range of assistance and intervention over an extended period of time. The United States is likely to be gun-shy about direct intervention, given its experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over the next 10 to 15 years, however, it may face rising threats. Through several paths radical Islam can move states out of the US hegemonic order and into the category of hostile state, failed state, or at least at-risk state. Each scenario increases the potential for both regional challenges to the United States and the existence of sanctuaries from which AQAM could expand its attacks on the United States and its allies. In addition, a government might be “Finlandized” into withdrawing from a relationship with the United States by terrorist attacks and the emergence of ideological brethren to al-Qaeda within its state or within a neighboring state.

In the wake of the revolutions in the Middle East of 2011, the big question is this: Are we witnessing another 1989, similar to the overthrow of communist leadership and the growth of democracy in Eastern Europe, or the collapse of the old order and the first shots in the battle for the new order? Political change is likely to give AQAM new opportunities. While authoritarian leaders inhibit freedoms, they also may have effective counterterrorist measures, however unjust, that quash radicalism in the short term even as they breed them in the long term. For example, it is not a stretch to argue that a politically free Egypt may face an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the short term as political organization, peaceful or potentially violent, becomes easier. This has been the Indonesia experience. At least four scenarios are plausible.

Instability in a major state. A radical Islamic challenge (whether sustained terrorist campaign, terrorist-led insurgency, or civil war) in a major state such as Egypt, Nigeria, or Pakistan is perhaps the greatest threat. As key regional stabilizers and potential economic hubs in US regional strategy, the ability for a radical Islamic movement to pose a significant threat to the viability of these states shakes the regional foundation of US

strategy, which has always been based, in part, on finding key regional stabilizers—states whose success breeds success to the rest of the region.⁹⁹ Similarly, instability can breed instability. Pakistan, already significantly unstable, may be the nightmare scenario. Its possession of nuclear weapons makes it a special case that might require direct intervention.

Instability in a minor state. Somalia-like scenarios in several nations—Yemen, Algeria, or following a failure of the current government in Afghanistan—are likely to lead the United States to reliance on a regional ally to contain the threat, similar to the US-Ethiopian alliance vis-à-vis Somalia. Though these scenarios may not significantly alter the stability of a region, these small state crises can lead to the spread of sanctuaries through which transnational actors such as AQAM may find a freedom of action they have not had since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001.

Hostile governments emerging peacefully. The United States may also face an increase in radical Islamist but nationalist movements that use the emergence of more open political orders as a path to power. Though Hamas and Hezbollah should be considered allied with AQAM only as a matter of convenience and are likely to oppose AQAM if it tries to dominate Palestinian areas or Lebanon respectively, both these movements could become role models for AQAM regional affiliates. Hamas and Hezbollah participated in elections and won their power, even while maintaining their violent strategies. In a “new” Middle East, more nationalist elements on the periphery of AQAM may shift their strategy. The United States often assumes that the act of voting transforms a nation into a US ally. Elections in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, and Iraq should put that notion to rest. Scholars also argue that democratizing states may be more war prone than any other type of state.¹⁰⁰ The United States, a nation that had supported the old regime, could easily become the new bogeyman for radical Islamic movements who seek to gain power peacefully. Alliances with the United States could become an Achilles’ heel for a political party. The result could be war or sponsorship of terrorism as a method of domestic political mobilization.¹⁰¹

Seizure of power. Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan under the Taliban are examples of how radical Islamic movements took advantage of instability and seized power. Each came to power through a different path: Iranian radicals captured a broad-based revolution, Sudanese radicals seized power through a military coup, and the Taliban fought its way to power during a civil war. These should remain exceptions; the difficulties these three

nations have caused regionally would suggest that the United States and its regional allies would likely take significant action long before another nation reaches such a critical stage. However, the Iranian revolution was a strategic surprise, and the situation in Afghanistan was not considered to be critical or strategic when the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. Regional champions for radical Islamic movements do expand the potential for opposition to US hegemony, even as they present the United States with a more traditional target.

Three analogies from the Cold War help bring the new threat into clearer focus using the model of hegemonic disruption. First, radical Islam can be seen as a twenty-first-century analog to communism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁰² It is a power-hungry ideological force waiting to take root around the globe. Though the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders has not become a virtual Comintern, disruption of US hegemony does not require much unity or formal institutional capability. Most scholars would have been skeptical of a prediction in 1848 that the world would be faced with a set of Marxist and left-leaning nations, sometimes aligned, sometimes feuding, that controlled states and fueled insurgencies on every continent except North America. Ideologically, the danger rests in radical Islam's ability to gain a foothold in states or regions.

Second, given its global power projection, radical Islam is similar to a virtual version of the communist wars of national liberation during the Cold War. If the Cold War era of wars of national liberation were a struggle against a tiger that supported a legion of hornets, then the United States today faces a legion of hornets which have varying goals but all believing the US has ruined their nest. Globalization empowers the movements, making radical Islam a global threat to US hegemony without a nation-state champion, without central unification, and even while divisions within radical Islam exist. The nature of network organizations, particularly their ability to disrupt, should be a reminder that organization is a key aspect of power and an important weapon of war. Scholars of networks argue that in a head-to-head conquest, networks will beat hierarchical structures.¹⁰³ This may be particularly true if the goal of the network is simply to disrupt the nascent order and ideology (AQAM), and the goal of the hierarchy is to build a new order and ideology (the United States). This is the basic challenge of the United States in Afghanistan. The Obama administration's policy is to "clear, hold, build, and transfer" (clear the

insurgents, hold territory, build a stable order, and transfer authority to the Afghans).¹⁰⁴ In a contest between the United States and AQAM in Yemen, for example, who will have the easier task: an AQAM bent on extending the instability or a United States determined to bring order? Both examples are microcosms for what the United States is trying to do globally.

Third, the US response to the “global war on terrorism” is the same as its response to wars of national liberation during the Cold War: direct intervention, assistance to allied governments and their militaries, and covert operations. During the Cold War the United States fought limited wars in Korea and Vietnam, deployed troops in Europe to support NATO, and intervened, deployed forces, or supported governments throughout the developing world. Since 2001, the United States has fought wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, engaged in significant counterterrorism activities in Pakistan, and deployed forces in allied nations with the mission of “enhancing counterterrorism capabilities” in Georgia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, and the Philippines.¹⁰⁵ Estimated costs of these operations run to \$1.147 trillion (constant FY 2011 \$) or 1.2 percent of GDP in 2008, the year congressional budget estimates benchmark as the peak year of the “global war on terrorism.” At peak years Korea cost 4.2 percent of GDP (1952); Vietnam cost 2.3 percent of GDP (1968), and the first Persian Gulf War cost 0.3 percent of GDP (1991).¹⁰⁶ As the United States draws down forces from Iraq and Afghanistan these costs will decrease, but the need for assistance to other governments, even including the best scenario for change in the Middle East and political development in Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, may not.

Conclusions

Great-power rivalry is certainly still relevant. Signs of hegemonic vulnerability could lead to more traditional challenges to US hegemony by second-tier powers. Great powers have always worried about how the failure to act or the act of failure may be perceived by their rivals. Could second-tier powers see US vulnerability as an invitation to engage in soft balancing or even hard balancing? The particular dynamics of the radical Islamic threat challenge the United States in key ways: the loss of access to oil-rich regions, movements opposed to a liberal-democratic nation-state order, and asymmetric warfare that ties the US military down in counterinsurgency and nation building. Nations may challenge US hegemony not because the United States is powerful

(balance of power) or as a result of some threatening policies (balance of threat) or when a challenger has been able to reach parity (power transition) but because the United States has shown weakness. In the short and medium term, however, while nuclear weapons render great-power war an unattractive option, the issue may not be war initiation against the United States by a second-tier power or preventive war by the United States to crush a rising challenger. Instead, hegemonic disruption and the vulnerability that may accompany it could hasten the end of the unipolar era, as the United States is demoted from hyperpower status and a multipolar era begins. While this may be inevitable, as nearly all theories and analysts argue, certainly the United States would rather enter a multipolar era on its own terms, not as a result of a series of failures in regional counterinsurgency and nation-building operations.

Two additional points should be addressed when considering any scenario related to the hegemonic disruption model. First, radical Islam also challenges all the second-tier powers that might balance against the United States. The European Union has faced more numerous attacks than the United States. China faces the separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang. India is beset by groups based in Kashmir and Pakistan. Russia faces groups in the Caucasus. Only Japan remains directly unaffected by the global growth of revolutionary Islam, though its alliance with the United States has brought it into the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the only power with the military might to combat revolutionary Islam, the threat nudges second-tier powers closer to the United States, even as hegemonic weakness may provide those powers with balancing incentives.

Second, nearly every state that faces a serious challenge from radical Islam is an ally of the United States and a partner in US counterterrorism efforts. In addition, AQAM has become increasingly unpopular within states whose populations are majority Muslim. According to the Pew Research Center, AQAM's unfavorable ratings in 2010 stood at 62 percent in Jordan, 56 percent in Indonesia, 72 percent in Egypt, 74 percent in Turkey, and 94 percent in Lebanon. Confidence in bin Laden dropped between 2003 and 2010 by significant margins: 42 percent in Jordan, 34 percent in Indonesia, 28 percent in Pakistan. Of the states surveyed, only in Nigeria do AQAM's favorable ratings rank above its unfavorable (49 vs. 34 percent).¹⁰⁷ Given that terrorists and those opposing them both believe

that popular support will be the ultimate determinant of the current contest, radical Islam would seem to be on the losing side.

However, even if policymakers assume that governments and populations reject AQAM and its ideas, the cost of defeating it is likely to be high. Given US hegemonic goals, the threat of nonstate actors with an ideology hostile to the US ideology nearly guarantees future clashes between the United States and radical Islam. Liberal hegemony is world order building. Though the Bush administration began its tenure explicitly rejecting nation building,¹⁰⁸ its post-9/11 policy, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, is exactly that. The impulse for intervention but not involvement is as old as the United States.¹⁰⁹ One of the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan may be that the United States cannot have one without the other, and both are required for hegemony.

In the long run the United States may want to listen to one of the important principles of counterinsurgency: "The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas."¹¹⁰ A revolutionary ideology percolating in authoritarian or semidemocratic societies whose economies are based on government control of oil or still mired in nineteenth-century agricultural patterns is a recipe for broad-based instability. The democratic movements in the Middle East suggest that there is an alternative to a choice between authoritarianism and radical Islam (an alternative that US-allied dictators have denied was possible). Reform within authoritarian societies makes radical Islam less attractive and enables governments to separate the committed revolutionaries from those who can be brought back into the community. It asks for no less than a widespread reformation in many nations from Morocco to Central Asia. Again, this is world order building on a global scale, a war of ideas that encompasses globalization, modernization, the role of religion in society, and may be what future historians think of as the "great struggle of the twenty-first century." From the US perspective this is the task of convincing governments, populations, and nonstate opponents to accept aspects of the US hegemonic ideology. Two guideposts may be helpful. For leaders of authoritarian nations, the United States may suggest that in reality they have two possible futures: each could become the Shah of Iran, the last dictator of a nation whose overthrow led to the inauguration of a revolutionary regime that poses a regional threat a generation later, or each could become Deng Xiaoping, a transformational leader who took a collapsing nation and led it back to prosperity and power. For newly emerging democracies the United States

can stress the benefits of its hegemonic order as enjoyed by Eastern Europe, India, Indonesia, or Brazil, or even nations that accept some but not all the elements of that order (China) while emphasizing the costs of rejecting that order that are faced by Iran, Burma, Sudan, or North Korea.

The model of hegemonic disruption is designed to strengthen realism's ability to explain current geopolitical trends. Traditional balance-of-power and power-transition theories are the best guides to the threat of peer competition with the United States. However, peer competition is not the only threat to hegemony. An unflinching focus on the nation-state as the unit of analysis can be a handicap to understanding current geopolitical trends. The addition of nonstate actors and ideology is explicitly neoclassical realist. The inclusion of nonstate actors and ideology represents an analytical decision to modify the premises of neorealism, but it is not a rejection of the most basic tenet of realism—the struggle for power. The modification here is an addition to the range of actors who may be involved in that struggle. It seems analytically rigid to argue against taking radical ideologies seriously until they gain control of a powerful nation-state. The goal of theory building is parsimony and accuracy. Expanding the range of power seeking actors adds an element of the twenty-first century to ideas framed around nineteenth- and twentieth-century realities. **SSQ**

Notes

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W. Barno, "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 15–28. The term *globalized insurgency* has been used by the Department of State. See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "The Terrorist Enemy," www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/index.htm.

5. The concept is discussed briefly in T. V. Paul, "The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary relevance," in *Balance of Power*, eds. Paul, James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 3; Christopher Layne, "The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power," in *Balance of Power*, 106–8, 16; and Josef Joffe, *Überpower* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 63–66.

6. Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game worth the Candle?" *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 52–67; Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *ibid.*, 68–83; Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *Unipolar Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).

7. Thomas S. Szayna et al., *The Emergence of Peer Competitors* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). Some scholars argue that unipolar sea powers beyond the Eurasian land mass (the UK or the United States) will not face challenges or be balanced; as noncontinental powers, their power resources are more distant and therefore less threatening. See Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?" in *Balance of Power*, 40–45; and John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 391.

8. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979); and Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1978): 173–84.

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The Past as Prologue

Realist Thought and the Future of American Security Policy

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Realism is dead, or so we are told. Indeed, events over the past 20 years tend to confirm the popular adage that “we are living in a whole new world.” And while some have proclaimed the death of power politics, it is worth remembering that we have heard this all before. Over the past 60 plus years, realism has enjoyed its time in the sun. Within the United States, realism initially arose during the interwar period in response to the perceived failures of Pres. Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism. By 1954, with the publication of the second edition of Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations*, those ideas had been discredited. During the 1970s, with gasoline shortages and a long, unsuccessful war in Vietnam tearing at America, the inadequacies of policy makers to properly frame world events led many to pursue other alternatives. Economic, political, and social changes led to the rise of topics such as transnational politics, international interdependence, and political economy, each of which allowed nonrealist perspectives to carve out a substantial space for themselves.

The dramatic ending of the Cold War—combined with the inability of policymakers to adequately explain, anticipate, or even imagine peaceful global change—ushered in a new round of thinking. Today many decision makers frame their policies around democracy, seeing it as the historical force driving the apparent peace among the world’s leading powers. Once an arcane argument among academics, democratization moved to the fore during the Clinton years and has defined America’s role in the world ever since. That “America believes in democracy” is more than a slogan. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq marked the beginning of a democratization project of gargantuan proportions. But if the past is any guide to the

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future, it will not be long until policymakers begin to reframe their thinking around realism. One can already see signs of realist resurgence within the administration, with insiders calling for an end to the wars and other nations decrying American adventurism.¹ With so much at stake, it is time for strategists and policymakers to reexamine realism lest it be rejected out of hand.

From the earliest moments of recorded history, realist thought has dominated the study and practice of international politics.² Since the time of Thucydides, realists have never lost sight of the fact that we live in a world of states, large and small, that must look out for themselves.³ Paraphrasing Thucydides, “the strong do what they will, while the weak suffer what they must.” In such a world—where there is no world government to protect a state from the harmful intentions of others—survival is the name of the game. Thus, the essence of any security policy is the protection and preservation of the state itself. This article critically examines realism and its relationship to national security policy. Rather than focus on individual realist authors, their ideas are synthesized here into a general interpretation of the field and integrated with the strong, symbiotic relationship between realist thought and national security policy.⁴ This article outlines the realist argument and focuses on four premises—states, anarchy, interests, and power—and illustrates the key differences between realism and other perspectives. The third section evaluates the usefulness of realism in terms of framing enduring security issues, and the final discusses the future of realist thought with respect to framing emerging security issues.

What is Realism?

Realism is the dominant theoretical tradition that defines the study of international politics. It begins with a pessimistic view of human nature, which Thucydides captures in his description of events during the Peloponnesian War. As his majestic history suggests, human nature drives men to repeal those “general laws of humanity,” even when those deeds have the potential to hurt not only the guilty but the innocent as well. Why? Because people are not led by reason; they are led by reason *and* passion, and it is passion that leads them into conflict and war. This point is worth stressing: that reason can temper passion is never the issue. Rather, the issue is that one can never be too sure that reason will temper passion *all of the time*.⁵ For those interested in understanding national security, the

lesson is simple and the implications enormous. States must constantly be on guard—not because statesmen are never honorable and peaceful, but because they might at any moment become dishonorable and belligerent.

The pessimism found in realism certainly gives it a doom and gloom edge. Pessimism is not the same as fatalism, however, and in fact realists can be wildly optimistic on some matters,⁶ but at the heart of realist thought is the notion that mankind is flawed. The world is what it is, and analysts must take it for what it is. Will it ever get better? The chances are slim. Why? Because man is what he is—a passionate creature, capable of reasoning right from wrong and shrewd enough to know that he should always hedge his bets.

While realist pessimism may accurately describe the human condition, it does not capture the essence of international politics. After all, in international life it is states not men that matter most, which is why some realists go out of their way to downplay the importance of man himself. Kenneth Waltz, in what is still considered to be the most important work in the realist revival, *Theory of International Politics*, makes no index entries for ethics, justice, or morality.⁷ Similarly, John Herz is emphatic about how his realism is different from that of Morgenthau who, like Thucydides, “sees the chief cause of power politics in innate human aggressiveness.”⁸ Human behavior can be grounds for conflict and war, but it is the anarchic nature of international life that remains an inescapable condition that leads to conflict even in the absence of human aggressiveness.

Whether conflict stems from the nature of man or the nature of international politics, or both, remains unprovable; however, one thing is certain—states acting in anarchy must look out for themselves. Since states and anarchy play cardinal roles in realist thought, we should be clear about their meanings. A state is what we ordinarily call a country. Costa Rica, Russia, Finland are good examples. States have four essential features: territory, population, government, and sovereignty. Territory, population, and government are self-explanatory. Sovereignty refers to a state’s ability to conduct domestic and foreign policies without undue external interference. This does not mean that a state can do whatever it pleases. On the contrary, while all states enjoy some measure of autonomy, great powers can do more than weaker ones, thus they tend to enjoy even more freedom of action. Still, no state—even those with the greatest of powers—can do all it wants all the time. No matter how powerful, states are limited in what they can do in the world.

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Likewise, anarchy does not mean chaos or the complete absence of order. It simply refers to an absence of rule or of a hierarchical order based on formal subordination and authority. There is considerable order in an anarchic international system, but that order is not the hierarchical order characteristic of domestic politics.⁹ That being the case, the consequences of anarchy can be severe. Because there is no higher authority to which states can appeal, statesmen must think in terms of security first.

No matter how good their intentions, national security policymakers must bear in mind that in the absence of world government, states must provide for their own protection. To do so means marshaling their power or the power of friends and allies who will support and defend them. However, such self-help actions, even when taken for purely defensive purposes, will appear threatening to others, who will be forced to respond in kind. This interstate phenomenon is commonly called the “security dilemma,” and it adequately explains why arms races occur and why some wars begin.¹⁰

Because the potential for violence in the international system is so great, states must prioritize their interests. Interests come in many forms.¹¹ Peace, prosperity, and freedom are good examples, and while peace, prosperity, and freedom might be in the interest of *most* states, survival is the sole interest of *all* states.¹² The means to ensure survival is power. The kind of power needed can be hard to define. For example, during the 1970s a group of relatively small Middle Eastern states nearly brought the industrialized world to a standstill because they controlled access to oil. Were they powerful? It depends on how one thinks about power. Similarly, today terrorists seem to wrest considerable power from their dastardly deeds, but are they as powerful as some seem to think? An answer begins by recognizing what power can and cannot accomplish in international life. Realists believe power clarifies international politics because it sets up a world of strong and weak states. For them, the distribution of military capabilities throughout the world makes differences between states stark and, by doing so, conditions the international system, setting up an informal set of rules that brings some order to a disordered world.

Think of the Cold War to understand this last point. What kept the Cold War “cold” was the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although hardly a perfect peace—there were several deadly proxy wars during this time—the balance of forces between the two great powers enabled international life to go on without producing

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a cataclysmic, nuclear war. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the Gulf Wars or the war in Yugoslavia occurring during the Cold War. Why? The superpowers—through threats or use of force—would never have allowed them to happen.

Regardless of how one thinks of power, it is important to point out that power is fungible and relative. Fungibility refers to the ease with which capabilities in one issue area can be used to solve problems in other issue areas. From a national security perspective, military power remains the most fungible of all the instruments of power, including economic, diplomatic, and informational. Reviewing the cases, one discovers that force, and threats of force, have been the instrument of choice for most states in times of crisis. Indeed, because war remains the *ultima ratio* in international politics, military power remains the first and foremost concern of most powerful states.

The word *relative* refers to relative gains, as the term is used in the study of economics. In brief, realists believe that relative gains matter more to states than absolute gains. Why? One can never be sure how a state will use *any gain from any transaction*. States might spend gains—in the form of money—on services to improve life at home for their citizens. On the other hand, they might spend those gains on a large military force capable of threatening others, which is why in international politics the question is never “Who gains?” The question is always “Who gains more?”¹³

Recall the fierce debate in the United States on the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA. The debate was not over the issue of what will the United States gain? Rather, the debate—at least from the dissenters—centered on the fear that Canada and Mexico might gain more. Was the United States afraid that Canada or Mexico might build a large army to threaten the United States? Of course not, but the mere fact that tensions existed among these close neighbors only highlights just how difficult international cooperation is to achieve, even on something as relatively benign as free trade. In the end, we can think of international politics as a struggle for power, cooperation, and peace, but that struggle is defined by the idea that state security must never be impaired.

Summing up, realists think the international system shapes what states must do by presenting them with overwhelming incentives to pursue self-interests or by eliminating those that fail to pursue self-interests relentlessly. “This natural selection process may be supplemented by a competition for influence; states following realist maxims grow, while those ignoring the mandates of anarchy decline or lose all influence. To the extent that

survival pressures tightly constrain state behaviors, we should not expect internal characteristics or moral considerations to seriously affect state conduct.”¹⁴ In a world of realist politics, nations may inevitably settle their disputes through force or threats of force, acting purely in self-interest. In the end, states must look out for themselves.

Realism and its Critics

Realism has many critics.¹⁵ A number of them are convinced realism is inherently limited because it takes little account of global change, a line of attack that sharpened considerably with the end of the Cold War. Others argue that realism overlooks the importance of global interdependence on international politics. Those who write on the importance of interdependence have provided illuminating accounts of international politics by calling attention to the role of international institutions. These authors, known as institutionalists, stress the mediating role played by institutions which lower transaction costs among states and increase the prospects for international cooperation. Institutionalists like to point to the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an example of an institution that has not only increased cooperation among its members but has also provided a framework for economic and military integration of Europe itself. What is more, institutional analyses have clarified the relationship between international politics and economics, opening up a line of inquiry known as international political economy. However enlightening institutional analyses might be, realists contend that these authors tend to exaggerate the possibilities for international cooperation because they do not understand—or have oversimplified the concern about—survival as a motivation for state behavior. States must look out for their own security, not because they are greedy, selfish, or vile. States might be all of these, but that alone is not a sufficient reason to cause them to think in terms of security first. They must look out for their own security because there is no authority capable of preventing others from using violence or threats of violence to destroy or enslave them.¹⁶ This tends to be downplayed in institutional analyses, but it remains the driving concern for most states.

Another line of criticism comes from those who believe the key to achieving a peaceful international system lies in radically altering state identity or transforming how states think about themselves and their relationships with others. Ideally, by not thinking of themselves as solitary actors who

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are responsible for their own security, states will develop a communitarian ethos and a broader sense of responsibility to the international community. While this might sound desirable in principle, in practice it will never work because anarchy and the danger of war cause all states to be motivated in some measure by fear or distrust, regardless of their internal composition, goals, or desires.¹⁷

This last point is lost on those who hang their hopes for humanity on democracy and are willing to risk blood and treasure to secure those goals. Democracy has had an impact on international life; it has both caused and affected the promotion of liberal capitalism. No doubt, democracy and free-market capitalism have taken hold of the world, and the apparent peace among the world's democratic states—both large and small—constitutes the “closest thing we might have to an empirical law of international behavior.”¹⁸ Put simply, democracies do not fight one another. Why not?

Some believe domestic institutions guard against the bellicose behaviors of kings or emperors.¹⁹ Democratic leaders, if for no other reason than self-preservation, tend to hedge against risky wars because their own fortunes are tied to either maintaining the status quo or assuring a victory, or both. Others are convinced democratic states seem to prefer adjudication and bargaining to fighting.²⁰ In short, it is not that liberal states would rather trade than invade, as interdependence theory suggests; it is that liberal leaders prefer to “jaw, jaw rather than war, war,” as Churchill might have put it.

As compelling as both explanations might seem, neither captures the essence of great-power politics, nor do they come close to describing what a democracy is like when it goes to war. Democracy, as George Kennan stated, fights in anger. Democracy “fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it—to teach it a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end.”²¹ Democracy also fights with vengeance, which is why democratic wars resemble crusades, characterized by unlimited means, ultimate ends, and popular calls for unconditional surrender. But above all else, democracies are states, and all states have interests, not the least of which is survival. Again, while peace might be an interest of some states, survival is *the* interest of all states. When interests compete, as they tend

to do, conflict arises and war is the extension of that process. Thus, peace among the world's democracies will not last forever.

The Enduring Usefulness of Realism

Up to now, I have focused on description and analysis in an attempt to clarify the realist tradition. This section evaluates the usefulness of realism in terms of framing enduring security issues by focusing on war, intervention, globalization, and human rights.²²

In an anarchic world, *war* is always a possibility, which is why realists present it as a standard, albeit destructive, instrument of statecraft or a continuation of politics by other means. This can be attributed to Clausewitz, who insisted that war was the result of some political situation. "The occasion is always due to some political object," he wrote. "War is therefore an act of policy." As satisfying as Clausewitz might be, war often requires more than political justification. It requires moral justification. Yet realists ignore this aspect, insisting that most wars can be justified in terms of interests or the balance of power. The central premise of the balance of power is stability, not justice. In fact, realists argue that the very idea of a just war may be incoherent. Think about it—if one adopts the perspective of the statesman, which presupposes the protection and preservation of the state, there seems to be no escaping the demands of the national interest. This point is worth stressing—even though considerations about justice might be real and important, they are not as important as the demands of security. This dilemma is recognized by other moral and political perspectives, but what makes realism so distinctive is its solution. When the demands of statecraft and the demands of justice cannot be reconciled, realists argue that political leaders must choose injustice, even if it means war.²³

Moral considerations aside, realists believe stability is present in an international system when the system remains anarchic—without a strong central authority—and the principal parties within the system remain unchanged. If one state threatens to achieve a position from which it might be able to dominate the rest, a military coalition of the other great powers will form against it and a general war will follow. Thus, balance of power arguments are not strong arguments for war any more than they are strong arguments for peace. They are anti-hegemonic in that a balance of power seeks to prevent, through war if necessary, the rise of one dominant power.

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Since the end of the eighteenth century, the European balance of power changed five times. Early in the nineteenth century, Napoleon's bid for supremacy ended at Waterloo when a coalition of states put an end to his ambitions by destroying the Grand Armee. In the early twentieth century, the Kaiser similarly challenged the European balance of power. Again, a coalition of states fought desperately for four years to rectify the situation. In the 1930s and early 1940s, Hitler overran Europe from the Channel to the gates of Moscow. Again a great coalition of forces fought to restore the balance of power. Following that war, however, the balance was not restored. Russia was left with half of Europe, while the rest lay prostrate before it. Tragically, the Western Europeans who had fought to defeat Hitler now faced Stalin, and the resulting imbalance of power was the reason for the start of the Cold War, which lasted nearly 50 years. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an imbalance of global power. The current unipolar configuration cannot last forever and is already showing signs of changing with a rising Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Will war be the result of the changing distribution of power? It need not be. If realism is correct, a balance of power ought to emerge which will force states to make appropriate security preparations. Barring attempts at regional hegemony, stability can be the result.

Although many states have intervened in the affairs of other states, realist authors have surprisingly little to say on the question of *intervention*. When they do address it, it is usually under the heading of nonintervention. This is because realists tend to think of intervention as an empirical question, not a philosophical one. That being the case, those realists who do tackle it head-on often fall back on John Stuart Mill's notions of self-determination and sovereignty.²⁴

We are to treat states as self-determining communities, whether or not they are free, because self-determination and freedom are not the same, or so Mill thought. Citizens have the right to fight for their freedom, and when they struggle and fail, they are still self-determining. This Millian view of self-determination sets people up for the right to become free by their own efforts, and it cuts against the grain of intervention, in general. Sovereignty, which legally defines a state's ability to conduct domestic and foreign policies without undue external interference, is the arena in which self-determining communities fight and sometimes win their freedom. It goes without saying then that there are things the international community cannot do for states, even if it is for their own good. By this measure, the

intervening state must make the case that its interference in someone else's liberty is best served by something other than moral support.

This is not an academic question, as it sits at the center of the current administration's policy agenda.²⁵ During the 1990s the United States was involved in numerous interventions, some of which clearly violate traditional views of sovereignty. Somalia II sticks in the minds of most Americans as an intervention characterized as wrong—wrong place, wrong time, and wrong reason. In the face of the ethnic killings and displacement in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, however, the idea of saving strangers came to the fore. Coupled with the attacks of September 11th, the question of intervention posed new problems and challenges as arguments about preemption took hold of American policy. Within the Obama administration, there are those who wish to see the United States continue to play an active interventionist role, while others seek to back away from it. In framing the future of intervention, realism has something to offer policy makers. In multipolar worlds, great powers are prone to inattention. In bipolar worlds, overreaction is the concern. In unipolar worlds, like the one we are living in now, guarding against overextension is the problem.²⁶ In the coming years, the United States will have to balance the need for security against the humanitarian desire to save strangers. If it behaves shrewdly, it can reduce the risk of overextension and, perhaps, save a few but not all.

Unlike intervention, realists have a lot to say about *globalization*. More than a mere shift in economic policies, globalization is transforming state relations and remaking international politics right before our very eyes, or so globalists insist. That globalization is occurring cannot be denied. Foreign trade, travel, and communication seem to be transforming the world into a global bazaar where goods and services are traded openly and freely, and war among the great powers becomes less and less likely. But while international economics might be changing, international politics are not.

With this in mind, one ought to wonder what globalization is doing to security. Does it mean more peace, as globalists contend? Realists conclude it does not. Why? Economic interdependence among nations is not capable of altering the nature of international relations, which puts a premium on politics, not economics. Globalists fail to see this because they do not understand that international peace, which is underwritten by the great powers, produces interdependence and not the other way around.²⁷

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The logic is obvious. If I rely on you for something essential, like oil, then I am vulnerable to your whims and fancies. The more vulnerable I become, the more demanding you might become. You might demand more money, more services, or if your commodity makes me stronger, protection. While I may be willing to go along in the short term, the longer this transaction goes on the more dependent I become. In short, interdependence creates vulnerabilities. For states this is a dangerous game, which is why international cooperation is so difficult to achieve. The enduring lesson is simple. Whether a state gains in an economic transaction is never the issue. The issue is always who gains more. Without a higher authority to appeal to, successful states will always hedge their bets when it comes to interdependence. Thus, globalization, at least from a security perspective, will not be enough to ensure a lasting peace.

Most realists eschew the idea of *human rights* as the basis for making decisions about national security.²⁸ This is largely due to realism's professed amorality. Kennan expressed it best, writing, "Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience."²⁹

But even if survival is the main concern of all states, it is not the only interest of all states all of the time. Clearly, there are times when interests compete. When they do, it is worth remembering that security is the primary concern, but there ought to be times when moral concerns matter. The war in Kosovo is hard to justify simply in terms of interests. This, in fact, may be a case where interests—stopping the spread of a wider war in Europe—coincided with a moral concern—stopping the slaughter of innocent civilians. Afghanistan, too, seems to fall into this category. In any event, there are times when interests and moral concerns do coincide. Realists recognize this but consistently come down hard on the limits of international action. As the discussion on intervention pointed out, human rights are a domestic—not an international—concern. There are real limits to what states can do to, and for, other states, but that does not necessarily exclude lending moral or material support in defense of human rights.

Realist Thought and the Future of US Security Policy

The previous section examined four enduring issues in an attempt to illustrate how realist thought can help frame policy responses. This

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section explores four emerging issues that are sure to dominate security discourse in the coming years: counterinsurgency, social revolutions, nuclear weapons, and power transitions.

Within the marketplace of ideas, *counterinsurgency* casts a long shadow but has a short life. Why? Policymakers are beginning to realize the return on the investment is simply not worth the costs. Consider Afghanistan. After 10 years, billions of dollars spent, and thousands of lives lost, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest states in the world. With a per capita GDP of \$800, a life expectancy of 42 years, and a mortality rate of 250 per 1,000 live births, it is a brand name for suffering. Moreover, if the United States were to stay in Afghanistan for another 10 years—adding billions of dollars and countless lives to the equation—it would create a state that is equal to but not greater than Pakistan. It is worth remembering that Pakistan is, in many ways, an American creation. American money began flowing into that country in 1954. Over the decades, the United States has sent billions of dollars to Pakistan, training and equipping its military and intelligence services. The goal of this activity sounds all too familiar: “create a reliable ally with strong institutions and a modern, vigorous democracy.”³⁰ But after nearly 60 years, Pakistan is one of the most anti-American states in the world; a far cry from what was originally intended. That is a sobering thought, one that will loom large in the minds of policymakers as they stare into the budget abyss, and also why counterinsurgency is destined to become a thing of the past. Another reason is the killing of Osama bin Laden. While it represents the high-water mark for special operations forces, whose courage and performance have been nothing but heroic and extraordinary, his end marks the beginning of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.

As with intervention, when realists write about counterinsurgency it is usually under the heading “We Should Not Try That Again.” Why? From a practical perspective, the US experience in this sort of war has not been a happy one. Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam add up to a bad scorecard, and recent events have continued this negative trend. Contrary to popular opinion, there is nothing small about these “small wars.” In colloquial terms, their largesse is captured by the words “hearts and minds,” which translates to “we can save you if you’ll let us.” In general, saving strangers is a noble goal but not necessarily good policy, because it rarely works, at least not for long. In the constellation of cases, only Malaya and the Philippines are thought to be unequivocal successes. The others—

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most notably Algeria, Indochina, and Namibia—all ended as something less than originally imagined.³¹ With that rate of success, the demand for counterinsurgency will inevitably decrease.

American policymakers have not had to deal with the political impact of *social revolutions* for some time, largely because they are such rare events. A social revolution can be thought of as a “rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures; they are accompanied and carried through by broad-based revolts from below.”³² What is unique to social revolution is that changes in social and political structures occur together and in mutually supporting fashion. France, Russia, and China are the classic examples, but the last time American policymakers had to deal with the aftermath of such cataclysmic events was in 1979. Revolutions in Nicaragua and Iran changed the social, political, and economic landscapes of Central America and the Middle East, while consuming one presidency and distracting another. In both cases, few saw them coming and even fewer knew how to frame a response. As we watch popular uprisings sweep through the Middle East today, one cannot help but wonder if social revolutions are far behind.³³ Here realism can help.

First, we must realize there is little one can do to influence the outcome of a social revolution because they are so hard to predict. Few saw the Sandinistas overthrowing the iron rule of Somoza, and even fewer foresaw or understood events in Iran. In both cases, US policy went into a period of confusion. In Nicaragua this resulted in the ill-fated Contra war, and in Iran it led to a long period of exclusion and denial; neither response produced a long-lasting, positive strategic effect in the region. Second, we must be prepared to deal with the revolutionary government as it is, not as we wish it to be, while keeping in mind that the policies of today can become the problems of tomorrow. In the case of Nicaragua this meant supporting a long, brutal war; in the case of Iran, it ultimately meant Saddam Hussein. In both, it resulted in the ill-fated Iran-Contra Affair. Third, whatever the outcome, we must come to grips with the fact that social revolutions can be short- or long-lived, and there is no telling which direction they will take. In Nicaragua the revolutionary government lasted just over 10 years; in Iran much longer. In all of these instances, realist thought forced policymakers to come to grips with humility—there was, in fact, little one could do after the revolution had occurred. In foreign affairs, humility is a rare but valuable commodity nonetheless.

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Within the nuclear arena, policymakers will need to learn how to cope with the rising demand for small, reliable *nuclear arsenals*. In this regard, China, India, and Pakistan are the “new normal” when it comes to nuclear arsenals, and other states like Iran have been watching closely. Within most nuclear countries, it has become common knowledge that large arsenals assure statesmen little. As in other areas of competition there comes a point of diminishing returns, and with nuclear weapons that point comes quickly; a few weapons are all one needs to achieve relative security, even against a larger, better-equipped opponent. The central conclusion these states have reached after watching nearly 50 years of arms racing during the Cold War is this: Statesmen are not sensitive to the actual number of weapons a state might possess; they are sensitive to the idea that a state might have them at all. All the tough talk between the Russians and the United States did not amount to much when it came to nuclear numbers—both raced up but backed down as soon as they safely could. This has not been lost on others.

Overcoming bureaucratic resistance to the idea of minimum deterrence will not be easy. The toughest obstacle is located within the cognitive domain.³⁴ Minimum deterrence poses a challenge to the perceptions many political and military leaders have about how nuclear deterrence works. Cold War paradigms characterized by numerical and technological parity, large numbers of weapons, and sophisticated counterforce war-fighting plans provide the mental focal points around which policymakers’ thoughts turn. In their quest for cognitive consistency, they will flatly reject or ignore evidence that challenges their well-formed perceptions about deterrence. Solving this will not be easy, as it demands that decision makers take time to analyze their own preexisting perceptions. Realism can help frame this. Policymakers should keep in mind that Cold War policies of deterrence were not so much based upon real-world evidence of how leaders would actually react to nuclear threats but instead upon expectations of how those leaders would react—expectations drawn from policymakers’ own deeply held beliefs about deterrence. In other words, Cold War notions are no more real than post-Cold War ones. One hears calls for new thinking all the time about deterrence, but that thinking usually turns out to be more of the same. In essence, old nuclear states are trapped within their own psychic prisons; the newer ones not as much, and they have adapted quickly; the age of minimum deterrence has arrived.

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All of the above pales in comparison to the effects that will result from *global power transitions* in the world. Already ongoing, the effects of the redistribution of power will become more apparent in the next 10 to 20 years. The changing balance of power among states in the world poses the greatest challenge to US security and, in this regard, the United States is in a precarious position. Large-scale economic changes, together with ongoing wars, have placed the United States in a relatively weaker position with respect to its rivals than it was eight years ago. In economic terms, the costs have been staggering, with estimates as high as \$3 trillion. In military terms, even if the United States were to achieve its current war aims, American forces are less capable than they were in 2000. Continual deployments, along with the accompanying wear and tear on personnel and equipment, have left the US military in desperate need of replenishment. As the new administration has made clear, coming to terms with these structural challenges will be demanding. Harder still is trying to find another case that rivals or even approximates the United States' relative decline, the pitch and speed of which appear unusual.

Complicating this are the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China. While policymakers may be familiar with the BRIC countries, few have thought seriously about the challenges they pose to US leadership. They are poised to become the four most dominant economies by the year 2050. These four countries encompass over 25 percent of the world's land coverage, 40 percent of the world's population, and hold a combined GDP of approximately \$18.5 trillion. On almost every scale, they would be the largest entity on the global stage. Hardly an alliance, they have taken steps to increase their political cooperation, mainly as a way of influencing the US position on trade accords. Among the questions facing the United States, few are more important than this: Can the United States successfully play the role of junior partner in some places in the world? And, if so, what strategies should it devise to ensure its well-being?

For the past 20 years, American policymakers have been in love with dominance. Military doctrine, trade papers, and journals are strewn with ideas of global hegemony. But America has never been a global hegemon. In fact, the idea of global hegemony is more illusory than real; there is no case in history of a true global hegemon—a state that ruled the entire world. With its influence stretching north to south, the United States is a regional hegemon, but even here it will have to back away from its love affair with dominance, especially in light of pressing fiscal constraints.

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Here, again, realism can help. When faced with historic, global-power transitions, states have essentially three choices: dominate, accommodate, or retrench. Domination strategies tend to be most appealing, which explains why the United States was drawn to them at the end of the Cold War. Accommodation strategies tend to be effective but not as popular because they are based upon the realization that one cannot “win.” This strategy is not about winning but about achieving some continuous advantage.³⁵ Retrenchment strategies tend to be least appealing but can be effective in some instances. Britain successfully retrenched following the war, allowing America to ascend to new heights, while enjoying the benefits of American hegemony herself. No doubt, this would be harder for the United States to do with the BRICs but not impossible. The countries have much in common economically and could forge a new future together, but much of that rides on America foregoing the urge to dominate.

Conclusions

Accepting the tenets of realism is an act of humility—a rare commodity in international affairs but a useful one nonetheless.³⁶ American policy-makers will eventually come to it, even if they do so reluctantly. Is realism in our future? The answer is yes. Advances in technology, health care, and communications are shaping the world we live in. Yet beneath it all, international politics has not changed significantly since Thucydides. In spite of economic interdependence, global transportation, and the information revolution, we live in a world where states must look out for themselves. As long as that holds true, statesmen are well advised to frame policy responses in terms of interests; no other tradition does that better than realism. In so doing, they ought to remember: a foreign policy based on a realist assessment is neither moral nor immoral but merely a “reasoned response to the world about us.”³⁷ 

Notes

1. Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” *New Yorker*, 2 May 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_lizza#ixzz1NwVKp2s3.

2. The roots of realism go back to the Greeks and are found throughout contemporary European politics. Elements of realist thought, however, are found in various cultures throughout the world. Thus, realism is not “Western,” per se. Interestingly, American policymakers have

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traditionally shunned realist thought. Woodrow Wilson thought balance-of-power politics was part of the “old world,” thus he sought a “concert of power” to replace it. Since then, many US policymakers have followed Wilson’s lead and sought to make the “world safe for democracy.”

3. While it is true that the Greek concept of the state differs from our own, citizens of the Greek city-states possessed rights and freedoms not readily found elsewhere in the Ancient world—the right to vote, assemble, own property, and pursue scientific knowledge, to name a few. For this reason, imperial Athens remains the archetype of contemporary democratic life.

4. There are many realist authors and many forms of realism. The classical argument begins with Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli. The theological argument is found in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Butterfield. Nicholas Syrkeman and A. T. Mahan represent the geopolitics school. The modern account begins with Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, and George Kennan. The English School is best represented in the work of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. The contemporary argument is found in Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, John Herz, Robert Tucker, Robert Osgood, Colin Gray, and John Mearsheimer. The strongest voice among sympathetic critics is Jack Donnelly.

5. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 2001), chap. 2.

6. Arms control is but one example.

7. Kenneth Waltz remains the most prominent modern realist. His *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) dominated discussions of international studies throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s. Even though the field has moved on into other interesting directions, Waltz remains a force with which to be reckoned.

8. Even though Waltz is often cited as the father of “structural realism,” it is John Herz who first wrote about it. His book *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) remains a standard for those interested in international politics.

9. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) for a superb illustration of this relationship.

10. The quote comes from Waltz’s first book, *Man, the State and War*. First published in 1954 and recently released in a second edition, it outlines the basic argument around which studies of war and peace still take place.

11. Some critics like to talk in terms of values rather than interests. Their point, I assume, is to cast the discussion of state motivation in terms of normative rather than material concerns. But there is nothing more normative than thinking of security in terms of survival. Besides, few states, if any, pursue interests that they think are “valueless.”

12. Waltz makes this point time and again, and it reverberates throughout his writings: “I built structural theory on the assumption that survival is the goal of states” (*Theory of International Politics*, 913). “The survival motive is taken as the ground of action.” “By assumption, economic actors seek to maximize expected returns, and states strive to secure their survival.” “I assume that states seek to ensure their survival” (*ibid.*, 92, 134, 91).

13. *Ibid.*, chap. 7.

14. See David Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949–1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) for a superb illustration and critique of this line of reasoning.

15. Liberalism itself might be considered a critique of realism or an optimistic response to realist pessimism.

16. See Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 485–507.

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17. See John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 5–49.

18. Jack Levy makes this observation in "The Causes of War: A Review of the Evidence," in *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, eds. Phillip E. Tetlock et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

19. The literature on democracy and war is voluminous. For the philosophical argument, see Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Parts I and II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205–35, 323–53. For a quantitative account, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (March 1983), 27–71. For an example of the structural account, see Clifton T. Morgan and Sally Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: Why Kant Democracies Fight," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 187–221.

20. Similarly, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

21. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 66.

22. The issues examined here were originally examined by Jack Donnelly. My intent is not to refute his interpretation or conclusions but merely update and expand them. See Donnelly, "Twentieth Century Realism," in *Traditions of International Ethics*, eds. Terry Nardin and David Mapel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

23. Donnelly, "Twentieth Century Realism," 101.

24. The best modern argument on nonintervention remains Michael Walzer's in *Just and Unjust Wars*, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Although hardly a professed realist, Walzer makes the strongest realist case I have found.

25. Lizza, "The Consequentialist."

26. This theme reverberates throughout realist writings, particularly Waltz, Gilpin, and historian Paul Kennedy.

27. Again, this theme reverberates throughout Waltz's and Gilpin's writings, as well as others.

28. In the debate regarding human rights, there are those who think rights are universal. That is, rights are applicable to all humans by virtue of the fact that they are human. Others believe rights are relative. That is, rights are culturally relative to the different societies found throughout the world. Recently, and in large part due to a reaction to cultural relativism, some realists have sided with those who support universal human rights. They do not, however, advocate intervention as a cure to human rights abuses. Instead, they hold true to the principles of self-determination and sovereignty.

29. George Kennan was one of America's leading realist practitioners as well as one of its most prolific authors. The architect of the containment policy, Kennan is revered as one of those rare intellectuals who actually had a dramatic impact on foreign affairs. His most important book on international politics remains *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; expanded ed., 1985), which is the source of these quotes.

30. Lawrence Wright, "The Double Game," *New Yorker*, 16 May 2011.

31. I thank my colleague Dr. James Kiras for this information.

32. Theada Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4. Skocpol's work, along with Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), remains iconic works in the genre.

33. I thank Dr. Mary Hampton for this observation.

34. See Jeremy Olsen, "The Best Defense: Making Maximum Sense of Minimum Deterrence," unpublished SAASS thesis, 2011.

35. I thank my friend and colleague Dr. Everett Dolman for tutoring me on the importance of this idea.

James Wood Forsyth Jr

36. Lastly, I thank Jack Donnelly for encouraging me to think about realism and human rights. His unselfish attention during my student years remains the model I strive to emulate. See his *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) for the definitive, synthetic treatment of the realist tradition and *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) for same regarding human rights.

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Zero Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security Enterprise Modernization

D'Anne E. Spence, Major, USAF

Every president since Franklin D. Roosevelt has authorized the production of nuclear weapons, requiring that the US government both understand the nuclear weapons program and establish policy for nuclear weapons employment.¹ Each of these presidents also has reiterated a desire to eliminate or reduce the role of nuclear weapons, only to confront the reality that as long as other countries possess them the United States must maintain a credible nuclear capability to deter adversaries and protect itself and its allies. Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is essential to US national security. Any degradation of its nuclear enterprise will impact negatively on its nuclear deterrent capability; an even greater impact could result if deterrence fails. Therefore, the United States must maintain its focus on nuclear weapons and the supporting infrastructure through modernization of the entire nuclear security enterprise (the enterprise), even while it pursues a world without nuclear weapons. To understand the current and future status of the nuclear enterprise, one must first consider its role in history and that of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Historic Roles

Nuclear deterrence has been a critical component of national security since World War II. During the Cold War, the nuclear weapons complex was a massive operation focused on an arms race with the Soviet Union and mass production of nuclear weapons.² As the Cold War endured, the average age of stockpiled weapons increased, reaching a plateau at approximately 12 years (see fig. 1). Weapons designers were focused on maximizing yield-to-weight ratios rather than increasing the longevity of the weapons.

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At the end of the weapons' life expectancy, they were dismantled and replaced with new ones designed to address the current perceived threat and to incorporate technological improvements. This high turnover created a solid base of expertise in weapons design. Between 1945 and 1992, these designers created innovative new designs and ultimately produced more than 65 different types of weapons, including air-dropped bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and artillery devices.³ Due to the evolutionary nature of the weapons, designers did not anticipate stockpiling them more than 12 years and therefore paid limited attention to designing components that would not corrode or fail over an extended life cycle.⁴ The end of the Cold War in 1990, the ratification of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991, and the subsequent US moratorium on underground nuclear testing dramatically changed the landscape of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. For the first time since the Manhattan Project, the United States was no longer building nuclear weapons and was in fact downsizing its nuclear arsenal.




Figure 1. Average age of US nuclear weapons stockpile. (Brig Gen Garrett Harencak, USAF, "Insider View of the NNSA and the Nuclear Enterprise," lecture, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 9 September 2010.)

In 2000, the NNSA was established by congressional mandate as a semiautonomous agency under the Department of Energy with the mission to provide management and "security to the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear non proliferation, and naval reactors programs."⁵ The NNSA maintains the US nuclear weapons stockpile and is tasked, in tandem with the Department of Defense, to ensure the US nuclear deterrent is

safe, secure, and effective to meet national security requirements. This joint task has become increasingly difficult over the past two decades, in part because various treaties and agreements have significantly restricted the development and testing of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons that were originally designed for a 10-year lifespan have been in the stockpile for 30-plus years. Each new treaty works to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy and further restrict what the United States can possess in its active nuclear stockpile. Self-imposed limitations on modernization also thwart efforts to extend the life of the aging nuclear weapons.

Over time, the huge nuclear security enterprise managed by the NNSA has shrunk from 15 to eight sites. Using a government-owned, contractor-operated model, the NNSA provides high-level oversight and requirements coordination. Its sites design, produce, and apply science and engineering to maintain and safeguard the nation's nuclear weapons. The enterprise, depicted in table 1, consists of three national laboratories, four engineering and production plants, and the Nevada National Security Site (until recently called the Nevada Test Site).

Table 1. Nuclear security enterprise facilities

Facility	Location	Primary Responsibility
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)	Los Alamos, NM	Weapons design
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)	Livermore, CA	Weapons design
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)	Albuquerque, NM Livermore, CA	Nonnuclear component design
Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12)	Oak Ridge, TN	Uranium
Savannah River Site (SRS)	Aiken, SC	Tritium
Pantex Plant (PX)	Amarillo, TX	Assembly/disassembly
Kansas City Plant (KCP)	Kansas City, MO	Nonnuclear component production/ procurement
Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)	Nye County, NV	National security experiments

While the size and structure of the enterprise may have changed since the Cold War, lingering elements of that era still affect the present-day mission of the NNSA, not the least of which is the drastic change in political perspective on acceptable weapons longevity.


Current Status

The average age of a weapon in the US nuclear stockpile today is over 25 years, well past its intended life. Meanwhile, funding from recent presidents and Congress for the stockpile and supporting infrastructure has reached historic lows due to the perceived reduced role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy. In fact, in the last five years the NNSA has lost 20 percent of its buying power although the vital mission to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile has not changed.⁶ Collectively, these events have reduced the nation's focus on nuclear weapons as a supporting pillar of US national security policy. This lack of focus has put the NNSA on a path to failure, because insufficient funding makes it more difficult to assess weapon reliability.⁷ This means the NNSA must maintain an increasingly dilapidated weapons complex and stockpile with maintenance funds that decrease significantly each year.

The aging weapons problem is further complicated by an unprecedented presidential commitment to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. In an April 2009 speech in Prague, Pres. Barack Obama created a paradox when, first, he said that the United States, as a world leader, would actively pursue a world without nuclear weapons and, second, promised that as long as other countries had nuclear weapons, the United States would maintain an effective nuclear deterrent.⁸ Since Prague, the United States has negotiated the "New START" treaty with Russia to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in both countries. Keeping with the Prague promises, the lower weapon levels negotiated in the New START translate into a critical need that the remaining weapons be highly credible and effective. To maintain US nuclear weapons as a credible deterrent, significant funding must go into the entire enterprise to reverse years of atrophy and neglect.

In 2008, the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Commission studied the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy and concluded that more money must be spent on the enterprise to maintain a credible US nuclear deterrent.⁹ This commission was established by Congress and co-chaired by William Perry, former secretary of defense, and James Schlesinger, former secretary of defense and energy. The commission confirmed in its report that the primary role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy is deterrence. They also provide extended deterrence to US allies and support nonproliferation among those allies who otherwise might develop their own arsenal without the US nuclear umbrella.¹⁰ The commission made several key recommendations on the future US strategic posture

which have served as a guide for the Obama administration. Notably, the commission recognized the substantial work that has already been invested in reducing the nuclear threat worldwide. The United States has reduced its arsenal from a peak of 31,255 warheads in 1969 to 5,113 warheads (total active and reserve) today; the lowest numbers since the Truman administration (see fig. 2).¹¹ Likewise, the Russians have significantly reduced their stockpile from over 45,000 at the peak of the Cold War.¹²



Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional nuclear warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement.

Figure 2. US nuclear weapons stockpile, 1945–2009. (Harencak, “Insider View of the NNSA and the Nuclear Enterprise.”)

Ratification of the New START will reduce these numbers further, sizably shrinking both countries’ nuclear arsenals. More significant, however, is the inverse correlation between reduced nuclear stockpile numbers and increased importance that the remaining weapons remain safe, secure, and effective.

Aging of the nuclear weapons, coupled with the decreased number of weapons available, creates increased operational risk to the nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies. This risk requires the United States to maintain a significant number of “hedge” weapons that protect it against technical uncertainty. Reducing the technical uncertainty in these aging weapons would allow the United States to reduce the overall number while maintaining the credibility of the weapons. However, current agreements and restrictions do not allow the United States to test weapons or to build newly designed weapons. These restrictions and the weapon-aging problem create a quandary for the directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence

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Livermore, and Sandia when they provide an independent assessment of the stockpile each year to the president, certifying the weapons are safe, secure, and effective. To alleviate these credibility concerns, the NNSA must continue to develop and fund two critical programs, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Life Extension Program (LEP).

Weapon surveillance is the foundation of both programs. Surveillance involves the evaluation of both nuclear and nonnuclear components of a weapon through destructive and nondestructive testing. The process is responsible for identifying original manufacturing flaws, design limitations, and effects of aging.¹³ The results from these tests drive the NNSA's understanding of weapon-aging issues and establish a baseline for life extension work. The surveillance results also feed into the modeling and simulation work done in the stewardship program to better understand the internal dynamics during a nuclear detonation.

The stewardship program was established in 1992 when the underground nuclear weapons testing moratorium was instituted "to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons."¹⁴ Its goal was to keep the nuclear stockpile reliable without nuclear testing. The SSP is a comprehensive, experiment-based modeling and simulation effort that applies data from multiple subcritical tests, simulating phases of a nuclear detonation, into high-speed computer models. The compilation of this data provides the NNSA a better understanding of nuclear weapons behavior.¹⁵ In the absence of nuclear weapons testing, the stewardship program becomes the primary tool used to certify weapon reliability each year. The complexity of thoroughly analyzing a nuclear detonation requires multiple nonnuclear experiments and the world's fastest supercomputers, driving up the cost of the program. Without full funding, the safety, security, and effectiveness of the weapons become questionable.

The surveillance program supports the Life Extension Program. The LEP is the solution to maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile without designing and building a new nuclear weapon.¹⁶ To comply with US policy on nonproliferation and worldwide dismantlement, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) highlights the preference for refurbishment of existing warheads or reuse of components from old weapons. To this end, the NNSA has a full spectrum of life extension options, all of which refurbish, reuse, or replace individual components within a weapon without giving it any newly designed components or new military capabilities. Replacement

of nuclear components is only done as a last resort to maintain a weapon and requires an extremely high level of political scrutiny for approval.¹⁷ The NNSA develops life extension programs based on DoD requirements for the enduring stockpile, which include an approximate 30-year life expectancy as well as added safety and security features to protect the weapons. The enduring stockpile, as established by the NPR, maintains the nuclear triad of SLBM and ICBM warheads and air-dropped bombs. To maintain all three legs of the triad, warheads from each leg must be life extended. Currently, the NNSA is in the production phase for the W76 SLBM life extension program. Already in the initial developmental phases, the B61, W78, and W88 warhead LEPs will follow. The LEP couples databases from the legacy systems and nuclear tests with the SSP data to sustain nuclear weapons for the enduring stockpile without having to test weapons explosively.

Just as aging weapons systems create a perception by some of diminished deterrence capabilities for the United States and its allies, the atrophied physical infrastructure of the enterprise further affects the credibility of US nuclear deterrence. Vital facilities within the enterprise date back 50 to 60 years to the Manhattan Project and are on the verge of catastrophic failure. Caustic chemicals and processes have sped up the corrosion and breakdown of the facilities. Then congressman Lincoln Davis (D-TN) stated on a tour of the nuclear facilities that he felt like he was in a Russian facility, given the utter state of disrepair.¹⁸ This deterioration occurred because the original facilities were built for maximizing production rather than for long-term structural integrity. The mission today is much different. Funding cuts and reduced stockpile numbers have forced the NNSA to consolidate facilities, reducing the overall square footage by 50 percent and the number of sites from 15 to eight.¹⁹ This transition eliminated redundancy, creating single points of failure for the majority of systems needed to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile. In other words, the NNSA is now a capability-based organization; that is, regardless of the size of the stockpile, it must ensure core competencies in several key areas to maintain the weapons stockpile rather than the capacity-based organization of the Cold War. Without significant investment in modernizing the existing infrastructure, the nuclear weapons program becomes vulnerable. There is no guarantee the sites are capable of maintaining their own operational status, let alone the operational status of nuclear weapons.

The Future of the Nuclear Enterprise

What is the future for the NNSA and the nuclear weapons complex? Most broadly, the NNSA must secure increased funding from Congress to modernize the enterprise. Recapitalization efforts must offset continued reduction in the nuclear stockpile and enable life extension programs, timely dismantlement, and proper management of fissile materials.²⁰ The smaller, streamlined enterprise must maintain all of the critical capabilities necessary to sustain the nuclear stockpile. The new facilities, although smaller, must be built to twenty-first-century safety and security standards. These standards are significantly different from original construction and will drive the cost of new facilities into the billions of dollars. The major facilities the NNSA anticipates building over the next 10 years to ensure uninterrupted capability and reduced risk include a chemical metallurgy research replacement facility at Los Alamos, a high-explosive pressing facility in Amarillo, and a uranium processing facility at Oak Ridge. While the costs and challenges will be high, there are also benefits in these modernization efforts. First, the new facilities will be more reliable, safe, and secure. Also, the external security benefits of the infrastructure improvements cannot be ignored. For example, at Oak Ridge the security cordon around special nuclear material will be reduced from 150 acres to 15 acres once the uranium processing facility is operational. This reduction will lower security costs and the possibility of loss of special nuclear material due to the smaller footprint and state-of-the-art facilities.

The infrastructure available to support the reduced number of nuclear weapons must be modernized to avoid operational risk that increases as the United States reduces the number of weapons in its arsenal. The modernization of the nuclear infrastructure will require significant, sustained investment and commitment over the next several decades. Without this investment, the risk associated with assessing the safety, security, and effectiveness of the weapons will increase to an unacceptable level.

The Perry-Schlesinger report acknowledges this reality explicitly. It states that to invest effectively in nuclear weapons systems through stewardship and life extension, there must also be investment in the enterprise infrastructure. Without such dual investment, the United States will be unable to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. As it continues to reduce its stockpile toward zero without fully addressing the aging issues in both the stockpile and the infrastructure, its nuclear umbrella will lack the credibility needed to deter potential adversaries and protect allies. These factors could

lead other countries to question the viability of the US nuclear program and the credibility of the weapons currently in the stockpile. Without the resources and facilities needed to maintain the weapons, the deterrent effect is dramatically reduced.

Even with increased funding for weapons and infrastructure modernization, the complex cannot be properly maintained without the sustained efforts and engagement of the best and brightest scientists and engineers. The world's top scientists initially produced the atomic bomb, and the same critical skills will be needed to maintain the weapons complex for the foreseeable future. The end of underground nuclear testing launched the stewardship program to ensure nuclear weapons reliability through subcritical tests and other experimentation via simulation, modeling, and high-power computing. The critical skills required to maximize the science, technology, and engineering capacity and properly execute the SSP underpin the strength of the US nuclear deterrent and establish a fundamental understanding of nuclear weapon behavior. Consequently, to assess the stockpile, appropriately trained scientists are needed to resolve technical issues, extend the lifespan of weapons, and aid in dismantlement activities.²¹ Maintaining the critical skills of the workforce is at the core of meeting mission requirements.

The reduction in mission legitimacy, the increasing age of employees, and other pressures have created the perception that employment on nuclear weapons is no longer important to the national security of the United States. This perception has caused many potential workers to seek other opportunities with higher career potential. The majority of nuclear weapons program personnel have spent their entire careers working on nuclear weapons. As Dr. Chris Deeney says, "The only certainty is the increasing age of the workforce."²² Only a handful of individuals who still work for the NNSA have experience designing weapons and performing underground tests. Some of those have stayed on well past retirement because of a desire to continue to contribute to US national security.²³ The fact of the matter is, as these individuals retire and eventually die, their knowledge dies with them. Therefore, it is vital to get a young, motivated workforce in place that can learn from the legacy of the past while building the future surety. The surveillance program's success relies on an engaged, highly trained, and motivated workforce. The pool of recruits is inherently small due to the highly focused training and US citizenship requirement. For example, stewardship program experts need specialized

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degrees and experience in such areas as high-density physics to understand nuclear weapons behavior. To attract this kind of talent, the NNSA must have important national security work, including development and experimentation that is unavailable anywhere else in the world and aids in the understanding of nuclear behavior. It must also invest in the world's highest-power computers to solve the challenging modeling and simulation problems. These efforts will entice the nation's best scientists into a career of service to the US nuclear program.

As the stockpile decreases, investment in human capital is essential to ensure the next generation of scientists and engineers has the right set of skills, expertise, and experience. The credibility of the reduced stockpile hinges on the workforce's manipulation of the science, technology, and engineering base to fully understand the weapon-aging issues and develop LEPs to address these concerns.

Budget cuts over the past 20 years have reduced both the government and contractor workforce necessary to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons. The president's budget request for FY 2011 starts to correct years of atrophy with a proposed 13.4 percent increase to \$11.2 billion from FY 2010. The appeal and rationale for this funding increase is outlined in the NNSA's yearly report to Congress, which includes a "year-by-year resource plan from fiscal year (FY) 2008 through 2030."²⁴ Figure 3 shows the estimated cost for modernizing the enterprise from FY 2011 to FY 2030. The legend breaks the funding into large program blocks to easily represent the scale of the funding effort the NNSA faces. "Directed Stockpile Work" addresses work on the actual weapons, for example LEPs and component replacements; "ST&E Campaigns" includes any work done to support stewardship, including subcritical experiments and high-powered computing; "Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities" accounts for processes such as tritium operations, maintaining existing infrastructure, and new infrastructure construction; and "Other Weapons Activities" encapsulates other funding requirements, including the Office of Secure Transportation, which is responsible for transporting nuclear weapons throughout the enterprise.

Figure 3 shows a bulge in the funding requirements for the NNSA in approximately the 2017 time frame. This funding spike coincides with several major projects that will be critical in modernizing the enterprise, including the first production unit for the B61 life extension and initial construction of the chemical metallurgy facility and the uranium process-

ing facility. These modernization efforts are being planned to comply with the NPR strategy that articulates a reduced role for nuclear weapons in national security, as well as the president's vision to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. To turn the president's vision into reality, there must be a long-term fiscal commitment to the modernization of the enterprise to maintain uninterrupted capability. Only through modernizing outdated equipment, processes, and weapons will the NNSA be able to reliably reduce the size of the arsenal while maintaining the stockpile in line with the president's vision.




Figure 3. An out-years budget requirements estimate of NNSA weapons activities in then-year dollars. (NNSA, FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Summary [Washington: Department of Energy, May 2010], 28.)

Recent political events have demonstrated that all funding of the enterprise has been heavily influenced by the ratification of the New START.²⁵ The New START has been a primary focus for President Obama and will further reduce the number of accountable strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 for both parties, 74 percent lower than START I.²⁶ President Obama and Russian president Dmitri Medvedev signed the treaty on 8 April 2010, and it was ratified by the US Senate in December 2010. Once the New START enters into force, the agreed upon reductions must be complete in seven years.²⁷

The nuclear weapons strategy established by the NPR was used to develop the US position for New START negotiations. The NNSA worked closely with the negotiation team to understand the impact of the significant reductions on the nuclear weapons stockpile. The New START

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and the NPR provide a clear roadmap for the NNSA to begin executing infrastructure modernization necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile.

President Obama's vision to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy, coupled with his commitment to the New START, has raised the nuclear weapons debate again to the presidential level. This new awareness has fostered an opportunity to obtain a national consensus on the future of nuclear weapons. Initially introduced by the Perry-Schlesinger report and solidified in the NPR and the New START, the NNSA is beginning to both turn the tide on Cold War legacy weapons and determine the right size stockpile for today's global threats. There is currently broad, national consensus that the enterprise must be revitalized to reverse years of neglect and sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile for the foreseeable future. This national consensus is underpinned by the argument that as the United States draws down its nuclear weapons stockpile, it must also fund the enterprise to ensure there is no doubt that the remaining weapons will deliver the expected effects in the expected locations should the president choose to employ them.

The Obama administration's *Nuclear Posture Review Report* states, "To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today, with the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons in the future, we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related Life Extension Programs (LEPs), while cultivating the nuclear infrastructure, expert workforce, and leadership required to sustain it."²⁸ This statement affirms the ultimate goal of reaching a world without nuclear weapons, but until that day, the United States must fund the long-term modernization effort of the entire enterprise. 

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Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power by Robert Kaplan. Random House, 2010, 384 pp., \$28.00.

Those familiar with Robert Kaplan's work know he has a reputation for unorthodox analysis that is rooted in his broad and deep study of history, supplemented by his extensive travels through the subject countries. I have always found Kaplan to be provocative and thoughtful. His articles and books are more than worth the time it takes to work through them. One of his latest works, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, does not disappoint in this regard and provides a well-written analysis of the region and how it could shape America's future in the world.

Kaplan views the Indian Ocean more through a maritime-centric than air- or land-centric lens. He nonetheless provides all military professionals a rich collection of hypotheses about how economic, political, military, religious, and social factors will interact. Kaplan believes this region, along with the western Pacific, will "truly be the strategic heart of the world."

True to form, the author bases his analysis on extensive travel through the Indian Ocean region. He provides an excellent overview of the complex issues at stake in this dynamic and increasingly important region.

For example, Oman "shows that something Americans believe is a bad thing—absolute monarchy—can produce good results." In southwest Asia "our struggle to separate Afghanistan from Pakistan may be in vain if geography, history, and culture are any guide," while "Burma provides a code for understanding the world to come" Indeed, "China's drive southward and India's drive both westward and eastward—to keep it from being encircled by China's navy—means that both powers collide in Burma."

A consistent theme running through the book is the interplay between India, China, and the United States, whose fortunes and futures come together in the Indian Ocean. Kaplan sees India as a key player:

India will emerge as a key "swing" state in international politics . . . The story of a rising India is, at least in military terms, the story of its navy. Hemmed in on land by a combination of the Himalayan Mountains and failing states from Pakistan and Nepal to Bangladesh and Burma, India can best project power at sea. . . . India can play the role of chief balancer vis-à-vis China . . . one cannot caution enough how subtly this game will have to be played, for India will never officially join the United States in any anti-Chinese alliance the way Japan joined the United States in an anti-Soviet one during the Cold War.

Kaplan concludes that "China's move into the Indian Ocean constitutes less an aggressive example of empire building than a subtle grand strategy to take advantage of legitimate commercial opportunities wherever they might arise in places

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that matter to its military and economic interests. China is adroitly riding a wave of economic history rather than plotting it out in the first place.” As for China being a military threat, he observes “There is nothing illegitimate about the rise of the Chinese military. China’s ascendancy can fairly be compared with that of the United States following its own consolidation of land-based power in the aftermath of the Civil War and the settlement of the American West, which culminated at the turn of the twentieth century with the construction of the Panama Canal. Strong American-Chinese bilateral relations going forward are not only plausible, but might be the best-case scenario for the global system in the twenty-first century, allowing for true world governance to take shape.”

The author offers his own solution for relations with a rising China: “Something quite nuanced: the United States will both compete and cooperate with China. The American-Chinese rivalry of the future could give new meaning to the word ‘subtlety,’ especially in its economic and diplomatic arrangements. Yet, if this relationship has its hard edges . . . one of those will be where the two countries’ navies interact: in the Greater Indian Ocean and western Pacific.”

In terms of a US strategy for managing relations with India and China, Kaplan advises that

leveraging allies like India and Japan against China is responsible in one sense only: it helps provide a mechanism for the US to gradually and elegantly cede great power responsibilities to like-minded others as their own capacities rise, as part of a studied retreat from a unipolar world. But to follow such a strategy in isolation risks unduly and unnecessarily alienating China. Thus, leveraging allies must be part of a wider military strategy that seeks to draw in China as part of an Asia-centric alliance system, in which militaries cooperate on a multitude of issues.

While I do not agree with all of Kaplan’s points, having spent most of the last six years in the Pacific I find a significant portion of his analysis rings true, especially his point that “the real lesson of the Indian Ocean world [is] nuanced relationships rather than overt alliances and basing arrangements.”

In sum, I highly recommend this book to anyone who desires a greater understanding of the complex issues the United States will confront in the Indian Ocean region through the first part of this century and likely well beyond. The prose is easy to digest, and even if only for the history lesson, the book is well worth your time.

Gen Edward A. Rice Jr., USAF

Commander, Air Education and Training Command

The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America, edited by Jim Lacey. Naval Institute Press, 2008, 186 pp., \$18.00.

This book should be required reading for every citizen of the United States and the European Union. Jim Lacey has done us all an incredibly valuable service by collecting this illuminating volume of writings. It is not a collection of writing *about* jihadists; it is a collection of writings *by* jihadists. As such, it provides an

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enlightening and, in many cases, alarming insight into the goals, the motives, and the very minds of jihadists. It is very much like reading their personal mail communicating with each other. *Canons of Jihad* reveals what jihadists are saying to each other, about each other, and about themselves. Every member of any US administration, as well as every member of Congress, should take the time to read this book and reflect upon its implications. That bold statement is very much like recommending, in 1936, that leaders around the world take the time to read *Mein Kampf*. Adolph Hitler was extraordinarily clear in describing his intentions and his underlying motivations, but the world in general did not take heed. So it seems today. Although we are not dealing with a single person advancing national socialism as a means to grab enough power to threaten the world, we are faced with a relatively small group of people who are even more determined to seize political power to impose their ideology and their religion upon the world at large.

Jim Lacey has made it much easier to understand just who these people are, what they really want, and how they intend to get it. As he states in his introduction, one of the major disincentives of reading jihadist writing is that it is so incredibly steeped in “religious” scholarship. Jihadists do not merely state facts and assumptions or use analysis to support conclusions. Instead, almost all of their writings are burdened with extensive religious or quasi-religious justification for a statement or a point of view. As Lacey points out, the ratio of noise to signal, or justification to message, generally approaches ten to one. Lacey uses the term *dense* to describe it; *impenetrable* might be a more appropriate description for most Westerners. Lacey has made literature that is simply too dense for most readers at least comprehensible for most.

Chapter 1, “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” a mere three pages, is worth the price of the book. It is the 1998 declaration of war against the United States issued by the “World Islamic Front” and signed by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, among others. Many Westerners tend to consider a fatwa as the ravings of a lunatic—someone shrilly screaming incomprehensible noise. A reflective reading of this chapter should cause a reader to pause and hear the message in the noise. These people are serious—deadly serious—and are absolutely convinced that any means to achieve their ends are fully justified, even required by God. They make three points in this document: the United States is “occupying” the Arabian Peninsula; it has been massacring Iraqis; and its ultimate aim is to permanently occupy the Arabian Peninsula as a means of guaranteeing Israel’s survival.

For a critical thinker, the appropriate question is not whether this point of view is accurate or even partially justified; the appropriate question is “Who does this message appeal to and how convincing is it to that audience?” The answer to that question is sobering, particularly in light of the accompanying fatwa: “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip.” Note the call to every Muslim and the universality of violent engagement worldwide. The message continues: “We, with God’s help, call on every Muslim

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who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money whenever and wherever they find it." To ignore the implications of such a call to violence requires a determined refusal to acknowledge a very real threat.

This somewhat detailed dissection of the first chapter could apply equally to the rest of the book as well. Lacey presents the distilled messages in a generally readable, comprehensible style. Americans in particular should understand the Muslim Brotherhood and what their goals are, as well as the fact that they have assassinated not just one but two Egyptian presidents. The Muslim Brotherhood is not your local Moose Lodge. A common theme is that replacing "apostate" despotic rulers in the Middle East is an intermediate goal that must be preceded by cutting off the support of the "Great Satan" United States. To cut off that support, the United States must be attacked and neutralized worldwide by any and every means possible. Only with the United States neutralized will the imposition of Islam be possible worldwide.

In the West, we tend to compartmentalize our lives and our environment, with a compartment for politics and government, another for religion, another for the law, another for business, and yet another for personal behavior. It is difficult for most Westerners to comprehend that Islam rolls all of these compartmentalized parts into a single integrated ideology; it is not just a religion, it is an all-encompassing, all-consuming ideology that would *impose* itself on every facet of human life. This truth emerges from the writings of jihadists to jihadists.

Lacey's book is not perfect. Even with the majority of religious justification stripped away, it is still tedious. It reminded me a great deal of the various communiqués and manifestos issued by an assortment of "revolutionaries" in the 1970s and 1980s. That cannot be helped. It is still one of the best, most readable insights into the mind of the jihadist I have read. Get a copy. Read it. Consider it in light of the recent unrest in the Middle East. Believe it.

Thomas E. Ward II, PhD

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East by Gilles Kepel, translated by Pascale Ghazaleh. Harvard University Press, 2008, 336 pp., \$27.95.

Gilles Kepel, a professor of political science at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, is a noted author of numerous books and commentaries on Islam and Middle East politics and has taught at New York University and Columbia University as a visiting professor. He holds degrees in Arabic, English, and philosophy and doctorates in sociology and political science.

Beyond Terror and Martyrdom is not a light read; however, it is worthwhile because it discusses salient issues concerning the use of terrorism and martyrdom as political tools to shape public policy and illustrates the complexity and causes of terrorist activities that have plagued the Middle East and Europe during the last 20

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years and precipitated the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It begins with the premise that two separate processes have influenced the landscape of the Middle East. One was the political agenda led by President Bush, who demonstrated a sense of urgency to bring democracy to this region through the invasion of Iraq. The second process, still ongoing, provides the majority of the content of this book and is led by avowed terrorists bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other members of al-Qaeda who use terror and martyrdom as the change agent to obtain their objectives. Kepel notes that both of these processes unsuccessfully tried to achieve their objectives through violence. The end state in the Middle East sought by either side—namely democratic rule heralded by President Bush or a ruling Islamist state sought by bin Laden et al.—has yet to occur.

Kepel offers numerous and detailed insights into the possible motivations for and use of suicidal terror bombings, political murders, and attempted terror strikes from various terrorist organizations linked to the Middle East. Through this lens, he suggests a host of reasons why these activities have occurred, based on his extensive study of this arena of political activity. It serves as a useful means to inform the reader on these issues and provide evidence for the basic theme of the work.

From his findings, Kepel suggests a different approach to stability in the region: to unite the economic power of Europe (note that Kepel is from France), based on its industrial and technological strength, and marry these attributes with the petroleum wealth and human resources of the Middle East to move past the perceived need for terrorism and martyrdom as the means to achieve political goals for the region. It is left to the reader to determine whether his approach is feasible for achieving peace and stability in the Middle East.

The reader, whether well informed on Middle East politics or possessing just a casual newspaper-supplied understanding, shall become better informed having read this book. Kepel is a knowledgeable and articulate writer, which makes this book worth your time and effort to read. I recommend *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom* for all the reasons stated above, but especially because it offers a new approach to Middle East stability that possesses global security implications.

Col Joseph J. McCue, USAF, Retired
Leesburg, Virginia

Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon
by Bernard Rougier. Harvard University Press, 2007, 360 pp., \$28.95.

Everyday Jihad provides an interpretive narrative of the rise of Sunni jihadist militarism in Palestinian refugee camps of South Lebanon. French political scientist and former professor at the Universite St. Joseph in Beirut (1996–2002), Bernard Rougier, currently serves as an assistant professor in political science at the University of Clermont and Sciences Po, Paris. The author was granted unfettered access to the jihadist networks in the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, Ain al-Helweh, while researching his book. Consequently, *Everyday Jihad* resonates with his pioneering fieldwork and is destined to become a seminal work on Islamic jihad.

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Approximately 370,000 Palestinians reside in Lebanese refugee camps. This is equivalent to 12 percent of Lebanon's population and 10 percent of the Palestinian diaspora in the Middle East. *Everyday Jihad* chronicles the radicalization of the refugee camps and the resultant instability. Southern Lebanon has served as a battleground for decades as regional neighbors Syria, Iran, Israel, and myriad factions including the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Maronite Christians, and disparate Islamic groups have sought to leverage a despondent, poverty-stricken, and displaced Palestinian populace to marginalize political and religious rivals. Rougier argues that the social and political constructs of the refugee camps have been torn asunder by the machinations of these external actors and sectarian interests.

Since its defeat by Israel in 1967, Syria has frequently intervened in the social, political, and military construct of the Palestinian refugee camps in pursuit of an offshore balancing strategy against Israel. Syria's decades-long attempts to marginalize Yasser Arafat and his PLO irredentist goals has increased its regional standing and has also ensured that Israel continues to be perceived as a common enemy to the Islamic countries of the region. Iran's similar strategy against Israel through its support of Hezbollah has been equally divisive in curtailing the nationalist aspirations of Lebanese Palestinians.

Rougier is most compelling in his contention that the Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon has become increasingly radical following the destruction of most of the refugee camps during the 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon. Using the Ain al-Helweh refugee camp as a model, he traces the rise of salafist Islam and its ideological battle with Palestinian nationalism. Established by Abdullah Azzam in the Peshawar region of Pakistan, the salafist movement believes that an original and strict interpretation of the Quran bestows a Muslim identity upon its adherents that obviates the need for a separate social, cultural, or political identity; hence, there is no need for a separate Palestine. This fundamentalist belief in a Muslim identity has led to an antagonistic relationship with Palestinian nationalists and the Shia-dominated Hezbollah. The two most prominent Lebanese salafist organizations, the al-Nur Mosque network and Ubat al-Answar, actively seek to replace the existing social, political, and military networks of the refugee camps with salafist ideology.

Salafist doctrine also requires that Muslims wage a perpetual global jihad against all *Kuffar* (unbelievers). According to salafist ideology, the ranks of unbelievers include the so-called apostate Muslim governments of the world. Adherence to this principle is clearly discernable in the large number of Ain al-Helweh salafists that traveled to Iraq and joined the ranks of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's organization several years ago. Rougier maintains that the salafist-jihadist phenomenon exists independently of terrorist groups; however, salafism frequently uses terrorist groups with a global reach. The salafists are a grassroots movement that uses existing terrorist groups to pursue global jihad.

Rougier's discourse on the rising influence of salafist ideology within Palestinian refugee camps can be best characterized as a "clash of modernity." Salafist ideology seeks to marginalize the trappings of modern civilization and replace it with

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traditional worship of the Quran. *Everyday Jihad* reveals how easily the despondent and frustrated youth bulge of the Palestinian refugee camps can be mobilized toward destructive purposes. Rougier reinforces David Kilcullen's polemic assertions from his book, *Accidental Guerrilla*, that Islamic extremists are currently engaged in a vitriolic clash of modernity and a global insurgency against the perceived apostate Muslim states of the world.

Everyday Jihad adds greatly to the existing literature on global jihad. Rougier poignantly describes how ideas are transmitted to disposed, oppressed, and frustrated youth to mobilize them to conduct violence on behalf of a cause. The single criticism of this book is that Rougier fails to adequately address the response of moderate Palestinian refugees to the spread of salafist radicalism within their refugee camps; however, this should not detract from the overall high quality of his analysis. I highly recommend this book to all who are interested in obtaining a better understanding of the dynamic, sectarian relationships endemic to Lebanon and the complexities inherent in Islamic extremism.

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Building Security in the Persian Gulf by Robert E. Hunter. RAND, 2010, 202 pp., \$24.00.

In his monograph *Building Security in the Persian Gulf*, Robert Hunter analyzes current conditions and challenges, explores opportunities for improving security, and provides comprehensive criteria and recommendations for building a new security structure for the region. He emphasizes the need for the United States, its allies, and other key players to plan for that new security structure as circumstances change, particularly with the US withdrawal from Iraq. Hunter draws on his extensive experience in diplomacy, public policy, and international relations research to create a concise discussion of the issues. His experience in developing and implementing Middle East policy lends great credence to his work.

Building Security seeks to define and develop the ways and means for achieving an end state of long-term security in the Persian Gulf region while also reducing the risks and costs to the United States. The monograph is intended to take a longer view, without stating specific, detailed solutions to current challenges and generally succeeds in that intent. While the discussion focuses on US opportunities, actions, and implications, Hunter acknowledges significant challenges for the United States acting unilaterally and discusses roles and opportunities for other actors. Although the stated focus is on the Persian Gulf region, he widens his aperture to include most of the major actors and challenges in the Middle East that obviously impact security in the Gulf.

Hunter organizes his analysis around eight key parameters: the future of Iraq; interacting with Iran; asymmetric threats; regional reassurance; addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict; regional tensions, conflicts, and crises; the role of external actors; and arms control and confidence-building measures. This comprehensive

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array more than adequately covers the gambit and serves to demonstrate just how complex developing a successful, long-term security structure in the region will be. Before presenting the details of his analysis and recommendations, the author provides a very good introduction and synopsis of regional history to provide background and context, albeit a bit Iran-centric.

Perhaps the biggest challenge presented throughout the monograph is the precise role the United States can and should play. On one hand, Hunter makes it clear that the United States must be the central player and take the lead in providing interim security and shaping the future security structure. He also notes, however, that some nations, notably Iran, will see any involvement by the United States as an impediment to progress. This extends to US involvement in multinational organizations like NATO that might support solutions. He strongly emphasizes that any solutions must be rooted in the region and not driven by US actions.

Weaving throughout his discussions are the two lingering challenges of Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran is the center of most of the deepest challenges and roadblocks to progress. The nature of its nuclear program, how Iran supports or curtails terrorism, and the approach it takes with its neighbors will determine whether those neighbors perceive it as a threat or potential partner. In response to this uncertainty, Hunter defines several opportunities for including Iran or keeping the door open for future cooperation. The Arab-Israeli conflict presents an equally challenging, widely acknowledged roadblock to progress, particularly as others perceive US efforts for a solution. This conflict is the clearest example of extra-Gulf issues that deeply affect security solutions throughout the region.

The most useful discussions are in chapters 9 and 10, defining the building blocks of a new security structure and the importance of arms control and confidence-building measures, including the key point—analyzing the various forms of threats is the essential element in determining the right responses and framework for the structure. Hunter correctly recognizes that the wide range of regional threats requires more than military-oriented solutions, including economic, political, and cultural measures. This argument points out the sheer complexity of any new structure and lends support to his proposal for multiple approaches and his extensive list of recommended criteria for success.

If there is any bias in the analysis, it is the reliance on multinational organizations and multilateral approaches. While Hunter acknowledges the opportunity for bilateral agreements and cooperation, he underplays the value of bilateral efforts as an alternative to failures in multilateral approaches. For the United States and the Persian Gulf states, a bilateral approach could resemble the web of post-World War II agreements in East Asia that now underpin in part expanding multinational organizations there.

The value of this work is its consolidation of a wide range of issues and framing a diverse set of criteria for potential solutions. The monograph is particularly useful for readers with only a basic knowledge of Middle Eastern politics and diplomacy who want to develop a deeper understanding; for example congressional staff,

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defense officials, and proponents of grand strategy. I strongly recommend it to anyone seeking appreciation of the intricacies of building security in the Persian Gulf.

Lt Col W. Paul Mazzeno, USAF

Acting Alone: A Scientific Study of American Hegemony and Unilateral Use-of-Force Decision Making by Bradley F. Podliska. Lexington Books, 2010, 272 pp., \$75.00.

The use of unilateral force by US presidents is a much maligned, but little studied, phenomenon. While there are no shortages of texts and articles noting, and usually condemning, unilateral action, few in-depth studies on why a president would decide to commit to such an unpopular activity exist. With Bradley Podliska's *Acting Alone*, this underresearched aspect of foreign policy decision making finally receives the rigorous social scientific analysis it deserves. In this monograph, Podliska, an analyst for the Department of Defense, examines the factors specifically connected to the decision to use unilateral force, considering how a president would weigh the potential problems with multilateral action against the benefits of unilateral action. Through statistical analysis, experimental methodology, and case studies, he explicates why presidents would find the decision to "act alone" so appealing among given options.

There are two major theoretical aspects of note in this text. The first is Podliska's analytic separation between (a) a president's decision to use force and (b) the decision whether to use this force in a unilateral or multilateral manner. While this may seem a simple distinction, the author rightly notes that most previous research blurs these two decisions together. More to the point, information and pressures that are highly relevant for the first decision may be less relevant, or not important at all, for the other (and vice versa). In focusing on the latter, Podliska provides valuable insight into why presidents decide to act unilaterally despite the widespread belief that such actions are inherently unpopular.

This brings us to Podliska's second major theoretical contribution: his explanation of the factors that lead presidents to decide between unilateral and multilateral action, decision (b). Reviewing the costs of multilateralism (in terms of burden sharing, inaction, collaboration/cooperation, reciprocity, and legitimacy) and the benefits of unilateralism (lower costs, public ambivalence on multilateralism, and sole reliance on the US military), Podliska presents an expected utilities model for unilateral use-of-force decision making. Major factors include the relative military power gap between the United States and its opponent as well as situational factors, such as conflicts occurring within the Western Hemisphere, thus touching on the Monroe Doctrine. The first element, on military power, focuses on military revolutions. In Podliska's argument, the hegemonic status of the United States needs to be understood in the context of the fast-paced military revolutions as well as the current revolution in military affairs (RMA). This revolutionized military factor incorporates military preponderance, technology, and force deployment as aspects of importance. Presidents consider the comparative gap in military revolutions

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between the United States and opponent states, as well as situational factors—hemispheric location, national security versus humanitarian intervention, and the like—when deciding how to act. Under this model, presidents will decide to use force unilaterally in cases where the gap is large and situational factors increase the saliency to US security. In cases of smaller gaps and less immediate security concerns, they are more likely to opt for multilateral responses. To help analyze the model, Podliska provides an empirical contribution, the Composite Indicator of Military Revolutions (CIMR) dataset. While useful for unilateral use-of-force decisions, this dataset has broader applicability as an alternate measure of military power.

The theoretical and empirical contributions of this book are strong. Moving away from the hyperbole and polemic that surround unilateral use-of-force decisions, Podliska's scientific analysis of what these decisions entail is a welcome addition to the literature. While some of the statistical results are a bit weaker than one would prefer, the additional evidence from experimentation and case studies (focusing on the Bay of Pigs debacle, George H. W. Bush's invasion of Panama, and the 1991 Gulf War) strengthens the book's main thesis. As such, this study requires researchers to consider seriously, first, whether our assumptions of the costs of unilateral use-of-force are accurate and, second, the role of revolutionized militaries in presidential decision making. However, there are some weaknesses in this text. The most notable issue is the model of unilateral use-of-force decision making that Podliska presents. While useful as a starting point, it is underspecified and overly broad in some ways. A more rigorous "mapping" and comparative strength/importance between the various factors influencing the president's decision would have helped. While Podliska is right to separate the use of force and type of force (unilateral vs. multilateral) decisions analytically, one assumes that some path dependency exists between these two choices. Even if gaps in military power and situational factors are the most relevant issues for the unilateral/multilateral decision, his model needs some recognition of how factors influencing the initial decision may shape the available "space" for choices in the latter. However, as his model was intended to present a new aspect in presidential decision making and makes no claims to absolute comprehensiveness, this weakness is minor and provides fruitful avenues for future research.

Acting Alone is a valuable contribution to the social science literature on foreign policy decision making, even with the noted weaknesses. Anyone interested in presidential use-of-force decisions, analysts concerned with the role of military revolutions in presidential decision making, and scholars examining multilateral use-of-force decisions would all profit from this text.

Phillip W. Gray, PhD
US Coast Guard Academy

Known and Unknown: A Memoir by Donald Rumsfeld. Sentinel, 2011, 815 pp., \$36.00.

Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld admits he made a few mistakes. He regrets having referred to France and Germany as “old Europe” because they opposed a preventive war against Iraq. He wishes he could take back, “We know where they are,” when asked about WMD stockpiles in Iraq. And he is sorry that he dismissed the mass looting in post-invasion Iraq as “Stuff happens!” Above all, he says he should have insisted that Pres. George W. Bush accept his letter of resignation in May 2004 following the revelation of the scandalous American mistreatment of detainees at Iraq’s infamous Abu Ghraib prison. “More than anything else I have failed to do . . . I regret that I did not leave at that point.”

Rumsfeld’s memoir is important because he was a principal architect of the greatest US foreign policy disaster since the Vietnam War. Expect no apologies, however. *Known and Unknown* defends the decision to invade Iraq as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks while absolving Rumsfeld of any real responsibility for what went wrong in post-invasion Iraq. Indeed, according to Rumsfeld, invading Iraq was Bush’s idea, which he first broached to Rumsfeld on 26 September—15 days after the attacks. Bob Woodward and Rumsfeld biographer Bradley Graham (*By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld* [Public Affairs, 2009], tell a different story. Within hours after the 9/11 attacks, Rumsfeld told JCS chairman Richard Myers that the United States should consider striking Osama bin Laden *and* Saddam Hussein. The next day, in a meeting of Bush’s war cabinet, Rumsfeld asked if 9/11 offered an opportunity to attack Iraq. Bush himself recalls a 15 September meeting at Camp David in which Rumsfeld said that “Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism.”

Big mistakes were made in Iraq, but not by Rumsfeld. The size of the invasion force was not an issue. “Among Myers, [CENTCOM commander GEN Tommy] Franks, and me, there was no conflict whatsoever regarding force levels. If anyone suggested to Franks or Myers that the war plan lacked sufficient troops, they never informed me.” The real problems were a dysfunctional interagency policy process, a non-team playing secretary of state, and an out-of-control Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Rumsfeld believes that “the President did not receive, and *may not have insisted upon*, [emphasis added] a timely consideration of his options before he made a decision.” The culprit? National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. “The most notable feature of Rice’s management of the interagency policy process was her commitment . . . to ‘bridging’ differences between the agencies, rather than bringing those differences to the President for decisions . . . Rice seemed to believe that it was a personal shortcoming on her part if she had to ask the President to resolve an interagency difference.” The result was that “fundamental differences remained unaddressed and unresolved,” among them the debate over how quickly—and via what mechanism—to transfer sovereignty to Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell presided over a State Department that “seemed to remain skeptical about President Bush and less than eager to implement his policies.” And

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an arrogant L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer III, picked to run the US occupation of Iraq, refused to report through the Defense Department, choosing to report instead directly to Bush and Rice. “The muddled lines of authority meant there was no single individual in control or responsible for Bremer’s work. There were far too many hands on the steering wheel, which, in my view, was a formula for running the truck into a ditch.”

Rumsfeld believes that Bush not only failed to discipline the interagency process but also mislabeled the war against Islamist extremists as a “war on terrorism.” The word *war* “focused people’s attention on military action, overemphasizing . . . the role of the armed forces.” More important, terrorism “was not the enemy but a tactic our enemies were using successfully against us. Saying we were in a war against terrorism was like saying we were in a war against bombers or we were waging a war on tanks, as opposed to a war against the people using those weapons.” Rumsfeld also chides Bush and Rice for embracing “far-reaching language about democracy” in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. “I believed in expanding the frontiers of freedom where possible, but that goal had to be tempered by our limited ability to achieve it.” Rumsfeld suspects a connection between the failure to find WMD in Iraq and a “way to change the subject” by focusing on democratization as the primary purpose of invading Iraq.

Known and Unknown is of course about Rumsfeld’s entire career, not just his six-year stint as secretary of defense under Bush. A politically ambitious Washington player for over 30 years, Rumsfeld served as a member of Congress, assistant to Pres. Richard M. Nixon (who, of all people, once called Rumsfeld a “ruthless little bastard”), US ambassador to NATO, White House chief of staff to Pres. Gerald R. Ford, and later, Ford’s secretary of defense.

Yet it was Rumsfeld’s *second* performance at the Pentagon for which he will be remembered, and the judgment of history is likely to be harsh. The bill of indictment includes his multiple failures in Iraq, most notoriously an insistence on an invasion force too small to seize control on the country, his gratuitous intimidation and humiliation of military professionals, his bureaucratic megalomania, and his skill, impressively evident in his memoir, at side-stepping responsibility for bad decisions. Above all was his addiction to perfecting US conventional military supremacy at the expense of preparing for the politically messy, low-tech, irregular wars that have dominated the post-Soviet world and have long occasioned failed American military interventions in non-Western societies. (Rumsfeld claims that “the transformation agenda I supposedly brought to the Pentagon was not of my own making” but rather the product of Bush’s “explicit guidance to make the Defense Department ‘lethal, light and mobile’.”)

With good reason is Rumsfeld compared to Robert McNamara in their respective performances as secretary of defense. It is all there: the hard-charging CEO reputation, the inability to admit mistakes, the slick press conference performances, the arrogant disdain for professional military opinion, the excessive confidence in technological solutions, the conviction that leadership is simply good management,

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the abject failure to understand the nature of the war at hand—and finally, their departure from office as political liabilities for the presidents they served.

Rumsfeld is right: he should have insisted on leaving office back in 2004.

Jeffrey Record, PhD
Air War College

National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities by Colin S. Gray.
Potomac Books, 2009, 334, pp., \$60.00.

Clausewitz was right: war is the province of uncertainty and chance. The future is unpredictable. Politics is or should be the driver of strategy and, in turn, military planning. The United States is seriously deficient on that point. It is excellent at the tactical and operational level in regular warfare but wanting in connecting strategy to policy and in counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. Further, the United States is guilty of presentism and not much given to the study of the historical bases of strategy and defense planning. Those are some of the ideas common in Colin Gray's recent writing and teaching, and they are presented in convenient form in his *National Security Dilemmas*.

Prof. Colin S. Gray is too well known to most readers of *Strategic Studies Quarterly* to require much introduction. He has been a frequent lecturer at many of the US war colleges and staff schools and is well published in some of our most prestigious academic journals, such as *Foreign Affairs* and *International Security*. One of the leading (perhaps *the* leading) strategic thinkers in the West, his published books are many. Further, Dr. Gray has long served as a consultant for many defense agencies here and in the United Kingdom. His undergraduate degree is in economics, and he holds a doctorate in international politics from Oxford. He is a professor at the University of Reading, England.

Several chapters of *National Security Dilemmas* are based on previous research Gray did for the Army's Strategic Studies Institute. That leads to some redundancies here and there, but each chapter is engaging in its own right. One of the most interesting is about the definition of victory. Impatient Americans are often distressed about outcomes because they are not the smashing outcomes like those of World War II. However, Gray makes the valid point that there are many degrees of "victory," especially if one keeps in mind that the goal of war is a better peace. Sometimes even a smashing victory does not result in an improved state of peace, while somewhat lesser achievements on the battlefield *can* improve a state's situation. Gray cautions against the American tendency to worship technology, for there are many other factors that can affect outcomes. He repeatedly argues that the incredible complexity of war makes it dangerous to count too heavily on any one of its dimensions—and that surprise in war is not surprising.

Perhaps the most informative chapter is "Maintaining Effective Deterrence." It argues that in many situations, that *should be* the strategic choice and that many different dimensions of military power can deter—including land power. A common notion has been that deterrence can work in state-on-state conflict but

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terrorists are undeterrable. Gray concedes that some terrorists may indeed be beyond reach but holds that deterrence can affect others. One problem is that regular war and irregular war are often seen as polar opposites. Gray argues that they are not. Many wars contain elements of each, and there are various mixes between the extremes—and deterrence can have an effect at many levels. It is fundamental that the ultimate decision in deterrence rests in the minds of the deterred, not the deterrers. That, along with cultural and psychological differences, makes it exceedingly difficult to predict outcomes—or to prove whether deterrence worked in any given instance.

National Security Dilemmas also deals with insurgency. That is not an area of excellence for the US military, but Gray argues that it can be mastered. He also points out that since the future is unknowable, it would be improvident to put all our defense eggs into the counterinsurgency (COIN) basket. He does not think that the “Long War” will go on forever, and in any event the national existence is not threatened by the terrorists—though an overreaction to the threat could wreck us. In short, competency in irregular warfare must become an important element in our military, but it should not dominate. State-on-state war is a possibility in the future, and that *can* threaten our national existence. Incidentally, Gray does not think that a nuclear-free world is a practical possibility, and he says that proliferation is practically certain to continue. Gray also sensibly argues that the United States needs to be careful in deciding when to engage in COIN. Some conflicts would be unwinnable, and others simply would not be worth the effort. One of the redundancies found in the book has been his treatment of the distinction between war and warfare. This is especially important in COIN, because war includes all the instruments of national power but warfare is the conduct of war by mostly military means. As the objective in COIN is typically not the insurgency’s military force but rather the hearts and minds of the civilian population of the area in question, the lethal part of COIN should be subordinate.

For the aspirant strategist, Gray’s work is a treasure chest. His treatment of preemption versus preventive war is golden. Preemption is entirely legitimate and necessary in his mind. However, preventive war is often wrongly labeled as preemption and should be approached with extreme caution—precisely because war and politics are so unpredictable. In the case of preemption, the decision for war has already been made by the prospective enemy, but preventive war is a choice for the political leadership. It can and has led to disaster when predictions turn out to be false—Hitler’s prediction in 1941 that the USSR would collapse like a house of cards with the first kick on the front door!

Some readers are already quite familiar with the works of Colin Gray. For them, *National Security Dilemmas* would be a fine review. For the rest, the book should be near the top of our reading lists—perhaps at the top. There are many more nuggets in this treasure chest than can be explored here.

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Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: Position, Space, and Conflict Escalation

by Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. Cambridge University Press, 2007, 314 pp., \$38.00.

Conflict has been one of the most enduring topics in the study of world affairs. In fact, many claim that it is the reality of conflict and the desire to overcome it that animate the theory and practice of international relations. In this respect, the examination undertaken by Michigan State assistant professor of political science, Michael P. Colaresi; Indiana University professor of political science, Karen Rasler; and the Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, William R. Thompson, indicates that the understanding of conflict demands an engagement with the strategic rivalries that provoke it. These researchers claim that the analysis of rivalry in global politics bears “considerable potential for revolutionizing the study of conflict” (p. 21). *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics*, therefore, provides a much-needed and thorough engagement with the contestations that presage conflictual international behavior.

The authors have divided their volume into five parts. The first engages with the contexts and analytical frameworks of strategic rivalries. In particular, Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson outline the issues related to the definition and identification of strategic rivalries. In this respect, they conclude that a central problem associated with the designation of strategic rivalries relates to their interpretation. The difficulty relates to the need “to codify decision-making perceptions [to make them legible for strategic analysis] without ever expecting to have direct access to these perceptions” (p. 29). Exploring the maze of conceptual and methodological quandaries leads the authors to develop six identifications of strategic rivalries in world politics. This classification, in turn, assists them in systematizing the distinct trends animating the dynamics of confrontation. What emerges is a quantifiable distribution of strategic rivalries across time and space. The datasets provided depict a vivid picture of such conflictual behavior. Yet, the authors acknowledge that despite such sophisticated analysis it is still difficult to address the question of “whether rivalries are more likely to escalate to higher levels of conflict—militarized disputes and war—than non-rivalry dyads” (p. 87).

Part 2 of the volume zooms in on the potential dangers emanating from strategic rivalries. The analysis concentrates on the relationship between protracted conflict and crisis escalation. What emerges from this engagement is perhaps an unsurprising picture of international politics which, however, many commentators have chosen to ignore. As Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson point out, their investigation provides empirical evidence that most actors in world politics do not engage in conflictual behavior; yet, the study of international affairs remains framed by the perception that “all state actors are equally likely to engage in conflict (or cooperation) with all other actors” (p. 130). In this respect, they demonstrate that rivalry matters to the extent that it is “very important in differentiating states that are likely to engage in conflict from those that are much less likely to do so” (p. 158).

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In the third part, Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson delve into the issues relating to the effects of space and positioning on the dynamics of strategic rivalry. While in the first part they suggested the difficulties associated with the identification and interpretation of “perceptual pathologies or misperceptions” (p. 24), here they demonstrate the fairly straightforward and well-established conflict emanating from the relationship between contiguity and policy attitudes. The inference then is, “not only is the existence of a rivalry a useful predictor of consequent conflict behavior, so, too, is the type of rivalry” (p. 162). In this respect, they observe that spatial and positional factors are mutually constitutive and one contributes to the conflict-propensity of the other. Thus, while the spatial component is a central feature of bilateral wars, “multilateral conflicts may depend on the constellation of positional rivalries and alliances that surround each territorial conflagration” (p. 215).

However, as part 4 of the volume reveals, geographic and ideological factors cannot encompass the full spectrum of issues that inform the escalation of a rivalry into open and all-out war. Instead, as Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson outline, arms buildups, territorial contestations, and the formation of military alliances all play important roles in process of conflict escalation. It is the notion and nature of hostility underpinning these trends that contribute to the outbreak of war. In this respect, the fifth and final part offers a careful summation of the main propositions put forward and presents their conclusions on the relationship between strategic rivalry and conflict. The authors outline the various inducements, facilitators, and suppressors that contribute to either the intensification or weakening violent international behavior. In terms of policy making, the main conclusion proposed by Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson is the continuation of efforts encouraging “democratization and interdependence” (p. 284). In this respect, their analytical endeavor contributes to the further validation of the democratic peace thesis.

Thus, with their comprehensive overview of the context and process of strategic rivalry, Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson have illuminated the dynamics of conflict and cooperation in world politics. Such a valuable contribution to the study of international security would benefit both the student and practitioner of international relations. The authors’ ability to gather such a wide range of perspectives, data, and experiences and, at the same time, to reflect critically on their implications makes their effort extremely worthwhile. *Strategic Rivalries in World Politics* will therefore be very useful to anyone dealing with or keen to learn more about the complex dynamics animating strategic rivalries in global life.

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Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict, edited by Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence. MIT Press, 2010, 285 pp., \$25.00.

Inspired by the works of several contributing scholars and focused on the many causes surrounding violence, nonviolent conflict, and nationalism, Chenoweth

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and Lawrence's *Rethinking Violence* pursues a deeper, newer perspective on the continuum of violence and an understanding of how violence is sometimes related to conflict. Examining violence within the state, the authors use statistical analysis and empirical case studies to forge an in-depth understanding of political violence as a dynamic process shaped by balance-of-power considerations rather than being caused by hatred or ideology, as in previous theories.

Rethinking Violence considers three recent influences on the political environment: the reduced frequency of interstate wars, the end of Cold War superpower competition, and the realization that internal struggles strongly impact state economies. Concerned that previous writings narrowly defined internal conflicts and struggles through a "one size fits all" lens, the authors systematically refute others' lack of definition while pursuing in-depth explanations for causality in modern conflicts. *Rethinking Violence* contains nine essays on violence-related topics organized into two major sections: states pursuing violence against groups within the state and non-state actors using violence while pursuing autonomy, separation, or nationalist goals.

The introduction questions how, when, and why state and nonstate actors might use violence against the state and its citizens and internal groups and further examines the effectiveness of political violence within the state. The authors reject the binary concept that violence is either present or absent in conflict and suggest that its apparent absence is an indicator of the presence of other nonviolent means, violence on the verge of erupting with little or no warning, or the state provoking violence through police action, ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate attacks, or genocide. By disaggregating violence from conflict, they argue that conflict is not necessarily the sole factor causing violent outbursts. They also challenge previous beliefs that weak or failing states, ethnic and national differences, state authoritarianism, or elite manipulation are primary causal factors of violence.

In the chapter "Targeting Civilians to Win?," Alexander Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran pursue insights into the controversial topic of regimes attacking civilians as a means of achieving strategic goals. Their research finds that states which victimize civilians are more likely to win, but nearly all of these victories occurred more than 80 years ago (Beirut in 1982 is an exception); that populations in small states are vulnerable to outside influence and are more likely to be victimized than those in larger states; and that democracies are less likely to subject their populations to violence than authoritarian regimes.

In "Driven to Arms?," Adria Lawrence convincingly delinks the connection between violence and conflict, preferring to define violence as its own entity and not a component on the conflict continuum. She suggests that as a society's moral foundations erode, violence may become accepted by the population, and this becomes especially true if the state ignores the population's desires and acts to satisfy the regime's interests at the expense of the population. A society's repressed emotions may also contribute to an acceptance that violence is morally warranted and necessary for resolving dilemmas. Lawrence concludes that violence is not a natural output of conflict and must be considered as one of many factors influencing conflict's causality.

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Rethinking Violence provides the modern strategic thinker with a broad and thorough perspective of violence and conflict and how these factor into twenty-first-century regime statecraft. Readers with interests in comparative politics and national and international security will find the thorough analyses and case study discussions useful and refreshingly more in-depth than many previous studies. While I enjoyed reading the book, I was left wondering why the editors chose not to include a conclusion chapter to summarize and reinforce the book's many insights. These insights may prove useful to those pondering what caused the recent Middle East outbursts of democratic protest and revolution (the "Arab spring") and how might the follow-on regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen govern their populations—will they repress the populations or promote liberal democracy?

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Terror from the Air by Peter Sloterdijk. Semiotext(e), 2009, 128 pp., \$14.95.

Despite what one might expect from the title, this book does not concern itself with the attacks of 11 September 2001 or even with the specific forms of terrorism that emerged around the turn of the millennium. Nor does it focus on airpower or deal with the aerial bombing campaigns—also called terror raids—conducted during the Second World War and in other conflicts, although they are part of the larger phenomenon the author describes. Instead, the book illuminates what the author proposes as the twentieth century's unique contribution to history, namely, "the practice of terrorism" (p. 9). It further highlights how it has served as part of "modernity's campaign against the self-evident," that is, against what previously existed in the background as mostly unperceived "givens" (p. 107). In the process, the author offers a rather different and more expansive definition of terrorism.

The title of the original 2002 German edition of the book, *Lufibeben*, or "air quake," refers to the seminal event that, according to Sloterdijk, heralded the arrival of the twentieth century proper and which, like an earthquake, ripped away what had long been considered secure conceptual footing. This event also marked the first release of poison gas—on 22 April 1915 by the German army—along the western front at Ypres. This action marked a shift to the "post-militaristic" (p. 9) period of warfare, the "transition from classical warfare to terrorism" (p. 16), in which the enemy soldier is no longer targeted directly—either through traditional face-to-face combat or by means of projectiles (bullets, artillery)—and instead is attacked indirectly through his environment. This form of war making Sloterdijk refers to as *atmoterrorism* (*atmo* referring to atmosphere). As he puts it, "The 20th century will be remembered as the age whose essential thought consisted in targeting no longer the body, but the enemy's environment. This is the basic idea of terrorism in the more explicit sense" (p. 14). It is the origin or "source of terror," as the book's original subtitle stated. It undermined what was until 1915 taken as a given: the breathability of air, and thereby "transform[ed] the harmless into a combat zone" (p. 29).

Sloterdijk goes on to describe a direct progression from the wartime use of poison gas to the postwar development of pesticides and of Zyklon A and B, the first use of gas chambers for executions (in Nevada in 1924), and from there the Nazi death chambers used it for mass slaughter during the Second World War. He extrapo-

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lates from these related forms of terrorism—"thermo-terrorism" (the fire bombings of Hamburg and Dresden) and "radiation-terrorism" (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) (p. 52)—and underscores that "the air force *per se* is a central phenomenon of the state form of atmoterrorism" (p. 51). In a footnote, he singles out the BLU 82 Commando Vault "lung-breaking bomb" as an example of the "normalization of the state-terrorist *habitus*" (p. 53). And, in a brief excursus on "carpet bombing," Sloterdijk refers to "the demonstrative NATO strikes on Serbia during the Kosovo conflict between March 24 and June 10, 1999" as examples of the "area effects associated with punctual large-scale bombing" (p. 52).

After touching momentarily on bioterrorism as yet another element in this continuum, Sloterdijk then turns to the further development of atmoterrorist tools in the form of the High-Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP), a plan of the US Department of Defense in the mid-1990s to employ "weather as a force multiplier." In other words, the plan called for the manipulation of weather as a means of engaging an enemy, along with the additional "prospect of developing a quasi-neurotelepathic weapon capable of destabilizing the human population with long-distance attacks on their cerebral functions." (pp. 64–68). Thus, Sloterdijk writes, "The disengagement of the Soviet Union . . . handed the sole remaining world power the monopoly over expanding the atmoterrorist continuum that had been elaborated between 1915 and 1990 in even more explicit and thereby more monstrous dimensions" (p. 63).

To be fair, Sloterdijk is not really interested in engaging in an explicit criticism of these developments (though he clearly does so implicitly). He remains aloof, the detached observer, describing and defining them so that they fit into his larger, primary concern: their effect of overturning former and long-held assurances about some fundamental aspects of life, the progressive undermining of established *Umwelts* (environments): natural environments; educational and conceptual environments; social and political environments.

Peter Sloterdijk, a professor of philosophy and media theory and director of the State Academy of Design at the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe, also serves as the public intellectual in Germany through his appearances as host of the occasional television discussion program, "The Philosophical Quartet," and his published essays and commentaries. And while he may use these forums to address topics of current interest, his approach to those issues is not directed at any particular policy proposals or concrete solutions. He instead employs them as jumping-off points for a broader, often rather esoteric and abstract consideration of related or underlying concepts. In this book (which is actually an extended essay or series of interconnected essays), this same approach leads to a less-than-satisfactory result. Real-world events are treated almost as incidental to the single-minded erection of a larger theoretical construct—not as matters worthy of consideration in themselves. Sloterdijk demonstrates no interest, for example, in the political, religious, social, or economic sources of terror but subordinates everything to the delineation of a concept of terrorism rooted in a dark view of Western society born of Nietzsche and Heidegger, both of whom Sloterdijk intellectually reveres.

While the book may work well as a mind-expanding intellectual exercise on the subject of mankind's alienation from primordial certitudes, it is less effective as a diagnosis of the terrorist impulse.

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