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U.S. ARMY. 41st DIVISION.

HISTORY OF THE BIAK OPERATION

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BEACH DEFENSE CAVE, BIAK ISLAND

U.S. Army, 41st Division

# HISTORY OF THE BIAK OPERATION

15-27 JUNE 1944

15459

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FOREWORD

Exploiting the successes of the Hollandia operations, Task Forces were organized by the Sixth Army to seize Wakde Island; Sarmi, on the mainland of Dutch New Guinea; and Biak Island. The Wakde and Sarmi landings were made with scheduled success; on 27 May 1944, landings were made at Bosnek, Biak Island, by the Hurricane Task Force.

It is not the purpose of this history to cover the organization of the Hurricane Task Force by the 41st Infantry Division; or their planning, landing, or early tactical stages. During a decisive phase of the operation, the Headquarters I Corps was ordered to Biak as Headquarters Hurricane Task Force. It is during that period that this history is concerned.

A form of warfare was encountered that required experimentation, trial and error, and all of our available weapons before the mission could be accomplished. Many lessons may be learned from this operation that may lessen casualties in future operations in which the terrain offers similar strong defensive positions to the Japanese. In that event, this history should prove of value.

*Robert L. Eichelberger*  
ROBERT L. EICHELBERGER  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.

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HISTORY OF THE BIAK OPERATION

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# NARRATIVE

## CHAPTER I

### The Terrain

Biak is located in the Schouten Island group; north of Geelvink Bay, and approximately one degree south of the equator. The island is shaped like a foot, with the heel to the south and the toe pointing to the east. Terrain studies have described the upper third of Biak as mountainous, and the remaining two-thirds as essentially flat. The ground action of the Biak campaign occurred on the "essentially flat" portion.



Area Due North of Mokmer Drome

The southern and eastern areas, while flat in part, are broken by steep, elevated coral and limestone terraces which rise with steplike precision to an inland plateau. Within the terraces and cliffs are countless caves, many of which are connected and interconnected by fissures and tunnels. Stalactites and stalagmites add to the near impregnability of the caves as defensive positions.

Biak appears to be principally of coral rock, thrust up by volcanic action in successive stages. The caves approximate levels which probably mark "pauses" in the upthrusts during which the rock, then at

sea level, was dissipated by water action and later raised. Sump caves are the largest, and are incident to faults which appear to have existed while the caves, now 200 or more feet above sea level, were at sea level.

Vegetation on the terraces is primarily rain forest; further inland, scrub and secondary growth predominate. The south-central and eastern areas of Biak are without surface streams, as the terrain is inclined to subterranean streams and pools. Springs and water points are rare and their possession was of high importance throughout the operation. The Japanese defense of Biak was based on brilliant appreciation and use of the terrain; his defeat was accomplished by the canalization of a considerable portion of the Japanese force by a relatively small number of our troops, while the remainder of our forces crushed his main defenses. This was possible because of the most unusual terrain conditions which will be discussed throughout this history.

## CHAPTER II

### Arrival of Headquarters I Corps at Biak

On the 14th of June, 1944 Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, Commanding General of the Sixth Army and of the Alamo Task Force, called General Eichelberger for a conference at 1800K. The latter was at once informed that he would proceed without delay to Biak with the entire Headquarters I Corps and assume command of the Hurricane Task Force. It was explained that after continuous heavy fighting, coupled with extremely unfriendly terrain, intense heat and scarcity of water, the infantry units within the task force were beginning to tire to a critical degree. It was further explained that the rather confused picture of the fighting at Biak indicated that the success of future operations was threatened. Major General Horace H. Fuller was informed that upon relief from command of the task force he would retain command of the 41st Division. General Eichelberger was also informed that the 34th Infantry was under orders to proceed to Biak to reinforce the Hurricane Task Force.

It was decided to move Headquarters and Headquarters Company I Corps and Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Corps Artillery to Biak in two echelons. The advance party was to go by air. The remaining personnel was to follow by water transportation. At 0830K, 15 June, the advanced echelon of the I Corps Headquarters departed from Lake Sentani for Biak by Catalina Flying boats. The planes landed on open sea at the destination, and at 1230K reached the shore.

Upon landing General Eichelberger immediately assumed command of the Hurricane Task Force. He spent the afternoon at the front, observing the forward positions and discussing the situation with Major General Fuller. On this same date, the remaining officers and enlisted men of the Corps Headquarters (except those still in the Rear Echelon at Goodenough Island), the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Corps Artillery, and the 34th Infantry Regiment, boarded LSTs. The LSTs sailed the following

day for Biak, escorted by destroyers.


The ground situation at this time was as shown on the accompanying map. After landing at Bosnek, the 162nd Infantry had attempted to seize Mokmer Drome by a drive along the coast. The regiment extended its lines without obtaining control of the dominating ridges above the coast. As a result its flank was attacked by the Japs at "the Narrows", a point vicinity Mokmer Village, at which the high coastal ridge extended almost to the sea. While the advanced elements of the 162nd Infantry were withdrawn by water and by overland movement, the Task Force Commander countered this situation by ordering the 186th Infantry to move to the north of Bosnek, then west and secure Mokmer Drome from the north and northeast.

The 186th had originally moved along the coast to the east after landing at Bosnek. Therefore, their move to the drome necessitated a long march over very difficult terrain. Heavy fighting was continuous; water was critical; many men were close to the point of exhaustion. The 186th had captured a water-hole in the hills north of Bosnek, but was forced to withdraw before the water point could be organized due to the emergency which developed as the Japs cut into the lines of the 162nd. After seizure of Mokmer Drome, the 186th relaxed but slightly. Although they had pushed through the high ground north of the drome, they failed to secure it after the drome was captured. Japs moved again to these ridges, and were in a position to fire on the drome area, and on the 186th. Mokmer Drome had been repaired and surfaced to 4,000 feet but Jap fire from the ridges denied the use of the drome. The 186th pivoted to face the Jap positions in a northeasterly direction. Several frontal attacks had been attempted, but with little success.

The 162nd Infantry, after reorganization following its engagement in the Narrows, moved up to the trail leading northwest of Mokmer drome and reached the Sump Holes (see map coordinate 32.7 - 42.0). The 1st Battalion

encountered the strong enemy positions there. The 2d and 3d Battalions faced north and west at the right side of the Sump Hole, their lines forming a "V". This regiment had also attempted frontal attacks on the enemy in that area without success.

The 163rd Infantry landed at Bosnek on 27 May 1944, after having been withdrawn from the completed Wakde operation. This regiment continued the mission that the 186th had begun: the elimination of enemy in the ridges east of Bosnek. This unit (less the 3d Bn) was placed under task force control and their mission was enlarged to include the ridges west of Bosnek as far as Parai town. Their operations consisted of patrolling and mopping up areas bordering the coastal track, and securing the water point north of Bosnek that the 186th had captured prior to its move to the Mokmer Drome area. The 3d Battalion had moved overland to the north-east of the enemy main defenses, and had succeeded in establishing a squad on the crest of Hill 320. This battalion remained under control of the 41st Division. Hill 320 was the dominating terrain feature within the entire zone of action north of the dromes and afforded excellent observation. The unexpected move by this 3d Battalion patrol evidently took the Japs by surprise.



**PLAN FOR 41<sup>ST</sup> DIV. ATTACK.**  
**- 19 JUNE -**

WD COF E MAP SCHOUTEN ISLANDS, SCALE 1:20 000

### CHAPTER III

#### The Attack of June 19

After complete investigation of the situation, which included two days of observing the battle situation in the forward areas, one of the Commanding General's first orders required a reinforced company to man the OP on Hill 320. By the end of that day a plan for attack on 19 June was formulated. The enemy situation had been none too clear throughout the operation. The existing maps were partially inaccurate and of course could only give indications of the detailed ground conformation. A few vertical aerial photographs were available but these failed to show the terrain features dictating the enemy defense: the net works of caves. From personal observations, intensive study of captured documents and such information as could be obtained from the limited number of prisoners, the Commanding General reached the conclusion that one Japanese infantry battalion defended the Sump Holes area, and the high ground to the north; and that a smaller force defended the high ridges northwest of Mokmer Drome. Enemy positions in the remainder of the southeastern part of the island were believed to be a battalion. This estimate was correct as far as the high ground north of the Dromes was concerned. Enemy dispositions at other locations on the island were positively determined at a later date.

The plan of attack required a reorganization within all units, and movements to assembly areas in preparation for coordinated attack. The field order, issued late in the night of 17 June, ordered a limited objective attack on 19 June. The mission was to envelop the enemy right (south) flank; seize the high ground north of Mokmer Drome; and required that the ridgeline 1,000 yards east of Borokoe Drome be occupied. This

last requirement was in preparation for a subsequent attack on Borokoe and Sorido Dromes.

The plan for attack necessitated that a small force canalize the Japanese strength in the ridges east of Mokmer Village. The 163rd Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was directed to increase the tempo of their patrol activity; and to locate and engage the enemy forces within their area. It was evident from the number of caves, holes and precipices, the the Japanese were free to choose the location of their positions at will. His main strength could be shifted to counter any localized attack that our forces might make. It was necessary that any shift of enemy strength be prevented prior to attack of 19 June. The remaining battalion of the 163d Infantry - the 3d Battalion - was ordered to move northwest and occupy a position on the high ground to the north of the Japanese positions. The 162d Infantry, still in the neighborhood of the Sump hole, was to remain in the positions they held at that time. In the coordinated attack, the 162d was ordered to continue its frontal attacks. The 186th Infantry was to attack to the north and to the east from its assembly positions on the ridge above Mokmer Drome. If successful, the enemy would be enveloped, with the 186th Infantry on the high ground north and west of the Jap positions, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 162d Infantry in the low ground to the south in defensive positions, and the 3d Battalion of the 163d Infantry on the high ground to the north and to the west of the enemy.

On 18 June 1944, the remainder of the Headquarters I Corps, the 34th Infantry, and the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery I Corps Artillery, and the 167th Field Artillery Battalion (which had joined the convoy at Wakde) arrived at Biak. General Fuller, who at his own request had been relieved of command of the 41st Division by Commanding General Alamo Force, left the area around 1100K. Brigadier General Doe was temporarily

placed in command of the Division. General Doe moved his headquarters that day to his advanced command post, which was south of Mokmer Drome. The I Corps, taking over its duties as Headquarters of Hurricane Task Force, established a command post on the beach near the village of Mandon. The 34th Infantry was attached to the 41st Division. Except for small labor detachments and vehicles, the regiment was moved from Bosnek to Parai in LCTs. During the remainder of that day and the 19th of June, the regiment assembled at the west end of Mokmer Drome. It was made definite in the field order of 17 June that the 34th Infantry would not be committed in the attack of 19 June without authorization of the Task Force Commander. Plans were in process to use this regiment in a drive west to Sorido village, and in the securing of Borokoe and Sorido Dromes.

On 19 June 1944, the coordinated attack of the 41st Division was launched as planned. The attack met with complete success and overran Japanese resistance to the north of the Sumps. The attack was witnessed by General Eichelberger, who on returning to his CP radioed General Krueger that at 1600K the situation was incomparably better. Included in the radio was his statement that Mokmer Drome was now secure from hostile ground attack. During the attack the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, advanced NE to the ridge extending from (32.3-42.9). The 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry supporting the attack, advanced north on the trail to (31.9 - 43.4). The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, attacking from the west, pushed in to a point approaching the "nose" at (32.4 - 42.8).

The 162d Infantry executed a holding mission during the attack. The 1st Battalion engaged with the enemy at the eastern end of the Sumps. It was beginning to be apparent that the Sumps were the key position in the Jap defense north of the drome. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 162d Infantry reorganized and improved their position; however, the relative location of their front lines was unchanged.



## CHAPTER IV

### The Attack of June 20

With the successful accomplishment of the limited objective mission, Field Order Number 3 was issued. This order required that the enemy be destroyed in the Sump area, and that Sorido Village be seized and secured. The 41st Division with 34th Infantry, 601st Tank Co, 121st FA Bn, 947th FA Bn, and 3rd Bn, 163rd Infantry attached was directed to continue its principle mission of destroying the enemy forces in the area around the Sumps, the previously mentioned "Nose", and in the Teardrop area. The Teardrop may be seen on the map at coordinates (32.5 - 43.5). It was specified that one RCT seize and secure Borokoe and Sorido Dromes, and secure Sorido Village. This RCT was further ordered to occupy the high ground overlooking Mokmer, Borokoe, and Sorido Dromes.

The 163rd Infantry (less the 3rd Bn) with the 146th FA Bn and 41st Rcn Troop attached, remained in Task Force Reserve. The Task Force Reserve was ordered to continue their assigned mission of vigorous patrolling in the ridges and cliffs north of Bosnek and extending to the eastern end of the island.


The attack was launched at 0630K on 20 June and was successful. Borokoe Drome was occupied at 1027K by the 1st Bn, 34th Infantry, and companies A and C advanced to the east edge of the ridge above the drome. Sorido Drome was occupied by the 2nd Bn, 34th Infantry at 0930K, and Companies F and G moved onto the ridge north of Borokoe Drome with little resistance. The 3rd Bn pushed on to Sorido Village meeting light resistance. Company I established a road block on the trail north of Sorido village. Company K patrolled west toward Insirom.

The 162d Infantry continued their operations in the Sump area. Late in the afternoon of June 20, the attacking units withdrew to their battalion perimeter, after being entirely unsuccessful in their efforts to reduce the Sump Caves. Jap snipers had been unusually active from their well concealed positions in crevices and recesses in the ridges around the Sumps. During the night, the Japs came out of their cave


positions and made a series of harassing attacks. Mountain guns and mortars were brought out from the caves and were fired on Mokmer Drome and on the road. Before morning, they were returned to the caves; which caves, the infantrymen did not know.

Company L, 163rd Infantry, was occupying the OP on Hill 320. This unit moved out of position early during the morning of 20 June. As soon as this change was discovered by the Task Force Commander, the unit was immediately ordered to reoccupy this position. Fortunately the Japs in that vicinity did not realize that Hill 320 was unoccupied and Company L was able to reoccupy the position without enemy interference. The enemy occupied positions throughout the area in the immediate vicinity of Hill 320 and intermittently placed mortar fire and mountain gun fire on the units of the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Infantry.


Throughout the night the 186th Infantry received mountain gun fire from Jap positions near 31.0-41.0. During the day of 20 June, this unit's effort to advance was slowed by heavy machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire. The regiment was forced to dig in at 1300K in the afternoon, due to increased enemy fire of all types. During the period 84 Japs were killed. Eleven of our troops were killed and 47 wounded. The majority of our casualties were due to mortar fire. Our casualties might well have been much higher except for advantageous use of unusually broken terrain.



PLAN



PROFILE of 3 & 2



PROFILE of 1

# THE SUMPS - BIAK ISLAND

ASSAULTED 22 JUNE '44, REDUCED 27 JUNE - SCALE 1" = 100'

## CHAPTER V

### The Assault on the Sumps

On June 21, the 1st Battalion of the 162nd Infantry, again sent troops to the Sumps, preceded by two patrols on the high ground on each side of the Sump area. The Jap snipers, who had made so much trouble the day before, were wiped out. While under the cover of automatic and small arms fire, men with flame throwers sprayed sniper positions. Occasionally, the sniper would run out, screaming; but usually would be found still in his position, charred and burning slowly.

Freed from sniper trouble, and supported by two Sherman Tanks, infantrymen reached points on the western lip of the Sump, from which they could fire and throw grenades into the entrances of some of the caves. As enemy soldiers would appear, they would be immediately riddled with bullets; but as the main cave entrances were shielded by stalagmites and stalactites, the Jap positions were still strongly held.

The cave at the western end of the Sump (labeled "1" in the sketch) was attacked on this date. Tank fire was brought against the cave entrance and flame throwers were fired into the mouth of the cave. This particular cave was shaped like a well. To further eliminate the enemy, five large drums of gasoline were poured into the cave through crevices and seepage points that had been found on top of the cave. This gasoline was ignited. No personnel were sent into the cave at this time, as it was suspected that there were connecting tunnels leading to other installations, at that time not reduced. A series of explosions were heard the following day. It was believed that the gasoline inside was still burning, and had reached ammunition stores.

Attack was continued against a second cave position without success. At dark the attacking units pulled back to the 1st Battalion area and 4.2 mortars fired on enemy positions throughout the night.

During the night, Japs again attacked, and over one hundred made an effort to reach Korim Bay.

Information was obtained from a prisoner of war who revealed that 0300 on 22 June, Colonel Kuzume, Commander of the 222nd Infantry, held a ceremony in the main Sump Cave. The colonel is reported to have stated that all able bodied soldiers should attempt a withdrawal to the north in any way they might find possible. Documents were then destroyed and gasoline poured on the regimental colors. When the colors had been burned the troops yelled the traditional "Banzai!".

The 3rd Battalion, 163rd Infantry, made an effort to contact the 186th Infantry without success. Due to dense jungle and incorrect map, the positions of this battalion were difficult to locate. The 186th Infantry sent out patrols in force throughout the day. During the day 81 enemy dead were counted with the loss of 7 of our men KIA and 16 WIA.

Throughout the night of 20 June, Jap mortar fire was placed in the 186th Infantry area. There were no casualties however. The broken terrain offered almost complete protection against fire unless directly hit.

The 34th Infantry greatly improved their positions on 21 June. After capturing the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido Village, the 34th Infantry had sent out units to secure the high ground north of the Dromes. This was done as directed on 20 June. On 21 June contacts were made between units occupying the high ground north of the Dromes and road blocks were established on the Korim Trail and on the road leading northwest from the Sumphole area. Company I repulsed three counter-attacks on the Korim Trail during the night of 21 June.

During the night of 21 June and early morning of 22 June, the Japs attempted a suicidal effort to break through the lines of the 186th Infantry. In the face of this night assault, the 186th Infantry demonstrated their ability to withstand a fierce night attack with a remarkable degree of courage and skill. 109 Japs were killed. Only one man of the 186th was killed. This casualty occurred when a Japanese jumped in the soldier's fox hole and fired a grenade killing them both.

It is believed that this Japanese force was the main portion of the remainder of the Sump Hole garrison.

Early morning on June 22 found the areas around the lip of the Sumps littered with Jap dead. As in preceding nights, the Japs had pulled their heavy weapons into open positions from which to fire on the road and on Mokmer Drome. This time, our early morning patrols were prepared for them. Many Japs who had not withdrawn to participate in the suicidal attack through the 186th Infantry, were caught in the open, before they could get back into the caves. In one case, six Japanese took cover in a shell crater; they were seen and a 60mm mortar fired its first registration shell into the crater with them. All were killed as shown in the illustration below.




Later in the morning the infantry secured the lip of the Sump under cover of 50 cal. machine gun and 75mm gun fire from tanks. Several experiments had been tried in the reduction of the Sump caves, but none so effective as the 850-pound charge of dynamite lowered by engineers into the cave entrance. The charge was lowered into the cave by a winch and fired electrically. This effectively reduced the cave. Only a few Japs survived the explosion most of whom came running out; at least one was insane.


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Systematically, the remaining caves were reduced by the combination of tank fire, explosives and flame throwers. The caves were reduced for practical purposes on this day. It was reported that troops entered the caves on 25 June. However, it was not until 27 June that the last Jap had been killed within the Sump network. On that day, the inner recesses of the caves were entered and searched. Considerable equipment was found, including generators, field guns, mortars and a high-powered radio. There were also large stores of food and ammunition. Living conditions must have been unbearable for the Japs. The smell of the rotting bodies permeated the tunnels and inner chambers.

By the end of 23 June nearly all enemy resistance in the high ground north of the Dromes had ceased. Many Japs were killed throughout the area but no organized positions were contacted. The semi-organized positions opposing the 186th Infantry were hourly becoming more untenable for the Japs. The Task Force Commander was now able to turn his attention to organized Jap positions in the ridges north of Mokmer and Ibdi Towns.



GENERALLY FLAT TERRAIN



WD C<sup>OP</sup>E MAP SCHOUTEN ISLANDS, SCALE 1:20000  
SOENGGARAI

SHEET INDEX



PARAI

## CHAPTER VI

### The Ridge Pockets

The 163rd Infantry (less 3rd Bn), as has been previously mentioned, had the mission of patrolling the ridges between Parai and Warwe. The enemy situation had developed as follows: On 21 June, Company F, 163rd Infantry, from their location on the high ground northwest of Ibdi, were attacking to the southwest. At a point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles northwest of Ibdi they met strong enemy resistance. This company had missed the enemy outpost positions and when it opened fire it received fire from three directions. Other elements of the 163rd Infantry were due north of this position on a high piece of ground and observed the fire. A heavy machine gun firing from that position evidently led the Japs to believe that they were being attacked by a sizeable force and they opened up all along their position on the high ground to their north. The executive officer of the 163rd Infantry reported that the fire power encountered was that of a battalion.

During this barrage of fire of all types, Company F withdrew to a point along the ridge which it could hold. One platoon remained in that location to prevent any move to the east and the remainder of the company moved on back to Ibdi Town.

Throughout June 22nd and June 23rd the Jap positions along the ridge were harassed by heavy artillery and fire from the 163rd Infantry Cannon Company. On 24 June the enemy position was skip bombed by 12 B-25s. Previous reconnaissance of the positions had been made in a Piper Cub. It was observed that the main enemy defensive position was apparently in a large cylindrical hole with caves leading off from its side. It was hoped that the B-25s would be able to secure a direct hit in this hole. It was believed but not positively determined that the B-25s did drop one bomb into the cave.

On 24 June the 163rd Infantry Regiment, still under Task Force control, participated in a coordinated attack with the 41st Division to seize the ridge extending from a point northwest of Ibdi to a point


north of Mokmer Village.

The 3rd Battalion had been under control of the 41st Division but was at this time released to the 163rd Infantry and placed in reserve occupying a position on the trail north of Mandom.

In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the regimental mission, it was decided to eliminate the enemy strong point northwest of Ibdì which had been under artillery fire and air bombing. The scheme of maneuver was an enveloping movement. The 1st Battalion, attacking from the north and northwest; and Company F of the 2nd Battalion, attacking from the southwest, were to be the assault elements; while Company G occupied a position to the east where it could block and hold. By 1800, 25 June, all units had closed in their assembly area.

After heavy preparatory fire from supporting weapons, the attack was launched at 0530 on 26 June. It is significant to note that this attack was launched before daylight, a move too infrequently attempted by our forces in jungle fighting. The result was highly satisfactory, as the attack was a complete surprise to the enemy. Many of his forward positions, normally occupied only during daylight, were found unmanned. This factor helped the attacking forces advance rapidly during the initial stages of the attack. They later contacted a series of enemy emplacements well organized in depth and protected by heavy sniper fire. The advance continued but progress was slower. The close of the day's fighting found the regiment in position as shown on the accompanying map; two platoons of Company A at the time were heavily engaged in a fire fight.

It was then decided to move Company F west to a position adjoining the Company G area and assist that company in its mission to blocking and holding. Company F by the end of the day, 27 June, had taken up its new position. During the day, the other elements of the attacking force made slight advances which improved their positions so that they would be better prepared to continue the attack the following day.



MOKMER POCKET  
Schematic Cross Section

In the meantime, it was well known to the Task Force Commander that the Mokmer Pocket, or "East Cave" was still occupied by the Japanese. This position was located in the cliffs north of Mokmer Town, and though seldom active, was always a potential threat to our traffic on the road to the airdromes. In fact the road was forced to be closed on one occasion when the Japs placed mortar fire on the shoulders of the road. On the night of June 23, the Task Force Motor Pool was shelled; however, no damage was done.

A company of infantry was given the mission of reducing this position, but by June 27, had met with only slight success. The Japs were engaged in several fire fights, but their results were always unobserved.

On 27 June, Japs again shelled the main road forcing a halt to our vehicles. An air strike was made on the Jap position by twelve P-40s. It was believed highly successful; the planes bombed and strafed for nearly an hour. At the completion of the strike, the Jap positions were silent.

After the I Corps had returned to Hollandia, the cliff positions were entered. The accompanying schematic drawing shows the main strong point as described by the assaulting party.

## CHAPTER VII

### Conclusion

About ten days after arrival at Biak, a radiogram was received from the Commanding General, Alamo Force, directing that plans be prepared to return Headquarters I Corps to Hollandia as soon as the emergency had been cleared sufficiently to permit turning the command of the task force over to General Doe.

The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, I Corps and the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Corps Artillery returned to Hollandia in three echelons; two groups returning by air transport, and the remainder by water. Command of the Hurricane Task Force was relinquished by General Eichelberger on 27 June and General Doe assumed command.

By this time the situation at Biak was one in which complete enemy dispositions were known. The organized pockets were under constant attack and mopping-up activities were entering the final stages in clearing out the remnants of the 222nd Infantry. A situation map on the following page shows the disposition of our troops at 0900K, 28 June, when General Eichelberger departed from Mokmer Drome, enroute Hollandia.



# G-1 REPORT

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## G-1 REPORT

1. Prior to the arrival at Biak of Corps Headquarters, the G-1 functions had been handled by the 41st Division for the Task Force. The current G-1 Periodic Report was in the process of compilation and at a conference of Corps and Division G-1 Sections, it was decided that the best results would be obtained by permitting Division to complete the report.

2. Before the time arrived for the compilation of the subsequent G-1 Periodic Report word was received of the imminent relief of Corps Headquarters. In view of the fact and in order to maintain continuity of the Task Force G-1 effort, the Corps and the 41st Division G-1 Sections worked in close cooperation in the maintenance of station lists, strength reports and other documents. In this way, a great deal of duplication of work was obviated. Decorations were awarded by Corps to units not attached to the Division.

3. One of the deficiencies noted immediately was the lack of an adequate casual camp, although one had been started. Despite continuous efforts, the camp was not up to desired standard, even when the Task Force reverted from Corps control. Such an installation is a necessary part of every task force and should be given some consideration during the planning stage of an operation. The casual camp on Biak Island, unsatisfactory as it may have been, served the following purposes:

a. Personnel temporarily attached to the force such as surplus Buffalo drivers, were kept there pending return to their units. Personnel going on DS were also quartered there. All arrangements for the transportation of personnel by water, except direct evacuation of sick and wounded, were thus handled by a single individual, the camp commander. In case adequate facilities were not available, he arranged the priorities.

b. Personnel released from hospitals in the rear area were transferred to the camp. They were reequipped as far as possible and then transported to their units.

c. When hospitals became over-crowded, convalescent patients and those with minor ailments such as skin diseases were transferred to the camp under adequate medical supervision.

4. The most glaring deficiencies were a lack of kitchen equipment and transportation facilities. Cots, blankets, hammocks and tentage were begged, borrowed or stolen. The camp location was the poorest in the entire area because it was the last to be selected. Prior to Corps' arrival, the casualties were camped on the edge of the cemetery.

5. Recommendations for casual camp:

a. That in planning the lay-out of an area, a casual camp site be selected within walking distance of the beach area. The tendency to grant such a camp any area that happens to be left over should be avoided.

b. That sufficient equipment be made available to house and feed a camp of the desired size. (In Hollandia and Biak approximately 200 men were handled daily.) This should include at least one 2½ ton truck, one ½ ton truck and one ¼ ton truck.

c. That an officer be assigned as camp commander, with an officer assistant. The C.O. will require an acting first sergeant, a duty sergeant, a clerk, and six cooks and cooks' helpers. One medical officer and two enlisted men will be required, more if convalescents are to be quartered in the camp. All other labor and personnel can normally be drawn from among the casualties in the camp at the time.

d. The camp commander should be authorized to draw from QM the supplies necessary to return a man to a line unit completely equipped.

6. It is also notable that combat units engaged in an operation are not receiving replacements. The infantry regiments on Blak were reporting an effective strength as much as 30% below their authorized T/O. At the same time hundreds of infantry replacements were waiting for transportation from various points in New Guinea and Australia. Adequate personnel is as important as sufficient ammunition and should be granted an equal place in planning the logistics of resupply.

# G-2 REPORT

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ANNEX 1 Enemy Order of  
Battle

ANNEX 2 Counter Intelligence

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## G-2 REPORT

### 1. PLANNING PHASE:

There was not a great deal of time available for planning by this headquarters for the BIAK Campaign. Two primary factors contributing to this situation were: (1) Until alerted for the operation, the primary effort of the G-2 Section was concentrated on the mopping-up phase of the HOLLANDIA Campaign. Between receipt of alert orders and actual embarkation a period of less than 24 hours, the job of packing and turning over the HOLLANDIA Operation to the 24th Division left little opportunity for orientation. (2) Before being alerted, the section had received one copy of Special Report No. 67 on the SCHOUTEN ISLANDS, the lithographed photo annex, and had received a few maps (Scale 1:20,000) of the BIAK Area. When the 34th Infantry was unexpectedly alerted to go to BIAK several days before, they had no preparatory material. At their request, this section gave the 34th Infantry all but file copies of available material.

### 2. OPERATIONS:

#### a. Orientation:

Upon arrival at BIAK on 15 June, the Chief of Section plunged into an orientation schedule which called for personal inspections and discussions with front line commanders during the daylight hours and study of the earlier phases of the operation and the broad picture of the current period at night. Close liaison was maintained with the G-2 of the Division.

By 18 June, when the Section arrived, the Chief of Section was prepared to actively direct the operations.

#### b. Personnel:

At this time, the Section was composed of the Chief of Section, Executive Officer and one operations officer (all of whom were experienced), and one newly transferred Captain, a former regimental S-2. There had been no appreciable change in the enlisted personnel, numbering 27 men, since the HOLLANDIA Campaign.

The CIC Detachment under one officer and the ATIS Detachment under one officer were the same as those which functioned during the HOLLANDIA Campaign.

#### c. Organization:

The operations of the section itself, did not vary from normal G-2 procedure; however, a marked effort was made to integrate plans and procedure into those already adopted and in use by the G-2 Section of the Division. Both headquarters had previously trained together and served together in the HOLLANDIA Campaign. As it worked out the integration was successfully achieved with a minimum of administrative complications.

#### d. Communications:

Throughout the Corps' phase of the campaign, communications were a constant source of difficulty. Our beachhead was eight to fifteen miles long, varying in depth from 1,000 yards to 5,000 yards. Telephone lines were of necessity strung along the beach road, the only means of lateral communications. Combat units service activities along the road frequently destroyed lines or otherwise interrupted service. The disadvantage of the time-lag in radio communications needs no comment.

e. Enemy:

The dominant factor of the BIAK Campaign, was the high combat efficiency of the enemy. For a detailed Enemy Order of Battle as compiled 26 June 1944, from captured documents and PWs, see Annex No. 1.

The enemy, principally the 222nd Infantry Regiment of the 36th Division, characterized Japanese military tradition at its best. By 1800K, 28 June, 2801 enemy had been killed in action and only 13 taken prisoner. Of the prisoners, all but one were from other than combat service elements and therefore of limited tactical assistance.

Further, the enemy at all times displayed a remarkable security consciousness from the point of view of documents and identifications carried on personnel. Literally hundreds of enemy dead were searched in vain for documents or other identification. Those documents that were found, were principally from abandoned enemy headquarters in which all enemy personnel had been killed before destruction of documents could be completed. Many enemy were killed inside of caves and on ridges or ledges from which their bodies could not be recovered and searched.

The enemy's commendable use of security measures made CIC work exceedingly difficult but at the same time emphasized the importance of having CIC personnel attached with forward battalions so that no opportunity will be lost to search enemy dead during the heat of battle. Once darkness fell the enemy lost little time in removing his dead and wounded.

f. Natives:

Much information, however, was gained by CIC, through NICA, from natives. The natives of the island had been hostile to the enemy from the outset of Japanese invasion and upon learning of the arrival of our forces they came in droves to be fed, cared for and interrogated by NICA under the direction of the Task Force Commander. Many natives volunteered to act as guides and also to personally infiltrate deep into enemy held territory in order to procure information.

Because of the dearth of documents and PWs, ATIS activity was of limited but vital assistance.

g. Liaison:

The BIAK Campaign further emphasized the imperative necessity of close liaison between the Navy, Air Force and Ground Force. The mutual exchange of information of intelligence value was continuous and had important results. Exchange of information with the Navy was expedited by the presence of a Navy liaison officer, who for a period lived at the Task Force CP and later with the Navy at the WOENDI ISLAND PT Base. Liaison was excellent while the officer remained with the Task Force but, when he joined the PT Base it became difficult to communicate with him.

Air liaison was never adequately established to gain a maximum of mutual advantage. Extreme difficulty was met in attempts to procure vital aerial photo reproduction, the taking of new photos of critical areas (for use by patrols and Artillery), and the arranging for specific aerial reconnaissance. It was also difficult to procure bombing and strafing support. In those incidents where liaison was established, results were excellent.

3. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. That the personnel of the section should be maintained in sufficient strength to operate with a maximum of efficiency. This should include provision for enough liaison officers to keep in personal touch with the situation at subordinate headquarters.

b. That the close liaison achieved between the Navy (PT) headquarters and Ground Force Headquarters by having a Naval liaison officer in the Task Force CP, should be adopted in future operations.

c. That air-ground force liaison should be improved by having either an officer from the Task Force stationed with the local Air Force Headquarters, or an officer from the local Air Headquarters with the Task Force, or both. In a situation where ground fighting is critical, close liaison and timely cooperation is vitally important.

d. That CIC personnel with combat forces should be augmented to a point where at least two CIC non-coms may be attached to each forward battalion as well as a substantial detachment maintained intact with the Division (and Corps) Headquarters.

e. That All personnel of the command must be further impressed with the importance of communications as exemplified in any telephone line.

f. That the importance of taking prisoners must be further emphasized to all combat troops.

g. That the importance of patrolling must be further emphasized laying particular stress on the importance of NOT killing Japs while on reconnaissance missions, BUT of procuring information.

h. That in the tactical evaluation of terrain, there is no substitute for personal investigation in contrast to the study of aerial photos or looking at the terrain in question from a distance.

i. That greater emphasis be given to the importance of map corrections. All too often units in a given area make note of inaccuracies in contours, track locations, etc., but do not notify higher headquarters so that these corrections may be applied to the maps being used by other units.

j. That interrogation of natives is exceedingly difficult and may be brought to its maximum value only by the use of experienced and trained interrogators. For this reason, it is important to have assigned within the section, interrogators of proven ability who both know natives and also the problems of the Intelligence Officer. The two Dutch enlisted men attached to the Corps CIC Detachment were excellent interrogators and NEI Force representative at BIAK was especially helpful.

k. That newspaper correspondents be fully equipped in the rear areas.

ANNEX 1 TO G-2 REPORT

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 26 JUNE 1944

1. The units and strengths of same, listed in this OOB have been identified either from Documents or PWs. These units were here when our forces landed on BIAK ISLAND "D" day.

<u>Code Name</u>	<u>Code No.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Strength</u>
YUKI	3523	222nd Inf Regt, 36 Div	Doc & PW	June	
		Regt'l Hq			226
		Med Sec			189
		Sig Sec			136
		Engr Sec			240
		Tank Co			64
		Machine Cannon Co			74
		Transport Sec			106
		1st Bn (incl'd Arty)			899
		2nd Bn, less 5th Co (incl'd Arty)			702
		3rd Bn, less 10th Co (incl'd Arty)			702
			Sub Total:		3338
RIGASEI	2921	221st Regt, 2nd Bn, 35 Div	Doc	17 June	322
		2nd Development Unit (KAITARU)	Doc & PW	29 Apr 23 June	1482
		NAGATA Force (Naval, probably 19th Guard Unit)	Doc	16 June	480
IKIOI	T5321	17 A/D Const Unit	PW & Doc	Apr, June	639
IKIOI	15333	108 A/D Const Unit	PW & Doc	May, June	616
IKIOI	15332	107 A/D Const Unit	PW & Doc	Apr, June	904
		50 Special Const Co	Doc	29 Apr	134
		69 Const Co	Doc	29 Apr	339
		5 Mobile Lumber Unit	Doc	29 Apr	84
		12 Mobile Lumber Unit	Doc	29 Apr	140
		5 Field Well Drill Co	Doc	29 Apr	100
		1/3 36 Div Intendence Sec	Doc	29 Apr	61
		14 Div Sea Transport Unit	Doc	29 Apr	302
		41 Special Land Duty Co	Doc	29 Apr	682
		47 Anchorage Hq (MOKMER Dr)	Doc	29 Apr	63
		2nd Army Fd Motor Trans	Doc	29 Apr	33
		248 Ind Motor Trans	Doc	29 Apr	50
		36 Div W/T Sec	Doc	29 Apr	20
		24 Sig Regt, 3rd Pl, 1st Co	Doc	29 Apr	66
		36 Div Fd Hospital	Doc	29 Apr	163
		87 Evacuation Pl	Doc	29 Apr	53
		Anti-Malaria Sqd	Doc	29 Apr	6
		1/3 27 Fd Water Purif Sec	Doc	29 Apr	33
		10 Fd MP Unit	Doc	29 Apr	3

<u>Code Name</u>	<u>Code No.</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Strength</u>
		30 Fd Ord Depot	Doc	29 Apr	110
		49 A/A 3rd Btry	Doc	29 Apr	136
		Fortification Sec	Doc	29 Apr	27
		SAKURAI Engr Work Sqd	Doc	29 Apr	13
					<u>10,499</u>

RECAPITULATION

Less 20% for evacuations and rear echelon pers	2100
Prisoners of War	12
Killed in Action	<u>2124</u>
Sub Total:	4536
Total:	5963

ANNEX 2 TO G-2 REPORT

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

1. OPERATIONS

a. Orientation: CIC Combat Team "D", established Headquarters with ATIS Detachment adjacent to G-2 Section, BOSNEK Village, BIAK ISLAND, on 18 June 1944. During the 24 hour period between notice of alert and embarkation for BIAK ISLAND, this detachment had no opportunity to become acquainted with the tactical or geographical situation of the BIAK Campaign, thereby making it impossible to plan in advance. Maps, patrol reports, dump coordinates, and location of enemy forces were obtained from the 41st Division CIC Combat Team.

b. Liaison:

(1) Because of the relative positions of the 41st and I Corps CP in forward and rear areas respectively, a division of territory was made. Combat Team "E" was responsible for area West of MOKMER Drome while Combat Team "D" covered the remainder of BIAK and adjoining Islands. It was further agreed at this time that there would be a daily exchange of reports in order to obviate duplication of efforts and to supplement counter intelligence information.

(2) Captain Budge, S-2, 163rd Infantry Regiment, was contacted and the assistance of 3 CIC agents was offered for counter intelligence patrols. After reviewing the tactical situation and enemy capabilities it was felt that it was unnecessary to detach CIC agents for duty with the 163rd Regiment. Captain Budge stated that in cases where he thought there would be a need for CIC patrols, he would notify this Detachment. He also forwarded documents and materiel located in areas in which no patrol had searched. This procedure proved to be very helpful as it withheld limited CIC personnel for use in other missions. Acting upon information received from the 163rd Regiment, several patrols were made to search abandoned Japanese bivouac areas.

(3) 1 CIC Agent was assigned as liaison man between NICA and this Detachment. In this manner information of interest to both organizations was made more readily available. NICA was extremely cooperative resulting in the efficient handling of natives with regards to interrogations. Lt. Krol, Dutch Intelligence Officer, and Lt. Cook, contacted each other daily formulating plans and policies and exchanging information.

(4) Lt. Cook and other key personnel of this Detachment made a daily study of the G-2 Situation Reports and using these reports as a basis, CIC patrols were made up for the following day. This Detachment submitted daily reports of its activities at 1800 hours.

c. Patrols:

(1) Although the M/T road from BOSNEK Village to MOKMER Drome had been searched previously by CIC personnel of the 41st Division, it was felt that the tactical situation had been such that it would have been impossible for them to thoroughly search all caves, gun emplacements, personnel, bivouac and dump areas. Consequently this area was covered again by this Detachment. Off Limits signs were posted where necessary. Identifications and approximately three cases of documents were processed by ATIS.

(2) On 21 June, a CIC patrol consisting of 1 officer and 11 enlisted men and 1 native guide searched the recently evacuated

bivouac areas approximately 3 miles North of MANDON Village. One bivouac area consisted of a Colonel's headquarters in addition to many other smaller huts. Search of these bivouac areas and 10 natural caves revealed that they were being used by Japanese at night. This information was reported thru proper channels.

d. Natives: Natives of BIAK were discovered to be openly hostile to the Japanese occupation and had been forced to work for them. It was felt that information from these natives could be utilized to a large degree. CIC work was further facilitated upon arrival by the fact that NICA was in full operation, having valuable information concerning loyal natives and those who worked voluntarily for the Japanese. Native control prohibiting entrance into restricted military areas was invoked. The immediate problem therefore, was to utilize the knowledge of that information possessed by natives concerning Japanese occupation to the best advantage for intelligence operations. This problem was solved by several methods.

(1) Native patrols were organized under the supervision of NICA and CIC. A police boy was selected after scrutinizing his trustworthiness, ability, and standing with other natives. He then led the patrol into territory which had been designated by CIC and NICA with instructions to have all Goeroes, Chiefs, and other important natives report to NICA for CIC interrogation. In this way it was possible to contact natives who had been in Japanese held areas two or three days prior to date of interrogation. Among places contacted by such patrols were Rani Island, Soepiori, Sorido-Korim trail, and northern parts of BIAK.

(2) A CIC patrol consisting of 1 officer, 3 CIC agents, an official G-2 photographer, and two NICA officers, accompanied a routine PT boat patrol to RANI and NOEMFOOR ISLANDS. At RANI ISLAND, CIC personnel were put ashore by rubber boat to interrogate natives and to bring two natives back to Headquarters for further interrogation.

(3) Information of a routine nature was obtained from natives who voluntarily reported to NICA.

(4) Prior to departure from the HOLLANDIA Area, some 150 repatriated Javanese soldiers had been interrogated concerning Japanese occupation of BIAK and surrounding Islands. This type of interrogation was continued at BIAK of approximately 40 Javanese soldiers.

e. Interrogations: For the purpose of expediting interrogation of natives and Javanese, three teams were formed with a NEI (CIC) agent and one U.S. Army CIC agent on each team. G-2 liaison enabled interrogators to obtain the desired tactical information. Efforts were made to pin point barge hideouts, barge and supply routes, concentrations of enemy troops, caves, gun emplacements, escape trails and former bivouac areas.

## 2. SECURITY LESSONS LEARNED

a. Natives: The unreliability of native information was further emphasized in the BIAK Campaign. Many interrogations were conducted without necessary maps or sufficient knowledge of BIAK ISLAND itself. The BIAK natives were discovered to be of comparatively high intelligence and according to native standards, educated. This team did not accept any statements without adequate proof of accuracy. It was found expedient to check and recheck information. Of great assistance was the vast number of natives interrogated during the relatively short period of participation in

this Campaign. Where three teams were operating separately, it was advisable to check information for discrepancies in order that corrections could be made on the spot. Correlating and evaluating information for concise accurate reports for dissemination to interested sections followed interrogations. Records of interrogations will be forwarded to proper authorities. Again rapid transfer of this Headquarters proved the value of keeping records up-to-date.

b. Captured documents and field experiences indicated that the Japanese troops in the BIAK area had been unusually well educated in security matters. Instances were observed and others reported that soldiers were either concealing, destroying, or not using identification disks. It is believed that responsible personnel had been instructed in the destruction of documents and materiel and that this had been carried out. There was a noted scarcity of documents in evacuated areas and the majority of captured documents were of "B" and "C" classification. In the HOLLANDIA Campaign, the ratio of "A" and Central Bureau documents were much higher.

c. This Detachment encountered one booby trap which had been set by the Japanese. The trap was a pull type of crude construction. A copper wire was stretched across a trail tied to the stump of a tree on one side and connected with a twenty or twenty-five gallon can on the other side. Location was clearly marked with no attempt to neutralize the device. Other booby traps were reported but no others were encountered by this Detachment.

### 3. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. In addition to motor transportation which, of necessity, accompanies CIC Detachments in the initial phases of an operation, it is recommended that water transportation be made available to CIC Detachments for use in inter-Island traffic.

b. It has been noted from past experiences that patrols of 11 or more men are necessary in many instances for CIC missions. In the BIAK Campaign where caves were encountered, safety precautions required that 8 men cover the 3 men conducting the search. If more than one patrol is necessary in any one day, present personnel is not adequate. Considering that patrols are just one phase of CIC work during a campaign, it is recommended that additional men be assigned to CIC Combat Teams, if only for the early stages of any operation.

c. The value of having an official photographer attached to a CIC Combat Team cannot be overly emphasized. In order to fulfill his duties properly and to be of the greatest value to the organization, it is recommended that this man be furnished full photographic equipment including the materials necessary for the processing, and printing of films in the field.

d. As Allied armies advance northward, the problem of native and civilian control will become increasingly complex and unwieldy and intelligence value will increase tremendously. Inasmuch as acts of Espionage and Sabotage fall within the jurisdiction of the Counter Intelligence Corps, control will have to be tightened to prevent the possible infiltration of active enemy agents and native informants. Heretofore, the enemies only means of obtaining information has been through uneducated and unintelligent natives who could be easily spotted and attempts to transmit information to the enemy neutralized. In the future, however, it is possible and highly probable that the major task confronted by CIC Combat Teams will be to neutralize trained enemy agents. Therefore, it will be necessary to apprehend suspects known prior to an operation and those discovered during the course of an operation. Following apprehension

it is necessary to interrogate these suspects and record identifications. In addition to the usual physical description, it is suggested that subject be photographed if advisable and fingerprinted if necessary.

It is recommended that a Standard Operating Procedure regarding civilian control be instituted by higher headquarters as soon as practicable for use by all CIC Combat Teams.

# G-3 REPORT

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Incl 1, Troop List, Combat Units

Incl 2, Field Orders

Incl 3, Maps

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ANNEX 1 Artillery

ANNEX 2 Chemical

Incl 1, Cave Defenses

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### G-3 REPORT

The Biak operation presented problems requiring development of techniques to deal with numerous strongly defended caves and networks of caves. The recommended procedures are peculiar to the Biak type of terrain. Lessons drawn are included as inclosures to Annex 2 of this report. Other lessons learned, which apply to all types of terrain, are listed below. Some of these lessons were drawn from errors made by our troops and staffs; others, from those made by the enemy.

#### 1. Tactical Errors Observed:

a. As some units advanced, there was a definite tendency to fail to garrison dominating terrain features which were later occupied by groups of Japanese who then had to be ousted by vigorous fighting.

b. The attack on Borokoe and Sorido Dromes proceeded with great rapidity through terrain thickly covered with small trees and underbrush. No patrols or supporting units were left behind to comb out and guard these areas. In view of the Japanese proclivity to permit the main body of our troops to pass before launching their attack, this will always be a dangerous procedure.

c. There was a tendency on the part of units from regiments down to squads to employ involved and complicated schemes of maneuver. This resulted in lack of coordination and weakened the force of the main attack. In some cases, it resulted in American fire pinning down American troops. The principle of simplicity is never so important as it is in a jungle.

d. There was a tendency on the part of all units to dig in for the night; establish a close perimeter and leave the surrounding area to the initiative of the Japanese who could, and did, wander through the area during the night.

e. In many instances, troops were observed in the immediate vicinity of the enemy without their arms. For example, signal corps men placed wire on trees in an area which had not been mopped up and no security detachment was present. Their own weapons, when observed, were in trucks. Such a practice normally results in unnecessary casualties.

f. There was a failure to employ to the fullest extent the possibility of night operations or night advances. The only effort at a night attack resulted in a marked gain. The unit staging the attack succeeded in occupying positions the Japanese had vacated for the night and caught the Japanese returning to the positions the next morning.

g. When a unit is given the mission of securing a certain area, it is possessed of a false sense of accomplishment when the area has been surrounded with a perimeter, even though the enemy who threatens the place has not been defeated. The establishment of a defense perimeter obviously enables the enemy to choose their time and place of attack.

#### 2. Staff Errors Observed:

a. In all headquarters, there was a tendency to devote too much time to "paper work". There was too much effort expended in compiling reports to higher echelons of command and in building up the files of various staff sections. This faulty apportionment of time resulted in hastily prepared plans and estimates and denied the commanding generals the full benefit of their staffs in reaching their tactical decisions.

b. The fog of war was appreciably thickened by inaccuracies which permeated information wending its way from the assault echelons to the task force command post. Frequently information sent back was incomplete and inaccurate. The irreducible residue of error inherent in reports flowing back through normal communication channels can only be overcome by staff officers of all echelons actively visiting crucial points to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation.

### 3. Japanese Weaknesses.

a. The terrain including many coral ridges and deep caves made the battlefields of Biak a military nightmare. The Japanese readily appreciated the defensive value of the many enormous and interlocking caves such as those known to the Americans as the "Sump" and to the Japanese as the "West Caves". The use of these caves, however clever, constituted a very serious Japanese weakness in that they split their forces into a number of parts. If the entire Japanese force had been held together on the ridges north of the Mokmer Drome they might have gained victory at certain stages of the fight. For example, they might have struck the 186th Infantry in the flank as it advanced off the plateau down onto Mokmer Drome. The establishment of large garrisons in the caves above Mokmer Village, and particularly in the so-called Iddi Pocket, while annoying, never amounted to more than just an annoyance.

b. There were a number of cases of what the Americans call suicidal attacks. These attacks might be successful against undisciplined troops and their use is considered by the Japanese as the acme of military training and elan. Nevertheless, these attacks are a great weakness in Japanese tactics; no record being available of one that has succeeded against trained American troops. For example, on the morning of 22 June a force of approximately 150 Japanese attacked the rear of the 186th Infantry. This force apparently was attempting to break through the encircling American force and escape to the north-west. However, instead of attempting to by-pass or infiltrate thru the American defensive position, the enemy elected to attack the perimeter protecting the command post of the 186th Infantry. As a result of this employment of mass tactics, the small group of Americans manning this perimeter were able to kill 109 Japanese in this attack, while suffering only two or three casualties themselves.

INCLOSURE # 1 TO G-3 REPORT

COMBAT UNITS

HURRICANE TASK FORCE

HURRICANE TASK FORCE

COMBAT TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co, I Corps  
Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Artillery  
Hq & Hq Co, 41st Inf Div  
41st Sig Co  
116th Med Bn (less Co B)  
41st Cav Ren Tr  
41st QM Co  
741st Ord Co (LM)  
116th Engr (C) Bn (less Co A)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 41st Div Arty  
146th FA Bn  
167th FA Bn  
205th FA Bn  
218th FA Bn  
162nd Inf  
163rd Inf  
186th Inf  
34th Inf  
947th FA Bn  
121st FA Bn  
Btry A, 168th FA Bn (155 gun)  
Hq & Hq Btry, 208th AAA Gp  
165th AAA Gun Bn  
476th AAA AW Bn  
Btry C, 236th AAA SL Bn  
674th AAA MG Btry  
675th AAA MG Btry  
718th CA Btry (155mm gun)  
720th CA Btry (155mm gun)  
Prov CA Harbor Surv Det SC Team No. 3  
Prov CA Harbor Surv Det CA Team No. 4  
Co D, 641st TD Bn  
603rd Tk Co (less 1 Plat)  
542nd Engr B & S Regt (less 1 Boat Co)  
1 Maint Det, 562nd Boat Maint Bn  
Hq & Hq Co, 1112th Engr Combat Gp (less Det)

INCLOSURE # 2 TO G-3 REPORT

FIELD ORDERS

AND

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

.....  
: [REDACTED] :  
: Auth: CG USF APO 920 :  
: Init: s/ FSB :  
: Date: 17 June 1944 :  
.....

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. FORCES  
APO 920  
2200K, 17 June 1944

FO 2

MAPS: WARAI, BOSNEK, MOKMER, SORIDO (First Revision) 1:20,000.

1. a. See current intelligence reports.
- b. See operations overlay.

2. 41st Division, less 163rd Infantry (less 3rd Bn) and 146th FA Bn (Corps Reserve) with the 34th Infantry attached, will launch a limited objective attack Monday, 19 June 1944, enveloping the enemy right (south) flank, seize the objective area shown on operations overlay in order to secure MOKMER Drome from enemy fire. The ridge 1000 yards east of BOROKOE Drome will be occupied for the purpose of protecting the north flank in a future operation. Time of attack 0630K.

3. a. The 41st Division will attack making their main effort on the west flank, seize and hold the objective shown on the operations overlay. Line of departure and direction of attack as shown on operations overlay.

b. A minimum of one battalion will be employed under division control on the plateau on the north flank to furnish protection and prevent movement of enemy reserves into and out of the objective area.

c. The 34th Infantry will remain in an assembly position in the vicinity of MOKMER Drome and will not be committed without authority of the Task Force Commander. Plans will be prepared for its employment in an attack to seize the remaining two dromes and SORIDO Village at a later date.

d. Field Artillery: The 41st Division Artillery, less 146th FA Bn, with the 947th FA Bn and the 121st FA Bn attached, will furnish artillery support for the attack.

e. Reserve: 163rd Infantry (less 3rd Bn), with the 146th FA Bn attached, will continue its present mission of providing security on the north flank and mopping up Japanese resistance on the ridge line of the MOKMER Drome - BOSNEK area. It will be the responsibility for the patrolling and security of the area east of the 34th North-South grid line.

f. Tanks: The 601st Tank Company will support the main effort.

x. (1) All reconnaissances of the area of attack, assembly areas and routes thereto will be executed by small parties.

    (2) Every means will be employed in order to keep the enemy in ignorance of our intention.

4. Supply and evacuation: No change.
5. Signal Communications: No change.

R. L. EICHELBERGER  
Lt. Gen., U.S. Army  
Commanding


1 Incl:  
Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

s/ Bowen  
F. S. Bowen, Jr.  
Colonel, G.S.C.  
AC of S, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - 41st Div  
1 - CO 163rd Inf  
2 - G-3 U.S. Forces, APO 920



HEADQUARTERS HURRICANE TASK FORCE  
 17 June 1944

Overlay to accompany Field Order No. 2

Map Ref: Shouten Islands,  
 MOKMER Sheet  
 Scale; 1 : 20,000

.....  
: [REDACTED] :  
: Auth: CG USF APO 920 :  
: Init: s/ FSB :  
: Date: 19 June 1944 :  
.....

HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES  
APO 920  
2000K, 19 June 1944

FO 3

MAPS: WARAI, BOSNEK, MOKMER, SORIDO (First Revision) 1:20,000.

1. a. See current intelligence reports.
- b. See Operations Overlay.
2. HURRICANE Task Force will attack, destroying the enemy force in the area north of the SUMP HOLE (32.5-42.0), seize, and secure SORIDO Village and the ridge to the north of the airdromes for the purpose of preventing enemy small arms fire on the three dromes.

Time of Attack: 200630K  
Line of Departure: Western line now held by Division  
Direction of Attack: West - Northwest

3. a. The 41st Division, less the 163rd Infantry (less the 3rd Battalion) and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion, will continue its principle mission of the destruction of the enemy force in the area generally north of the SUMP HOLE.

Attachments: 34th Infantry  
601st Tank Company  
121st Field Artillery Battalion  
947th Field Artillery Battalion  
3rd Battalion, 163rd Infantry




- b. A minimum of a regimental combat team will seize and secure the BOROKOE and SORIDO Dromes and secure SORIDO Village. It will occupy the high ground overlooking MOKMER, BOROKOE, and SORIDO Dromes.
  - c. A minimum of one battalion will protect the right (north) flank of the Task Force and deny to the enemy the high ground north and east of (32.6-43.1).
  - d. Battery B, 168th Field Artillery Battalion, under Corps control, will reinforce the fires of the 41st Division Artillery on call from the Division Artillery Officer.
  - e. Reserve: The 163rd Infantry (less one battalion) with the 146th Field Artillery Battalion and 41st Reconnaissance Troop attached, will continue assigned missions.
4. Omitted.
  5. No change.

R. L. EICHELBERGER  
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army  
Commanding

1 Incl.  
Operations Overlay

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bowen  
G-3



OPERATIONS OVERLAY  
 To accompany  
 P.O. #3, HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES, APO 920  
 Dated 19 June 1944  
 Map Ref: Schouten Islands, WARAI, MONNER &  
 SORIDO Sheets 1 : 20,000

.....  
: [REDACTED] :  
: Auth: CG USF APO 920 :  
: Init: /s/ FSB :  
: Date: 24 June 1944 :  
.....

24 June 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions.

TO : Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division.  
Commanding Officer, 163rd Regimental Combat Team.

1. HURRICANE Task Force will attack Monday, 26 June 1944, destroying the remaining isolated Japanese pockets of resistance within the area and secure the airdromes, port, and coastal supply road from interference by the Japanese.

a. The 41st Division, less 163rd Infantry, reinforced, (paragraph b) will attack and secure the high ground generally along the line: Road junction on the KORIM BAY road at (27.7-46.6) - (31.6-44.8) - to the ridge in the vicinity of (33.5-44.0). It will destroy all enemy resistance within its zone of action and block any movement South from KORIM BAY, east from IMPENDI, and west from the plateau area north of BOSNEK. This force will establish and maintain contact with the 163rd Infantry along the high ground in the vicinity of (35.0-42.6). Adequate local protection for each of the three airdromes will be provided. A minimum of one company will continuously occupy and defend the observation post now held by Company L, 163rd Infantry (32.6-43.1).

Attachments: 34th Infantry  
947th Field Artillery Battalion  
121st Field Artillery Battalion  
603rd Tank Company  
Company D, 641st TD Battalion, less 1st Plat.

b. The 163rd Infantry, reinforced, will attack and seize the high ground between (41.0-42.5) and (36.2-40.2) destroying enemy resistance within its zone of action. It will block any enemy movement west to the airdrome area. 3rd Battalion, 163rd Infantry, less Company L, 163rd Infantry, reverts to control of 163rd Infantry upon relief by a company from the 41st Division.

Attachments: 146th Field Artillery Battalion  
Company B, 116th Engineers  
1st Platoon, Company D, 641st TD Battalion  
605th Medical Clearing Company  
Company B, 116th Medical Battalion

2. a. Attachments effective 0001K, 25 June 1944.

b. Thorough reconnaissance, reorganization, and movement to assembly positions for the attack will be accomplished by 2400K, 25 June 1944.

c. Contact will be maintained with enemy throughout reorganization and regrouping period. The evacuated enemy positions will be occupied wherever found.

d. Artillery preparations will be as directed by the respective commanders.

e. Time of attack: As announced by each commander

f. Boundary between units: Hill 180 (33.5-44.9) (35.0-42.7) (35.7-41.8) Mokmer Village, (36.5-39.5) all to 41st Division.

g. Request for close air support will reach Task Force Headquarters by 1200K, 25 June 1944.

3. Isolated enemy positions which cannot be immediately reduced will be contained and bypassed while pushing to the objective assigned in paragraph 1 above.

4. Commanders will submit plans to Commanding General, Task Force, prior to 1200K, 25 June 1944.

/s/ R. L. Eichelberger  
/t/ R. L. EICHELBERGER  
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army,  
Commanding

Distribution:



1 - 41st Inf Div  
1 - 163rd Inf  
1 - G-2  
1 - G-4  
1 - Corps Arty  
1 - 14th ALP  
1 - Alamo Force  
1 - Task Force File  
1 - G-3 File

# ORIENTATION MAP


## SCHOUTEN ISLANDS, JAPEN AND NOEMFOOR




**Legend**  
*Operational Airfields* (indicated by a circle with a dot)  
*Airfields under construction* (indicated by a circle with a cross)




ALLIED GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION  
 3 MAY 44 AGS / HQ 139 / 44





REFERENCE MAP  
BIAK ISLAND  
1:250,000




SHEET INDEX



WARNING: GRID COORDINATES ON THIS MAP DIFFER FROM THOSE ON PRELIMINARY SHEET






44 WARNING: GRID COORDINATES ON THIS MAP DIFFER  
 FROM THOSE ON PRELIMINARY SHEET

REFERENCE MAP  
 BIAK ISLAND  
 1:20,000

SHEET INDEX



12'

11'

10'

09'

ANNEX NO. 1 TO G-3 REPORT

ARTILLERY

1. Participation:

On 18 June 1944, the Headquarters I Corps Artillery as Headquarters Hurricane Task Force Artillery, established a command post near Mandon. Control was assumed of the 168th FA Battalion (less Batteries A & C) and of the 146th FA Battalion. The mission of the 168th FA Battalion was general support of the Task Force; of the 146th FA Battalion, direct support of the 163rd Infantry. Remaining artillery units of the Task Force operated under control of 41st Division.

2. Lessons learned:

a. It is practical for artillery agencies to prepare firing charts in advance from vertical photographs having sufficient overlap. In this operation the 1/20,000 battle map was unsatisfactory as a firing chart. The previously prepared firing chart resulting from radial line assembly of photos and restitution of points proved to be suitable.

b. Sufficient ordnance personnel to handle and maintain properly ammunition supply points should be a part of each task force. Transportation units for stockage of ammunition supply points should be a part of the task force. Artillery units should not have to furnish this transportation.

c. For security for warning of air and ground attacks on a liaison aircraft conducting a fire mission, and also for the accurate location of ground installations, particularly those delivering fire on our aircraft, it is desirable when possible to have our liaison aircraft operate in pairs. They should operate at slightly different altitudes, avoid making the same maneuvers, and vary their horizontal distance apart. Much of the effectiveness will be lost if the horizontal distance apart is less than 100 yards.

ANNEX 2 TO G-3 REPORT

CHEMICAL

1. Participation:

a. Chemical troops with the Task Force consisted of Co. D of the 641st TD Bn employing 4.2" chemical mortars (later redesignated as 98th Chemical Battalion) and Unit No. 2, 94th Chemical Composite Company. The former was continuously engaged as platoons in support of infantry assault elements; the latter in administering the Task Force Chemical Warfare Dump.

b. Co. D participated with each of the regimental combat teams in all of the principal assaults during the period described and fired 7986 rounds during the entire operation.

c. Studies were made by the Task Force Chemical Section of the various types of cave defenses with which the area abounded and recommendations of means of reduction were made. (See inclosure, this Annex)

2. Lessons learned:

a. The lack of tank-mounted, large-capacity, long-range flame throwers for rapid reduction of cave defenses of the type found on Biak was acutely felt.

b. The shortage of 4.2" chemical mortar ammunition limited the usefulness of the weapons in a situation to which they were peculiarly adapted. Resupply bogged down largely because of intermediate unloading and reloading difficulties. Four U/F (150 rds. per mortar = 1 U/F) should accompany the mortars. Supply levels should be brought up to 6 U/F as rapidly as transport permits, and be maintained at that level. Resupply to maintain prescribed levels should be loaded with ordnance resupply for through-shipment for resupply point to target area.

(1) Attachment to supported infantry units, or to artillery when supplementary fires were required, added materially to the effectiveness of the weapon. The need for greater mobility of 4.2" chemical mortar units was again emphasized. Available special LCM mounts could have been fruitfully employed. The irreducible minimum per company is 3, 2½-ton 6x6 trucks, each with 1-ton trailer; 2, 3/4-ton weapons carriers; 17, ¼-ton trucks, each with ¼-ton trailer.

(2) The mortar units were used to a point of physical exhaustion. When a platoon is in support of an infantry unit which is relieved for rest, the platoon should also usually be relieved. In this operation such a platoon was immediately re-attached to the relieving unit. Exhaustion and sickness were unreasonably high for that reason.

c. The gas mask loss was less than half that in Operation "G". It is estimated at 15%. The experience in both operations suggests the desirability of requiring combat troops employed in the initial "D" day phases to land with masks on the individual; masks for other troops and protective ointment for all troops to be carried in unit stores. Supply officers should be impressed with the need for protecting these chemical supplies as much as is practicable from dampness.

This precaution was frequently and unnecessarily omitted. Troops carrying their own masks should, if enemy gas is not used or threatened, drop their masks at the initial objective or upon order by task force commander, small details from a chemical composite unit to be dispatched promptly for recovery of those masks and their return to unit supply or for salvage.

d. In regard to cave nets, see inclosure this Annex.

Cave Defenses - Biak

1. General: While the BIAK caves are in many respects peculiar to BIAK ISLAND, lessons learned there are adaptable to other volcanic-and-coral terrain conditions which are general in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER north of 2 degrees south latitude. The BIAK land mass appears to have been of volcanic origin, a fringing coral reef having been formed after the initial eruption. Successive thrusts seem to have raised the mass from time to time. In pauses or intervals between thrusts additional coral reefs were created at the then sea-level, and these were evidently raised with the land mass in later upheavals, forming an irregular series of broken cliffs, rises and ridges, each from 8 to 200 feet in height. Horizontal and vertical action by sea-water during the "submarine life" of these formations, erosion, faults and fissures at later periods resulted in caves and cave nets common in the southern areas investigated.

2. Types:

a. Type one: This consists of a cavern from 3 to 50 feet in depth, occasionally with access to another cavern or to fresh air through a transverse tunnel in the face of the cliff, 10 to 50 yards in length. This type was for M.G. emplacement; food and ammunition caches.

b. Type two: The cavern traverses the base of a narrow coastal ridge 20 to 30 feet in height, with a forward opening in the seaward cliff (6 to 12 feet in height), usually improved by a concrete M. G. port, and a rear opening in the landward face adjacent to an MP road. The cavern is irregular, approximating 15 to 25 feet in length by 8 to 15 feet in width, 3 to 6 feet in height. Food, ammunition and personnel enter and exit only through the rear opening. Cans attached to coral teats in the roof provide ample fresh, cool water. The field of fire from the port usually approximates frontal. However, a variation occurs when the seaward opening is masked by an apron consisting of a portion of cliff broken from the main face or separated from it by sea-action. Between apron and cliff there is a narrow alley, the ends of which are sealed with concrete, pierced for ports and OP's.

c. Type three: Open galleries may occur at any elevation. Those east of the PARAI defile were 80 feet above the coastal road and about 200 yards back from the beach. They were reached by a 75 degree slope of rotten coral, and found to consist of a level series of intermittently connected cavities about 4 to 8 feet in height and 3 to 6 feet in depth. Stalactite-stalagmite unions and hard limestone formations occasionally interrupted continuous passage. In several instances tunnels arched or ran behind these obstructions. Blankets, food and wood flooring were found in interior connections. The face of these cliffs rose another 80 feet above the galleries and was pocked by unoccupied cavities at one or more distinct levels. The wooded areas extending back from the cliff-top afforded good mortar sites. Above the face of the cliff there were suitable M.G. emplacements.

d. Type four: On ridges north of the coastal plain holes or faults are found, more or less circular in shape and from 30 to 75 yards in diameter, 15 to 75 feet deep, with sheer or steeply sloping sides. One or more caves open at the base of these sides, or from small pits in the bottom of the sump. The cave may be a cavity of 5



REAR AREA  
MORTARS

CLIFF 160'  
ABOVE ROAD

UNOCCUPIED  
GALLERY

ORGANIZED  
GALLERY  
DEFENSE 80'  
ABOVE ROAD

ROTTEN CORAL  
SLOPE 75°

ROAD 20'  
ABOVE SEA  
LEVEL 100 YDS  
FROM SHORE,  
JUNGLE ON  
NEAR SIDE OF  
ROAD

ORGANIZED CLIFF GALLERIES  
COMMANDING APPROACH TO  
PARAI DEFILE



RIDGE 30'


CLIFF 10'

OP

APRON 8'

PORT

BEACH




PORTS AND OP AT ENDS OF ALLEY  
 BETWEEN CLIFF AND APRON MASKING  
 CAVE. (FOLIAGE SCREENING REMOVED)



RIDGE 20'

CLIFF 8'

BEACH



RIDGE

**BEACH CAVE WITH CONCRETE  
FRONTAL PORT  
(FOLIAGE SCREENING REMOVED)**

to 30 feet from front to rear, as in the East caves over IBDI, or as in the case of the West caves, the entrance to a succession of chambers and interconnecting galleries, some as high as 40 feet, which result in a cave net with egresses in three sumps separated by 35 to 100 yards. The West caves accommodated 900 men and were radio equipped and lighted by electricity.

e. Variations: While most caves fall within one of the foregoing types, a position may combine features of two or more types. An important characteristic of many caves is the screening by natural, growing foliage, which in several observed instances made the port or entrance invisible at six paces. In "sump" caves, screening may consist of stalactites and stalagmites which do not conceal the cave mouth, but stop or deflect much of the fire of all calibers. Further screening may be afforded by coral forms in front of the mouth, or by a deep pit in the "sump" floor, upon which the cave opens. An example of the screening coral wall occurred in the main "sump" on the IBDI ridge. The "sump" was about 75 feet deep. In the landward or north wall, and level with the "sump" floor, was a cavern, across the mouth of which ran a natural coral wall. Mortars placed in the cavern had a limited but effective seaward field of fire. The trajectory barely cleared under the forward edge of the cavern roof, and over the coral wall and the seaward edge of the "sump". The emplacement was virtually bomb proof and shell proof.

### 3. Methods employed for reduction:

a. The techniques of reduction were frontal and vertical attack, envelopment, isolation, siege and assault. The means included all ground fires capable of being laid on the target using HE & WP, shell and grenades, air bombardment, and strafing, flame throwers, gasoline, demolition charges and FS smoke.

b. Tanks were employed to precede infantry, firing cannon and M.G. at point blank range.

c. Gasoline drums were poured into cave openings after the enemy had been driven into the interiors, or dropped by plane and ignited by WP hand grenades. Demolition charges were brought up under cover of smoke or of flamethrowers, or lowered into cave mouths and fired electrically. Charges were from 50 to 500 pounds of TNT or equivalent. Clusters of FS-filled 4.2" mortar shell were defuzed, No. 6 detonators being substituted, lowered in front of windward openings of cave nets and exploded electrically. In addition to the harrassing effect of FS in confined spaces, the drift revealed remote openings which were promptly invested, thereby cutting off supply and escape.

### 4. Conclusions:

#### a. Preparation:

(1) Location and definition of target require:

(a) Thorough ground and air reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance is of especial importance in preparation for assault on "sump" positions.

(b) Removal of screening foliage. For this purpose suspected areas should be subjected to searching HE and WP fires and to rockets and bazookas.

(2) Except as noted in the preceding subparagraph, ground fires and also air bombardment and strafing have little physical effect upon deep cave structures or defending personnel. They serve to harrass and to pin the enemy well within the cave and thus obstruct or limit his field of fire.

- (3) Remote openings of cave nets may be revealed by smoke shell or smoke rifle grenades bursting at windward mouths. The smoke will exit at leeward or higher vents, thereby facilitating reconnaissance.
- (4) If practicable, cave positions should be isolated before assault.

b. Investment and Assault:

- (1) The portable flamethrower is effective against shallow caves, and to cover the placement of demolition charges within cave entrances. In employing this flamethrower with unthickened fuel against shallow caves or leeward entrances of deep caves, flanking bursts should be delivered to avoid the serious hazard of back-blast.
- (2) The large-fuel-capacity, long-range flamethrower mounted on a medium tank is peculiarly adapted to cave and cliff-gallery assault.
- (3) Gasoline in quantity poured into windward entrances and ignited by greande tends to exhaust oxygen, produce harrassing fumes, cause casualties and destroy enemy ammunition. This method is most effective when the cave or tunnel floor slopes downward from the entrance. Where this occurs, gasoline may be ignited even at leeward entrances with effect.
- (4) FS smoke released by portable smoke generators lowered into windward openings, produces a harrassing effect, especially in confined, damp passages. This result, in a lesser degree, may be attained by removing fuzes from a cluster of five or more FS filled 4.2" mortar shells, inserting No. 6 detonators, lowering the assembly into a windward opening and exploding it electrically. While the harassing effect of HC in confined spaces is greater. Batteries of HC smoke pots released at windward entrances are most effective. As noted above (par 4 a (3) ) connections with other caves and vents may be disclosed by remote smoke plumes. All entrances must be covered by small arms to kill individuals exposing themselves in seeking relief from the smoke.
- (5) The reduction of the cave defense will usually be accomplished by a heavy charge of explosive. The purpose is to produce some cave-in and great concussion effect. Therefore, the size of the charge of TNT or equivalent may be sufficient for a cavern with a small entrance and a depth of not in excess of 50 feet. 500 pounds is not excessive for large caves and cave nets, and comparable charges should be exploded at remote openings as nearly simultaneously as practicable. When it can be determined that the roof of a gallery is readily penetrable from the ground above the roof, the placement of drilled charges may disorganize subsurface communications and lighting, produce casualties and destroy stores.

- (6) Well trained war dogs may be employed to carry time charges into cave defenses.

c. Consolidation: The habitual re-occupation by the enemy of reduced cave defenses requires prompt, considered and effective disposition of such positions upon capture.

- (1) The disposition of a reduced cave defense will be determined by the following considerations:

- (a) The completeness of destruction in assault.
- (b) The condition of the interior as affected by quantity and deterioration of enemy dead and enemy stores.
- (c) The tactical, supply or communications value of the position to our own forces.
- (d) The probability of future re-occupation of the position by the enemy.
- (e) The availability of sufficient details to secure the position.

- (2) These considerations may dictate:

- (a) Cave-in or sealing of the position.
- (b) Trapping and mining of entrances and galleries.
- (c) Guarding of entrances and galleries.
- (d) Reorganization and occupation of the position.

- (3) In any event, thorough search and detailed description and measurements of the position should be made promptly, with due precaution against enemy booby traps and mines.

# G-4 REPORT

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- Incl 1, Periodic Report Form
- Incl 2, Graph-Daily Supply Levels  
and Discharged Tonnage
- Incl 3, Opns Instructions Nos 1 to 6
- Incl 4, Administrative Map
- Incl 5, Service Troops

- 
- ANNEX 1 Quartermaster
  - ANNEX 2 Ordnance
  - ANNEX 3 Medical
  - ANNEX 4 Engineer
  - ANNEX 5 Signal
  - ANNEX 6 Transportation
-

## G-4 REPORT

### SECTION I: PARTICIPATION

On the night of 14 June 1944, the headquarters was informed that it would leave for BIAK Island the following day to assume control of the HURRICANE Task Force. In view of the hurried preparations, there was no time to formulate plans for operations. The G-4 and a stenographer flew to BIAK with the forward echelon, 15 June 1944. The remainder of the section followed by LST, arriving 18 June 1944.

16th - 17th June were used in briefing the forward echelon, selecting a CP and laying the ground work for assuming operation of service agencies. Although Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER assumed command of the HURRICANE Task Force on 15 June 1944, physical operation of supply activities was still in the hands of the 41st Infantry Division Staff. Upon arrival of the rear echelon, special staff sections were asked for recommendations as to what service units should be placed under the active control of the corresponding Task Force staff section. The decision was made to revert all service units to Task Force control except the portable surgical hospitals. Task Force special staff sections were instructed to contact their units and verbally inform them of this decision. By 20 June, I Corps Headquarters had assumed operation of existing supply and maintenance installations of the Task Force.

Since the Task Force Headquarters was taking over an already operating setup, problems were few. The discharge of cargo was proceeding satisfactorily; supplies were reaching the front line troops. As the tactical situation stabilized, certain services (notably Quartermaster, Engineer and Ordnance) established dumps near the combat area; but the main base service installations were located between BOSNEK (49.0 - 42.8) and PARAI (38.5 - 40.5). These installations served 3,500 Medical, Engineer and Air Corps troops on OWI Island as well as the entire force on BIAK proper. The 41st Infantry Division moved its divisional installations up to the airdrome area, so as to be nearer the scene of operations.

Prior to the arrival of I Corps Headquarters, no provision had been made for the centralized control of matters pertaining to transportation. Based on experience gained during the Hollandia Operation, a Transportation Section was created to coordinate and control all air, water and motor transportation. The creation of this section greatly simplified the many administrative details necessary for the proper control of transportation activities and cargo discharge. The duties and responsibilities of the Transportation Officer are set forth in Operations Instructions No. 6. (Inclosure No. 3).

The long road haul to MOKMER Airdrome, together with the large number of trucks tied up by hauling discharged cargo to dumps, made it imperative that available vehicles be utilized to full capacity. To meet this situation, a provisional motor transportation pool was organized, consisting initially of elements of two Quartermaster Truck Companies supplemented by forty-one (41) 2½-ton trucks withdrawn from Medical, Signal, Engineer and Anti-aircraft units. The responsibility for all motor transportation was delegated to the Task Force Transportation Officer, who, in turn, set up a motor transportation section staffed by personnel of the 542d Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment.

The problem of water transportation was also handled by the Transportation Officer in accordance with priorities determined by the Task Force G-4. The presence of a well-trained and experienced regiment of Amphibian Engineers simplified this matter.

Service troops in the area were insufficient to handle the labor requirements of the Task Force, so it was necessary, on several occasions, to resort to the use of tactical troops for labor. Soon after the assumption of command, requests were made to higher headquarters for additional service troops. (See Inclosure No. 5).

## SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

Once again the necessity became apparent of having a well-trained Transportation Section as an organic part of the Task Force Headquarters. Such a section should have clearly defined responsibilities and sufficient personnel to supervise and coordinate the myriad activities pertaining to transportation. Of particular importance is the need for having a Transportation Section accustomed to working together, rather than a hastily collected and loosely organized provisional section.

The practice of calling forward ships only as the need arises and facilities are available needs no justification. Only two cargo ships arrived during the period 18 June - 28 June, and this, together with the excellent loading plan of the ship TARAKAN, made a smooth and rapid discharge of cargo possible. The use of San Francisco block-loaded cargo vessels is deemed definitely advantageous.

In summary, the problems of supply and evacuation were relatively few and were quickly disposed of. The fact that service activities were organized and functioning prior to the arrival of this headquarters, coupled with the favorable weather, made the G-4 aspect of the operation highly successful.

INCLOSURE #1, to G-4 ACTIVITIES, HISTORY OF OPERATION "H".

PERIODIC REPORT FORM

G-4 PERIODIC REPORT  
 HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES  
 APO 920

As of 1800K, \_\_, 1944

No.

Maps:

1. LOCATION:
2. STRENGTH: \_\_\_\_\_
3. RATIONS ON HAND: Total \_\_\_\_\_ days.  
     B \_\_\_\_\_ J \_\_\_\_\_  
     C \_\_\_\_\_ K \_\_\_\_\_ Native strength \_\_\_\_\_ days.  
     D \_\_\_\_\_ 10-1 \_\_\_\_\_ Native Rations \_\_\_\_\_ days.

4. a. LIGHTERING CRAFT:

<u>Type</u>	<u>On Hand</u>	<u>Unser- viceable</u>	<u>Other Uses</u>	<u>Purposes</u>
LCT				
LCM				
LCV				
LCV(P)				
LVT				
Barge				
_____				
_____				
Totals				

b. DWT Discharged: \_\_\_\_\_

c. Status of Ammunition:

d. Landing Facilities:

Dump Areas:

5. Evacuated during preceding 24 hours: \_\_\_\_\_ Waiting: \_\_\_\_\_

6. ROADS:

7. CAPTURED MATERIAL:

Item

Disposition

8. IMPORTANT OR UNUSUAL EVENTS:

9. CRITICAL SHORTAGES:

Class

Item

INCLOSURE #2 TO G-4 ACTIVITIES, HISTORY OF OPERATION "H"

GRAPH - DAILY SUPPLY LEVELS

AND

DISCHARGED TONNAGE


# SUPPLY LEVEL IN DEPOTS BIAK ISLAND AREA

## LEGEND

CLASS I — II — III — IV — V

	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	REMARKS
Strength	26880	27720	25260	26250	26220	26885	26710	26845	

DYS CLASS I II III IV V DWT CARGO SHOWN IN HUNDREDS



INCLOSURE #3 to G-4 ACTIVITIES, HISTORY OF OPERATION "H".

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS 1 - 6.

APO 920  
21 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS )  
:  
NUMBER . . . . . 1 )

CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIEL

1. General. All captured equipment and supplies are the property of the U.S. Government. Division and separate unit commanders will turn in all captured enemy materiel to the appropriate Task Force supply agencies. All materiel will be properly labelled, tagged and processed in accordance with existing regulations.

2. Vehicles.

a. All captured vehicles in the custody of divisions and attached units will be assembled in a division pool and held for disposition as directed by Task Force Ordnance Officer.

b. All captured vehicles in the custody of non-divisional units will be turned in to the Task Force Captured Vehicle Pool in the vicinity of (41.8 - 42.0).

c. The Task Force Ordnance Officer will repair and service these vehicles and issue same to the Task Force Transportation Officer for use in the Task Force Motor Pool or as otherwise directed by this headquarters. Task Force Ordnance Officer will issue all refueling units to the Commanding Officer, 308 Bomb Wing.

d. No captured vehicle will be operated without a special permit from this headquarters.

e. The Task Force Provost Marshal will impound all captured vehicles not operating under proper authority.

3. No captured materiel will be used that has not been cleared in accordance with existing regulations.

4. Salvage captured materiel will be turned in to the Task Force Quartermaster for disposition.

5. A record of all materiel captured and the disposition of same will be maintained by units effecting the capture.

6. All Task Force supply agencies will maintain records of captured materiel received and disposition of the same.

7. All units will take the necessary action to safeguard all captured materiel in their areas, or in their custody,

pending proper disposition. This will include establishment of adequate guards and construction of necessary fire breaks.

8. Prompt disciplinary action will be taken by all commanders for violations of AW 79 and AW 80.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC,  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight

G-4

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APO 920  
21 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS )

NUMBER . . . . . 2 )

SECTION I - DISPATCH OF MOTOR TRANSPORTATION

1. The use of motor transportation will be held to a minimum. Effective at once, all motor vehicles operating on roads in this vicinity and adjacent areas under the command of the CG, US Forces, APO 920, will be properly dispatched daily by organizations. Each driver must have in his possession a driver's trip ticket and performance record, QMC Form #237, or a suitable facsimile, properly and completely filled out with all pertinent details. Vehicles will be dispatched for official business only.

2. Any vehicle found operating without a properly accomplished trip ticket will be impounded by the Provost Marshal and turned in to the Task Force Transportation Motor Pool, operated in the vicinity of BOSNEK Beach. Vehicles so impounded are subject to be used for the next twenty-four (24) hours as the officer in charge of the motor transportation pool deems necessary. Responsibility for recovery of vehicles so impounded rests solely with organization commanders concerned.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES

3. All requests for movement of units, equipment, supplies and personnel by water, land or air, will be made through proper command channels to the Transportation Officer, US Forces, APO 920, in writing, prior to 1400K of the day preceding date movement is desired. Application must contain the following information where applicable:

- a. Name of unit or individual.
- b. Strength - officers and men.
- c. Number and type of vehicles or heavy equipment.
- d. Dead weight tonnage of supplies and equipment not mobile loaded.
- e. Present location.
- f. Destination.
- g. Officer or enlisted man in charge of movement, and to whom vehicles or craft should report.
- h. Desired time for movement to begin.
- i. Deadline for completion of movement.

4. Except in cases of extreme emergency, no requests received after the time specified in paragraph 3 above, will be considered in setting priorities for the following day.

5. Where more than one movement is requested on the same date, relative urgency will be indicated. Request having been submitted once, it is unnecessary to make additional application, as priorities are kept on file and re-considered daily.

SECTION III - STATUS OF TRACTORS & VEHICLES

6. A report of the status of tractors and vehicles will be rendered in duplicate as of 1800K on the 10th, 20th and last day of each month, by all units under the command of the CG, US Forces, APO 920. This report will reach this headquarters not later than 1500K on the day following date of the report.

7. The report will cover all tractors and vehicles (trailers, wheeled, half-track and full-track), listing the following by type:

- a. Authorized.
- b. On hand.
- c. Deadlined.
- d. Vehicles continuously mobile loaded.

8. a. Applicable T/O & E of the organization reporting will be shown with a notation indicating the authority for any excess on hand.

- b. Suggested form for report is attached.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight

G-4

1 Incl:

Incl 1 - Vehicle Status Report Form.

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HEADQUARTERS US FORCES  
Office of the AC of S, G-4

E/jcr

AFQ 920  
21 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS )  
:  
NUMBER . . . . . 3 )

CLASS V (ORDNANCE) SUPPLY

1. AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINTS

- a. Ammunition Dump #2 (Vicinity Bosnek)
- b. Ammunition Dump #4 (Vicinity Parai Jetty)

2. SUPPLY

- a. Division Ordnance Officer will make request upon HTF Ordnance Officer for ammunition for all Divisional and attached units.
- b. AAA Units will make request for ammunition through AAA Group Headquarters upon Ordnance Officer, HTF.
- c. Task Force Artillery Units will make requests for ammunition through Task Force Artillery Headquarters upon Ordnance Officer, HTF.
- d. All HTF Service Troops, not organic or not attached to Divisions, will make request for ammunition directly upon Ordnance Officer, HTF.

3. REPORTS

- a. Divisional, AAA Groups and Task Force Artillery.
  - (1) Division, AAA Group Headquarters and Task Force Artillery Headquarters will submit a consolidated initial Status of Ammunition Report to the Task Force Ordnance Office not later than 1500 hours on 22 June, indicating the ammunition status as of 1800 hours on 21 June in Divisions, AAA Units, Task Force Artillery Units and respective attached units. A daily consolidated report will be submitted thereafter, by Divisions, AAA Group Headquarters and Task Force Artillery, not later than 1500 hours, indicating ammunition status as of 1800 hours the preceding day.
- b. Service Troops.
  - (1) A consolidated Initial Status of Ammunition Report will be submitted to the Ordnance

Office, HURRICANE TASK FORCE, by the various Task Force Special Staff Sections for all Task Force and attached Service Troops under their control not later than 1500 hours 22 June, indicating the status of ammunition on hand as of 1800 hours the preceding day. Thereafter, a tri-monthly report will be submitted by Task Force Special Staff Sections indicating the status of ammunition on hand as of 1800 hours on the 10th, 20th and last day of each month, not later than 1000 hours the following day.

c. Reports will indicate the following:

- (1) Date
- (2) Period covered by report
- (3) Ammunition on hand last report
- (4) Ammunition received since last report
- (5) Ammunition expended since last report
- (6) Balance on hand
- (7) Number and type weapons on hand

d. Ammunition Identification Code, including nomenclature, will be used. Reports will be classified as Secret.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC,  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight

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APO 920  
22 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER . . . . . 4)

TRAFFIC CONTROL

1. All roads on BIAK Island and adjacent territory are under control of the CG, US Forces, APO 920, who will designate certain areas to be controlled by subordinate units as the situation warrants.

2. Main Supply Road.

a. The main supply road (MSR) is the East-West beach road from the East end of MOKMER DROME through IBIDI, MANDOM, BOSNEK and OPIAREF to WARWE.

b. Traffic on MSR will be controlled by priorities set by this headquarters and enforced by the Provost Marshal.

3. Priorities.

a. Priorities for movement of vehicles on MSR are as follows:

- (1) Movement of vehicles occupied by general officers.
- (2) Evacuation of wounded.
- (3) Movement of Class I supplies.
- (4) Movement of Class V supplies.
- (5) Movement of engineer equipment for road and drome construction.
- (6) Movement of messenger personnel.
- (7) Movement of Class III supplies.
- (8) Vehicles returning to supply installations.

b. Priorities for movement of organizations will be made by this headquarters only after specific requests have been submitted which will include the number of vehicles and personnel to be moved.

4. Control.

a. The Provost Marshal, this headquarters, will establish traffic control posts on MSR. The Provost Marshal will establish a main control station at junction Main road and Jetty #4 (47.7 - 42.7). Road patrols and sub-stations will report daily to Main Control Station condition of roads and as often during each day as changes in road conditions occur.

b. The Provost Marshals of sections that may be allotted to subordinate units will report daily by phone or messenger to Main Control Station the condition of roads in their areas.

c. The Signal Officer, this headquarters, will establish telephone communication between traffic control posts as requested by the Provost Marshal.

d. Slow moving vehicles, such as tractors and heavy engineer equipment, when overtaken by faster moving traffic will use the first available space to pull well over to the side of the road and stop to allow the faster moving traffic to proceed.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight

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Office of the AC of S, G-4

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APO 920  
23 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS)

NUMBER . . . . . 5)

REQUESTS FOR AIR SHIPMENT AND AIR DROPPING

1. All requests for shipment of supplies by air, including air dropping, will be forwarded through the AC of S, G-4, to the Commanding General, US Forces, APO 920, for approval. Requests for air dropping will first clear through the Quartermaster. Requests will include weight, cubage and reason air shipment is necessary.

2. Requests for air shipment will be restricted to cases of extreme critical necessity for the supplies involved.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight

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APO 920  
26 June 1944

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS )  
NUMBER . . . . .6 )

TRANSPORTATION SPECIAL STAFF SECTION

1. Attention is directed to the following which sets up for the Task Force a Special Staff Section to be known as the Transportation Special Staff Section. Colonel C. B. Fowlkes, Jr., CE, Commanding Officer, 542d Engineer Boat & Shore Regiment is Chief of Section. Phone -- Lake Exchange.

2. The Transportation Officer will be responsible for:

a. Discharge of all cargo and equipment and debarkation of all troops from ships, landing craft, barges, lighters, etc.

b. Transportation of all cargo and equipment from beach jetties or dock to the Task Force dumps or depots. Depot and dump commanders are responsible for the prompt unloading and return of such transportation, unloading to be done by personnel under their control.

c. Providing necessary water transportation for supply of outlying areas as may be directed by Commanding General, US Forces, APO 920.

d. The operation of all harbor craft; maintenance, repair and salvage of all 2d ESB craft; assist within capabilities in maintenance and repair of Navy and other harbor craft.

e. The assignment of berths and anchorages.

f. Requisitioning such additional harbor craft, lighters, tugs, stevedore gear, and other Transportation Corps equipment as may be necessary.

g. Furnishing such landing craft and other facilities as may be needed for tactical use, when directed by the Commanding General, US Forces, APO 920.

h. Arranging for evacuation of the sick and wounded; maintain close liaison with Surgeon, US Forces, APO 920, for this purpose.

i. Operating pool of available motor transportation; working in close cooperation with Special Staff Sections concerned with supply, US Forces, APO 920, to insure efficient use.

j. Receiving, checking, and notifying consignees of all incoming air freight; booking all outgoing air freight and arranging for shipment; booking outgoing personnel and arranging air transportation.

k. Coordinating with Navy Port Director to arrange for routing of shipping; reporting arrival and departure of shipping to Headquarters Alamo Force.

l. Report daily by radio to Headquarters Alamo Force (two copies to AC of S, G-4, US Forces, APO 920) tonnages discharged, tonnages remaining to be discharged and estimated date of completion.

m. Arrange for water and air transportation for troop movement and for evacuation of prisoners of war and allied nationals.

n. Book and furnish transportation for visiting personnel and luggage to and from drames, and from this area.

o. Arrange for evacuation of captured materiel and salvage; coordinate with G-2 and Special Staff Sections concerned with supply, US Forces, APO 920.

p. Arrange for dispatch of mail; coordinate with Postal Officer, APO 920.

q. Arrange for reception and staging or restaging of incoming units, coordinating with the proper Task Force Staff Sections.

By command of Lieutenant General EICHELBERGER:

C. E. BYERS  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ McCreight


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INCLOSURE #4 TO G-4 ACTIVITIES, HISTORY OF OPERATION "H"

ADMINISTRATION MAP



BIAK I.

GENERALLY FLAT TERRAIN

QM Class III Supply

SOENGGARAI BAY

MENOEBABOE

SBOERIA

MOKMER

PARAI

AVN Gas Dump

Eng. Dump

Mokmer Drome

Det F 854 AVN

754 (AVN)

1178 (cons) X 62

308 Bom b

Det Q 3818

Q 41

Q 60168A

(W) dp

(W) dp

(W) dp

(W) dp

Q 352274K

S 273

Q 205874K

WARNING: GRID COORDINATES ON THIS MAP DIFFER FROM THOSE ON PRELIMINARY SHEET

JAPAN OR

K



INCLOSURE #5 to G-4, ACTIVITIES, HISTORY OF OPERATION "H".

SERVICE TROOPS

1. Service troops at BLAK 20 June 1944.

a. Corps of Engineers:

116th Engr Bn (C)  
650th Engr Topo Det  
783rd Petrol Dist Co  
860th Engr Avn Bn  
863rd Engr Avn Bn  
864th Engr Avn Bn  
1054th Port Const & Rpr Gp Det  
1112th Engr Combat Gp

b. Signal Corps:

41st Div Sig Co  
1st Plat, 253rd Sig Co  
273rd Sig Co

c. Ordnance Department:

649th Ord Ammo Co  
741st Ord Co (LM)  
287th Ord Co (MM)  
7th Sv Gp (Avn)  
308th Bomb Wing Gp  
193rd Depot Co (Avn)

d. Medical Corps:

1st Plat, 605th Clr Co  
2nd Plat, 605th Clr Co  
8th Port Surg Hospital  
Co B, 262d Med Bn  
27th Med Sup Plat  
29th Malaria Survey Unit  
5th and 56th Malaria Control Unit  
Co B, 135th Med Regt  
92nd Evacuation Hospital

e. Chemical Warfare Service:

Unit 2, 94th Chemical Comp Co

f. Quartermaster Corps:

41st Div QM Co  
Det, 3818th QM  
Det, 601st QM (GR)  
Post Exchange  
4189th QM Serv Co  
3818th QM Gas Supply  
601st QM Cemetery  
109th QM Bakery  
993rd QM Serv Co  
342nd QM Depot Co  
3522nd QM Truck Co  
2058th QM Truck Co

g. Transportation Corps:

542d Engr B&S Regt  
296th Port Co  
244th Port Co  
1459th Engr Boat Maint

2. Additional service troops requested for BIAK area.

a. By letter to Commanding General, Alamo Force, dated 22 June 1944.

(1) Quartermaster Corps

	<u>Priority</u>
6 Service Companies	Two each, 8, 12, 18
2 Truck Companies	4
1 Amph Trk Co (less 1 Plat)	9
1 Laundry Company	13
1 Hosp Laundry Plat	10

(2) Ordnance Department:

1 Depot Company	14
1 Automotive Co MM	5

(3) Signal Corps:

1 Construction Co	3
1 S & I Sec, Depot Co	15

(4) Medical Corps:

3 Collecting Companies	One each, 6, 11, 16
1 Clearing Company	17
1 Evac Hosp (SM)	19

(5) Chemical Warfare Service:

1 Comp Unit	7
-------------	---

(6) Transportation Corps:

1 Port Bn (less 1 Co & 1 Plat)	2
8 LCT's	1

b. By letter to Commanding General, Alamo Force, dated 23 June 1944.

(1) Corps of Engineers:

	<u>Priority</u>
46th Engr Const Bn	1
1178th Engr Const Gp	2
Det (1 O & 40 EM) 1054th Port Construction Gp	3
29th Topo Bn, Co A	4
Det 533d B&SR w/Det 650th Hydro Surv	5
Det 783d Petroleum Dist Co	6
477th Maint Co (1st Plat)	7
875th A/B Avn Bn	8

808th Engr Avn Bn	9
567th Dump Truck Co	10
689th Base Equipment Co	11
1896th Engr Avn Bn	12
874th A/B Avn Bn	13
Co B, 796th Forestry Bn	14
856th Engr Avn Bn	15
585th Dump Truck Co	16
810th Engr Avn Bn	17
828th Engr Avn Bn	18

ANNEX NO. 1 TO G-4 REPORT

QUARTERMASTER

1. The I Corps QM Section was alerted for movement to BIAK Island at 2000 hrs, 14 June '44.

2. Early on the 15th of June, General EICHELBERGER and eight (8) officers of his staff, including the QM, reached BIAK Island by way of Navy seaplane. There had been no time for preliminary study of the tactical or logistical situation existing at BIAK as regards the HURRICANE Task Force; therefor, it was necessary to become oriented as quickly as possible. The first day was spent by the QM in orientation of the situation in general and the QM situation in particular. It was ascertained thereby that the QM installations were in good shape, considering the tactical conditions, and the troops had benefited from ample food of excellent variety.

3. By the 16th the QM had determined his general plans for the future, which may be stated as follows:

a. Take over the operation of existing dumps to relieve the Division QM for the performance of his normal task of QM supply to the Division. This could be accomplished by a careful and sharp division of the Task Force QM personnel consisting of 2 Lt Cols, 2 Capts, 1 M/Sgt, 1 S/Sgt, 1 Sgt, 2 T/4's, and 1 T/5. Two (2) officers and two (2) enlisted men were to assume general supervision of the QM dump. Additional personnel needed by them would come from the QM service units already in the area, which were: 601st GR Co (- dets), 2 Plats 109th Bkry Co, 993d Service Co, 4189th Service Co, 3522 Trk Co, 2058th Trk Plat, 342nd Depot Co (- dets). These units, although depleted in strength and insufficient as to number of types for the troops to be serviced, would have to suffice for the operation. The remainder of the Task Force QM personnel would operate the QM office at Task Force Headquarters in general supervision of all QM activities.

b. Establish new dumps in more favorable locations as to storage and distribution.

c. Enter immediate requests for augmentation of the existing service personnel.

d. Promote shipment to the area of additional QM units and supplies, such as a laundry company, refrigeration plants, and perishable foods.

e. Regroup the personnel of the service units under a central command. The units had become widely separated due to the necessity of following the tactical spread.

f. Coordinate the service personnel requirements from the available service units and augment such service pool with tactical troops as supplied by G-3.

4. It was further planned to establish three (3) depots, a main task force depot located in the proposed service command area, a divisional dump in the vicinity of PARAI, and an Air Corps dump located in the vicinity of MOKMER Airdrome. A subsidiary dump was also established on OWI Island to supply Air Corps, Avn Engr units, and hospitals. In the latter case, the Air Corps would furnish the directing personnel to receive, store and issue supplies.

5. The main dumps thus planned were developed and an especially good Cl I dump was established. For the first time, it was possible to completely discharge a ration ship, segregate by class and commodity, and inventory prior to making any issues. Thus, issues could be made by menus and a balanced stock maintained. This is the ultimate goal of the Cl I phase of QM activity but it is seldom attained. A further item of interest was the issue of approximately 34,000 bottles of captured Jap beer.

#### 6. LESSONS LEARNED.

a. This operation again brought out the fact that units (especially small ones) should not attempt to take maintenance equipment into the operational area until the beaches have been well secured. It is recommended that the maintenance items be held in floating reserve until adequate preparation on the beach has been made to receive them. The danger of loss by sinking is probably much less than the corresponding danger of loss on the beach from bombing, fires, pilferage, etc.

b. It was apparent during this entire operation that an insufficient number of service troops had been brought into the area. Because of this lack of service troops, it was necessary to secure, through and with the approval of G-3, line troops, in order that supplies could be received, stored and issued. Obviously, line troops not trained in the recognition and handling of supplies cannot be as efficient as service troops trained for that specific job. It is recommended that in future operations serious consideration be given to providing an adequate number of service troops to be landed early in the operation. These troops, by arriving early, will be in position to receive and distribute supplies as they reach the beaches.

c. During the operation at BIAK it was necessary to withdraw 2½-ton cargo trucks from the combat troops in order to handle the supplies being unloaded from ships, to establish dumps, and to distribute supplies. This withdrawal of trucks from combat units obviously handicapped the fighting troops. In the future, it is recommended that a sufficient number of truck companies be taken into the operational area for the purpose of handling supplies, thus eliminating the necessity for withdrawing vehicles from the combat troops.

d. The value of bulldozers in the matter of preparation of dump sites cannot be over-emphasized. A well laid base for a dump will render to a minimum the loss of supplies by weather. It will also permit a more efficient establishment of the dumps. It is, therefore, recommended that in future operations at least one (1) bulldozer (preferably a D-7 or D-8) be made available to the Quartermaster prior to the arrival of supplies.

e. In the BIAK operation it was possible to unload one (1) complete ration ship before issue was made therefrom. It is the Quartermaster's plan that this procedure be followed in future operations in order that an adequate and balanced ration may be made available to the troops.

ANNEX NO. 2 TO G-4 REPORT

ORDNANCE

Taking over after the operation had started, all of the planning and much of its execution had been accomplished. The report is therefore confined to the ordnance problems encountered thereafter, and the recommendations based thereon.

AMMUNITION

1. As in several previous operations, the main ammunition dump was situated on a narrow strip of beach where the initial landing and unloading occurred on "Z" Day. The space available on the beach was much less than desired and certainly not favorable from a safety standpoint. The ammunition dump was flanked by other supplies such as gasoline, rations and construction materiel. However, lack of any other available space, labor, transportation, equipment, and time, dictated a necessity and not a choice, in the location of the ammunition dump. Ammunition was issued and received continuously at the dump from the moment the first container was dropped on the beach. The most that can be done under such circumstances is attempt to segregate and stack the ammunition where it lays. Even that is no small task when conducted during the early stages of an operation.

2. There were two other smaller ammunition dumps, one forward on the left flank, into which ammunition was transported over a road which ran parallel to the front line and was impassible during a period of each day due to enemy action. The other small dump was only temporary and was evacuated to make room for another supply installation and because of insufficient depot personnel to man three dumps.

3. The total ammunition in three dumps was approximately 5,000 tons. One ammunition company was provided to handle it though labor from other sources was available occasionally in small numbers.

4. Transportation of all ammunition on BIAK Island was by truck since no suitable landing jetties were available for small landing craft. Air corps ammunition had to be supplied from BIAK Island and shipped via water to OWI Island, some three miles distant. Movement of air corps ammunition necessitated the coordination of three elements at one place and at one time, namely, water transportation, trucks and labor. Trucks were available through the Transportation Officer. Additional labor was made available from a labor pool providing a request for same was made 24 hours in advance.

5. After giving the situation some study, a plan was devised with the following objectives:

a. To determine Status of Supply Levels, and Daily Receipts and Expenditures in order that daily routine reports could be submitted to G-4 and to higher headquarters and requisitions prepared for shortages. This entailed the establishment of a channel for ammunition reports and requests which became routine in a few days.

b. To choose a new location for the ammunition dump which would provide more space, accommodate future ammunition stockage requirements, prepare and improve the area prior to moving ammunition into it, and at the same time serve the present tactical requirements. An area was chosen and made ready for storage of ammunition but control of the operation passed from our control before any ammunition was moved into it. Ammunition began to flow into it the following day.

6. a. Daily reports of Status of Ammunition from combat troops were grouped into three groups to facilitate consolidation and receipt. The three groups were: Division, Anti-aircraft Artillery, and Task Force Artillery. Unit reports were consolidated by the headquarters of these groups and forwarded to the Task Force Ordnance Officer.

b. All Task service troops were placed in a separate group. Reports were required only on the 10th, 20th and last day of the month from this group. Unit reports were consolidated by the Chiefs of the Task Force Special Staff Sections exercising supervisory control of the various services and forwarded to the Task Force Ordnance Officer.

7. It was necessary to evacuate an appreciable amount of enemy ammunition to prevent the enemy from using it when infiltrating at night. Much of it was destroyed by dumping at sea for storage space was very limited. Some of it was destroyed by demolition.

8. The artillery ammunition lot number controversy once again arose. It is highly desirable that some more practical means or method be devised whereby artillery ammunition, especially semi-fixed types, can be readily and rapidly segregated immediately as it is unloaded from landing craft onto the beach. Under present landing techniques in which time, labor, space, and transportation is critical, it is practically impossible to segregate according to lot numbers during the initial unloading. Perhaps if more time could be allotted for unloading in the temporary ammunition dump on the beach, this problem would be somewhat alleviated. However, Beach Masters and Naval Officers, whose aims are to unload in the shortest time possible, do not have any great enthusiasm for such suggestions.

9. One known premature burst occurred, presumably caused by premature functioning of the M51A1 Fuze assembled to a 155mm projectile, M107, for M1 Hewitzer. This premature occurred approximately 800 yards short of the target. No immediate solution for preventing a re-occurrence of a similar accident was forthcoming.

#### SUPPLY

1. The maintenance of Ordnance materiel in the Task Force was greatly hindered due to an insufficient supply of spare parts.

2. Both the 287th Medium Maintenance and 741st Light Maintenance Companies had participated in the HOLLANDIA operations prior to their present assignment. They had arrived in the HOLLANDIA area with approximately the prescribed days of supply. However, both units remained in the area long enough to exhaust most of the stock, and did consume all high mortality parts. No resupply arrived in HOLLANDIA prior to their departure for BIAK Island.

3. Thirty days after initial landing at BIAK Island only a few spare parts had arrived that could be carried by hand, such as gas check pads.

#### MAINTENANCE

1. The ordnance maintenance units in the Task Force were the 287th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company, 741st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company, one AA repair team and one tank repair team.

2. During the first thirty days, 1,988 work orders were completed, broken down as follows:

Work Orders				
	741 LM Co	287 MM Co	Total	Percentage
Ordnance	1,511	146	1,657	83
Engineer	58	33	91	5
Field Ranges	100	7	107	5
Other items	120	13	133	7
Total	1,789	199	1,988	100

3. The above percentages are based on number of work orders and does not reflect a true picture. The relative weight of engineer work to total performed would be about 25% due to heavy equipment requiring many man hours.

4. The Medium Maintenance Company, capable of performing over 50% of work due to more personnel and equipment, actually did only 10% of the total work during the first thirty days because no permanent area was assigned to the company until Z / 24.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Ordnance units must have initial prescribed stock levels before leaving near shore.

2. Resupply of Class II and IV Ordnance should arrive at far shore without fail and should be given high shipping priority. Other than ordnance field units, no one seems to be concerned about getting spare parts to the forward area until a gun or an unusual large number of vehicles are on deadline.

3. Engineer maintenance shop companies should accompany forces having two or more engineer battalions in order to maintain engineer equipment.

4. Maintenance areas should be given priority equal to dump areas. They should be jointly selected by Ordnance Officer and Shore Party Commander and cleared by bulldozer prior to arrival of ordnance company. The early selection of a work area is necessary in the rapid repair of the tremendous number of vehicles deadlined after the first two weeks of abusive treatment in salt water and over rough terrain.

5. Separate bomb disposal squads are needed desperately on every operation. It is understood requisitions have been made to the States for these units. It is recommended, pending their arrival, that separate bomb disposal squads be created immediately to function as independent units. They should be organized under T/O & E 9-179, dated 20 November 1942. Positive action, not wishful thinking, is mandatory.

6. Some Ammunition Companies are authorized two tractors as special equipment. The models designated are D-2 or D-4 with blade. In recent operations, it was found that these tractors are not large enough, particularly on terrain which is composed of coral formations. Tractors are an essential item of equipment for an ammunition company in the preparation and maintenance of ammunition dumps. It is recommended therefore, that at least one if not both of the tractors be larger, preferably D-8 with blade.

7. There is a definite need and use for Ammunition Renovation Squads beginning approximately D / 10 and possibly earlier in the operation. These squads would have the functions of caring for and evacuating accumulated brass and container components from the beach-head to rear areas, repair of

damaged containers of which there are considerable during the initial phase, stenciling of weathered crates, re-packing of serviceable ammunition, and conducting inspections when necessary. The equipment and tools necessary to perform these functions would be minor. A squad of one officer and six enlisted men is suggested.

8. It is believed that certain revisions in the Unit of Fire tables should be made. Revisions would increase the quantities in some cases and decrease in others, dependent upon the types in which the rate of expenditure is out of proportion to the prescribed allowances. Two items in particular are outstanding, namely, Grenade, rifle, M9A1, for which the Unit of Fire could be reduced from six to four and shell, 81mm Mortar could be increased from one hundred to one hundred and fifty rounds. It is suggested that a thorough study of the Unit of Fire tables could be conducted more advantageously in higher headquarters where considerable data relative to expenditure rates is on file based upon numerous operations. This much has been observed, that in all Task Force dumps there are too many AT Grenades which move slowly while no dumps, to our knowledge, have ever reported sufficient 81mm Mortar shells on hand.

ANNEX NO. 3 TO G-4 REPORT

MEDICAL

Prior to 14 June 1944, sufficient medical supplies had been received in the area to carry through the period. Two emergency requisitions for air delivery were sent by radio for urgent items, but neither had arrived prior to 29 June. Two MMU's were to have been received on 25 June but due to the manner of loading, it was necessary to remove them from the Hospital Ship at "G", separate them from other supplies, and transship them later. This reduced the supplies to a 14 day level, which is considered below a safe reserve. It is recommended that in the future, MMU's be loaded separately in order that they will reach their destination on time.

Evacuation was accomplished by LST, Air and Hospital Ships. Facilities were adequate to prevent stagnation of patients in hospitals.

There were too few ambulances in the area to properly handle the patients. It is recommended that Collecting Companies be permitted to take their ambulances in with them.

A certain amount of engineer work is always necessary in order to establish an evacuation hospital. Primarily, this consists of the use of a bulldozer to clear an area and establish a road, and water supply. Invariably, due to other priorities, it is very difficult (almost impossible) to get the work done, seriously delaying efficient operation. It is recommended that this work be given due consideration.

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ANNEX NO. 4 TO G-4 REPORT

ENGINEER

1. On 14 June 1944, the I Corps Engineer Section was alerted and instructed to prepare for movement the next day from HOLLANDIA to BIAK Island. At this time the Engineer Section consisted of the following personnel: 1 Lt Col, 3 Capts, and 7 enlisted men.

2. Prior to departure from HOLLANDIA no information was made available regarding the nature of the operation in which this section was to participate, therefore no engineer advance planning or map reconnaissance could be made for the operation on BIAK Island. On 18 June 1944, landing was made at BOSNEK Village, BIAK Island, and the Engineer CP was opened in this vicinity at 1000 hours, same date.

3. a. Since Operation "H" had already been in progress for approximately three weeks and the Engineer Task Force Staff was then in operation, the Engineer Section, I Corps, was merged into the already established Task Force Engineer Section and the I Corps Engineer was made executive officer to the Task Force Engineer.

b. Immediately upon opening the CP, all engineer officers and selected enlisted men were ordered to make engineer reconnaissance to obtain information as to the status of the engineer situation and supply matters up to this time.

c. During the entire operation, the Engineer Section, I Corps, functioned as an integral part of the Task Force Engineer Section and made continuous reconnaissance and reports as to progress of engineer construction and operations.

4. a. Enemy opposition although isolated, was very stubborn and engineer troops working on the roads and airdromes were often under fire of enemy mortars and minor casualties were sustained by some of the engineer units, especially the 116th Engineer Battalion (C) which was following close on the heels of the advancing combat elements. At this point it is worthy to note that the 116th Engineers constructed a very difficult road through swamps and over and around precipitous coral cliffs. This piece of road construction is believed to be one of the best engineering jobs of the entire operation. Without it, supply of a regimental combat team enveloping the flanks and rear of enemy opposition would have been most difficult and hazardous.

b. Of the three Japanese Airdromes which were captured, the MOKMER Airdrome was in the best condition for operation by our Air Force. One company of the 863rd Engineer Aviation Battalion repaired this drome sufficiently to land transport planes within forty-eight hours after its capture.

c. Prior to the beginning of our air operations from MOKMER drome, the 860th and 864th Engineer Aviation Battalions were landed on OWI Island, approximately two miles south of BIAK Island, and thereon had constructed a runway in approximately 5½ days suitable to land Transports and P-38s.

5. Of special interest to this operation, the following matters are noteworthy:

a. At the beginning of the operation it was found that there was an acute shortage of available and potable water and most of the initial fighting by the combat elements was to obtain and retain possession of the very limited water holes and other sources of water supply.

b. Japanese resistance was for the most part centered in and around the various caves on the island and reduction of these defensive positions was a very difficult problem. (For detailed report on cave defenses, see Annex 2 to G-3 report.)

c. A small number of pieces of Japanese engineer equipment was captured during the operation and most of the equipment was damaged to such an extent that it could not be immediately repaired and put in operating condition and use by our engineer troops. Most notable of this equipment were several mobile water purification units.

6. Summary of Lessons Learned.

a. All engineer units should be completely equipped and all equipment in serviceable condition prior to embarkation with the task force.

b. Careful consideration must be given to engineer stores and supplies accompanying all units of the task force for the accomplishment of its mission.

c. Sufficient spare parts for engineer equipment must be carried in on D day.

ANNEX NO. 5 TO G-4 REPORT

SIGNAL

1. The I Corps Signal Section arrived at Biak on 18 June 1944, and assumed responsibility for Task Force Signal functions. The 41st Signal Company, reinforced by the 21st Radio Team and Detachment of 16th Signal Battalion, continued the operation of Task Force communication facilities, in addition to the 41st Division communications. The Commanding General, Sixth Army, had specified that no additional signal troops would move to Biak with the I Corps Headquarters.

2. The 41st Signal Company was operating a Signal Dump in the vicinity of Bosnek. An average level of three days of supply for the entire Task Force was maintained. Second, third, and fourth echelon Signal repair facilities were provided. The Depot also received, stored, and issued to construction units the material for the Air Corps construction projects. A sub-depot was operated at Parai, to supply troops in the forward areas. A level of one days supply for these troops was maintained at the Parai dump. Equipment in need of repair was accepted at the Parai dump, and repaired equipment was returned there to be picked up by the organizations. The Bosnek depot sent trucks to Parai twice daily, to carry supplies and repaired equipment, and to bring back equipment in need of repair.

3. The principal Signal construction required was for Air Corps projects. The initial installation was to consist of a rubber-cable installation at each of the airdromes and rubber cable connecting the various dromes and Air Corps units. The final installation was to consist of lead cable and open-wire pole lines in and between the dromes area, with a submarine cable from Bosnek to Owi Island, a distance of about five miles. The initial rubber-cable installation was under construction at the time of arrival of I Corps Headquarters.

4. Practically all the project material brought in during the initial landing had been consumed when Corps Headquarters arrived, and repeated requests by the 41st Division had produced only a small part of the materials needed. Radio requests were sent to Sixth Army for air shipment of materials immediately needed for the initial minimum installation. This material arrived in time to cause only slight delay in the initial installation. The lead cable, submarine cable, and a number of essential items of pole-line hardware, had not been received. Information was received that some of this material was on ships at Hollandia, but could not be called forward because of the limited unloading facilities and because of higher priorities assigned to other classes of supplies. At the time I Corps Headquarters left on 29 June, permanent construction was still being delayed because of the lack of materials.

5. The 273rd Signal Construction Company was employed in setting poles for the permanent installation at the Mokmer Drome area. The platoon of the 253rd Signal Construction Company was employed in completing the initial installation and beginning permanent construction. The wire section of the 41st Signal Company laid additional rubber cable from Owi Island to Bosnek, and from Bosnek to the Mokmer Drome area. In addition to the Signal troops available, the Task Force requested another construction company and a Storage and Issue section of a Signal Depot Company. Sixth Army made arrangements to furnish the additional construction company, but it had not arrived when I Corps Headquarters left.



c. Unloading and Backloading Cargo Ships:

Ship	Date Arrived	Date Discharged	Date Backloaded	Date Departed	Tons Dschgd	Pers- onnel	Backloaded	
							Tons	Pers- onnel
Discharged at Biak								
Carib Queen	20 June	21 June		26 June	659	---	---	---
Tarakan	20 June	28 June	29 June	- -	5565	---	233	183
Maetsycker (Hosp, Ship)	25 June		25 June	25 June	---	---	---	151
Total					6224	---	233	334

d. Local Transshipment:

(1) LCVPs and LCMs

From	To	Distance	Craft w/pay load		Pers Carried	Cargo (Tons)		
			LCV	LCM		LCV	LCM	LCV
Bosnek	Parai & Ret	870	27	60	250	555	40	920
Bosnek	Owi & Ret	1680	54	226	450	3764	54	4279
Arty Floating OP		1020	17		44			
Bosnek	Aeeki & Ret	180	7	11	52	99	29	140
Bosnek	Woendi & Ret	2340	31	8	139	740	49	60
Harbor Missions		2240	70	166	283	1760	35	3390
Parai	Owi & Ret	600	20	40	80	240	-	-
Woendi Harbor		600		60		1000		1200
		9530	226	571	1298		207	9989

(2) LCTs

From	To	Boat		Personnel	Cargo (Tons)
		Trips	Miles		
Bosnek	Owi	57	342	1000	5780
Bosnek	Parai	4	40	1700	80
Bosnek	Woendi	3	180		400
Lightering		24	24	-	3034
		88	586	2700	9294

d. Motor Transportation Section:

This section provided trucks for the unloading and loading of the craft. It operated the Provisional Truck Company and dispatched all trucks. An average of 57 trucks were dispatched daily.

e. Air Transportation Section:

Inasmuch as the volume of air traffic was so small, this section had little to do. Transportation was arranged for approximately 25 officers and 70 enlisted men via air to Hollandia.

f. Engineering Section:

This section repaired and maintained the unloading slots in the Bosnek area. Cribbing, piling, and additional fill were placed on Jetties 1 through 4. The lateral beach road from Jetty 1 to coordinates 41.3-41.8, Mokmer Topo map #6, 108 E13610/5. For the latter half of the period, the Shore En alone had the responsibility for maintaining this road.

Two survey crews also were used continually in laying out proposed dump areas.

A new Quartermaster dump was developed. The area cleared was approximately three acres. The area for nine QM warehouses was surveyed and fill was brought in to level up the sites. Three 30 foot dump roads were constructed in the area.

A waterpoint was maintained in 24 hour operation throughout the period. Output for the period was approximately 400,000 gallons.

During the period, the Transportation Area Engineer also built and installed 15-foot markers for each slot to guide incoming shipping, and permanent signposts throughout the beach and dump areas.