Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy
Abstract
This monograph examines how those aspects of the reset policy with Moscow that concern arms control and proliferation are proceeding. It addresses the question of whether further reductions in strategic offensive weapons are likely anytime soon, for example, is it possible to go beyond the parameters in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with respect to reductions? Other critical issues involve European missile defenses, which Moscow vehemently opposes, and tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which NATO wishes to have Russia reduce. The analysis delves deeply into Russia's strategic posture with regard to the questions of why it needs and prioritizes nuclear weapons and what it thinks about the necessity for retaining large numbers of them to meet the security challenges posed not only by the United States and NATO, but also China. Based on this analysis, which takes into account the asymmetries in force structures and in strategic orientations of the two or three main actors, the author argues that the United States, NATO, and Russia will find it difficult to move forward on these issues quickly and achieve large-scale nuclear reductions or strategic harmony in the foreseeable future. At the same time, a key component of the reset policy is to obtain Russian assistance in stopping, if not reversing, Iranian and North Korean proliferation. Here it appears that the reset policy has reached the limit of its utility, for Russia maintains a highly ambivalent and ambiguous policy with respect to Iran. As a result, we may be reaching a political dead end regarding Iran. Meanwhile, the Six-Party Talks on North Korea have reached an impasse. The monograph analyzes Russia's posture on these issues and suggests alternative courses of action for the United States to undertake with regard to Russia to advance U.S. goals, particularly with respect to the Korean issue.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA552785
Entities
People
- Stephen J. Blank
Organizations
- United States Army War College