Compelling China: The Strategic Culture of Coercion
Abstract
In a political-military crisis with China, the United States may seek to avoid the terrible costs of a direct military conflict and use coercive diplomacy strategies to compel China to back-down and defuse the situation. However, since World War II, U.S. coercive diplomacy strategies have failed in 68% of the cases. Given the costs of failure, U.S. policy-makers and military planners must adapt a coercive diplomacy strategy to a China-specific context that takes into account China s strategic culture. This study assesses the utility and challenges of using coercive diplomacy as a strategy to compel China to change its behavior in a crisis situation. The paper examines coercive diplomacy using the lens of China s strategic culture as a means to inform and evaluate United States policy options. The study: 1) examines the theoretical basis for coercion and briefly compares historical examples of coercive diplomacy, 2) provides an analysis of China s strategic culture as it relates to coercive diplomacy and crisis management, and 3) addresses strategic policy implications for the United States and offers recommendations for revising U.S. China strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 25, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA552988
Entities
People
- Matthew B. Schwab
Organizations
- United States Army War College