A Full Spectrum Case for the Heavy Force
Abstract
The U.S. Army heavy conventional ground capability that crushed Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 no longer exists, and the assumption that the U.S. Army can dominate high intensity ground combat operations for the foreseeable future is questionable. The balance of U.S. Army combat brigades shifted significantly from favoring a heavy force to favoring a lighter force over the past decade. Further reduction of HBCTs based upon assumptions that there are no enemies willing to challenge alleged U.S. conventional warfare supremacy, or that if some arise, precision long range fires would neutralize them, is a mistake. Recent examples of hybrid warfare prove beyond any reasonable doubt the worth and utility of a robust, scalable heavy combined arms capability. With few leaders trained for combined arms maneuver over distance remaining in battalions and brigades, heavy brigade combat teams lack the expertise to dominate combined arms maneuver, and there may be too few of them to deter would be conventional adversaries. The Army could not rebuild a trained heavy conventional capability quickly enough to be relevant against a newly emerging threat once the current residual capability is gone. Protecting and recapitalizing the current heavy force structure is essential to full spectrum preparedness of the U.S. Army over the next decade.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA552994
Entities
People
- Richard D. Creed Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army War College