

PUTTING THE POLICE BACK INTO THE MILITARY POLICE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT DILLON
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PUTTING THE POLICE BACK INTO THE MILITARY POLICE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Dillon
United States Army

Ms. Karen Finkenbinder
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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Terrorism, insurgency, and crime continue to rise as non-state threats to world-wide stability and thus the importance of establishing an effective local police force in stability operations has become widely accepted. However, the U.S. Government (USG) lacks the institutional capacity to develop police abroad apart from using the U.S. military during contingencies. The USG does not have an expeditionary stability police force similar to our international partners and our military, in spite of its many capabilities, will always be the second-best solution. To solve this problem, this paper proposes that the Military Police seek to become a more technically professional police organization in support of USG operational and strategic aims.

PUTTING THE POLICE BACK INTO THE MILITARY POLICE

In recent years, the strategic importance of policing in stability operations has been widely accepted; however, since 2002 the Iraqi and Afghan police have failed to develop at projected rates even though police development remains a key strategic goal.¹ Specifically, this failure is due to a lack of understanding the role, mission, and operations of police in current stability operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. Moreover there is little expert knowledge within the Army regarding how police efforts at the tactical level contribute to strategic and operational goals. Many scholarly works have outlined what should be done about this policing knowledge gap, but few have provided a detailed solution of how it should be done.

The endstate of this research is to identify why the U.S. Government has been unable to adequately develop foreign police and proposes a comprehensive solution that is centered on improving the technical policing professionalism of the U.S. Army Military Police. This goal takes on renewed urgency in light of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicting such security assistance operations will be a core U.S. military job for years to come.²

Framing the Problem

The Police are Critical to Successful Stability Operations. Stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. The recently released Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop Review (QDDR) proposes the creation of a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the Department of State.³ Similarly, the Defense Department recognizes in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) six missions, two directly related to stability operations. The first makes a direct link by

purporting that the U.S. “must succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;” whereas, the second, “build the security capacity of partner states” – is a somewhat less obvious link unless one understands that security is integral to stability operations.⁴

The trend in the number of stability and broader peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 2010 supports this conclusion. In particular, there has been a significant increase in the number of these operations since the end of the Cold War. Starting in 1989, the U.S. has played a major role in stability operations in Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and again in Haiti (2004). Shilling⁵ noted that “barring genocide, no recent major war has led to lasting peace without a significant period of reconstruction and stabilization – stability operations – following a peace agreement.” In sum, the policy for the United States Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that the ongoing stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are not our first and are unlikely to be our last such excursions into stability operations.⁶

Stability operations are defined by joint doctrine as:

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.⁷

This definition is also recognized in the Army’s Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3-07).

In conducting stability operations, the cost of failing to deal effectively with internal security threats is high. It can undermine the legitimacy of the government;

undercut efforts to reconstruct the political, economic, and infrastructure systems; and provide rationale for the insurgency. Ultimately, failing to defeat internal threats may lead to the same problems that led to intervention in the first place.⁸

U.S. Army doctrine clearly states that the deployment of military force is important to provide a secure environment for civil authorities to achieve their goals.⁹ However, the U.S. has a mixed record in establishing security in past stability operations. All societies in transition experience an increase in violence and crime as old security institutions are replaced or reformed; however, rising levels of crime and violence over an extended period of time provide an important indicator of the security situation. But, military force alone is insufficient for establishing conditions for security and stability. This requires a mix of military and police forces, in which roles are clearly defined.¹⁰

The World Bank Governance Indicators data set is informative in measuring and clarifying the problem. The data measures the likelihood that a government will be destabilized by violent internal means. In the study by the World Bank of eight stability operations with which the U.S. has been involved since the end of the Cold War, there was a direct relationship between increases in stability and the employment of expeditionary stability police such as the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie forces. In the least successful cases, there were no international stability police to help establish law and order.¹¹

Military forces are important to defeat and deter well-armed groups through combat operations, but are not trained to do policing tasks as they approach security with a different mindset.¹² The most rudimentary police training teaches technical skills

in understanding criminality, engaging the public through community policing, and counter crime operations. This is important because the criminal threat in stability operations is a greatly underappreciated problem that has a symbiotic and supporting relationship with other sources of instability, such as insurgencies and terrorists.

International stability police forces serve a critical role in stability operations.¹³ Unlike military forces, they routinely perform a range of policing tasks among their home country population and a deployed host nation population. Currently, the U.S. does not have an expeditionary stability police force similar to our international partners. Thus our military, in spite of its resident capabilities, will always be the second-best solution.

After World War II, the USG had a better institutional response than it currently does. From 1954 to 1974, the International Cooperation Administration, and then the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), had programs that provided technical training, equipment, and advice for foreign civil police organizations. In 1963, the USAID International Police Academy was established to train foreign police officers. During its 10-year existence, USAID's academy trained over 5,000 students from seventy-seven countries until it was closed by Congress due to allegations of advocating torture techniques. Concerned about damaging the image of U.S. efforts abroad, Congress passed legislation prohibiting foreign assistance funds for training and supporting law enforcement forces within or outside the United States.¹⁴ The shadow of this scandal still hangs over USG associations with foreign police and continues to undermine efforts to develop police in failing or failed states of interest.

Since then, the USG has not developed interagency policy or doctrine for police assistance programs. As a result, the U.S. continues to rely on military personnel—

mostly the U.S. Army—to train civilian police in the early phases of stability operations. This is in spite of the fact that military personnel are not prepared to train and advise civilian police on the principles necessary for effective policing.¹⁵

Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful stability operations, but is a task for which the USG is less prepared. This capability shortfall can embolden corrupt local officials, enable insurgents to take advantage of disorder, and set conditions for organized crime enterprises. In view of this, the USG is being justifiably criticized by the international community as it continues to fail in this critical task.

Impact on Current Operations. How does this problem manifest itself in our current operations? According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), since 2002 the United States has provided about \$6.2 billion to train and equip the Afghan National Police.¹⁶ However, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Over three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not capable—the lowest capability rating DOD assigns to units that have been formed. The GAO's conclusion: U.S. efforts to develop capable Afghan police forces face challenges and need a coordinated, detailed plan to help ensure accountability.¹⁷ Similar difficulties have been faced with the Iraqi Police Service since 2003. During the past nine years, the police in both Afghanistan and Iraq have failed to develop at projected rates; even though, police development has been a key strategic goal for the United States. There are numerous issues that compound the problem.

One key issue is the conflict over the role of police in a counterinsurgency (COIN).¹⁸ Specifically, there is a need to reconcile the NATO vision of a civilian law

enforcement service (quality over quantity) and the U.S. vision of a security force with a major COIN role (quantity over quality). There are three reasons why the police should not be subordinated to the military in conducting offensive COIN.¹⁹ First, this leaves the local communities unprotected in the face of crime and disorder. Second, it delays the development of the police in their long-term crucial mission of providing local public safety on a daily basis.²⁰ Last, the police live and work in their communities and largely bear the brunt of violence while the military live in secure barracks. This conflict of roles has led to catastrophic consequences in recent years as the Afghan police have suffered an almost three to one killed in action rate compared to the Afghan Army.²¹

Another issue is the lack of centralized focus for police development. Multiple chains of control and administration have developed plans independent of one another and independent of larger linkages with judicial and penal sector reform. In Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for example, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) is responsible for institutional training of the police while the Intermediate Joint Command (sometimes reported as ISAF Joint Command) has been established to run the tactical battle and provide operational mentorship of the police in the field. With regard to linkage to broader rule of law efforts, resourcing is out of balance between police, judicial, and penal sector reform. Since 2004, the U.S. has spent 55 times more on the Afghan National Army (ANA) than on reconstructing the justice system and sixteen times more on ANA than on the police.²² The current state of “cops, courts, and corrections” is that of “a stool with one long leg and two stubby ones.”²³

Still another issue involves civilian police advisors. Not all civilian police advisors are equal. While most civilian police advisors have general police experience at the

state and local level, by and large they are rank and file patrol officers with limited organizational management experience. Moreover, most civilian police advisors provided by Department of State (DOS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) are contractors. These contractors fail to train Civilian Police Advisors to advise Host Nation police. They receive little training on actual police mentoring (95 percent on personal survival skills and five percent on cultural information) and receive no training on evidentiary procedures, legal systems, or penal systems.²⁴ Contracted police advisors often cannot or will not operate outside of a secure base.²⁵ This de facto absence of civilian police trainers in the field at the provincial and district level further compels the military to partner with the police.

The common denominator in all of these issues is a lack of expert policing knowledge within the DOD—and to a lesser degree the DOS—to understand and articulate the proper role, mission, and functions of police to strategic leaders and senior decision makers. There is a knowledge gap in identifying and executing a comprehensive framework to link local police actions to wider operational and strategic objectives in the planning and execution of stability operations. So, how can the USG build expert policing knowledge, and more specifically, how can the U.S. Army best contribute?

A Lack of Concern with Substantive Matters. The problems identified with the police entities and those responsible for police development within the DOD and DOS are symptomatic of American policing dysfunction in general. Therefore, in framing the problem we must look broadly with a critique of the current state of policing. The primary critique of policing is that the police have a lack of concern with substantive

matters.²⁶ There is an imbalance between the concern for the organization and the concern for substantive matters. In other words, there is an over-emphasis on outputs over outcomes and this causes dysfunction within policing. This problem impacts not only how American police work in local U.S. communities, but also how USG authorities train foreign police institutions around the world. This critique is best summed up by the father of organized policing, Sir Robert Peel when he said, “The test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with it.”²⁷

How did we get to this state of policing in the U.S.? This condition is an unintentional result of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 and the subsequent implementation of a professional policing model throughout the first half of the 20th century. The professional model of policing sought to reduce corruption by formalizing interactions with the public and improve police process efficiency through the use of Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management. This model narrowly focused on the output goal of making arrests, and its internal management process was accomplished by random patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and reactive investigations. Over the past century, the “three Rs” of policing have become so ingrained in police organizational culture that that the professional model of policing is now known as the “traditional” or “standard” model of policing.²⁸

Unfortunately, this standard model of policing did not improve the effectiveness of the police. By the late 1960s an increase in crime, civil rights demonstrations, and political protest led to several national investigations into the state of policing and the passing of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. These

assessments were critical of the standard model of policing because of its failure to adequately respond to the needs of the local community and because of its impersonal nature.²⁹

In contrast, substantive matters in other fields of work would be concerned with the outcomes produced by the organization. In the field of medicine, for example, substantive concerns would be with the treatment of diseases or injuries as opposed to the administrative running of hospitals, employment of doctors and nurses, and budgeting for hospital operations. This is not to say that these functions are not important, but they are a means to an end. Another analogy can be found in the field of automobile manufacturing. The quality and performance of the car that comes off the assembly line is the matter of substantive concern, while the operation of the assembly line itself is merely an internal procedure toward that end.³⁰

In policing, a concern with substantive matters would focus the police (and citizens) on the common problems that the community expects the police to handle such as speeding, domestic disputes, and noise complaints and would explore the effect police have on these problems. Current organization, manning, training, and operations of police agencies do not reflect this type of concern. Again, the efficient running of a hospital is crucial in effectively treating illnesses. And the efficient operation of an assembly line is essential to producing a quality vehicle at minimum cost. Similarly, the same considerations go into the administration and management of a police organization; therefore, one should not discount the effort that has gone into developing well-organized, properly staffed, efficient police agencies.

However, what is most troubling in policing, as compared to other fields, is the imbalance that exists between concern for the outputs of the organization and concern for the outcomes to effective substantive matters. The latter have been neglected resulting in communities not receiving the careful attention they deserve and thus further eroding the respect and legitimacy needed for effective policing. The former has caused an almost obsessive running of the organization and its procedures without consideration of the latter creating the illusion that crime is intractable and immune to police actions.

What accounts for this imbalance? The influence of the standard model over the past one hundred years has formed a police organizational culture, and an equally important subculture, that has led to the following interrelated cultural characteristics.

First is the nature of the police function itself. The poorly defined and somewhat overwhelming character of the police function makes it difficult to establish what, precisely, is the purpose and end product of policing. This results in the end product being defined differently depending on one's interest and expectation of the police.

Second is the focus on immediate needs. The common view has the police meeting immediate, emergency-like needs and alleviating problems rather than solving them. A clear indicator of this trend is in the fact that police on military installations are now organized under a Directorate of Emergency Services. Greater rewards, from police and political officials, are attached to improving the speed and efficiency of dealing with incidents and getting back into service to respond to the next emergency. This is in contrast to seeking longer lasting solutions to the problems that require such responses.

Third and closely related to the second, is the concern with incidents rather than problems as described in Figure 1.³¹ Again, the working environment and organizational rewards encourage officers to treat police work as the efficient handling




Figure 1: Incident-driven versus Problem-oriented Police

of incidents rather than the solving of the underlying problems that cause the reoccurring incidents.

Last is the intractable nature of the substantive problems confronted by police. Many of the problems that the police handle are, by their nature, insolvable. The ability to solve these types of problems is commonly perceived as very limited. It is much easier and satisfying to solve an internal communication issue or develop a new

operating procedure than to devise a response to shoplifting or prostitution. Moreover, non-substantive matters are more self-contained and thus easier for superiors to measure and reward.

If police are to mature as a profession, they must concern themselves more directly with the outcomes of their efforts. Improvement of the police profession requires that the police develop a more systematic process for analyzing and responding to the problems the public expects them to address. Improvements in organization and operations are important, but should be seen as the means and ways to achieve the substantive ends of policing.

In summary, there are numerous reports of the USG's failure to develop and reform police in the recent stability operations within Iraq and Afghanistan. This is due to a lack of expert policing knowledge, capability, and capacity within the DOD and DOS, with the DOD taking the lion's share of blame in the last nine years. Looking at the field of policing, some progressive police organizations have improved their effectiveness and efficiency; however, most (including Military Police) are still wedded to an out-dated and ineffective model of policing developed over eighty years ago.

Proposal of Solution

After framing the problem and reviewing the documented results of our current efforts to develop indigenous police, it is clear that there is a problem and the status quo is not working. This paper proposes that the Military Police, as the U.S. Army's proponent for policing, seek to become a more technically professional police organization in support of USG operational and strategic aims. In pursuing this end, several questions need to be answered. What is meant by more technically

professional police organization in this context? What are the ways and means to become more professional?

Up to this point, the terms capacity and capability have been used repeatedly. For the purpose of this paper, the difference between capacity and capability is that the latter (usually) emphasizes technical ability such as intellectual acuity or physical dexterity. It refers to talents or skills that can be learned, changed, or enhanced. Capacity, on the other hand, relates to a power to experience, produce, or retain something.³² With these definitions in mind, the remainder of this paper will narrow its focus on exploring policing capabilities and leave capacity as a subsequent topic of research.

The methodology used to propose a solution to this capability gap is to outline and analyze ends, ways and means in order to present a comprehensive answer and generate justifications and conclusions. The following framework is proposed:

- A professional policing capability is the end we seek
- Effective policing activities are the way or method to achieve this end
- Efficient organizational structure is the means to the end

Police Professionalism as an End. General Martin Dempsey, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, said in a recent interview, “you’re not a profession just because you say you are a profession.” While he was addressing the Army as an institutional whole, the Army is also a “multi-professional workplace” and the professional core competencies of all the Army branches and functions must be reviewed for professional relevancy.³³

Why is being a profession an issue for the Army and Military Police? There are three reasons why the Army must be a professional force. First, is the exercise of positive control and discipline within an institution capable of wielding such significant power. Second, and equally important, is the creation and adaption of abstract expert knowledge that enables the application of this immense power in order to defeat threats to our national security and to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.³⁴ Last, is the need for it to be seen as legitimate by its client, the American people. Using the same logic, the police in general—and Military Police specifically as a “multi-professional” organization—must also be a profession because of the coercive governmental power they wield over citizens within a liberal democracy that holds individual rights preeminent. This could also include the citizens of other countries who are subject to the power of the policing institutions that are trained by the U.S.

With an understanding of why professionalism is important we turn to what professionalism is and how it is related to the subject of this paper. In addition to the seminal works by Huntington and Janowitz that have defined military professionalism since the 1950s, the Army is currently reviewing a definitional framework created by James Burke from the book *The Future of the Army Profession*. Burke’s framework consists of three interrelated elements.³⁵

First, professions apply expert knowledge and should be seen for what they do, not just how they are organized to do it. For example, in the fields of medicine, law, military, and police—effectiveness, not efficiency—is the key to the work of professionals. The ill want a cure, the accused want exoneration, the defenseless seek

security, and the citizen demands public safety. And while all clients want efficiency in any field of expertise, effectiveness is the overriding concern.

Second, professions have a jurisdiction or field of endeavor for problem solving in which control for the work and jurisdictional boundaries are constantly disputed between groups.

Third, professions seek continued legitimacy in the eyes of the client—through numerous channels such as the public opinion, legal, and the free market—for the control of a particular jurisdiction.

Using this framework of a profession, the next step is to examine the strength of these three elements—expertise, jurisdiction, legitimacy—with regard to Military Police.

What is the nature of Military Police expert knowledge? Military Police are responsible for, among other things, the execution of a police function within the Army, and therefore must be considered a “multi-professional” organization and examined as such. For the purpose of this paper, it is not the Military Policemen’s general military skills that are of concern. It can also be argued that the proficiency of the individual Military Policeman to execute his role as a patrolman is also sufficient and not of concern. What is the problem (if not the primary problem from which all other identified problems stem) is the lack of expert knowledge, skills, and abilities of Military Police leaders to manage the performance of police-specific operations at the organizational level in order to achieve substantive public safety outcomes such as reducing crime, disorder, and public fear-levels of crime. In summary, the Military Police are weak in the professional element of expert knowledge in the area of policing.³⁶

Do the Military Police have a clearly defined jurisdiction? Unfortunately, the Military Police find their jurisdiction simultaneously increasing in an area in which it is least prepared and decreasing in an area that it needs to retain to in order to practice and improve its expert knowledge. The professional jurisdiction of the Military Police prior to OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was well established and generally uncontested even during peacekeeping operations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. This broadly included responsibility for enemy prisoners of war, area security, and law and order in both a deployed or home station environment. It was assumed that Military Police were expert in policing. However, this proved to be a false assumption during OIF when the focus transitioned to stability operations. Upon receiving the mission to develop host nation police, the Military Police struggled with a fundamental lack of understanding of the role of civilian police in a whole of government approach, police management at the large organizational level, and the expertise to design a long-term, coherent plan of development and reform.³⁷ Despite being ill-prepared, however, this jurisdiction of developing host nation police was thrust upon the Military Police due to the slow response and a lack of capacity by the Department of State (DOS) in Iraq. In Afghanistan, it is a similar situation in which the DOS and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies lack the capacity (and lack the capability in the case of some of the contractors) to partner with the overwhelming numbers of Afghan Police that need development. Clearly, there is a professional jurisdictional void that the Military Police have had to fill with regard to developing indigenous police.

Interestingly, the one jurisdiction that Military Police need to retain in order to maintain their professional core competency of policing is being moved under the

auspices of the Department of the Army Civilian Police (DACP) working for the Army Installation Management Agency (IMA). Generally, DACPs make up to 60 percent of the manpower to police an Army installation with Military Police responsible for the remaining 40 percent. The decision for this split was twofold: to reduce the deployment burden on Military Police and achieve cost efficiencies by hiring Department of the Army Civilians. Overall, the professional jurisdiction of Military Police is unclear and ill-defined, which indicates the weakness of this element of professionalism.

Lastly, are Military Police seen as legitimate police professionals in the eyes of its client, the Army? The position of the Army is stated in current doctrine. In discussing the training of police during stability operations, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency makes it clear that, “Military police can provide much of the initial police training. Higher level police skills—such as civilian criminal investigation procedures, anti-organized crime operations, and police intelligence operations—are best taught by civilian experts.”³⁸ It seems apparent by this doctrinal excerpt and the contracting of retired police officials through the Army Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) program, that the Army does not see the Military Police as legitimate police professionals. With regard to legitimacy of expert knowledge in the eyes of the client, the Military Police have a weak case for this element of professionalism.

In summary, all three elements within the definition of police professionalism are either absent or very weak within the Military Police. Furthermore, all three elements examined seem to be interdependent. For example, there is a circular logic at work here in which it can be argued that the Military Police are not seen as legitimate because (1) they are challenged with a new operational jurisdiction to develop foreign

police for which they are the least prepared to exercise their implied core expert knowledge and, (2) they are least prepared to apply this area of expert knowledge because their home station jurisdiction to practice and exercise this same knowledge is being reduced to bring in DACP experts. The Military Police must break this cycle by building and demonstrating expert police knowledge at the organizational leader level and never losing it as a core competency within the eyes of the Army.

Effective Policing Activity as a Way to Achieve the End. Planning and executing modern police operations is a complex and demanding job whether in a civilian or military context. It is not enough for the police chief or provost marshal to merely control budgets and direct daily operations; rather, he or she should also be expected to control crime and disorder. How best to control crime and disorder has always been a complex issue.

Starting in the 1970s, there has been considerable research into what is effective and not effective in reducing crime. The National Academy of Sciences established a panel of social scientist to review all police research including the question of police effectiveness.³⁹ The least effective strategies to crime reduction are in the lower left quadrant and the most effective are in the upper right quadrant of Figure 2.

In the lower left corner of the figure, we have the standard model. This is the prevailing strategy in the United States. As previously mentioned, the standard model is characterized by the “Three Rs” of random patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and reactive investigations. When faced with the public demand to reduce crime, public and police officials who are tied to the standard model will respond in the predictable manner of requesting more police officers, attempting to decrease response

time, greater patrol visibility, higher investigation success rates, and more arrests. Equally important is what public officials and the media do not address: increased precision in policing, differentiation among crime types, or the application of non-law enforcement alternative to address crime.⁴⁰




Figure 2: Effectiveness of Policing Strategies

Research starting in the 1960s was critical of the standard model of policing. This research has consistently found that the standard model has not had a significant impact on crime, disorder, or fear of crime. The “Three Rs” may have other purposes, but we should not expect them—or the addition of police officers to carry out these practices—to have an effect on crime and disorder.⁴¹ To have an effect on crime, research strongly concludes that policing strategies must include two elements. These are displayed on the axes of Figure 2. First, the strategy must have a diverse approach

to reducing crime and disorder. A diversity of approaches would require using a greater range of tools than simply enforcing the law. This idea is expressed in the vertical axis. There is evidence that creating a public and private partnership between the police and the community can have a modest reduction in crime with the closer the partnership, the more likely the effect on crime. The second element required for highly effective policing is focus. This is represented on the horizontal axis and there is solid evidence that geographically concentrated police activity at crime hot spots can be effective in the short term. Research shows that focused police operations of very small high-crime places (street corners, city blocks, etc) has a modest effect on crime and a large impact on disorder.⁴²

Problem-oriented policing combines both elements—the use of diverse approaches with focused action. This is depicted in figure 3. This is the most effective




Figure 3: The basic concept of problem-oriented policing.

policing strategy and there is a large body of evaluative evidence using weak-to-strong research methods that consistently finds this combination significantly reduces crime and disorder.⁴³ Interestingly, many problem-solving efforts have been implemented and succeeded after other strategies have failed to produce long lasting results on crime.

The lessons during the past 40 years of research are conclusive. Effective police activity requires both a diversity of approaches and focused attention. In contrast, the least effective policing uses neither element. Currently, the concept of problem-oriented policing provides this combination.

An Efficient Performance Management Structure as the Means to the End.

There is nothing professional about the responsive nature of the standard policing model. There are no long term objectives. There is no purpose beyond reacting to the here and now. However, a more preventive and proactive approach such as problem-oriented policing requires police agencies to develop more efficient management structures and systems. The purpose of this section of the research is to define a police management structure that assists police executives with realizing a more professionally capable organization. There are two organizational structure changes needed to support the ways and achieve the ends outline early.

The first is an analytical-based process in the form of crime analysis or intelligence. Imagine a blindfolded boxer futilely swinging and missing his opponent to the point of exhaustion and frustration. This is what policing is like without crime analysis. Crime analysis is the engine that drives proactive police activity. Crime analysis, within the process of crime intelligence, is the systematic study of crime and disorder problems as well as other police related issues including socio-demographic,

spatial, and temporal factors to assist in decision making.⁴⁴ This capability gives police organizations a more objective basis for deciding objectives, priorities, and resource allocation. The real value of an analytical capability is the means it provides to police leaders to move from intuition to intelligence-based decisions. The end result is police leaders who are more strategic, future oriented, and targeted in their approach to organizational management and crime reduction—this is a significant change and a step forward in the business of policing.⁴⁵

Second, a performance management structure, supported by crime analysis, must be implemented. Performance management is a systematic effort to improve performance through an ongoing process of establishing desired outcomes, setting performance standards, then collecting, analyzing and reporting on streams of data to improve individual and collective performance. Virtually everything in policing is subject to measurement, and as such, police leaders must abandon the standard reactive model of policing by moving away from measuring outputs (three Rs) to measuring outcomes (reduced crime and disorder).

One of the most remarkable stories in criminal justice today is the tremendous decline in crime in New York City since 1993. The total number of reported crimes for seven major crime categories declined an unprecedented 57 percent from 1993 to 2000.⁴⁶ In assessing the New York Police Department's (NYPD) dramatic crime reduction success in the 1990s, Phyllis McDonald explains today "modern police (and other government agencies) measure their success on the basis of results achieved, not by productivity levels."⁴⁷

This shift is illustrated in several conceptual changes in police management since the 1990s:

- From outputs to outcomes
- From incidents to problems
- From reaction to prevention
- From control of serious crime to overall public safety
- From accountability for rules to accountability of problems solved
- From intuition to data

Introducing the process of performance management would create numerous organizational benefits from hindsight and foresight. Again, supported by the crime analysis processes, the organization now has the ability to look backwards and extract useful information from data as it moves ahead with foresight. Foresight and leadership allows the organization to predict and prevent crime and disorder, improve resource allocation, service delivery, and strategic planning.⁴⁸ Performance management processes shifts the emphasis from compliance of regulation to managing for results. Finally, an organizational performance management structure should be embraced as a dynamic and logical means to assessing and managing police activity in order to determine what works, what does not work, and why.

In summary, our end is to improve the technical professionalism of the Military Police so as to achieve national security objectives abroad and our public safety requirements at home. To achieve this end, we determined the most effective way for the police to conduct their activities. A diversity of approaches and focus of effort were the most determinant elements in reducing crime and disorder with problem-oriented

policing as the best and most practical strategy that incorporates both elements. The best means to achieve our end and execute our ways efficiently is an organizational performance management structure similar to the successful NYPD crime control model. Improving a police organization's effectiveness in operations while simultaneously improving its efficiency in executing those operations is what must be done to close the identified police professionalism gap.

Conclusions and Justifications

The previous portions of this research paper have outlined the comprehensive framing and description of the problem, a proposed solution to the problem by creating a more professional policing capability within the Military Police, and a discussion of the ways and means to achieve this professional policing capability. From this, several conclusions stand out.

Stability Operations are Enduring. The first conclusion is that stability operations and its methods (security force assistance, COIN, etc.) will continue to be a part of our missions well into the future and within this operating environment we will see a nexus of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals as an emerging threat to the U.S. achieving its national security objectives. As noted earlier, history is replete with examples of the military, specifically, the U.S. Army, conducting stability operations.⁴⁹ Our senior leaders recognize this and have provided strategic guidance to develop U.S. military capabilities to meet stability operations requirements. In a June 2010 Foreign Affairs article, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates provided his thoughts on future operations:

This strategic reality demands that the U.S. Government get better at what is called "building partner capacity": helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.⁵⁰

In addition, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the Army, General Martin Dempsey recently blogged:

Tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces. This statement institutionalizes in the Army the lesson of Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. troops have arduously built new armies and police forces from scratch.⁵¹

Professional Policing Capability is Full Spectrum Applicable. The second conclusion is that the proposed development of a more professional policing capability residing in the Military Police is doctrinally consistent with full spectrum operations and can meet three essential requirements that are currently not being met in the area of a professional policing capability within the U.S. Government.

The first requirement is for the Military Police to perform general policing responsibilities. This may be within a combat environment when the indigenous police have disintegrated due to conflict or at a military installation to ensure the public safety of the military community. These activities would include the most effective and efficient police practices as previously described.

The second requirement would be the building of indigenous police capability and capacity (with the acknowledgment that training and equipping represent only half of the equation). A more comprehensive development and reform effort is the goal to achieve effectiveness. As we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, to decouple broader programs of development and reform from training and equipping only makes the police more proficient at being corrupt and abusive.⁵²

The third and most important requirement is to maintain a resident U.S. Government professional policing capability to advise and influence indigenous police leaders on the development of a democratic policing culture. According to Dr David

Bayley, a distinguished professor in the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York, this inculcation of organizational culture would include responsiveness to the needs of the local community, accountability to the rule of law and not a particular government official, defense of basic human rights, and demonstrated transparency to outside oversight.⁵³ The maintenance of expert policing knowledge to advise and influence indigenous police is only possible if the Military Police are allowed a jurisdiction—free from artificial displacement—in which to practice their field of work.

Proposed Solution Offers Improved Organizational Effectiveness and Efficiency.

The last conclusion is that adopting the recommended proposed end, ways, and means for police professionalism brings improved efficiencies and effectiveness. The future of the U.S. Government and subsequently the Army includes smaller budgets and a quest to offset shortfalls with efficiencies. Military Police organizational leaders who make analytically-based decisions and manage operations by measuring performance will be more efficient and more effective, which will solidify legitimacy in the eyes of the Army.

The overall conclusion of this paper is that the gap in USG's capability to develop police in stability operations can be filled by improving the technical policing professionalism of the Military Police. U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Dubick, Commander of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq, recently wrote about his experiences in creating police and law enforcement systems in Iraq. He said, "Why is it that we always have time to do things over, but never to do it right the first time?"⁵⁴ A more technically professional Military Police Corps at the ready increases the

probability of getting police development and reform right the first time and decreases the likelihood of facing a “do over.”

Endnotes

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² Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves> (accessed January 7, 2011).

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⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), 20-26.

⁵ Adam Shilling, *Nation Building, Stability Operations, and Prophylactic COIN*, PKSOI Perspective (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Army Analysis, May 5, 2010), 2.

⁶ Terrence K. Kelly, et al, *A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 4.

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 22, 2010), 232.

⁸ James M. Dubik, *Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems: Report 4 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, October 2010), 4-6.

⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2-10

¹¹ Terrence K. Kelly, et al, *A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capability*, 9-10.

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 7-5 to 7-6. In addition, David Bayley and Robert Perito comment on how the military as opposed to the police contribute to security in their book, *The Police in War*, in that, “Ultimately, the police contribute to counterinsurgency by winning the allegiance of the disaggregate population; the military contribute to counterinsurgency by eliminating immediate threats of violence.”

¹³ Terrence K. Kelly, et al, *A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capability*, 11.

¹⁴ Dennis E. Keller, *U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap*, PKSOI Papers (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 2010), 5-6.

¹⁵ Ibid., 38.

¹⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Security: U.S. Effort to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability*, 2.

¹⁷ Ibid., 16.

¹⁸ Stability operations (SO) is the concept, COIN is a method of stability operations. This is doctrinally consistent; however, current Army practice is to COIN, FID, etc. into stovepipes (what some call cylinders of excellence). Adam Shilling proposes a framework where SO is the umbrella term and under full spectrum operations, SO may be simultaneous with Offense or Defense and COIN, FID, SFA can be methods of stability operations.

¹⁹ Keller, *U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap*, 32.

²⁰ David H. Bailey and Robert M. Perito, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 76.

²¹ International Crisis Group, *Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy*, Update Brief (Kabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 18, 2008), 3.

²² Seth G. Jones, et al, *Establishing law and order after conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 103

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³⁰ Ibid., 10-11.

³¹ Anthony A. Braga, *Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention* (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2002), 13.

³² Annabel Beerel, *Leadership and Change Management* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc, 2009), 90.

³³ Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 69-79.

³⁴ Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 15.

³⁵ Ibid., 48-52.

³⁶ The term policing was added to Army doctrine in FM 3-39 and 3-39-10 and that's what the school is teaching the students. A more in depth discussion of policing in stability operations is occurring now (as U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) helps craft the TTP companion manuals to the stability operations manual).

³⁷ Dubik, *Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems: Report 4 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency*, 5-7.

³⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, 6-20.

³⁹ Wesley Skogan et al., *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004), 11-12.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 223-228.

⁴¹ Ibid., 246.

⁴² Ibid., 246-251.

⁴³ Ibid., 246-247.

⁴⁴ Rachel Boba, *Introductory Guide to Crime Analysis and Mapping* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, November 2001), 6.

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⁴⁷ Phyllis Parshall McDonald, *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control Model—CompStat* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 78.

⁴⁸ Jon M. Shane, "Performance Management in Police Agencies: a Conceptual Framework," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 33 No. 1 (2010): 21.

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations*, 1-1.

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⁵³ David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 18-21.

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