Could a Rotational Equipping Strategy Save the Army Money?
Abstract
The long-standing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted U.S. Army leaders to alter the ways that units are made ready to fight. Following the 2006 Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, readiness is built over time as units progress through a three-part cycle of unit training, unit deployment, and recovery and individual training. Although early steps have been taken to equip units according to this new management structure, further changes in equipping policies are needed as DoD budgets continue to tighten and the wars begin to wind down. A recent RAND Arroyo Center study sought to help the Army meet new equipping challenges by constructing a fast-running analytic model to simulate the deployment of units and the allocation of equipment to units according to the new ARFORGEN cycle. From the model, Arroyo researchers were able to determine whether equipment levels could be reduced at any point in the rotational management cycle while not hindering the Army's ability to conduct critical operations and meet goals. Key findings: long-term commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan have caused the Army to employ a rotational strategy for its units, however, it still provides units with all their equipment, even though some have years between deployments; a rotational equipping strategy reduces the amount of equipment units have in the early phases of the ARFORGEN cycle, thus enabling reductions in overall equipment authorizations; and such a strategy could reduce costs by $5-$10 billion from FY 12 and beyond.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA553080
Entities
People
- Jerry Sollinger
- Kate Giglio
Organizations
- RAND Corporation