

FUTURE JOINT SEABASING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-04-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Future Joint Seabasing in the Asia-Pacific Region				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Joseph R. Corleto				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) COL Robert S. Buran Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations (DMSPO)				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT War and conflict have always been a means to an end to settle what reason and diplomacy could not. In the future nation states will continue to rise and fall, and regimes and balance of powers will change. Many friction points exist in the Asia-Pacific Region that may result in war or armed conflict. The United States maintains significant economic interests and investments within the region. The possibility of armed conflict exists in the Asia-Pacific Region. Disagreement over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, China's economic and military rise, and the unpredictable nature of natural disasters, could result in armed conflict. These conditions demand a coherent US foreign policy and military strategy. This paper examined a Joint Seabasing capability that will: contribute to international security and stability, reassure friends and allies, deter aggression by China, ensure freedom of navigation, promote cooperation and economic prosperity.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Policy, National Interests					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 42	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Joseph R. Corleto
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 757-912-3210

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FUTURE JOINT SEABASING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Corleto
TITLE: Future Joint Seabasing in the Asia-Pacific Region
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 01 April 2011 WORD COUNT: 9,349 PAGES: 42
KEY TERMS: Foreign Policy, National Interests
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

War and conflict have always been a means to an end to settle what reason and diplomacy could not. In the future nation states will continue to rise and fall, and regimes and balance of powers will change. Many friction points exist in the Asia-Pacific Region that may result in war or armed conflict. The United States maintains significant economic interests and investments within the region. The possibility of armed conflict exists in the Asia-Pacific Region. Disagreement over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, China's economic and military rise, and the unpredictable nature of natural disasters, could result in armed conflict. These conditions demand a coherent US foreign policy and military strategy. This paper examined a Joint Seabasing capability that will: contribute to international security and stability, reassure friends and allies, deter aggression by China, ensure freedom of navigation, promote cooperation and economic prosperity.

FUTURE JOINT SEABASING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

A peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific Region is vital to the security, stability and economic prosperity of the United States, its allies, and partners. The region plays an important role in the global economy and serves as an economic engine. The key to a secure, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific Region lies in assuring freedom of navigation and access throughout the Western Pacific. However, the region has had a turbulent past ranging from world wars to natural disasters. A nuclear armed North Korea and a potential emerging Chinese threat provides a basis for future turmoil. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has dramatically reduced its forward presence. It will be more reliant on continental United States (CONUS) based power projection and strategic mobility capabilities to rapidly respond to a wide range of military operations (ROMO). Current economic conditions and fiscal constraints will significantly affect future military capabilities and limit the amount of resources that can be deployed globally to support Geographic Combatant Commanders. Seabasing is a misunderstood concept that has been defined and described in a variety ways. This paper will distinguish the difference between seabasing (the verb) and future Joint Seabasing (the noun) in order to establish a common understanding. In the past, a variety of forms of seabasing has demonstrated utility and will have to change to compensate for future threats and a new security environment. Some of these future threats, such as China, may challenge the United States for regional influence. To deter future threats or conflicts with peer competitors, the US will require a flexible and effective military capability such as Joint Seabasing.

Where access is limited or nonexistent, Joint Seabasing (the noun) provides a means to rapidly generate and project combat power from the sea. In the past, seabasing (the verb) has demonstrated great utility in projecting US power to: defeat an adversary; respond and provide relief to a variety of global emergencies such as earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, and tsunamis; and perform noncombatant evacuations. However, current seabasing capability may not be sufficient for the future environment and must be transformed in order to provide a joint capability. Simply, the United States' current seabasing capability is the old way of doing business (WW II and Cold War) and must be transformed to deal with the projected realities of the future. Therefore, the United States must invest now in the development of future Joint Seabasing concepts and capabilities, capitalizing on commonality and next emerging technology. A future Joint Seabasing capability will enable the US to project and sustain power in the Asia-Pacific Region to demonstrate commitment, ensure access to the global commons, and promote regional stability.

This paper will examine future Joint Seabasing as a means to deter regional aggression, protect US national interests, and achieve US strategic goals. China is emerging as a strong economic and military regional power and may pose a serious challenge for US policy makers.¹ United States influence in the region has diminished over the last decade due to its focus in the Middle-East Region. To reverse the perception of diminished influence in the Asia-Pacific Region, the 2010 National Security Strategy addressed ways to enhance US influence through a policy of active "engagement and cooperation."² On October 9th, 2009, the Foreign Editor of "the

Australian”, Greg Sheridan interviewed the Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), Admiral Robert “Rat” Willard. In the interview, Admiral Willard said that

The US recognizes it has no choice and that we have to maintain our forward presence in the Pacific for our interest and the interests of our partners. That the Secretaries of Defense and State have recently addressed the lack of US diplomatic and military attention and intends on reengaging in the region.³

Since September 11, 2001, the US has been focused on the Global War on Terrorism which has consumed a tremendous amount of military and diplomatic resources. These limited resources over the past decade have had a negative effect on US policy in the Asia-Pacific Region. If this continues, US influence may decline and cause our allies to be reluctant to allow access and forward presence on their soil. The United States cannot solely rely on our friends and allies for use of their aerial and sea ports to facilitate the projection of US forces. Therefore, Joint Seabasing is a way to project US power and diplomatic influence that is not dependent on basing rights or agreements with allies.

Today, relations with China are centered on an economic and financial perspective; with very little military cooperation. Chinese influence and assertiveness is rising in the Asia-Pacific Region. China is expanding to new locations on a global scale; such as Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Latin America. Currently, Chinese foreign policy is primarily focused on securing energy and natural resources rather than spreading communism and influencing other nation’s internal politics. China is focused on supporting the world’s second largest economy and population.⁴ Competition will undoubtedly increase for scarce resources and may lead to conflicting national interests abroad. Therefore, the United States must aggressively engage in regions such as Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America to limit Chinese soft power. Otherwise, the

United States might miss opportunities to improve its economy and prestige abroad and achieve its strategic goals.⁵

Assumptions

The aforementioned discussion of US interests and regional trends is based on a series of assumptions that establish Joint Seabasing as a necessary future military capability. My analysis of available literature revealed eight assumptions critical in the development and conclusion to this paper. The following eight assumptions provide the basis for further examination of the Joint Seabasing Concept. First, US influence will compete with Chinese global influence. Second, US allies, friends and partners around the globe may be reluctant to allow basing rights to the US military due to political dynamics. Third, host nations may deny use of aerial ports and sea ports to facilitate force projection and reception activities. Fourth, US economic circumstances may prevent future financial aid to friends and allies in the region. Fifth, China's economy continues to grow and prosper giving way to a larger and more capable military. Sixth, China will continue to expand its sphere of influence outside of the Western Asia Pacific Region. Seventh, China will seek resolution at some point in the future to reclaim Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory. Finally, future Department of Defense (DoD) budget constraints will delay or deny the development of new future Joint Seabasing technology and materiel procurement.⁶ In the following paragraphs, this paper explores future Joint Seabasing (the noun) and what distinguishes it from current seabasing (the verb) capabilities.

What is Seabasing?

Seabasing remains a misunderstood concept. There have been many attempts by experts in the field to define seabasing and what it really is, which has led to

confusion throughout DoD and think tanks alike. However, for the purpose of this paper, seabasing is the way the US is currently employing naval, maritime, and expeditionary operations. Equally, the use of the term Joint Seabasing refers to future seabasing capability as described in the 2005 Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC). Both of these terms and associated concepts will be explained in greater detail in the following analysis.

Today, seabasing represents a variety of military maritime capabilities. These range from aircraft carriers, to amphibious assault vessels with combined air and ground capabilities, to prepositioned equipment and sustainment capabilities. Seabasing allows the US to rapidly project forces forward in support of US policy. Seabasing has been defined in many ways in the past; however, the definition in the 2005 “Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)” provides a common definition. Future Joint Seabasing is defined as:

The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.⁷

Seabasing is not a new concept; it has been employed in various ways and represents the status quo or the old way of doing business. The world has changed and the threat to United States is much different than it was before or after the Cold War. Over the past ten years, new thinking has driven efforts to reinvent seabasing as a future joint concept. This new concept erases the boundary between the sea and land.⁸ It is a new concept because rather than using the land as the base to generate and project combat power, seabasing uses the ocean. In 2005, DoD published the

“Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept” as a new concept. The future “Joint Seabasing Concept” as defined above represents a distinct shift to the way the US will project future joint forces from a sea base.

What Distinguishes Seabasing from a Future Joint Seabasing Capability?

Today’s version of seabasing has demonstrated its utility and value as a means of US foreign policy. However, it is challenged to operate as a true joint capability which would enable all the Services to aggregate at a sea base to project combat power. Today’s seabasing faces a variety of challenges such as interoperability and equipment interface issues. There has been, and continues to be, a longstanding issue with the Services procuring separate communications, and command and control (C2) systems which complicate interoperability and joint operations. Current seabasing is not governed by joint doctrine to describe the Services function and role in conducting operations from a sea base. However, over the years, the Services have defended their force structure, roles and responsibilities, and fought for a larger portion of the DoD budget promulgating parochial views.⁹

The Services continue to maintain parochial views and positions regarding force structure and materiel procurement. Each Service by law maintains certain levels of manning and equipment that is paid for through separate Service budgets. This includes the Services traditional Title 10 responsibilities as well as Secretary of Defense Directives. For example, the US Navy’s responsibility is to provide the US a global naval sea power capability. The US Navy’s historic focus is on its “Blue water” capability and “control of the seas” generally has remained the same over the past century. The US Marine Corps has focused on its core mission as an amphibious expeditionary fighting force from the sea.¹⁰ The US Army on the other hand, has evolved into a CONUS based

land centric expeditionary force that is reliant on strategic air and sea assets to project it globally. In the event of a conflict, and denied access, the US would be significantly challenged in its ability to project Joint combat power from the sea. The US Navy can certainly move a “Carrier Strike Group” or the Navy and Marine Corps could move an “Expeditionary Strike Group” to the area of conflict and form a sea base. However, US Army and Marines Corps combined prepositioned afloat assets are not designed to offload and project forces in a contested environment. This capability shortfall is not at all in line with the thinking previously outlined in the JIC.

Current seabasing assets do not have the proper systems interoperability or technology to facilitate skin-to-skin cargo transfer with large vessels such as those in the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and Maritime Preposition Squadron (MPSRON) fleets.¹¹ These prepositioned fleets are reliant on sea ports to introduce high volumes of equipment and sustainment into an established environment. Finally, current seabasing capability is unable to sustain large numbers of forces at sea (sea base) and would rely on other means such as land bases or intermediate staging bases to generate and sustain combat power. Therefore, the US must rethink how it will rapidly project Joint combat power in a new era of conflict. This new era is characterized by anti-access/area denial (A2-AD) capabilities and develops a true joint capability such as Joint Seabasing that can leverage new concepts, technology, to rapidly project forces.

The 2005 “Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept” (JIC) represents a revolutionary change in thinking of how future joint forces will project and sustain combat power when access is restricted. Future Joint Seabasing is an objective capability that is borne from a new concept requiring proper resourcing, new joint doctrine, and state of the art

equipment and technology. The JIC describes how Joint forces in the future (2015 to 2025) will rapidly deploy for a range of military operations; supported by a sea base that is prepositioned forward and can provide speed, access, and persistence.¹²

The Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept states:

The foundation of seabasing is the sea base, an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms and organizations, capable of receiving deploying forces and supporting the employment of those forces. Joint forces rapidly deploy and close by a combination of means to the sea base, or points in the objective area, where they organize for operations and from which they receive protection, C2, combat support, and combat service support. These forces then project combat power ashore from the sea base, exploiting the operational freedom of action that maritime superiority provides.¹³

What distinguishes the future Joint Seabasing Concept from current seabasing is that the US will use the ocean and seas as the base to generate and project joint combat power ashore. It includes activities that typically have taken place on foreign soil such as Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI), and assemble for combat operations. In the past, the US traditionally has benefited from being able to use foreign soil as a staging base to generate and project power. For example, the US conducted a large scale seabasing operation during World War II (WW II) in the invasion of the Japanese held Island of Okinawa. This was the site where over a thousand vessels; to include aircraft carriers and amphibious warships, projected power from the sea.¹⁴ A future Joint Seabasing capability will require a variety of sea going vessels, large and small, and specialized aircraft that can facilitate the projection of combat power.

A future Joint Seabasing capability will rely on large sea going platforms such as the Joint High Speed Ship (JHSS) and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)¹⁵ that will act as the sea base, a place where forces will close, assemble, employ, sustain, and

reconstitute. Large vessels such as those found in prepositioned APS and MPSRON fleets will be capable of arriving at the sea base and interfacing with other larger vessels such as the JHSS and the MLP to cross load equipment and sustainment. The sea base will also facilitate the movement of passengers and smaller quantities of cargo through the use of sea and airborne connectors to the objective or ashore. The future Joint Seabasing Concept is particularly different from current seabasing practices in that it maintains the sustainment “(iron mountains of sustainment)” aboard large vessels rather than projecting a large footprint ashore where it is vulnerable to enemy attack.¹⁶ The future Joint Seabasing concept is not an attempt to just get the Services more integrated. The future Joint Seabasing Concept (JIC) is a forward thinking and transformational concept and is established as an extraordinary capability that doesn't exist today. The concept (JIC) identifies interoperability and technology gaps that exist in the current seabasing (the verb) capability and provides solutions through new technology and doctrine.¹⁷ However, seabasing (the verb) and the Joint Seabasing (the noun) Concept are still misunderstood by many.

Is Seabasing a Misunderstood Concept?

Research shows that the Services and various agencies have defined seabasing in many different ways and confused “seabasing” with the “sea base.” Over the last decade, the Services, think tanks, and individual experts have published a variety of definitions and concepts for seabasing. The Services have developed different definitions for seabasing resulting in confusion. Seabasing proponent retired US Navy Captain, Sam J. Tangredi, has written extensively on seabasing. He said that “the concept of seabasing is a concept that has been defined in a variety of often contradictory ways.”¹⁸ Others, such as Commander Gregory Parker argued that

“seabasing and sea based are two different things.”¹⁹ He suggested that “seabasing really refers to the ground force portion of the operation. In other words, seabasing is about the land.”²⁰ He based his opinion on historical uses of seabasing during the Pacific Campaign and states “by mid 1945, the United States was capable of landing over a million troops on a foreign shore and supporting them with aircraft and logistics.”²¹

While seabasing has played a significant role in conducting US foreign policy as well as protecting and preserving national interests, it is important to acknowledge the difference between a “Sea Base” and “Seabasing” (the verb). First, a “Sea Base” (the noun) is the geographic location, a place, on the ocean or sea where naval and joint platforms either exist or aggregate to project power. The Department of Defense (DoD) has defined the sea base as:

The ships and platforms on which and by which the forces are positioned. The ocean is the fluid medium that provides both the terrain and the reduction in friction that allows for the movement of heavy objects.²²

On the other hand, seabasing are the things and activities that occur at a sea base. In the near term, seabasing will go on as a misunderstood concept and meaning until the future “Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)” is recognized as the primary joint document and is reemphasized as a future capability by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²³ The 2005 “Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept” is a good step forward in bringing a common understanding of what Joint Seabasing is and what it will provide as a means to future US policy. In the following paragraphs, consider the utility of seabasing and how it has contributed to past US operations designed to achieve strategic objectives.

Utility and Historical Perspective of Seabasing

Seabasing of US military capability has provided positive benefits in the past and today in responding to a variety of political, environmental, and military global issues. Seabasing provides one of the means behind US foreign policy either to deter or combat an adversary, or communicate US commitment and resolve. Seabasing can also serve as a means to compel would be adversaries to re-think their strategic calculus when acting against US interests. For example, a show of force measure is usually employed to signal US commitment and resolve.²⁴ Tangredi believes seabasing is not a new concept and states:

U.S. forces have been seabasing since the U.S. Navy became a global Navy at the turn of the last century-and, arguably, even before. "The World War II 'fleet train' [auxiliaries, oilers and supply ships that replenished the combatant ships at sea] that provided the U.S. battle fleet with such unprecedented range and freedom of action" could be considered a sea base since it allowed the fleet to resupply at sea or in isolated anchorages.²⁵

History has demonstrated that the United States has employed some form of seabasing capability as a means to bolster its foreign policy. Seabasing has been used as a deterrent to achieve or preserve national interests. It has also been employed to project US combat power in Europe, North Africa, and the South Pacific to defeat the Nazis and Japanese. Over the years, various forms of seabasing have been employed by the United States throughout the globe, but were never referred to as "seabasing." However, one could argue that "Gunboat Diplomacy" was and is employed today as a form of seabasing.²⁶ "Gunboat Diplomacy" was simply a way of deploying US Naval warships, such as a battleship, to an adversary's coast line to compel, coerce or deter them from acting in a fashion counter to US interest and to enforce US foreign policy.

Today, “Gunboat Diplomacy” continues through the employment of aircraft carriers as a replacement of the old battleship and a form of seabasing.

As the US looks to the future for a new Joint Seabasing capability, it must reflect on history to help guide further development of seabasing concepts and doctrine. It must seize opportunities now to develop and procure new maritime and amphibious concepts and technologies as the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Army did during the “interwar” period.²⁷ “In the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps experimented with amphibious warfare, thereby developing the concepts and equipment that would enable the great advances in amphibious assault needed in World War II.”²⁸

Reflecting on how the United States began its initial assault across the English Channel to the Nazi occupied coastal area of Normandy, it was primarily spearheaded through the use of some form of seabasing to deliver waves of US and allied troops, supplies and equipment. Arguably, the invasion of Normandy was probably the largest seabasing operation the United States and coalition forces have ever attempted. Most if not all of the troops, supplies and equipment were pre-positioned in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, all the personnel and materiel had to be loaded aboard thousands of sea going and amphibious vessels. Vessels such as the Landing Ship Tank (LST), Landing Craft Tank (LCT), and Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) as well as other larger vessels enabled the allies to cross the English Channel to meet the German threat head on contributing to a tremendous strategic victory.²⁹

In the Pacific Theater, fighting against the Japanese, the US Navy and Marine Corps employed its tremendous fleets of aircraft carriers, amphibious and support vessels to facilitate the capture of the Marshall, Solomon, Philippines, and Okinawa

Islands, defeating the Japanese. After World War II, the US continued to successfully employ seabasing (the verb) in the Asia-Pacific Region. For example, during the Korean War, the US employed amphibious operations at Inchon, Korea, to project combat power ashore. During the Vietnam War, the US employed aircraft carriers to conduct its bombing campaign from the South China Sea. Seabasing was also employed off the coast of Lebanon to assist in peace enforcement in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, seabasing was employed to evacuate United Nations forces out of Somalia and US Embassy personnel out of the failing state of Sierra Leone in West Africa. In 2001, the US Navy established a sea base in the Arabian Sea, to rapidly project and introduce US forces into Afghanistan. In 2004, seabasing provided disaster relief and recovery operations after the tsunami hit Thailand. In 2006, after the Israeli attack on Lebanon, the US conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation of US expatriates from Lebanon. More recently, the US quickly responded to the earthquake and tsunami ravaged Island of Japan by moving the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan to provide relief. This type of assistance will be even more useful if Japan's damaged nuclear power plants in Sendai emit radiation and that may restrict access to the area.

For the most part, seabasing was employed to defeat an adversary and not to deter or prevent conflict. Equally, seabasing has been very beneficial in quickly responding to global disasters and humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, when one thinks about every time a US aircraft carrier peacefully transits the Asia-Pacific Region, it provides a sense of stability and reassurance of our commitment to our allies. Seabasing (the verb) is also recognized by adversaries in the region as an indication of US resolve. This is presumably because an attack on a US Naval vessel would likely be

considered an act of war. Hence, the presence of a US ship implies a commitment to defend partners in the area. Therefore, one can argue that seabasing is not a new concept or capability. Seabasing has demonstrated its utility as a successful means to project combat power, defeat aggression, bolster US foreign policy, and protect national interests. The next sections will identify and discuss the Services' current seabasing capability and perspective.

Current Seabasing Capability

Today, the United States military employs a full menu of seabasing capabilities globally to protect national interests and enforce foreign policy. It does this through a combination of its fleet of ships and vessels, amphibious and expeditionary capability, and prepositioned forces abroad that can aggregate and disperse based upon the mission. Today's seabasing capability is separately owned and managed by the separate Services, and continues to be very expensive to maintain.

The U.S. Navy owns and operates a fleet of super carriers along with a compliment of destroyers, frigates, submarines and fighter-attack aircraft commonly referred to as "Carrier Strike Groups (CSG)." The US Navy employs the most visible and impressive of all the Services' seabasing capability with its "Capital Ships" or aircraft carriers and naval task forces that support Geographical Combatant Commanders worldwide. Today, as well as in the past, it has been the US "gold standard" to use the US Navy and its tremendous sea based war fighting capability to act as the "big stick" of US foreign policy around the world. In addition to the CSG, usually not too far away is a Marine Corps expeditionary amphibious capability enhancing what the US Navy brings to any contingency forming "the core" of today's seabasing capabilities.³⁰

The Marine Corps, supported by the US Navy's fleet of amphibious surface ships, provides a ready, robust, responsive, and flexible multi-capable amphibious expeditionary task force that can project a combined arms force that is lethal and self sustaining from the sea. Such units are referred to as Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Units (MEB and MEU). Additionally, the Marine Corps manages and relies on its fleet of prepositioned afloat vessels referred to as Maritime Preposition Squadrons (MPSRON) that provide a contingency source of equipment and sustainment stocks and is similar to the Army's Prepositioned Stocks (APS).³¹

The U.S. Army is the land power capability and projects most of its combat power if not all (equipment, supplies & personnel) from a system of CONUS based power projection platforms. When it comes to seabasing, the US Army relies on a fleet of forward deployed vessels commonly referred to as the "Army Prepositioned Stock 3 (APS) Program."³² APS 3 is comprised of nineteen Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Off (LMSR) vessels and container ships that are stationed in strategic locations worldwide. APS is operated by Military Sealift Command (MSC) and stores combat, combat support, combat service support equipment, and sustainment that can provide a rapid initial war fighting capability at any time.³³ Part of the prepositioned capability is the semi-submersible vessels that transport lighterage (smaller vessels that transport cargo from the sea) as part of a theater port opening and logistics over the shore (LOTS) capability. Recently, the APS system was successfully utilized in equipping US combat forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.³⁴

The US Army relies on APS 3 and other prepositioned stocks that are afloat to rapidly project and sustain combat power and in some circumstances has reduced

deployment response times to a variety of threats and contingencies. On the other hand, the APS system is completely separate from the US Navy and US Marine Corps current seabasing capability and remains very costly to maintain and operate.³⁵ Each of the Services' seabasing capabilities is separate and does not operate under a single concept or doctrine as a truly joint system. Current seabasing fails to take into consideration the future operating environment and threats to US interests abroad. Current seabasing capabilities would experience significant interoperability system interface issues in projecting forces ashore from over the horizon. It simply doesn't fit in tomorrow's way of projecting power.³⁶ DoD's future Joint Seabasing Concept transform current seabasing to a true joint capability that is interoperable and allows the Services aggregate different seaborne assets to assemble, generate and project combat power. Future Joint Seabasing will be able to operate independently of allies' resources integrating capabilities to defeat Anti-access/Area-Denial (A2-AD) environments. The following paragraphs, will examine the threat to US interests in the Asia-Pacific Region.³⁷

Threats in the Asia-Pacific Region

The US faces many challenges executing foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific Region. While economic prosperity remains one of the United States primary objectives, so is security and stability in the region. Our friends and allies in the region rely on security provided by the United States to defend them from the intimidation and aggressive acts perpetrated by North Korea and an increasingly assertive China.³⁸

Over the past decade, China's economic success has facilitated its military transformation and expansion as a means to influence and protect its national interest in the region. While the United States has been engaged in two distinct theaters of war

and the Global War on Terrorism, the Chinese have taken advantage of the circumstances quietly engaging in its version of “soft power.”³⁹ For instance, the Chinese have forged new economic alliances and agreements for oil with nations such as Sudan and Nigeria. The Chinese have also played an active role in peacekeeping on the African Continent and anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, partnering with other nations in construction of ports and infrastructure. China has reached out to Taiwan partnering in various areas with the goal of seeing Taiwan returned to Chinese sovereignty. While China does not pose a significant military threat to the United States and its allies in the region now, it could in the next 10 to 15 years.⁴⁰

As an example of military modernization, China is expanding its naval (Peoples Liberation Army Navy-PLAN) and air force (Peoples Liberation Army Air Force-PLAAF) capabilities in lethality and range.⁴¹ It has acquired a Russian aircraft carrier and has plans to build another. China has invested in a fleet of fighter aircraft possessing an extended range well beyond Japan and South Korea. China employs a vigorous cyber-warfare and anti-satellite capability to disrupt command and control information systems and is also developing an extensive anti-access/area-denial (A2-AD) capability that fits in their overall “strategy of deterrence.” This comprehensive and extensive A2-AD capability could threaten US interests, our allies, freedom of navigation, access, and security and stability in the region. In the event of armed conflict, Chinese A2-AD will make it difficult for the US to project power and sustain extended combat operations. Therefore, the Asia-Pacific Region will be a region that will have the potential for tensions to increase. To diffuse any tensions, the US must aggressively engage our allies in the region and do the same with China to prevent future conflict.⁴²

Over the next 10 to 15 years, the Asia-Pacific Region will be characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. The North Korean conflict and reunification may or may not be settled which creates a level of uncertainty. By 2025, China may increase its development rivaling the United States as a peer competitor influencing friends and allies and changing the balance of power in the region. Other Asian nations such as Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand may align themselves with a more powerful China for more than just economic interest which could add to stability of the region. It is understandable that the region would form close economic ties due to proximity but also because of the vast market potential that China presents to its neighbors. With a population of 1.3 billion, some nations see their prosperity tied to China and assume that this would lead to closer relations than in the past.⁴³ On the other hand, China has also increased its assertiveness in the region which has caused some countries to be alarmed and skeptical.

In the next decade, the United States will have to contend with the unpredictable behavior of the North Korean regime and deal with the reality of China's continued economic, military, regional and global influence. The United States will have to establish firm foreign policy with feasible ways and means to influence the two communist nations. A future Joint Seabasing capability can provide the means to serve as a counterweight to China and an extension of US foreign policy to deter aggression, demonstrate commitment, and reassure allies and friends. If history can serve as a guide, the US would do well to reflect on the "interwar" period (1920s and 1930s) and its relations with pre-war Japan. Studying this period assist will assist the US in shaping future policy for the Asia-Pacific Region and China.⁴⁴ The following paragraphs will

examine the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the strategic guidance for a future Joint Seabasing capability.

Strategic Guidance on Seabasing

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides strategic guidance for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Services for a four year period. In the QDR, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Robert Gates states the following:

To meet the potential threats to our military's ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners, this QDR directs more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs.⁴⁵

The 2010 QDR outlines the future operational environment, objectives, key missions, and challenges for the US. One of these objectives is to "prevent and deter conflict."⁴⁶ A key mission is to "Deter and defeat aggression in Anti-Access environments and maintaining power projection and forward presence capability."⁴⁷ A future Joint Seabasing capability supports the objective and key mission that the SECDEF has outlined in the QDR. It does this through its: persistent forward presence, ability to rapidly project and sustain power independently; and, employing a full range of joint integrated effects.

The QDR incorporates specific language that articulates what the Services will have to accomplish in the near term. The QDR states:

"The Department defends the United States from direct attack, deters potential adversaries, fosters regional security, and assures access to the global commons by extending a global defense posture composed of joint, ready forces forward-stationed and rotationally deployed to prevail across all domains, prepositioned equipment and overseas facilities, and international agreements."⁴⁸ "...In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict."⁴⁹ "...Prudence demands

that the Department prepare for possible future adversaries likely to possess and employ some degree of anti-access capability—the ability to blunt or deny U.S. power projection—across all domains. Future adversaries will likely possess sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyber domains.⁵⁰ “...America’s Armed Forces will retain the ability to act unilaterally and decisively when appropriate, maintaining joint, all domain military capabilities that can prevail across a wide range of contingencies.”⁵¹

Based on the QDRs guidance, future threats and environment, future Joint Seabasing is a capability that the Services must accept and develop to accomplish stated objective and missions.

However, the 2010 QDR does not specify the term “seabasing” nor does it address a future Joint Seabasing capability to act as a means to achieve the objectives and missions directed by the SECDEF. The lack of any language that identifies future Joint Seabasing in the 2010 QDR indicates little commitment or priority by the SECDEF. The previous 2006 QDR does specifically identify “Seabasing” and states “The future joint force will exploit the operational flexibility of seabasing to counter political anti-access and irregular warfare challenges.”⁵² Despite the fact that the 2010 QDR fails to specifically identify “future Joint Seabasing,” it does paint the future environment as an environment that is suitable for a future Joint Seabasing capability. The environment characterized by anti-access and allies that are reluctant to allow US basing rights may merit continued effort towards developing a future Joint Seabasing (the noun) capability. It is also possible that the SECDEF believes that developing new technology and materiel systems to form a future Joint Seabasing capability is not financially possible in the near term or scope of the 2010 QDR (four years out). Given the United States current economic challenges and a likely reduction in the DoD budget, new development of a Joint Seabasing capability will have to remain a concept until

resources become available. On the other hand, the SECDEF may be of the opinion that the US would not engage in a future land based war with the Chinese. The SECDEF while giving a speech at the United States Military Academy stated “that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements.”⁵³ His comments confirm that he (SECDEF) does not envision committing a large amount of combat forces like in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, recent comments by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullins, agreed with the SECDEF’s guidance. He stated that a future Joint Seabasing capability is a good concept and will take time to evolve.⁵⁴

DoD must fund and allow future Joint Seabasing to evolve through research and development, experimentation, and simulations. This will allow questions to be answered and develop insights that either proves or disproves the concept as a feasible capability. The risk to the US might be that a future conflict with China may render current seabasing incapable and ineffective for projecting and sustaining forces. The following sections will outline and analyze the Services’ perspectives of seabasing.

The Services’ Perspective of Seabasing

The US Navy Perspective. The US Navy maintains the lion’s share of current global seabasing capability and capacity below the sea and above the sea. With the smallest Navy since 1916, today’s Navy is focused providing a presence in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf with a fleet of 288 vessels.⁵⁵ The US Navy serves as the day to day face of US foreign policy to deter adversaries and reassure allies and partners globally. The US Navy’s concept of seabasing has evolved since the end of the Cold War and began to take shape in the early 1990s. Since then, the US Navy has published a series documents such as “*The Way Ahead*”, “*From the Sea*” to

“*Sea Power 21*,” and “*Naval Power 21*” along with US Marine Corps (USMC) doctrine such as “*Operational Maneuver from the Sea*.” These publications have served to invigorate interests at the national level for a viable and feasible alternative in projecting US power, providing deterrence, and securing the global commons. The publications also served as the impetus to DoD’s 2005 Joint Seabasing Integrating Concept as a future capability.

Based on the 2010 Naval Operations Concept (NOC), the US Navy has a positive and forward thinking perspective on seabasing.⁵⁶ Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, in a recent visit to the United States Army War College, said the following about the Navy’s core capabilities:

The Navy’s core capability is to be a forward Navy, to be a Navy with enough deterrent strength that it is in fact a deterrent, to be able to control the sea, to be able to provide power projection wherever and whenever needed, to be able to contribute to the maritime security and to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response whenever and wherever it is needed.⁵⁷

Admiral Roughead stated in the “CNO’s Guidance for 2011, Executing the Maritime Strategy”, and in recent comments, the “US Navy remains committed and the need for a strong naval presence will grow in importance.”⁵⁸ It is evident that the CNO’s focus for the US Navy is to remain a traditional “blue water” navy controlling the seas, maritime trade routes, providing a forward presence, maintaining access, and projecting US power to act as a deterrent. However, with respect to future Joint Seabasing, the CNO did not specifically identify or make reference to any future Joint Seabasing capability other than efforts to modernize and build the future force expanding the number of ships to 312. This is more than likely due to SECDEF guidance through the 2010 QDR and forthcoming reductions prohibits any future progress in a future Joint

Seabasing capability in the near term.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the CNO may feel that seabasing is not new to the US Navy and views current naval operations as seabasing, and therefore does not require any new concept or technology. However, the CNOs perspective is short-sighted, it is the old way of doing business and does not provide the future capability required to rapidly project and sustain forces independent of allies. Based on the CNO view, current naval operations under his purview is seabasing and unfortunately that seems to be a very parochial view. Despite the lack of emphasis by the SECDEF and CNO, a future Joint Seabasing concept must be developed in coordination with the other Services. Ultimately, Joint Seabasing can become a way the US can project joint forces and maintain forward presence in the Asia-Pacific Region.⁶⁰

The US Marine Corps Perspective

The Marine Corps has been and continues to be the United States lead contingency force that leverages seabasing to support its core mission as the premier expeditionary fighting force. The Corps' perspective of seabasing is that it provides:

An asymmetric advantage for the United States, wherein the diverse elements of sea power could be combined in complementary ways to conduct a broad range of operations ashore.⁶¹

Currently, the Corps represents the subject matter experts in matters of seabasing and future Joint Seabasing. This is not surprising based on the Corps history, traditions, Title 10 responsibilities, roles and functions of projecting its capability from the sea. This includes conducting expeditionary operations responding to aggression, engaging in combat, providing humanitarian and disaster relief, or simply conducting noncombatant evacuation operations. Like retired Navy Captain Sam Tangredi, USMC leadership has suggested that “the concept of seabasing is frequently misunderstood and its utility to the range of military operations and the challenges of the 21st Century is not well

recognized.⁶² In March 2009, the Commanding General, USMC Combat Development Command, LtGen Flynn, published a document referred to as “*Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations*”. The purpose of this document was to review past seabasing definitions, concepts, and doctrine to level the playing field and provide a common understanding of future Joint Seabasing. It is also appropriate to mention that the USMC has been one of the key players in the establishment of the Department of Defense Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) published in 2005 and is an advocate for the concept.

It is easy to get the USMC’s perspective of seabasing through its plethora of publications and multimedia posted on its website. This includes the issues LtGen Flynn addressed during a recent visit to the US Army War College. Specifically, he made comments on the future of seabasing and that recent test and evaluation of the Maritime Landing Platform (MLP) that took place in the Gulf of Mexico looked promising. The MLP is a vessel that is designed to interface with larger Maritime Sealift Command (MSC) vessels (e.g. Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off) to transfer and project equipment and sustainment ashore. While DoD, through the Joint Staff, remains the authority for future Joint Seabasing, the Corps represents the experts and will be the drivers for a future Joint Seabasing capability. Based on LtGen Flynn’s comments and the Marine Corps doctrine and concept work on future Joint Seabasing, the Corps recognizes that now is the time, similar to the “interwar” period, to develop a future Joint Seabasing capability to prepare for future conflict with China and defeat their complex strategy of A2-AD.⁶³

The US Army's Perspective

The US Army's perspective is no more apparent than what is indicated in several US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) publications such as the "*White Paper on Joint Seabasing*," "*TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-10, US Army Contributions to Joint Land Operations from a Joint Sea base for the Future Modular Force 2015-2024*," and "*TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*."

The US Army views future Joint Seabasing as an important capability in rapidly projecting its modular force as indicated below:

Expeditionary warfare from the sea has always been an Army core competency. However, growing anti-access challenges, coupled with the critical need to increase deployment momentum, while simultaneously reducing predictability and vulnerability, demands that it increasingly do so with less dependence on developed air and sea ports. Thus the Army fully supports the concept of joint seabasing as defined by the Seabasing Joint Integration Concept.⁶⁴

However, as indicated previously, the US Army has maintained some seabasing and forward presence capability through the Army Prepositioning Ships (APS) and Army War Reserve (AWR) system. In the past, the US Army has been the benefactor of the US Navy during WW II in the European and Pacific Theaters in terms of delivering hundreds of thousands of Soldiers and material generating combat power from a sea base. More recently in 2001, US Army Special Forces assembled and launched from a sea base provided by the USS Kitty Hawk in the Arabian Sea to commence combat in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Over the past seven years, the US Army has established itself as a Continental US (CONUS) based modular Brigade Combat Team centric expeditionary force. The US Army has transformed from a forward stationed force focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union to a CONUS based expeditionary force reliant on strategic

mobility to project itself rapidly worldwide. These strategic mobility enablers include CONUS based power projection platforms and transportation infrastructure, airfields and sea ports, Air Mobility Command's (AMC) fleet of C-5s and C-17 cargo aircraft, Maritime Sealift Commands (MSC) fleet of Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) and Fast Sealift Ships (FSS). The US Army is completely reliant on U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and sister Services to provide the strategic lift and transportation to deliver them rapidly throughout the globe in support of contingencies and Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Army recognizes that political relationships with our friends and allies may change and not permit a US military presence on their soil. This creates additional challenges for the US Army and its ability to provide a forward presence to project power and decrease deployment timelines.⁶⁵ As a result, the Army has published the TRADOC White Paper on Joint Seabasing in 2006 and established greater interest in the concept. It offers the Army's perspective on Joint Seabasing by concluding:

The continued development of Joint Seabasing as a means of improving the strategic responsiveness and operational agility of future Army and joint forces in an access challenged environment. The Army fully recognizes the relevance of future Joint Seabasing and sea based capabilities for support of a large array of contingencies across the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO).⁶⁶

Based on the above quote, it is apparent that the Army views future Joint Seabasing in a positive light. The Army recognizes the future challenges of rapidly deploying and projecting combat forces in an environment that restricts access to traditional ports and airfields and reluctance by allies to allow use of resources. The Army has to be able to rapidly project from CONUS and views future Joint Seabasing as the solution allowing the Army to remain relevant as the US land power force.

The Army maintains a positive outlook on future Joint Seabasing and a desire to play an active role in the development, experimentation and implementation of the capability. Its contribution in the short term will be through the development of high speed intra-theater connectors such as the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) that will be able to facilitate projecting combat power to and from a joint sea base. However, the US Army will always be reliant on the US Navy and Maritime Sealift Command (MSC) to operate the core of a future joint sea base providing the platforms to generate combat power and force projection in order to defeat future adversaries. Overall, the Services have demonstrated that there is value and utility in a future Joint Seabasing capability to be a flexible and responsive means to prevent conflict, deter, and or defeat adversaries. Equally important is what Joint Seabasing provides as a way to project, generate, and sustain combat power which mitigates the reliance and use of host nation resources. However, parochialism still exists and competition for limited resources will continue and hamper the Services' integration and future development of a Joint Seabasing capability. The following section of this paper will examine and describe the future Joint Seabasing Concept and associated technology and materiel solutions.⁶⁷

Future Joint Seabasing Capabilities and Employment Concept

Along with the Joint Seabasing JIC comes a variety of new systems such as large well-deck vessels that are multi-purpose and can project combat power ashore. These new vessels will play a key role in supporting and forming the future Joint Seabasing capability. The new systems also include smaller vessels and aircraft that serve to transport and transfer cargo from ship to shore or ship to ship, are referred to as connectors. For example, there is the Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) and Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD) that serve as the primary amphibious vessel capable of

delivering and projecting forces by both sea and air lift.⁶⁸ Accompanying the amphibious vessels are the Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR), the Maritime Landing Platform (MLP), Joint High Speed Ship (JHSS), and legacy MPSRON Ships that provide the strategic lift of equipment and sustainment which gives forces enduring presence and power. Smaller vessels such as the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) and the Joint Maritime Assault Connector (JMAC) provide the means to quickly move forces and cargo intra-theater from the “Advance Base” to the sea base and ashore. The “Advance Base” is a land based location and serves as an intermediate place, like the island of Guam. This is where forces can arrive to be transferred to the sea base via connectors. Finally, a variety of rotary wing aircraft provide the intermediate connectors that move forces and cargo in and around the sea base and to and from the Advance Base. In addition, a whole series of new seabasing technology such as Selective Offload, Vehicle Transfer system, Skin-to Skin Transfer, Automated Cargo Handling, Stabilized Cranes, Joint Modular Intermodal Container, and Mobile Landing Platform Interface are all geared towards fast and efficient offload of equipment and sustainment at the sea base.⁶⁹

The Marine Corps has stepped up to take ownership of the Joint Seabasing Concept by developing a concept of operations that describes how future Joint Seabasing will operate. Figure 1 below is a visual representation of the future Joint Seabasing Concept as described in the 2005 JIC. A narrative of the activities shown in figure 1 follows and highlights Lines of Operation such as close, assemble, employ, sustain, and reconstitute.⁷⁰




Figure 1. USMC Joint Seabasing concept overarching view⁷¹

Joint forces will fly into a sea base (amphib and MPF(F) big decks) on long range rotary wing aircraft, such as the MV-22 or over sea via JHSV, or other surface craft. Equipment already forward in theater as part of maritime prepositioning or in other forward locations is offloaded while underway by and to the MLP. Joint personnel to man equipment are re-positioned or cross-docked onto the MLP or JHSV to marry up with their equipment and organized for employment ashore. The MLP then moves joint force (personnel and equipment) from the protected sea base which is well over the horizon (40 NM+) to ~25 NM where forces then move ashore from the MLP or amphibious shipping on high speed JMAC, EFV, and/or rotary wing aircraft.⁷²

The 2005 Seabasing JIC is a great point of departure in attempting to describe and articulate a future Joint Seabasing concept and how the US can leverage the capability as a flexible and responsive way to project power and assemble forces. The JIC also provides a venue for all the Services to participate as a common understanding and the way forward for future Joint Seabasing. What is concerning however, is that the JIC was published in 2005 and it does not identify an interim solution in reaching an objective state. For example, taking current seabasing capabilities and develop materiel

solutions that can bridge the now until the future concept described in the JIC can be realized. Recent testing with the Maritime Landing Platform (MLP) in the Gulf of Mexico is a positive step and proof that interim solutions are at work to move towards a future Joint Seabasing capability. The JIC was published almost six years ago when the US was engaged in two distinct wars. At the same time, DoD budgets were the highest they've been in years when funding for a Joint Seabasing capability may have been possible. Today, with the current economic and budget constraints, it is apparent funding for a Joint Seabasing capability is not a high priority. The JIC fails to direct that the Services take steps to integrate as part of a comprehensive effort to build next generation seabasing materiel solution and technology.⁷³ This is due to the current predicament with fighting in two distinct theaters of operations and the cost associated with it along with current economic and budgetary constraints. Even if the US was able to field all the new vessels and material solutions that the concept calls for, many challenges exist. The following paragraphs will examine challenges to a future Seabasing capability.

The Challenge to Future Seabasing Concept Development

A future Joint Seabasing capability will encounter several challenges from a variety of reasons such as a potential adversary like China, continued parochialism by the Services, fiscal constraints, and environmental effects. Chinese A2-AD and "strategy of deterrence" will more than likely pose some challenge to a future Joint Seabasing capability to deny, delay, and disrupt US operations.⁷⁴ The next challenge is that the Services may continue to be parochial in development of future force structure and war fighting capabilities and miss an opportunity to integrate the concept as a comprehensive joint capability. Future Joint Seabasing Concept development has been

affected by the current resource constrained environment and has taken a back seat to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as indicated by the 2010 QDR. Finally, the environment will more than likely pose a challenge to future Joint Seabasing. Severe weather conditions, low visibility, and high sea state would ensure that Joint Seabasing operations would grind to a halt. On the other hand, future Joint Seabasing technology may mitigate some effects such as high sea states and rough sea conditions allowing for continued offload and projection of forces ashore. To overcome these challenges, DOD must reemphasize future Joint Seabasing as a priority and invest in furthering its development.

Conclusion

This paper argued the distinction between current seabasing (the verb) and future Joint Seabasing (the noun) as a capability to rapidly project and sustain US forces. This paper also clarified why seabasing is a misunderstood concept and established a common understanding, demonstrated the utility of seabasing through historical examples, analyzed current strategic guidance, and the Services' perspective of seabasing. Finally, this paper introduced and described the future Joint Seabasing Concept and challenges to its development.

The employment of seabasing has demonstrated throughout history, especially during WW II, Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, great value and utility in rapidly projecting US power. However, current seabasing capabilities represent the old way of business. DOD must transform its current seabasing capability to an objective capability described in the Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept. Future Joint Seabasing may provide an independent forward presence of United States military power that can employ and sustain forces from an over the horizon location. This may defeat an

adversary's A2-AD and act as a means to deter future Chinese aggression. It is expected that China will continue its path of economic prosperity and military rise in the region. China will probably do so in a patient fashion asserting its power and testing US commitment and will. At this point, it is unclear whether a future Joint Seabasing capability can deter Chinese aggression. However, if history is an indicator, seabasing has certainly affected the strategic calculus of would be adversaries across the globe and even contributed to their demise. To realize a future Joint Seabasing capability, the US must invest now and allow the capability to evolve through experimentation and simulation. The risk if the US fails to field a future Joint Seabasing capability might be too high. The risk may render the US unable to assure regional allies, respond rapidly to Chinese aggression, put US forces at a disadvantage, and possibly endanger US national security in the Asia-Pacific Region.

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⁴² *Ibid.*, 29.

⁴³ Daniel Twining, "Democratic Partnership in Asia," *Hoover Institution: Policy Review*, no. 163, October 1, 2010, <https://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/49861> (accessed January 25, 2011).

⁴⁴ The US must reflect on its relations with Japan during the interwar period in shaping future US policy and strategy to deter Chinese aggression and maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific Region. During the "interwar" period, the Japanese gradually took the opportunity to develop and grow its economy and build its military to new levels employing it throughout the Asia-Pacific Region to influence and protect its commerce. One can argue that today's China is similar to an "inter-war" Japan with respect to a rising economic and military power. Today's China like pre WW II Japan, expanded its sphere of influence in the region and established international relations well beyond the Asia-Pacific Region to secure natural resources such as gas and oil.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, i.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, v.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 47.

⁵³ Robert M. Gates, "Speech at the United States Military Academy," February 25, 2011, linked from The Department of Defense Home Page at "United States Military Academy," <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539> (accessed March 20, 2011).

⁵⁴ According the Admiral Mullins, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) on a recent visit to the United States War College (USAWC), when asked about a future Joint Seabasing capability, he responded by saying "that he supported the idea of the Joint Seabasing that's been put forth and that we won't be able to make a leap from where we are today to a new

capability. He said new Joint Seabasing must be able to evolve and may take some time as a result of budget restraints and reductions within the DoD.” Future Joint Seabasing capability does not seem to be gaining as much traction as it did six years ago. The SECDEFs guidance is clear that the focus is on the current fight and indicates very little in new force structure and procurement of a Joint Seabasing capability. The way ahead is to continue to shape the Seabasing JIC, integrate the Services more aggressively, leverage experimentation and simulations to test and evaluate the concept.

⁵⁵ Gary Roughead, “Delivers Remarks at the Hudson Institute,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, November 16, 2010).

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of the Navy, *Naval Operations Concept*, 9, 25.

⁵⁷ Gary Roughead, “Commandants Leadership Lecture Series,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2010.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of the Navy, *CNO Guidance for 2011, Executing the Maritime Strategy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, October 2010), 1.

⁵⁹ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 2.

⁶⁰ Morrow, “Sea Basing: Logistical Implications for the US Army,” 14.

⁶¹ U.S. Marine Corps, *Seabasing for the Range of Military Operations*, 1.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Morrow, “Sea Basing: Logistical Implications for the US Army,” 15.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-7-10, *The United States Army Concept Capability Plan for U.S. Army Contributions to Joint Land Operations from a Joint Sea Base for the Future Modular Force 2015-2024, version 1.0* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Department of the Army, March 23, 2009), iii.

⁶⁵ Morrow, “Sea Basing: Logistical Implications for the US Army,” 14.

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) *White Paper on Joint Seabasing, The Army Perspective* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Department of the Army, July 7, 2006), 14.

⁶⁷ Morrow, “Sea Basing: Logistical Implications for the US Army,” 15.

⁶⁸ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Force Structure*, 28.

⁶⁹ U.S. Marine Corps, “Seabasing: A Joint force Enabler in Area-denial and Anti-Access Environments,” 49.

⁷⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, version 1.0*, 7.

⁷¹ U.S. Marine Corps, "Seabasing: A Joint force Enabler in Area-denial and Anti-Access Environments," 55.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Force Structure*, 30-32.

⁷⁴ Dean Cheng, "Chinese Views on Deterrence," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 60, (1st Quarter, 2011): 92.

