

THE ARMY RESERVE'S FUTURE: PART OF THE OPERATIONAL FORCE

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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War has changed drastically in the last decade causing the U.S. Army's Reserve Component (RC) to mobilize on a regular basis. The Army Reserve is one component of the Total Army which also consists of the Active Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG). While the National Guard can perform both federal and state missions, the Army Reserve is a federal force only. Over the last decade, the Army increased its reliance on reserve forces for contingency operations. This paper addresses the Army Reserve's transition to an operational force and proposes two missions ideally suited for an operational reserve: Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). In addition, the paper makes four recommendations for transitioning the AR to be part of an operational force. These include working to change Title 10 to authorize the AR to perform DSCA missions, legislative changes to allow the President, DOD, and Army senior leaders quick access to AR personnel and assets during national emergencies, funding the AR in DOD's base budget and adding TSC and DSCA staff sections to the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) Deputy Commanding General for Operations.

THE ARMY RESERVE'S FUTURE: PART OF THE OPERATIONAL FORCE

For a long time, the Reserve component had been a strategic reserve, and we had, I think by inches, turned it into an operational reserve. And I think a lot of people who had spent some years in the Guard and Reserves and were accustomed to summer training and the monthly meetings and helping in national disasters or in local and regional disasters suddenly found themselves deployed for 15 months to Iraq and Afghanistan.¹

- Secretary Of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2009

This quote from Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, to the students at the U.S. Army War College is an appropriate description of what the Reserve Component (RC) future missions will be as it transitions to an operational force.² His words are relevant and timely as the face of war has changed drastically in the last decade causing the Army RC to mobilize on a regular basis. In this era of persistent conflict, the Army's Active Component (AC) has increased its reliance on the Army Reserve (AR) to conduct routine and contingency missions.³ Since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, AR Soldiers deployed all over the world and successfully performed operational missions - making them an experienced force of vital strategic importance.

This paper examines two missions ideally suited for the AR as part of the operational force: Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). It describes these two missions and demonstrates their strategic importance. It then concludes with four key recommendations for transitioning the AR to be part of an operational force.

Background

Historically, the AR served as a strategic force whose mission was to mobilize to augment and back fill the AC during large-scale operations such as the Persian Gulf

War in 1991.⁴ After September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush activated AR Soldiers to participate in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom to support the AC missions. Since 9/11, the Army activated over 198,228 AR Soldiers (26,238 are currently deployed) in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom (OEF), Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and New Dawn (OND).⁵ It is evident the AR plays a vital role in supporting U.S. military missions and reducing deployments and combat stress on the active force, making it a critical part of the operational force.

An example of the AR as part of the operational force is best demonstrated by the deployment of the Army Reserve's 143rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) to Afghanistan in February 2009 to establish the first General Officer sustainment command in theater. The 143rd ESC was initially mobilized in October 2008 to replace the 311th ESC in Kuwait, but conditions changed when President Obama authorized a 30,000 troop increase for Afghanistan creating a need to establish an ESC. As a result, a few days after Christmas 2008, the Army remissioned the 143rd ESC to Afghanistan.⁶ During this deployment, the 143rd ESC worked in partnership on a daily basis with the Active Component U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), the Army Central Command (ARCENT), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to provide sustainment, logistics, deployment, redeployment, and retrograde operations in support of U.S. and multinational forces in Afghanistan.

While Secretary of Defense Robert Gates could have selected an Active Component ESC, he specifically selected the 143rd ESC to perform this important logistics mission because he was confident AR Soldiers could perform the mission

successfully – and he was correct. This assurance was also expressed by the former commander of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (MG James Rogers) and 1st Army's Division East Senior Mentor (MG (Retired) Robert Shadley).⁷

One important statistic demonstrates the AR is already part of the operational force: from 7 October 2001 through 28 March 2011, 301 AR heroes lost their lives in support of OEF, OIF, and OND.⁸ Clearly, the AR is an important part of the blood and treasure this country is investing in current operational missions.

The AR as Part of the Operational Force

Despite the Army Reserve's contributions, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Army senior leaders have not agreed on a definition for Operational Reserves; therefore this paper uses three sources to describe the AR's role as part of the operational force. First, in 2008 DOD Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, described an operational reserve force as a reserve force with capabilities to meet military requirements during peace or at time of war by providing ready units to perform missions across the full spectrum of operations.⁹ This directive reflects both the nation's reliance on the RC operating in a Combatant Command and codifies its future transition that can sustain U.S. military power in an era of persistent conflict.¹⁰

Second, in 2010, *The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, also known as the "Reimer Report", described the AR as part of the operational force consisting of units that are focused, resourced, and prepared for specific missions at home or in a foreign country.¹¹

Third, LTG Jack C. Stultz, Chief of Army Reserve (CAR), described the AR as part of the operational force and meant AR Soldiers would be used on a regular basis to

augment the active Army.¹² For the last three years, the CAR has been a strong advocate for making the AR part of the operational force to support the Army's future needs and requirements.

Strategic Importance of the AR Being Part of the Operational Force

There are four reasons why transforming the AR to be part of the operational force is strategically important. First, the AR possesses a large percentage of combat support and combat service support forces and expertise. The AR provides the total Army with 100% of its Theater Engineer Commands, Civil Affairs Commands, Training Divisions, Biological Detection Companies, Railway Units, and Replacement Companies. In addition, the AR provides more than two-thirds of the total Army's Medical Brigades, Civil Affairs Brigades, PSYOPS Groups, Expeditionary Sustainment Commands, Dental Companies, Combat Support Hospitals, Army Water Craft units, Petroleum Units, and Mortuary Affairs Units. Furthermore, the AR provides nearly half of the total Army's Military Police Commands, Information Operations Groups, Medical Units, and Supply Units.¹³ Since the AR possesses a large percentage of support capabilities, the AC must rely on the AR to deploy and conduct sustainment, logistics, medical, and engineering operations.

Second, the Army can no longer afford to conduct sustained operations with only the Active Component; Army commanders must integrate the Army Reserve into the operational force to be successful. LTG Stultz noted that ten years of depending on the Guard and Reserve to carry on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has forced the Army to reorganize itself to maintain an operational reserve and avoid reverting back into a strategic reserve.¹⁴ General James D. Thurman, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command adds that, "We cannot squander away what we learned. If we

say we are going back to the way we used to do business, I think we are going to fracture the force.”¹⁵ Having the FORSCOM Commander and the CAR sharing similar visions about the AR being part of the Operational Force adds credibility to the concept and increases the chances to successfully change future AR policies, doctrine, and missions.

Third, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report described the strategic importance of using the RC as part of the operational force:

Achieving the defense strategy’s objectives require vibrant National Guard and Reserves that are seamlessly integrated into the broader All-Volunteer Force. Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity—available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment. Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component—especially those that possess high demand skill sets—in an operational capacity well into the future.¹⁶

As a result, the 2014 QDR should specifically stress funding the AR appropriately to fulfill its operational role. Including specific wording in the 2014 QDR about base funding for the AR would legitimize the AR’s role as part of the operational force.

Fourth, in 2007 Congress created the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) to gather data, conduct analysis, and recommend changes and reforms to ensure the RC is structured to meet U.S. national security objectives. The 2008 CNGR Final Report concluded, “The nation requires an operational reserve force.”¹⁷ Just as the Army changed its war-fighting methods and transformed its business processes so must the role of the AR. The Army cannot afford to operate as it did in the past with the AR as a strategic force. The Army should continue to leverage the AR in its current operational role in order to become an effective total force.

Possible AR Operational Missions

As part of the Army's operational force, the AR is best suited to contribute to two important missions: Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA). This section defines both missions, provides examples about how the AR can carry out these missions, and discusses their strategic importance.

Joint Publication 5 defines Security Cooperation as,

The means by which the Department of Defense encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. Security Cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships.¹⁸

Conducting TSC is not new to the AR because reserve forces have supported Combatant Commanders' TSC programs, missions, and exercises successfully for many years. Because AC units are stretched thin performing world-wide operations, Combatant Commanders used AR forces for conducting TSC missions such as logistics, engineering, security, medical, and civil affairs support. The AR has developed and improved U.S. relationships with many countries by participating in theater exercises and providing training, logistics, engineering, and medical support.¹⁹

An example of AR Soldiers participating in TSC missions occurred in U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). They provided thousands of people in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore with much-needed dental and medical care during a training rotation. There are also similar types of missions under way in South America and Africa noting AR Soldiers can boost Combatant Commanders' effectiveness and efficiency in building partnership capacity. The AR's support makes it both a contingency force for the U.S. and a valuable asset to theater engagements.²⁰

LTG Stultz also explored new missions for the AR to augment the active Army where Army Reservists' civilian skills could contribute to missions such as training foreign armies and providing humanitarian assistance, especially in Africa and South America. However, he cautioned that mobilizing an AR unit for 30 days to complete these missions isn't practical because the units actually need 90-days to effectively execute humanitarian and training missions.²¹ Current legislation and funding policy authorizes AR Soldiers to perform 48 Battle Assemblies (24 days) and 14-29 days of annual training per fiscal year.²² So, the way these missions can be successfully accomplished is to change legislation and to fund the AR in the base budget to pay for these 90-day missions.

GEN William —KipWard, former commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), reported Reservists already make up 90 percent of the forces performing missions in support of AFRICOM. He acknowledged the AR's contributions to AFRICOM during his speech on October 25, 2010 at the Association of the U.S. Army's conference by saying, "When [African] soldiers meet our Soldiers ...they see the best in America," [and concluded that], "The role the Guard and Reserve plays in that is vital."²³ Because the AR possesses the personnel, experience, and equipment to support certain Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) missions, it would be prudent to plan, budget, and allocate resources to maximize the AR's contributions to Combatant Commanders' TSC programs and theater engagement missions.

DSCA or civil support is the second important AR mission area. DOD Directive 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* authorizes the use of:

U.S. Federal military forces,²⁴ DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary

of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.²⁵

Another DSCA definition is documented in the 2011 Army Posture Statement which describes DSCA as the activities of all DOD entities that provide military support to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and U.S. territories and possessions in response to support civil authorities during civil emergencies and incidents.²⁶ These incidents include terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, other emergencies and National Security Special Events. However, federal law restricts use of Title 10 forces to support civil law enforcement and it does not apply to foreign disasters. Supporting civil authorities enhances working relationships and mutual support between the Army and local, state, tribal, and federal agencies which results in rapid and well-organized responses to disasters and emergencies. Because the AR is a community based force which is ready to provide skilled Soldiers and modern equipment to integrate and collaborate with federal, state, tribal and local authorities to plan and conduct DSCA missions, the Army should be able to use these Soldiers. Especially since AR Soldiers possess experience in civil support and their equipment is located in local communities across the nation.

Recommendations for the Future

As demonstrated over time, the AR's transition to become part of the Army's operational force was essentially unplanned. The AR's role shift was an ad hoc solution to the nation's demand for forces to conduct ongoing operations over the past decade and now in an era of persistent conflict.²⁷ Many AR leaders recognized this change and are advocating future missions for which AR forces are best suited. The following four

recommendations should ensure a successful transition of the AR into the operational force. First, legislation should be changed to establish the AR as part of the operational force by allowing them to perform DSCA missions. Second, legislation should authorize the President, DOD and Army senior leaders' quick access to AR personnel and assets in national crises. Third, DOD and the Army should fund the AR in DOD's base budget so the AR is prepared to execute missions as part of the operational force. Fourth, the USARC Deputy Commanding General (Operations) should add a TSC staff section and a DSCA staff section to its staff to plan, coordinate, and execute the AR's expanded support of Combatant Commanders' programs, missions, and exercises.

The first recommendation is for Congress to legitimize the AR as part of the operational force by changing legislation such as U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, Section 12304.²⁸ Title 10 authorizes the President to activate up to 200,000 RC members to active duty for no longer than 270 days to augment the active forces for any operational mission he or she deems appropriate. This is also known as Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority. Title 10 also says, AR Soldiers may not be ordered to active duty to assist the federal government or states during natural or manmade disasters or accidents and the President cannot use reserve Soldiers for emergencies within the United States.²⁹ Even though this legislation authorizes the Secretary of Defense to commit active Army Soldiers from Army bases as part of a federal response to an emergency, it does not allow the Secretary of Defense to activate AR forces which may be located closer to an actual incident.

Thus, amending U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, Section 12304 to give the President the authority to activate AR forces in response to domestic

emergencies whether natural or manmade, is critical to the nation's security. For example, Americans in need during an emergency do not distinguish between AC or AR Soldiers and often see that local military assets are available, but not used. This can be confusing to the public and increases their perception that military and federal government organizations can be dysfunctional and bound by out-of-date and ineffectual constraints.

In addition, the AR should address DSCA missions in the 2014 QDR and identify appropriate requirements, processes, and policies so Soldiers can legally perform civil support missions. LTG Stultz provided an example of how 18,500 AR Soldiers assigned to units in Texas were hamstrung by outdated legislation. AR Soldiers in Texas possess many capabilities such as medical, engineering, logistics, which go unused during hurricane emergencies unless a unit decides to use its annual training as the support mechanism.³⁰ It does not make good business sense for AR capabilities to be available in local communities to support DSCA missions, but authorities are unable to employ them because of antiquated legislation. Therefore; U.S. Code, Title 10, Chapter 11, Section 261 and the 2014 QDR should be modified to authorize AR Soldiers to perform DSCA missions in support of the American people.

The second recommendation is for Congress to amend current legislation to allow DOD to access AR capabilities and quickly mobilize AR Soldiers to lawfully perform DSCA missions. Current laws governing access to the AR require adjustments to permit more regular, normal access to support DSCA missions during national emergencies.³¹ Current mobilization statutes were enacted for Cold War-era scenarios in which the National Guard and Reserves were a force to augment and backfill the

active force only in the event of a major conflict. These statutes are outdated and do not serve the military well in the current or future security environment.³² Even after ten years of consistent activations, the mobilization process is still burdened by a lengthy approval process which causes delays in notifying units and individuals about impending deployments.³³ The AR's mission has changed considerably over the last decade, so laws should reflect current and future requirements to secure the nation.

John Nagl and Travis Sharp addressed the need to change legislation to allow quick access to the AR by writing,

Current law prevents the federal government from mobilizing Guardsmen and Reservists when a massive hurricane is bearing down on a major American city – even if reserve component forces are the nearest and most capable. This arrangement defies logic and unnecessarily endangers American lives. To correct the problem, Congress should amend mobilization statutes to provide military service secretaries with the authority to mobilize Federal Reserve components for a limited time in response to imminent natural or manmade disasters.³⁴

Without current legislative restrictions, the AR could have mobilized quickly to provide the humanitarian assistance required in Haiti and to strengthen the homeland response during Hurricane Katrina. The President and Congress should heed these lessons learned and change legislations so the AR can be accessed quickly to support future DSCA missions.

According to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report's Recommendation 49, —Service Secretaries should be empowered to exercise their statutory authority to conduct the functions of mobilizing and demobilizing their respective departments."³⁵ The authority to approve mobilization orders should be delegated to the CAR once the Secretary of Defense and the Army's Chief of Staff approve a mobilization. The ability to expeditiously publish mobilization and deployment

orders is key to quickly accessing AR Soldiers and units for operational missions. The CAR briefed several members of Congress on the need to authorize swift access to AR capabilities and rapidly mobilize Soldiers and received positive feedback on making the required legislative changes.³⁶ Therefore, legislative changes should allow the AR to legally perform DSCA missions and for the President to have rapid access to AR personnel and assets for deployment to leverage AR capabilities to assist in securing the nation in times of emergencies.

As a result, a third recommendation is to fund the AR force for DSCA missions at home and TSC missions in Combatant Commanders' areas of operation. Despite the AR's performance conducting operational missions in the last ten years, legislative changes are still required to fund and legitimize the AR's role as part of the operational force. To sustain AR capabilities for the future, the Army must move AR funding requirements from wartime budget supplementals to the base budget to ensure the AR is resourced like the AC.

In September 2009, the GAO noted the Army had not yet recognized specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve and had not budgeted for most of the costs identified for transitioning the AR to become part of the Army's operational force.³⁷ Current legislation and funding policy authorizes AR Soldiers to perform 48 Battle Assemblies (24 days) and 14-29 days of annual training. A base budget increase is required because with ARFORGEN, the AR five-year training cycle increases unit annual-training requirements from 14 days to 29 days in year four.³⁸ More annual training days allows AR units to conduct pre-mobilization training and to participate in collective training events, such as National Training Center exercises

which better prepare the units to conduct future operational missions. In addition, more days are required for AR units to participate in 90 days TSC programs and missions overseas and also to support unforeseen DSCA emergency missions at home.

Undoubtedly, the Army's budget will be reduced in the future. However, Secretary of Defense Gates published guidance that the Army could save about \$29 billion over the next five years, with more than \$6 billion saved by reducing the size of the Active Army and Marine Corps starting in FY 2015.³⁹ Making the AR part of the operational force is a fiscally sound decision in times of shrinking funding.

The AR provides a way the Army can keep its active-duty end strength lower and save money. LTG Stultz compared this approach to only having to pay a pilot when he's inside the cockpit. He also used seasonal workers as another example to show why an AR Soldier is less expensive than an AC Soldier. Both pilots and seasonal workers, like AR Soldiers only get paid when they are in training or performing missions. As a result, LTG Stultz reasoned, mobilizing or deploying AR Soldiers cost a fraction of what it costs to maintain an AC Soldier.⁴⁰ AR Soldiers also cost less because DOD does not have to pay them as many benefits as the AC. While it may require an initial investment to fund AR Soldiers as part of the operational force, AR Soldiers could provide significant cost savings in the out-years in a time of budget constraints.⁴¹ It could be prudent to invest up front to realize future savings for the Army. Employing the AR as an operational force provides the nation a cost-saving option because it only pays the full cost when AR Soldiers are mobilized.

For example, the following data argues that the AR military price tag is relatively low when compared to the costs of the AC. –The Reserve Components account for

18% of the Army's military end strength but only 3.8% of the total Army budget in FY 2011."⁴² John Nagl and Travis Sharp's Center for a New America Security recommends DOD and Congress transfer as many reserve component operational functions as possible from the FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations budget once the reserve component review is completed next year.⁴³ The 2011 Army Campaign Plan directed the CAR to, —Provide ready AR units and Soldiers for contingency and operational missions as part of ARFORGEN and Army Global requirements."⁴⁴ This can only be accomplished when funds are appropriated in DOD's base budget for AR units and Soldiers to train and execute the missions.

For the AR to be fiscally programmed to conduct operational missions, it should develop a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 13-17 strategy that includes base funding for the level of operational AR enablers identified in the ARFORGEN institutionalizing training day levels in support of combatant commander Theater Security Cooperation activities.⁴⁵ Incorporating the AR's budget in the POM provides stability and predictability for AR Soldiers and enhances the AR's ability to support operational missions on a consistent projected schedule. Also important, stability and predictability supports Soldiers because it enables them to establish a balance between their civilian employers and their families along with their military service.

The fourth recommendation is for the U.S. Army Reserve Command's (USARC) Deputy Commanding General for Operations to establish a TSC staff section and a DSCA staff section. The DSCA staff section could focus on civil support missions in the U.S. and the TSC staff section would focus on supporting Combatant Commanders' theater engagement requirements overseas. These new sections would serve as the

primary focal entry point for AR TSC and DSCA requirements. This new directorate could also provide an operational reserve organization responsible for planning, integrating, and executing AR capabilities alongside the TSC and DSCA missions. Creating new structure would require AR policy and mission changes to align with Combatant Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and the DSCA requirements.⁴⁶ In the future, the USARC should consider creating a TSC and a DSCA individual skills identifier to better facilitate the recruitment, training, and assignment of Soldiers with appropriate skillsets to perform these specific missions. While further analysis is needed to determine the skills, competencies, and knowledge a TSC Specialist and a DSCA Specialist would require to perform their duties successfully, establishing individual skills identifiers would be logical since requirements for AR forces to support TSC and DSCA missions will continue in the future.

To make this recommendation a reality, the USARC Deputy Commanding General (Operations) should engage Combatant Commanders during their annual Security Cooperation Conference and should integrate the AR as a key stakeholder. The Conference is a strategic venue that provides AR leaders with a platform to articulate the AR's capabilities and timelines to enhance the Combatant Commanders' TSCP. The AR could also use a different approach. The CAR could request the Combatant Command Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) attend the AR Theater Security Cooperation Capabilities Summit to discuss AR competencies that can enhance Combatant Commands' TSCPs. The ASCCs are supportive partners for the AR because they are the entry point for the Combatant Commands' Army TSC requirements. The CAR should participate in these meetings and summits to address

AR requirements as well as lead the initial meetings to emphasize strategic command importance. As a result, the AR could lead these annual summits as a force provider for future TSC strategies.

At the same time, the AR could serve as an adaptive requirements-based force pool that provides the Combatant Commands with appropriate capabilities to accomplish their missions. If the Combatant Commands request a capability that is not in an AR ready support package, the AR should have the ability to build and tailor a new support package within 180 days. As a critical part of the Total Army, the AR should not lack support capabilities. The USARC Deputy Commanding General (Operations) should also be authorized to develop, coordinate, task, and execute Theater Support Packages with the AR's Functional and Operational Commands. Knowing Combatant Commands' mission requirements a year or more in advance of deployment enables the AR to establish stability of support by increasing the predictability of Soldiers and assets required to conduct theater missions. Adding consistency to mission requirements also enhances the Soldiers morale by providing them flexibility to plan activities earlier with their families and civilian employment. Predictability should also help AR Soldiers and their families as well as their employers better prepare for these future missions.

Conclusion

This paper's supporting research addressed four issues for Congressional, DOD, and Army leaders to consider as the AR continues to transform into the operational force into the 21st century. It recommended DOD and Army take the following actions to capitalize on the progress made by AR Soldiers over the last decade. These include

working to change Title 10 to authorize the AR to perform DSCA missions, allowing the President, DOD, and Army senior leaders quick access to AR personnel and assets, funding the AR in DOD's base budget to properly execute missions and allowing the USARC Deputy Commanding General (Operations) to add TSC and DSCA staff sections to facilitate the support of Combatant Command requirements.

This paper also addressed requirements to transform the AR into the operational force and identified TSC and DSCA as suitable AR roles. It then concluded with four recommendations for completing the AR's transition to part of the operational force. The AR cannot simply advocate changing from a strategic reserve force to being part of an operational force and expect the concept to succeed. To fully integrate the AR into the operational force, Congress must change Title 10, DOD and the Army must initiate policy changes, DOD's base budget must fund the new requirements, and USARC Deputy Commanding General (Operations) must establish TSC and DSCA staff sections. If the Army attempts to transition the AR to become part of the operational force without Congressional support for legislative changes, support for DOD policy changes, or without appropriate funding, the transition will not succeed. Also, this evolution should be seamlessly implemented since over 15,584 AR Soldiers are participating in operational missions in 22 countries around the world while supporting two major hostile operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁷

Transitioning the AR to part of the operational force will better position the Army to manage the risks of declining resources and adapt to ever-changing missions. Indications are the AR should not return to a strategic force conducting Cold War era missions because today's Soldiers would not support a return to the past and depart.⁴⁸

The AR can assuredly succeed in TSC and DSCA missions when provided the opportunity to excel, the authority to conduct the missions, and the funding to execute the missions.

The Total Army should be trained, resourced, adaptive, and capable of meeting the nation's security needs while using AR Soldiers in the most efficient means possible. Today's AR Soldiers joined to be part of the Army's operational force, to deploy in support of the nation's defense at home and in foreign countries. The Army's future relies on using these highly experienced Soldiers in operational missions.⁴⁹ Over the last decade, the AC increasingly relied on the AR for routine and contingency missions and this reliance will likely continue in the future. Transitioning the AR to become part of the operational force is the right strategy for meeting future military requirements.

Endnotes

¹ Real Clear Politics Home Page, April 16, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Speaks to the Army War College, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/04/16/secretary_gates_speaks_to_the_army_war_college_96041.html. (accessed 25 September 2010).

² DOD Directive 1200.17 defines Reserve Components (RC) of the armed forces as: (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, (2) The Army Reserve, (3) The Navy Reserve, (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, (5) The Air National Guard of the United States, (6) The Air Force Reserve, and (7) The Coast Guard Reserve. U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 29, 2008) 1.

³ The Army RC is comprised of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve (AR). This paper's main emphasis will be on the AR.

⁴ The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991) was a war waged by a U.N.-authorized coalition force from thirty-four nations led by the United States, to liberate Kuwait from Iraq's invasion.

⁵ Contingency Tracking System (CTS) Daily Processing Files Produced by the Defense Manpower Data Center, 15 March 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110315ngr.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2011).

⁶ Michelle Tan, "Logistics command will be first in Afghanistan," 2 February 2009, linked from the United States Army Times Home Page, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/army_143deployment_020209/ (accessed 10 March 2011).

⁷ First Army Division East trains, provides readiness oversight, and validates mobilized Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers for combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, the Sinai Peninsula, Guantanamo Bay, and Kosovo. MG James Rogers and retired MG Robert Shadley, (2009, January), 143rd ESC Mobilization Readiness Exercise out brief, Fort Bragg, NC.

⁸ Defense Manpower Data Center, Data, Analysis and Programs Division, 28 March 2011, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/gwot_component.pdf (accessed 29 March 2011).

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 29, 2008) 1.

¹⁰ A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. The following are Combatant Commands; United States Africa Command (Geographic), United States Central Command (Geographic), United States European Command (Geographic), United States Northern Command (Geographic), United States Pacific Command (Geographic), United States Southern Command (Geographic), United States Special Operations Command (Functional), United States Strategic Command (Functional), and United States Transportation Command (Functional). Joint Publications 1-2, 8 November 2011, p. 60.

¹¹ GEN (R) Dennis J. Reimer, LTG (R) Roger C. Schultz, and LTG (R) James R. Helmly, *The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, (2 November 2010), 2.

¹² Sergeant First Class Michael J. Carden, "Army Reserve postures for 'uncertain' future," September 14, 2010, linked from *The United States Army Home Page* at <http://www.army.mil/news/2010/09/14/45181-army-reserve-postures-for-uncertain-future/> (accessed October 4, 2010).

¹³ The U.S. Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, "*An Enduring Operational Army Reserve is a Positive Investment for America*", (March 2011), 27.

¹⁴ Michael Hoffman, "Officials seek to keep operational Reserve," November 17, 2010 linked from the United States Army Times Home Page, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/11/army-officials-seek-to-keep-operational-reserve-111710w/> (accessed October 13, 2010).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010, 53.

¹⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force, (January 31, 2008), 11.

¹⁸ Joint Publication 5-0, 26 December 2006, p. I-3.

¹⁹ The U.S. Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, *"An Enduring Operational Army Reserve is a Positive Investment for America"*. (March 2011), ii.

²⁰ Sgt. 1st Class Michael J. Carden, "Army Reserve postures for 'uncertain' future," September 14, 2010 linked from the United States Army Times Home Page, <http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/09/14/45181-army-reserve-postures-for-uncertain-future/> (accessed October 13, 2010).

²¹ Michael Hoffman, "Officials seek to keep operational Reserve," November 17, 2010 linked from the United States Army Times, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/11/army-officials-seek-to-keep-operational-reserve-111710w/> (accessed October 13, 2010).

²² Battle Assembly is the term used by the United States Army Reserve to describe drills, where soldiers practice their military skills and maintain individual and unit readiness in case of mobilization and deployment. These activities used to be referred to simply as "drill" or "weekend drill" but according to former Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, the term was changed in 2005 to emphasize the need for Army Reserve soldiers' training to focus on continued preparations for fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Rob Schuette, Triad Staff, "Battle assembly, Army Reserve Expeditionary Force new terms," May 13, 2005 linked from the Triad Online Home Page, <http://www.mccoy.army.mil/ReadingRoom/Triad/05132005/Battleassembly.htm> (accessed 24 February 2011).

²³ Master Sgt. Paul Mouilleseaux, National Guard Bureau Video (AUSA Annual Meeting, National Guard and Reserve Breakfast, 25 October 2010), General William "Kip" E. Ward, Commander United States Africa Command speaks to the National Guard Reserve about their role in AFRICOM, <http://www.dvidshub.net/tags/video/william-kip-e-ward>.

²⁴ U.S. Federal military forces is defined as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force personnel (including Reserve Component personnel) on Federal active duty and National Guard personnel when under Federal command and control. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA), Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 December 2010) 16.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA), Department of Defense Directive 3025.18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 29 December 2010) 16.

²⁶ The 2011 Army Posture Statement, 21 March 2011, https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/information_papers/PostedDocument.asp?id=267 (accessed 30 March 2011).

²⁷ Persistent conflict has characterized the environment in which the Army has operated over the last nine and a half years. This protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors, using violence to further their ideological and political goals, will likely continue well into the second decade of the 21st Century. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous. Conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope and will be less susceptible to traditional means of conflict resolution. The 2011 Army Posture Statement, 21 March 2011, https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/aps_pages/strategic_context.asp#persistentconflict (accessed 30 March 2011).

²⁸ United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle E, Part II, Chapter 1209, Section 12304, Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency. No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b), to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.

²⁹ Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00012304----000-.html (accessed 28 March 2011).

³⁰ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Readiness Subcommittee hearing on Budget Request for Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air National Guard Training and Operations: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 27, 2010, 20.

³¹ GEN (R) Dennis J. Reimer, LTG (R) Roger C. Schultz, and LTG (R) James R. Helmly, *The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, (2 November 2010), 28.

³² *Ibid.*, 34.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ John Nagl and Travis Sharp, *—An Indispensable Force, Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves,*” Center for a New American Security (September 2010) 20.

³⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*, (January 31, 2008), 35.

³⁶ Colonel Thomas J. Vaccaro personal interview with LTG Jack C. Stultz, Chief of Army Reserves and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 17 February 2011.

³⁷ Government Accountability Office, *Reserve Forces: Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force*, (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2009), 35.

³⁸ The Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN), is a training and deployment cycle model which bring more predictable deployment schedules for Army Reservists, their employers and their families. ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units. ARFORGEN ensures there's always a pool of trained, equipped and deployment-ready troops. The AR is on a 1:5 year rotation cycle. Within ARFORGEN Train/Ready and Available force pools, the Army organizes units into multi-component Expeditionary Force Packages, providing a reliable supply of units based on known, validated mission requirements (including routine and predictable missions). The U.S. Army Reserve Vision and Strategy 2020, *–An Operational Force Providing Strategic Depth in an Era of Persistent Conflict*”, (2 February 2011), 8.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Speech, Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, The Pentagon, Thursday, January 06, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1527> (accessed October 13, 2010).

⁴⁰ Donna Miles, *The United States Department of Defense, Operational Reserve Makes Business Sense*, October 20, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=61342> (accessed October 13, 2010).

⁴¹ Michael Hoffman, *–Officials seek to keep operational Reserve,*” November 17, 2010 linked from the United States Army Times Home Page <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/11/army-officials-seek-to-keep-operational-reserve-111710w/> (accessed October 13, 2010).

⁴² The Army Budget, An Analysis, *Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare Fiscal Year 2011*, Arlington, VA., Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, 2010, 87.

⁴³ John Nagl and Travis Sharp, *An Indispensable Force, Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves*, Center for a New American Security (September 2010) 20.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Campaign Plan 2011*, (04 Feb 2011), Annex H-6.

⁴⁵ The U.S. Army Reserve Vision and Strategy 2020, *–An Operational Force Providing Strategic Depth in an Era of Persistent Conflict*”, (2 February 2011), 16.

⁴⁶ TSCP is the means of using the U.S. military in an overall diplomatic engagement strategy –designed to support the U.S. defense strategy, advance regional defense policy goals, and in the immediate term, enable the war on global terrorism. Norman M. Wade, ed., *The Joint Force & Operational Warfighting SMARTbook: Guide to Joint Doctrine, Operational Warfare & Theater/Campaign Planning* (FL: The Lightning Press, 2003), 4.

⁴⁷ The U.S. Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement, *“An Enduring Operational Army Reserve is a Positive Investment for America”*. (March 2011), iv.

⁴⁸ Michael Hoffman, "Officials seek to keep operational Reserve," November 17, 2010 linked from the United States Army Times Home Page. <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/11/army-officials-seek-to-keep-operational-reserve-111710w/> (accessed October 13, 2010).

⁴⁹ The U.S. Army Reserve Vision and Strategy 2020, *An Operational Force providing strategic depth in an era of persistent conflict*, (2 February 2011), 27.

