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The virtual desktop

Options and challenges in selecting a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization

Sébastien Durand and William Pase

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Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa

Contract Report
DRDC Ottawa CR 2011-135
October 2011

Canada

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Options and challenges in selecting a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization

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Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa

Contract Report
DRDC Ottawa CR 2011-135
October 2011

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Abstract

Desktop virtualization technology can help to address the requirements for secure information sharing within DND. This report provides guidance for the selection and implementation of a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization. It includes an overview of desktop virtualization, including an in-depth examination of two alternative architectures: Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) and Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD). SBVD places the user's desktop environment in the data centre, whereas LHVD places it on the endpoint itself. Desktop virtualization implementation considerations and potential security concerns are discussed, and an outline of some of the current state-of-the-art virtualization products is also provided.

Résumé

La technologie de virtualisation du poste de travail peut contribuer à combler les besoins de partage de l'information sécuritaire au sein du MDN. Le présent rapport donne les directives à suivre pour la sélection et la mise en œuvre d'une infrastructure de poste de travail sécurisée, basée sur la virtualisation. Il englobe un aperçu de la virtualisation d'un poste de travail, y compris un examen approfondi de deux architectures différentes : le poste de travail virtuel sur serveur local (PDVSL) et le poste de travail virtuel basé sur un serveur (PTVBS). Le PTVBS place l'environnement de l'ordinateur d'un utilisateur dans un centre de données, alors que le PDVSL le place sur le terminal lui-même. Le rapport aborde les considérations relatives à la mise en œuvre de la virtualisation du poste de travail ainsi que les préoccupations de sécurité potentielles, et il donne un résumé de certains des produits actuels de virtualisation à la fine pointe de la technologie.

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Executive summary

DND Virtual Desktop

Sébastien Durand; William Pase; DRDC Ottawa CR 2011-135 Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa; October 2011.

Currently, the Department of National Defence (DND) lacks the ability to implement Multi-Level Security (MLS) and Multi-Caveat Separation (MCS) for securely handling and exchanging electronic information at multiple caveats and security levels. Furthermore, it is currently not possible to exchange relevant data between DND organizations and select Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) partners in a seamless, automated manner. As a result, there exists a serious shortfall in the ability to ensure that decision makers at all levels have access to a Command and Control (C2) system that fully characterizes the battle space by exploiting all information sources, enabling information superiority and effective command and control.

In order to rectify the information sharing deficiencies identified, DND is looking to deliver a capability that allows users to securely access, share, simultaneously view, and process data/information across security classifications from a single user interface. In order to achieve this capability, DND would need to leverage desktop virtualization technology. This report provides guidance for the selection and implementation of a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization. The focus and motivation throughout the report is the DND use case for a desktop computer, namely:

A DND user wishes to access Secret material while concurrently conducting normal (unclassified) business on his desktop computer. The use case includes two different working environments on the desktop computer:

1. A Secret environment that is securely isolated from other users, unclassified data, and insecure applications and/or resources; and
2. A traditional desktop computing environment running typical applications such as email, chat, web browsing, etc.

Any virtualization solution developed for this environment will require that separation be maintained between the two environments to avoid unauthorized data leakage, while simultaneously providing a rich and familiar user experience.

This report includes an overview of desktop virtualization, including an in-depth examination of two alternative architectures: Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) and Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD). SBVD places the user's desktop environment in the data centre, whereas LHVD places it on the endpoint itself.

The presentation of desktop virtualization in this report is divided into the following main topics:

- Desktop Virtualization: examines a number of concepts of importance to desktop virtualization, including benefits and security concerns, and introduces the LHVD and SBVD architecture options;
- Local Host Virtual Desktop: describes LHVD and examines options, secure implementation, management, benefits, and issues;

- Server-Based Virtual Desktop: describes SBVD and examines options, secure implementation, management, benefits, and issues;
- Considerations: addresses other desktop virtualization considerations including data centres, bandwidth, and non-technical considerations; and
- Virtualization Products: discusses some of the current state-of-the-art virtualization products available.

While both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, SBVD demonstrates some distinct benefits over LHVD. For example, SBVD environments are easier to update and provision since they run in the data centre. Furthermore, desktop environments of different security levels can be hosted on physically distinct hardware (within the data centre), while still accommodating a single endpoint for access to those environments. On the other hand, LHVD may provide a more suitable solution for users with insufficient or unreliable network communication infrastructure.

Since specific DND requirements were not available, it is not possible to provide detailed recommendations for the selection and implementation of a desktop virtualization solution. However, desktop virtualization technology can clearly help to address the needs for secure information sharing within DND.

Sommaire

DND Virtual Desktop

Sébastien Durand; William Pase; DRDC Ottawa CR 2011-135 R & D pour la défense Canada – Ottawa; octobre 2011.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) n'a pas la capacité de mettre en œuvre un système à sécurité multiniveau et à séparation par multiples restrictions pour le traitement et l'échange sécuritaires de renseignements électroniques à de multiples niveaux de restrictions et de sécurité. En outre, il est actuellement impossible d'échanger des données pertinentes entre les organisations du MDN et différents partenaires IIMP (interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public) d'une façon transparente et automatisée. Ainsi, la capacité de veiller à ce que les décideurs à tous les niveaux aient accès à un système de commandement et de contrôle (C2) qui soit vraiment caractéristique de l'espace de combat fait cruellement défaut. En exploitant toutes les sources d'information, ce système octroie la supériorité de l'information et permet d'exercer un commandement et un contrôle efficaces.

Afin de remédier à ces lacunes en matière d'échange de renseignements, le MDN envisage de produire une capacité permettant aux utilisateurs de consulter, d'échanger, d'afficher simultanément et de traiter des données/informations de diverses classifications de sécurité à partir d'une interface utilisateur unique. À cet effet, le MDN aurait besoin de miser sur la technologie de virtualisation du poste de travail. Le présent rapport donne les directives à suivre pour la sélection et la mise en œuvre d'une infrastructure de poste de travail sécurisée, basée sur la virtualisation. Le rapport porte entièrement sur le cas d'utilisation du MDN pour un ordinateur de bureau, conformément à ce qui suit :

Un utilisateur du MDN a besoin d'accéder à du matériel Secret tout en menant parallèlement des activités normales (sans classification) sur son ordinateur de bureau. Le cas d'utilisation comprend deux environnements distincts de travail sur l'ordinateur de bureau :

1. Un environnement Secret qui est isolé de façon sécuritaire des autres utilisateurs, des données non classifiées et des applications et/ou des ressources non sécuritaires;
2. Un environnement informatique traditionnel avec un ordinateur de bureau utilisant des applications typiques telles que le courrier électronique, le clavardage, la navigation Internet, etc.

Toute solution de virtualisation développée pour cet environnement nécessitera que l'on maintienne cette séparation entre les deux environnements afin d'éviter des fuites de données non autorisées, tout en permettant simultanément à l'utilisateur d'avoir une expérience riche et familière.

Le rapport englobe un aperçu de la virtualisation d'un poste de travail, y compris un examen approfondi de deux architectures différentes : le poste de travail virtuel sur serveur local (PTVSL) et le poste de travail virtuel basé sur un serveur (PTVBS). Le PTVBS place l'environnement de l'ordinateur d'un utilisateur dans un centre de données, alors que le PTVSL le place sur le terminal lui-même.

Dans ce rapport, la présentation de la virtualisation du poste de travail porte sur les principaux thèmes suivants :

- Virtualisation du poste de travail : cette section examine un certain nombre de concepts importants pour la virtualisation du poste de travail, y compris les avantages et les préoccupations en matière de sécurité, et elle présente les options d'architecture à PTVSL et à PTVBS;
- Poste de travail virtuel sur le serveur local : cette section décrit le PTVSL et examine les options, la mise en œuvre sécuritaire, la gestion des avantages et les problèmes connexes;
- Poste de travail virtuel basé sur un serveur : cette section décrit le PTVBS et examine les options, la mise en œuvre sécuritaire, la gestion des avantages et les problèmes connexes;
- Considérations : cette section traite d'autres considérations relatives à la virtualisation du poste de travail, y compris les centres de données, la bande passante et des considérations non techniques;
- Produits de virtualisation : cette section passe en revue certains des produits actuels de virtualisation à la fine pointe de la technologie.

Bien que les deux solutions aient chacun des avantages et des désavantages, le PTVBS présente des avantages particuliers par rapport au PTVSL. Ainsi, les environnements du PTVBS sont plus faciles à mettre à jour et à entretenir, car ils sont exécutés dans le centre de données. De plus, les environnements du poste de travail de niveaux de sécurité différents peuvent être situés sur des matériels différents (dans le centre de données), tout en prenant en charge un terminal unique pour l'accès à ces environnements. Par ailleurs, le PTVSL peut offrir une solution plus appropriée pour les utilisateurs ayant une infrastructure de mise en réseau et de communication insuffisante ou non fiable.

Étant donné que les exigences particulières du MDN n'étaient pas disponibles, il n'est pas possible de formuler des recommandations détaillées pour la sélection et la mise en œuvre d'une solution de virtualisation du poste de travail. Cependant, il est clair que la technologie de virtualisation du poste de travail peut contribuer à combler les besoins de partage de l'information sécuritaire au sein du MDN.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background¹

Currently, the Department of National Defence (DND) lacks the ability to implement Multi-Level Security (MLS) (UNCLASSIFIED to TOP SECRET) and Multi-Caveat Separation (MCS) (e.g., CEO, CANUS, CANUKUS, CANAUSUKUS et al.) for securely handling and exchanging electronic information at multiple caveats and security levels. Furthermore, it is currently not possible to exchange relevant data between DND organizations and select Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) partners in a seamless, automated manner, apart from very basic classified email with attachment capability. As a result, there exists a serious shortfall in the ability to ensure that decision makers at all levels have access to a Command and Control (C2) system that fully characterizes the battle space by exploiting all information sources, enabling information superiority and effective command and control over assigned forces.

In order to rectify the information sharing deficiencies identified, DND is looking to deliver a capability that allows users to access, share, simultaneously view, and process data/information across security classifications from a single user interface using a single logon. In order to achieve this capability, DND will need to leverage desktop virtualization.

1.2 Purpose

The report will provide guidance for the implementation of a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization. The report will include an overview of desktop virtualization, including an in-depth examination of two alternative architectures: Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) and Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD). A brief discussion of some of the current state-of-the-art virtualization products will also be provided.

1.3 Assumptions

This report assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of virtualization.

1.4 Document Structure

This document consists of the following sections:

- Section 1 – Introduction: provides a general introduction to the document;
- Section 2 – Desktop Virtualization: examines a number of concepts of importance to desktop virtualization;
- Section 3 – Local Host Virtual Desktop: introduces LHVD and examines options, secure implementation, management, benefits, and issues;
- Section 4 – Server-Based Virtual Desktop: introduces SBVD and examines options, secure implementation, management, benefits, and issues;

¹ Some of the information in this section was taken directly from the *XENA Project Request for Information* [Reference 1].

- Section 5 – Considerations: addresses other desktop virtualization considerations including data centres, bandwidth and non-technical considerations;
- Section 6 – Virtualization Products: discusses some of the current virtualization products available;
- Section 7 – Conclusions & Recommendations: summarizes the conclusions and assessments derived from the development of this report, and provides a recommended path forward;
- Section 8 – Abbreviations and Acronyms: provides the long form for all of the acronyms used throughout the report; and
- Section 9 – References: identifies the reference material that was used in the development of this report.

2 Desktop Virtualization

This section of the report will examine desktop virtualization, and in particular how it can be utilized to address the use case outlined below. Specifically, this section will address the following aspects of desktop virtualization:

- Virtualization Concepts;
- Virtualization Benefits;
- Security Objectives;
- Security Concerns; and
- Options.

Note – DND Desktop Use Case

In this use case, a DND user wishes to access Secret material while concurrently conducting normal (unclassified) business on his desktop computer. The use case includes two different working environments on the desktop computer:

1. A Secret environment that is securely isolated from other users, unclassified data, and insecure applications and/or resources; and
2. A traditional desktop computing environment running typical applications such as email, chat, web browsing, etc.

Any virtualization solution developed for this environment will require that separation be maintained between the two environments to avoid unauthorized data leakage, while simultaneously providing a rich and familiar user experience.

2.1 Virtualization Concepts

Desktop virtualization, regardless of the type, leverages full virtualization. Full virtualization completely abstracts the guest operating system and applications from the underlying hardware. Neither the guest operating system nor the applications are aware that they are running in a virtualized environment. Full virtualization consists of the following components, which will be discussed in this section of the report:

- Virtual Machine (VM);
- Hypervisor; and
- Virtual Networking.

2.1.1 Virtual Machine

A VM is an instance of an application or operating system (OS) that is created within another environment, and is thereby abstracted from the physical platform on which it is running. Multiple VMs can be used to provide isolated working environments on a desktop computer or a server.

2.1.2 Hypervisor

The hypervisor, also known as the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), is responsible for dynamically sharing system memory and Central Processing Unit (CPU) resources between multiple VMs and their host environment. Access to hardware resources and inter-VM communication is also typically mediated by the hypervisor and/or a privileged virtual domain, depending on the implementation. Hypervisors are typically classified as one of the following:

- Bare-metal Hypervisor - Bare-metal virtualization consists of a hypervisor that is installed and loaded directly on the hardware platform. The hypervisor is then responsible for loading and running guest VMs. Bare-metal virtualization is illustrated in **Figure 1**. The hypervisor provides virtual instances of devices including the CPU and memory, which are mapped to corresponding physical devices. This is illustrated in the diagram by the coloured lines; and
- Hosted Hypervisor - Hosted virtualization, on the other hand, is installed on an OS that itself runs on the physical platform. The platform first loads the OS, then the hypervisor, and finally the VMs. The hypervisor runs as an application inside the OS. The system hardware components are managed by the OS; shown by the coloured lines. Hosted virtualization is illustrated in **Figure 2**.

The differences between the two types have been described in detail in *Virtualization Architectures Research Report* [Reference 2], but there are two important points worth mentioning:

- The use of bare-metal hypervisors requires placing trust in the hypervisor, while the use of hosted virtualization requires that both the host OS and the hypervisor be trusted. In

practice, this implies that the potential attack surface of a bare-metal system is smaller than that of a hosted solution; and

- Until recently, the majority of virtualized servers used bare-metal hypervisors, while desktops relied on hosted virtualization. Only within the last year or so have client bare-metal hypervisors been released as commercial products.




Figure 1: Bare-metal virtualization




Figure 2: Hosted virtualization

2.1.3 Virtual Networking

Virtualization software will create a virtual bridge between the physical Ethernet adapter and a virtual switch to provide network access for the virtual guest. A virtual switch will act as a physical switch by allowing the virtual guest's virtual adapter to connect itself on an available virtual port. Typically, three network configurations are available for providing virtual guest network access. These configurations are as follows, and are illustrated in **Figure 3**:

- Bridge Networking;
- Network Address Translation (NAT) Networking; and
- Host-only Networking.




Figure 3: Types of virtual networking

2.1.3.1 Bridge Networking

Bridged networking connects a VM to a network by using the host computer's network adapter. This is often the easiest way to provide a VM with network access if the host computer is already connected to a network. The virtual network adapter in the VM connects to the physical network adapter in the host computer, allowing it to connect to the host computer network. The VM has its own Internet Protocol (IP) address on the network and therefore appears as any other computer on the network.

2.1.3.2 NAT Networking

NAT (Network Address Translation) configures a VM to share the IP and Media Access Control (MAC) addresses of the host. The VM and the host share a single network identity that is not visible outside the network. NAT uses the host computer's network connection to give the VM access to the Internet or another Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/IP network. The VM appears to be connected behind a router supplying NAT; it has access to the network, but is protected from access by other systems.

With NAT networking, all of the virtual guest network traffic passes through the host network layer. In this configuration, the security software installed on the host OS can be used to monitor and block the virtual guest traffic.

2.1.3.3 Host-only Networking

Host-only networking creates a network that is completely contained within the host computer. Host-only networking provides a network connection between the VM and the host computer, using a virtual network adapter that is visible only to the host operating system. This approach can be useful for establishing an isolated virtual network. A VM with host-only networking can access the host and possibly others guests, but has no direct access to the network, nor can it be accessed directly from other systems on the external network.

A host-only network creates an isolated network connection between the host machine and the virtual instances. On the host OS, packet leakage can be avoided by enabling packet filtering and specifying that host-only network packets should not be sent outside the host computer, which ensures no IP packets sent from a VM leak onto the physical network. On the virtual guest operating system, packet leakage can occur only if packet forwarding is enabled. A policy or a start-up script must be configured to disable and lock packet forwarding services.

2.2 Virtualization Benefits

Given the size of the virtualization market, and the rate at which the market continues to increase, there are obvious benefits to the use of virtualization. This section outlines some of these benefits, with particular emphasis on those relevant to desktop virtualization. Specifically, the benefits of desktop virtualization include the following:

- **Desktop Consolidation** – In a traditional system-high environment, a separate physical desktop system is required for accessing each security domain. Consequently, a user with access to multiple security domains must have an equivalent number of systems with which to access these domains. While some savings can be accrued by sharing a single keyboard, monitor and mouse amongst these systems, separate physical desktop systems are still required. Desktop virtualization provides an opportunity to consolidate these systems on a single physical desktop system that can be used to access multiple security domains. Obviously, consolidation will result in significant savings in terms of space, energy consumption and capital costs;
- **Increased Mobility** – Desktop virtualization facilitates the ease with which users can access their workspace from different locations within the organization. This is due to the fact that the user's workspace is encapsulated in a VM that can be carried on a portable media device, executed remotely, or even transferred over the network;
- **Security²** - Virtualization allows disparate systems to run on the same platform without fear that one VM will detrimentally affect the operation of the other VMs. This ability to effectively isolate VMs can allow for the deployment of VMs of different security levels on a single hardware platform. Virtualization has the potential to improve the security of an endpoint in the following ways:
 - ♦ By providing separation between multiple VMs used for trusted versus untrusted applications, or for business versus personal tasks;
 - ♦ By enforcing the isolation between information residing in different security or trust domains;
 - ♦ By placing the burden of security on the hypervisor rather than on the (possibly untrusted) guest OS and third-party applications;
 - ♦ By assuming control over network security, disk encryption, and authentication processes, and by handling these according to established security policy, independent of any enforcement that may be provided by the guest OS; and

² It should be noted that virtualization will not improve computer security over and above the physical separation in use today. The goal of desktop virtualization is to provide an acceptable level of separation. This is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3.3.

- ♦ By optionally providing valuable services, such as secure start-up procedures and remote attestation (based on Trusted Computing [Reference 3]), which may not be adequately provided by the guest OS.
- ♦ Furthermore, existing virtualization solutions can provide other security features and benefits, including the following:
 - Secure and controlled distribution of user environments;
 - Limited lifetime of user environments (including forced expiration);
 - Reset and rollback of user environments to pre-established secure states;
 - Strong authentication restrictions;
 - Encryption for VMs and data;
 - Granular access-control policies for devices; and
 - Restrictions on networking access.

Virtualization on the server end also has benefits, whether or not the desktop utilizes any virtualization solution. These additional benefits include:

- High Availability – Minimizes the amount of downtime for the system;
- Load Balancing – Maximises performance by distributing the workload;
- Live Migration – Running VMs can be moved between servers without interruption; and
- VM Snapshots – The state of a VM can be captured or restored rapidly for easy backup and disaster recovery.

2.3 Security Objectives

The ultimate goal for a virtual desktop environment is for the virtualization layer to assume responsibility for client security. The hypervisor becomes the trusted system, and potential vulnerabilities in a guest VM's OS or applications are effectively mitigated so that they cannot affect other guest VMs, the host system, or other machines on the network.

In order to achieve this, the desktop virtualization solution must be capable of addressing a number of security objectives. However, it should be noted that there is a balancing act between security and usability. Locking down a user's desktop working environment to the point where it is unusable is not an effective solution.

This section will examine the following security objectives:

- Security of data at rest and in transit;
- Authentication of both users and devices; and
- Isolation of virtual environments.

2.3.1 Data Security

Sensitive data must be appropriately secured, whether in a traditional environment or in a virtualized environment. This includes maintaining the configuration and integrity of the data. Furthermore, security is applicable to both data at rest and data in transit. Data at rest deals with an endpoint or storage device that contains sensitive data stored locally. There must be assurances that the stored data cannot be compromised if the endpoint were lost, stolen or otherwise compromised. This can be accomplished by encrypting the data or by ensuring its destruction if accessed by a device other than the endpoint, or by an unauthorized user. Data in transit deals with data that is being transmitted to or from the endpoint. The concern here is that an attacker may attempt to intercept this data while it is in transit. Encryption of the communication channel (e.g., using SSL/TLS) can mitigate this threat.

2.3.2 Authentication

Authentication considerations include concern for both authentication of users and for the endpoint itself. User authentication considerations for the virtualized desktop, which are no different than for a standard desktop, include such things as Single Sign-On (SSO), multifactor authentication, etc.

The authenticity and integrity of the endpoint itself is accomplished using attestation over a secure connection protocol. Attestation is provided by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [Reference 3 & 4] which can be used to provide assurance that the endpoint is correctly configured at boot time and at network connection time. Attestation is described in additional detail in *Virtualization Architectures Research Report* [Reference 2].

2.3.3 Isolation

The desktop will be used to access disparate security domains. Consequently, isolation of the respective security domains is critical. Unauthorized data transfer may occur between the security domains if isolation is not sufficient, thereby potentially compromising data (high to low) or introducing malicious code (usually low to high).

The traditional solution for ensuring isolation is to run disparate security domains on separate hardware, thus using physical separation to enforce domain separation. This approach is taken since standard operating systems are considered insufficient to guarantee domain separation in security critical deployments. Virtualization provides an alternative by shifting the problem of domain separation to the hypervisor. It can effectively provide a software alternative to physical separation. In a virtualized environment, multiple domains are contained within their own VM, analogous to containment in separate hardware machines.

This approach makes the assumption that the hypervisor can be trusted to maintain separation. It is worth noting that no software solution, including virtualization, can achieve the guaranteed separation provided by physical isolation. At best it can provide an acceptable level of separation without the high cost and inconvenience of utilizing physically separate systems.

2.4 Security Concerns

There are a number of security concerns that must be considered when contemplating desktop virtualization. These security concerns include the potential exposure of sensitive data due to factors such as:

- Inadequate isolation of user environments;
- Inadequate separation between user data on physical system resources (e.g., network devices or shared storage);
- Bugs or vulnerabilities in the virtualization layer itself, in third-party device drivers, or applications running with system-level privileges;
- Improperly configured, poorly maintained, or compromised endpoints;
- Loss or theft of an endpoint system (desktop or laptop); and
- Failures in networking services to provide adequate security for server-client interactions or remote access.

2.4.1 Inadequate Isolation of Environments

A single endpoint may be used for access to, and the processing of, information from different security domains. The security domains must remain isolated, as it would be a violation of the security policy if this isolation is not appropriately maintained.

Any solution proposed for a DND user endpoint must provide the required isolation of information. Proposal considerations must therefore include what assurances there are that isolation is maintained, and what safeguards are available to detect and report any violations that might occur in spite of the protection provided.

Most desktop virtualization solutions also provide for interaction between the guest VMs and the host OS. Permitting such interaction can undermine the isolation that is otherwise assumed. It is important to ensure the isolation between the host and the guest is properly configured such that any permitted interactions do not violate the intended security policy of the endpoint.

Consequently, features such as shared folders, cut-and-paste, and drag-and-drop functionality between VMs would likely violate the security policy, and as a result will need to be disabled. Alternatively, policy-based controls could be put in place to regulate these features.

As an example, the Qubes operating system [Reference 5] has very recently introduced secure cut-and-paste and drag-and-drop between VMs under user control and discretion. It is likely that similar support for these features under strict policy-based access control of information sharing will be developed in future systems.

2.4.2 Inadequate Separation of Resources

An essential service that hypervisors provide is their ability to share physical system resources between VMs. Risk is incurred due to the fact that user data from the different VMs, each

representing a different security domain, is being transmitted, processed and stored on these shared resources. The hypervisor must be trusted to ensure that this information is effectively isolated.

The resources that are shared between the host and the guest VMs include:

- Storage – The physical hard drive contains the virtual storage that comprises the VMs. The hypervisor has access to the disk and is responsible for restricting each guest to its own virtual disk. Failure to do so means that one guest VM may be able to access another guest VM's virtual disk;
- Random Access Memory (RAM) – The hypervisor allocates RAM to each of the VMs from the available physical memory. Guest VMs should not be able to access another guest VM's memory. Furthermore, there is the potential that memory subsequently released from a VM does not get properly erased (overwritten with random data or zeros), and may contain residual data from another security domain;
- Output devices – Each guest VM is able to send information to various output devices such as a video monitor or printer. VMs must be configured so that they can only access specific output devices. Furthermore, VMs should be prevented from reading any RAM that might be part of the device and has been allocated to another VM. For example, a VM might be able to read video RAM or some printer state information belonging to another VM;
- Input devices – VMs must interact with input devices such as keyboards and mice. It is important that input be directed to the correct VM, and that input information from one VM is not accessible by another VM;
- Network devices – The network connections available to the host OS may be shared with the guest VMs. Guests must be strictly limited to the networking they are permitted according to the security policy of the endpoint, and there must not be any interaction between VMs via the network device. This includes the ability to access a shared state, which could be used for the transfer of information between VMs; and
- Removable devices – Removable devices, including Universal Serial Bus (USB) devices and Compact Disc Read Only Memory (CDROMs), may be shared between VMs. As with other shared resources, it is essential that there is no information leakage between VMs resulting from the use of removable devices.

2.4.3 Bugs or Vulnerabilities

The security of the endpoint can be undermined by bugs or vulnerabilities in the virtualization layer. Since the hypervisor is being trusted to maintain isolation, such bugs can be disastrous. A second issue is the use of third-party device drivers or applications running with system-level privileges. The use of such software, in so far as it may also have bugs or vulnerabilities, adds a potential attack vector to the overall solution.

2.4.4 Improper Configuration of Endpoints

Improperly configured, poorly maintained, or compromised endpoints all violate the security policy and can result in the compromise of sensitive data. Fortunately, this problem can be addressed in much the same way as for traditional environments. This includes the following:

- Configuration – VMs can be centrally built as standard images prior to deployment to the endpoint. Different images can be built to address disparate use cases, ensuring that each user receives only the capabilities and features they require;
- Maintenance – Similarly, VMs can be centrally maintained and updated. Whenever a virtual image is updated, it can be deployed to all of the users of that image; and
- Protection – VMs need the same protection as non-virtualized images. Consequently, firewalls and virus scanners must be included in the design.

2.4.5 Loss or Theft of the Endpoint

Loss or theft of an endpoint system is a very real risk, especially when the endpoint is a laptop or other mobile device. Any data stored on the device may be accessed, and if not adequately protected, can potentially be compromised. Furthermore, a device with network access adds a potential risk to data stored on the network. These types of threats are generally dealt with through the use of authentication, access control, and encryption.

2.4.6 Failures in Network Security

The endpoint is a networked device, and as such network security must also be addressed. Since the endpoint will be communicating with servers via the network, data in transit must be adequately protected to avoid data compromise or leakage between security domains. Similarly, VMs may be deployed and maintained via the network, and so these communications are also potentially vulnerable. These types of threats can be addressed through authentication and encryption of network traffic. Furthermore, the compromise of endpoints may be mitigated through the use of security safeguards such as virus scanners and system integrity tools.

2.5 Options

The purpose of a virtualized DND endpoint solution is to address the use case outlined in Section 2.0. In addition, the solution must satisfy the security objectives discussed in Section 2.3 while mitigating the security concerns highlighted in Section 2.4.

There are two possible approaches to desktop virtualization: Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) and Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD). These will be discussed in detail in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.

3 Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD)

LHVD provides desktop virtualization using full virtualization on the desktop system. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, this can be provided using a bare-metal hypervisor or a hosted hypervisor. These two approaches are illustrated in **Figure 1 & 2**, respectively.

This section will examine the following aspects of LHVD:

- Options;
- Secure Implementation;
- Management;
- Benefits;
- Issues; and
- Assessment.

3.1 Options

There are a number of ways in which LHVD can be used to address the use case outlined in Section 2:

- Option 1: Client Bare-metal Hypervisor hosting two VMs – In this approach, a bare-metal hypervisor hosts two VMs, one for each security domain. The bare-metal hypervisor is responsible for ensuring the appropriate level of separation/isolation between the two VMs;
- Option 2: Client Operating System with Hypervisor hosting two VMs – This approach is identical to Option 1 except that the bare-metal hypervisor has been replaced with a hosted hypervisor. While the security of the virtualization layer may be somewhat reduced, the usability of the overall solution is likely to be enhanced; and
- Option 3: Secret Client Operating System with Hypervisor hosting one VM (Unclassified) – This approach is similar to Option 2 in that it leverages hosted virtualization. However, in this case the host operating system is the Secret environment and the Unclassified environment is hosted in a VM. The hypervisor application is responsible for providing an appropriate level of separation/isolation between the VM and the host operating system.

Note – Unclassified Client Operating System with Hypervisor hosting one VM (Secret)

This is not a viable option due to the fact that the hypervisor hosted in the unclassified environment would have complete access to the Secret environment hosted in the VM. This could potentially result in unauthorized information flow from the high (Secret) to the low (Unclassified) security domain.

3.2 Secure Implementation

Depending on the LHVD option selected, a number of additional steps can be taken to secure the implementation. These include the following:

- Bare-metal Virtualization;
- Virtual Image Protection;
- Locked Full Screen Mode;
- Network Restrictions;
- Policy Restrictions; and
- Secure Network Configuration.

3.2.1 Bare-metal Virtualization

Bare-metal hypervisors have been around for a number of years in the server environment. However, client-side bare-metal hypervisors have only recently made an appearance due to the challenges faced in developing them. The client environment is considered more challenging due to the number and variety of components with which the hypervisor must interact, such as networking components, graphics hardware, peripherals, etc. While the use of a bare-metal hypervisor for LHVD is desirable in order to improve the overall security of the solution, DND must ensure that the usability of the solution is not detrimentally affected.

3.2.2 Virtual Image Protection

Virtual images are susceptible to compromise when being transported (e.g., a lost portable media device) or even at rest (e.g., a stolen laptop). However, a number of steps can be taken to secure the image. These include the following:

- Strong Authentication – The virtual image should require a strongly authenticated user to activate it, thus preventing it from being activated by just anyone. The authentication process can be a simple password required at the instance launch, or a stronger method such as an Active Directory authentication;
- Activation Protection – A script facility incorporated into the virtualization software package can help to increase the security around the virtual instance activation. The activation of the instance can then be dependent on the success of the script. For example, a script can check some parameters on the host system before allowing virtual image activation. The script can perform a simple check on some system variables or associate a virtual instance with a host device by checking the Ethernet MAC address and the processor Universally Unique Identifier (UUID);
- Full Encryption – To prevent tampering, it is desirable to encrypt the entire distribution package including the configuration and policy file. By encrypting the configuration, the policy file, and the virtual drive, the policy files and the configuration files cannot be tampered with and the virtual disk file cannot be associated with another configuration or policy file; and

- Integrity Checking – All the resource files included and deployed by the distribution package should be digitally signed in order to prevent file tampering. The virtualization software must provide signature checking at each virtual guest start-up and must block the activation process if a file does not present a valid signature.

3.2.3 Locked Full Screen Mode

Locked full-screen mode should be used to protect information and applications running in guest VMs; this is accomplished by locking access to the host OS when a guest VM is activated. If more than one virtual instance runs simultaneously, a switch mechanism (generally a hot-key) must be provided to the users so that they can effectively switch between VMs. This technique can be used to protect sensitive data present on the virtual guest from features such as print screen, screen capture tools, and screen recording software running on the host or another guest VM.

3.2.4 Network Restrictions

When the host connects to a network, a policy is checked to confirm that the host is allowed to connect. If the connection is permitted, the policy then applies a set of prescribed access rules for the connection. These rules determine what access is permitted by the host and VMs. For example, if an endpoint is connected to a Secret network, the network policy may permit the host to connect, and it may permit a Secret guest VM to connect, but it will not permit an Unclassified guest VM to connect.

3.2.5 Policy Restrictions

The policy setting must allow granular restrictions on the virtual image. It is important to have the ability to restrict not only the connecting devices but the types of devices as well. For example, while a USB smart card reader may be permitted, USB storage devices may be blocked. The policy must be sufficiently flexible to provide rules based on specific models of devices. Details of the policy restrictions that can be placed on virtual images are product specific. As an example, the policies provided by Virtual Computer's NxTop product [Section 6.1.5] are fairly typical:

- Expiration – An image can be set to expire so it can no longer be used;
- USB filter – Allows limiting the use of USB devices with the virtual image;
- Backup – Defines the backup policy, i.e. the frequency and retention;
- Lockout – Defines how often an image must contact the server before it is disabled;
- OS profile – Sets rules for the image for various OS and application settings; and
- Engine – Configuration settings for the hypervisor on the client machine.

Policies are defined by an administrator using an application for that purpose, i.e., NxTop Center. The user of the image has limited control over the virtual image, as defined by the policy. Additional restrictions may be imposed besides the policy restrictions defined on the virtual

image. For example, the user may or may not have administrator rights to the image (as defined by the OS), or may have limited network access (as defined by firewalls).

When an image is restricted to specific work related tasks, it may still be desirable to provide access to non-work related tasks; this can be accomplished by providing additional virtual images. For example, there might be separate images for work and non-work, where the former is tightly controlled by policy and the latter gives the user greater control, and the hypervisor would maintain separation between the virtual images. In this scenario, it is as if the user has two separate machines: one for work and one for non-work tasks.

The DND use case [Section 2.0] could be managed similarly, with separate virtual machines for Secret and Unclassified work, where the Secret VM has a more restrictive policy than the Unclassified VM.

3.2.6 Secure Network Configuration

A combination of two virtual guests can be used in order to improve virtual network security. The first virtual guest can be a security appliance (firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), etc.) with two network interfaces. One network interface would be connected to the bridge network, and another one to an isolated virtual switch. The second virtual guest can be set up with only one network interface on the isolated virtual switch.

With this type of configuration, all virtual guest network communications must transit the security appliance. Such a configuration will permit monitoring of network traffic between the virtual guest and the outside network. This configuration also allows all direct network traffic on the host OS to be blocked, and forces the network traffic on the host OS to pass through the security appliance.

Figure 4 shows the interconnection for a security appliance protecting a guest OS in either a bridged network or a NAT network configuration. In the case of a bridged network, the appliance is in direct contact with the network and must provide all of the required protection between the guest and the network.

In the case of a NAT network, the appliance (and thus the guest) is behind a virtual NAT device, which provides isolation from the network. This reduces the requirements on the security appliance since it is no longer in direct contact with the network and is already protected from external threats. There is no restriction on outgoing traffic, however, and the security appliance must still provide such protection as required along with any protection not offered by NAT.




Figure 4: Secure network configuration

3.3 Management

VMs used within LHVD can be managed locally. This approach tends to be cumbersome and places an unrealistic management burden on the organization. Fortunately, some products offer centralized management and deployment tools for local desktop implementation.

Figure 5 illustrates the centralized management and ensuing deployment of virtual images for a LHVD endpoint solution. The images are assembled centrally using base images and are then appropriately secured for distribution. The VM images can be distributed using portable media devices, such as a USB device or a Digital Video Disc (DVD), or via the network.

The centralized management controls the creation and deployment of images. Standard virtual images containing an OS and applications are created, for example for Secret and Unclassified domains. These images can then be deployed or updated at the endpoints, whether by network or USB devices. As new endpoints are required, they can be created from the pool of standard images for rapid deployment.

At a minimum, the package deployment should be protected by a password to prohibit uncontrolled instance installation. Furthermore, the centralized management tool should provide an update feature in order to permit the modification of the policy for all of the instances already deployed. The update management tool must be sufficiently granular to permit the update of a single instance, a pool of instances, or all of the instances.

It is important to have the option of setting a lifetime for the distribution package and for the virtual instance deployed on a host device. The distribution package must expire after a defined time in order to prevent an old package deployment. If a user tries to deploy a previous version of

a virtual instance with an old base image, the expiration date will block the attempt and will ensure that only the more recent virtual image with all of the latest security updates is deployed. In addition, the virtual image must have the ability to expire after a number of days or on a specific date. This allows virtual image distribution to temporary users and ensures that the virtual image is not available after the authorized period of time has elapsed.




Figure 5: Virtual image management and deployment

3.4 Benefits

There are a number of benefits to using LHVD for desktop virtualization, including the following:

- **Mobility** – Virtualization fully isolates the virtual instance from the hardware. Consequently, it gives the user considerable flexibility on which devices are used to run the virtual instance without any consideration for the operating system present on the host computer. The virtual desktop can be carried on a portable media device, and will provide users with their own desktop environment from anywhere;

- **Offline Support & Reduced Network Bandwidth Requirements** – One of the major benefits of a local virtual desktop is its capability to run locally, devoid of any network connectivity. This grants the user access to their production desktop environment even when no network access is available, or when the network access available does not satisfy the bandwidth required to work remotely with a centralized solution; and
- **3D Graphic Support** – Virtual desktop solutions are able to provide a 3D graphic experience within the virtual session, just as with a traditional desktop environment.

3.5 Issues

The decision to deploy a LHVD endpoint solution raises a number of issues:

- **Increased Hardware Requirements** – A LHVD endpoint solution has greater hardware requirements than a non-virtualized endpoint. First, the hardware must be sufficiently powerful to deal with the additional overhead of running a guest OS on a hypervisor. Second, the hardware must be supported by the hypervisor software. Traditionally, bare-metal hypervisors have only supported a finite number of hardware platforms;
- **Backup Considerations** – In a LHVD solution, the virtual image typically resides on the user's computer. The same backup strategy and complexity exist in this case as for a traditional desktop environment. Consequently, the backup of this type of data requires sufficient network bandwidth and relatively complex management tools to accomplish;
- **Print Screen and Screen Capture Tools** – To bypass some security restrictions, a user can easily open a sensitive document in the virtual guest, and create a screen capture of the virtual guest window from the host OS. This screen capture can then be saved on the local drive, on a mobile device, or sent by unsecure email, etc.;
- **Security Software** – Security software (including anti-virus) installed on the host OS can only protect the virtualization software, not the VMs themselves; this is due to the fact that the virtual disks are not accessible to the security software for scanning. Consequently, the installation of security software is also required on the virtual guest operating system to protect it and the applications that it hosts. While this is good security practice, it is also inconvenient and may require multiple or site licences;
- **Shared Folder** – The shared folder feature provides an internal network connection between the host operating system and the virtual guest. The virtual guest presents one or more folders on the host OS as a network drive. The host and virtual guest create a trusted network connection between them that does not require any authentication process. This permits a user to work inside a virtual guest and save a document on the host OS directly. This type of interaction can be disabled using policy; and
- **USB Devices** - USB devices are very difficult to restrict and consequently represent a significant security concern. The majority of policy tools provide the option to enable or disable access from the virtual guest to the USB devices connected to the host system. However, the difficulty arises when it comes to differentiating between USB devices and applying the appropriate policy. For example, use of a 3G modem or fingerprint reader may be required, but a camera may be disallowed. USB keyboards and mice can present an especially high security risk since they give complete control over the endpoint, but could be rogue devices masquerading as legitimate input devices.

3.6 Assessment

LHVD leverages full virtualization on the user desktop to provide a virtual desktop capability. While the Unclassified virtual image likely constitutes a higher vulnerability risk, it can be effectively isolated from the Secret environment through the hypervisor. Ideally, a hardened microkernel (bare-metal hypervisor) would be used in order to minimize the likelihood of vulnerabilities in the virtualization layer. A hardened system has increased security due to additional restrictions, and the removal of unnecessary services, when compared to a default configuration.

However, security still needs to be balanced with usability. Consequently, the bare-metal client hypervisors currently available on the market may not provide sufficient support for client environments, and specifically client hardware. In this case, a hosted virtualization solution may be the only viable option. However, effort must be made to select a product in which the hypervisor is embedded in a kernel that can be locked down securely, rather than a hypervisor that runs on a bloated commercial operating system.

The products for LHVD are changing rapidly, so this assessment will need to be revised at such a time that a specific solution proposal is requested. The available products continue to add support for a greater variety of systems, devices, and software.

4 Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD)

SBVD, also commonly referred to as Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI), provides a virtual desktop capability by employing full virtualization in the server environment. Guest VMs run on a server in a data centre and the user accesses them from a standard desktop or thin client. A remote control protocol is used to convey keyboard strokes and mouse movements from the user desktop to the VM and display information in the reverse direction. In certain architectures a connection broker is used to broker the connection, thereby ensuring that the user is connected to the appropriate VM.

Figure 6 illustrates a data centre with a virtual machine pool (running on a hypervisor cluster), Active Directory for policy objects, and storage of user and VM data. Access to the data centre controlled by routers and firewalls, and further limited by secure access (such as a VPN). The data centre can be accessed by local users, remote users, and remote offices, using a variety of network connections.

This section will examine the following aspects of SBVD:

- Options;
- Secure Implementation;
- Management;
- Benefits;
- Issues; and
- Assessment.




Figure 6: Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD)

4.1 Options

Some SBVD solutions support an offline mode that provides users with access to the desktop even when no network access is available, or where the network access parameters don't comply with the minimal bandwidth requirements needed to establish a stable connection with the remote desktop. An initial synchronization between the user's system and the virtual desktop image hosted in the data centre is required in order to accomplish this. The synchronization will create an encrypted copy of the virtual desktop on the user's hard drive.

The offline feature enables end users to "check out" personalized virtual desktops running on the virtual desktop infrastructure to a system for use offline, and then "check back in" to the same desktop running in their virtual desktop infrastructure environment. Only the modified blocks on the local copy are synchronized when the user checks their virtual desktop back in. The users' modified data are replicated in the data centre, and any virtual image updates will be applied to the local copy.

This process is shown in **Figure 7**. An initial synchronization copies the virtual image to the endpoint. The user then utilizes the VM while disconnected from the data centre. Finally, when the user reconnects to the data centre, the changes to the virtual image are copied from the endpoint to the data centre.

The SBVD management console automatically encrypts the entire virtual desktop files on the local device. The virtual image is stamped with a lifetime when the user checks it out. The virtual image will be locked at the end of the grace period if the user has not checked it back in. This ensures the integrity of the virtual desktop image (updated for software, security patches, policies, anti-virus etc.). Each time the user synchronizes with the data centre, a new expiration date is applied to the local copy.




Figure 7: Offline desktop synchronization

4.2 Secure Implementation

A number of additional steps can be taken to secure SBVD implementations. These include the following:

- **Security Appliance** – A security appliance is a virtual instance present on the hypervisor that leverages a specific Application Programming Interface (API) to communicate directly to the hypervisor. This appliance will use the API to communicate and protect the hypervisor itself. At the same time, the virtual appliance will use the API to monitor, quarantine, or block all guest VM network traffic. The communication between the security appliance and the virtual desktops occurs through a local agent. It is important in a virtual desktop environment to protect all of the virtual images from threats, not just the virtual instances

that are active at a given point in time. Many virtual instances, such as templates or the master base image, are inactive and are therefore not regularly scanned. Consequently, they can present a security risk when activated. This security appliance safeguard should be implemented in the virtual data centre to ensure the integrity and protection of all virtual instances present in the virtual desktop environment;

- **Communication Bridge** – Even if the virtual desktop is not locally installed on the user's desktop, and even if it only receives the display contents (i.e., pixel data) from the remote desktop, a communication bridge can still be initiated and that would present a security risk. When a remote virtual desktop wants to communicate with a local device connected on the user's host desktop, it creates a communication pipe between the virtual desktop and the host operating system. Threat agents can try to access the virtual desktop content through this bridge between the two systems. The Information Technology (IT) administration team can prevent this type of vulnerability by setting up policies in the virtual environment to forbid this type of communication between the host and the virtual instance. However, in some cases, it may be necessary to allow this type of link between the two systems. For example, for authenticating a user through a local smart card reader or for allowing the user to print documents present in the virtual instance on a local printer. In these cases, it is extremely important to be able to trust the host operating system with which this bridge is established, and to have the ability to lock it as required;
- **Firewalls** – Virtual desktop security is based on multiple levels of firewall and security barriers. The first level is the hypervisor integrated firewall. This regulates the inbound and outbound traffic directly addressing the hypervisor. For a more granular inbound and outbound traffic authorization, a virtual firewall can be installed and configured on each virtual desktop. This allows the creation of a case-by-case configuration, but increases the complexity from a management and support perspective. Firewall and packet filtering can be implemented to define and protect a specific network zone inside the virtual network. These appliances will define a network zone and will provide basic firewalling of traffic between VMs by zones, allowing connections to be filtered and grouped based on the source IP address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and/or protocol.
- **A perimeter virtual appliance** can be deployed on the virtual network in order to provide a secure virtual environment. This type of appliance will act as a gateway for all the traffic between the virtual network and the physical network. It can include the same type of features and protection of perimeter security appliances commonly present in a data centre. Outside the virtual network managed by the hypervisor, the current data centre secure network infrastructure will act as another shield to protect the virtual desktop and its associated data; and
- **Internal Network Traffic** – One particularity of the virtual network managed by the hypervisor is the ability for the VMs to communicate through the virtual network without being exposed to physical network security safeguards. The network packets transit directly from one virtual instance to another on the same host through the virtual network. This process increases the communication speed within the virtual environment but can compromise network security unless this type of communication is explicitly monitored. This type of network traffic can be monitored by implementing security appliances.

4.3 Management

SBVD solutions allow for the provisioning of many virtual desktop in a short time by using a library of template-based images. When the IT team provisions a pool of virtual desktops, each virtual desktop in the pool is linked to a common master image that is created based on a template. By updating the contents of the master template with a security patch or a software update, all of the associated virtual desktop instances are automatically updated as well. This reduces the time required to update potentially thousands of virtual instances.

4.4 Benefits

The benefits of employing SBVD include the following:

- **Data Security** – In a SBVD solution, no corporate data is typically present on the end user's system and/or device. The exchanges between user systems/devices and the data centre are typically limited to carrying keystrokes and mouse movements to the server and returning screen refreshes (pixel data) to the endpoint. In this case, the virtual disk for the virtual desktop is stored on shared storage in the data centre and can benefit from the same security safeguards as those present for the server. By hosting the desktop in the data centre, the IT team can have better control over all aspects of security. Security monitoring is facilitated by the centralized nature of the solution. Sensitive data can be securely stored in the data centre to provide improved protection against information theft. Furthermore, backing up user desktops in a centralized environment is easier than in a typical distributed desktop environment: the necessary backup tools are already available in the data centre, and the virtual desktop data are held on storage accessible to the backup solution via the network;
- **Ease of Management** – As discussed in Section 4.3, SBVD greatly simplifies desktop management through ease of provisioning, centralized patching, and application installation;
- **Flexibility** – SBVD provides considerable flexibility in terms of user environment delivery and access. By centralizing the desktop in the data centre, the user desktop becomes fully portable and is potentially accessible to the user from any location using a variety of devices. Security policy may restrict the type or location of endpoint devices that can connect;
- **Power Consumption** – A SBVD solution can further reduce power consumption if thin clients are employed at the user's desktop. Thin clients use significantly less power than traditional desktop systems. Furthermore, server virtualization increases the utilization rates of servers, thereby decreasing overall power consumption; and
- **Reduced Storage** – Many SBVD solutions provide a mechanism to provision a master template and link many virtual desktops instances to this master image. This feature reduces the storage requirements for virtualized desktops as only the differences from the master template need to be stored.

4.5 Issues

Issues with SBVD solutions include the following:

- Communications – Securing the communications link between the endpoint and the data centre is critical due to the sensitivity of the information being transferred. Consequently, the data must be encrypted, both parties authenticated, and all communications audited;
- Bandwidth – SBVD requires a considerable amount of communication between the endpoint and the data centre. Insufficient bandwidth introduces latency, and can regularly disconnect the end user. High latency on the screen refresh can give rise to misinterpretation of a user's keystrokes, and can thus cause non-voluntary actions in business applications. Disconnection can result in the corruption of data for offline users or open applications in virtual sessions;
- Local or Remote Code Execution – Depending on the protocol for providing remote access to the virtual desktop, graphics processing may be performed on the endpoint or on the server, or on a combination of the two. If any graphics processing is performed on the endpoint, a security policy is required to protect the information. Otherwise, an attacker can potentially gain access to the local graphics process and record (or rebroadcast) the virtual desktop session. If a device doesn't meet the security requirements of the security policy, its access must be blocked;
- Offline Support – If the network is down, the user will not have access to their desktop. This is particularly serious if the user workstation is a thin client, as the client is effectively completely shut down;
- Performance – Some desktop applications will not perform well in a SBVD environment, especially if they are computationally intensive (e.g., large financial spreadsheets) or graphically intensive (e.g., graphic design or visual simulations). Consequently, these desktops are not well-suited to SBVD environments; and
- Peripheral Support – SBVD complicates peripheral support (e.g., for USB and media devices).

4.6 Assessment

While SBVD has many favourable aspects, it is important to remember that from a security perspective it leverages full virtualization on the server. Consequently, the desktop environments running in virtual images have all of the same vulnerabilities as traditional desktop systems. However, in the case of server virtualization, these VMs are hosted on a bare-metal hypervisor thereby reducing the risk of compromise of the virtualization layer. Furthermore, if thin clients are used then the possibility of endpoint compromise is further reduced.

Bandwidth and connectivity, and their reliability, are serious considerations. If either is limited, or unreliable, then a SBVD solution may not be a viable option. Availability of the endpoint is an important requirement and needs to be considered as part of the design. This is discussed in greater detail in the following section.

The remote control protocol is of little concern due to the availability of secure protocols capable of protecting these communications. However, the connection broker, which is an optional component, constitutes a single point of failure for the entire architecture that is at risk due to software vulnerabilities, exposed network interfaces, and administrative interfaces. Consequently,

care will need to be taken to appropriately secure this component and ensure that it is implemented in a high availability configuration.

Note – In some ways SBVD provides better separation than LHVD due to the fact that VMs of varying security levels can be physically separated (i.e. hosted on different physical servers). In the case of LHVD, the VMs are hosted on the same physical system.

5 Considerations

This section will examine two considerations of importance to desktop virtualization: data centre topologies and bandwidth considerations. The topology defines the distribution of the servers, which impacts the bandwidth requirements for the deployed solution.

The issue of scalability is a concern; it is limited both by the bandwidth and by the topology. A small deployment may require little bandwidth and may be insensitive to the topology, but as the system is scaled to larger numbers of endpoints, the requirements increase. The available bandwidth at various endpoint locations will determine the complexity of the topology needed. Without detailed requirements, it is impossible to provide specific solutions; instead this section is limited to an overview of the considerations.

5.1 Data Centre Topologies

The topology of a standard centralized virtual desktop environment is illustrated in **Figure 8**, and consists of a main data centre, which hosts all the major virtual desktop components, and a remote office. (The diagram is simplified; it leaves out all of the details of networking and pool management.) To resolve some bandwidth issues, a local connection server can be hosted on the remote site in order to provide virtual desktops locally. Nevertheless, even if the remote site hosts a connection server, it is dependent on the management console and its database on the main site. A disruption in service can occur any time the remote site and the main data centre lose their network link.




Figure 8: Centralized virtual desktop environment

Recent developments in virtualization data centres have resulted in more advanced topologies that provide greater flexibility and can address more complex requirements. Divided data centres and replicated data centres are two examples of this.

In a divided data centre topology, a main data centre is linked to a limited number of remote data centres. In the case of a centralized virtual desktop solution, this topology ensures that local

access to the virtual desktop on a remote site is provided. Even if the remote data centre loses the connectivity with the main one, the virtual desktop environment still functions for the users associated with it. Users can access the virtual desktop through the local network and benefit from good performance. The main data centre continues to be visible and can provide remote support, but all processes are executed locally to ensure their execution, even if the link is lost between the two sites. The divided data centre topology is illustrated in **Figure 9**.




Figure 9: Divided data centre topology

The replicated data centre topology is more complex to implement but addresses the needs of larger and more complex deployments. The main data centre contains multiple centralized virtual desktop environments. Each one is replicated to a remote data centre. This data centre duo work together as a unique entity in a private and isolated virtual sandbox. Users are automatically load balanced between the two data centres in the sandbox depending on established criteria. Global director software provided by the virtualization vendor(s) is used to manage all sandboxes inside the main and remote data centres. When the link between two data centres in a sandbox is broken, each one acts as an individual data centre, and continues to provide the virtual desktop service to the users. One important constraint of this topology is the requirement for data replication between the main and remote data centre in each sandbox. The replicated data centre topology is illustrated in **Figure 10**.




Figure 10: Replicated data centre topology

5.2 Bandwidth Considerations

Bandwidth is a concern for the DND endpoint user and may be a significant factor in choosing a solution for the delivery of desktop applications. The endpoint may suffer from limited bandwidth to the data centre (possibly through slower satellite connections), the connection might be unreliable (with frequent errors or lost data), or the connection might be have very limited availability (perhaps only for a limited time, or with unpredictable network failures). Both the speed and the uptime of the network connection must be considered when choosing an endpoint solution.

The bandwidth usage with LHVD is easy to estimate, as each virtual desktop can be considered as a new physical desktop in the environment. The bandwidth usage will be equal to the increase in the number of physical desktops in the current environment. Due to the sharing of the network adapter by the host operating system and the virtual instance, the user may encounter some network latencies on one or both systems if network-intensive applications are launched. In a SBVD, the network bandwidth usage and latency are more complex to evaluate due to the number of factors to consider. On the user side, the bandwidth and latency considerations depend on the type of devices in use. With a thin client, the user can only access remote virtual desktops. In this case, the bandwidth usage and latency are only due to the virtual desktop usage. A

traditional system loads an operating system and uses a soft client to access the virtual desktop. If the user launches an intensive network application on the bootable operating system, this can induce a heavy latency for the virtual desktop environment.

Virtual desktop bandwidth usage depends on many factors. By default, only a constant display refresh of the virtual desktop is sent to the user on the network. However, depending on the type of application used in the virtual instance, this display refresh can produce significant network traffic. 3D applications, web conferencing, and high-definition video streaming are among the most bandwidth-intensive consumers. A remote device such as a USB device can induce heavy network traffic by creating a bridge between the physical device and the virtual instance inside the remote data centre. When a user chooses to copy a file from the USB device to the virtual instance, this can not only result in latency in the copy process itself, but it can also create latency in the virtual desktop infrastructure. The same problem must be considered when a user is allowed to print to a local printer.

By centralizing the desktop environments within the data centre, the network traffic between the desktop and the corporate desktop applications no longer transits the main network. This reduces the bandwidth consumption normally used by applications such as the mail system. The major portion of the network traffic between the data centre and the end users then consists of carrying the keystrokes and mouse movements, and sending a refresh to the user's display. However, the network bandwidth requirements in the data centre itself will increase accordingly.

The bandwidth required for the virtual desktop refresh on the user side can be quite substantial depending on the type of application used inside the virtual desktop. This bandwidth requirement for an individual user then needs to be multiplied by the number of users connected to the virtual desktop infrastructure. Some applications such as a video conferencing applications or 3D graphic design software will require a lot of refresh. This will affect the access point of the data centre, which will have to provide sufficient bandwidth to support all of the remote users.

The bandwidth requirement for a typical VDI session consumes from 50 to 70 Kbs per user, and can increase to between 128 and 256 Kbs per user for intensive graphic usage. Some high-definition content can increase bandwidth requirements in excess of 1 Mbs. It is critical that sufficient bandwidth be provided to meet client requirements. Insufficient bandwidth will result in high latency, which will have a detrimental effect on the overall user experience.

Furthermore, very low bandwidth can dramatically compromise the usage of the offline remote virtual desktop. The synchronization between the virtual desktop instance (hosted in the data centre) and the local offline instance requires time to validate the execution of the authentication process and start the synchronization. If the network connectivity cuts out multiple times during these steps, the synchronization process can freeze or a synchronization corruption can appear on one or both virtual images. Without appropriate monitoring of the synchronization errors at the data centre side, some offline images can halt their synchronization process. As result, an obsolete offline virtual desktop may be saved that will not have the benefits of the latest security updates, such as anti-virus or OS security updates.

6 Virtualization Products

A wide array of virtualization solutions are currently available (or soon forthcoming) that provide some or all of the capabilities that might be required for a virtual desktop in an environment like that envisaged for DND. As there is a great deal of literature already available elsewhere that extensively describes individual hypervisors and their features, we will restrict the scope of this section to relevant virtualization products from leading vendors. Specifically, this section will examine the following:

- Virtualization Vendors and Solutions; and
- SBVD Complexity.

The support for virtualization is evolving rapidly, particularly in the area of client virtualization. Significant updates are being introduced by every developer every few months. The information herein is current as of the report date; for the latest information on any system, see the associated web site and [Reference 2].

6.1 Virtualization Vendors and Solutions

This section will examine the following virtualization vendors and their respective solutions:

- VMware – VMware is currently the commercial leader in terms of virtualization market share, and provides a mature hosted solution for clients;
- Citrix – Citrix provides an end-to-end virtualization solution for enterprises, and has recently released a bare-metal client virtualization system based on the Xen open-source hypervisor;
- Red Hat – Red Hat has recently entered the desktop virtualization market with an enterprise solution based on the KVM open-source hypervisor;
- Oracle – Known for their enterprise database solutions, Oracle provides several virtualization products on both the server and client;
- Microsoft – Microsoft has been involved with virtualization for some time and offers a variety of virtualization solutions;
- Virtual Computer – Virtual Computer's NxTop product includes a client hypervisor and server based management tools; and
- Other Virtualization Products – In addition to the enterprise products, it also is worth noting that there are a number of quality open-source solutions, such as Xen and KVM, which could be used as a base for the development of a custom solution meeting the specific endpoint requirements of DND.

Many of the client virtualization solutions are based on the Xen open-source hypervisor, including XenClient, NxTop Engine, and Qubes OS.

A virtualization solution must be evaluated in terms of use case outlined in Section 2.0 for the virtualized DND endpoint. The solution must satisfy the security objectives discussed in Section 2.3 while mitigating the security concerns highlighted in Section 2.4. All of the solutions listed in this section are evolving rapidly, making an evaluation difficult without a more detailed study of the options. Therefore, this section is restricted to a high-level review of the options currently available.

In addition to examining the suitability of a product as measured against the DND endpoint requirements, it is worth considering two other aspects of any proposed solution:

- EAL certification – An Evaluated Assurance Level is an evaluation of a product against the Common Criteria **[Reference 6]**. Several of the listed products do have a Common Criteria evaluation, but only for one of the lower levels such as EAL-4;
- Closed source versus open source – Closed-source (or proprietary) solutions do not provide access to the source materials of their end products, whereas open-source solutions do provide access to their source code. Several products are based on open-source software and provide at least portions of the source code.

Open-source software provides a number of advantages over close-source products **[Reference 7]**; namely, product code can be reviewed for functionality and security compliance, features can be added or removed, and problems or vulnerabilities can be detected and fixed. The removal of features can be leveraged to reduce the size of the trusted code base and thus reduce the potential vulnerability footprint.

Closed-source software provides the traditional advantages of having commercial support, legal redress in the case of problems, as well as regular updates. However, much open-source software also has commercial support. Furthermore, a lot of closed-source software is based on open-source systems. See **[Reference 8]** for a comparison.

6.1.1 VMware

VMware is a major player in the virtualization market with several virtualization products. Due to its current market share in virtualization, VMware has a significant partner program, resulting in a number of products that are available from third-party vendors to increase performance, security, management, and reporting. VMware products relevant to desktop virtualization include the following:

- VMware Workstation and ACE – Provide a local virtual desktop capability. The ACE product is manageable from a central management console for package and policy deployment, as well as updates.
- VMware vSphere – VMware's server virtualization solution; it is capable of hosting the VMware View virtual desktop solution.
- VMware View Client – View provides access to applications and desktops hosted on vSphere; desktops become managed services.

VMware ESXi versions 3.5 & 4.0 have received EAL-4 certifications³.

Detailed information about VMware products can be found at: <http://www.vmware.com>

6.1.2 Citrix

Citrix produces a modern and efficient virtual desktop solution. They offer the same quality as VMware's virtual desktop solution with respect to performance, manageability, and flexibility. Citrix's solution can be hosted on different types of hypervisors such as vSphere, XenServer or Hyper-V. Like VMware, Citrix also benefits from a wide choice of additional products from other vendors for management, reporting, and security. Citrix products relevant to desktop virtualization include the following:

- Citrix XenClient – Citrix's recent client-side bare-metal hypervisor provides the benefits of virtualization to desktop and laptop users. It enables virtual desktops to run directly on a client device, while providing isolation from the underlying hardware. It includes support for provisioning, deployment, and recovery of VM images.
- Citrix XenServer – A server for hosting and managing multiple VMs in the data centre. VMs can perform server functions, or be used for remote desktop access. Features include support for multiple OSs, live migration of VMs, snapshot and backup of VMs, etc.
- Citrix XenDesktop – Provides a SBVD and virtual applications for many types of devices, including standard desktops, thin clients, tablets, and smart phones. It includes centralized delivery and management of virtual desktops.

Citrix XenServer and XenDesktop have received an EAL-2 certification⁴.

Several Citrix products (including XenServer and XenClient) are based on open-source solutions, and portions of the products are released as open-source.

Information on Citrix products can be found at: <http://www.citrix.com>

6.1.3 Oracle

Oracle provides several virtualization products that are comparable to those of the other leading vendors. They deliver their own products, including Oracle Database and Linux, as virtual images for rapid deployment and the elimination of installation and configuration expenses. Oracle VM includes a graphical interface for the creation and management of virtual servers. Oracle software virtualization products include:

- Oracle VM – Oracle's virtualization solution for the server is a bare-metal hypervisor based on the Xen hypervisor. Both Linux and Windows VMs are supported on the server and Oracle delivers pre-configured VM templates for their software products. Oracle VM supports the usual server virtualization features including live migration, high availability, and load balancing.

³ <http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/services/cc/vmware-esxi-v40-cert-eng.html>

⁴ <http://www.citrix.com/support/security-and-compliance/common-criteria>

- Oracle VM VirtualBox – A hosted client hypervisor that is available on a wide variety of systems, including Linux, Windows, and Mac OSX. It provides features similar to the VMware products VMware Player and VMware Workstation, including multiple VMs and snapshots.
- Oracle Virtual Desktop Infrastructure – A solution for managing and accessing virtualized desktop environments hosted in the data centre⁵.
- Oracle Enterprise Linux – Oracle’s re-branded version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux includes KVM (Kernel Virtual Machine). However, Oracle products are not supported on KVM or the version of the Xen hypervisor included in Unbreakable Linux.

Oracle Enterprise Linux has received an EAL-4+ certification⁶.

Information on Oracle products can be found at:

<http://www.oracle.com/us/technologies/virtualization/index.html>

6.1.4 Microsoft

Microsoft offers two virtualization solutions. First, the desktop operating systems, Windows Vista and 7, which both integrate a basic local virtual desktop solution (Windows Virtual PC); and second, a hypervisor and a virtual desktop solution with the Hyper-V and Med-V products.

The hypervisor product does not offer a strong secure virtual desktop environment, nor is centralized management available. This product suite is less mature in terms of development compared to VMware and Citrix products, and does not offer the same level of performance as provided by its competitors. This situation can be expected to change rapidly, for example NxTop adds centralized management and client virtualization with Hyper-V and Xen, and is presented later in this section. Microsoft products relevant to desktop virtualization include the following:

- Microsoft Desktop Virtualization;
- Microsoft Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) Suite;
- Remote Desktop Services (RDS) on Windows Server 2008 (formerly Terminal Services);
- Virtual Machine Manager 2008;
- Windows Server 2008 with Hyper-V; and
- Microsoft Virtual PC.

Windows Server 2008 Hyper-V has received an EAL-4+ certification⁷.

Information on Microsoft virtualization can be found at: <http://www.microsoft.com/virtualization>

⁵ Oracle also supplies a hardware device called the Sun Ray; a thin client for remote access.

⁶ <http://www.atsec.com/us/news-oracle-enterprise-linux-evaluated-atsec-common-criteria-157.html>

⁷ http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/epfiles/0570a_pdf.pdf

6.1.5 Red Hat

Red Hat is considered the leader in supported open-source operating systems with their Red Hat Linux products. They have supplied virtualization for servers based on Xen for some time and have recently switched to KVM (Kernel Virtual Machine) as the basis for their virtualization portfolio.

They now offer Enterprise Virtualization 2.2, which is a single platform for virtual servers and desktops. The product is not very different from that offered by VMware or Citrix, including servers, desktops, and management. However, it is still recent in terms of development, and does not yet benefit from additional vendor support.

Red Hat products relevant to desktop virtualization include the following:

- Red Hat Enterprise Virtualization:
 - ♦ Virtualization for servers – Includes SELinux (Security Enhanced Linux) for access control policy enforcement **[Reference 9]** and capabilities such as live migration, high availability, and load balancing;
 - ♦ Virtualization for Desktops – Central provisioning and management of desktops; and
 - ♦ SPICE – Remote rendering technology for high performance endpoints.

Red Hat Enterprise 6, including virtualization based on KVM, is currently in evaluation for EAL-4+ certification⁸.

Red Hat software is either open source or expected to be released as open source⁹. The server OS and virtualization support (KVM) are open source and are also available from other projects, such as CentOS and Scientific Linux.

Information on Red Hat virtualization can be found at: <http://www.redhat.com/virtualization/rhev/>

6.1.6 Virtual Computer

Virtual Computer's products include centralized virtual desktop creation, management, and distributed desktop on a bare-metal hypervisor. These products are distinguished by their modest hardware requirements; in particular they support a much larger set of hardware than other bare-metal hypervisor systems.

NxTop 3 central management is a central console for the creation and management of virtual machines. The VMs can be distributed to users, including security patches and updates as needed. A client hypervisor on the endpoint runs the distributed virtual machine isolated from other VMs on the same hardware, including unmanaged desktops that the user may have created.

⁸ <http://www.redhat.com/about/news/blog/rhel-in-evaluation-for-common-criteria>

⁹ As of the time of writing, the desktop virtualization has not yet been released as open source.

Security features include disk encryption, policy controls (such as access to USB ports, and forced expiration of virtual machines), and the ability to flag a machine as ‘lost’ (in the event it is lost, stolen, or goes missing).

Information on Virtual Computer can be found at: <http://www.virtualcomputer.com>

6.1.7 Custom Virtualization Products

Open-source hypervisors such as Xen or KVM could be considered as a basis for a virtualized DND endpoint solution. Xen is the base for several of the server hypervisors, and is the base for all of the client bare-metal hypervisors.

The open-source products could be used as the basis for developing a custom solution if it is determined that none of the current offerings meet the specific requirements for a virtualized DND endpoint. Although they do not have the management capabilities of some of the commercial offerings, such a solution could leverage the management capabilities of other systems, provided they adhere to a virtualization standard, such as those defined by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF) [Reference 10]. A custom solution would have the advantage of addressing the specific requirements without unnecessary features. This potentially would make for a smaller, simpler solution, having a reduced attack surface that is more amenable to a code review or security audit.

For example, the Qubes OS has been developed over a one-year period by a team of two researchers [Reference 5]. It is designed to provide strong security for desktop computing. This work is evidence that custom solutions are possible within a reasonable length of time, provided they have a well defined and limited scope.

Custom solutions may be needed if support is required for devices that are not otherwise supported by any commercial product. A hybrid approach based on a combination of custom and commercial products may also be appropriate.

Information on the software mentioned above, can be found at:

- Xen – <http://www.xen.org>;
- KVM – <http://www.linux-kvm.org>; and
- Qubes – <http://qubes-os.org>.

6.2 SBVD Complexity

Deploying a virtualized system is more than simply deploying a hypervisor; an entire solution for the installation and support of virtual images is required. A SBVD (Server-Based Virtual Desktop) infrastructure is not a single product provided by a single vendor, but rather a combination of multiple products from one or more vendors, which together provide the required solution.

Building and deploying a SBVD infrastructure requires the selection of the following components and features:

- Hypervisor – The role of the hypervisor is to host the virtual infrastructure in a virtual environment that abstracts the hardware layer of the server, including storage and networking. . Besides a virtual environment for hosting of the virtual desktops, the hypervisor may support additional functions, such as virtual machine migration, which are controlled by a separate management console. The major products in this area are VMware ESX and vSphere, along with Citrix XenServer and Microsoft Hyper-V.
- Management console – The console enhances the hypervisor’s functionality of the virtual desktop environment, adding features such as high availability, distributed scheduling resources, and virtual machine migration. The console provides management of virtual machines throughout their lifecycle, including creation, configuration, and ongoing management (including features such as snapshot, rollback, backup, and export). Citrix XenCenter is the default management console for XenServer, however other consoles can be used that conform to the API, including OpenXenManager (a free open-source alternative to XenCenter).
- Desktop provisioning – The software provides support for provisioning, and distribution of virtual desktops to the users. The desktop provisioning tools include features such as policy control [Section 3.2.5], advanced virtual desktop image management, and connection protocol control. The provisioning software is normally installed on a dedicated server, and is compatible with the different hypervisors. The major products are VMware View Connection Server, Citrix XenDesktop Director, and Microsoft Med-V.
- Secure Access – This dedicated server will be located in the DMZ (De-Militarized Zone), and will manage secure access from the users to the virtual desktop infrastructure. Limiting remote connections to the DMZ and placing the secure access server in the DMZ, provides extra protection for the SBVD infrastructure. Secure access is provided by client software including Citrix ICA Client, Citrix XenDesktop, and VMware View.
- Template building – The software provides a graphical interface for building and managing the virtual desktop template library. Software such as VMware Studio or Citrix XenDesktop Studio provides this functionality. It is recommended that this software be installed on a dedicated server.
- Application virtualization delivery – A virtual application library is recommended in order to optimize the provisioning of the applications in a virtual desktop environment. This will act in coordination with the desktop provisioning tool and will virtualize the applications, providing them dynamically to the virtual desktop. This simplifies the application delivery, compatibility and update processes. Products include VMware ThinApp, Citrix XenApp, and Microsoft App-V.
- Offline streaming – The software controls the streaming and synchronization of the offline virtual desktops. It is normally installed on a dedicated server. Products include VMware View Transfer server. (Offline streaming is only part of the SBVD when offline operation is a requirement. The resulting system is not a pure SBVD solution.)

All of the components require specific security tools, and the design needs to consider the requirements for proper integration of these tools. They must be integrated with the existing virtualization architecture in order to deliver the virtual desktop environment to the end users. This integration must consider many critical factors, including the following:

- Physical network – What access is required and what is the network bandwidth [Section 5.2];
- Security components – What security components are part of the system, for example firewalls and virus scanners;
- Printing environment – What are the printing requirements, is local printing permitted;
- File server – Where are files stored, what access is required, can they be copied locally; and
- Active Directory and identity management – What is the scheme for user authentication and management, and what tools will be used to meet the requirements.

7 Conclusion

This report provides an introduction to virtualization concepts, benefits, and security. Two approaches to desktop virtualization were described, both capable of satisfying the DND endpoint use case: LHVD and SBVD. Additional considerations for scalability, namely data centre topology and bandwidth requirements have been provided, along with a brief background on a few specific state-of-the-art virtualization solutions.

Since specific requirements were not available, it is impossible to make detailed recommendations. Instead, the conclusions are limited to the choice between Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD) and Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) solutions. SBVD places the user's desktop in the data centre, versus LHVD that places the user's desktop on the endpoint.

While both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, SBVD has some clear advantages over LHVD. Desktop environments are easier to update and provision since they run in the data centre. The fact that the desktop environment runs in the data centre also facilitates data backup, and reduces the likelihood of compromise of user data. Of course, this requires the security of the data centre be maintained, since failure to do so puts the data of many users at risk. From an isolation perspective, SBVD is favourable due to the fact that desktop environments of different security levels can be hosted on physically distinct hardware (within the data centre), while still accommodating a single endpoint for access to those environments.

While SBVD may be the preferred option, it may not be suitable for all users or for all working environments. Specifically, users engaged in computationally intense or graphically complex tasks will likely require a LHVD solution. Aside from these types of users, LHVD may also be the preferred option for constrained environments where network communications are insufficient or unreliable (e.g., for deployed users). It is necessary to consider the user experience when there are network limitations, including bandwidth and latency. Care should be taken when developing a LHVD solution to ensure the appropriate level of separation is provided for VMs running at different security levels.

This report does not provide specific recommendations or a preferred solution to the challenges of developing a virtualized DND endpoint. Before making recommendations, detailed requirements and use cases are needed for the endpoint. However, desktop virtualization technology can help to address the needs for information sharing within DND, specifically by enabling users to access, share, simultaneously view, and process data/information across security classifications from a single user interface using a single logon.

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9 Acronyms & Abbreviations

API	Application Programming Interface
BIOS	Basic Input/Output System
C2	Command and Control
CDROM	Compact Disk Read Only Memory
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CVP	Client Virtualization Platform
DMTF	Distributed Management Task Force
DMZ	De-Militarized Zone
DND	Department of National Defence
DVD	Digital Video Disc
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
GPO	Group Policy Object
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IP	Internet Protocol
IT	Information Technology
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public
KVM	Kernel Virtual Machine
LHVD	Local Host Virtual Desktop
MAC	Media Access Control
MCS	Multi Caveat Separation
MLS	Multi Level Separation
NAT	Network Address Translation
OS	Operating System
RAM	Random Access Memory
SBVD	Server-Based Virtual Desktop
SELinux	Security Enhanced Linux
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
SSO	Single Sign-On
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
USB	Universal Serial Bus
UUID	Universally Unique Identifier
VDI	Virtual Desktop Infrastructure
VM	Virtual Machine
VMM	Virtual Machine Monitor
XENA	Cross-Domain Exchange Network Architecture

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3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.) The virtual desktop: Options and considerations in selecting a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization		
4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used) Durand, S.; Pase, W.		
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.) October 2011	6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.) 58	6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.) 10
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Contract Report		
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) Defence R&D Canada – Ottawa 3701 Carling Avenue, Ottawa, ON, K1A 0Z4		
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) 15bs	9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.) W7714-08FE01	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) DRDC Ottawa CR 2011-135	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)	
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Desktop virtualization technology can help to address the requirements for secure information sharing within DND. This report provides guidance for the selection and implementation of a secure desktop infrastructure based on virtualization. It includes an overview of desktop virtualization, including an in-depth examination of two alternative architectures: Local Host Virtual Desktop (LHVD) and Server-Based Virtual Desktop (SBVD). SBVD places the user's desktop environment in the data centre, whereas LHVD places it on the endpoint itself. Desktop virtualization implementation considerations and potential security concerns are discussed, and an outline of some of the current state-of-the-art virtualization products is also provided.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

virtualization // virtual desktop // computer security

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