A Game Theoretic Model Of Strategic Conflict In Cyberspace

Abstract

We study cyber conflict as a two-person, zero-sum game in discrete time, where each player discovers new exploits according to an independent random process. Upon discovery, the player must decide if and when to exercise a munition based on that exploit. The payoff from using the munition is a function of time that is (generally) increasing. These factors create a basic tension: the longer a player waits to exercise a munition, the greater his payoff because the munition is more mature, but also the greater the chance that the opponent will also discover the exploit and nullify the munition. Assuming perfect knowledge, and under mild restrictions on the time-dependent payoff function for a munition, we derive optimal exercise strategies and quantify the value of engaging in cyber conflict. Our analysis also leads to high-level insights on cyber conflict strategy.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2012
Accession Number
ADA555943

Entities

People

  • David L. Alderson
  • Harrison Schramm
  • Nedialko B. Dimitrov
  • W. M. Carlyle

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Computer Network Security
  • Computer Networks
  • Cyber Warfare
  • Cyberattacks
  • Cybersecurity
  • Cyberspace
  • Cyberspace Operations
  • Equations
  • Game Theory
  • Information Science
  • Military Research
  • National Security
  • Networks
  • Numerical Analysis
  • Operations Research
  • Warfare
  • Zero-Sum Games

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Military Science and Technology Research and Modernization.
  • Strategic Security Studies

Technology Areas

  • Cyber
  • Cyber - Cryptography
  • Cyber - Legality in Cyberspace