The Integration of Information Operations into Army Operations during Periods of Unstable Peace and Insurgency
Abstract
The classical military theorists and U.S. Army doctrine emphasize the role of information within a conflict. The U.S. Army's primary means for controlling and manipulating information is the doctrinal concept of information operations. However, there remains debate as to what IO is and how it is to be integrated into U.S. Army operations. Case studies indicate that IO is more than media relations or psychological operations, and that information is an integral element of the convergent nature of conflict. Understanding the physical, informational, and cognitive domains of conflict and the IO doctrinal construct will facilitate the integration of IO into U.S. Army operations. This study is based upon a close examination of military theorists principles, U.S. Army doctrine, and historical case studies. Review of selected military theorists writings and the IO doctrinal evolution will be used to create the case study analytical framework. The historical analysis of the British Army in Dhofar, 1970-1975, and the 1st Infantry Division in Southern Iraq, 2010-2011, will be conducted using a combination of archival research and primary source interviews of commanders and other participants in these counterinsurgencies. Each case study will examine the respective organization's strategies and operations and identify any lessons learned.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 16, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA556555
Entities
People
- Darrell F. Vaughan
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College