CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Capabilities in Development Activities
Abstract
The recent doctrinal emergence of stability operations in the military is based primarily on the changing international dynamics that followed the end of the Cold War. Types of U.S. operations radically shifted in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and conclusion of major combat operations in the Gulf War. The military became more engaged in so-called operations other than war, which included peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, counterdrug, and nation assistance missions. A 2004 Defense Science Board report recommended that stability operations be recognized as a core mission for the military. This recommendation was codified in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (2005). The new directive stipulated immediate and long-term goals for stability operations that included providing security, restoring essential services, and meeting humanitarian needs of the local populace while encouraging long-term development of indigenous capacity, fostering a viable market economy, and promoting rule of law and democratic institutions. The challenges of implementing expeditionary economics are daunting. The overarching question is whether it makes sense for the military to engage beyond the limited aims of stabilization. In this article, we take a practical view, arguing that the military is already substantially engaged in both stability and development activities in Afghanistan and other conflict and postconflict zones, and that we need to figure out ways in which it can do its work more efficiently and effectively.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA557341
Entities
People
- Gregory Johnson
- Julie Walz
- Vijaya Ramachandran
Organizations
- National Defense University