SOF Integration with Conventional Forces: A Doctrine Gap?
Abstract
Throughout the history of the United States, the American military has integrated capabilities from diverse military units. From the regulars under Washington and the local militias in the American Revolution to the airborne Divisions of World War II to the Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terrorism, all of these units developed an organizational culture all their own due to the background of their soldiers and the function of their units. These different organizations and cultures have led to friction whenever they were employed together. The same is true today concerning the integration of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the General Purpose Force (GPF). This paper will examine military doctrine within the scope of two case studies: Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 and Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N) operations in northern Iraq at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. In both cases, doctrine provided clear guidance in terms of organizing command and control structures. With no gap in doctrine, the problems of integrating GPF and SOF capabilities arise from other areas such as organizational culture, personalities, or understanding.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA557653
Entities
People
- Gregory M. Stroud
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College