Operational Art and the Clash of Organizational Cultures: Postmortem on Special Operations as a Seventh Warfighting Function
Abstract
The Army of the United States is in the midst of an important transition. As the Army begins drawing down forces in Afghanistan and completes the withdrawal of major forces from Iraq, it is once again challenged to determine what type of Army it will be. While policy makers continue to set demands for the force in National Security Strategy, the Army must introspectively examine itself and determine if it has the capabilities needed to conduct operational art within the confines of that strategy in the future. One aspect of national strategy that is central to the current strategy and will remain so into the future is "Engagement." Another concept that frames the capabilities the Army will require in the future is the Army Capstone Concept "Operational Adaptability: Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict." Recently, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) proposed a change to Army doctrine that would have made Special Operations Forces (SOF) a seventh warfighting function for the Army. The proposal failed to pass and the Army is now taking a much slower approach to change. This monograph uses this failed proposal as a micro-event that illuminates a macro-phenomenon that could be preventing the Army from meeting its challenges of Engagement and Operational Adaptability. SOF represent an organizational subculture within the greater Army organizational culture that is dominated by General Purpose Forces (GPF). SOF represent a subculture that is often fragmented and counter to the Army's organizational culture. This fragmentation continues to prevent doctrinal and structural changes. Using organization theory as a lens, the author demonstrates that the fragmented subculture of SOF influenced the failure of the proposal, and that it also continues to prevent the Army from leveraging the institutional strength of the SOF community toward Engagement and Operational Adaptability.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA557913
Entities
People
- Jan K. Gleiman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College