

DEMONSTRATED CASES OF INSECURITY IN CONTROL SYSTEMS

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Vulnerabilities in HMI Software

- ⦿ GE Fanuc Proficy iFIX 4.5/5.0
- ⦿ Insecure storage of passwords
- ⦿ Authentication bypass
- ⦿ Allows those with access to escalate privileges on the SCADA system
 - Lower-level personnel with physical access
 - Remote attackers with access via other/mainstream exploits

Case Study: iFIX



GE Fanuc
Intelligent Platforms



Proficy® HMI/SCADA – iFIX® 5.0



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US Cert Vulnerability Announcement #310355

<http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2009-02-10-01.pdf>

Insecure Password Storage

```

00000000: 2cd1 2df9 4763 087f 86d1 d4f8 45d6 0990 ,.-.Gc.....E...
00000010: 41d8 dfba fbe0 a235 088e 0ab3 6f63 3c18 A.....5....oc<.
00000020: 812e d881 b908 7d4b 7ab9 33cd e1de 9a15 .....}Kz.3.....
00000030: f4d0 2c30 621c f857 6019 dea3 4a11 f6fd ..,Ob..W`...J...
00000040: 7d28 05e2 cc4f 772c 8977 a92b 4cca 4677 } (...Ow,.w.+L.Fw
00000050: 9353 fec4 bd81 793a 9ac3 5b35 e604 e26d .S....y:..[5...m
00000060: 5542 10ea 8b0d 5228 a408 2974 9da2 d3a3 UB....R(..)t....
00000070: 28a4 7c59 04ed dbc6 6fee 8c9f cdb1 65ef (.|Y....o.....e.
    
```

User's Full Name
 Password
 Username


```

bash-3.2$ ./ifixpassdump.py XTCOMPAT.UTL
User      Password      Full Name
-----
ADMIN     ADMINADMIN888 SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR
GCLARK    GC            GEORGE CLARK?5??
GUEST     GUEST        GUEST ADMINISTRATOR
LJONES    MYPASS       LAURA JONES?5??
PSMITH    PSMITH1978   PETER SMITHA?5??
TWHITE    JI74ERT      THOMAS WHITE?5??
    
```

- User information/password is XOR'd with a static key and saved to XTCOMPAT.UTL
- User credentials can be recovered from this file


Authentication Bypass

6ED1759F		
6ED175A0		
6ED175A5		
6ED175A8	85C0	TEST EAX,EAX
6ED175AA	75 08	JNZ SHORT SECNGR.6ED175B4
6ED175AC		
6ED175B2		
6ED175B4		
6ED175BA		
6ED175BE		
6ED175C0		
6ED175C2		
6ED175C7		




6ED1759F		
6ED175A0		
6ED175A5		
6ED175A8	85C0	TEST EAX,EAX
6ED175AA	74 08	JE SHORT SECNGR.6ED175B4
6ED175AC		
6ED175B2		
6ED175B4		
6ED175BA		
6ED175BE		
6ED175C0		
6ED175C2		
6ED175C7		


- Authentication is performed by a process running as the current Windows user
- A copy of the login program and security DLL can be made, modified, and used to log in as any user with any incorrect password
 - Single-byte patch to the DLL to branch differently after comparing passwords



More violations of security principles in HMI software...


Locked-out customers may call support to get a response to the "Challenge" Field







An attacker can discover
(on their own time/systems)
the algorithm used for challenge
responses

Result:
Attacker is logged into security
server as the default admin
account. Can grant/deny
permissions, add/remove
users





Response is first 8 characters
of MD4(challenge)

Easily calculated on a
mobile device



Real-World HMI Security Incident

Texas Hospital Control System Incident – late June to early July 2009



SCADA Communications Vulnerabilities

⦿ PLC Radios

- Freewave 900 MHz
 - 902-928 ISM Unlicensed band
 - Point to Multi-Point serial over wireless

⦿ Attacks

- Scanning for radios
 - NMAP-like capability for PLC radios
- Eavesdropping
- Denial of Service

Student Researcher: Bradley Reaves

Discovery Scans

- ⦿ Determines:

- Existence of network
- Access Control (Network Identifier or Serial Number)

- ⦿ Network Identifier Scan

- 12,288 combinations
- Scan time: 6.4 secs/combo
- Max runtime: 21.76 hours

Discovery Scans

Serial Number Scan

- 96,000 Combinations
- Scan Time: 1.7 secs/combo
- Max runtime: 45.5 hours


Infiltration Scans

- ⦿ Seeking a continuous, unbroken connection
- ⦿ Need Frequency Settings
- ⦿ 539,400 Legal Combinations
- ⦿ Can scan at 12s / combination
- ⦿ Max time:75 days
- ⦿ +2.25 days to eliminate false positives

Denial of Service

- ⦿ If our rogue slave transmits continuously, nothing else gets through.
 - `cat /dev/urandom > /dev/ttyS0` brings the whole system down
- ⦿ This can be **deadly** in a PCS system
- ⦿ This attack mirrors symptoms seen in the Bellingham incident

Denial of Service



Conclusions

- ◎ We (our lab, vendors, and infrastructure) have made significant progress in SCADA security.
 - Lots of vulnerabilities
 - Potential for serious incidents
 - Lack of applied security principles
- ◎ We are heading in the right direction
 - Finding vulnerabilities
 - Averted at least one control system incident
 - Mapping out where these principles can be applied, and educating others