Operational Risk and the American Way of Warfare
Abstract
This monograph examines operational risk in the United States Army and the tendency of the Army to subordinate risk because of an institutional focus on aggression, offensive action to seize the initiative, and a reliance on firepower. The tendencies of the American way of warfare compel operational risk acceptance without properly integrating risk into operational planning. U.S. doctrine references risk in many locations, but it never really defines it in a useful way or links it to operational purpose and decision-making. The purpose of this monograph is threefold. First, it suggests a model to help planners better understand operational risk. Second, it proposes a better definition for operational risk. Third, it points out the vulnerabilities that current thinking about risk has caused. The monograph explores American operational doctrine from 1949 to the present to identify the risk tendencies of modern U.S. ground forces and the roots of those tendencies. Specifically, the monograph examines two case studies of X Corps' advance into Korea during the fall of 1950. The case studies examine one campaign from two perspectives, that of X Corps and that of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army. The purpose is to examine how two different formations dealt with similar terrain, mission, and risk.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 2011
- Accession Number
- ADA558182
Entities
People
- Jon W. Meredith
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College