

WHY DEMOCRACY?

BY

COLONEL KIMO C. GALLAHUE
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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Colonel Kimo C. Gallahue
United States Army

Dr. Conrad C. Crane
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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The United States led endeavors in both Iraq and Afghanistan have yet to achieve success. The establishment of democracies in these newly free and fledgling states has been a stated goal of these efforts. This paper posits that the effect of Democratic Peace Theory, as it permeates our foreign policy and even our doctrine, has contributed to this problem by imposing the ill advised requirement to establish democracy in shattered populations unprepared for such a grand social undertaking. The evolution and development of the Democratic Peace Theory, what it is and why it is attractive, will first be analyzed. Then this paper will provide a description of how the theory has been woven into the fabric of American policy and actions abroad. With that established, attention will then be turned to an analysis of the conditions in which true democracy can take hold with a further analysis of these conditions with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper concludes by making the case for pursuing a more limited goal than democracy in future regime changes. Limiting the endstate to something less than democracy will be far more achievable and far less costly.

WHY DEMOCRACY?

Change is constant. From China's Warring States Period, to the Westphalian balance of power in Western Europe, to the bi-polar framework of the Cold War, each distinguishable era has had identifiable characteristics that defined the international order. That definition then dictated the best rules, methods, and tools for international interaction. We are barely twenty years removed from the end of the Cold War and the international community, to include the United States, still struggles with defining the current international environment and determining the best tools and methods to achieve national objectives.

In many ways this struggle can be attributed to the change from the relative simplicity and order that the Cold War brought to international relations. Soon after World War II, the major paradigm was easy to discern, two major powers, ideologically distinct, in competition for influence, power, and resources¹. For forty some years this condition existed. It was in many ways both a clarifying and stabilizing factor and can be described simply as western free market democracy versus Soviet Communism. Although, the stakes were high, especially when nuclear weapons were considered, the competition for influence that created a balance of power and even the nuclear issue over time served to stabilize the world.² Much effort was expended in avoiding direct conflict between the two super powers whose competition devolved into the pursuit of influence in the remainder of the world. Although this system was not without its wars, it provided and enforced a consistent limit on the scope of conflict.

This paradigm dominated the world for so very long that it is no surprise that once the system dissolved with the crumbling of the Soviet Union, some time would

pass before a replacement pattern could be identified. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, many have tried to discern a coherent pattern to the changing world order. From Huntington to Fukuyama, the passing of the Cold War invigorated philosophers and theorists. The possibility of an “end of history” that Francis Fukuyama foretold and the subsequent democratic peace theorists may have glimpsed had many adherents.³ There were competing viewpoints too. Samuel Huntington’s work “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order” offered a realist view and perhaps has come closer to describing the current international system and how it has gelled over the last few years. Combine Huntington’s socio-political tome with Thomas Friedman’s body of work on economic globalization, and another broad model of the current environment emerges describing our current system as a globally interconnected set of actors in which religion, ethnicity, and culture are often times the catalyst for conflict.⁴⁵

Separate from this explanation of conflict, however, is another theory about how to make and preserve peace. At the end of the Twentieth Century this Democratic Peace Theory had the space to expand and mature. The major competing ideological competitor to democracy had dissolved and a body of empirical evidence supported the view that democracies were more peaceful in comparison to other more authoritarian forms of government. That view found purchase in the strategic thought of the nominal winner of the Cold War and the world’s closest approximation of a global hegemonic power, the United States.⁶

The analysis presented here is intended to explore the utility of Democratic Peace as it has been applied in the United States’ efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to

secure a favorable endstate in both lands broken by military power. After almost ten years of effort in Afghanistan and eight in Iraq, has time proven or disproven the application of the theory? Have the shattered remnants of the regimes proven to be fertile ground for the grand experiment of democracy? Or, has the pursuit of democracy hindered the effort to consolidate a better peace?

Democratic Peace Theory

In order to conduct an analysis, an understanding of the theory is required. Central to democratic peace theory is the idea that “war can be eliminated by democracy, because democratic states will have peaceful relationships with each other.”⁷ Democratic Peace Theory is less a true theory but more an empirical finding based on evidence gathered from two conditions. First, the interaction between two democracies very rarely results in war. This is the dyadic finding. The monadic finding is that a democratic states are more peaceful than other forms of government.⁸ The logic of the theory involves three basic tenets. Democracies follow norms of peaceful conflict resolution, especially in relations with other democracies. Democracies are more open than other regimes to international trade and this trade creates interdependencies that serve to prevent violent conflict. Finally, the domestic structure of democracies checks the propensity of political leaders to go to war in the first place.

Historically, the roots of Democratic Peace Theory can be traced as far back as Immanuel Kant. Kant’s 1795 treatise entitled *Perpetual Peace* asserted that political and economic liberalism would reinforce each other and mitigate violent conflict. Free trade was thought to be a remedy for war long before democratic institutions were considered feasible in most countries. Kant suggests that economic interdependence reinforces

liberal norms and republican institutions by creating transnational ties that facilitate cooperation versus conflict.⁹

As stated in the introduction, not until the end of the Cold War did the theory have real room to flourish. Following the Cold War a proliferation of writing on the subject of Democratic Peace occurred. The most common explanations advanced for Democratic Peace point to either institutional or normative influences on state behavior. The substance of the argument is exemplified in Bruce Russett's 1993 book *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Russett posits that there are institutional and structural explanations which differentiate democracies from autocracies. These institutions and structures provide checks and balances on war by constraining democratic leaders thereby slowing the path to conflict. Additionally, the reactions of the population are much more important to democratic leaders and voter opinion serves to preclude precipitous decision-making. He further states there are cultural and normative explanations which are significantly different than for autocracies and include a commitment to peaceful conflict resolution internally and respect for the liberty of others.¹⁰

There appears to be ample proof of the theory and yet there is also much debate about the subject. The debate concerns a number of areas. The first is in regards to the definitions of a true democratic state in regards to the dyadic argument that democracies have more peaceful than warlike interaction. The second area in question involves the amplitude of available evidence. The amount of time democracies have existed in relation to themselves and other forms of government is still relatively small when a strict definition of democracy is applied and when compared to a monarchical

form of government. For this argument, simply put, the body of evidence may yet be too small. Finally along similar lines, another questionable area revolves around the fact that strictly defined democracies are not a world-wide phenomenon, but are solely concerned with a narrow band of democracy that includes only the United States and Western Europe and are therefore not applicable on a global scale.

However the debate has evolved, the fact remains that liberal politics embraced Democratic Peace as a path to security in the new post Cold War world order. The theory filled the void left by the realist dominated competition for power and influence with the Soviet Union. Under that paradigm, states in constant competition were forever in search of an advantage over other states, who likewise were similarly motivated. The ultimate advantage was often found in an alliance with either the United States or the Soviets. This played out mostly in the nations of the Third World. Smaller, less developed, and seemingly insignificant nations were the prize in the greater struggle of liberal democracy versus totalitarian socialism. Due to the competition for influence, neither side cared very much what form of government a potential client state might have. Be they liberal democracies or authoritarian autocracies all were valued more for their position in support of either superpower rather than the ideals that framed their domestic rule. When that balance of power construct vanished, then Democratic Peace found purchase.

The evidence for American adoption of the Democratic Peace Theory first appears in the language of the President Clinton's National Security Strategy of 1996. That strategy, the first of the Clinton Administration,

...elaborates a national security strategy that is tailored for this new era and builds upon America's unmatched strengths. Focusing on new threats and new opportunities, its central goals are:

To enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad.

To bolster America's economic revitalization.

To promote democracy abroad.¹¹

The third bullet comment is telling. Given the dramatic shift in the world order, a vanished framework that demanded stability in light of the threat of nuclear conflagration, what then, under the new conditions, should be the method for securing peace? One possible solution, it seems, is to make the world more like the United States and the West, an attractive solution for the international community's only superpower.

The last years of the twentieth century saw the U.S. pursuing this strategy and cementing its super power role. From Somalia to Haiti and into the Balkans, the U.S. led interventions throughout the world. Those excursions had an ultimate political cost. By the end of President Clinton's second term, power had been transferred back to the rival Republican Party. However, even in that transfer, the undercurrent of Democratic Peace prevailed. The forty-third president, George Walker Bush recognized as much in his 2001 inaugural address when he declared, "Through much of the last century, America's faith in freedom and democracy was a rock in a raging sea. Now it is a seed upon the wind, taking root in many nations."¹² Although not a central issue of his platform, the pursuit of democracy remained a viable tool for the advancement of national interests and security and an integral part of what the U.S. viewed as its role in world affairs. In times of relative peace the methods for promoting worldwide democracy

were carried out in the form of aid, support, engagement and influence through diplomacy, informational, and economic assistance. That was to be short lived.

Application of Democratic Peace in the 21st Century

The events of September 11, 2001 shifted world perspective as much as the fall of the Soviet Union; however in this instance, much more violently. The United States' reaction was immediate in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime that harbored Al Qaeda, the transnational Islamic terrorist organization responsible, was quickly overthrown by the use of Special Operations Forces aiding the proxy force of the Northern Alliance with technological overmatch. Less than two years later, the pre-emptive assault on Saddam Hussein in Iraq began and that regime likewise toppled through the use of overwhelming conventional force. Military victory in both was relatively easy to secure. Yet, the method to secure the peace in both areas of operations was unsure. What should the nations of Afghanistan and Iraq look like when U.S. forces departed? What form of government should these nations adopt? How was a responsible power, the U.S., to ensure that both nations emerged from the conflict with governments that cared for their populations, were at peace with their neighbors, and were peaceful participants in the international community? It is at this point Democratic Peace again became the attractive solution; this time not through just aid and support to established nations, but now as a way to establish friendly democracy in place of a government overthrown by force. Success would be consolidated and peace assured because the new regimes in power at the end of the efforts in both states would be free and representative democracies.

This movement was led through the Department of Defense, specifically by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. Dr. Wolfowitz, a Neo-

Conservative, was no stranger to evolving international relations theory having earned his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago, and served as the Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.¹³ Early in his career his actions were marked by a very idealistic form of conservatism evident in his work from the Philippines to Indonesia. By 2001 he was a major force in the decision to move against the Hussein regime in Iraq. He embraced the idea of spreading democracy and supported its application in U.S. Foreign policy, especially in policy concerning the efforts in Iraq where the Defense Department had the lead.¹⁴ As the United States began a foreign policy shift from one of containment to preemption, the notion that democracy should be the end result of military intervention accompanied that shift.

Mr. Wolfowitz' comments in an interview given in December of 2002 to Businessweek serve to confirm this view. In the interview he was asked about the United States' efforts and policy to support democratic change particularly in the Middle East. He replied, "It's really a strategic interest of the U.S. to see progress toward representative government and free government and free markets and economic development."¹⁵ Furthermore, in this period Mr. Wolfowitz was not the only one in the administration advocating the spread of liberal democracy as a matter of foreign policy. The President expounded on the pursuit of democratic freedom well beyond the brief mention in his inaugural address of 2001. President Bush's National Security Strategy of 2002 moved the pursuit of democracy to the fore as his second major point in the strategy entitled "Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity," where he made the case to help states to move toward democracy and for the U.S. to reward the development of democratic institutions.¹⁶ As the confrontation with Iraq grew closer, the President

addressed the American Enterprise Institute and laid out the way ahead for the nation. In his speech he described an America that would not be an occupier, but a force that would leave behind “constitutions and parliaments”. Iraq was described as “fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.” And more than that, a democratic Iraq would be a beacon for the larger Arab world.¹⁷

After hostilities had commenced in Iraq and the effort in Afghanistan was reaching the two year mark, the President in a joint forum with British Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered these telling remarks about the importance of democracy in both countries in conflict,

Our shared work at democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq is essential to the defeat of global terrorism. The spread of freedom and the hope it brings is the surest way in the long term to combat despair, and anger, and resentment that feeds terror. The advance of freedom and hope in the greater Middle East will better the lives of millions in that region, and increase the security of our own people¹⁸

Even later, in 2005, President Bush delivered a speech in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where he described the political element of the strategy for Iraq as one that hinged on the formation of democracy.

By helping Iraqis to build a democracy, we will win over those who doubted they had a place in a new Iraq, and undermine the terrorists and Saddamists. By helping Iraqis to build a democracy, we will gain an ally in the war on terror. By helping Iraqis build a democracy, we will inspire reformers across the Middle East. And by helping Iraqis build a democracy, we will bring hope to a troubled region, and this will make the American people more secure¹⁹

Later the influence of Democratic Peace was apparent in even the slower moving changes of the United States Army's own doctrine. The Army Field Manual FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, is riddled with the language of Democratic Peace Theory so much so that the establishment of democracy as a way to stability seems almost an

imperative rather than an option. In the manual's opening chapter regarding the context for the doctrine the following passage is presented,

The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development. Effective democracies generally resolve disputes through peaceful means, either bilaterally or through other regional states or international institutions.²⁰

Throughout the manual the effort to establish and arrive at desired outcome of democracy is referenced in no less than eight specific instances. Each of these examples ties democracy to the ultimate end of stability where instability had existed before.

The multiplicity of threats that Iraq was purported to represent did not materialize. No weapons of mass destruction were found. The links to transnational terrorism were tenuous at best. However, one long range goal of the American efforts was still attainable, that goal being the establishment of a free and democratic state in the heart of the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and the Islamic world.

If successful, these new governments would not only serve as a catalyst for change in the region, but could also serve other purposes equally as important. Iraq could become a foothold in the fight against transnational terrorism. Geographically, if successful it could serve as a platform for U.S. interests in the region. In Afghanistan the efforts against transnational terrorism were always in the van in regards to stripping Al Qaeda of its capabilities and sanctuary. But additionally, the establishment of a similar friendly democratic state would again serve to further U.S. interests in the region and also remove a chaotic situation from the border of one of the newest members of the nuclear club, Pakistan. Democracies in both areas of operations would be an endstate that could easily be called victory.

Therefore in both countries the long term path to victory involved the establishment of free and open representative governments. From the chaos of civil war in Iraq and the insurgency in Afghanistan, American power focused on imposing the grand experiment that is democracy on these shattered countries. Can democracies be manufactured from nothing or must certain conditions exist for a representative government to take root? If so, what then are the preconditions for democracy? The next section will examine this question

Conditions for Democracy

Similar to the growth of the study of Democratic Peace, U.S. efforts to establish democracy have received an ample amount of scholarly attention since the end of the twentieth century. The Merriam Webster definition of a democracy serves as a start point. Webster's definition of democracy is "a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections."²¹ Borrowing from a collection of scholars, this paper proposes several essential prerequisites for the establishment of democracy in a nation. These conditions are national identity, civil society, and institutions. Taken in the right measure and developed over time a democracy can be established with these elements present. However, the outcome is not certain. Other forms of less democratic government can result from the same elements. History has shown that, like a recipe for a gourmet meal, all the ingredients for a democracy can be present, but it is the mixture and timing that will produce a palatable result. For these conditions do not automatically cause a democracy to occur, but they do correlate to the formation and maintenance of democracies in general.²²

Dankwart Rustow in his essay “Transitions to Democracy” describes the first essential condition, national unity. This condition is a sense of community or identity within the population to the point that “the vast majority of the citizens of a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”²³ This recognition is essential and can emerge at any time. State identity can be prehistoric in origin or arrived at very recently.²⁴ Similarly, Charles Tilley cites the necessary existence of a unitary state as a foundational condition for a democracy. In his view the state is the embodiment of that national unity.²⁵ Within this unity or state the presence of an elite or ruling power is a vital subcomponent. Those in the position to choose democracy must make a conscious decision to adopt democratic rules to deal with issues that arise within the community, vice other forms of government²⁶

Civil society is the second essential condition for the formation of a democracy. A civil society is often interchangeable with trust or social capital in political analysis. It describes the boundary between individual and familial interaction and the interaction between a citizenry and the state. Simplified, civil society is “a rule governed society based on the consent of individuals.”²⁷ It is based on “the notion that trust and social interaction are essential ingredients of good governance.”²⁸ This is vitally important in determining methods other than violence for the processes of government that solve the recurring problems of conflict and accommodation inherent in an open society. The rules of interaction are also heavily influenced by many diverse elements both tangible and intangible, like history, tradition, culture, and education. This civil society or as Robert Putnam terms it, social capital provides the direction for the manner in which a

state chooses to deal with conflict in governance. A democracy with a store of social capital is more apt to choose a democratic solution to governance because the

performance of representative government is facilitated by the social infrastructure of civic communities and by the democratic values of both officials and citizens. Most fundamental to the civic community is the social ability to collaborate for the shared interests²⁹

In other words, people recognize common interest and trust one another to act through the social infrastructure, i.e., institutions for the common good.

This relationship is therefore reliant on the final condition, the presence of institutions required for the establishment of democracy. These institutions are formed over time and codified by tradition in a civil society. The institutions are the methods by which a civil society is and remains civil. They are instruments and processes of interaction and of rule and they must be developed and functional. They are also dynamic in that the institutions of government change in accordance with the requirements demanded by the citizens in order to do what good governments do, respond to the will of the people and take action on that will.³⁰

As Rustow puts it in his causality and correlation discussion, these conditions are independent variables in relation to democracy. They can be present, but they do not dictate that democracy occurs. Democracy and its formation is the dependent variable.³¹ Additionally, time itself is identified as a critical factor for the "...process of democratization itself is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle."³² Violence may still result when these nascent institutions are overwhelmed by the level of conflict and complexity of the problems. In the U.S. for example, the major institutions are the three branches of government and the massive bureaucracy that underpins each, thereby providing a mechanism for rule. In the American system each arm also

provides a limit on the power of the other. Oh, by the way, these institutions did not spring forth in a functioning form overnight or even in a matter of decades.

The Conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq

In Afghanistan and Iraq the victors in the military prelude to the extended conflict quickly ceded the responsibilities and duties of occupation in favor of a rushed move to sovereignty. In both circumstances a provisional government was hastily installed and elections were held. In Afghanistan the first presidential elections were held in 2004, three years into the effort. In Iraq the first presidential elections were held in 2005 less than two years after the collapse of the Hussein regime. More elections, inconclusive, chaotic, and some fraught with corruption, have been held. Elections have covered a myriad of topics from the selection of officials, polling on constitutions, and matters of law. Democracy has yet to truly be identifiable in either nation. A peaceful transfer of power to an opposition government, the true hallmark of a democracy, has remained elusive. This section provides a study of the two countries that are and have been the central focus of the U.S. led efforts to establish democracy in the past decade. Both will be studied using the three conditions described in the previous section.

First in Afghanistan, it is evident that a sense of national unity is severely hampered. The Afghans are a diverse collection of groups that find their identity primarily in a hierarchical ethnic tribal affiliation with strong geographic influences. These tribal groups and their complex intra and inter-relationships create circumstances that run counter to a sense of national unity. Three of the major divisions are the ethnically and religiously discernible Hazarans who reside in the central Hazarajat, the Northern Tajiks in the north, and the Pashtuns in the East. The population is not only split by race, but also along a Sunni – Shia interpretation of Islam, and language, with

Dari and Pashto being the two major languages among other lesser ones.³³ In addressing this issue Robert Barro of Stanford University's Hoover Institution describes the condition as a lack of ethnic heterogeneity. That lack of heterogeneity is a significant obstacle to the prerequisite condition of identity as a unique community or nation cited by Rustow. Barro also highlights the very low education level, the marginalization of women, and the poor potential for economic independence as significant obstacles to democracy in Afghanistan.³⁴

The marginalization of women in Afghan society is a significant factor that diminishes the level of civil society there. Un-civil society is perhaps a better term. The traditional treatment of women has long been a cause célèbre in Afghanistan. While there is evidence of some change, the ingrained prejudicial attitude toward women is far from the standards of the western world and is therefore, not indicative of a modern civil society that would produce a western liberal democracy. The institutions that spring from this un-civil society are unsurprisingly not those that are conducive to a transition to democracy in any timely or simple fashion. A powerful central government has never truly existed within the boundaries of modern day Afghanistan. Instead, a tribal hierarchy at the local level surmounted by a central government delivering royal patronage is the traditional form of Afghan government. On the surface the tribal shura system as an institution has some shared characteristics with democracy, but upon a deeper inspection those similarities are quite limited and only locally, not nationally, appropriate.

Other experts with experience in Afghanistan, notably Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason writing collaboratively from the Naval Postgraduate School and the

Center for Advanced Defense Studies argue for a local distribution of representative governance vice a much more centralized western ideal. They contend that “in its rush to stand up an overnight democratic success story, the Bush administration overlooked Afghan history. Indeed, it was willfully ahistorical.”³⁵ Furthermore Johnson and Mason cite the element of time in the recipe for democracy in Afghanistan. Again, the ingredients must be mixed in the right amounts and at the right time. Without this significant factor being taken into account, the coalition efforts in Afghanistan are attempting to “...magically shortcut 400 years of political development and morph (Afghanistan) into a democracy in a decade.”³⁶

Criticism of the notion of a western democracy for Afghanistan has emerged even in the Middle Eastern Press. An article in the Arab News echoes the thoughts above, describing the different idea of democracy extant or emerging in Afghanistan is described as one “shrouded in culture and founded on Islam.”³⁷ The efforts in Afghanistan leading up to and culminating in the 2009 presidential elections are described as focused superficially on the ...”visible outcomes of democracy at the expense of the quality of the processes that produce them.”³⁸ In other words elections were conducted more for the sake of an appearance of democracy rather than in support of a democracy. It can be argued that the elites in Afghanistan, the Karzai government made so by the popular elections, have yet to truly choose democratic rules as opposed to traditional tribal patronage as the form of government.

In Iraq the story has been much the same. National unity, while arguably more achievable because of some history as a modern nation state, was heavily undercut by the Sunni – Shia civil war, not to mention the complications of the Kurdish issues in the

north. The customs and rules of a civil society are hard to discern in the violence and insecurity of a civil war. The institutions and processes for centralized government were severely hampered by the decision to disallow participation at any level by former Baath Party members in the formation of the new government. Institutions do not function without people with the education, training, and experience to run them. Elites capable of running a government were either out of play due to de-Baathification or out of the country because they had fled Hussein's regime. When elections were held it should have been little surprise that the Shia majority was put in power. Likewise, it should have been no surprise that the newly elected majority was relatively unprepared to govern as a result of decades of brutal suppression.

Because of the relative priority the efforts in Iraq had over those in Afghanistan, there are ample studies already available outlining similar issues with establishing a foreign form of government in that nation. A notable work in this area is by Col Stephen R. Schwalbe, the director of the Air War College's Regional Studies Program. Col Schwalbe's article for the Air and Space Power Journal in February of 2005 entitled simply enough "Democracy in Iraq," analyzes the prospect for the establishment of democracy in that war torn country. Citing some of the same criteria as Johnson and Mason in regards to Afghanistan, Col Schwalbe takes a further look into the requirement for civil society, in his terms a liberal culture, in order to foster a liberal democracy. Extrapolating from the 2002 NSS, he asserts that in Iraq the United States was implementing "...a liberal democracy without first ensuring liberalism exists within the Iraqi culture."³⁹ He expands this point through an examination of liberalism in Islam and in Iraqi culture, finding little evidence for it in either. Finally, Col Schwalbe

recommends allowing and promoting a form of illiberal democracy; a form of democracy that is more in keeping culturally and idealistically with Iraqi and other Arab or Muslim states.⁴⁰

Democratic Peace theorist Bruce Russett reinforces the difficulty of imposing democracy through military power in an article published in 2005. He takes issue with the imposition of democracy and concludes that “military interventions have sometimes installed democracies by force, but they have more often failed, and the successes have been immensely expensive in lives and treasure.”⁴¹ The two largest successes occurred in post World War II Germany and Japan, but Russett and many others cite the enormous effort and time devoted to those nations’ path to democracy and the unique circumstances that facilitated that path.⁴²

Democracy, however, is a valid and noble form of government. Where it has taken root and flourished, the benefits cannot and should not be underestimated. And still Democratic Peace Theory has its merits in describing the interaction between states democratic and otherwise. What is in question is the efficacy of imposing democracy where none existed before. The imposition of democracy, especially after the use of military force as is the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan, is not a condition to be arrived at in the matter of a few months. Moreover, if the conditions for democracy to take root are nonexistent or muddled by decades of suppression, oppression, and violence then democracy may not be attained at all. Much time has already passed and it remains uncertain whether lasting democracies can be established in either fledgling state.

Conclusion and Recommendation

What lesson can be derived from the experiences of the last ten years? If western styled democracies cannot be established by force of arms and the expenditure

of will and treasure, what if any are the alternatives? The answer may lie in simply limiting the endstate. Nations go to war to obtain a better peace. Peace has been the stated goal of both President Bush's and now President Obama's administrations. But, if peace in the form of a similar looking democracy is outside the grasp of the time horizons allowed by national will and resources; and likewise outside the ken of the people who must ultimately adopt the democracy, then the ways and the means do not match the ends.

The recommendation put forth for consideration is not the all-in effort to build a democracy where none existed before. A less lofty goal, an occupation with an end of internal and regional stability is proposed as an achievable endstate. Either way, whether the goal of post-military intervention is to build a democratic nation or just occupy and establish stability in pursuit of national security, the upfront cost in both is time. However, the track record for occupations with an end of stability is far better than the record for democratic nation building. In his article "Occupational Hazards", David M. Edelstein elaborates on a specific form of occupation. He terms it a Security Occupation in which the occupying power only seeks to establish security and prevent instability. In Edelstein's model the term occupying power is significant. In both Afghanistan and Iraq the term occupation has been disallowed and sovereignty was ceded swiftly to emerging indigenous governments. In no case does Edelstein recommend granting sovereignty to the occupied as an essential and early element.⁴³ Therefore, the assumption of the responsibilities of an occupying power is crucial.

Furthermore, he describes three elements essential to the success of any occupation. The first element is the recognition for the necessity of an occupation by the

occupied population. The second element is mutual recognition of an existing threat to the occupied population. The third element is the credible guarantee that the occupation is not a permanent condition.⁴⁴ This point should inform any model for future interventions. If applied early to the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, a different outcome would be almost inevitable. In both countries, initial intervention to effect regime change was welcomed by the population. Similarly, Afghanistan and Iraq have unfriendly neighbors and both populations could easily grasp the necessity of an occupying power to guarantee its own security for a period of time. This satisfies the second element of Edelstein's model. The last element has become a hallmark of post Cold War interventionist action in an effort to distance an occupier from the taint of colonialism. So, instead of choosing to pick up the internationally recognized responsibilities of an occupation, the U.S. and its allies chose instead to rush to democracy in both countries. A decision that led to today's circumstances.

Kimberly Zisk Marten analyzes more post Cold War examples in her 2004 book, *Enforcing the Peace*. In it she describes a framework for stability suitable for application in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Her framework calls for limiting the goals of post military intervention to focus on stability and "...give up the notion that political change can be forced on another country."⁴⁵ She holds up the Australian experience in East Timor as an example of a successful occupation. The Australians led a coalition of regional powers that focused on providing security only to the point of opening the door to other multilateral organizations. Once security was established and instability reduced, the efforts were then handed over to these other organizations to continue to consolidate stability in the best interests for all.⁴⁶

Figure 1 illustrates this approach to ending a military intervention in a favorable peace. The experiences to establish democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq inform this model. A critical decision point number one is identified in this model as a conscious decision to determine how a conflict will end. The three manners listed, negotiated settlement, unconditional surrender, and regime change are important in that each has much to do with the status of the three factors for the establishment of democracy post hostilities. If national unity, civil society, and governing institutions were present pre-hostilities and are preserved at the end of combat operations, then conceivably the effort to establish or rebuild them will be easier. Decision point number two is identified at the point the occupying power has established stability. At this juncture the decision is contingent on the status of the three conditions and a number of other factors like national interests and the availability of international and regional security or private civil society organizations to take up the effort. The decision is embodied in the degree of effort and continued investment in the conquered nation by the occupying power or the desire to hand off to other nations or organizations. The ultimate outcome can be democracy or it can be something less.




Figure 1:

Perhaps this is the model endstate for future military action involving regime change. The world is not getting any simpler and even today there are calls from within and abroad for the United States to use its power to intervene in North Africa. The underdeveloped world remains filled with ungoverned spaces and near failing states where U.S. security can and probably will be threatened. Whether intervention will occur in one or many of numerous sticky scenarios will likely involve a debate revolving around national interests and the means to secure them. There are lessons to be learned from the experiences of the last twenty years and the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are still emerging. It is not too hard to discern the insight that the imposition of democracy on a population unwilling and unable to adopt the concept make it exceptionally unlikely that it will. If and when the United States becomes involved in a

future conflict, then stability not democracy ought to be the goal at the end of a military intervention, a stability that ensures the mutual security of the United States and the security of the occupied country. Democracy can then be a matter of choice from within and if so, then supported from without.

Endnotes

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